Introduction

Anyone interested in the question ‘what is the nature of law?’ soon finds a vast array of answers, each embodying a particular set of concerns and methodological commitments, and each proclaiming its own special importance. Among these answers and approaches, analytical legal theory stands out as perhaps the most ambitious, claiming as its objective the identification and explanation of universal, essential truths about the nature of law. As Joseph Raz asserts,

> It is easy to explain in what sense legal philosophy is universal. Its theses, if true, apply universally, that is they speak of all law, of all legal systems; of those that exist, or that will exist, and even of those that can exist though they never will. Moreover, its theses are advanced as necessarily universal . . . The universality of the theses of the general theory of law is a result of the fact that they claim to be necessary truths, and there is nothing less that they claim . . . A claim to necessity is in the nature of the enterprise.¹

In this recent encapsulation of his views, Raz sets out in particularly forthright terms a set of goals and commitments long associated with him, since taken up root and branch by other analytical legal theorists.² Julie Dickson, for instance, characterizes the task of analytical jurisprudence in the same way:

> . . . analytical jurisprudence is concerned with explaining those features which make law into what it is. A successful theory of law of this type is a theory which consists of propositions about the law which (1) are necessarily true, and (2) adequately explain the nature of law . . . If law has a given feature, but this is discovered to be a contingent matter, due, for example, to the social and/or economic conditions which just happen to hold sway in a particular time and place, and hence is not necessary to its existence as law, then the feature in question is not one which is part of law’s essential nature, and cannot assist us in the important task of getting to the heart of this social institution in the sense of understanding that which makes it into what it is.³

¹ J. Raz (2009a) 91–2.
² Most recently, see S. Shapiro (2011). For illuminating criticism of Shapiro’s methodology, see B. Tamanaha (2011).
³ J. Dickson (2001) 17–18. [author’s notes omitted]
The promise of analytical jurisprudence thus expressed is undeniably attractive: by analytical jurisprudence we may gain access to what law really is, through an account of law’s necessary and essential features. Raz, Dickson, and many others sharing an interest in finding those necessary features have also appeared to many readers to share a familiar method in analytic philosophy for finding them. The method, most commonly known as ‘conceptual analysis’, is the exercise of subjecting to rigorous investigation the conceptual commitments which give shape to our shared experiences of typical instances of law. For example, Raz writes:

Legal theory contributes . . . to an improved understanding of society. But it would be wrong to conclude, as D. Lyons has done, that one judges the success of an analysis of the concept of law by its theoretical sociological fruitfulness. To do so is to miss the point that, unlike concepts like ‘mass’ or ‘electron’, ‘the law’ is a concept used by people to understand themselves. We are not free to pick on any fruitful concepts. It is a major task of legal theory to advance our understanding of society by helping us understand how people understand themselves.4

Dickson also explains:

That the concept of law is thus already part of the conceptual currency which we use to understand our social world means that the legal theorist is not in the same position as a criminology theorist seeking to elucidate the concept of ritualism. The legal theorist does not introduce a concept anew in order to further his account of the behaviour of persons not familiar with that concept. Rather s/he seeks to elucidate a concept which people already know about and make use of in characterising the society in which they live, and their own behaviour and attitudes within it.5

Conceptual analysis in legal theory is of course most often associated with the work of H.L.A. Hart,6 who is often thought to be the first philosopher of law to introduce and use the general methods of ordinary language philosophy and conceptual analysis to understand law. Analytical jurisprudence so conceived in task and method has been hugely influential, with Hart’s The Concept of Law serving simultaneously as a manifesto and exemplar of the style of analytical jurisprudence in explaining the nature of law. For many inquirers into the nature of law, analytical jurisprudence marks a fundamental step forward in understanding law, at least as it is found in what analytical jurisprudence calls ‘modern municipal systems

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4 J. Raz (1995) 237. [author’s notes omitted]
5 Dickson (2001) 43.
of law’, of the sort most strongly associated with contemporary constitutional democracies, yet also evident in various morally questionable regimes which nonetheless appear to operate legal systems. In its morally neutral, descriptive-explanatory approach to law, analytical jurisprudence has developed a kind of conceptual topography which maps and explains the interactions of law’s components, from individual laws to courts and other institutions, and the officials and citizens using those laws.

Yet, despite its attractiveness and explanatory power, analytical jurisprudence has not been immune to probing criticism. Several formidable kinds of challenge have been raised. First, some critics argue that if law has any necessary or essential features at all, these will not be discovered and explained by the morally-neutral method of conceptual analysis. Rather, such features can only be identified using morally and politically evaluative investigation of law’s purpose and justification. Ronald Dworkin, for example, argues that law is morally significant by its very nature, to the extent that the creation, application, and enforcement of law affect the interests and well-being of individuals.7 On Dworkin’s view, to understand law correctly, one must adopt a theoretical approach which best identifies the moral purpose, point or value law is meant to serve. To do otherwise, as analytical jurists engaged in conceptual analysis do, is to generate an account which simply fails to capture and explain the moral significance of law. Second, there are those, such as Brian Tamanaha and William Twining, who also begin with observation of law’s role in society, but notice instead that law’s manifestations vary so much across time and place as to render pointless the proposed search for necessary or essential features.8 On their view, the best theoretical approach to understanding the nature of law is social scientific:9 law’s existence and character is inescapably shaped by particular historical, sociological, political, psychological and economic factors, such that study of these myriad factors and their interaction is the key to understanding law in all its varieties. Third, there are those, such as Dan Priel and Liam Murphy, who argue that analytical legal theorists engaged in conceptual analysis have typically operated with the unwarranted presumption that there is pre-theoretical

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7  R. Dworkin (1986).
8  See B. Tamanaha (2001); and W. Twining (2009).
9  To be more precise, the views of Tamanaha and Twining comprise a legal pluralist strand of social scientific explanation of law. A second, and perhaps more familiar strand is represented by the legal realists, who propose that social scientific investigation be employed to make sense of the decisions of particular legal actors, especially judges. See B. Leiter (2007). Legal pluralist views will be taken up in Chapters 1 and 2, and legal realist views in Chapters 5, 6 and 7.
agreement in the uses of the concept of law and intuitions about what does and does not count as law.\textsuperscript{10} They argue that instead of agreement we find disagreement, and such disagreement dooms conceptual analysis, and so analytical legal theory, from the start. Fourth, there are those who argue that analytical legal theory, and again, conceptual analysis of law, have not kept pace with developments in analytic philosophy more generally and epistemology in particular. Brian Leiter, for example, has offered sustained argument that the conceptual arguments of Hart and Raz have failed to learn the lessons we can gather from W.V.O. Quine’s criticisms of core ideas in analytic philosophy, especially its reliance on an analytic-synthetic distinction.\textsuperscript{11} Leiter argues that there can be no reliable \textit{a priori} knowledge about law, and certainly no reliable appeal to shared intuitions about the instances of law. Instead, he argues that the only proper way to judge conceptual claims about law is to see which of these figure in the best social scientific theories of legal phenomena.

The state of contemporary legal theory is thus marked by rejection of a particular conception of analytical legal theory, which arrives in the context of general disagreement over the best method to explain law. A newcomer to scholarly investigation of the nature of law might well be perplexed and not a little troubled by this situation. Must we really abandon the goal of analytical jurisprudence? Might there be some way to achieve something very like that goal by adoption of new methods? This book aims to save the heart of the goal of analytical jurisprudence, and to preserve some of its methods, while reframing the goal and reforming those methods to account for criticisms whose merits cannot be rejected. To do so, I will advance two general theses. First, while analytical legal theory and conceptual analysis of law have often been taken to be the same thing, they are not co-extensive; the association is a false one. Here I shall attempt to show that while conceptual analysis may form an element or perhaps the beginning of the theories of Hart and Raz (as some of their self-characterizations tend to support), conceptual analysis is certainly not the whole nor, by any means, the ultimate end of their theories. Their interests in analytical legal theory – and the viability and value of analytical legal theory itself – reach well beyond conceptual analysis of the kind routinely used to characterize their theories. I shall argue instead that many of their conceptual claims, because of the manner in which they are presented and assessed, are better understood as claims of \textit{a posteriori} necessary truths. In this way I intend to show that the pursuit of necessary

\begin{footnote}{
11 Leiter (2007).
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features of law can be maintained, albeit by methods not fully articulated or appreciated by Hart, Raz, and others.

However, there is much more to analytical legal theory, and in particular conceptual explanations of law, than identification and explanation of necessary or essential features of law. The second general thesis I will advance is the claim that a staunch commitment to the importance of necessary features of law exacerbates counter-productive divisions between analytical legal theory, moral and political theory, and social scientific investigation of law. The relative isolation of these investigations hampers the ability of legal theory\textsuperscript{12} to account for the full richness of life under law. My thesis is that analytical, conceptual explanation of law can and must be understood to make room for the role and significance of contingent features and relations which are critical to a deeper account of the varying experiences of law in diverse communities. Once understood in this way, analytical jurisprudence can aim again at universal truths about the nature of law, composed of a combination of necessary \textit{and} contingent features and relations. Such renewed understanding preserves the historical aim of analytical jurisprudence to provide a universal account of law while recognizing the multi-faceted nature of law (and its conceptual explanation) as a reflection of varied and varying social situations.

One key aspect of my argument deserves an early, preparatory sketch. In contrast to the focus of some analytical legal theorists on necessary conditions of law, I propose to emphasise what I have called contingent features and conditions of law, found in relations between law and other phenomena. It will be helpful to evaluation of my criticism of the necessary features approach (that is, the approach which advocates that legal theorists pursue only necessary features in their accounts of law) to have a sense of what I mean by a focus on contingent features and relations as an important part of a conceptual explanation of law which do not so much replace necessary conditions in an analytical picture of law as offer a fuller and more dynamic explanation of the same phenomena. Beginning with terminology, I will follow Dickson and use the terms ‘necessary’ (and sometimes ‘essential’) and ‘contingent’ as types of existence conditions of law. So, for example, X is a necessary or essential feature of Y if X must always be among the existence conditions of Y. Similarly, P is a contingent feature of Q if it is possible for Q to exist in some instance without the presence of P. To distinguish necessary features and relations

\textsuperscript{12} A clarification on terminology: by ‘legal theory’ I mean to include all types of theorizing about law, which includes analytical jurisprudence, morally and politically evaluative theories, as well as social scientific theories.
from contingent features and relations will require argument and analysis about each particular feature or relation under consideration. While there is no general formula to follow, consideration of the following issues, among others, will be relevant in determining whether a particular feature or relation is necessary or contingent: the range of phenomena chosen to be explained (for example, if state law is the only phenomenon chosen to be explained, it might have some necessary features not present in other varieties of law; see Chapter 2), the level of analysis (for example, Hart maintained that coercion was not a necessary element of the existence conditions of \textit{legal obligation}, but he did believe that it was a necessary condition of the existence of a \textit{legal system}; see the concluding chapter), and most importantly, the degree to which a purported necessary feature contributes towards a misleading or distorting picture of social reality (see Chapter 8).

Consider, for example, the relation between law and practical reason. As I will explain in greater depth in Chapter 8, many analytical legal theorists follow Raz in presuming that the relation is necessary: where law exists, it necessarily claims to provide reasons for action for its subjects in the form of directives claiming authority. With this presumption in place, certain explanatory tasks follow. We must, for example, elucidate the precise nature of law’s claims on our practical reason (for example, is law trying to offer us a service, or requiring us to surrender judgment over some matter?). However, as I shall attempt to show, it is more likely that the relation between law and practical reason is contingent: it might not always be the case that law operates by making claims of practical reason on subjects. Sometimes, law’s creation, existence, and application have consequences for the lives of subjects but not by leaving them with decisions or choices of practical reason; sometimes, that is, law does not treat subjects as reason-responsive agents. Retroactive laws, for example, can create such conditions where law alters the lives of subjects without having given them choices, and so provide a good illustration of the contingency between law and practical reason. The next move in my argument is critical. Once the relation between law and practical reason is found to be contingent, it would be a mistake to suppose that since practical reason does not figure as a necessary feature of law, or does not stand in a necessary relation to law, practical reason ought to be removed from or ignored in our conceptual understanding of law, as Raz and Dickson and others might have it. The contingent relation between law and practical reason, like other contingent features and relations of law, is important and significant to bear in mind in thinking about law wherever and whenever it exists: wherever and whenever law exists, it is important to know that law may not leave its subjects with decisions of practical reason. Observation
of law’s contingent relation to practical reason is likely as important as observation of the contingency of law’s relation to morality.\textsuperscript{13}

I believe it is possible, then, to reject analytical jurisprudence’s exclusionary focus on necessary and essential features of law without abandoning altogether the method of morally-neutral conceptual explanation of law. As I shall argue, acknowledgement of contingent features and relations also forms part of the resolution of some methodological disputes which unnecessarily hinder philosophical understanding of law. I argue that on the basis of recognition of the importance of contingent features and relations, such as law’s relation to practical reason, new points of meaningful intersection between analytical jurisprudence and moral, political and social scientific theories begin to emerge. More specifically, recognition of contingency demonstrates the underappreciated dependence of analytical theories of law on empirical investigation, and also identifies issues left open for political decision and moral argument. Consider again the relation between law and practical reason. Its contingency is best demonstrated through empirical observation of subjects whose lives have been altered by law without having faced a practical choice. The existence of such subjects also raises political and moral issues having to do with the circumstances under which it might be justifiable (or not) for law to operate by means other than claims on practical reason. These particular insights are obscured or overlooked when only necessary features are pursued; empirical investigation is ignored since what is necessary is not liable to change or variation (so why look?), and moral and political theory is ignored since it does not make sense to talk of what is left open for moral or political

\textsuperscript{13} More specifically, the contingency of the relation between law’s existence and content, on the one hand, and its satisfaction or reproduction of moral standards, on the other. Consider Raz’s explanation of the importance of the legal positivist separation thesis:

. . . it is a social fact rather than a moral fact that the law of one country or another is so and so, and no different. This aspect of the law derives from several features fundamental to our understanding of its nature: First, it explains how there can be not only good and bad law, but also law and governments lacking all (moral) legitimacy, as well as those that are (morally) legitimate. Second, it explains why we cannot learn what the law in a certain country, or on a certain matter, is simply by finding out what it ought to be. Third, it explains how two people, one believing the law to be legitimate and the other denying its legitimacy, can nevertheless agree on what it is. What accounts for these and other simple but deep features of the law is that it is a social fact, which means that its existence and content can be established as social facts are established, without reliance on moral arguments.

J. Raz (1998) 169–70. [author’s notes omitted]
choice or criticism in an account of the necessary features of law (whereas it does make sense to raise moral or political questions regarding features or relations of law which are contingent, and so could be otherwise). If analytical jurisprudence is to combine its insights with those of complementary approaches, the prospect for continuity among approaches through identification and explanation of contingency must be pursued.

The picture of law (or ‘philosophically-constructed concept of law’, as I explain in Chapter 3) which arrives via sensitivity to contingent features and relations of law – which may be indefinite in number and whose identification and exploration depend on inquirer interests and concerns – delivers on the promise of universality, but not through the limiting exercise of hunting for necessary features and relations only, which might be relatively few and in any event encourage a kind of single-mindedness and ignorance of complementary investigations. Instead, a conceptual account of law which identifies contingent features and relations as well is richer; its recognition of the social embeddedness of law gives law’s diverse and variable conditions of existence, as well as its relations with numerous related social phenomena,14 a role in analytical legal theory which it has not yet enjoyed but must assume for analytical legal theory to make good on its claim to universality.

The chapters are divided as follows. The aim of Chapter 1 is to identify some of the most important and recent challenges to the project of analytical jurisprudence, conceived as an exercise in conceptual analysis. In particular, I will introduce in greater detail three of the objections sketched above: (a) the objection that disputes about the boundaries of the concept of law are simply irresolvable, which in turn shows that conceptual analysis of law ought to be given up; (b) the objection that conceptual analysis employs two problematic epistemological devices – a sharp distinction between analytic and synthetic truths and appeals to intuition; and finally, (c) the objection that the sheer variety of types of law makes pursuit of a single essence or concept of law meaningless. However, since these objections can be seen as criticisms of the method of conceptual analysis more broadly, this chapter begins with an account of the roots of conceptual analysis in ordinary language philosophy and its current status in analytic philosophy. This will be helpful, for subsequent chapters, in explaining precisely the sense in which not all conceptual explanations of law need to be the results of conceptual analyses of law. The category of conceptual theory has more than one possible kind.

14 For example, from coercion, social rules and morality to practical reason, the state and technology.
In Chapter 2 I assess the net impact of the objections introduced in Chapter 1. Here I argue that while parts of these challenges can be met, more importantly they reveal the need for analytical legal theorists to move beyond conceptual analysis of law and towards constructive conceptual explanation of law. Conceptual analysis attempts to uncover implicit features of a particular culture’s self-understanding of law, and so is inherently conservative, while constructive conceptual explanation seeks to modify or develop new and improved conceptual explanations of law for use in characterizing and understanding the social reality of law. I shall argue that the real value of the three objections set out in the first chapter lies in how they reveal several ways in which the move from analysis to construction can and ought to be made.

Using Hart’s conceptual theory of law as an illustration, in Chapter 3 I begin more positive argument. I attempt to show how analytical legal theory has internal resources enabling it to characterize law in terms of contingent features and relations, and not just the necessary features and relations it has historically sought to find and explain. I shall emphasize in particular that Hart’s conceptual theory of law is best understood not as a report of some familiar intuitions about law manifested in ordinary language use, but instead as a philosophical construction, comprised of several interconnected theses presented to highlight important features and relations of law wherever and whenever it exists.

While a primary aim of the book is to explain the role of contingent relations and features in analytical legal theory, I still believe there is an important place for necessity claims as well. The notion of necessity involved, however, needs to be carefully explained, so in Chapter 4 I shall introduce the view that many necessary truths about law that, for example, Hart defends, are neither analytic nor a priori truths, but are instead best understood as claims of a posteriori necessary truth. So while I agree with Leiter that philosophers of law ought to consult the work of epistemologists and analytic philosophers more generally, it need not be the case that Quine’s naturalized epistemology delivers the only, or the best, lessons. Saul Kripke’s account of the separability of

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15 For explanation about just how little ordinary language philosophy there is in The Concept of Law, see L. Green, ‘Introduction’, in Hart (2012) xlvii.

16 This is not to say that there is no value in pursuing a project of showing how analytical jurisprudence might seek not just necessary truths, but analytic and a priori truths as well. For some excellent resources, see P. Boghossian and C. Peacocke, eds (2000); C. Juhl and E. Loomis (2010); and G. Russell (2008).
analyticity, a prioricity and necessity is just as useful, if not more so (as I shall argue).\footnote{This view of the relative importance of Kripke is certainly held outside legal philosophy. For example, on the diminishing role of the ‘analytic’ in philosophy Timothy Williamson writes:}

In Chapter 5 I provide an illustration of how recognition of contingent relations constitutes a viable alternative and addition to identification of necessary features of law, by engaging in a substantive dispute in analytical jurisprudence. Specifically, I defend a particular – and rather unpopular – descriptive-explanatory theory of law, exclusive legal positivism. My argument will turn not on consideration of the authoritative nature of law – as almost all arguments for exclusive positivism do – but rather on identification of the contingent relation between unconstitutionality and invalidity. My account in this chapter will also help to set up the view discussed in subsequent chapters (especially Chapters 6 and 8) that the best conceptual explanation of some aspect of the social phenomenon of law may require revision to ordinary or folk understandings of that aspect.

In Chapter 6 I offer a second illustration of how constructive conceptual explanation proceeds by testing conceptual accounts against observable social reality. Unlike Chapter 5, which is restricted to consideration of a particular type of modern sovereign state, in this chapter I turn to conceptual investigation of a particular example of non-state law, European Union (EU) law. Here I argue that one of the central philosophical puzzles emerging from reflection on the nature of EU law is how best to understand the rival supremacy claims – regarding the ultimate source of validity of EU norms – made respectively by member-state courts and the European Court of Justice. I shall argue that in this context strict adherence to the method of conceptual analysis results in a logically incoherent descriptive-explanation of EU law, and for this reason, constructive conceptual explanation must be pursued.

However, because conceptual explanation provides only one way of understanding law, in Chapter 7 I present and examine two prevalent views about how to understand the diversity of methodological approaches to

\footnote{T. Williamson (2007) 51.}
law. The first view is what I call, following Hart, ‘imperialism’ in legal theory. Imperialism is the attempt to find and demonstrate the truth of a single methodological approach to understanding law. Any theory which does not adopt the method claimed to be the correct one is dismissed by the imperialist view as inadequate, since it will simply miss what is truly important about law. The second view is what I call the ‘difference view’, and is best understood as a reaction to imperialism. For example, in comparing his type of legal theory with Dworkin’s, Hart writes that ‘[i]t is not obvious why there should be or indeed could be any significant conflict between enterprises so different as my own and Dworkin’s conceptions of legal theory.’ In more precise terms, the difference view maintains that theories should be distinguished and understood in light of their avowed purposes, such that theories of different types cannot be viewed as competitive if their principal aims are fundamentally different. The difference view also maintains that a multiplicity of aims is not just possible but quite justifiable as a reflection of reasonably different inquirer interests, concerns, perspectives and methodological commitments. In this chapter I begin the argument that neither imperialism nor the difference view is acceptable. The imperialist view is unsuccessful because it fails to appreciate that particular theoretical perspectives are at best incomplete contributions to a broad and general understanding of law, and the difference view fails because it risks concealing conflicts between different types of theories of law. Hart and Dworkin, for example, may have been engaged in significantly different but equally valuable enterprises, making a winner-take-all assessment of their debate misguided; but nothing follows from this about whether conflicts might still remain between their views.

In Chapter 8 I take a closer look at one prominent imperialist claim (best associated with Dworkin), that a proper understanding of law must be from and for the participant’s perspective. The role of participant understandings in legal theory has been the topic of much debate, yet no clear solution has been provided of how or why participant perspectives matter to legal theory. This chapter is designed to clear some misunderstandings about what legal theory owes to participant understandings in the context of the general diversity of theories of law and establish a basis upon which to resolve some methodological disputes. I aim to show that attention to participant perspectives shows that three general approaches to explaining and studying law must be included in a broad and general

20 However, there is a particularly good discussion in G. Postema (1998).
understanding: conceptual, moral and social scientific. My argument here turns on developing an account of norm subjects which is constructed out of recognition of the contingent nature of the relation between law and practical reason introduced above.

Once the limitations of the imperialist and difference views have been shown, in Chapter 9 I offer what I call ‘continuity’, a methodological commitment (or meta-method) to openness which recognizes and reconciles the diverse approaches to understanding law and legal phenomena. The nature of continuity, I shall argue, lies in recognition that diverse approaches can be connected by both complementary and conflicting relations: diverse approaches are complementary at the level of theoretical perspective (that is, all of conceptual, moral and political, and social scientific investigations are valuable and required for explanation of the social phenomenon of law), yet conflict may remain at the level of particular claims about the nature and existence of law (for example, a morally evaluative theory might presume that judges never have discretion to make law, yet such a presumption might be challenged by a conceptual account of law). I aim to show how a renewed account of conceptual explanation coupled with a commitment to pursuit of continuity yields a truly superior way of understanding the diversity of theories of law, and cuts through a number of meta-theoretical obstacles. Here the importance of contingent features and relations in conceptual explanation will be demonstrated. Use and recognition of contingent features and relations in conceptual explanation will show how descriptive-explanatory or conceptual theories are connected – in ways not yet adequately understood – to moral, political and social scientific accounts of law and legal phenomena. The upshot of continuity, with its emphasis on contingent features and relations, is a synergy among competing approaches to understanding law which fully capitalizes on the potential of diversity to explain law in all its dimensions in an integrated fashion.

In the concluding chapter I take up the question of where a renovated account of conceptual explanation and analytical jurisprudence, and their relation to complementary investigations, might take us. Here I suggest several ways in which the aims and methods of analytical jurisprudence are capable of renewal. These suggestions include better responsiveness to shifts in legal phenomena which might disrupt widely held conceptual views about law, commitment to exploration of new concepts and conceptual tools, investigation of relations beyond the familiar ones of law’s relations to morality, coercion and social rules, and openness to evaluation of concepts employed in disciplines outside analytical legal theory. These are not just random suggestions. Each shows that not only is law marked by contingent features and relations; the core choices and presumptions
of analytical legal theory itself are subject to shifting (and so contingent) interests and concerns of inquirers.

The call for a renewed agenda amounts, I think, to illustration of how analytical jurisprudence’s role in legal theory can thrive once again and perhaps deliver on a new and improved promise: a universal account of law which identifies both necessary features and relations as well as contingent features and relations, with the goal of putting diverse methodological approaches into proper interaction rather than isolation.