access to finance, measurement of 105–8, 112, 116–17

Agnello, R. 25

Ahlering, B. 65

Alchian, A. 22

Allen, F. 120, 136

Anderson, R. 29

anti-director rights index 51, 52–5, 63, 64, 86–7

see also investor rights

arbitrage pricing theory (APT) 102

Arcand, J. 111, 112, 124

Argentina 70

Armour, J. 55–6, 65

Arnason, R. 26

Arrow, K. 15

Arruñada, B. 59–60

Asian financial crises and relationship banking 120

asymmetric information problems in financial contracting 97

Austria 52

Ayyagari, M. 116–17

Azfar, O. 65, 110, 114, 118, 124, 125, 126, 128, 130, 132, 134–5

banking

ATMs across income groups 107, 109, 112

bank accounts across income groups 106, 107

bank branches across income groups 106–7, 108, 112

bank credit and firm financing 114

bank financing of investment and bias towards less risky projects 121

banking system operation costs, developing countries 117

basic banking services across income groups 116–17

branch networks 117

branchless 117

development measurement 110

directed lending and government-owned banks 120–21

economies of scope, branch networks used for other purposes 117, 119–20

firm and bank, effects of long-term relationship 119–20

government-owned banks and directed lending 120–21

lending and growth, relationship between 111–13

lending and informal institutions, influence of 135–9, 140–41

lending versus stock market 114–18

ownership control, developing countries 115–16

privatization effects 116

public credit registries and bank lending 119

regulatory capacity of banking versus stock market 115–16

relationship banking 119–20, 136–8, 162

size of commercial banks relative to commercial banks plus central bank 98

bankruptcy issues 87, 114–15, 134

Bardi, A. 85

bargaining (negotiation) costs 16–17, 33, 38, 119, 154

Beck, T. 50, 105–6, 109, 110, 111, 112, 124, 125

Belgium 52

Bell, F. 25

Berglöf, E. 36, 37

Berkowitz, D. 48, 61, 62, 63, 75, 76, 157

Bernstein, L. 38

Besley, T. 69

big bang approach 36–7

Blanchard, O. 37

Blanchet, D. 65

Bottomley, A. 25

bounded rationality and transaction costs 17–19

Brändle, U. 52, 65

Breuer, W. 83, 84

Canada 25

capital asset pricing model (CAPM) 102

capitalism

crony capitalism concerns 116, 120, 121

culture of 36, 37, 39–40, 85

and formalized property rights 68–9

Caprio, G. 115–16

Carlin, W. 121

Carter, M. 70

Central and Eastern Europe (CEE) 35–41, 63–4, 85–6, 87, 139

Chamoro, J. 71

Chang, H. 7

Chen, D. 14

China 6–7, 75–6

civil law 48, 49–53, 56, 61, 63–4, 145–7, 160–61

Claessens, S. 72, 73–4

Clarke, G. 116

Coase Theorem 15, 16, 17, 33–4, 35, 36, 155–6

common land, disincentive to invest on 25–6

see also land tenure

common law 48, 49–53, 56, 61, 63–4, 145–7, 160–61

common-pool resources, and property rights 25–31

tragedy of the commons 24, 27–8, 155

competition, imperfect, and transaction costs 17–19

complexity and transaction costs 18–19, 20–21

conditionality, and legal transplants 61–2, 157

contracts

contingent claims 18–19

contracting choices and transaction costs 16, 37, 38, 40, 79

and economics of transition 36

enforcement 21, 78, 119

financial 97

incomplete 15, 77–8

repudiation of 54, 66, 72, 73, 75, 128, 134

see also property rights; transaction costs

Cools, S. 52, 65

Corbett, J. 120, 136

corporate governance 82–3, 84, 97, 104, 123

see also governance; regulation

credit

link between formalization and credit 69–72

private 64, 98–100, 111, 117–18

credit registries 119, 136, 138, 162

creditor rights

culture and embeddedness 87

and estimating determinants of growth 132, 134–5, 139, 141, 143, 147

and financial markets 110, 119

Legal Origin Theory 48, 49–53, 56, 63, 64

see also investor rights

crony capitalism concerns 116, 120, 121

cultural regions

Central and Eastern Europe (CEE) 35–41, 63–4, 85–6, 87, 139

common law/civil law comparison 146, 147, 160–61

and embeddedness 84–6

and financial sector size 144

culture

common law jurisdictions 145–7

cultural differences effects 37–8, 39–40, 143–4

cultural heritage and path dependency 20–21, 37–8

institutional environment 139–44

culture of capitalism 36, 37, 39–40, 85

see also capitalism

culture, dimensional models see New Institutional Economics (NIE) approach to law and development, culture and embeddedness

customs 23, 81

Dahlman, C. 16

Dam, K. 65, 120, 121

Davis, K. 60

Davis, L. 19

De Alessi, L. 25

De Laglesia, J. 70–71

de Soto effect 23, 57, 67–72, 156

dead capital, and developing countries 67–8, 69

Deakin, S. 22–3, 52, 65, 67

Deininger, K. 71

Demirgüç-Kunt, A. 112, 116, 117, 124

Demsetz, H. 22

dependency theory 4–5

determinants of growth see New Institutional Economics (NIE) framework and estimating determinants of growth

developing countries 4–6, 9, 67–8, 69, 115–16, 117

development theories

and financial markets see financial markets

New Institutional Economics (NIE) to see New Institutional Economics (NIE) approach to law and development

dimensional models of culture 82–7, 123, 155

see also New Institutional Economics (NIE) approach to law and development, culture and embeddedness

directed lending and government-owned banks 120–21

directors’ fiduciary duties 53

Djankov, S. 55, 59, 119, 136, 138

‘Doing Business’ project see World Bank, ‘Doing Business’ project

Donnelly, L. 25

Du Marais, B. 57–8, 59

Duxbury, N. 7–8

Eccles, R. 19

economic development 4–6, 9, 10

and property rights see property rights

and role of finance 94–113

and strength of law enforcement 118–19

Washington Consensus 5, 36, 113, 121

see also financial markets

economic organization 11, 15, 46

see also firms; governance; institutions

economic transition research 36–7

economies of scale 60, 96

economies of scope 117, 119–20

efficiency levels 17, 19, 94, 96, 98, 108, 109, 112–13, 117

Egypt 138

Ellickson, R. 42

embeddedness

culture and embeddedness see New Institutional Economics (NIE) approach to law and development, culture and embeddedness

institutional environment, embeddedness level 78–9, 80–81

enforcement

across legal origins 54, 59

credit markets 49, 119

and economic growth 41, 118–19

index 87

law of contract 38

policing costs 16, 154

and property rights 22–3, 68, 73, 74, 75, 77, 78, 81

see also legality; regulation

enforcement costs 16–17, 21–2

ethnocentrism 8, 9, 10–11, 52, 156–8

European Bank for Reconstruction and Development (EBRD) 64, 87

external financing of firms and investor and creditor protection rules 48, 49–53, 56

externalities

pecuniary 32, 42

and property rights, absence of 31–5

technological 32, 42

Feder, G. 70, 71

Field, E. and A. 70

financial breadth 105–7

financial depth 98, 105–6, 111

financial intermediaries 94, 96–7, 99, 110, 118, 119

financial markets 93–125, 158–9

access to finance, measurement of 105–8, 112, 116–17

and accounting rules 110

banking see banking

bankruptcy issues 87, 114–15, 134

clear and settle payments 96

and creditor rights see creditor rights

crony capitalism concerns 116, 120, 121

economic development and role of finance 94–113

economic development and strength of law enforcement 118–19

efficiency levels 17, 19, 94, 96, 98, 108, 109, 112–13, 117

finance and growth, relationship between 108–13

financial depth measurement 98

financial development as consequence of economic growth 94–5

financial intermediary role 94, 96–7, 99, 110, 118, 119

financial sector development (FSD) 98–105, 113–21, 158–9

financial sector size effects 110–11, 112–13

firm size and financial problems 112, 116

firms and availability of financial services 116–17

free riding issues 115

frictions in markets for goods and services, reduction of 95–6

incentive and asymmetric information problems in financial contracting 97

information processing and dissemination 96–7, 115

information theories of financial sector development 119–21

institutional foundations 113–14, 115, 119

international arbitrage pricing theory (APT) 102

international capital asset pricing model (CAPM) 102

legal institutions and financial sector development 118–19

lenders’ rights as power theories 119

liquid liabilities of financial system relative to GDP 98, 101

market capitalization ratio and income group 102–4, 117–18, 121

market mobilized capital (MMC) measurement 110, 111, 118–19

mobile money 117

private credit 98–100, 111, 117–18

public credit registries 119

stock market capitalization as share of GDP 118–19

stock market development measurement 100–102, 110

stock market liquidity measurement 101–2, 109

stock market value traded ratio 104–5

sub-markets 95

transaction cost reduction and efficient financial intermediation 94

uncertainty and risk management 18–19, 23, 83, 93, 97, 134

see also economic development

financial sector development (FSD)

facilitating 113–21, 158–9

and growth, relationship between 130–31

legal institutions impact 131–5

measurement 98–105

firms 15, 36

and availability of financial services 116–17

and banks, effects of long-term relationship 119–20

corporate governance 82–3, 84, 97, 104, 123

financing and bank credit 114

growth and income inequality 112–13

size and financial problems 112, 116

see also economic organization; governance

fisheries management 26

formalized property rights 60, 68–72

France 52, 120, 136

Frank, A. 14

free riding issues, financial markets 115

Furubotn, E. 22, 35

Galanter, M. 7, 8–9

Gale, D. 120, 136

Galiani, S. 70

Germany 52, 53, 120, 136

Ghana 71

Glick, T. 29

Glorious Revolution, England 21

Goldberg, V. 18, 42

Goldstein, A. 120, 136

governance 6, 12, 15, 16

corporate 82–3, 84, 97, 104, 123

market economy 3, 63–4, 95–6

structures 77–8, 79–80, 81, 88, 127–8, 150, 154–5

see also economic organization; firms; regulation

government-owned banks 120–21

Goyal, A. 71

Greif, A. 21, 38

growth

bank lending and growth, relationship between 111–13

determinants of see New Institutional Economics (NIE) framework and estimating determinants of growth

finance and growth, relationship between 108–12

financial development as consequence of economic growth 94–5

institutions and growth 19–22, 37–8

growth theories 5, 6, 10, 153–4

Hardin, G. 24, 155

Heitger, B. 73

Hodgson, G. 90

Hofstede, G. 83, 84–5, 155

Holcombe, R. 32

Honore, A. 23

Hu, A. 6

impersonal trade 21

income groups 99–100, 102–4, 106–7, 108, 109, 112, 116–18, 121

income inequality and firm growth 112–13

India 71

individualism, and transaction costs 39–40

Indonesia 121

informal institutions 135–9, 140–41

information

asymmetric information problems in financial contracting 97

impactedness 18

processing and dissemination 96–7, 115

information costs 16, 95–6, 154

see also transaction costs

institutional environment

constraints 86, 87

and culture, influence of 139–44

and economizing behaviour 78–9

embeddedness level 78–9, 80–81

and transaction costs 38–9

institutions

and economic growth 19–22, 37–8

and financial sector development 118–19, 131–5

foundations 113–14, 115, 119

informal 135–9, 140–41

see also economic organization

intellectual property rights protection 73–4

see also property rights

investment 25–6, 121

investor rights

anti-director rights index 51, 52–5, 63, 64, 86–7

and estimating determinants of growth 132, 134, 135, 139, 141, 143, 147

Legal Origin Theory 48, 49–53, 56, 63, 64

see also creditor rights; stock market

Japan 120, 136

Johnson, S. 72, 73

Kaufmann, D. 74

Keefer, P. 128

Kelley, J. 58, 59

Kenya, land titling 71

Kerekes, C. 71

King, R. 65, 98, 124

Klapper, L. 116, 117

Knack, S. 112, 128

La Porta, R. (LLSV approach) 47, 48, 49–57, 63, 86, 87, 127, 128, 129, 134, 146, 156–7

Laeven, L. 72, 73–4

Lancaster, K. 43

land tenure 5, 25–6, 69–71

see also property rights

law in action 64, 87, 119, 153, 161

law on the books 64, 87, 118–19, 153, 161

Law and Development Movement 7–9, 52

law and finance theory, adaptability and political channels 50

see also LLSV approach

law-and-economics (L&E) movement 35

legal effectiveness 143–4

see also legality

Legal Origin Theory 47–65, 156–7

anti-director rights index 51, 52–5, 63, 64

creditor rights index 51, 63, 64

creditor and shareholder protection rules 48, 53, 56

directors’ fiduciary duties 53

enforcement effect as addition to state of the laws 54

external financing of firms and investor and creditor protection rules, common versus civil law countries 48, 49–53, 56

investor and creditor rights, measurement of 50–53

and legal environment 127, 144–9, 160

legal system and economic development links 49

LLSV approach to role of law in process of development 47, 48, 49–57, 63, 86, 87, 127, 128, 129, 134, 146, 156–7

securities laws 53, 55

Legal Origin Theory, transplant effect 60–65, 75, 157

common and civil law development 61, 63–4

GNP, effect on 63

law in action 64, 87, 119, 153, 161

laws adapted to local conditions 62

legality, receptive and unreceptive transplants 62–3

private sector lending effect 64

shareholders’ rights 64

transplants arising from conquest or imposition as supply-driven 62–3

unreceptive transplants and raised transaction costs 63

World Bank, ‘Doing Business’ project see World Bank, Doing Business’ project

Legal Origin Theory, transplant effect, legal transplants 61–5, 157, 160

and conditionality 61–2, 157

receptive and unreceptive 62–3, 64–5, 127, 146, 157

and transition countries 63–4

transition from socialism to market economy 63–4

legal system, development of jurisdiction’s 82–3

legality 62, 63, 75, 146, 157, 161

see also enforcement; legal effectiveness; regulation

Lele, P. 65

lending 119, 120–21

levels of social analysis 11–12, 77, 79, 80, 81, 82, 123, 127, 154

see also Williamson, O.

Levine, R. 54, 65, 98, 100–101, 102, 108, 109, 110, 119, 124, 126, 128, 130, 159

Lewis, W. 14

Libecap, G. 24, 26, 31, 38–9

liberal legalism 7–8

Libya 25

Licht, A. 83, 84, 90

Lipsey, R. 43

LLSV approach (La Porta et al.) 47, 48, 49–57, 63, 86, 87, 127, 128, 129, 134, 146, 156–7

Lucas, R. 124

Maass, A. 29

Macneil, I. 19

Mahoney, P. 50

‘make or buy’ decisions 36, 77–8

market capitalization ratio and income group 102–4, 117–18, 121

market economy 3, 63–4, 95–6

market failure 5, 33, 34, 117

Market Mobilized Capital (MMC) 110, 111, 118–19, 130, 131, 132–4

market transactions 16–17, 23, 38

market-driven growth theory 153–4

Matheson, T. 65, 110, 114, 118, 124, 125, 126, 128, 130, 132, 134–5

Mayer, C. 120, 121, 124, 136

Medema, S. 34, 43

Ménard, C. 15, 16, 19, 20, 22, 57–8, 59, 77, 155

Merryman, J. 7, 8

Messick, R. 7, 8

Migot-Adholla, S. 71, 90

Miller, M. 108

Mishan, E. 32

mobile money 117

modernization theory 4, 8, 9, 10–11, 52, 156–8

Modigliani, F. 108

Mohieldin, M. 3

Mojuye, B. 120, 136

negotiation costs 16–17, 33, 38, 119, 154

neoclassical economics 5, 15, 16–17, 77, 81

Netting, R. 29

New Institutional Economics (NIE) approach to law and development 66–90, 155–6

capitalism and formalized property rights 68–9

developing countries and dead capital 67–8, 69

possession and property rights, distinction between 22–3, 67

New Institutional Economics (NIE) approach to law and development, culture and embeddedness 82–7, 123, 155

anti-director rights index 86–7

‘bankruptcy effectiveness 87

corporate governance laws and cultural dimensions, relationship between 83

and creditors’ rights 87

cultural regions 84–6

cultural value dimensions 83–5

culture of capitalism 36, 37, 39–40, 85

and development of jurisdiction’s legal system 82–3

‘enforcement’ index 87

institutional and legal environment constraints 86, 87

‘rule of law’ index 87, 134

New Institutional Economics (NIE) approach to law and development, economic development, and Williamson/North framework comparison 76–81

governance structures 77–8, 79–80, 81, 88, 127–8, 150, 154–5

institutional environment and economizing behaviour 78–9

institutional environment, embeddedness level 78–9, 80–81

‘make or buy’ decisions 36, 77–8

neoclassical economics 5, 15, 16–17, 77, 81

organizations as actors 79–80

and property rights enforcement 77, 81

reallocation restrictions 81

and transaction cost economics 76–8

New Institutional Economics (NIE) approach to law and development, property rights

evidence on true changes 75–6

high cost of asserting 67–8

institutions and rule of law 74–5, 155–6

intellectual property rights protection 73–4

property rights measurement 72–6

reliability of enforcement of legal rights 75

New Institutional Economics (NIE) approach to law and development, property rights and de Soto effect 23, 57, 67–72, 156

link between formalization and credit 69–72

and quality of land administration 69–71

squatters and land tenure 70

New Institutional Economics (NIE) framework and estimating determinants of growth 126–50, 159–61

bank lending and informal institutions, influence of 135–9, 140–41

common law jurisdictions and cultural effects 145–7

common law/civil law comparison in cultural regions 146, 147, 160–61

credit registries and borrowers’ credit histories 119, 136, 138, 162

creditor protection 132, 134–5, 139, 141, 143, 147

data and estimation strategy 128–30

financial sector development, legal institutions impact 131–5

financial sector and growth, relationship between 130–31

financial sector size and influence of cultural region 144

institutional environment and culture, influence of 139–44

legal effectiveness and cultural differences 143–4

legal origin theory and legal environment 127, 144–9, 160

Market Mobilized Capital (MMC) 130, 131, 132–4

property rights protection 135

relationship banking 119–20, 136–8, 162

risk of contract repudiation index 134

rule of law index 134

shareholder (investor) protection 132, 134, 135, 139, 141, 143, 147

transplant theory 146, 147, 160

New Institutional Economics (NIE), main concepts 6, 15–43, 154–5

bounded rationality and transaction costs 17–19

Central and Eastern Europe see Central and Eastern Europe (CEE)

common land, disincentive to invest on 25–6

complexity and transaction costs 18–19, 20–21

contracting choices and transaction costs 16, 37, 38, 40, 79

economic transition research 36–7

governance and transaction costs 16

impact on mainstream economics 36

imperfect competition and transaction costs 17–19

institutional structure and transaction costs 38–9

institutions and economic growth 19–22, 37–8

law-and-economics (L&E) movement link 35

market exchange and property rights 23

mass privatization policy 36–7

and nature of the firm 15, 36

neoclassical economics 5, 15, 16–17, 77, 81

opportunism and transaction costs 17, 18–19, 21, 31

path dependency 20–21, 37–8, 41, 60–61, 65

price theory 15

state expropriation and enforcement costs 21

state’s coercive power in enforcing laws 23

transaction cost economics 15, 16–19, 36, 37, 76–8, 156

transaction costs see transaction costs

vertical integration as efficiency enhancing 17, 19

workers’ co-operatives, property rights and effects on investment 25–6

New Institutional Economics (NIE), main concepts, property rights 22–35

absence of, and externality 31–5

alienability and resource exploitation 26–7

collective 24

and common-pool resources 25–31

definition 22

enforcement 22

fisheries management 26

missing or ill-specified 24–5

and pollution 23–4

and possession, distinction between 22–3, 67

private and communal rights comparison 24

and ‘tragedy of the commons’ 24, 27–8, 155

and transaction costs, relationship between 23, 24, 34

universal allocation 23–4, 33

Nicaragua 70–71

North, D. 19, 20, 21, 35, 36, 37, 40, 47, 65, 76, 77, 79, 126, 154

Ochan, T. 70

Olinto, P. 70

opportunism 17, 18–19, 21, 31, 97, 115

Ostrom, E. 24, 27–31, 35, 67, 155

Paraguay 70

path dependency 20–21, 37–8, 41, 60–61, 65

pecuniary externalities 32, 42

Pejovich, S. 22, 37–8, 39–40, 73, 82, 85, 86, 87

Perkins, D. 121

Peru 70

Philippines 30, 31

Pigou, A. 33

Pistor, K. 61, 63, 64, 86–7, 157

policing costs 16, 154

see also enforcement

possession and property rights, distinction between 22–3, 67

price theory 15

private and communal rights comparison 24

private credit 64, 98–100, 111, 117–18

see also credit

privatization 36–7, 116

production externality 32–5

productions costs 17, 18–19, 20

see also transaction costs

property rights

and credit 69–72

de Soto effect see de Soto effect; New Institutional Economics (NIE) approach to law and development, property rights and de Soto effect

enforcement 77, 81

formalized 60, 68–72

land tenure 5, 25–6, 69–71

and market exchange 23

and New Institutional Economics (NIE) see New Institutional Economics (NIE), main concepts, property rights

possession and property rights, distinction between 22–3, 67

protection 135

registration 60, 68–9, 70–71

workers’ co-operatives 25–6

see also contracts; transaction costs

public credit registries and bank lending 119

see also credit registries

Rajan, R. 65, 124

registration 60, 68–9, 70–71

see also property rights

regulation

civil and common law 48, 49–53, 56, 61, 63–4, 145–7, 160–61

law in action 64, 87, 119, 153, 161

law on the books 64, 87, 118–19, 153, 161

legal system, development of jurisdiction’s 82–3

regulatory capacity of banking versus stock market 115–16

rent-seeking concerns and regulation costs 59–60

rule of law 56, 64, 74–5, 87, 134, 155–6

statute law 53, 157

see also enforcement; governance; legality

relationship banking 119–20, 136–8, 162

see also banking

rent-seeking 59–60, 110–11

repudiation of contracts 54, 66, 72, 73, 75, 128, 134

see also contracts

Richter, R. 35

Rickets, M. 24

risk management 18–19, 23, 83, 93, 97, 121, 134

Rittich, K. 6

Robinson, J. 124

Rodrik, D. 74–5

Roe, M. 53

Roland, G. 36, 37

Rostow, W. 4

rule of law 56, 64, 74–5, 87, 134, 155–6

see also regulation

Russia 75

Rwanda 71

Saltzmann, A. 83, 84

Schargrodsky, E. 70

Schlager, E. 28, 31

Schwartz, S. 83–4, 85–6, 87, 128, 129, 139, 140, 155, 159

search costs 16–17

see also transaction costs

securities laws 53, 55

shareholder rights see investor rights

Shirley, M. 15, 16, 20, 22, 43, 77, 155

Sidgwick, H. 33

Siems, M. 52–3, 65

Simon, H. 17

Siy, R. 29, 30

size factors 19–20, 98, 110–11, 112–13, 116, 144

small numbers condition 18–19, 31

see also transaction costs

Sobel, R. 32

socialism to market economy transition 63–4

South Korea 121, 138

Spain 26, 27, 29–30

Spamann, H. 54–5

speculative bubbles 111–12, 113, 158

squatters and land tenure 70

statute law 53, 157

see also regulation

Stigler, G. 34

Stiglitz, J. 5, 114, 117–18, 120, 121

stock market 101–2, 104–5, 109, 114–19

see also investor rights

Sussman, O. 124

Svensson, J. 72, 73

Switzerland 29

taxation, Pigouvian taxes 33

technological externalities 32, 42

Thomas, R. 19

Torero, M. 70

Torstensson, J. 72, 73

tragedy of the commons 24, 27–8, 155

see also common-pool resources, and property rights

transaction cost economics 15, 16–19, 36, 37, 76–8, 156

transaction costs

and bounded rationality 17–19

and contract enforcement costs 21

and contracting choices 16, 37, 38, 40, 79

and governance 16

and imperfect competition 17–19

and individualism 39–40

information costs 16, 95–6, 154

institutional structure 38–9

market transactions 16–17, 23, 38

and opportunism 17, 18–19, 21, 97, 115

productions costs 17, 18–19, 20

and property rights, relationship between 23, 24, 34

reduction and efficient financial intermediation 94

search costs 16–17

size of transacting sector 19–20

small numbers condition 18–19, 31

transformation costs 20

unreceptive transplants and raised transaction costs 63

see also contracts; property rights

transformation costs 20

transplant effect see Legal Origin Theory, transplant effect

transplant theory 146, 147, 160

Trebilcock, M. 60, 69–70

Trubeck, D. 7, 8–9

UK 21, 53

UN, Millennium Development Goals 6

uncertainty and risk management 18–19, 23, 83, 93, 97, 121, 134

unitization, oil field unitization and extraction concerns 26–7

US 7–8, 25, 26–7, 31, 38–9, 52, 53

Van Hemmen, S. 49, 54, 56–7, 65, 114, 118, 124, 125, 126, 130, 132

Veel, P. 69–70

vertical integration as efficiency enhancing 17, 19

Wallis, J. 19, 79

Washington Consensus 5, 36, 113, 121

Weingast, B. 21

Wiggins, S. 26

Williamson, C. 71

Williamson, J. 5

Williamson, O. 11–12, 15, 16, 17, 18–19, 35, 36, 76–9, 80, 81, 82, 86, 123, 125, 126, 127–8, 154, 155, 158, 159

Woodruff, C. 69

workers’ co-operatives 25–6

see also property rights

World Bank 3, 6, 68–9, 72, 117

World Bank, ‘Doing Business’ project 47, 57–60, 68–9, 144

compulsory procedures, costs of undertaking 60

and economies of scale in reducing costs for developed countries, lack of focus on 60

formalization benefits and reduction in future transaction costs 60

implementation costs, focus on 59–60

indicators of ‘Ease of Doing Business’ (EDB) 58–9

rankings oriented towards Common Law regimes 57

reforms linked to 58–9

rent-seeking concerns and regulation costs 59–60

Xu, G. 14

Xu, L. 112

Zerbe, R. 34, 43

Zervos, S. 54, 65, 100–101, 102, 109, 110, 124, 126, 128, 130, 159

Zingales, L. 65, 110–11, 124