## Index

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Term</th>
<th>Pages</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>abuse of buyer power</td>
<td>84–7</td>
<td>Competitive harms from the existence and abuse of buyer power, exploitation of producers, seller access and discriminatory or total denial of access to the buying market.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>competition policy for abusive unilateral conduct</td>
<td>16–18</td>
<td>Cartels and competition policy goals.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>employment effects</td>
<td>8–9</td>
<td>Employment effects.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>favoring technology of insiders</td>
<td>210–12</td>
<td>Favoring technology of insiders.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>market regulation to remedy abuse of buyer power</td>
<td>84, 113</td>
<td>Market regulation to remedy abuse of buyer power.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>access</td>
<td></td>
<td>Access.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>competitive harms from the existence and abuse of buyer power</td>
<td>84, 113</td>
<td>Competitive harms from the existence and abuse of buyer power.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>exclusion of competing producers from access to inputs as competitive risk</td>
<td>200–201, 216, 218</td>
<td>Exclusion of competing producers from access to inputs as competitive risk.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>information access concerns and merger policy</td>
<td>234</td>
<td>Information access concerns and merger policy.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>market access, limiting</td>
<td>6–7</td>
<td>Market access, limiting.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>multiple buyers, sellers need to have access to</td>
<td>54–5</td>
<td>Multiple buyers, sellers need to have access to.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>open access to buying markets, opportunity improvement suggestions</td>
<td>151–2</td>
<td>Open access to buying markets, opportunity improvement suggestions.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>retail outlets</td>
<td>58–64</td>
<td>Retail outlets.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>seller access and discriminatory or total denial of access to the buying market</td>
<td>84–7</td>
<td>Seller access and discriminatory or total denial of access to the buying market.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>sellers' access to multiple buyers</td>
<td>54–5</td>
<td>Sellers' access to multiple buyers.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>supplier access to third parties</td>
<td>126</td>
<td>Supplier access to third parties.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Adjemian, Michael</td>
<td></td>
<td>Adjemian, Michael.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>advertising dynamics</td>
<td>63–4, 82, 92</td>
<td>Advertising dynamics.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>agent use, buyer cartels and buyer groups</td>
<td>189, 190–91</td>
<td>Agent use, buyer cartels and buyer groups.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>aggregate welfare</td>
<td></td>
<td>Aggregate welfare.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>cartels and competition policy goals</td>
<td>16, 17–18, 19–20, 21–2, 25, 29, 33, 34, 36</td>
<td>Cartels and competition policy goals.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>and competitive harms and abuse of buyer power, monopsony abuse versus monopoly abuse</td>
<td>113</td>
<td>And competitive harms and abuse of buyer power, monopsony abuse versus monopoly abuse.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>competitive harms from the existence and abuse of buyer power</td>
<td>96, 113</td>
<td>Competitive harms from the existence and abuse of buyer power.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Amazon</td>
<td>6, 114–15</td>
<td>Amazon.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Angotti, Tom</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>Angotti, Tom.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>arbitrage effects</td>
<td>70–71, 85, 233–4, 237, 271</td>
<td>Arbitrage effects.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Aschenfelter, Orley</td>
<td>54</td>
<td>Aschenfelter, Orley.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Asker, John</td>
<td>180, 188, 220, 229, 238</td>
<td>Asker, John.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>auctions</td>
<td></td>
<td>Auctions.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>auction-buying ring as cartel</td>
<td>182, 183</td>
<td>Auction-buying ring as cartel.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>bidding auction model</td>
<td>229</td>
<td>Bidding auction model.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dutch auction suggestion</td>
<td>131–2, 217</td>
<td>Dutch auction suggestion.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Australia</td>
<td></td>
<td>Australia.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Comm’n v Australian Safeway Stores</td>
<td>100, 125</td>
<td>Comm’n v Australian Safeway Stores.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>buyer cartels</td>
<td>207, 212</td>
<td>Buyer cartels.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Competition and Consumer Commission</td>
<td></td>
<td>Competition and Consumer Commission.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>licensing of producer cartels</td>
<td>167–8</td>
<td>Licensing of producer cartels.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>grocery industry as nationwide duopoly</td>
<td>135</td>
<td>Grocery industry as nationwide duopoly.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>merger law</td>
<td>267</td>
<td>Merger law.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TPC v Carlton United Breweries</td>
<td>100, 124–5, 207</td>
<td>TPC v Carlton United Breweries.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Trade Practices Comm’n v Australia
Meat Holdings Pty Ltd.
267
unilateral exclusionary practices
124–5
violations of the competition law
through ‘unconscionable’
conduct 122
Aviram, Amitai 205
Axelrod, Robert 77, 238
Bailey, DeeVon 58
Baker, Donald 113, 197, 216
Baker, Jonathan 83, 98, 101, 196, 236, 257
Balto, David 196
Bar-Isaac, Heski 220
bargaining power 55, 136, 167, 247–50, 259–60
Baumer, David 159
Baumol, William 52
Baxter, William 150
Bell, Robert 250
Benet, Chloé 64
Bhattacharyya, Sugato 84, 213, 257, 259
Binet, Chloë 182, 222, 264, 265
Bjorkroth, Tom 121, 135
Blair, Roger 2, 12, 17–18, 19, 21, 25, 27, 42, 46–7, 48, 83, 129, 163, 183, 187, 194, 195, 196, 247, 249, 255
Boeing 8, 93
Bohannan, Christina 24
Bork, Robert H 26
Botti, Mark 182, 215, 249
Bowman, Ward 187
Bradsher, Keith 50, 95
branded goods
high volume retailers with leverage
over suppliers 234–5
monopolistic competition and
above-cost pricing 82–4
retail sales relationships for branded
and generic goods 6
branded goods and buyer power
definition 58–66
access to retail outlets 58–64
advertising dynamics 63–4, 82, 92
category captains 62–3
competitive harms 92–3, 98–9
defining markets in retail
distribution 64–5
dominant brand 61
house brands or generics and
consumer choice 60
product promotion 60–61
regional market concentration levels
64–5
and resale price maintenance (RPM)
63
retailer excluding a product line,
effects of 63
stocking fees and shelf space 61–2
switching costs 63
thresholds for concern about retailer
buyer power 65–6
Brandeis, Louis 26, 27
BRICS, competition law coordination
279
Brodley, Joseph 185
Bruce, Bill 265
Brunet, Ed 190
Bullard, Bill 213
bundling, buyer-induced bundling of
input purchases 93–4
Bush, Darren 114, 217
buyer cartels and buyer groups,
competition policy see
competition policy for buyer
cartels and buyer groups
buyer power definition 38–78, 271
all-or-nothing contract 45–6
branded goods see branded goods
conventional understanding 43–9
mutual entrenchment in market,
incentives to engage in 48–9
price-cost relationships and costs of
production 44–5
waterbed effect 46
buyer power definition, increasing
relative power 66–75
buyer as decider 67–70
collective bargaining 72–4
commodity exchanges decline 67–9
direct purchase by buyer, negotiating
advantage 67–8, 70
market’s inherent difficulty in
overcoming buyer power 71–5
producer arbitrage, limited
effectiveness of 70–71, 85
Index

public market price as unreliable basis for contract prices 69–70
‘tournament’ system 73
buyer power definition, in input 53–8
buyer side, defining 56–8
elasticity of supply and demand 58
geographic scope of actual and potential sales 56–7
market failure and market power 55
multiple buyer access 54–5
number and size of potential buyers 57
producer defecting to new customer then regretting decision 53–5
producer selling to several buyers at once 57
producers facing high switching costs 58
sources of buyer power 53–6
specialized producers 56
thresholds for concern 58
buying groups see competition policy for buyer cartels and buyer groups, legitimate buying groups

Cai, Xiaowei 68, 75, 213, 229, 236, 238
Calabresi, Guido 33
Campbell, Thomas 196, 257
Canada
321665 Alberta Ltd. v Mobil Oil Can. Ltd. 188
R. v Abitibi Power & Paper Co. 188
Vancouver Malt & Sake Brewing Co. v Vancouver Breweries 33
Wheat Board 164

Capps, Cory 40
Carameli, Leo 62
Carey, Benedict 89
Carlton, Dennis 51, 52, 82, 225
cartels
and aggregate welfare 17–18, 20, 21–2, 25, 33, 34
competition policy see competition policy for buyer cartels and buyer groups
producer see market regulation to remedy abuse of buyer power, offsetting producer power, producer cartels
category captains 62–3, 87

Chen, Zhiqi 43–4
Cheng, Thomas 44, 93, 140, 143, 147
Chevalier, Judith 101
Clarke, Julie 135
Clarke, Roger 12, 43, 235
Cohen, Amy 49, 50, 68, 73
Cohen, Kalman 48, 112
Colino, Sandra 221
collective action 72–4, 114–15, 163–7, 169–70, 199
collusion
buyer collusion to drive down input prices 186–7
and merger policy 228–30, 236–8
monopsony powers and collusive practices 2, 4
tacit and secret, buyer cartels 205–7, 213–14

Comanor, William 20
commodities
commodity-specific market-facilitating regulations 157
exchanges decline 67–9
public authority to regulate marketing 164–5
public commodity markets 57, 70, 85, 86
see also inputs
competition policy
elasticity of supply and adverse competitive effects 252
mergers creating buyer power 241–3
mergers and price reduction from supracompetitive level 232
producer cartels and market regulation to remedy abuse of buyer power 168
and regulation of contract terms 161
competition policy for abusive unilateral conduct by dominant buyers 117–38, 272
competition policy for buyer cartels and buyer groups 221–2
and exploitation of monopoly powers 119–20
policy implications on limits of direct remedy for monopsony 137
waterbed effect 119
Competition policy and the control of buyer power

competition policy for abusive unilateral conduct by dominant buyers, regulatory doctrines 118–34
all-or-nothing contracts 122 and consumer welfare 120–21
discrimination and refusals to buy, addressing 123–4
Dutch auction suggestion 131–2
goals of competition policy applied to monopsonistic conduct 132–3
institutional problem of continued oversight 132 and overbidding 128–30
price offered for purchase as wrongful act 122–3
recouping, effects of 130–31
remedying unreasonable exploitive and exclusionary conduct 131–2
and requirements contracts 122, 125–6
rules governing unjustified exclusionary use of buyer power 124–31
seller conduct cases and legitimate business justification 127–8
unilateral exclusionary practices by buyers 124–5
unjustified exploitation of buyer power 118–23
competition policy for abusive unilateral conduct by dominant buyers, structural remedies to avoid monopsony risk 133–7
concentration reduction and economies of scale 134–5
differentiating between undue buyer exploitation and hard bargaining 136
dissolution remedy 135
efficiency gains concerns 136
competition policy for buyer cartels and buyer groups 179–223, 274–5
competitive risks from buyer power 184
distinguishing buying groups from cartels 191–3
horizontal agreements 180–220
vertical restraints 220–23
waterbed effect 222
see also cartels
competition policy for buyer cartels and buyer groups, buyer cartels and agent use 189
all-or-nothing contracts 194
auction-buying ring as cartel 182, 183
buyer collusion to drive down input prices 186–7
competition policy rethink 213–14
competitive harms and market justifications 194–8
criminal penalties 203–5, 207–8
defectors 197, 204
definition 186–9
economic incentives 184, 195
information exchanges 205–6
input side of market focus 186–7
labour supply agreements 205
market justification for 196–8
public supervision, need for 197–8
tacit and secret collusion 205–7, 213–14
competition policy for buyer cartels and buyer groups, legitimate buying groups
abuse of buying power to favor technology of insiders 210–12
all-or-nothing contracts 193
buying activity integration 192
collective buying 199
competition foreclosure by selecting same supplier 202
competition policy, rethink 214–19
competitive harms and market justifications 194–8
economies of scale 192, 216, 217, 218
efficiency gains 190, 198–9, 202–3, 214, 216–17, 218
exclusion of competing producers from access to inputs as competitive risk 200–201, 216, 218
franchise model 191
incentive to reduce input prices 193, 200
price bargaining 199, 200
price elasticity 192–3, 216
prices below a reasonable competitive level, risk factors 209–10
resale price setting 201, 218–19, 220
safe harbor standards 193, 203
size and purchase volume effects 202–3, 215–16, 217
standard-setting organizations 209–10
competition policy, buyer power as challenge to 1–15, 269–71
competition policy goals 16–37
aggregate welfare 16, 17–18, 19–20, 21–2, 25, 29, 33, 34, 36
consumer welfare 16, 19, 22, 23, 24, 25, 32
and economic theory 17–26
fairness and economic welfare 26–30, 36
Kaldor-Hicks formulation and aggregate welfare 19–20, 22
market competition, promotion and protection 30–35
market failure issues 31
monopolies, existing 34–5
Pareto formulation and aggregate welfare 19, 22
producer welfare 19, 24
product differentiation and seller power 20
resale price maintenance (RPM) 20, 23, 27
restrictions on freedom to compete and exempt transactions 33–4
theory of the second best 26, 32
value subjectivity 20–21, 23
competitive harms and abuse of buyer power 79–116, 271
see also harms
competitive harms and abuse of buyer power, buyer power use to exclude competition 98–105
branded consumer goods 98–9
and consumer welfare 104–5
exclusive input buying 98–100
foreclosure of competition 98–9, 100–101
indirect exclusion 103–4
predatory buying (overbidding) 102–3
resale price maintenance (RPM) 99
small (new) firms and barriers to entry 101, 102, 103–4
supplier refusal to deal, inducing 100–101
and supply uncertainties 99–100
competitive harms and abuse of buyer power, exploitation of producers 79–98
and aggregate welfare 96
all-or-nothing strategy 80–81, 83, 96
branded goods market 82–4, 92–3
buyer incentives to coordinate locations (geographic differentiation) 90–92
buyer-induced bundling of input purchases 93–4
buyer's possession of substantial but undisclosed information about short-term demand for inputs 88–9
category captain status and limitation of competitors 87
corporate welfare effects 84, 95, 96–7
contracting strategies 83–4, 86–8
double marginalization risk 83–4
dual input price system 80
government loan-guarantee program and risk factors 81
horizontal mergers, effects of 84, 95–6
income reduction to exploited producer 94–5
market information distortion 87–9
new entrant barriers and geographic differentiation 90–91
prices below competitive market price 80–84
retailers refusing to carry competing product lines 86–7
retailers and regional diversification 91–2
seller access and discriminatory or total denial of access to buying market 84–7
small firms, effects on 83, 84
stocking fees and slotting allowances 87, 92
Competition policy and the control of buyer power

upstream effects, passing on buyer power pressure 94–6, 97
waterbed effect 81–2, 83
working conditions 94–5
competitive harms and abuse of buyer power, monopsony abuse versus monopoly abuse 105–16
and aggregate welfare 113
all-or-nothing contracts 110
and consumer welfare 113
cooperative production 115
and entry barriers 106, 107, 112–13
foreclosure of competition 114–15
harm measurement and market integrity 105–9
innovation incentives 108–9
institutional limits facilitate exploitation 112–16
monopoly regulation issues 113–14
monopoly–monopsony balance 116
monopsonist buyer decisional control, retaliation and discrimination 111–12
output effect 105–6
producer collective action issues 114–15
producer incentive to increase production to offset reduced income 110–11
product quality issues 108–9
substitution effect 113
traditional measures of monopsonistic impact, understatement of effects 109–11
waterbed effect 111
wealth transfers 106–8
see also monopsony power
concentration levels 134–5, 233–5, 250–51, 259
Connor, John 207
consumer choice, house brands or generics 60
consumer overcharge, and producer cartels 163, 169
consumer welfare 1, 9, 270
and buyer cartels 194, 195
and competition policy for abusive unilateral conduct by dominant buyers 120–21
competition policy goals 16, 19, 22, 23, 24, 25, 32
and competitive harms and abuse of buyer power 84, 95, 96–7, 104–5, 113
merger policy and controlling the creation of buyer power 242
proof of effect on 145–6
contracts
all-or-nothing 45–6, 80–81, 83, 96, 110, 122, 193, 194, 230
basic contract law 149
exclusive dealing 122
exploitation of producers 83–4, 86–8
forward contracting by suppliers 244
and general market conduct regulation 151–4
public market price as unreliable basis for contract prices 69–70
regulation of terms 161
requirements contracts 122, 125–6
cooperative production, competitive harms and abuse of buyer power, monopsony abuse versus monopoly abuse 115
cooperaives 150, 166–7, 169, 173
 Cotterill, Ronald 48, 83
countervailing power 163–7, 168–70, 196–7, 247–50, 259–60
Crane, Daniel 111
Crespi, John 12, 77
criminal penalties, buyer cartels 203–5, 207–8
Cropp, Bob 245
Curtin, John 264
Cyert, Richard 48, 112
Daskalova, Victoria 188
De Fontenay, Catherine 255
De Schutter, Olivier 3, 4
decider, buyer as 67–70
defectors, buyer cartels 197, 204
delivered-pricing schemes 229
Desrochers, Debra 87
Devadoss, Stephen 50
developing countries 4, 5–6, 50, 110, 278
Devlin, Alan 183, 194, 196
Diamond, Peter 54
differential pricing regulation 123
DiLorenzo, Thomas J 11
direct purchase by buyer, negotiating 
advantage 67–8, 70
Dirlam, Joel 149, 151
discounts, secret, and buyer cartels 197
discriminatory practices 123–4, 144–6, 150–51
see also exclusion; exploitation
dissolution remedy, and monopsony 
risk 135
Dobson, Paul 46, 60, 65, 82, 92, 191, 248
Domina, David 151, 173
dominant buyers, and unilateral 
conduct see competition policy for 
abusive unilateral conduct by 
dominant buyers
Dorman, Gary 51, 52, 182, 184, 208, 209, 212
downstream markets 169, 201, 218–19, 220, 239–40
Doyle, Chris 187, 189, 202, 249
Dutch auction suggestion 131–2, 217
see also auctions
Easterbrook, Frank 31
economic theory, and competition 
policy goals 17–26
economies of scale 134–5, 148–9, 192, 216, 217, 218, 246
Eddy, Melissa 115
efficiency effects 
competition policy 18, 28, 136
competition policy for buyer cartels 
and buyer groups 190, 198–9, 202–3, 214, 216–17, 218
exploitation of producers 81
and merger policy 227, 240, 253–6, 258, 259
producer integration 171
elasticities of supply and demand 58, 192–3, 216, 235, 252–3
Elhauge, Einer 94, 239
Elliott, Porter 265
employment issues 4–6, 8–9, 54, 153–4, 
158, 167, 205
wage levels 4–5, 160, 161
entry barriers 101, 102, 103–4, 106, 
107, 112–13, 202, 252
see also small firms
Epstein, Richard 160
Estache, Antonio 183
EU 
and buyer cartels 181, 188, 207, 212, 222
competition law policy and 
consumer welfare 10, 121
Horizontal Merger Guidelines 225
merger system 34, 64, 264–5, 266
restrictions on freedom to compete 
and exempt transactions 33
unilateral exclusionary practices 125
EU, cases
Boeing/McDonnell Douglas 250
British Airways v Comm’n 125
Carrefour/Promodes 248, 264
Comité des Industries 
Cinématographiques des 
Communautés Européennes v 
Comm’n 121
Competition Authority v Beef 
Industry Dev. Soc’y Ltd. 181
Danish Crown/Vestjyske Slagterier 
173, 264
Enso/Stora 222, 250
Fenin v Comm’n 121
Fenin/SNS+Spain 121
Friesland Foods/Campina 173, 264
General Electric/Honeywell 279
Gottrup-Klim Grovvareshopping 
v Dansk Landbrugs 
Grovvareshopping 212
Green Paper on Unfair Trading 
Practices 112, 121–2
Kesko/Tuko 248, 264
Korsnas/AssiDoman Cartonboard 
222
Philips/Intermagnetics 250
Rewel/Meinl 182, 248, 264
T-Mobile Netherlands v Raad van 
bestuur van de Nederlandse 
Mededingingsautoriteit 17, 207
Virgin/British Airways 125
exclusion 
abuses of monopsony power that 
focus on eliminating rival 
buyers, competition policy for 
abusive unilateral conduct by 
dominant buyers, regulatory
doctrines, rules governing unjustified exclusionary use of buyer power 124–5
competition policy for abusive unilateral conduct by dominant buyers 122, 124–31
competition policy for buyer cartels and buyer groups 200–201, 204, 216, 218
competitive harms from the existence and abuse of buyer power 80, 98–100, 103–4
and merger policy 228, 231, 247, 252, 253
retailer excluding a product line, effects of 63
supplier’s exclusionary practices in return for slightly better return 45–6

see also discriminatory practices; exploitation

exploitation
buyer power exploitation 1, 2–4, 270–71
and competition policy 1, 2–4, 270–71
competition policy for abusive unilateral conduct by dominant buyers 118–23, 136
institutional limits facilitate 112–16
market regulation to remedy abuse of buyer power 145–6
producer cartels 168–9
of producers see competitive harms from the existence and abuse of buyer power, exploitation of producers

see also discriminatory practices; exclusion

Ezrachi, Ariel 11, 265

failing firm defense, merger policy 256–7
fairness and economic welfare 26–30, 36
fear factor 148, 177
Fee, C Edward 84, 96, 213, 231, 239
Feldman, Robin 24

Feuer, Alan 74
Finland, mergers and abusive buying practices 135
firm size effects 2, 57, 202–3, 215–16, 217
First, Harry 190, 191, 201, 218, 266
Fishman, Charles 235
Fitzsimons, Brian 206
Fleming, Olivia 6–7
floors (base line), imposing, market regulation 158–61
Flores, Chris 257
foreclosure 98–9, 100–101, 202
forward contracting by suppliers 244
Fox, Eleanor 266
franchise model 191
Freyer, Tony 30
Friedman, Richard 83, 163
Frischmann, Bret 114

Galbraith, JK 161–2, 196
Ganesh, Aravind R 5–6
Gans, Joshua 255
garment industry, working conditions 94–5
General Electric 63, 99
geographic differentiation, exploitation of producers 90–92
geographic market definition, merger policy 245–7
geographic markets, selective bidding practices as means of entering different 104
geographic price discrimination, merger policy 227
Germany
merger law 265–6
Permaswage Holding/Precision Castparts Corp. 250
Gilson, Ronald 153
global buyer power 5–6, 277–8
government loan-guarantee program 81
Granitz, Elizabeth 111
Greenhouse, Steven 50, 95
Grimes, Warren 23, 24

Haglund, Michael 75, 129
Hamilton, Neil 85
Han, Martijn 187, 189, 202, 249
Hannaford, Steve 50
harms
buyer cartels 194–8
competitive see competitive harms
merger policy 226–35, 242, 247, 252, 253, 254–5
Harrison, Jeffrey 2, 12, 19, 42, 46–7, 58, 83, 187, 247, 249
Hauter, Wenonah 3, 6, 43, 92
Hegar, Glenn 85
Hemphill, C Scott 33
Hepher, Tim 8, 93
Hicks, JR 19
Hirschmann, Albert O 10
horizontal integration of upstream production into single entity 170–71
horizontal mergers, effects of 84, 95–6
Horton, Thomas 28, 29, 253
Hovenkamp, Herbert J 24
Huffman, Max 256
Hunnicutt, Lynn 73, 103, 227, 229
Hylton, Keith 90, 129
Iimi, Atsushi 183
incentives
buyer cartels and buyer groups 193, 195, 200
competitive harms from the existence and abuse of buyer power 80, 108–9, 110–11
merger policy and barriers to entry 252
income reduction, producer 94–5, 110–11
Inderst, Roman 46, 82
India 50, 73, 74, 279
information access 87–9, 154–6, 174–5, 205–6, 234
innovation 108–9, 202, 227
inputs
buyer power in see buyer power definition, in input
competition policy for buyer cartels and buyer groups 186–7, 193, 200–201, 202, 216, 218
competitive harms from the existence and abuse of buyer power 80, 88–9, 93–4, 98–100
horizontal consolidation in input industries 170
price, bidding up 74–5
see also commodities
institutional limits facilitate exploitation 112–16
institutional problem of continued oversight 132
insurance, subcontractors providing 151
Intamano, Nisit 181
International Competition Network 143
internet sales 59, 76
investigation and potential liability triggers, merger policy 247–53
investment incentive reduction 80
investment for new ventures 174
Ioannidou, Maria 11, 265
Ireland, Rye Invs. Ltd. v Competition Auth. 250
Jacobson, Jonathan 51, 52, 117, 182, 184, 208, 209, 212
Japan 93, 140, 142, 143, 219
Jedličková, Barbora 135, 267
Jesse, Ed 245
joint ventures 171–3, 190, 202–3, 214
Jones, Harriet 8
Jones, William 24, 144, 182, 242, 269
Kahn, Alfred 149, 151
Kaldor-Hicks formulation and aggregate welfare 19–20, 22
Kameoka, Etsuko 142
Kaserman, David 27
Kaysen, Carl 18
Kireyev, Alexei 50
Kirkwood, John B 6, 9, 11, 19, 21, 24, 32, 52, 82, 105, 106, 123, 146–7, 168, 169, 212, 225
Klaus, Jared 7
Klein, Benjamin 46, 111
Klish, Julie 202, 215
Komesar, Neil 178
Kotsiris, Lamabros 180
Kovacic, William 112, 136, 206
Kraft Foods 69, 88–9, 95
Competition policy and the control of buyer power

Krattenmaker, Thomas 28, 46, 128, 236–7
Kwoka, John 34, 213, 251, 258

labour market see employment issues
Lambert, Craig 255
Lambert, Thomas 214
Lancaster, Kelvin 26, 32
Lande, Robert 9, 19, 22, 32, 55, 88, 105, 186, 212
Larson, Lex 158
Leftwich, Richard 110
Leonard, Christopher 3, 9, 43, 47, 73, 81, 86, 90, 91, 108, 155, 164, 175
Leslie, Christopher 7, 183, 194
Levine, Jay 7
liability triggers, and merger policy 247–53
Lindblom, Charles 26, 29, 32
Lipsey, RG 26, 32
loan-guarantee program and risk factors 81
Lopatka, John 129, 206
Luxottica 6–7

Macaulay, Stewart 148
MacCulloch, Angus 135
McCchesney, Fred 31
McCoy, Kevin 170
McCraw, Thomas 21, 26, 27, 63, 99, 169
McGee, John 52, 197
Manning, Alan 12
marginalization risk, exploitation of producers 83–4
market access, limiting 6–7
competition, promotion and protection 30–35, 36
defining in retail distribution 64–5
definition focus and merger policy 243–7, 251, 252, 259
and exploitation of producers 80, 83, 87–9
failure issues 31, 55
harm measurement and market integrity 105–9
Herfindahl-Hirschman Index (HHI) 58, 215–16, 250–51, 259

inherent difficulty in overcoming buyer power 71–5
justification and buyer cartels 194–8
multimarket firms 130
mutual entrenchment in 48–9
public market price as unreliable basis for contract price 69–70
regional market concentration levels 64–5
specific market operation, effects of 57

market regulation to remedy abuse of buyer power 139–78, 272–4
market regulation to remedy abuse of buyer power, offsetting producer power, producer cartels 162–70
collective action challenges 163–7, 169–70
coopertives and output limiting 166–7, 169
countervailing power 163–7, 168–70
exploitation of power 168–9
price increases and output limiting 163
producers’ cartel that negotiates prices with buyers 72
public authority to regulate aspects of commodity marketing 164–5
public interest-based oversight 167–8
state authorization of private associations of sellers 165–6
state-run agencies and marketing boards 164
third party collaborations 166–7
worker pay and conditions 167
market regulation to remedy abuse of buyer power, offsetting producer power, producer integration 170–73
coopertives 173
efficiency considerations 171
horizontal integration of upstream production into single entity 170–71
joint ventures 171–3
producer combinations as excuse for buyers to combine 171
vertical forward integration 173
market regulation to remedy abuse of buyer power, public sponsorship of alternative markets for producers 174–6
capital investment for new ventures 174
information about opportunities and options, lack of 174–5
new buyers, challenges of attracting 175–6
public subsidies 174
market regulation to remedy abuse of buyer power, regulation of buyer conduct 140–61
ambiguity problems 148
competition policy and regulation of contract terms 161
conduct of large grocery chains in dealings with suppliers 147–8
discriminatory buying practices authorization 144–5
and economies of scope and scale 148–9
fear factor 148, 177
floors (base line), imposing 158–61
International Competition Network report 143
oligopoly markets and price controls 159–60
and ombudsperson 147–8
producers’ rights to establish minimum prices through use of marketing orders 159
prohibition on unjustified differences in prices paid by buyers 146–7
strategic buyer conduct 140–49
’superior bargaining position’ abuse prohibition 142
unjustified discrimination and exploitation 145–6
worker treatment 158, 160, 161
market regulation to remedy abuse of buyer power, regulation of buyer conduct, general market conduct regulation 149–57
basic contract law 149
commodity-specific market-facilitating regulations 157
contract premium over cash market price 151–2
contracts preserving buyer discretion and protecting producers from abuse 152–3
cooperatives as agents for transactions 150
employment contracts, and covenants not to compete 153–4
information disclosure of certain information about market transactions 154–6
market-facilitating regulations 156–7
monopsony and effects on labor markets 154
open access to buying markets, opportunity improvement suggestions 151–2
opportunistic conduct, limiting 149–50
protection of small retailers from discriminatory discounts 150–51
Marshall, Robert 47, 58, 188, 204, 229, 238
Marvel, Howard 186
Mayne, Carrie 114, 217
Meier, Barry 182
Melamed, Douglas 33
merger, horizontal, effects of, and exploitation of producers 84, 95–6
merger policy and controlling the creation of buyer power 224–68, 275–6
all-or-nothing contracts 230
analysis framework 259–60
arbitrage effects 233–4, 237
blocking mergers 258
buyer power more durable than seller power 235–9
collusive harms 228–30, 236–8
competition policy for mergers creating buyer power 241–3
consolidation among downstream buyers, effects of 239–40
consumer welfare 242
countervailing bargaining power 247–9, 259–60
defenses to merger enforcement 253–7
efficiency claims 227, 240, 253–6, 258, 259
elasticity of buying side 252–3
enforcement of merger law 260–67
exclusionary harms 228, 247, 252, 253
failing firm defense 256–7
geographic market definition 245–7
geographic price discrimination 227
harm arising from modest increases in concentration 233–5
information access concerns 234
investigation and potential liability triggers 247–53
market definition focus 243–7, 250–51, 252, 259
mergers with significant adverse price effects on selling side 251
new entrant difficulties 237, 238–9
oligopoly potential 237–8
post-merger market structure and changes in structure 247–51
price discrimination concerns 226–7, 234
price reduction from supracompetitive level 232
product market definition 244–5
raising rivals’ costs, effects of 238–9
seller power 257
selling markets and ‘SSNIP’ test 246
supplier’s switching costs, effects of increase 234
under-enforcement consequences 251
unilateral harm 230–32
upstream effects 231, 239–41, 244–5, 252
validity of a proposed market, assessment of 246–7
waterbed effect 231–2, 240–41
Meurer, Michael 47, 58, 188, 204, 229, 238
Meyer, Steve 262
Miller, Darrell 5
Miller, Joseph 227
Mills, David 46
monopoly power 34–5, 82–4, 119–20, 159–60
monopsony abuse versus monopoly abuse see competitive harms
and abuse of buyer power, monopsony abuse versus monopoly abuse
monopsony power 38, 39–52, 71–2
abusive buyer power risk 51–2
and all-or-nothing approach to buying 42–3
and buyer power, distinction between 47–8
change in input cost impact 40–41
and competition policy goals 132–3
conventional models 40–43
and effects on labor markets 154
exclusionary abuses that focus on eliminating rival buyers 124–5
exploitation conditions 41–2, 46–7
exploitation of producers 80, 83
monopsony abuse (buyer power harms competitive process) 49–52
policy implications on limits of direct remedy for 137
risk, structural remedies see competition policy for abusive unilateral conduct by dominant buyers, structural remedies to avoid monopsony risk
wealth transfer and efficiency, lack of reward for 42–3, 49–50
see also competitive harms and abuse of buyer power, monopsony abuse versus monopoly abuse
Morales, Alfonso 107, 115, 174
Morison, Carole 71
Morris, Derek 135
Mueller, Willard 69, 95, 163, 169, 197, 239–40
Nain, Amrita 84, 213, 257, 259
Nelson, Jon 213
new entrant barriers 90–91, 174, 175–6, 237, 238–9
Nocera, Joe 210
Noll, Roger 42
OECD, Green Paper on ‘unfair’ trade practices 10
Ogle, Maureen 3
Oinonen, Mika 59
O’Keefe, Brian 46, 50
ombudsperson role 147–8
Onyanga-Omara, Jane 170
open access to buying markets,
opportunity improvement
suggestions 151–2
opportunistic conduct, limiting 149–50
output limiting, producer cartels 163, 166–7, 169
overbidding (predatory buying) 102–3, 128–30
Page, William 206
Palamountain, Joseph 187, 235
Patinkin, Don 4–5
Pearson, Sandra 151
Penrose, Edith 45
Perloff, Jeffrey 51, 52
Piraino, Thomas 181, 185, 190, 193
Pitofsky, Robert 29
Poland, merger law 265
Poomipark, Chitanong 181
Posner, Richard 26, 113
predatory buying (overbidding) 102–3, 128–30
pricing
below competitive market price 80–84
below a reasonable competitive level, risk factors 209–10
branded goods market and above-cost pricing 82–4
and buying groups 188–9, 192–3, 199, 200, 216
controls, oligopoly markets 159–60
delivered-pricing schemes 229
differences, prohibition on unjustified 146–7
differential pricing regulation 123
discrimination and merger policy 226–7, 229, 230, 232, 234
fixing, and buyer cartels 204
increases and output limiting, producer cartels 163
manipulation legalization 89
marketing orders 159
price offered for purchase as wrongful act 122–3
price-cost relationships and costs of production 44–5
waterbed effect (increasing prices to other buyers to compensate for lost revenue) 46, 81–2, 83, 111, 119, 222, 231–2, 240–41
producers
arbitrage, limited effectiveness of 70–71
cartels see market regulation to remedy abuse of buyer power, offsetting producer power, producer cartels
collective action issues 114–15
combinations as excuse for buyers to combine 171
defecting to new customer then regretting decision 53–5
exploitation of producers see competitive harms from the existence and abuse of buyer power, exploitation of producers
facing high switching costs 58
incentive to increase production to offset reduced income 110–11
integration see market regulation to remedy abuse of buyer power, offsetting producer power, producer integration
and marketing orders 159
selling to several buyers at once 57
welfare 19, 24
see also suppliers
product differentiation and seller power 20
product lines, exclusion effects 63
product market definition, and merger policy 244–5
product promotion, branded consumer goods 60–61
product quality issues 108–9
production
chain and wealth transfers 107
mergers, productive efficiency gains outweighing losses from increased buyer power 240
mergers, specialization and switching capacity 244
and price-cost relationships 44–5
transferring productive activities to other locations 161
proof of effect on consumers 145–6
Competition policy and the control of buyer power

public authority to regulate aspects of commodity marketing 164–5
public interest-based oversight, producer cartels 167–8
public market price as unreliable basis for contract prices 69–70
public sponsorship of alternative markets for producers see market regulation to remedy abuse of buyer power, public sponsorship of alternative markets for producers
public supervision for buyer cartels, need for 197–8
Ray, Daryll 77
recoupment proof, effects of 130–31
refusal to deal, inducing 100–101
regional diversification, and exploitation of producers 91–2
regional market concentration levels 64–5
regulation of buyer conduct see market regulation to remedy abuse of buyer power, regulation of buyer conduct
requirements contracts 122, 125–6
resale price maintenance (RPM) 20, 23, 27, 63, 99, 201, 218–19, 220
retailer excluding a product line, effects of 63, 86–7
risk factors
branded goods market 92–3
competitive risks, legitimate buying groups 199–203, 209–10, 215–16, 218
double marginalization, and exploitation of producers 83–4
government loan-guarantee program 81
monopsony risk see competition policy for abusive unilateral conduct by dominant buyers, structural remedies to avoid monopsony risk
Robinson, Thomas 158
Rodger, Barry 135
Rogers, Richard 255
Rosenfelt, Natalie 186
Ross, David 29, 30, 51, 112
Rossi, Jim 113
Roth, Bette 34, 210
Roth, Randi Ilyse 81, 85
safe harbor standards, legitimate buying groups 193, 203
Salop, Steven 22, 28, 46, 128, 236–7
Sandford, Jeremy 54–5, 58, 88, 234, 249
Schaffer, Harwood 77
Scheelings, Richard 11
Scherer, FM 20, 29, 30, 51, 112, 253
Schumpeter, Joseph 35, 71
Schwartz, Marius 234, 261
Scott, Alwyn 8, 93
Scully, Gerald 12
second best theory 26, 32
Sen, Amartya 19
Sexton, Richard 187, 238, 249, 255, 256
Shapiro, Carl 17
shelf space and stocking fees and shelf space 61–2, 87, 92
Shughart, William 31
Sidak, J Gregory 113, 209
Sisario, Ben 85
size, firm size effects 2, 57, 202–3, 215–16, 217
Skipper, Lihlani 107, 115, 174
small firms 56, 83, 84, 101, 102, 103–4, 150–51
see also entry barriers
Smith, Tyler 159
Smithfield 90–91, 155–6, 257, 262
Snyder, Brad 211
Sokol, Daniel 17–18, 19, 21, 25, 183, 194, 196
Solomon, Elinor 227, 237
Song, Songun 50
South Africa 181, 207, 266–7, 279

Competition Comm’n v Patensie
Sitrus Behrend Beperk 125, 200

In re South African Raisins v SAD Holdings 125, 200
Masscash Holdings & Finro Enter. 267

specialization effects 56, 81, 244
sponsorship 174–6, 190–91
standard-setting organizations 209–10
Index

state authorization of private associations of sellers 165–6
state-run agencies and marketing boards 164
Steiner, Robert 60
Stigler, George 51–2, 183
stocking fees and shelf space 61–2, 87, 92
Stokes, Susan 71
Storm, Stephanie 226
Strauss, Ben 210
Streitfeld, David 115
Strom, Stephanie 93
Strong, Peter 93
Stucke, Maurice 11, 20, 28, 29
subcontractors, insurance provision 151
‘superior bargaining position’ abuse prohibition 142
suppliers
access to third parties 126
competition foreclosure by selecting same supplier 202
elasticity of supply and demand 235
exclusionary favors from 231
exclusionary practices in return for slightly better return 45–6
exploitation 96–8
refusal to deal, inducing 100–101
supply-side market structure 249–50
switching costs, effects of increase 234
see also producers
Sweeney, David 190
switching costs 58, 63, 234, 244

Taylor, C Robert 42, 85, 151, 173
Taylor, Madeline 147–8
Telser, Lester 187
Thailand 180–81
third party collaborations 126, 166–7, 191
Thomas, Shawn 84, 96, 213, 231, 239
Tor, Avishalom 205
‘tournament’ system 73
Turner, Donald 18

Uber 74
UK 62, 140

Mitchel v Reynolds 33

regulation of major grocery chains 44, 142, 147–8, 219, 247–8
unilateral conduct and dominant buyers see competition policy for abusive unilateral conduct by dominant buyers
unilateral harm, and merger policy 230–32
unjustified exclusionary use of buyer power see competition policy for abusive unilateral conduct by dominant buyers, regulatory doctrines, rules governing unjustified exclusionary use of buyer power
upstream effects 94–6, 97, 170–71, 231, 239–41, 244–5, 252
Urbina, Ian 50, 95
US
Agricultural Marketing Agreement Act 159
antitrust policy and fairness 26–7
Beechnum-Heinz merger case 86–7
Capper-Volstead Act 165, 167
Chicago Board of Trade 150, 152
Clayton Act 22, 27, 150
collective bargaining 72–4
commodity exchanges decline 67–9
Department of Agriculture (USDA) 143–4, 145–6, 151–2, 155, 175
Federal Trade Commission (FTC) Act 22–3, 141, 147
Grain Inspection Act 150
Horizontal Merger Guidelines 224–5, 240, 246, 254
merger law 10–11, 34, 260–63
New England milk prices study 48
Packers and Stockyards Act (PSA) 68, 85, 88, 141–2, 143–5, 149–50, 151–2, 155
poultry industry ‘tournament’ system 73
resale price maintenance (RPM) 27
restrictions on freedom to compete 33–4
Robinson-Patman Act 123, 143, 146–7, 149, 150–51
Sherman Act 22, 27
transformation of rural America 2–3, 9, 11, 47–8, 50
US, cases

Adaptive Power Sols. v Hughes Missile Sys. 7
Addamax Corp. v Open Software Found. 210
All Care Nursing Serv. v High Tech Staffing Servs. 180
Allen Bradley Co. v Int’l Brotherhood of Elec. Workers Local 166–7
April v Nat’l Cranberry Ass’n 165
Arizona v Maricopa Med. Found. 25
Balmoral Cinema v Allied Artists Pictures Corp. 120–21, 183, 207
Balmoral Theaters v United Artists 204
Bd. of Trade v Olsen 150
Been v O.K. Indus. 44, 45, 77, 81, 85, 145
Bell Atl. Corp. v Twombly 205
Boise Cascade Int’l v N. Minn. Pulpwood Producers Ass’n 167
In re Brand Name Prescription Drugs Antitrust Litig. 183
Brooke Group v Brown and Williamson 130
Brown Shoe Co. v United States 17, 28
Brown v Pro Football 211
Bus. Elecs. Corp. v Sharp Elecs. Corp. 221
Cape Cod Food Prod. v Nat’l Cranberry Ass’n 165
Cargill v Monfort of Colo. 90, 104, 130
Cason-Merenda v Det. Med. Ctr. 5
Cerberus Institutional Partners 263
Cobb Theatres III v AMC Entm’t Holdings 7, 124, 207
Commodity Futures Trading Comm’n v Kraft Foods Group 69, 237, 243
Con’tl T.V. v GTE Sylvania 221
Conwood Co. v U.S. Tobacco Co. 62, 87
Credit Suisse Sec. (USA) v Billing 198
Del. Health Care v MCD Holding Co. 180
DeLoach v Lorillard Tobacco Co. 188
Discon v NYNEX 189

E. States Retail Lumber Dealers v United States 100, 187, 192, 200
Exxon Corp. v Maryland 60
Fashion Originators Guild of Am. v Fed. Trade Comm’n 195
Fleischman v Albany Med. Ctr. 5, 180, 187, 205
Flood v Kuhn 211
In re Fresh and Process Potatoes Antitrust Litig. 166
FTC v Cement Inst. 229
FTC v H.J. Heinz Co. 87
FTC v Ind. Fed. of Dentists 34
FTC v Mylan Labs 99, 101–2, 125, 228
FTC v Super. Ct. Trial Lawyers Ass’n 195
FTC v Superior Court Trial Lawyers Ass’n 37
FTC v Sysco Corp. 263
In re Genetically Modified Rice Litig. 246
Growers 1–7 v Ocean Spray Cranberries 166
In re High-Tech Emp. Antitrust Litig. 5, 205, 206
Ice Cream Liquidation v Land O’Lakes’89
Ins. Brokers Antitrust 169, 189, 228
Intergraph v Intel Corp. 24
Interstate Circuit v United States 207, 228
iPic-Gold Class Entm’t. v Regal Entm’t. Group 207
JTC Petroleum v Piasa Motor Fuels 98
Kartell v Blue Shield of Massachusetts 120, 221–2
Klor’s v Broadway-Hale Stores 76, 100, 124, 186, 192, 228, 231, 248
Knevelbaard Dairies v Kraft Foods 89, 95, 123, 180, 239, 240, 243
Law v NCAA 210–11
Leegin Creative Leather Prosds. v PSKS 27, 34, 221
LePage’s v 3M 94
LG Elecs. v Bizcom Elecs. 24
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Index</th>
<th>297</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Mackey v Nat’l Football League</td>
<td>211</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mandeville Island Farms v Am. Crystal Sugar Co.</td>
<td>120, 144, 162, 191</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Re Max Int’l v Realty One</td>
<td>127</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Missouri v Nat’l Org. for Women</td>
<td>39</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Montague v Lowry</td>
<td>100, 124, 186, 187, 200</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>In re Mushroom Direct Purchaser Antitrust Litig.</td>
<td>166</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NAACP v Claiborne Hardware</td>
<td>39–40</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nat’l Broiler Marketing Ass’n v United States</td>
<td>166</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nat’l Macaroni Mfrs. Ass’n v Fed. Trade Comm’n</td>
<td>188, 192</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NicSand v 3M Co.</td>
<td>63, 189, 202, 249</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Northland Cranberries v Ocean Spray Cranberries</td>
<td>165</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Northwest Wholesale Stationers v Pacific Stationery</td>
<td>182, 190, 199, 208–9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NYNEX Corp. v Discon.</td>
<td>100–101</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>O’Bannon v NCAA</td>
<td>210, 211</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Omega Envtl. v Gibrarco</td>
<td>195</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pac. Bell Tel. v linkLine Commc’ns</td>
<td>103, 104, 130</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pacific Stationery &amp; Printing Co. v Nw. Wholesale Stationers</td>
<td>208</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pickett v Tyson Fresh Meats</td>
<td>71, 73, 85, 144, 151</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>In re Pilgrim’s Pride</td>
<td>144</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Polygram Holdings v FTC</td>
<td>34, 100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pool Corp.</td>
<td>263</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Quanta Computer v LG Elecs.</td>
<td>24</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rambus</td>
<td>119, 120</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rambus v Fed. Trade Comm’n</td>
<td>210</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Reed v Advocate Health Care</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Reid Bros. Logging Co. v Ketchikan Pulp Co.</td>
<td>180, 186, 194</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Schine Chain Theaters v United States</td>
<td>125</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Schumacher v Cargill Meat Solutions Corp.</td>
<td>88, 155</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Se. Milk Antitrust Litig.</td>
<td>169, 245</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Servais v Kraft Foods Group</td>
<td>89</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Shine Chain Theaters v United States</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Silver v New York Stock Exch.</td>
<td>210</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Smith v NCAA</td>
<td>211</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Smith v Pro Football</td>
<td>211</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sony Elecs. v Soundview Tech.</td>
<td>210</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Stafford v Wallace</td>
<td>68, 144</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Standard Oil Co. v United States</td>
<td>35, 71, 135</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Swift &amp; Co. v United States</td>
<td>180, 242</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Terry v Tyson Farms</td>
<td>144, 145</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Todd v Exxon Corp.</td>
<td>180, 188, 192, 204–5, 230, 250</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Toys ‘R’ Us v FTC</td>
<td>44, 65, 76, 100, 124, 186, 228, 231, 235, 248</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Treasure Valley Potato Bargaining Ass’n v Ore-Ida Foods</td>
<td>162</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Treehouse Foods v Green Mountain Coffee Roasters</td>
<td>99</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>In re Union Oil Co.</td>
<td>210</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>United States v Addyston Pipe &amp; Steel Co.</td>
<td>33</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>United States v Adobe Sys.</td>
<td>5, 180, 206, 238</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>United States v Actna</td>
<td>261</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>United States v Aluminum Co. of Am. (Alcoa)</td>
<td>119</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>United States v Am. Broad. Co.</td>
<td>120</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>United States v American Tobacco Co.</td>
<td>35, 135</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>United States v Apple</td>
<td>114–15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>United States v Blue Cross Blue Shield of Mich.</td>
<td>101, 234</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>United States v Capital Serv.</td>
<td>120</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>United States v Cargill</td>
<td>260, 261</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>United States v CBS</td>
<td>120</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>United States v ConAgra Foods</td>
<td>262–3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>United States v Crescent Amusement Co.</td>
<td>180, 207</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>United States v De Beers Centenary</td>
<td>278</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>United States v E. States Retail Lumber Dealers Ass’n</td>
<td>124</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>United States v Gen. Dynamics</td>
<td>259</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>United States v Gen. Elec. Co.</td>
<td>214, 278</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>United States v Griffith</td>
<td>7, 125</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>United States v JBS S.A.</td>
<td>261</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>United States v King</td>
<td>166</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>United States v Microsoft</td>
<td>126, 127, 136, 201, 221</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>United States v Nat’l Broad. Co.</td>
<td>120</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>United States v Pennzoil Co.</td>
<td>260</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>United States v Reading Co.</td>
<td>119, 120</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

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Competition policy and the control of buyer power

United States v Romer 180
United States v Seminole Fertilizer Corp. 183
United States v Swift 141
United States v Taubman 182, 192
United States v Topco Assoc. 190, 192, 201, 209, 215, 218
United States v Trans-Missouri Freight 26–7, 242
United States v United Health Group 261
United States v U.S. Gypsum Co. 88
United States v Visa USA 126, 127, 201, 221
Verizon Commc’ns v Law Offices of Curtis V. Trinko 71, 119, 120, 198
Vizcaino v Microsoft Corp. 161
Vogel v Am. Soc’y of Appraisers 203–4
Volvo Trucks N. Am. v Reeder-Simco GMC 147
W. Penn Allegheny Health Sys. v Univ. Pittsburgh Med. Ctr. 234
Weyerhaeuser Co. v Ross-Simmons Hardwood Lumber 75, 102, 120, 128–9, 130, 144, 186, 238
Wheeler v Pilgrim’s Pride 144
Woodman’s Food Mkt. v Clorox Co. 62, 103, 146, 231
Vaheesan, Sandeep 26
Van Cise, Gerald 123
vertical integration and restraints 20, 28, 173, 220–23
wage levels 4–5, 160, 161
see also employment issues
Wakui, Masako 44, 93, 140, 143, 147
Walmart 6, 8, 45–6, 92–3
Walsh, Mary Williams 94, 182
waterbed effect (increasing prices to other buyers to compensate for lost revenue) 46, 81–2, 83, 111, 119, 222, 231–2, 240–41
wealth transfers 106–8, 256
welfare see aggregate welfare; consumer welfare
Werden, Gregory 31, 206
Western Organization of Research Councils (WORC), contract premiums 151–2, 214
Williamson, Oliver 25, 113, 255
Woeste, Victoria 166, 197
Womack, Brian 170
Wright, Joshua 11, 61, 87
Zhang, Mingxia 187, 238, 249, 255, 256

298