access to safe water 8, 303–16
changing agenda 8, 303–6
lack of safe water as major
obstacle to human well-being
and health 304
problem related to lack of
adequate institutions 304–5
reasons why corruption/low QoG
detrimental to safe water
provision 305–6
corruption as a root cause of water
crisis 292, 293, 305–6
reducing corruption would result
in stricter environmental
policies 307
cross-country water quality 307–9
economic development and QoG
in providing healthy water
309, 310
no significant effect of government
effectiveness on access to safe
water 309
interplay between much money and
quality rule 310–11
lack of empirical analyses 306–7
causal link between QoG and
quality of water based on
case studies 306
democracy and environmental
degradation/policies 306–7
accountability 17, 281
and corruption 134
and democracy 21, 278, 292
government accountability 232
leaders’ accountability 196, 197,
200
in Mexico 239
MP–citizen accountability
relationships in Ghana 215,
225
as norm of good governance 176
political accountability 133
public ethics 92–3
public sector 13, 21, 93, 135, 156,
168–9
and voice 17, 281
in water management 305
Achebe, Chinua 192–3
Afghanistan 71
African Capacity Building Foundation
198
Afrobarometer 262
Agulanna, Christopher 193
Ahrend, R. 135
Akçay, S. 285–6
Alesina, A 18, 120
Algeria 31
Alhassan-Alolo, Namawk 233
Ambrosio, T. 184
American Political Science Association
1
Amin, Idi 202
Andersson, Emma 5
Angeletos, G.-M. 18
Annan, Kofi 174
Anti-Corruption Convention 182
Anti-Corruption in Transition: A
Contribution to the Policy Debate
(World Bank) 192
Anti-Corruption Toolkit (UN) 192
‘Are women really the ‘fairer’ sex?
Corruption and women in
government’ (Dollar) 231
Argentina 281–2
Aristotle 21
asymmetry of information see under
principal–agent framework
Australia
impartiality 29, 30
public administration 51, 53
quality of government 105
Austria 57
authoritarian regimes see under political regimes and quality of government
Azerbaijan 57
Bäck, H. 110–12, 119–20
Banfield, E. 152
Bangladesh 323
corruption 144
and access to safe water 306
impartiality 30
Bardhan, P. 257
Barrett, S. 295
Barro, R. 120
Barry, Brian 24, 25–6, 297
Bauhr, Monika 4, 6, 74, 80–81, 184–5
Beck, T. 120
Becker, Gary 18, 78
Belarus
public administration 57
quality of government 108
Belgium
corruption 134
public administration 53, 58, 151, 167
Bénassy-Quéré, A. 179
Besley, T. 292
Bhutan 108
Birner, R. 297
Björnskov, C. 318
Blaydes, L. 290
Boix, C. 125
Botswana 53
‘bringing the state back in’ 16–17
Britain see United Kingdom
Brunei 108
Brunetti, A. 133–4, 135
Bueno de Mesquita, B. 125
Bulgaria
corruption 185
quality of government 108
bureaucracy
bureaucratic structures, world see under public administration around the world
criticisms of bureaucracy
human interpretation and judgment versus objectivity 89–90
human variety versus unitary bureaucratic systems 88–9
customer/client preferences 97
market versus democracy/ineffective nature of bureaucracy 89
dimensions of bureaucracy see under public administration around the world
impartial bureaucracy and its critics see under impartiality
most widespread model of government 88
public ethics as a safety net encouraging whistle-blowing 92
state bureaucracies strengthening poverty reduction 40
Weberian bureaucracy see Weberian bureaucracy and corruption prevention
and welfare state policy see under impartiality and the need for a public ethics of care
see also institutions; public administration
Calderón, C. 283
Canada
impartiality 30
public administration 44
quality of government 106
capture of administrative agencies by interest groups 19–20, 24, 284
state capture by groups prospering at expense of the poor 291
Cejudo, Guillermo M. 239
Chad 179
Charron, Nicholas 5, 114, 118–20, 123–4, 135, 153
Chazan, Naomi 254
Chikulo, B.C. 192
Chile 144
China
effects of autocracy 106, 323
growth 286
rule of law 286
Chong, A. 279, 283, 290–91
Chowdhury, S.K. 135
citizens’ values/demand-side factors see
under political regimes and quality of government

civil liberties
and accountability 278
and economic improvement/better outcomes 277–8, 281
and environmental quality 295

Clague, C. 116–17
Clark, G. 112, 113

Clean Development Mechanism (CDM) 182–3
clientelism see under legislators and variation in quality of government
climate change 182–3
Colburn, Tom A. 1–2, 3
Congo, Democratic Republic of 202, 212
corruption
and access to safe water see access to safe water
advantages/positive impact on economic development 15, 260–61, 285
benefits from corruption balanced against costs, expected 132–3
costs and benefits of corruption vis-à-vis honesty in corrupt settings 264–9
black corruption 261
causes 131, 152–3, 180
see also corruption, need or greed as collective action problem 262–3
consequences of corruption for economic development/social well-being 150
control of corruption 15, 17
corrupt subsystems 233
international see international organizations promoting quality of government
as part of governance 16
press freedom see press freedom and corruption
public administration see Weberian bureaucracy and corruption prevention
and decentralization 135
definition of corruption 19, 252
and democracy see under democracy education, impact of 134–5
and environmental outcomes 294–5
and environmental policy stringency 295
favoritism see under legislators and variation in quality of government
and gender see why women are less corrupt than men
and good governance
corruption debate in QoG 284–6
good governance as the absence of corruption 19–20, 284
gray corruption 261
health inequity 291–2
historical aspects determinants of corruption 133
and inequality 70
as an informal institution see under rethinking the nature of the grabbing hand
and international social and political openness 135
and large governments 18–19
and leaders see leaders
‘legal’ corruption/influence 73–4, 80
mechanisms of reproduction of systemic corruption 260–62
functionalist mechanisms of reproduction 260
ideational mechanisms of reproduction 261–2
material mechanism of reproduction 262
as a negative force 261, 285–6, 295
non-corruption implying ‘ought to treat equally’ principle 25
as the norm in many countries 253–4
see also rethinking the nature of the grabbing hand
and political institutions 134, 153
probability of being caught dependent on country’s legal system 132
religion, influence of 132, 152–3
residual, decisions over the 168–9
and rule of law 295
state’s size and control affecting opportunities for corruption 133
Good government

and transparency 134
white corruption 70, 261
worst in countries that have been newly democratized 21–2
corruption, need or greed 4, 68–86
basic motive for corruption 69–71
greed corruption building on collusion 68, 69
moral acceptability distinction linked to scale of the problem 70
need corruption building on coercion and extortion 68, 69
scale or profitability of types of corruption, problem with focus on 70–71
distinction between ‘need’ and ‘greed’ corruption 68–9
implications of the need and greed distinction 82–3
traditional principal–agent concept of anti-corruption problem 69, 78–9, 83
failing anti-corruption programmes focusing on scale of corruption problem 68, 70
meaning of greed corruption 68, 69
meaning of need corruption 68, 69
need, greed and collective action against corruption 78–82
absence of actors willing to enforce anti-corruption measures 69, 79, 82
anti-corruption efforts based on logic of principal–agent theory 69, 78–9, 83
implications of unobtrusive corruption for civic engagement 79–80, 82–3
social dilemma character of the problem of corruption 80–81
transparency and exposure of corruption, effects of 80–81, 82–3
need, greed and institutional trust 74–8, 82
detrimental effect of corruption on institutional trust 74–6
greed corruption not necessarily reducing institutional trust 76–8, 82
less intrusive greed corruption less detrimental than need corruption 76
need corruption reducing institutional trust 76, 82
understanding greed corruption 71–4
importance of corruption rankings 72, 76
‘legal’ corruption/influence 73–4, 80
motives for corruption varying between different settings 71
Swedish case study of greed corruption in low need context 72–4, 79, 81
Corruption Perceptions Index 15, 31, 71, 76, 138, 142, 159, 177, 277, 320
Costa, Antonio Maria 286
Cowen, M. 212
Cuba 144
cultural values 113–14, 152–3
culturalist theories 112–14, 116
Czechoslovakia 112
Dahl, Robert 18, 24
Dahlberg, S. 44, 159
Dahlström, Carl 4, 5–6, 28, 58, 151, 153, 155–6, 159, 169
De Soto, Hernande 283–4
Declaration of Human Rights, UN 17, 92
defining and measuring quality of government 3–4, 13–39
concepts of quality of government, good governance, state capacity 13–14
conclusions 31–5
consequences of impartiality 31
origins of impartiality 31–5
QoG as impartiality as ‘public good’ type of institutions/problems 35
empirical background: quality of government and human well-being 15–16
feminist challenge: commitment, flexibility and impartiality/‘logic of care’ 27–8
good governance
as the absence of corruption 19–20
concepts of QoG, good governance, state capacity 13–14, 17–18
and democracy 14, 21–2, 277, 278–80
different conceptions of quality of government and good governance 17–18
as the rule of law 20–21
increase in number of democratic countries 14
intellectual background to the debate 16–17
measuring QoG as impartiality 28–31
see also impartiality
policy background: two failed hopes of democratization and marketization 14–15
quality of government
concepts of QoG, good governance, state capacity 13–14, 17–18
QoG as government efficiency 22–3
small government as good government 18–19
states that perform impartially/without corruption as QoG definition 119
quality of government, towards a definition of 23–7, 119
content of policies and reasonableness 25–6
impartiality in the exercise of public power 24–7
requirements for 23–4
democracy 5
and accountability 21, 278, 292
citizens in democracies with free elections voting as an exit mechanism 114–15, 116
corruption and quality of government 109, 279
acquisition of political credibility needed 110
administrative capacity and level of democracy 110–12
corruption lower in democracies/economically developed countries 133
corruption worst in newly democratized countries 21–2, 110, 112, 153, 279
democracy debate in QoG 278–80
democracy as punishing mechanism restraining corruption 135
hard measuring 118
impact on QoG contingent on economic development levels 116, 118–20
more years of democracy correlated with better government performance 110
perception-based measures 118–19
reasons why consolidated democracies outperform transitional ones 110–11
definitions, procedural and substantive 22
and environmental policy 295–6, 306–7
and good governance 21–2, 277, 278–80
and happiness and human well-being 16, 22, 307, 319, 321, 324
and health 292
increase in number of democratic countries 14
moral values of liberal democracy and the rule of law 20
new democracies 212–14
democracy not guaranteed to improve social/economic conditions 14, 105–6
and other political regimes see political regimes and quality of government
strong bureaucracy as counterweight to power of democratic majority 154
trust in democracy see political
regimes and quality of government

*Democracy and Redistribution* (Boix) 125

Denmark
corruption, control of 71
public administration 44, 51, 53, 58, 155
quality of government 105
developing countries and poor countries
access to safe water see access to safe water
climate change and CDM 182–3
corruption a widespread problem 253–4
decentralization and corruption 135
democracy not guaranteed to improve social/economic conditions 14, 105–6
formal constraints of only limited effect in anti-corruption reforms 196–7
and good governance 13, 22, 105
good governance agenda overwhelming for poor countries 18
happiness see under happiness and human well-being
lacking institutions required for Washington Consensus policies 15
quality of water see access to safe water
state bureaucracies strengthening poverty reduction 40

Diamond, Larry J. 14, 212, 254, 279–80
Doig, Alan 251
Dollar, David 231–2
Drèze, J. 126
Dworkin, Ronald 25

East Germany 112
eating in public office see state legitimacy and the corruptibility of leaders
Ecological Footprint index 294
economic development
and access to safe water 309, 310
and corruption perception 288
consequences of corruption for economic development 150
economic growth debate in QoG 278, 280–84, 317–18
and good governance 277, 288
importance of 153
and rule of law 286–8
economic/financial crises 13
*Economist, The* 286, 288
Ecuador
access to safe water and corruption 306
impartiality 31
public administration 53
Eek, D. 287
Egypt 323
elections in Ghana see legislators and variation in quality of government
Englebert, Pierre 198, 199, 202
environmental Kuznets curve 294
environmental policy
environmental outcomes and QoG 294–6
environmental protection and political institutions 304
Environmental Sustainability Index 294
Erlingsson, G. 156–7
Eslava-Schmalbach, J. 292
Esty, D.C. 295
ethics of care see impartiality and the need for a public ethics of care
European Social Survey 30
European Union 176
accession conditions/Copenhagen Criteria 183–4
prioritizing economic reforms over other reforms 185
corruption 185, 280
Evans, Peter 40–41, 42–3, 45–6, 49, 60, 153, 165, 174
Ewers, R.M. 294
‘exit, voice and loyalty’ theory of QoG see under political regimes and quality of government

Färdigh, Mathias 5
favoritism see under legislators and variation in quality of government
Index

Finland 24
corruption 145
public administration 162
quality of government 106
Fischer, W. 43
Fjeldstad, O.-H. 181
Foreign Affairs (Rotberg) 193
France
public administration 43, 44, 51, 53, 58, 151, 155, 157
NPM 162
Fredriksson, P. 295–6
Freedom from Corruption Index 138
Freedom House 119–20, 136, 139, 142, 160, 177, 308, 321
Freedom of the Press index 136, 137
Fredriksson, P. 295–6
Frias, Sonia M. 240–41
Fujimori, Alberto 22, 279
Galbraith, J.K. 120
Gandhi, J. 115
Geddes, B. 115, 118, 121–2
Geertz, Clifford 202
Georgia 57, 58
Germany 304
public administration 44, 157
Gerring, J. 180–81
Ghana
corruption 233
elections see legislators and variation in quality of government
Gilley, Bruce 16, 199
Gilligan, Carol 94
Global Corruption Report 2008 (Transparency International) 291–2, 293, 303–4, 305
Global Integrity 196
Goetz, Anne-Marie 233, 242
Goldsmith, A.A. 281–2, 297
good governance
as the absence of corruption 19–20
concepts of QoG, good governance, state capacity 13–14, 17–18
and corruption see under corruption criticisms 278, 282–3
and democracy 21–2, 277, 278–80
importance emphasized by World Bank and UN 277–8
importance in eradicating poverty and promoting development
174, 277
lack of mainstreaming of good governance norms within IOs 181–3
negative consequences of bad governance 15–16
as the rule of law 20–21
see also quality of government (QoG)
Goodin, R.E. 25
Governing the Commons (Ostrom) 16
Graddy, K. 295
Gradstein, M. 279, 290–91
Gray, M.M. 120, 176, 177, 185
Greece 13
corruption 150
public administration 53, 58
quality of government 106
rule of law 286
Greif, Avner 19, 35, 288
Grigorescu, A. 184
Grimes, M. 236
Grindle, M.S. 18, 180, 282
Guatemala 306
Gupta, S. 291–2
Hadenius, A. 110–12, 115, 119–20
Handbook of Development Economics 285
Handbook of New Institutional Economics (Greif) 35, 288
happiness and human well-being 8, 317–32
dysfunctional government institutions dominating societies without well-being 3
earlier research 317–18
interpersonal trust mechanism by which QoG increases happiness 318, 320
QoG having a positive effect on happiness in poorer countries 317, 318
fundamental relationships 321–4
civic trust 323
democracy 324
economic equality not strongly related to happiness/life satisfaction 323
GDP per capita 323
health as major determinant of satisfaction 323
levels of happiness in developing countries 322–3
post-materialism 323
religion 323–4
richer populations happier 323
little positive correlation between democracy and human well-being 16, 22
operational variables 319–21
other factors affecting happiness 319
degrees of societal equality 320
democracy 319, 321, 324
health 319, 320, 323
individualism 319
post-materialism 321, 323
poverty 319, 320, 323
religion 319, 321, 323–4
security/trust 320–21, 323
positive links between good governance and human well-being 15, 22
quality of government matters 15–16, 324–5
social well-being and QoG 290–91
Harberger, Arnold C. 194
Harris, Robert 257
Harris-White, B. 153
health
important factor behind happiness/satisfaction 319, 320, 323
public health 291–2
and water see access to safe water
Heidenheimer, A.J. 70, 261
Held, Virginia 96
Hellwell, J.F. 15, 317–18
Hellman, J.S. 73
Heritage Foundation 138
Hirschman, A. 114, 116, 278
Holmberg, Sören 8, 15, 150, 177, 288, 291–2, 296
Holsti, K.J. 199
Honduras 29, 30, 31
Hong Kong 22
corruption 193
good governance 280
impartiality 29, 30
public administration 53
Hope Sr, K.R. 192
Horowitz, D.L. 202
Huang, H. 317–18
human well-being see happiness and human well-being
Huntington, Samuel P. 261
Iceland 145
impartiality
employees, public see impartiality
and the need for a public ethics of care
in the exercise of public power 24–7, 210, 297
conditionality in the application of impartiality as a justice principle 26–7
consequences of impartiality 31
definition of impartiality in the exercise of public power 24, 119, 297
impartiality not equivalent to objectivity 27, 89–90, 98–9
impartiality not a moral basis for policy content 26
meaning of acting impartially 25, 26, 27, 88, 90
measuring QoG as impartiality 28–31
origins of impartiality 31–5
QoG as impartiality as ‘public good’ type of institutions/problems 35
and favoritism constituted by constituency service 211
feminist challenge: commitment, flexibility and impartiality 27–8
impartiality not implying policy implementation as rigid rule-following 28
impartial bureaucracy and its critics 88–90
impossibility of impartial judgment 27, 89–90
nature of theory of impartiality 87, 88
measuring 3–4
how to measure QoG as impartiality 28–31
measuring impartiality among MPs 214–19
non-impartial behaviours in electoral processes see legislators
and variation in quality of government
norm of impartiality breached by ‘legal’ corruption/influence 73–4
impartiality and the need for a public ethics of care 4, 27–8, 87–102
logic of care 27–8
professional norms 91
public ethics of care 93–6
ethics as a political issue 94–5
ethics of care as a morality in its own right 94
ethics of care theory requiring certain things to be attended to 93–4
interdependent nature of people 94
provision of good care requiring sensitivity to context and responsiveness 95
vast number of policies are care policies 93
quality of government in welfare-state related areas, importance of 87
value of public ethics 91–3
features defining public ethics 92
public ethics as set of value-oriented principles 92
public ethics supplementing professional norms 92
specifying the concept of public ethics 92–3
strengthening public values that might be neglected 91
welfare state policy implementation and institutions
bureaucratic system versus unconditional care 96–7
customer at the market versus the responsive employee 97–8
the empathetic state 99–100
employees given discretion to determine implementation 89, 90
an ethics for implementation and administration 96
impartial welfare state implementation 90–91
meaning of impartial implementation/impartial treatment 90
objectivity versus human judgment based on experience 27, 89–90, 98–9
paternalism 95, 97–8
and public ethics content 93–6
system oriented slots for human needs posing severe problems 89
India
access to safe water and corruption 305–6
democracy 110
effects of democracy 106
quality of government 108, 112
individualism 319
Indonesia
corruption 134
environmental degradation 296
information asymmetry see under principal–agent framework
Inglehart, R. 112, 113–14, 153, 321
institutionalist theories 109–12, 114
institutions
corruption as an informal institution see rethinking the nature of the grabbing hand
need, greed and institutional trust see under corruption, need or greed
creating effective institutions 288
detrimental effect of corruption on institutional trust 74–8
environmental protection and political institutions 304
impartiality in the exercise of public power see under impartiality
as incentive systems 255
industrialization process giving rise to better institutions 282
informal institutions 255–6, 280, 287
accommodating informal institutions 256
competing informal institutions 256
complementary informal institutions 255–6
evolving into formal institutions 287
resistant to change as path dependent 256
societal institutions 281
substitutive informal institutions 256
institutional mechanisms of reproduction 258–60
functionalist accounts, strong and weak versions of 258
legitimation framework 258–9
utilitarian accounts, liberal and power-centred versions of 259
institutional reform initially increasing poverty 283–4
international see international organizations promoting quality of government
legal/judicial institutions 16, 76
probability of being caught for corruption dependent on legal systems 132
micro foundations of institutional reproduction 257–60
more efficient institutions leading to less poverty 283
path dependent institutions 255–6
political institutions central in explaining social and economic outcomes 16–17
and corruption 134, 153
poor countries lacking institutions for Washington Consensus policies 15
and poverty see under poverty
providing incentives to rulers 112–13
public organizations differing from private ones 91
and quality of governance 17–18
reinforcing nature of 255, 256
supply-side factors see under political regimes and quality of government
and the welfare state see impartiality and the need for a public ethics of care
see also bureaucracy; public administration
Institutions, Institutional Change and Economic Performance (North) 16
International Monetary Fund
conditionality schemes 180
good governance 13
international organizations promoting quality of government 6, 174–90
contested policy advice 179–81
country ownership not a solution 181
difficulty of achieving good performance 180–81
hampering strategy of placing conditions on assistance 180
inappropriate policy recommendations as counterproductive 181
failures of international organizations addressing problems of bad QoG 174
how international organizations (IOs) promote quality of government 175–7
precise role of IOs contested 175
socialization theory as an understanding how IOs can diffuse norms 176
strategies to influence state behaviour 175–6
imprecise data 177–8
difficulty of producing objective indicators 178
strategy of using governance rankings to encourage reform hampered 177
incomplete internalization of norms in member states 183–4, 185
IOs varying in degree of authority/capabilities to promote QoG 184
lack of mainstreaming of good governance norms within IOs 181–3
interaction with IOs not necessarily promoting better governance 183
IOs projecting conflicting norms 182–3
low priority and anti-corruption reform 184–5
market pressures for investments in low QoG countries 178–9
rankings as a basis for IO investment decisions 178
role of QoG variables in investment decisions 179
power and potential of international organizations 185–6
Iran 323
Ireland 53, 58
Isaksen, J. 181
Italy 13
corruption 22, 150
cultural values 152–3
public administration 53, 58, 155, 162, 167
quality of government 106
rule of law 286
It’s Our Turn to Eat: The Story of a Kenyan Whistle Blower (Wrong) 197
Jackman, R.W. 110
Jamaica
corruption 22
governance reforms and economic development 281–2
impartiality 31
Japan 53
Justice as Impartiality (Barry) 25
Kapur, D. 181
Kaufmann, D. 73, 118–19, 281, 286
Kayser, M. 290
Kazakhstan 57
Keefer, P. 18, 110, 112, 119
Kenya
corruption 196–7, 202, 203–4, 262
costs and benefits see under
rethinking the nature of the grabbing hand
Kibaki, President Mwai 196–7, 203–4
Klitgaard, Robert 195, 252
Korea see South Korea
Kraay, A. 286, 290
Krugman, Paul 2
Kudamatsu, M. 292
Kum, H. 120
Kuwait 105–6
Kyrgyzstan 53, 57
La Porta, R. 19, 120, 132, 152, 160
Laakso, L. 212
Lapuente, Victor 4, 5–6, 16, 114, 118–20, 123–4, 153, 155
leaders
accountability 196, 197, 200
authoritarian regimes see under
political regimes and quality of government
and chief administrative officers 155–6
and corruption see state legitimacy and the corruptibility of leaders in democratic countries having larger coalition to who they owe power 125
incentives to supply QoG 112–13, 126
role of leaders 191
Lederman, D. 134, 136
Lee, J. 120
legal/judicial institutions see under institutions
legislators and variation in quality of government 6–7, 210–29
constitutional structure in Ghana 215
informal norms can help create better quality of government 224–6
hybrid office character – formal expectations/constituency father/mother 225
voter pressure on MPs for greater impartiality 225–6
legislators 210–12
constituency service as favoritism 211
roles 210–11, 212–13, 214
measuring impartiality among MPs 214–19
clientelism, measuring 216–19
performance of MPs in terms of QoG, measuring 215–16
new democracies 212–14
higher incidence of clientelistic practices in contested constituencies 213–14
institutional pressures on MPs to supply public goods 213
less need for individually targeted private goods where party dominant 213
pressures to provide private goods taking precedence 212–13
variation and puzzles 219–24
Lemarchand, R. 110
Lessman, C. 135
Li, H. 279
Limongi, F. 113, 125
Lindberg, Staffan I. 6–7, 225
Lindstedt, C. 134, 137–8, 142
*Logic of Political Survival, The* (Bueno de Mesquita) 125
Lundgreen, P. 43
Madagascar 212
Mahoney, J. 259
Malaysia
- impartiality 30
- quality of government 106
Malta 30
*Managerial Dilemmas* (Miller) 157
Mangu, André Mbata B. 198
Mani, M. 295
March, James B. 16
Markwardt, G. 135
Mauritania 212
Mauritius 281–2
Médard, Jean-François 254
Members of Parliament (MPs)
- measuring impartiality among MPs 214–19
- MP–citizen relationship in Ghana 224–5
Messick, R.E. 286–7
Mexico
- corruption 235–6
- legacy of the past 241–2
- and women see why women are less corrupt than men
government 235
accountability mechanisms
- incomplete 239
- election of women 237
- subsidies for irrigation systems 306
- women's visibility 237
Migdal, Joel 201
Milgrom, P. R. 287
Mill, John Stuart 26–7
Millennium Declaration 277
Millennium Development Goals 286, 291
Miller, Garry 154, 157
Mocan, Naci 233
Moldova
- impartiality 30
- public administration 58
Montinola, G.R. 110
Morris, Stephen D. 235, 236
Morocco 30
Morse, S. 294
Mozambique
- impartiality 30
- public administration 53
Mugabe, Robert 202
Mungiu-Pippidi, Alina 280, 287, 297
Museveni, President 196, 204
Myrdal, Gunnar 263
Naim, M. 181
Nasiritousi, Naghmeh 6, 8
National Endowment for Democracy 279
National Science Foundation 1–2
Naurin, D. 134, 137–8, 142
Nepal
- impartiality 29
- public administration 53
Netherlands 304
- public administration 44, 53, 151
- quality of government 105, 106
Neumayer, E. 295
new public management (NPM) reforms 40, 41, 45
- NPM reforms and opportunity for corruption 156–7, 161–2, 167
- performance-related pay as core element of NPM 159–60
- and public ethics 93
*New York Times* 1, 105, 303
New Zealand
Index

corruption, control of 71
impartiality 30
public administration 51, 53, 58, 162
Nigeria
corruption 134, 144, 192–3, 203, 204
impartiality 30
North, Douglass C. 16, 18, 255, 256, 259–60, 261, 280, 284, 287, 297
Northcote–Trevelyan Report 154
Norway
impartiality 30
public administration 51, 53, 155
quality of government 106
Nye, Joseph 1
O’Donnell, G. 20
OECD 14
public administration data 59, 60
Olsen, Johan P. 16, 41, 49, 116, 153, 291
open access orders 270, 297
Orwell, George 88
Oscarsson, Henrik 5
Ostrom, Elinor 16, 35, 263
Ott, J.C. 15
PACEK, A.C. 15
Painter, M. 53
Pakistan 30
part of the solution 8, 277–302
corruption debate 284–6
democracy debate 278–80
economic growth debate 278, 280–84
policy outcomes 288–96
environmental outcomes 294–6
public health 291–2
social well-being 290
quality of government is part of the solution 297–8
rule of law debate 286–8
terms describing a ‘basic norm’ for QoG 297
path dependency 256–7, 282
changing patterns of path dependence 257–8
Pellegrini, L. 306–7
Persson, Anna 6, 7–8, 35, 194
Peru
corruption 22, 279
quality of government 108
Peters, B.G. 53
Pickett, K. 320
Platonian–Leninist alternative to democracy 18
Plattner, M. 212
Plümper, T. 139
political regimes and quality of government 105–29
authoritarian regimes 111
autocracy to democracy and environmental degradation 296
autocrats as ‘roving’ or ‘stationary’ bandits 116
classification of authoritarian regimes 115
dictators providing higher QoG the longer their time horizons 116–17
differences in QoG among authoritarian regimes 109
different types of authoritarian regimes 115
impact of regime-type on QoG 120–25
impact of single-party regime on QoG and economic development 116
monarchies, military dictatorships, personalistic regimes 115, 116–17, 121–5
single-party systems 115–16, 121–5
time horizons’ impact on regime types and QoG 124–5
time horizons, measuring 117, 122–3
top-down control capacity over official and employees 111
conclusions 125–6
empirical evidence 118–25
impact of democracy on QoG and economic levels 116, 118–20
impact of regime-type within non-democracies 120–25
an ‘exit, voice and loyalty’ theory of QoG 114–17
citizens in free elections using exit
Good government

mechanism of voting 114–15, 116

dictators following classical supply-side explanation 116–17

implicit social contract based on loyalty in regimes with no exit or voice 116

mechanisms of exit and voice to prevent deterioration of supply 114

QoG in regimes based on loyalty resulting from rulers’ self-interest 117

QoG in regimes with exit/voice partly resulting from citizens’ demands 117

single-party regimes developing voice for improving performance 116

supply factors the only factors that matter in regimes based on loyalty 116

non-linear relationship between level of democracy and level of QoG 105–7, 153

two key literatures 108–14

culturalist view: demand-side factors 112–14

institutionalist view: supply-side factors 109–12, 114

vast majority of top performers in QoG as democracies 105

Political Risk Services (PSR)


International Credit Risk Guide Methodology 59, 60

political science and importance of good government 1–8

factors differentiating research and making it relevant for human well-being 2–2

relevance of political science 1–2

poor countries see developing countries and poor countries

Porter, M.E. 295

Portugal
corruption 145

public administration 155

post-materialism 321, 323

poverty

bad for happiness 319, 320

and corruption 285

growth in average incomes reducing poverty 290

institutions and state bureaucracies

importance of quality of institutions 304

institutional reform initially increasing poverty 283–4

more efficient institutions leading to less poverty 283

poor countries lacking institutions for Washington Consensus policies 15

strengthening poverty reduction 40

and QoG 283–4, 290–91

good governance and pro-poor growth 284

good governance reforms not sufficient to reduce poverty 283

importance of good governance in eradicating poverty 174, 277

press freedom and corruption 5, 130–49

citizens’ access to media content/information crucial for efficient markets 131, 136

definitions of press freedom 130–31

empirical analyses – data and method 137–9

multiple indicators of corruption 138

new estimation technique 138–9

replication 137–8

looking beyond direct effects of press freedom and corruption 145

press freedom and corruption 130–37

clear correlation between press freedom and corruption 133–4

decentralization and corruption 135

education’s impact on corruption 133–4
expected benefits from corruption balanced against expected costs 132–3
influence of religion 132
international social and political openness and corruption 135
political institutions and corruption 134
probability of being caught dependent on country’s legal system 132
reducing political influence over media as best way to reduce corruption 136
relationship driven by political and economic environment 136
role of media on transparency/information 131, 133, 135
sanctioning mechanisms, public’s access to 133
transparency and corruption, relationship between 134
robust effects of press freedom on corruption 139–45
press freedom/corruption and levels of democracy 144–5
principal–agent framework and absence of agents to monitor/punish corrupt behaviour 253
bureaucratic corruption, rulers as principals and bureaucracy as agent in 253
as conception of anti-corruption problem 69, 78–9, 83
framework fitting non-systemic corruption 251
origins of corruption traceable to agent’s information advantage 131
standard conceptualization of corruption 251, 252–4
corruption occurring when the agent betrays principal’s interest 195–6, 253
defined by asymmetry of information between principal and agent 131, 195, 252–3
key assumptions on which principal–agent model based 252
leaders facing multiple principals receiving contradictory messages 200–201
MP–citizen relationship in Ghana 224–5
political corruption, rulers as agents and citizens as principals in 253
principal controlling the agents through formal mechanisms 196
transparent information about the agent not necessarily reaching the principal 134
professional norms 91
Prussia 43
Przeworski, A. 113, 115, 125
public administration accountability 13, 21, 93, 135, 156, 168–9
bureaucracy see bureaucracy
civil service reforms and low pay problem 283
impartiality and public ethics see impartiality and the need for a public ethics of care
institutions see institutions
publicness of 91
professional norms 91, 92
public organizations differing from private ones 91
Weberian see Weberian bureaucracy and corruption prevention
worldwide see public administration around the world
public administration around the world 4, 40–67
bureaucratic structures in the real world 49–58
focus on human resources dimensions of Weberian bureaucracy 49
four different types of bureaucracies 58
see also bureaucracy
cross-source validation 58–60
Dahlström survey 58–9
OECD data 59, 60
PRS International Credit Risk Guide Methodology 59, 60
data collection 47–8

Sören Holmberg and Bo Rothstein - 9780857934932
Downloaded from Elgar Online at 03/28/2019 08:16:46AM via free access
dimensions of bureaucracy 43–4, 62–3
closedness 41, 43, 44, 51–2, 53–7, 59–60, 151
professionalism 41, 43, 44, 49, 51–5, 57, 59–60
impact of bureaucratic structures 40–41
key characteristics of bureaucratic structures 42–4
employment system as useful way of classifying public bureaucracies 42–4
questionnaire design 44–7
considerations motivating questionnaire design 45–6
purpose/goal of QoG Survey 41, 44
reasons for few large cross-country comparisons 40–41
respondent perception bias 60–62
public ethics of care see impartiality and the need for a public ethics of care
public health see under health
Puerto Rico 31
Putnam, R.D. 152–3
Qatar 106, 108
quality of government (QoG) and access to safe water see access to safe water
‘basic norm’ for QoG, terms describing 297
capture see capture
concepts of quality of government, good governance, state capacity 13–14
corruption debate 284–6 see also corruption
defining and measuring see defining and measuring quality of government
and democracy debate 278–80 see also democracy
economic development debate 278, 280–84, 317–18 see also economic development
effects and significance of QoG see part of the solution
electoral mechanisms see legislators and variation in quality of government
and environmental outcomes 294–6
‘exit, voice and loyalty’ theory see under political regimes and quality of government
and happiness/human well-being see happiness and human well-being
and inequality 290–91
and international organizations see international organizations promoting quality of
and leaders see to eat or not to eat in public office
measuring see defining and measuring quality of government
negative consequences of bad governance 15–16
policy outcomes of QoG see under part of the solution
and political regimes see political regimes and quality of government
and poverty 283–4, 290–91
public administration see public administration
and public health 291–2 see also access to safe water
quality of government theory and rule of law 87
rule of law debate 286–8 see also rule of law
and self-expression values 113–14
Quality of Government (QoG) Institute 2, 28
QoG Survey/dataset 4, 8, 119–20, 159–60, 277, 320 see also under public administration around the world
Ráby, N. 16
Radcliff, B. 15
Rajkumar, A.S. 292
Rauch, James 40–41, 42–3, 45–6, 49, 60, 153, 165, 174
Rawls, John 23, 24, 25, 26
Index

Rediscovering Institutions (March/Olsen) 16

religion
and corruption 132, 152–3
positive effect on happiness 319, 321, 323–4

Resnick, D. 297

rethinking the nature of the grabbing hand 7–8, 194, 251–73
collective action problem of systemic corruption 262–3
corruption as an informal institution 254–7
corruption as a ‘frequency-dependent equilibrium’ 257
informal institutions highly resistant to change as path dependent 256
re-framing systemic corruption as an informal institution fitting reality 254–5
self-reinforcing nature of corruption as an informal institution 255, 256
systemic corruption as unwritten, socially shared rules 254
types of informal institutions 255–6
costs and benefits of corruption vis-à-vis honesty in corrupt settings 264–9
corruption as a means of bypassing inefficient institutions 266–7
discrepancies across groups in distributing benefits from corruption 266–8
punishing corrupt behavior costly where no state-provided alternative 264–6
sanctions on whistleblowers where corruption is the rule 266
distinguishing characteristics of systemic versus non-systemic corruption 251
mechanisms of reproduction of systemic corruption 260–62
functionalist mechanisms of reproduction 260
ideational mechanisms of reproduction 261–2
material mechanism of reproduction 262
micro foundations of institutional reproduction 257–60
functionalist accounts, strong and weak versions of 258
importance of bargaining power in institutional change 259–60
legitimation framework 258–9
utilitarian accounts, liberal and power-centred versions of 259
principal-agent model as standard conceptualization of corruption 251, 252–4
assumption that corruption is deviant behavior often unfounded 253
corruption as the norm in many countries 253–4
ruling systems of most countries as neo-patrimonial 253
rethinking the nature of the grabbing hand 269–70
fight against corruption and resilience of systemic corruption 269
need to tilt systems to universalism, open access order, impartiality 270
reverse causality 152–3, 232, 281

Riley, Stephen 192
Rios-Cázare, Alejandra 239
Rodríguez, Victoria E. 243
Rodrik, Dani 15, 281, 288
Romania 13
Rose-Ackerman, Susan 78, 181, 195, 252, 286
Rotberg, R.I 177–8, 193–4
Rothstein, Bo 3–4, 7–8, 16, 174, 210, 287, 297
Ruddick, Sarah 94

rule of law 15, 17
and corruption 295
and economic development 286–8
effects of 142
good governance as 20–21
as an institution 287
as a ‘luxury good’ 287
meaning and definitions of 20–21
and moral values of liberal
democracy 20
as part of governance 16
as a public good 19
quality of government
rule of law debate in QoG 286–8
and rule of law theory 87
Russia
corruption 134
privatizations 287
public administration 57
Rwanda 244–5
Samanni, Marcus 8, 15, 318
Sandholtz, W. 120, 176, 177, 185
Sayari, S. 110
Scott, J.C. 110
Self, Peter 154
self-expression values 113–14
Sen, A. 106, 108, 126
sequencing 14
Shepherd, A. 283
Silberman, B. 44
Singapore 22
corruption 134, 144, 193
quality of government 106, 280
Sjöstedt, Martin 6, 305
Slovak Republic 134
Smith, R.J. 294
social well-being see under happiness
and human well-being
socialization theory 176
Somalia
corruption, control of 71
quality of government 108
South Korea 41, 53
Spain
public administration 41, 43–4, 51,
53, 151, 155, 157–8, 162, 164,
167–8
quality of government 112
state capacity 13
concepts of quality of government,
good governance, state capacity
13–14
and legal command 198
see also defining and measuring
quality of government
state legitimacy and the corruptibility
of leaders 6, 191–209
and good governance 13
importance of behaviour of leaders
for society free of corruption
191
leadership effect in the fight against
corruption 192–4
corrupt leaders setting a bad
example though shaping
behaviour 194
leaders’ behaviour crucial in fight
against corruption 191, 192–4
poor leadership hindering
development 193
to eat or not to eat in public office
203–5
leaders failing to reform and
acting corruptly 204
varying corruptibility of leaders
195–9
formal constraints needing
economic/administrative
capacity back up 197–8
lack of effect of formal constraints
on leadership behaviour 195,
196–7
leaders benefiting relatively more
from corruption than acting
honestly 195
some leaders more predatory 195
state capacity and legal command
198
state legitimacy constraining
opportunities and incentives of
leaders 6, 191–2
state legitimacy and the propensity to
eat in public office 199–203
definition of state legitimacy
199–200
empirical support for argument
that state legitimacy constrains
leaders 201–2
illegitimate political systems and
leaders’ insecure power base
199–200
lack of shared social contract
implying weakening of societal
control 200
lack of social contract and leaders' shorter time horizon/self-enrichment 201
state legitimacy gearing leaders towards honest behaviour 200–201
Stensöta, Helena Olofsdotter 4, 27
Stigler, G. 78
Stolle, D. 16, 287
Strömberg, Häkan 297
Summers, Lawrence 304
Sung, Hung-En 153, 232, 237
Swamy, A. 232
Swaroop, V. 292
Sweden 304
corruption, control of 71
case study 72–4, 79, 81
gender equality in Parliament 244, 245
public administration 51, 53, 155, 156–7, 164
quality of government 105, 106 and economic growth 282
Switzerland 24, 304
public administration 44
Tanzania 323
Teorell, Jan 3–4, 7–8, 16, 106, 115, 174, 210, 297, 318
Thacker, S.C. 180–81
Thailand 233
Thelen, K. 257–8
time horizons
dictators providing higher QoG the longer their time horizons 116–17
lack of social contract and leaders’ shorter time horizon/self-enrichment 201
time horizons’ impact on regime types and QoG 124–5
time horizons, measuring 117, 122–3
Torgler, B. 232
Transparency International 15, 31, 76, 13, 159, 177, 277, 320
*Global Corruption Report 2008* 291–2, 293, 303–4, 305
Mexico, corruption in 235–6
press freedom 130
Treisman, D. 131–3, 136, 152
Troeger, V.E. 139
Tronto, Joan 27, 98
Tunisia 144
Turkey 110
Turkmenistan 108
Uganda
corruption 196, 202, 204, 262
costs and benefits see under rethinking the nature of the grabbing hand
lack of effect of formal constraints on leadership behaviour 196–7
United Arab Emirates
corruption 144
impartiality 31
United Kingdom
advent of democracy, reasons for 113
focus on social role of law 132
Northcote-Trevelyan Report 154
public administration 43, 44, 51, 53, 151, 162
QoG and economic growth 282
United Nations (UN)
anti-corruption policy 192
climate change measures 182
Commission on Crime Prevention and Criminal Justice, UN 286
Declaration of Human Rights, UN 17, 92
Development Programme, UN 142
capacity building programmes 198
Fourth World Conference of Women 237
Global Programme against Corruption, UN 284
and good governance 13, 277–8
Human Development Report 277–8
Millennium Declaration 277
Statistics Division 160
UNCTAD 179
United States 24
governance reforms and economic development 281–2
National Science Foundation,
whether funding should be cut from 1–2
good government 44, 151
universalism 270, 280
definition 297
Uslaner, E.M. 70
utilitarianism 23
Uzbekistan 57
Valev, N.T. 232
Venezuela 30
Vietnam 323
Vlaicu, R. 110
voice
and accountability 17, 281
‘exit, voice and loyalty’ theory of QoG see under political regimes and quality of government
VonDoepp, P. 193
Wade, R. 110
Wängnerud, Lena 7, 236
Washington Consensus 14–15
water see access to safe water
Water Integrity Network 304
Weber, Max 4
characteristics of ideal-type Weberian bureaucracy 49, 51
definition of a legitimate state 199–200
employment relationships core of Weberian bureaucracy concept 42, 88
impartiality 93
necessity of a politically independent civil service 154
Protestant work ethic theory 152
rational–legal system of rule 253
unavoidable organizational conflict within modern bureaucracies 42
Weberian rigid rule-following 28, 92
‘Weberian state hypothesis’ 41, 42–3
‘Weberianess Scale’ 43
Weberian bureaucracy and corruption prevention 5–6, 150–73
bureaucratic dinosaur is back 152–4
cultural values/factors 152–3
democracy and corruption 153
importance of bureaucratic institutions against political institutions 153
importance of economic development 153
Weberian bureaucracy meaning different things 153
four ways of separating activities of politicians and administrators 156–8
hypotheses from bureaucracy as separation of politicians and bureaucrats 158
public jobs should follow a closed system 157–8
traditional public management preferable to NPM organization 156–7
relationship between four ways of separating activities of politicians/administrators effects of separation of activities 161–7
method and data 158–60
separate careers but not separate activities 167–9
arrangements following separation of careers principle curb corruption 169
individuals with different interests taking decisions over the residual 169
isolating activities of administration not effective to curb corruption 167–8
separating public servants and politicians 150–52, 153–6
distinction between open and closed civil service systems 151, 157–8, 169
four ways of separating activities of politicians and administrators 156–8
separating activities or careers 151–2, 154–6
Weder, B. 133–4, 135
Weingast, B.R. 20
welfare state see impartiality and the need for a public ethics of care
Welzel, C. 112, 113–14, 153
Werner, S.B. 191
White, G. 153
White, Julie 98
why women are less corrupt than men 7, 230–50
deviant cases 243–5
incremental and fast track models towards increased gender equality 243–4
variation at subnational level in terms of socioeconomic stratification 245
gender decisive for behaviour in many spheres of society 230–31
gender perspective 237–8
number of women elected to municipal legislatures/corruption level 237, 242
gender perspective, elaborating 239–41
gender equality 240–41
socioeconomic stratification 239
strategy of contrasting cases 239
legacy of the past 241–2
Mexican case 234–6
need for framework where multiple theories study gender/corruption 230
previous research 231–4
corrupt subsystems 233
experimental research 234
indirect effect of gender/women’s behaviour as passive rejection 233
mechanisms suggesting internalized instead of conscious behaviour 232
opportunity structures theories 232–3, 242
possibility of reversed causality 232
societies that elect large numbers of women are less corrupt 230, 231–2
rationality perspective 242–3
women’s reasons to abstain from corrupt behavior 243
Wilkinson, R. 320
Wilson, Woodrow 154
Wolfensohn, James D. 285
Wollscheid, J. 295–6
women and corruption see why women are less corrupt than men
care ethics as a field for women 94
World Bank
anti-corruption strategy 181, 183, 192
capacity building programmes 198
civil liberties and successful investment projects 279
climate change measures 182
corruption
perception of 285
redefined as an economic problem 179, 285
gender and corruption research 231
good governance 13, 21, 23, 277
norms 176
governance database 42
government effectiveness measure 119, 277, 307, 320
as an international organization teaching norms 176
investment decisions
attempts to make countries use investment profit to improve government 179
conditionality schemes 180
political considerations not taken into account 179
recognition of investment benefits in countries with high QoG 178
Mexico, corruption in 235
press freedom 130
rule of law index 277, 290
Worldwide Governance Indicators 15, 17, 31, 40, 122–3, 177
**Good government**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Organization/Source</th>
<th>Pages</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>World Bank Research Institute</td>
<td>17, 31</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>World Business Environment survey</td>
<td>76, 78</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>World Development Index</td>
<td>119</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>World Health Organization</td>
<td>8, 304</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>see also</strong> access to safe water</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>World Values Survey</td>
<td>4, 76, 232, 319, 320</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wright, J.</td>
<td>117, 121, 122–3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wrong, Michela</td>
<td>191, 197, 200–201</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Young, Iris Marion</td>
<td>95</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Zimbabwe</td>
<td>202</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>