Index

‘8.10 Incident’ 141
327 incident 172–3

A shares 70–71, 73, 115, 186–7
accountability 100
accountants, sanctions against 147, 148
accounting firms 41, 78, 122–5
sanctions against 147, 148
accounting standards index 11
administrative sanction rates 144–5
administrative system 147–9, 152
adverse selection 105, 175
advertising 18
agency problem
dealing with 9–11
in gatekeepers 42
in SOEs 58
theory of corporate governance 7–9
Agricultural Development Bank of China 85
Agriculture Bank of China (ABC) 85
Allen, F. 1–2, 31
Anglo-American governance model 3,
48–9, 196–7
anti-director index 11, 12
Anti-Rightist Campaign 152
arbitration 23–5, 30
arbitration forums 29
artificial segmentation 70–71
Asian financial crisis 33, 37, 50
asset management 173–5
asset management corporations
(AMCs) 64, 87
attorneys 40, 41, 125
auditors 40, 122–5
external 100
authority, judicial 152–4
autonomy 109
lack of for the media 126–30

lack of for non-state third-party
enforcers 111
lack of for stock exchanges 113–14
B shares 71, 74
bail-out
forced 168
of investment banks 172–5
of listed companies 170–71
of state-owned commercial banks 64,
87
bank deposits 180
Bank of China (BOC) 85, 87
New York branch 84
banks/banking
China 64, 84–93
banking reform 91–3
Big Four 84–6
failure of the banking system
86–91
NPLs 37, 64, 68, 86–7, 88
relational banking 36–7
barring from the market 146, 148
Barzel, Y. 15, 26, 27
Ben Gang Ban Cai 179
Berglof, E. 7
Bernstein, L. 23–4, 29
Big Four accounting firms 41, 124
Big Four banks 84–6
bilateral relationship 19
Chinese stock market 77, 84–101
in corporate context 36–8
Blair, M. 7
board of directors 65, 97
board of supervisors 65, 98
bond markets
control in China 180–81
inter-country comparison 181, 182
bundled listing 167–8
Index

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Term</th>
<th>Page</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>class actions 44–5</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Coffee, J. 39, 41–2, 107–8</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>collateral 16, 17–18, 35, 78</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>commercialization of media 127–8</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Committee on the Financial Aspects of</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Corporate Governance (Cadbury Report) 6–7</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>common law 11</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Companies Act 1948 (UK) 53, 54</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Company Law 1993 (China) 70, 155, 158</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Company Law 2005 (China) 155, 160</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>large shareholders 98–9, 100–101</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>competence, judicial 157</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>competition</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>between stock exchanges 83, 114–15</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>investment banks 119–20</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>concentration of ownership 33, 51</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>China 74–5</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Confucianism 108, 149–50</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>content control 128–30</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>contingency fees 44–5</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>control rights 95–6</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>residual 8–9</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>corporate bonds 180–81</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>corporate governance 2–3, 4, 6–15, 194,</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>195–6</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>agency theory of 7–9</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Anglo-American model 3, 48–9, 196–7</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>conception and significance 6–7</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>dealing with the agency problem 9–11</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>enforcement in corporate context 34–55</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>as an enforcement issue 12–15, 55</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>corporatism 110–11</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>corporatization 60, 65</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>correction orders 146, 148</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>corruption</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>banking system 90</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>judicial 156–7</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>media 131</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>quota system and 168</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>regulatory 140–43</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>corruption index 11</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>cost of information 50</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>of litigation 28–9, 44–5</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>of regulation 46</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>courts</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>efficacy of 45</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>lack of independence and authority 152–4</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>private enforcement of law 16, 43–5, 47,</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>147–62</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>see also judicial system; private</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>securities litigation (PSL)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>credit rating agencies 40, 125</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>creditor rights index 11, 12–13</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>creditors, large 84–93</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>criminal organizations 22–3, 33</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>crises 50</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Asian financial crisis 33, 37, 50</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>government response to the 2008 crisis 92–3</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>investment banks and 172–3</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>critical reporting 129, 130–31, 131–2</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>crony capitalism 33, 89</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>cronyism 88–9</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>cross-listing 35, 36, 78–84</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cultural Revolution 109, 152</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>cumulative voting 100–101</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>currency inconvertibility 181–2</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Czech Republic 1, 165</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dam, K. 14</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dapeng Securities 187–8</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Daqing Lianyi 119, 159, 161</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>debt-equity conversion 64</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>debt financing 175–6</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>delisting 106–7, 168</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>rate 170</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Deloitte 124</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Delong, B. 9</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Deng Pufang 138</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Deng Xiaoping 63, 136–7</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Denis, D. 7</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>deposit interest rate 91, 180</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>developing and transition countries 4, 27</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>47, 196–8</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>diamond industry 24</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>directors</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>board of 65, 97</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>independent 99–100</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
disclosure rules 48
dividend payout ratio 183–4
dividend yields 184
Dixit, A. 21, 23, 25, 32, 33
Dongfang Boiler 119
Dyck, A. 42–3
dysfunctional public order 30–34, 50–4

‘East Asian Miracle’ 31–2
Economic Observer 131–2
economic reform 109, 154–5
efficiency of the judicial system index 11
elites 137–8
Ellickson, R. 28
emperor 149
employee shares 73–4
employment 80
enforcement 4, 5, 12–56, 194
  broad approach to 15
centrality in transition/developing countries 12–15
  in China’s stock market 5, 77–163
  bilateral relationship 77, 84–101
  non-state third-party enforcement 77, 107–34, 162
  reputation 77, 101–7
  self-enforcement 77, 78–101, 162
  state enforcement 77, 134–62
  weakness of 5, 189–90, 190–2
  in corporate context 34–55
general framework for 15–34
‘enforcement matters’ thesis 55–6, 164–5, 192
Enron scandal 41–2
entry regulation 178–80
equity finance 167
  Chinese preference for and rent seeking 175–80
  ethnicity-based networks 32, 33
Europe 45
exploitation 95–101
Export-Import Bank of China 85
expropriation 8, 9, 50
external auditors 100
extraterritorial law enforcement 82–4

Fafchamps, M. 33
Fan, H. 96
Fan Xiaowei 143
Feng, W. 121
financial bonds 181
financial repression 180–82, 196, 197
fines 146, 148
force 130–31
forced bail-out 168
forced private ordering 30–34, 50–54
foreign-invested enterprises 61
foreign shares 71, 74
foreign strategic investors 92
formal enforcement 55, 134, 62, 194
  by the state 134–9
  in natural states 137–8
  weak and failure of auditors 123
Foss v. Harbottle 52–3
Franks, J. 54
fraud 52
free-rider problem 44–5
Friedman, M. 25
Fukuyama, F. 135
fund management companies 187, 188
Galaxy Securities 174
Gao Shan 90
gatekeepers 40–42
  Chinese stock market 116–25
GDP growth rate 191
generalization 197–8
Germany 36–7, 108, 182
Goldman Sachs 121, 122
Gomes, A. 9
  ‘grasp the big’ policy 61, 63–6
Gray, C. 32
Greif, A. 32, 33
Guo Min Dang (GMD) 109
Guo Shuqing 198
Guojin Securities 142
Guotai Junan 119, 174
Guoxin Securities 120
H shares 71, 74
  Chinese stock market 78–84
He Yuan 147
Hermitage 42
Hong Guang Industrial 119, 158
Hong Kong 49, 50, 165
Hong Kong Stock Exchange (HKSE) 71, 185
hostages 16, 17, 18, 34–5, 78
Hu Shuli 132–3
Huang Songyou 156–7
Huaxia Securities 188
Hubei Lihua 123

insider control see internal/insider
centralization
insider privatization 61–3
insider trading 144–5, 189–90
institution building 51
sequence of 197
institutional investors 186, 187–90
institutionalized rent seeking 175–80,
196, 197–8
interest rate 91
control 180
effective interest rates 180, 181
internal/insider control 81–2, 178
weak and the failure of the banking
sector 90–91
international investment banks 121–2
international trade 24
investment banks 78, 146–7
bail-out of 172–5
gatekeepers 40, 41, 116–22
investment value of listed companies
183–4
investor protection 1–2, 10–11, 195–6
developing and transition countries
12–13
weak for minority shareholders
98–101
investors, number of 165–6

Jackson, H. 14
Japan 22, 31, 33, 86, 182
relational banking 36, 37
Jian Liantong 89
Jiang Zemin 63
Jin Yu Group 179
job insecurity 102
Johnson, S. 13–14, 50
joint stock companies (JSCs) 60
Jones, C. 31
Judges Law 1995 157
judicial system 152–4
competence of the judiciary 157
corruption 156–7
efficiency of the judicial system
index 11

Kaien Gufen 131–2
Corporate governance, enforcement and financial development

Kan Zhidong 147
Kang Sai case 168
Korea, South 31, 86, 182
Kornai, J. 58
KPMG 124
Kreps, D. 9

L shares 71, 74
La Porta, R. 1, 10–11
Lan Tian 105
Lang, H. 104
large creditors 84–93
Lang Xianping (Larry Lang) 62
large shareholders 37, 49–50
China 93–101
dominance of 97–8
strong in exploitation 95–101
weak in monitoring 93–5
Lau, C. 74
‘law and economics’ school 3, 9–10,
195–6, 196–7
‘law and finance’ school 1–2, 3, 10, 12,
195–6, 196–7
law firms 40, 41, 125
Lazzarini, S. 30
legal enforcement 10–11, 12–15
legal person shareholder 94–5
legal person shares 70, 72–3
legal reform 197, 199
legal system
China’s 147–57
current system 152–7
legal tradition 147–52
impact on private ordering 49–50
Legalism 150
Lei Bo 142
lending decisions, bad 87
see also non-performing loans
(NPLs)
‘let-go the small’ policy 61–3
Li (Confucian moral code) 149–50
Li, D. 142–3
Li Kejun 143
Li Minying 130
liability rules 44, 48
licensing system 128
limited liability companies (LLCs) 60,
62
limiting access order see natural states
listed companies 72–5, 198
bail-out of 170–71
concentration of ownership 74–5
low investment value 183–4
ownership structure 72–4
performance of and economic
performance 167–9
state ownership 69, 74, 75, 198–9
listing
cross-listing 35, 36, 78–84
quota system 2, 103–4, 166–9, 195
listing rules 54
Liu Baochun 170
Liu Binyan 155
Liu Bo 147
Liu, G. 75
Liu Jinbao 89, 90
local business community 52–4
local governments 109, 124–5
interference in courts 153–4
silencing the media 130–31
local officials 168
local stock markets 53–4
London Stock Exchange (LSE) 39, 52,
71, 107, 185
Listing Rules 54
Lopez-de-Silanes, F. 1
Lotus Gourmet 100
Lou, F. 74
Lu, L. 90
Lüliang (‘Mr K’) 125
Luneng Group 133
macro economy, deviation from 191
Mafia 22
Mai Kete 105, 119
management buyouts (MBOs) 62–3
managerial ownership 74
manipulation
of data 104–5
of the market 145, 187–90
Mao Zedong 136–7
market capitalization 1, 164–5
market manipulation 145, 187–90
Index

market segmentation 70–71, 188–9
McConnell, J. 7
McMillan, J. 32
media 42–3
China 125–34
Merrill Lynch 121
Michie, R. 53
Milgrom, P. 23
Min Sheng Bank 85
Ministry of Finance (MOF) 63, 84–5, 87, 174
minority shareholders 37–8, 49
weak protection in China 98–101
misappropriation of clients’ capital 173–5
mixed enforcement 27–8
in corporate context 47–9
monetary policy response to the financial crisis 92–3
monitoring, weak 93–5
moral hazard 88
Morgan Stanley 121, 122
N shares 71, 74
Nanfang Securities 119, 146–7, 187
National Audit Office 122
National Electronic Trading System (NETS) 114–15
National People’s Congress (NPC) 141, 153
national stock exchanges 67
natural states 135–8, 197
China as a natural state 136–7
formal enforcement in 137–8
networks
forced private ordering 30–34
patron–client 136, 139
New Institutional Economics (NIE) 4, 6, 195
New York Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Arbitral Awards 30
New York Stock Exchange (NYSE) 71, 185
self-regulation 52
third-party enforcement 39, 107, 111, 112–13, 114
non-performing loans (NPLs) 37, 64, 68, 86–7, 88
non-state third-party enforcement 22–5, 26–7
Chinese stock market 77, 107–34, 162
in corporate context 38–43
non-tradable shareholders 177–8
non-tradable shares 69–70, 96
North, D. 15, 26, 134–6, 197
number of investors 165–6
observable information 21
one-shot games/transactions 16–18, 34–6
open access order 136, 197
opportunism 8, 17–18, 35, 48, 50
optional private ordering 28–30, 49–50
organizations
ability to form 135
social 110–11
overseas listing 35, 36, 71, 78–84, 105
Chinese banks 92–3
ownership
concentrated 33, 51, 74–5
need for ownership reform 198–9
private 59
SOE reform with ownership change 61–6
SOE reform without ownership change 60–1
state see state-owned enterprises (SOEs); state ownership
structure of listed companies 72–4
Pacific Securities Company 142–3
‘packaging for listing’ 96, 103–4, 119
Paris Bourse 108
partial privatization 65
party-state see state
‘party supervises the cadre’ rule 81
patron–client networks 136, 139
pecking order theory 175–6
Peerenboom, R. 156
People’s Bank of China (PBOC) 84–5, 87, 141, 174
CSDCC 174–5

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People’s Court News 127
People’s Daily 126, 127, 198
People’s Liberalization Army (PLA) 136–7
PetroChina 79–81
Ping An 178
Pistor, K. 1–2, 5, 12, 164, 192, 195, 196
critique of Pistor and Xu’s argument 166–9
Poland 165
policy development banks 85
political intervention 79–81
Political-Legal Committees (PLCs) 153
power 108–9
Prague Stock Exchange (PSE) 1
price distortion 80
pricing of IPOs 118
private arbitration 23–5, 30
private enforcement of law 16
China 147–62
current legal system 152–7
legal tradition 147–52
corporate context 43–5, 47
private information 21
private ordering 15, 28–34
in corporate context 49–55
in the shadow of the law 28–30,
49–50
under dysfunctional public order 30–34, 50–54
private ownership 59
private securities litigation (PSL) 44–5
China 101, 147, 157–62, 162–3
privately placed funds 187
privatization 61–3
partial 65
profitability 183–4
Propaganda Department of the Central
Committee of the CCP (CPD) 126–7, 128, 129, 133
protection of investors see investor protection
provincial stock exchanges 53–4
public enforcement 16, 43, 46–7
Chinese stock market 139–47, 162
public governance, quality of 58–9
Public Offering Review Committee (PORC) name lists 141
public order, dysfunctional 30–34,
50–54
punishment 20
lack of credibility 168
lack of for investment banks 118
lack of and reputation 106–7
PwC 124
Pye, L. 108–9
pyramid structures 95–6
Qiong Minyuan 138–9
Qiu Ziming 132
Qualified Foreign Institutional Investors (QFIs) 70–71
quan qian game 176–8
quota system 2, 103–4, 166–9, 195
Rajan, R. 53
rat trading (insider trading) 144–5,
189–90
rating agencies 40, 125
Rauch, J. 32
regional trading centres 67
regulation 46–7
of media 130
rents from entry regulation 178–80
regulators 10, 46–7
corruption 140–43
relational banking 36–7
relational contracting 19, 31–3
Ren, M. 121–2
rent-creation 135
rent seeking 168
institutionalized 175–80, 196, 197–8
repeated games/transactions 18–20,
36–8
repression 110
financial 180–2, 196, 197
reprimands 146, 148
reputation 19–20, 24, 38, 41
Chinese investment banks
demand for reputation 117–18
supply of reputation 120–21
Chinese stock market 77, 101–7
lack of incentive to build reputation 102
residual control rights 8–9
natural see natural states

participation in the stock market 71–2

party-state and control of the economy 63–4, 87–8

party-state and control of social organizations 110–11

theory of states 134–6

state capital stock/state net assets conversion ratio 176–7

State Economic and Trade Commission (SETC) 64

state enforcement 25–7

Chinese stock market 77, 134–62

corporate context 43–7

state guarantee 169–75, 196, 197–8

State-owned Assets Supervision and Administration Commission (SASAC) 62–3, 94

state-owned enterprises (SOEs)

asset management 174–5

bad lending pattern of banks 87

bundled listing 167–8

in capitalist and socialist countries 59

cross-listing 78–9

funds for market manipulation 189

inefficiency of 57–9

institutional rent seeking 175–80, 196, 197–8

reform 57–66

with ownership change 61–6

without ownership change 60–61

using the stock market to finance 67–9, 167–8

state ownership 162

banks 64, 84–91

lack of incentive to build reputation 102

listed companies 69, 74, 75, 198–9

state shares 70, 72, 73, 171

Stock Exchange Executive Council (SEEC) 132–3

stock exchanges

competition between 83, 114–15

non-state third-party enforcement 39–40, 111–15

status of 112–14

see also under individual exchanges

stock incentive plans 74

strict majority rule 53

subsidies in listed companies 170–71

Sun, P. 75

Sun Tianzhi 147

supervisory board 65, 98

Supreme People’s Court (SPC) 127

1.15 Tongzhi 159

1.9 Guiding 160

Circular No 406 159

suspension of licences 146, 148

telecom industry 81–2

Tenev, S. 75

Thadden, E. Von 7

theoretical framework 4–5, 6–56

corporate governance 6–15

enforcement 15–55

in corporate context 34–55

general framework 15–34

third-party enforcement 4, 15, 22–7

in corporate context 38–47

non-state see non-state third-party enforcement

state see state enforcement

Tian, J. 74

Tokyo Stock Exchange 185

Tonghai High Tech 119

Tonghua Steel 63

township-village enterprises (TVEs) 61

tradable shareholders 177–8

tradable shares 69–70, 73

market segmentation 70–71

trade associations 23–5

traditional SOEs (TSoEs) 59

transaction-specific assets 18

transition and developing countries 4, 27, 47, 196–8

treasury bond futures (TBF) market 172–3

treasury bonds (TBs) 175, 181

trust 52–4

turnover rate 185

UBS Investment Bank 122

United Kingdom (UK) 107, 182

LSE see London Stock Exchange

trust 52–4
Index

United States of America (USA) 30, 83, 107, 165, 176, 182
Business Judgement Rule 10
NYSE see New York Stock Exchange
private enforcement of law 45
SEC 52, 83, 139, 141, 144
self-regulation 51–2
unofficial economies 27
Upham, F. 31

verifiable information 21
Vietnam 32
Vimpelcom 35, 36
violence 25–7, 130–31
theory of states 134–6
Vishny, R. 1
volatility, extreme 191–2
voting
  constraints on large shareholders’ voting 101
  cumulative 100–101

Wallis, J. 134–6
Wan Guo Securities 172–3
Wang Huayuan 130
Wang, J. 104
Wang Jianzhong 125
Wang Jianzhou 81–2
Wang Xiaochu 82
Wang Xiaoshi 141–2
Wang Xuebing 90
Wang Yi 142–3
warnings 146, 148
weak enforcement 5, 190–92
  and failure of auditors 123
  of insider trading 189–90
Wei Dong 142
Weingast, B. 134–6
Wen Jiabao 79

wholly state-owned limited liability companies (WSOLLCs) 60
Wong, S. 179–80
Wong, T. 96
Woodruff, C. 32
World Bank 14
Wu, J. 96
Wu Liang Ye 179
Xia Bin 187, 189
Xiao Shiqing 143
Xiao Yang 154
Xiao, Z. 98
Xie, P. 90
Xu, C. 1–2, 5, 164, 192, 195, 196
critique of Pistor and Xu’s argument 166–9
Xu, L. 74–5
Xu Weiguo 173
Yakuza 22
Yian Technology 145, 158
Yin Guangxia 104–5, 125–6
Yu Huafeng 130
Yuan, H. 74
Yuan, J. 189

Zhang Enzhao 90
Zhang, T. 96
Zheng Baiwen 105
Zhong Jing Kai (China Economic Development Trust Investment Company) 172–3
Zhong Tianqin 123, 125–6
Zhou Xiaochuan 88
Zhou Zhengyi 89
Zhu, L. 122
Zhu Rongji 112, 122, 167
Zingales, L. 42–3, 53