Introduction

D. Hugh Whittaker

Ever since he first arrived in Japan in 1950, Ronald Dore’s fascination with the ‘real world’ has generated a rich and distinctive scholarship, appreciated by readers in many social science disciplines. That he has made enormous contributions to our understanding of modern Japan is without doubt. But his contributions extend to the fields of development, education, political economy, sociology and more. The breadth of this scholarship, however, means that most readers only see a piece of the proverbial ‘elephant’. The first aim of this book is to present the various pieces and show how they fit together.

This is not something that can be done simply with scissors and paste. It means trying to identify common themes and underlying orientations, a task not helped by the fact that Dore’s fascination with interpreting the ‘real world’ has been far greater than any desire to advance any theoretical or methodological ‘school’, or found one around himself. (He laughs off labels like ‘neo-institutionalist’ which some have tried to identify him with.) Yet most readers will know that there is something in his work that goes beyond a keen eye for detail, jargon-free description and rigorous use of logic for analysis. A second aim of this book is to identify what this something is and assess its contribution to social science.

First I make my own attempt. This Introduction provides a biographical sketch which shows how his research interests developed and the context in which they developed based on my discussions with him, interviews and biographical notes published in Japanese, and his major published works. It then assesses his contributions.

Perhaps the best description of Ronald Dore is ‘comparative sociologist’. I use the term recognizing first that, although his approach is sociological, he has no great commitment to sociologists as a professional group – in fact he more frequently mixes with economists and political scientists. His research interests straddle conventional disciplinary boundaries. Second, comparison is endemic to sociological research. Some of it is done very badly, however, while his is very sophisticated. I use ‘sociologist’, then, in a non-tribal sense and ‘comparative’, not to further narrow down his contribution, but to point to contributions fundamental to social science research. As historically-created
disciplinary boundaries blur, these contributions become even more noteworthy.

The main body of the book is a collection of readings – articles and chapters written by Dore, and also abridged or extracted by him – organized around four themes which have been vital in his research. The first is a classical sociological concern – social evolution, or common patterns of developmental change that supposedly all societies go through. The second is his late development twist to social evolution: the argument, first, that late developers are not bound to follow the same evolutionary path as early developers, and second, that late developers share systematic institutional features. The third theme is that culture matters; the interplay of culture and evolutionary development is what creates national differences. Culture here is neither an all-powerful stamp, nor a residual category into which unexplained phenomena are swept. It is the combination of his conception of social evolution and his sophisticated view of culture, based on detailed empirical studies, which accounts for the conceptual richness of Dore’s work. The fourth springs from his own interests as a ‘political animal’, and methodologically from the belief that the previous three may pose constraints, but they are not deterministic; there is scope for human agency and policy choices, for hope and reason, to make a difference. Dore’s contributions to policy debates, therefore, are consistent with his own comparative sociology.

The choice of these four themes, and the selection of papers, is the result of discussions between Ronald Dore and myself. Some readings are heavily abridged, representing the need to balance inclusion and a word count limit. Where appropriate, details of related readings are provided. One or two of his more famous articles, such as ‘Goodwill and the Spirit of Market Capitalism’ have not been included, as they have been widely reproduced elsewhere.

Finally, a list of Ronald Dore’s publications arranged by year further attests to the development and scope of his research, as well as his enormous productivity. Compiling this list was no easy task since Dore himself has not fully recorded or collected his own writings. It required considerable detective work and some small gaps may remain. Perhaps this attests to the fact that he is remarkably modest, despite all his achievements.

BIOGRAPHICAL SKETCH

Encountering Japan, and Sociology

Ronald Dore would be the first to concede the importance of chance in historical events. In 1942 a state scholarship took him from Poole Grammar School to the School of Oriental Studies (now the School of Oriental and
African Studies, SOAS) to study an enemy language for the war effort. Turkish was his first choice, but he was assigned to Japanese, which he proceeded to study for the next eighteen months. An accident and an injured leg saw him staying on and teaching Japanese at SOAS instead of being sent to India along with the rest of his classmates. The university atmosphere and the steady improvement of his Japanese as he was teaching it induced academic ambitions. He took evening classes to do his A levels and then, with the help of his teaching colleagues, took an external London degree in Japanese language and literature:

all at the army’s expense. And then, when I was demobbed in 1947 they gave me a Further Education and Training Grant on the grounds that my education had been interrupted by the War!³

He used the grant to do post-graduate work, but reluctance by General MacArthur’s Occupation GHQ staff to admit foreign students prevented him from using his London University travelling studentship for a year’s study in Japan. His first demobilized summer he spent cataloguing the Satow and Aston collections of Japanese publications in Cambridge University Library.⁴ It was there that he came across Arai Hakuseki’s account of learning Chinese characters in Oritaku shiba no ki.⁵ This autobiography alerted Dore to the scope and depth of education in Tokugawa Japan (1603–1868), and prompted him to choose it as a research subject. He was registered as a PhD student at SOAS studying ‘Japanese Confucianism’:

It made a good, traditionally Orientalist subject but reading, not just about schools, but also the moralistic writings about education of the Confucianists, taught me a lot, as you can see from my frequent references back to Confucian ideas, contrasted with those of ‘individualistic’ Christianity.⁶

He supplemented the material in the SOAS and British Museum libraries with works sent by a Tokyo University professor, in return for which he sent books on British education. He was increasingly drawn towards educational sociology and, ultimately, sociology. While he was waiting for his visa for Japan, the newly established ‘Scarborough posts’ for Japanese language, literature and history at SOAS were filling up. Eventually only one post was left – vaguely specified as ‘Japanese institutions’.⁷ This post was kept open for him and, in anticipation, he attended introductory sociology and psychology courses at the London School of Economics (LSE) for a term.

If I’d been asked then what I was doing, I would have said Japanese studies. I started going to sociology classes at LSE a couple of months before I went to Japan for the purely self-interested reason that by that time the only job left was something curiously called Japanese institutions, which to most people then meant festivals
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and folklore. As it was the only job likely to be available for me afterwards, I started thinking, and decided I needed some general sociological background.8

In 1950, under the pretext of being assigned ‘honorary secretary to the Cultural Advisor to the United Kingdom Liaison Mission to the Supreme Commander of the Allied Powers’, he was able to enter Japan. He lived with the Cultural Advisor – George Fraser – and his family in Seijo while commuting to the sociology department and library of Tokyo University to further his research on Tokugawa education. Six months after arriving in Japan he placed an advertisement in the Asahi newspaper, seeking a room to let. He found a six mat (about twelve square metres) room in Hanazono-chō, Taito Ward, behind a sake shop, facing onto a small alley, which was always bustling with people doing subcontracting work for a nearby factory.9 The sheer vitality of the district, and Tokyo in general, prompted him to put his library-based research to one side and look at the Japan around him. The seeds of the idea had been planted by Fraser ‘somewhere off the coast of Malaysia’ when they had talked about Lynd’s classic study of Middletown (Lynd and Lynd, 1929) in the USA. Dore decided he would attempt to shed light on Japanese social structure and culture through a study of Hanazono-chō (which he named ‘Shitayama-cho’). The purchasing power of a £150 special Treasury research grant enabled him to recruit research students, mainly from Tokyo University, to distribute questionnaires and conduct interviews. He brought the data with him back to London in late 1951, and proceeded to write City Life in Japan (1958) whilst lecturing at SOAS, and attending further sociology lectures and seminars at LSE.

The lectures included Ginsberg’s ‘Theories of Progress’, and Marshall’s ‘Elements of Social Structure’. He was admitted to the ‘awesomely formal’ sociology staff seminar, but got his greatest intellectual stimulation from the informal Thursday evening seminar, organized by graduate students such as David Lockwood and Ralf Dahrendorf between 1952 and 1954.10 While many of the departmental staff perfunctorily dismissed the US sociologist Parsons for his verbiage and/or lack of empirical relevance,11 in the Thursday evening seminar he was ‘all the rage – “real sociology” in contrast to the Ginsbergian bland mixture of history, philosophy plus empirical sociology, which typified the department’.

Dore had no great liking for Parsons’ grand theory-building scheme – and his own rejection of the library in Tokyo in favour of the bustling alleys of Hanazono-chō provides a sharp contrast in sociological orientation with Parsons’ sojourn in Heidelberg, where the latter studied Weber and Sombart – but he did find some of Parsons’ concepts useful for his City Life analysis. Indeed he acknowledges a debt to Sprott’s 1952 article for alerting him to the usefulness of Parsons’ recasting of earlier evolutionary ideal–typical
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dichotomies – Toennies’ Gemeinschaft (community) and Gesellschaft (association) in particular – through his ‘pattern variables’. These provided useful conceptual tools for considering social change during Japan’s industrialization and urbanization.12 In the final chapter of City Life (Chapter 1 in this volume), however, Dore provided a twist. Although the past eighty years had brought greater individuation in terms of personal choice to ‘Shitayama-cho’ residents, they could not be called ‘individualistic’. He quotes a Japanese author who berates his countrymen for their ‘spirit of dependence’ and lack of individual awareness:

The Westerner must guard against the fallacy of assuming (like the author quoted, together with most other Japanese intellectuals) that the stages of social development which Western countries have experienced are right and natural stages deviation from which is somehow unhealthy (for the Westerner the historicist fallacy may become tinged with arrogance). But it was difficult for someone who left Japan in 1951 to think other than in these terms of a nation whose leaders of opinion had decided that theirs was a ‘backward country’, a ‘following-behind country’, committed to imitating the development of the West now in its social and political as well as in its industrial forms. Japan had, owing to its peculiar circumstances, skipped a stage in the proper order of social development. The damage had to be repaired. (1958, 393, italics added)

Dore left open the question of whether the ‘damage’ could be repaired – whether it was possible for the Japanese to become as individualistic as the Westerners they wanted to emulate – but he did endorse the Japanese sociologist’s stage-skipping diagnosis. In this he was influenced by Riesman’s (1950) notions of ‘mass’ society and its ‘outer directed’ individuals. Riesman saw guilt-control as one aspect of the ‘inner direction’ of individuals in early capitalist, competitive societies. It is this stage which Japan had missed, Dore believed, moving directly from the ‘collectivity orientation’ of Tokugawa Japan to a ‘new collectivism’, albeit with greater individuation than the former stage.

In this evolutionary perspective, culture – which in later writings Dore describes as ‘modal behavioural dispositions’ – is something that can change over time and vary according to place, even within Japan. This was quite a different conception of culture to that advanced by the cultural anthropologist Ruth Benedict (1946). It was impossible in the 1950s to write about Japan without taking a stand on Benedict’s depiction of Japan as a ‘shame culture’ as opposed to Western ‘guilt cultures’. Dore criticized first her assumption of the ‘immutability’ of Japanese culture, and second her ‘Japanese as totally alien’ exaggeration of cultural differences (using moral concepts from the West).13

He identified a variety of sanctions on behaviour which were important not only in Japan but elsewhere, too – personal shame, family/we-group shame,
punishment for breaking the law, displeasure of particular individuals, and
guilt from failing to live up to personal standards – and showed how different
combinations applied in different situations. According to Dore’s view, it was
meaningful to say that Japanese culture is distinctive, but only in the sense that
the average Japanese man or woman is inclined to think or behave in different
ways and with different weightings compared with the average man or woman
in similar circumstances in other societies. On the one hand, therefore, he
rejected the ‘historicist fallacy’ and its universalist (and ethnocentric)
assumptions, while also rejecting the cultural particularism of Benedict.14
These twin positions are fundamental in Dore’s writings, and were already
evident in his first monograph.

A further feature of City Life was a strong emphasis on what is nowadays
called grounded research. He recalls discussing his City Life survey with the
US sociologist John Bennett at the Culture, Information and Education (CIE)
section of the Occupation GHQ in 1951, and being berated for not having a
clear guiding hypothesis.

He said, ‘You can’t do research unless you’ve got a hypothesis.’ Actually I didn’t
have one until I was writing up, and even then it wasn’t really a hypothesis. I did
write it in the context of theories of modernization – the foreshortening, skipping a
stage notion.15

In sum, in City Life we can already discern the main elements of Dore’s
sociology. First, he shares with classical sociologists a broad interest in
community, social change and social evolution. Second, however, he rejects
the ethnocentric assumptions of some of them – that there is only one path to
development, the one pioneered in the ‘West’. Third, he rejects static and
deterministic views of culture in favour of studying the interplay of human
agency, institutions and cultural values or norms in specific settings. Fourth,
and related to this, his ‘open’ approach contrasts with that of the ‘closed’
systems theorists of the times; in this sense it is closer to that of Weber.16

Digging deeper, we can discern certain attitudes which underlie these
orientations. First, a respect for the Japanese and Japanese society, the seeds
for which were sown, ironically perhaps, during his early language classes
during the war (Dore, 1994a, 274), and while cataloguing at Cambridge
University Library, but reinforced during his first stay in Japan. This meant a
reluctance to accept the prevailing view of the backwardness of Japanese
society, whose peculiarities would have to be abandoned if Japan were
successfully to modernize.

Second, a reluctance to accept the innate superiority of British (or Anglo-
Saxon or ‘Western’) civilization. Dore was born into a working-class family.
His father worked at a butcher’s shop before working on the railway, starting
as an engine cleaner, and retiring as a locomotive driver. He grew up with a
working class disparagement of, but discomfort in the presence of, the ‘nobs’ of the middle and upper classes. Japanese academics who expected him to exemplify English gentlemanship got on his nerves. Switching his research from Japanese Confucianism to the hustle and bustle of Hanazono-chō was consistent with these sentiments. The affinity he felt towards the residents made him reluctant to see them as unique or peculiar, let alone backward. We shall return to this later.

Affinity, however, did not mean unreserved admiration. There is a brief discussion at the end of City Life about the implications for democracy of skipping a stage. Without a stage of small-scale, competitive, independent economic activity, could independence of thought and action become and remain established? The ambiguity of this discussion reflects an attitudinal dilemma; a desire to avoid ethnocentric assumptions about social evolution on the one hand, but a positive value placed on ‘inner direction’ on the other. Although he writes sympathetically of Japan, and often critically of Britain, his preference has always been to live in the latter (or in recent years, Italy). 17

Studies in Development

After four years back in the UK, Dore was anxious to return to Japan. His chance came fortuitously. The Royal Institute of International Affairs (RIIA) was looking for someone to study Japan’s land reforms. Land reform was widely seen as a prerequisite to establishing a stable democracy and for economic growth. There were reports that in Japan it had been a spectacular success, but were these accounts exaggerated? The RIIA was willing to fund someone to look at this. In his earlier stay Dore had occasionally accompanied village survey teams with the sociologist Fukutake Tadashi. Now he had the chance for a systematic study. With a year’s leave from SOAS, he arrived in Japan in time for the February 1955 elections, in which land reform debates figured prominently. He spent the following months in three villages in different parts of Japan, with different crop and tenure patterns, finishing off with a questionnaire survey conducted by Tokyo University students before burying himself in the village he subsequently wrote about as ‘Shinohata’ to write up his findings.

In studying land reform, Dore was entering a minefield of politicized and entrenched views, with which his findings brought him into conflict. On the one hand, General MacArthur had credited himself with the most successful land reforms since the Roman Gracchus brothers in the second century BC. MacArthur may have championed the reforms, Dore reasoned, but their success and durability had much more to do with indigenous social forces and endowments, which the Occupation had unblocked. On the other hand, he could not agree with the British cynics who derided the Americans for their
naïvety in believing that they could march in and democratize Japan: the ‘leopard cannot change its spots’ view as he called it. In his view, not only had Japan changed, but the leopard wasn’t so spotty in the first place, at least in terms of rural fascism.

More significantly, his upbeat assessment of the progress and effects of land reform clashed with the views of those (kōza school) Marxists within Japan who argued that the semi-feudal nature of Japanese agriculture remained intact, and that the landlords would make a comeback since, among other reasons, the land reforms had not touched their forestry holdings. He argued that changes in postwar Japan meant that a return to the 1930s was inconceivable, and that markedly improved standards of living were widely shared. Finally, he disagreed with his friend and mentor Fukutake, and most other rural sociologists, who believed that progress and democracy required individuation and a breakdown of community cohesion and hence of community constraints on the individual. He argued – against the evolutionary perspective of his own urban study – first that the shift from vertically organized, landlord-dominated communities to more egalitarian owner-farmer communities had actually increased cohesion, and second that this was a good thing and not inimical to democracy.

Dore did, however, share the pessimism of all those Japanese scholars who foresaw a chronic labour surplus problem in the villages, at least until the benefits of Japan’s compressed demographic revolution were felt, because of an incapacity to generate sufficient jobs elsewhere in the economy. Within five years, as he has reflected on a number of occasions, growing labour shortages in a booming economy were to provide him with a graphic lesson in the dangers of prediction, although they reinforced his views about the benefits of economic growth experienced in rural Japan.

Dore resigned from his SOAS job in 1956, in part so that he could spend an extra six months in Yamanashi writing up his findings, and then to take up a post in Canada, launching Japanese studies at the University of British Columbia. There he returned to his notes and the books he had collected on Tokugawa education, but with new questions as a result of his research on contemporary Japan, and with the growing interest amongst foreign scholars in the ‘pre-modern’ facilitators of Japan’s rapid ‘modernization’. Again employing Parsons’ pattern variables, he showed how ascription (in which status is determined by the family into which one is born) was tempered by achievement in Tokugawa schools and how, by the end of the period, the balance had been decisively tipped towards the latter, both in education and the bureaucracies, as a result of internal and external crisis, introduction from the West of new branches of learning, and the quantitative expansion of education. His emphasis on social institutions contrasted with that of Parsons’ own student, Bellah (1957), whose use of the Weberian tradition was to look
for the emergence in Tokugawa Japan of a functional equivalent of the Protestant ethic.

Dore’s estimates of literacy rates, which are still used today, pointed to levels of literacy in the 1870s which were at least comparable to those of many European countries, Britain included, at the same time. While Japan was only just embarking on industrialization, however, the industrial revolution was well underway in the latter. This finding marked the beginning of his ‘late development’ thesis, a development of stage-skipping evolution:

Education seems to have become the major mechanism of social selection at an earlier stage of industrialization in Japan than in Western countries. Learning was the royal road not only to the professions and to government, but also to business success as well – as the very high proportion of university graduates among Japanese business-men suggests. Undoubtedly one explanation of this fact is that Japan was a late developer, catching up by learning, and hence having more practical use for already systematized knowledge. (1964, 293)

The concluding chapter of Education in Tokugawa Japan was presented at the first of a series of conferences on Japan’s modernization which resulted in a number of volumes later published by Princeton University Press, the second of which Dore organized and edited (1967). The moving spirit of the group was celebratory. Recent Japanese history was not, as contemporary Japanese intellectuals were inclined to present it, a story of wicked predatory aggression and imperialism. It was also a heroic tale of successful industrialization under dedicated modernizing leadership. Dore’s ‘balance sheet’ account, including the way the ultranationalists corrupted the Confucian legacy, showed his characteristic reluctance to side wholly with either simplification. Later, when one of the ‘modernization’ group, Edwin O. Reischauer, became US ambassador to Japan, the modernization story, and his courting of Japanese intellectuals, became branded by the Japanese left as part of the ‘Reischauer offensive’, designed to further America’s Cold War aims.9 It was partly in response to that criticism that the last book of the series was a somewhat more critical collection of papers under the title Dilemmas of Growth in Prewar Japan, to which Dore contributed a paper jointly with Marxist economic historian Ouchi on the landlord’s role in the development of Japanese fascism (1971).

On the debate itself, Dore criticized those who flatly spurned, as part of the ‘Reischauer offensive’, attempts to look at Japan for development lessons for ‘less developed countries’. He also wrote (Chapter 2 of this volume) on the need to distinguish between modernization as a conscious ‘transitive’ process – what people deliberately do to their society when they are trying to catch up with more ‘advanced’ countries – and modernization postulated as an ‘intransitive’ evolutionary process, as in ‘the Reformation was the start of European modernization’.
These views grew out of his work the previous year, which he spent with the Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO) in Rome reading about Africa, Latin America and south and east Asia in order to write the FAO’s fourth Progress in Land Reform report. (The rural co-operatives chapter was deemed insufficiently optimistic by the International Labour Organization [ILO] co-operatives division, and he was happy to withdraw it for publication in his own name [1971; Chapter 4]. It questioned Engels’ claim that primordial village communities cannot directly develop modern co-operatives without an intervening stage of individuation.) Now back in London in the sociology department of LSE, he had already taught a course on the sociology of development with Tom Bottomore (who had spent a year in India) and Ernest Gellner (who had done anthropological work in North Africa), but his year in Rome made development his prime preoccupation. He later recalled that the FAO year put a new perspective on the different starting points in the drive to industrialize and modernize, and reinforced the significance he attached to the legacy of Tokugawa education and administration (1983a, 34; see Chapter 16).

This preoccupation, too, ensured ‘late development’ a central place in his next major project – a comparative study of industrial relations in British and Japanese factories. Dore had spent a couple of months in the summer of 1965 interviewing in two Seiko watch factories. He was drawn to industrial relations because it seemed – as Abegglen (1958) had demonstrated – that there were marked differences between Japan and Western countries, and these were likely to raise interesting questions. As the differences were more pronounced in the modern, large-firm sector than the traditional small-firm sector, it was unlikely that they could simply be attributed to Japan’s backwardness. And as there were also considerable sectoral differences within Japan to be accounted for, a simple cultural explanation was not convincing, either.

He joined a comparative project with Keith Thurley and Martin Collick in the UK, and Hazama Hiroshi and Okamoto Hideaki in Japan. Thurley and Okamoto were to concentrate on the construction industry; Collick, Okamoto and Hazama on steel; and Dore and Hazama on electrical engineering, from which they chose two matching factories in each of Hitachi and (then) English Electric. All notes and collected materials were to be pooled, and each was to write his own book.

This was Dore’s first fully comparative study using matched cases, and British Factory–Japanese Factory has become a classic for both its rich empirical detail, and the use of this method. It was published at the same time that a series of French–German comparisons were being conducted, also critiquing universalist and culturalist approaches to industrial relations and work organization. However, while the ‘societal effects’ group was
attempting to construct a framework to show how social and economic institutions differed, and fitted together differently, in the respective countries (rather statically at first), Dore’s main interpretive interests lay in relating his findings to evolutionary change.

In particular, he attacked widely-held assumptions that Japan would have to reform its distinctive, ‘backward’ institutions if it were to develop successfully. He did so on three counts. First, as a result of late development, Japan had developed an ‘organization-oriented’ industrial relations system as opposed to Britain’s (earlier, ossified) ‘market-oriented’ system. The former conferred technological advantages. Second, late development offered the benefits of greater social equality, the movement towards which was another social evolutionary trend. Third, late development conferred advantages in related social institutions, such as education and personnel management. If anything, it was Britain that would change, as a fledgling organization-oriented system struggled to break out of the restraining market orientation.

Not surprisingly, the book proved controversial, on a number of grounds. First, regarding the empirical and historical evidence, it has been argued that it did not adequately represent the chequered industrial relations history preceding the ‘co-operative line’ which emerged in Hitachi in the 1960s, as well as lingering resistance and conflict (e.g. Kawanishi, 1992). Critics of Japanese industrial relations and management concede that there is indeed a high degree of equality in terms of status and wage differentials in large Japanese companies, but this has been gained at the expense of worker self-determination, and the subordination of individuals’ interests to those of the company. In the words of one, Japan’s unions pressed for and gained ‘citizen’s rights’ in the corporation, but lost ‘villager autonomy’.

Logically speaking, this is not inconsistent with Dore’s own views (cf. his earlier interpretation of Riesman), but he stressed the value of ‘citizen’s rights’, and saw the professed intention of Japanese union leaders to ‘transcend’ enterprise unions and create British-style industrial unions as misguided.

Second, and more controversial, were the arguments about ‘late development’, and ‘reverse convergence’ as it came to be called. ‘Late development’ effects, and the converse ‘penalty of taking the lead’, had been expounded by a number of economists, including Veblen (1915; 1934) and Gerschenkron (1962), but Dore took the concepts further, into institutions of training, employment and industrial relations (cf. Chapter 9). In part, the controversy hinged upon just what, and how much, of Japan’s employment and industrial relations system derived from (1) its late-development status (which should be evident in other late developers); (2) its own socio-cultural distinctiveness, particularly its pre-industrial legacy; and (3) idiosyncratic or historical factors such as war.

In the exchange between Cole and Dore in the *Journal of Japanese Studies*
(1978 and 1979 respectively), Dore denied that he was holding up Japan as a normative model for Britain. Instead, he was suggesting that later developers were more likely to develop institutions closer to Japan than Britain, and that 'the British system was getting closer to the Japanese system a good deal faster than vice versa'. This was due, in part at least, to an evolutionary trend towards the greater prominence of (bureaucratic) organizations in economic and social life, a view echoing not just Weber but, more recently, the writing of Shonfield (1965), further developed subsequently by scholars of corporatism (e.g. Schmitter, 1979). Cole questioned this tendency:

[S]ome scholars maintain that bureaucracy is on the wane in advanced industrial societies, ill-suited as it is for the condition of rapid environmental change and the growth of people and idea-oriented service jobs. I have yet to see convincing evidence on this score, but were the thesis correct, it would certainly invalidate the Dore hypothesis. (1974, 392)

On the face of it, history would seem to have vindicated Cole’s view. De-regulation and market resurgence, the demise of tripartite corporatism and rise of the Silicon Valley entrepreneur would appear to mark a reversal of the earlier evolutionary trend. Dore held to his view of the bureaucratic future until the late 1980s (cf. Chapter 13; also Chapter 7 on its recent evolution), but in recent writings has become clearly uncertain (e.g. 2000). In the mid 1970s, however, neither Cole nor Dore could foresee the complex socio-economic developments that the industrialized countries were soon to experience. We shall return to some of these below.

After spending a year in Princeton in 1969-70 to write up British Factory - Japanese Factory, Dore moved to the newly formed, interdisciplinary Institute of Development Studies (IDS) at Sussex University as its sociologist, joining economists such as Dudley Seers and Paul Streeten. His next major monograph, combining analysis with polemic, stayed with 'late development', but in the context of education. Again it posits a trend towards bureaucratic organization, but the analysis also draws on Young’s (1958) notion of the rise of meritocracy. Dore was first drawn back to education by going to Japan in 1970 as an OECD examiner to prepare a report on the Japanese education system. The following year, as a member of an ILO employment mission looking at large-scale youth unemployment in Sri Lanka, he spent six weeks visiting schools and talking to educational administrators in that country. There he experienced:

for the first time a country with a sharp division between a modern sector offering salaries and security far superior to life in the traditional peasant economy; and the tremendous strains set up because that modern sector grew only slowly, while the school system, whose certificates had hitherto acted as license to enter that modern sector, expanded at a much more rapid rate. I saw this as one more 'late
development effect’, vastly accelerating processes which were common to all modern societies. (1997b, 24)

Observations on those missions, and in England, generated the arguments for The Diploma Disease, an expression which has entered common discourse. The ‘diploma disease’ (or ‘credentialism’) is not a personal affliction, but a social one. It occurs when ‘genuine’ learning – learning for its own sake, or learning how to do a job – is displaced by learning in order to get a job. Late developers, which use education certificates for occupation selection from an early stage, and which experience an expansion of education relative to employment growth at a rate which generates ‘qualification inflation’, are particularly prone to the disease.

In terms of polemics, the book strongly criticizes human capitalist writers on the one hand, and deschoolers on the other. It is not against examinations and meritocratic selection per se, but it tempers the more optimistic image of late development and bureaucratization of British Factory–Japanese Factory by explicitly (re)introducing a pathology which inhibits the development of inner direction, promotes the development of a ‘managed society’ (kanri shakai in Japanese), and ultimately a new form of social stratification. Japan is a good example (1983a, 37–8; although its experience of the ‘diploma disease’ was less severe than in other late developers: Chapter 16).

Dore argues that the process eventually takes hold in earlier developers as well; indeed nowhere has qualification inflation been more evident in recent years than in Britain, which has seen a massive expansion in tertiary education, and increased use of certificate-based selection. Yet this has occurred alongside the market reforms of the ‘Thatcher revolution’, modified but carried on under the Blairite banner of universal flexibility. The two trends are not necessarily contradictory, he suggests. The latter reforms may have an effect in shortening job tenures, reducing the importance of seniority in pay and promotions, and so on, but they have not affected the growing importance of certificates for getting jobs, which is a key aspect of bureaucratization in The Diploma Disease.24

Returning to industrial relations, Dore began to look at whether Japan’s ‘organization-oriented’ employment system could be found in other late developers and, if so, whether it needed consolidating by advocacy in the face of all the experts advocating Euro-centric (or American) models. In 1973 he organized a project to study industrial relations in Mexico, Senegal and Sri Lanka, again extending and refining the late development thesis. It was this research, as he noted in his exchange with Cole, that brought home the importance of ingrained ‘behavioural dispositions’ of culture (Chapter 16). And there were limitations to any simple advocacy of a ‘Japanese model’ as a recipe for developing countries, as he notes in the Epilogue to Shinohata
(1978; Chapter 13), written after a ‘20 years on’ spell in his Yamanashi village (and also in an article (1984; Chapter 12) written after a three month spell at the Institute for Economic Growth in Delhi in 1980). Some of these limitations stemmed from differences in culture and institutions, others from the changing political and economic context of development, and yet others from thorny issues such as intergenerational distribution; even current Japanese villagers, beneficiaries of visibly growing wealth, would be unlikely to support Japan’s model of industrialization which brought harsh privations for their grandparents.

**Political Economy of Capitalisms**

By the mid 1970s development studies itself was in a state of flux, racked by internal criticism. The ‘missions’ of the 1960s and early 1970s had dried up as developing countries now had their own specialists, and master-pupil relations were replaced by bargaining for resources. There was a debate within the IDS over its role, and whether it should extend its scope to look at development in Britain. Dore’s view was that the problems of a stagnant Britain were completely different from those of development in Tanzania, that attempts to draw lessons from one to the other were futile but, ironically, it was he who switched his research focus to Britain. His study of the textile industry in Blackburn was intended not as a study of processes of development, but:

I came around to the view that if one was at an Institute for Development Studies, which had the function of providing intellectual backup to help poorer countries become richer, that one of the best things one could do when sitting in England, and one of the things one had a better right to do than preaching to developing countries’ governments, was to look at the possibilities of running down in as humane and efficient a way as possible the British industries which were subject to the competition of trade from developing countries. Like textiles.25

The project involved a comparison of the textile industry in Britain, France and Japan. Parts of this study were published (Dore, 1982, Chapter 23; 1986b), but difficulties with collaborators meant that the planned book based on a Blackburn-Kishiwada comparison never materialized. However, a related ILO project on structural adjustment led to *Flexible Rigidities* (1986a), which contains a substantial case study on the textile industry in Japan.

These studies of the textile industry marked a new transition in Dore’s scholarship, in four ways. First, he was moving away from development studies *per se*, which had been a key interest for the past decade and a half. Second, he was drawn towards the growing debates on technology, technological innovation and the social context of innovation. In 1981 he
became assistant director of the newly formed Technical Change Centre (TCC), set up by the Leverhulme Trust, Science and Engineering Research Council (SERC) and Economic and Social Research Council (ESRC), with a double brief – exploring how to make technical change happen to promote competitiveness on the one hand, and how to anticipate and if necessary ameliorate the consequences of technical change on the other. Under the first brief he studied the introduction and use of CNC (computer numerical control) machine tools in British (and Japanese) factories, and innovation in the British (and Japanese) pump industry, and under the second, the Youth Training Scheme and unemployment. Third, his studies of textiles, and a 1980–81 study of energy conservation measures in Japan, fuelled his keen interest in industrial policy and, hence, what is nowadays called ‘political economy’. Fourth, although to some extent he had always been interested in policy debates, his writing became more explicitly advocative. In particular, he felt the new right agenda for curing Britain’s economic malaise was misinformed and socially regressive. Japan was the platform for his critique.

As he argued in Flexible Rigidities: ‘Japan ... has grown to be the second biggest Western economy precisely by incorporating these features which are deplored elsewhere, as integral functioning elements of its system of “organized capitalism”. It has seen the shape of the future and made it work’ (1986a, 250). His prescription was to make rigidities (of long-term commitments) produce the flexibility that comes from willing co-operation, not removing the rigidities by making commitments short term as in auction markets. Those who attempt the latter course, he argued, have a limited concept of efficiency; in stressing allocative efficiency – the efficiency that comes from the constant reallocation of labour and capital to the use that brings the highest returns – they ignore what Leibenstein (1966) calls ‘x-efficiency’, which encourages work based on conscientiousness, diligence, caring about the quality of work, but is less amenable to algebraic manipulation as it depends on how people are educated, trained, motivated and integrated. The argument – and the transition – is most clearly expressed in Taking Japan Seriously. The main themes in the book are given as:

1 ‘x-efficiency’ or ‘production efficiency’ is as important as, and probably for explaining differences in national economic performance more important than, allocative efficiency.
2 A sense of fairness of social and economic arrangements is a crucial precondition for that kind of efficiency.
3 That sense of fairness cannot be achieved in the rough and tumble which results when each actor in the market is encouraged to maximize his own short-term benefits, unconstrained by anything except the hard reality of market forces – not, at any rate, in modern societies, with modern concepts of citizenship and the accompanying rights to be respected and consulted and to receive a minimum level of income and security. (1987a, 18)
The subtitle of the book - ‘A Confucian Perspective on Leading Economic Issues’ - deserves some comment. Dore clearly saw a Confucian legacy in modern Japan (e.g. Dore, 1996; Chapter 18), but strictly speaking, that is not what the subtitle referred to. It was actually being used as a polar construct, to contrast the assumptions of ‘original virtue’ of the Mencian Confucianists on the one hand, and those of ‘original sin’ on the other. These give rise to very different views as to why people work, why they co-operate, why they compete and notions of fairness. The latter, he argued, have influenced the evolution of Western economic doctrines and more recently the policy programmes of Mrs Thatcher and Mr Reagan, while the former have been embedded in Japanese economic policy (p. vii). By means of comparison and contrast, he sought to stimulate debate on policy alternatives in Britain (and the USA):

One starts off taking the role of the state and views of its limitations current in Britain today for granted. The next step is a sense of the polarized dichotomy: Japan/developmental state – Britain/regulatory state. The third step is the realization that this is not in fact a dichotomy but a spectrum, that in getting a sense of the contrast between the two polar states at the ends of the spectrum, one has got hold of a new tool of analysis, a new dimension, a new means of measuring changes as a shift along that dimension, a new means, say, of analyzing the compatibility of different institutions which may belong to different parts of that dimension. (1987a, 7)

Through the contrast, he sought to challenge widely-held views of employment, unemployment, social participation and citizenship. Technological change creates new jobs and destroys others. The jobs it creates tend to be the so-called ‘symbolic analysts’ jobs’ (demanding logical reasoning and verbal exposition associated with a university education) and those that disappear are jobs which can be learned without much special training. The “ability demanding-ness” of jobs shifts upwards, but the supply of abilities does not keep up, even with concerted efforts to extend participation in education, given that ability endowments vary and not everyone can become a symbolic analyst.

Work, however, is critical for a sense of first class citizenship, he argued, by giving people a sense that they are contributing to society, that society needs their contribution, by providing the money to live a ‘normal’ or ‘decent’ life-style, and so on. Yet one result of the above trend is growing long-term unemployment and/or people engaged in ‘Mcjobs’ which do not yield a wage sufficient to meet either a welfare or dignity minimum. On the other hand, those at the other end of the spectrum have no fear or experience of unemployment, find themselves in great demand, enjoy considerable power and prestige, and command high wages for doing work which more and more
is of a kind which gives its own intrinsic satisfactions. Given a long-term secular trend towards egalitarianism, this new type of inequality is amplified, he argues, and creates if not a new Two Nations, then a New Hierarchical Order, with debilitating social consequences (Chapter 24).

Instead of developing theories to justify the New Hierarchical Order, Dore proposed we change our conception of work to conform to the actual nature of the ‘good jobs’ which the technology we use still leaves to be done by humans, from one of irksome duty to privilege, and that those enjoying the privilege share with those that do not. Specifically, he argued for a universal ‘citizen’s income’ which would form a base income, to which salaries of those privileged to work would be added (ibid.). This would require a massive redistribution of income, hence a rediscovery of fraternity, the forgotten French Revolution value, or a new communitarianism. Rather than a utopian vision, he considers this to be the best of a number of painful alternatives to dealing with ever greater inequality of rewards resulting from increasing technological complexity which, rather than unemployment itself, he considers to be the real problem.28

In the late 1980s, Japan was being taken very seriously, especially in the USA, though not necessarily in the sense advocated by Dore. USA-Japan trade friction was reaching new heights, and was followed by ‘investment friction’ as cash-flush Japanese companies bought US icons like the Rockefeller Center. The USA was attempting to chip away at Japan’s ‘invisible’ trade and investment barriers through the Structural Impediments Initiative, which highlighted differences in Japanese and US capitalism. In this context the end of the Cold War marked not so much the end of history, but a new era of competition, if not between civilizations, at least between different forms of capitalism. Dore became a visiting professor first at Harvard University (1986–9) and then MIT (1989–94).29 In the polarized, highly-charged clashes between the so-called revisionists and free-traders in the USA, he sought to bring an ‘outsider’s’ view, which led to his ‘IIIRQ’ (Investment Inviting Import Quantity Restrictions) proposal (1990b; 1993; Chapter 26).

The Japanese economic juggernaut of the late 1980s also produced a spate of ‘Japanization’ writing, which seemed to support the ‘reverse convergence’ thesis, although Dore had suggested convergent independent evolution, and had not, in 1973, contemplated imitative borrowing. Dore returned to this and late development in the Afterword to the 1990 edition of British Factory–Japanese Factory. On the whole, he found evidence, as originally proposed, of a trend towards greater organization-orientation in employment systems, albeit for core workers. This was tempered in some cases, however, by the casualization of employment of non-core workers, and what he judged a minority trend towards market-oriented employment in Britain and the USA. He also stood by his view of an evolutionary trend towards greater
egalitarianism, though again with the exception of peripheral groups in Britain and the USA, and with the twist of attempts to turn (core) employees into shareholders rather than improve their rights at the expense of shareholders.30

As co-ordinators for a major study of corporatism in the UK, Crouch and Dore (1990) found that corporatist arrangements had not been swept aside in toto, but rather that tripartite neo-corporatist institutions had been replaced by quangos and quagos, while old forms of corporatist arrangements, particularly in the professions, were largely intact. They found a ‘return to the old British pattern’. A ‘return’, however, is not the same as continuation of an evolutionary trend, even with blips. The ‘return’ was evident, not only in the attempt to impose market solutions to Britain’s economic malaise, but in the reassertion of shareholder power in corporate governance, and a revival of the ‘company law’ model of the firm. This revival, moreover, was being exported with evangelical fervour, fanning the ‘clash of capitalisms’.

Dore gradually became more equivocal about the outcome of the ‘Darwinian contest’, not just within Britain, but in Japan itself (1994c). In his Ishizaka Lectures of 1989, he explored whether the Japanese were bound to become more individualistic – in various senses of the word – in the twenty-first century. At this time he still concluded that:

I do not believe that the world of the 21st century will be dominated by consumerist rather than productivist values ... [and] I do not believe that the productivist ethic will be of a market individualist kind such as prevailed in the heyday of the yeoman and the small entrepreneur. It is much more likely to be a group corporatist ethic. (1990a, 112-13)

The question which he was becoming increasingly preoccupied with, however, was not whether Japan would finally experience its missing stage, but whether it was suffering from, in Hirsch’s (1977) term, the ‘depleting moral legacy of capitalism’. Hirsch’s argument was that to be in some overall sense efficient, capitalist societies rely on pre-capitalist moral constraints, but it is these very constraints which are eroded by capitalism. When he cited Hirsch in his ‘Goodwill and the Spirit of Market Capitalism’ article (1983b), it was still in the context of how Britain could replenish the ‘depleting moral legacy’ by learning from Japan. In the 1990s, however, the question was whether Japan’s moral legacy was itself being rapidly depleted.

Albert had argued that ‘Rhine capitalism’ might eventually give way to neo-American capitalism despite being more economically efficient and socially equitable because of the latter’s seductive appeal: ‘In the ideological beauty contest, it is easy to see who will score more points. The neo-American model proudly presents itself as a hard-headed professional, undisguised and untroubled by sentiment or second thoughts. Its main rival comes across as complicated, opaque – if not obscure – and cloaked in too many overlapping
folds of social considerations, financial constraints, cherished traditions and good intentions.' So much so that: 'even the good grey burghers of Zurich and Frankfurt are beginning to wonder what it feels like to win the jackpot with one spin of the roulette wheel'."

Dore saw this beginning to happen in Japan as well. He explained recent trends in Japan partly as a consequence of the way Japan’s post-bubble recession and the US boom had eroded Japanese self confidence, but also in terms of generational change. The newer generation – *chūryū nisei* (second generation middle class) – raised in relative urban prosperity, with no direct experience of collective efforts to overcome postwar hardship, and inheritors of financial assets their parents had accumulated, might well succumb to the temptations of the roulette wheel, or at least to the attractions of market ‘allocative efficiency’ arguments which justified higher returns to shareholders and less concern for employees. ‘Making money’ in financial markets was beginning to take precedence over ‘making things’.

What a world we are away not only from Shitayama-cho, but also from the economic structures and values of Japan in 1950–51. Then banks performed the wholly necessary function of collecting savings from depositors and lending them to people who were engaged in producing and trading real goods and services. Their income came from the difference between deposit rates and loan rates. Now, increasingly, they serve only to mediate the relationship of their clients to volatile financial markets, creaming off fees for that service and meanwhile juggling their clients’ and their own money in elaborate risk pyramids of swaps, futures and options, thereby helping to cause the very volatility they charge their clients for protecting them from. Finance, once the handmaiden of industry, is rapidly becoming its master (1999, xxix–xxx).

Feelings about egalitarian social justice were also changing: modern elites, segregated from an early age from those they would eventually manage and attending the best schools their parents went to, with the financial benefits that schooling bestowed, would be less able or inclined to identify with those they led. The led, in turn, would be increasingly deprived – by enlarged equality of opportunity in the meritocratic education selection system – of voices competent to articulate their concerns, in contrast to the early postwar labour movement. As a result, Japan’s capacity to develop measures to replenish the ‘depleting moral legacy’ would be reduced.

In his writing for publication in Japan he turned from addressing the criticism that he had paid insufficient attention to the unhealthier consequences and victims of Japan’s economic growth (two volumes of interviews with non-establishment and anti-establishment people: 1994e; 1997d), to warning against paying insufficient attention to the unhealthier consequences of Anglo Saxon neo-liberalism. He did this through a regular column in the *Tokyo Shinbun*, various other newspapers and journals, and
through a ‘global standards’ research group, in which he brought together a number of senior businessmen, bureaucrats and academics to study the issues at stake in the late 1990s debates about changing corporate governance. With the implementation of Japan’s Big Bang, the rapid inroads of foreign institutions in its financial markets, globalized transactions, and the growing importance of credit-rating agencies on the one hand, and a recognition of the need for strategic change in its manufacturing heartland on the other, it was in the area of corporate governance that he saw the decisive Darwinian battles being fought. These concerns are also the major theme of his latest book (Dore, 2000a).

Is US-style finance capitalism – or more appropriately ‘investor capitalism’ (e.g. Useem, 1996) – the next stage in the evolution of Japan’s ‘producer capitalism’, or are there alternatives which Japan might realistically adopt? We appear to be back where we started, only this time Dore is somewhat more pessimistic. His pessimism contrasts, for instance, with the easy optimism of Fukuyama, who foresees the recreation of moral values and community after the ‘great disruption’ because human beings are, by nature, social beings (Fukuyama, 1999, 6). Is his pessimism evidence that he has become a jeremiad, as he sometimes suggests? Is he seeking to warn the Japanese about a potential loss of community? Or are Japan’s ‘post-industrial’ options really more limited than those open to it when it was industrializing or recovering from World War II? In less pessimistic moments, he suggests that Japan might offer ‘stiffer resistance’ than Germany because its distinctive institutions are based not simply on law and class compromise, but (presumably less fragile) communitarian traditions. Much depends, he suggests, on whether the respective experiences of the Japanese and US economies in the coming years permit a revival of Japanese national self-confidence. And also on developments in Korea and China. Continued rapid growth in East Asia may lead the Japanese to reassess their Asian-ness and hence their institutions (Dore, 2000b). The issues are crucial, and attest to the continued relevance of Dore’s research in understanding community, social evolution, and modern political economy.

LOCATING DORE AND HIS CONTRIBUTIONS

Like many of Halsey’s ‘provincial thirteen’, Ronald Dore was of working class background, ‘won the scholarship’ to grammar school, and only went to university because of World War II. Like them, he was an outsider in Britain’s status hierarchy, but came to London to study in an environment removed from the traditional ‘Oxford–London–Cambridge axis’ of politics, power and letters. Indeed Dore mixed with many of the thirteen at LSE,
particular in the Thursday evening seminars, in a pulsating postwar intellectual milieu.

Yet Halsey does not include Dore in the group, for good reason. Based at SOAS, Dore was an outsider, even here, and although he has always borne the sociologist label, and taught in the sociology department at LSE for ten years, he did not particularly espouse the profession of sociology. Though British, with 'occasional pangs of pride over Britain’s possession of the BBC, the NHS (National Health Service) and FT', and keenly interested in making Britain a better social democracy, he has spent considerable periods of his academic career outside the UK, and his primary research interests have lain abroad as well, particularly in Japan.

He once described his lack of interest in the demarcation and maintenance of academic disciplines in the following terms:

I had the good luck never to have been brought up from an early age – never to have been socialized, a proper sociologist would say – into any disciplinary tribe. I came to sociology by the autodidact’s back door. I got a job in a sociology department because Japan was considered exotic and important, and I had accidentally acquired some knowledge of it ... I myself have never really been aware of being in possession of any particular disciplinary expertise, or of having anything in the way of theoretical tools of the trade that were specifically sociological. (1994d, 1425, emphasis added)

One who does not show allegiance to a particular tribe is unlikely to be honoured by it. And so it has been, to some extent, with Dore. His preference has been to move across disciplinary boundaries in his pursuit of answers to his questions, and to use rigorous reasoning and empirical evidence in the formulation of those answers. His success in doing so, however, has gained him at least honorary membership in a wide range of tribes, including anthropology, education, sociology, economics and political economy.

The reason he considers himself lucky (according to the above quote) is that when disciplinary tribalists are faced with the dilemma, in the competition for funds and prestige, of whether to appeal to wider-world relevance or the superior intellectual quality of their discipline, they tend to opt for the latter. The dilemma and the tendency are particularly apparent in economics departments, where a scholar's prestige is often 'in inverse proportion to the number among them who can understand his algebra' (1995, 102), but it happens in other disciplines as well.

Even if it began with 'luck', then, Dore's lack of interest in academic tribalism is not the result of indifference. On the contrary, it is based on definite views of good and bad, useful and useless, beneficial and injurious social science:

A line of division much more important than any disciplinary boundary – important
because it has clear political implications – is that between what one might call the rationality-obsessed economists, political scientists and sociologists, and those who are struck with wonder at the world about them, seek explanations of their own and their fellow humans' behaviour, and in seeking such explanations, allow for the possibility, not only of irrationality but also of altruism, and of adherence to norms – norms driven by conscience of concepts of self-respect, by guilt or shame. In part it is a division between theorists and social scientists. But it is also, if you like, a division between those whose feet are planted joyously and firmly in the traditional Christian doctrine of Original Sin, and those who would find more congenial the Confucian doctrine of Original Virtue. (Not 100% virtue, of course, even according to the most optimistic of Confucianists such as Mencius or Mao Tse Tung...) That line of division is one which cuts across conventional disciplinary divisions. While it is true that many economics departments are dominated by the rationality-obsessed because their rationality obsession provides the essential axiomatic base for their mathematical pyrotechnics, some of the most socially - if you like sociologically – perceptive and empirical reality-rooted social scientists are economists. Some of them lead a double life; doing their professional stuff in the journals to build up their claim to a Nobel prize, talking about the real world in casual journalism, and only actually daring to bring their two selves together when they come to give a presidential address to some economic association. Others actually concentrate their professional work on the study of real-world economies, keeping alive the political economy tradition of Smith and Marshall. (1994d, 1429-30, emphasis added)

'Theorists' here are those whose preoccupation with theoretical advancement or confirmation leads them to extract a very limited number of factors from complex webs of real life causation – or else simply to work with 'stylized facts' which the theory requires and are assumed to approximate real life causation – and to work out the logical implications of what would happen if only those factors operated. The result may well be clever models and theoretical advancement, but limited relevance to real life, and limited ability to make real life situations intelligible. Principal-agent theory in economics, for instance, is built on 'uni-dimensional man', ignoring the fact that 'principal and agent in Lagos are often uncle and nephew, that Yokohama principals are often business firms engaged in some R&D joint venture with the firm of their so-called agent, that an Idaho principal is often some junk-bond-issuing asset stripper' (1995, 102). While sociologists might be expected to step in and pick up such 'tosh' or 'irrational residue' (according to Samuelson’s infamous demarcation), increasing numbers are themselves succumbing to the same tendencies, adopting the same view of 'uni-dimensional man'.

The rejoinder to such criticism may be summed up by Coase’s blunt assessment of the (older) institutional economics tradition: ‘Without a theory they had nothing to pass on except a mass of descriptive material waiting for a theory or a fire’ (1984, 230). To this Dore might well respond that being remembered by posterity is a dubious motive for research; a more immediate motive, apart from intellectual curiosity, should be improving the human lot
through informing policy with sound social science research. And policies based on the assumptions of the theorists who win Coase’s approval – assumptions that human beings move solely out of self-interest, with the propensity for guile – may well accelerate the ‘depleting moral legacy’ of capitalism, bringing the real world into closer alignment with theory. It would be better to have no lasting legacy than one of this sort.

If we accept Dore’s distinction between theorists (bad) and social scientists (good), who are the social scientists? In general, they are researchers who examine the world about them and seek for recurrent regularities, or generalizations arrived at by induction, which may be translated into predictions, the falsification of which gives rise to better propositions and predictions. They strive for objectivity by constant self-examination, and listening to critics who have different views. (Herein lies a danger of academic tribes, or rather bands within tribes, who read and write largely for each other, because everyone else is either wrong or not worth bothering with.) And in general, they tend to be methodological individualists, although they tend to leave the study of the micro mechanisms of human behaviour to psychologists (Dore, 1995, 98-9).

As for Dore himself, being ‘struck with wonder’ at the world about him has always been his motivating drive, and he much prefers to explore that world than to become involved in debates on methodology or theory, his one notable exception being an article on ‘Function and Cause’ (1961, reproduced in several collections on sociology theory), which coincided with his taking up a readership in sociology at LSE. He has not even attempted to spell out exactly what he means by ‘social evolution’, for instance, unlike his late friend Gellner (1988), much less develop a general theory like Ginsberg or Hobhouse. Being ‘struck with wonder’, however, has always been coupled with an insistence on rigorous reasoning and avoidance of obfuscation. This may owe something to formative years at LSE, to Popper’s lectures on logic for instance. But it probably owes more to his own research ethics. ‘Seeking explanations of their own and their fellow human’s behaviour’ means an insistence on avoiding a ‘double life’ in the sense described in the quote above.

This insistence takes on a special significance when it comes to Dore’s comparative sociology. As Lipset states in his book on American particularism: ‘It is impossible to understand a country without seeing how it varies from others. Those who know only one country know no country’ (1996, 17). But there are many ways of making comparisons, some of them crude and lazy, some of them reflecting a researcher’s ‘double life’. Dore’s refusal to accept the complete ‘otherness’ of the Japanese in 1950 (and perhaps also his earlier fascination with the rationality of Confucian ethics) posed a conundrum which could not be resolved reasonably through a double life, or by subscribing to existing theories or disciplinary schools. Rather than
placing the conundrum to one side, he used it creatively to generate his research agenda, and to discipline his thinking.

His criticism of Benedict’s guilt and shame cultures concerned not just her oversimplified dichotomy, but her basic stance of seeking out and emphasizing the ‘other’ in Japan. His reaction, he explains in the new preface for *City Life in Japan*, was to try to show how the ‘essentially Japanese’ notions of *on* and *giri* and ‘shame culture’ were reorderings of elements familiar enough to non-Japanese. Fundamental here is the attempt and ability to empathize with the subjects of study, to strive towards bridging the gap between self and other, while at the same time, not to assume that there are no differences.

The institutional constraints which surrounded their lives, and their choices, might be different, but it rarely seemed to me difficult to empathize with the citizens of Shitayama-cho. I always felt fairly confident that I could ... reconstruct what people thought and felt from what they said and did. And with the empathy mostly went sympathy. (1999, xi)

In addition, and this was a further major criticism of Benedict’s approach, the particular reorderings or differences were not simply a product of Japanese culture, but also a product of Japan’s history as a latecomer to industrialization. This evolutionary perspective goes beyond empathy and introduces a variety of possibilities in which self and other might be linked. Benedict’s particularist view of Japanese culture on the one hand, and universalistic (or unilinear) views of social evolution on the other, both become much more nuanced and dynamic. The incorporation of an evolutionary perspective into the comparative method – or vice versa – generates a conceptual richness which is the hallmark of Dore’s scholarship, but it is based on empathy, and an insistence on avoiding a double life. Those who have wrestled seriously with the issue of ‘self’ and ‘other,’ particularly in relation to Japan, and with static conceptions of culture mobilized to account for the ‘other’, can readily appreciate the importance of this contribution.

Dore has been a pioneer in his sociological attempts to take a non-Western country seriously and without condescension. His concern with social evolution (the increasing specialization of social institutions and co-ordinating mechanisms brought about by the accumulation of scientific knowledge and its application to technology) is in the classical tradition of sociology, but his work is a far cry from the Oriental despotism and Asiatic mode of production treatment of the non-West by many of sociology’s founding fathers (whose ‘Orientalism’ is alive and well today, as shown in the outpouring of ‘crony capitalism’ commentary following the 1997 Asian Crisis). It is a far cry, too, from probing the mind and mores of the savage, however noble. Coming to
terms with the ‘other’ has been a major problem for social science, and Dore has made a major contribution.

Dore sums up his own approach as ‘looking around the world at the enormous variety of situations and solutions to problems that human beings have arrived at, evaluating them, and asking whether what are considered better solutions can be applied elsewhere, particularly to your own country. And in order to know whether or not they can be applied depends on whether or not, in the places they are operating, they are to be explained by certain historical factors or contemporary cultural factors which are not present in the place you want to transplant them to. The only way of ascertaining this is by detailed, historical, analysis.’ Detailed, socio-historical analysis has always characterized his research; the policy orientation came later. The case is set out in the Preface to Taking Japan Seriously.

For those seeking to overcome the late nineteenth-century general methodological dispute (Methodenstreit) between the historical and social sciences, and the artificial division of labour between sociology and economics, to rescue Veblen from Coase’s fire through evolutionary economics, or to forge a new economic sociology, Dore’s work merits particular attention. And his approach to dealing with the ‘other’ will become even more important as cautious attempts are made once more to incorporate insights from the biological sciences into social science.

STRUCTURE OF THE BOOK

The rationale for the selection of papers and their organization into four parts now needs little further explanation. In a very rough sense the four parts follow the chronological development of Dore’s thinking and, at the same time, depict the logic of his approach to his research. Part I is titled ‘Technology-driven social evolution’. As Figure 6.1 suggests, ideas and philosophies also have an exogenous role in this conceptual scheme, and in this sense, at least, his approach is Weberian. The major chapters have been selected to show how his concept of social evolution has been applied. There is the added twist, however, of late development, taken up in Part II. The notion itself was not new, but Dore perhaps applied it more determinedly than earlier exponents to various institutional settings, as the five selected chapters show.

While Dore addressed the question of culture as early as his City Life book, his early inclinations were to stress the scrutability of Japanese society, in reaction to the approach adopted by Benedict. As he developed his thinking on social evolution and late development, however, it become necessary for him to spell out more clearly how culture fitted into his evolutionary framework.
The chapters in Part III show how he did this, although the ordering is designed to show how the pieces fit together rather than chronological development. (Chronologically we would begin with Chapter 16, which stresses the importance of starting points in industrialization, specifically educational and other institutional heritages.) Eventually Dore adopts Weberian ideal types, particularly in the (British/Anglo-Saxon) ‘company law’ model of the firm versus the (Japanese/Japanese-German) ‘community’ model. These are an expository device, and are also intended to portray how different institutions fit together, as well as institutions and behavioural and motivational dispositions, to form ‘systems’ (Chapter 19).

Further, they are used as polemical devices, to draw attention to different possibilities for reform, as suggested by the ‘Confucian perspective’ quote above (cf. 1987a, 7). His concern that ‘real world’ research be employed for ‘real world’ policy solutions was already evident in his Diploma Disease ‘modest proposals’ (Chapter 22, and before that in numerous Letters to the Times and other newspapers), but became more prominent in the 1980s, when he started doing research on technological innovation in the UK and its consequences. The chapters in Part IV present a range of his advocatory writings, which as noted earlier, are consistent with his view that structure and culture are not deterministic, but that there is scope for human agency and policy choices, for hope and reason, to make a difference. No double life, but a sociologist who (in his words) ‘cannot keep quiet when he thinks he can see ways in which people could be made happier, richer, or less at each others’ throats if only they could be made to understand the world as he does’.

A few words about the abridging and editing processes are necessary. The abridging was done by Dore himself. Omissions are indicated by ‘…’ and bridging or summarizing abridgements are put in square brackets [ ]. Any impulses to rewrite were resisted; the only other changes are the correction of grammatical or typographical errors, and stylistic changes made by me to produce a consistent style for the book. Romanization of Japanese words has not been made consistent, however, and generally follows that of the original publication. For the sake of balancing inclusion and overall word length, some chapters were pruned more drastically than others. Decisions about the extent of pruning were also made by Dore; I have attempted to indicate the outcome by designating them ‘slightly abridged’, ‘abridged’ or ‘extracted’.

NOTES

1. Genes and (chance) historical events can be added; see Figure 15.1.
2. His own term; see note 27.
3. Personal communication in response to a preliminary draft of this Introduction. Brief,
unattributed quotes come from this source. Dore’s mastery of Japanese, it goes without saying, is a vital foundation for his scholarship.

4. The results fed into an ongoing effort, published as Hayashi and Kornicki (eds), 1990.

5. Arai Hakuseki was a mid-Tokugawa period Confucian scholar and shogunal adviser. Japanese names appear with the family name first, personal name following.


7. The original plan was for ten posts in Japanese language and literature, two in history, two in religion and folklore, one in economic institutions and one in social institutions and the law. The total number was reduced to six, with economic and social institutions rolled into one, called ‘Japanese institutions’ (Dore, 1994a, 274–5).


11. Glass dismissed Parsons without argument, according to Halsey (1985: 159). Sprott provided an assessment of Parsons in the British Journal of Sociology, but it was clearly intended to save others from having to embark upon the ‘time-consuming task’ of venturing into the murky ‘waters’ themselves (1952, 203, 221).


13. Dore’s first seminar at LSE, in 1952, was on the subject of Ruth Benedict’s Chrysanthemum and the Sword.


15. Discussion, 10 January 1997.

16. By ‘open’ I mean starting with particular phenomena and working out what other phenomena are involved in causing them, rather than starting from the notion of a social system as a whole and trying to establish where the phenomena fit in. Relatedly, however, he exhibits a disciplinary openness (cf. Inagami, 1999).

17. He says that the sentence most often quoted back to him in Japan is from the Preface to the Japanese translation of British Factory–Japanese Factory (1973; 1990) about the relative merits of British and Japanese industrial relations and employment systems: ‘I think the Japanese system is better, but I’m glad I don’t have to live in it.’ Italy’s synthesis of ‘inner direction’ and communitarian attitudes and institutions to some extent resolves this ambivalence.

18. Dore, 1958, xvi. He recalls being confronted with this attitude, tinged with arrogance, when giving his first talk at the RIIA (Dore, 1997a: discussion).

19. Cf. Dower’s criticism of scholars whose work ‘has tended to be congruent with the objectives of the American government’ (1975, 33). He was attempting to resurrect interest in E.H. Norman’s work, which they had ‘courteously shelved’.

20. He was appointed a reader at the LSE in 1960, and taught courses on Japanese society, social structure and social change. As professor from 1965, he held a joint LSE–SOAS appointment until 1969, when he spent a year at Princeton writing up the British Factory–Japanese Factory study.

21. Dore, 1983a, 35–6. Abegglen had generally avoided attributing the distinctiveness of Japan’s employment system to backwardness, emphasizing instead socio-cultural distinctiveness.

22. Maurice, Sellier and Silvestre (1982; 1986) brings together this work.

23. Kumazawa, 1982. Gordon, 1998, is an exponent of this view. It is interesting that Hazama, Dore’s partner in the research, framed his analysis in terms of association-based British workplaces versus community-based Japanese workplaces. He was distinctly ambivalent about the evolutionary implications of this framework, and the respective merits of each. His concluding chapter follows the convention of asking what Japan can learn from Britain, and calls for greater individualism, but towards the establishment of a new democratic type of workplace, rather than British shop-floor relations (Hazama, 1974).

24. Personal communication in response to draft.


26. Dore suggests he ended up as ‘a dabbler in both, expert in neither’ (discussion), but the following discussion shows that he took them seriously. The TCC closed in 1986.
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27. E.g. Chapters in Part IV. Regarding his political activities, he joined the Labour Party and went to branch meetings in the 1950s, but did not enjoy politics. (‘If I had had a more forceful personality, and the prospect of being elected a candidate soon, I might have stuck with it…’) He was associated with the Tawney Society, and subsequently the Social Democrats in the early 1980s (prior to the merger with the Liberals), and was opposed to Britain’s see-saw politics, in which successive Labour and Conservative governments scrapped the institutions set up by their opponents once they gained power and then set up their own, with the result that few could ever become established.

28. The concepts were first explored in the final chapter of The Diploma Disease. Cf. also Dore, 1987a, b, 1994b.

29. He was simultaneously a visiting professor and then director of the Japan–Europe Industry Research Centre at Imperial College, and from 1991 senior research fellow at the Centre for Economic Performance, LSE.

30. At this stage he had still not taken on board the evidence of growing income differentials in the UK and USA, although they were consistent with his technology change and unemployment (‘scissors effect’) thesis (Chapter 21).


32. Halsey, 1985, 154. The ‘provincial thirteen’ were students of sociology at LSE from 1950-52, many of whom helped to establish sociology departments throughout Britain in the 1960s. They were J.A. Banks, Olive Banks, Michael Banton, Basil Bernstein, Percy Cohen, Norman Dennis, Ralf Dahrendorf, A.H. Halsey, David Lockwood, Cyril Smith, J.H. Smith, Asher Tropp and John Westergaard.

33. In contrast, for instance, to Durkheimian sociology, or Friedman’s economics.

34. Dore’s first advice to his research students to me at least was to go and read Ayer’s Language, Truth and Logic.

35. Discussion, 10 January 1997.

REFERENCES


