References

- Aasjord, B. and G. Hønneland (2008), 'Hvem kan telle "den fisk under vann"? Kunnskapsstrid i russisk havforskning', *Nordisk Østforum*, **22**, 289–312.
- Acheson, J.M. (1975), 'Fisheries management and social context: the case of the Maine lobster fishery', *Transactions of the American Fisheries Society*, **104**, 653–68.
- Allison, G.T. and P.D. Zelikow (1999), *Essence of Decision: Explaining the Cuban Missile Crisis*, New York: Longman.
- Andresen, S., E.L. Boasson and G. Hønneland (eds) (2012), *International Environmental Agreements: An Introduction*, London and New York: Routledge.
- Axelrod, R. (2006), *The Evolution of Cooperation* (with a new foreword by Richard Dawkins), New York: Basic Books.
- Baland, J.-M. and J.P. Platteau (1996), *Halting Degradation of Natural Resources: Is There a Role for Rural Communities?*, Oxford: Clarendon Press.
- Becker, G. (1968), 'Crime and punishment: an economic approach', *Journal of Political Economy*, **72**, 169–217.
- Bentham, J. (1789), *An Introduction to the Principles of Morals and Legislation*, London: T. Payne and Son.
- Berenboym, B.I., V.A. Borovkov, V.I. Vinnichenko, E.N. Gavrilov, K.V. Drevetnyak, Yu.A. Kovalev, Yu.M. Lepesevich, E.A. Shamray and M.S. Shevelev (2007), 'Chto takoe sinopticheskiy monitoring treski v Barentsevom more?', *Rybnye resursy*, **4**, 24–9.
- Berkes, F. (ed.) (1989), *Common-Property Resources: Ecology and Community-Based Sustainable Development*, London: Belhaven Press.
- Bonger, W.A. (1916), *Criminality and Economic Conditions*, Boston, MA: Little, Brown and Co.
- Borisov, V.M., S.I. Boychuk, G.P. Vanyushin, A.D. Gomonor, D.N. Klyutshkov, B.N. Kotenev, G.G. Krylov and B.M. Shatokhin (2006), *Sinopticheskiy monitoring zapasov treski v Barentsevom more v 2005 g. na osnove ispol'zovaniya sovremennykh issledovatel'skikh tekhnologiy izucheniya bioresursov*, Moscow: VNIRO Publishing.

- Bose, S. and A. Crees-Morris (2009), 'Stakeholder's views on fisheries compliance: an Australian case study', *Marine Policy*, **33**, 248–53.
- Bromley, D.W. (general ed.) (1992), *Making the Commons Work: Theory, Practice, and Policy*, San Francisco, CA: Institute for Contemporary Studies Press.
- Brox, O. (1990), 'The common property theory: epistemological status and analytical utility', *Human Organization*, **49**, 227–35.
- Burgstaller, M. (2005), *Theories of Compliance with International Law*, Leiden and Boston, MA: Martinus Nijhoff.
- Chayes, A. and A.H. Chayes (1991), 'Compliance without enforcement: state behavior under regulatory treaties', *Negotiation Journal*, **7**, 311–30.
- Chayes, A. and A.H. Chayes (1995), *The New Sovereignty: Compliance with International Regulatory Agreements*, Cambridge, MA and London: Harvard University Press.
- Churchill, R. and G. Ulfstein (1992), *Marine Management in Disputed Areas: The Case of the Barents Sea*, London and New York: Routledge.
- Cooter, R. and S. Marks, with R. Mnookin (1982), 'Bargaining in the shadow of the law: a testable model of strategic behavior', *Journal of Legal Studies*, **11**, 225–51.
- Crawford, B.R., A. Siahainenia, C. Rotinsulu and A. Sukmara (2004), 'Compliance and enforcement of community-based coastal resource management regulations in North Sulawesi, Indonesia', *Coastal Management*, **32**, 39–50.
- Dawes, R.M. (1975), 'Formal models of dilemmas in social decision making', in Martin Francis Kaplan and Steven Schwartz (eds), *Human Judgment and Decision Processes: Formal and Mathematical Approaches*, New York: Academic Press, pp. 88–107.
- Eggert, H. and A. Ellegård (2003), 'Fishery control and regulation compliance: a case for co-management in Swedish commercial fisheries', *Marine Policy*, **27**, 525–33.
- Franck, T.M. (1990), *The Power of Legitimacy among Nations*, New York and Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Garcia, S.M. (1994), 'The precautionary principle: its implications in capture fisheries management', *Ocean and Coastal Management*, **22**, 99–125.
- Gardner, R., E. Ostrom and J. Walker (1990), 'The nature of common-pool resource problems', *Rationality and Society*, **2**, 335–58.
- Gergen, K. (2001), 'Self-narration in social life', in Margaret Wetherell, Stephanie Taylor and Simeon J. Yates (eds), *Discourse Theory and Practice: A Reader*, Thousand Oaks, CA and London: SAGE, pp. 247–60.

- Gezelius, S.S. (2002), 'Do norms count? State regulation and compliance in a Norwegian fishing community', *Acta Sociologica*, **45**, 305–14.
- Gezelius, S.S. (2003), *Regulation and Compliance in the Atlantic Fisheries: State/Society Relations in the Management of Natural Resources*, Dordrecht and Boston, MA: Kluwer Academic.
- Gezelius, S.S. (2004), 'Food, money, and morals: compliance among natural resource harvesters', *Human Ecology*, **32**, 615–34.
- Gezelius, S.S. (2006), 'Monitoring fishing mortality: compliance in Norwegian offshore fisheries', *Marine Policy*, **30**, 462–9.
- Gezelius, S.S. (2007), 'Three paths from law enforcement to compliance: cases from the fisheries', *Human Organization*, **66**, 414–25.
- Glaser, B.G. and A.L. Strauss (1967), *The Discovery of Grounded Theory: Strategies for Qualitative Research*, Chicago, IL: Aldine.
- Gordon, H.S. (1954), 'The economic theory of a common-property resource: the fishery', *Journal of Political Economy*, **62**, 124–42.
- Gray, W.B. and J.T. Scholz (1993), 'Does regulatory enforcement work? A panel analysis of OSHA enforcement', *Law and Society Review*, **27**, 177–213.
- Gubrium, J.F. and J.A. Holstein (2009), *Analyzing Narrative Reality*, Thousand Oaks, CA and London: SAGE.
- Habermas, J. (1984), *The Theory of Communicative Action*, Boston, MA: Beacon Press.
- Hardin, G. (1968), 'The tragedy of the commons', *Science*, **162**, 1243–8.
- Hatcher, A. and D. Gordon (2005), 'Further investigations into the factors affecting compliance with U.K. fishing quotas', *Land Economics*, **81**, 71–86.
- Hatcher, A., S. Jaffry, O. Thébaud and E. Bennett (2000), 'Normative and social influences affecting compliance with fishery regulations', *Land Economics*, **76**, 448–61.
- Hauck, M. (2008), 'Rethinking small-scale fisheries compliance', *Marine Policy*, **32**, 635–42.
- Hauck, M. and M. Kroese (2006), 'Fisheries compliance in South Africa: a decade of challenges and reform 1994–2004', *Marine Policy*, **30**, 74–83.
- Henkin, L. (1968), *How Nations Behave: Law and Foreign Policy*, London: Pall Mall Press.
- Henriksen, T. and G. Ulfstein (2011), 'Maritime delimitation in the Arctic: the Barents Sea Treaty', *Ocean Development and International Law*, **42**, 1–21.
- Hersoug, B. (2005), *Closing the Commons: Norwegian Fisheries from Open Access to Private Property*, Delft: Eburon.
- Hewison, G.J. (1996), 'The precautionary approach to fisheries

- management: an environmental perspective', *International Journal of Marine and Coastal Law*, **11**, 301–32.
- Hoel, A.H. (2005), 'The performance of exclusive economic zones: the case of Norway', in Syma A. Ebbin, Alf Håkon Hoel and Are K. Sydnes (eds), *A Sea Change: The Exclusive Economic Zone and Governance Institutions for Living Marine Resources*, Dordrecht: Springer, pp. 33–48.
- Hønneland, G. (1993), *Fiskeren og allmenningen; forvaltning og kontroll: Makt og kommunikasjon i kontrollen med fisket i Barentshavet*, Tromsø: University of Tromsø, Department of Social Science.
- Hønneland, G. (1998), 'Compliance in the Fishery Protection Zone around Svalbard', *Ocean Development and International Law*, **29**, 339–60.
- Hønneland, G. (1999a), 'A model of compliance in fisheries: theoretical foundations and practical application', *Ocean and Coastal Management*, **42**, 699–716.
- Hønneland, G. (1999b), 'Co-operative action between fishermen and inspectors in the Svalbard Zone', *Polar Record*, **35**, 207–14.
- Hønneland, G. (1999c), 'The stories fishermen tell (or: Themes from the Barents Sea fisheries)', *Human Ecology*, **27**, 621–6.
- Hønneland, G. (1999d), 'The interaction of research programmes in social science studies of the commons', *Acta Sociologica*, **42**, 193–205.
- Hønneland, G. (2000a), *Coercive and Discursive Compliance Mechanisms in the Management of Natural Resources: A Case Study from the Barents Sea Fisheries*, Dordrecht and Boston, MA: Kluwer Academic.
- Hønneland, G. (2000b), 'Compliance in the Barents Sea fisheries: how fishermen account for conformity with rules', *Marine Policy*, **24**, 11–19.
- Hønneland, G. (2000c), 'Enforcement co-operation between Norway and Russia in the Barents Sea fisheries', *Ocean Development and International Law*, **31**, 249–67.
- Hønneland, G. (2003), *Russia and the West: Environmental Co-operation and Conflict*, London and New York: Routledge.
- Hønneland, G. (2004), *Russian Fisheries Management: The Precautionary Approach in Theory and Practice*, Leiden and Boston, MA: Martinus Nijhoff.
- Hønneland, G. (2005), 'Fisheries management in post-Soviet Russia: legislation, principles and structure', *Ocean Development and International Law*, **36**, 179–94.
- Hønneland, G. (2006), *Kvotekamp og kyststatssolidaritet: Norsk–russisk fiskeriforvaltning gjennom 30 år*, Bergen: Fagbokforlaget.
- Hønneland, G. (2010), *Borderland Russians: Identity, Narrative and International Relations*, Basingstoke and New York: Palgrave Macmillan.
- Hønneland, G. (2011), 'Kompromiss als Routine: Russland, Norwegen und die Barentssee', *Osteuropa*, **61**, 257–69.

- Jackson, P.T. (2010), *The Conduct of Inquiry in International Relations: Philosophy of Science and Its Implications for the Study of World Politics*, London and New York: Routledge.
- Jacobson, H.K. and E.B. Weiss (1995), 'Strengthening compliance with international environmental accords: preliminary observations from a collaborative project', *Global Governance*, **1**, 119–48.
- Jensen, Ø. (2011), 'Current legal developments, the Barents Sea: treaty between Norway and the Russian Federation concerning maritime delimitation and cooperation in the Barents Sea and the Arctic Ocean', *International Journal of Marine and Coastal Law*, **26**, 151–68.
- Jentoft, S. (1985), 'Models of fishery development: the cooperative approach', *Marine Policy*, **9**, 322–31.
- Jentoft, S. (1989), 'Fisheries co-management: delegating government responsibility to fishermen's organizations', *Marine Policy*, **13**, 137–54.
- Jentoft, S. (2005), 'Fisheries co-management as empowerment', *Marine Policy*, **29**, 1–7.
- Jentoft, S. and B.J. McCay (1995), 'User participation in fisheries management', *Marine Policy*, **19**, 227–46.
- Jentoft, S., M. Bavinck, D.S. Johnson and K.T. Thomson (2009), 'Fisheries co-management and legal pluralism: how an analytical problem becomes an institutional one', *Human Organization*, **68**, 27–38.
- Jönsson, C. and J. Tallberg (1998), 'Compliance and post-agreement bargaining', *European Journal of International Relations*, **4**, 371–408.
- Jørgensen, A.K. (2009), 'Recent developments in the Russian fisheries sector', in Elena Wilson Rowe (ed.), *Russia and the North*, Ottawa: University of Ottawa Press, pp. 87–106.
- Jørgensen, J.H. and G. Hønneland (2006), 'Implementing global nature protection agreements in Russia', *Journal of International Wildlife Law and Policy*, **9**, 1–21.
- Kagan, R.A. and J.T. Scholz (1984), 'The "criminology of the corporation" and regulatory enforcement strategies', in Keith Hawkins and John Michael Thomas (eds), *Enforcing Regulations*, Boston and The Hague: Kluwer-Nijhoff Publishing, pp. 67–95.
- King, D.M. and J.G. Sutinen (2010), 'Rational noncompliance and the liquidation of northeast groundfish resources', *Marine Policy*, **34**, 7–21.
- King, D.M., R.D. Porter and E.W. Price (2009), 'Reassessing the value of U.S. Coast Guard at-sea fishery enforcement', *Ocean Development and International Law*, **40**, 350–72.
- Koh, H.H. (1997), 'Why do nations obey international law?', *Yale Law Journal*, **106**, 2599–659.
- Krebs, R.R. and P.T. Jackson (2007), 'Twisting tongues and twisting

- arms: the power of political rhetoric', *European Journal of International Relations*, **13**, 35–66.
- Krementsov, N. (1997), *Stalinist Science*, Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.
- Kuperan, K. and J.G. Sutinen (1998), 'Blue water crime: deterrence, legitimacy, and compliance in fisheries', *Law and Society Review*, **32**, 309–37.
- McCay, B.J. and J.M. Acheson (eds) (1987), *The Question of the Commons: The Culture and Ecology of Communal Resources*, Tucson: University of Arizona Press.
- McCay, B.J. and S. Jentoft (1996), 'From the bottom up: participatory issues in fisheries management', *Society and Natural Resources*, **9**, 237–50.
- Mearsheimer, J.J. (2001), *The Tragedy of Great Power Politics*, New York: Norton.
- Mitchell, R.B. (1994a), 'Regime design matters: intentional oil pollution and treaty compliance', *International Organization*, **48**, 425–58.
- Mitchell, R.B. (1994b), *Intentional Oil Pollution at Sea: Environmental Policy and Treaty Compliance*, Cambridge, MA and London: MIT Press.
- Mnookin, R.H. and L. Kornhauser (1979), 'Bargaining in the shadow of the law: the case of divorce', *Yale Law Journal*, **88**, 950–97.
- Morgenthau, H. (1948), *Politics among Nations: The Struggle for Power and Peace*, New York: Alfred A. Knopf.
- Neumann, I.B. (1996), *Russia and the Idea of Europe: A Study in Identity and International Relations*, London and New York: Routledge.
- Neumann, I.B. (2008), 'Discourse analysis', in Audie Klotz and Deepa Prakash (eds), *Qualitative Methods in International Relations: A Pluralist Guide*, Basingstoke and New York: Palgrave Macmillan, pp. 61–77.
- Nielsen, J.R. (2003), 'An analytical framework for studying: compliance and legitimacy in fisheries management', *Marine Policy*, **27**, 425–32.
- Nielsen, J.R. and C. Mathiesen (2003), 'Important factors influencing rule compliance in fisheries: lessons from Denmark', *Marine Policy*, **27**, 409–16.
- Nøstbakken, L. (2008), 'Fisheries law enforcement: a survey of the economic literature', *Marine Policy*, **32**, 293–300.
- Olson, M. (1965), *The Logic of Collective Action: Public Goods and the Theory of Groups*, Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
- Ostrom, E. (1990), *Governing the Commons: The Evolution of Institutions for Collective Action*, Cambridge and New York: Cambridge University Press.
- Ostrom, E., R. Gardner and J. Walker (1994), *Rules, Games, and Common-Pool Resources*, Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press.

- Pedersen, T. (2008), 'The constrained politics of the Svalbard offshore area', *Marine Policy*, **32**, 913–19.
- Pedersen, T. (2009a), 'Norway's rule on Svalbard: tightening the grip on the Arctic islands', *Polar Record*, **45**, 147–52.
- Pedersen, T. (2009b), 'Denmark's policies toward the Svalbard area', *Ocean Development and International Law*, **40**, 319–32.
- Pedersen, T. (2011), 'International law and politics in U.S. policymaking: the United States and the Svalbard dispute', *Ocean Development and International Law*, **42**, 120–35.
- Pinkerton, E. (ed.) (1989), *Co-operative Management of Local Fisheries: New Directions for Improved Management and Community Development*, Vancouver: University of British Columbia Press.
- Pyle, D.J. (1983), *The Economics of Crime and Law Enforcement*, London: Macmillan.
- Randall, J.K. (2004), 'Improving compliance in U.S. federal fisheries: an enforcement agency perspective', *Ocean Development and International Law*, **35**, 287–317.
- Ries, N. (1997), *Russian Talk: Culture and Conversation during Perestroika*, Ithaca, NY and London: Cornell University Press.
- Ringmar, E. (1996), *Identity, Interest and Action: A Cultural Explanation of Sweden's Intervention in the Thirty Years War*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Røttingen, I., H. Gjøsæter and B.H. Sunnset (2007), 'Norsk–russisk forskersamarbeid 50 år', *Havforskningsnytt*, **16**, Bergen: Institute of Marine Research.
- Rubin, H.J. and I.S. Rubin (1995/2005), *Qualitative Interviewing: The Art of Hearing Data*, 1st and 2nd editions, Thousand Oaks, CA and London: SAGE.
- Sen, S. and J.R. Nielsen (1996), 'Fisheries co-management: a comparative analysis', *Marine Policy*, **20**, 405–18.
- Serebryakov, V. and P. Solemdal (2002), 'Cooperation in marine research between Russia and Norway at the dawn of the 20th century', *ICES Marine Science Symposia*, **215**, 73–86.
- Smith, A. (1759), *The Theory of Moral Sentiments*, London: A. Millar.
- Smith, A. (1776), *An Inquiry into the Nature and Causes of the Wealth of Nations*, London: Strahan & Cadell.
- Somers, M. (1994), 'The narrative constitution of identity: a relational and network approach', *Theory and Society*, **23**, 605–49.
- Southall, T., P. Medley, G. Hønneland, P. MacIntyre and M. Gill (2010), *MSC Sustainable Fisheries Certification: The Barents Sea Cod and Haddock Fisheries*, Inverness: Food Certification International.
- Spector, B.I. and I.W. Zartman (eds) (2003), *Getting It Done: Post-Agreement*

- Negotiation and International Regimes*, Washington, DC: United States Institute of Peace Press.
- Sproule-Jones, M. (1982), 'Public choice theory and natural resources: methodological explication and critique', *American Political Science Review*, **76**, 790–804.
- Stokke, O.S. (2009), 'Trade measures and the combat of IUU fishing: institutional interplay and effective governance in the Northeast Atlantic', *Marine Policy*, **33**, 339–49.
- Stokke, O.S. (2010a), *A Disaggregate Approach to International Regime Effectiveness: The Case of Barents Sea Fisheries*, Oslo: Unipub.
- Stokke, O.S. (2010b), 'Barents Sea fisheries: the IUU struggle', *Arctic Review on Law and Politics*, **1**, 207–24.
- Stokke, O.S. (forthcoming), *Disaggregating International Regime Effectiveness: Theory, Method, Governance*, Cambridge, MA and London: MIT Press.
- Sutinen, J.G. and P. Andersen (1985), 'The economics of fisheries law enforcement', *Land Economics*, **61**, 387–97.
- Sutinen, J.G. and K. Kuperan (1999), 'A socioeconomic theory of regulatory compliance in fisheries', *International Journal of Social Economics*, **6**, 174–93.
- Sutinen, J.G., A. Rieser and J.R. Gauvin (1990), 'Measuring and explaining noncompliance in federally managed fisheries', *Ocean Development and International Law*, **21**, 335–72.
- Tyler, T.R. (2006), *Why People Obey the Law* (with a new afterword by the author), Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.
- Underdal, A. (2000), 'Conceptual framework: modelling supply of and demand for environmental regulation', in Arild Underdal and Kenneth Hanf (eds), *International Environmental Agreements and Domestic Politics: The Case of Acid Rain*, Aldershot and Burlington, VT: Ashgate, pp. 49–86.
- Vylegzhanin, A.N. and V.K. Zilanov (2007), *Spitsbergen: Legal Regime of Adjacent Marine Areas*, Utrecht: Eleven International Publishing.
- Walt, S. (1998), 'International relations: one world, many theories', *Foreign Policy*, **110**, 29–45.
- Weber, M., G. Roth and C. Wittich (1978), *Economy and Society: An Outline of Interpretive Sociology*, Berkeley: University of California Press.
- Weiss, E.B. and H.K. Jacobson (eds) (1998), *Engaging Countries: Strengthening Compliance with International Environmental Accords*, Cambridge, MA and London: MIT Press.
- Wendt, A. (1992), 'Anarchy is what states make of it: the social construction of power politics', *International Organization*, **46**, 391–425.

- Wilson, D.C., J.R. Nielsen and P. Degnbol (eds) (2003), *The Fisheries Co-management Experience: Accomplishments, Challenges and Prospects*, Dordrecht and Boston, MA: Kluwer Academic.
- Young, O.R. (1979), *Compliance and Public Authority: A Theory with International Applications*, Baltimore, MD and London: Johns Hopkins University Press.