1. Introduction¹

China, as the biggest country and since 2006 also as the biggest emitter of greenhouse gas emissions, has been the core target of engagement and lobbying by other countries. Yet, when foreign climate policy-makers try to address Chinese counterparts, they first must navigate the myriad of institutional stakeholders influencing domestic climate policy in China. The contents of policies and norms on their agenda will inevitably be modified during this process. This book sets out to shed light on the dynamics of bureaucratic interaction that characterize climate policy-making in China. The book follows foreign-inspired policies, such as emissions trading, from agenda-setting to policy adoption in China. It therefore addresses the question of when and how early climate policies were adopted in China during the fourth leadership era (2002–2012) and the first years of Xi Jinping's presidency, and what role some specific actors, such as the European Union and the United States, could play.

'This is a landmark step China has made in building a domestic carbon emission trading market', commented Xie Zhenhua, Vice-Minister of China's National Development and Reform Commission (NDRC), the top economic planning agency, on 16 August 2012 (Xinhua 2012b). He was referring to the launch of the Shanghai emissions trading scheme, one of seven schemes that were approved by his agency in November 2011. Emissions trading schemes (ETS) through allocation of emissions certificates to heavy polluters are part of the market-based measures advocated by the international climate change regime to lower overall carbon emissions in a cost-effective way. Once fully implemented nation-wide, the Chinese ETS will be the biggest in the world.

But prior to the Paris Summit of 2015, China was not considered as proactive in combating climate change: Mark Lynas, member of the Maldives delegation to the 2009 climate negotiations in Copenhagen, went so far as to state that 'China wrecked the talks' (Lynas 2009). Then UK climate secretary Ed Miliband even said the negotiations were 'hijacked' (Miliband 2009; Vidal 2009). Other narratives remember China trying to coordinate the group of developing countries to agree to a constructive outcome during the last hours of the summit. In fact, China was one of the first countries to submit its autonomous domestic mitigation actions as requested by the Copenhagen Accords just six weeks after the COP (Department of Climate Change NDRC 2010). How do these statements rhyme with ETS adoption in China? Surely, one cannot claim that Chinese climate policy has been obstructionist in general.

Just think of the adoption of car emissions standards based on the European Standards (Euro I to V), the successes in wind and solar industries or even the country's low-carbon growth strategies. This inconsistency in behaviour has been linked to the country's stage of development, where China was a 'nation at crossroads, undecided which way to turn' (Conrad 2012: 435).

Chinese climate policy underwent considerable change towards the end of the first decade of the twenty-first century during the era of government leadership by President Hu Jintao and Prime Minister Wen Jiabao. Reducing the country's coal dependency became a core task for its economic development and climate policy nationally as well as a global challenge in the fight against climate change. The Chinese leadership change in March 2013 bringing in President Xi Jinping and Premier Li Keqiang led to several reforms and bureaucratic restructuring, framing climate change in the context of 'ecological civilization' and dedicating more resources to the fight against climate change.² Adding to the unique window of opportunity in which Chinese climate policy has been strengthened since 2007, established policies and influences of other global actors have been, and will be of great importance. The United States and the European Union are such actors and are renowned for decades of proactive climate policy domestically and at the multilateral level. The United States reduced such engagement in the first decade of the twenty-first century, hence the European Union was broadly considered to be one of the most consistent promoters of global climate policy.

Other countries' first and foremost instrument vis-à-vis China is the provision of information, through examples and capacity-building, or incentives, such as the funding of demonstration projects. For this, outsiders interact with a variety of actors in the Chinese climate policy network: Politicians at high-level meetings, national ministries, commissions, government research institutes, provincial and local governments, and NGOs (non-governmental organizations). In order to identify their influence, it is not enough to assume China as a monolith in terms of decision-making. Otherwise, would it not be enough to carry out regular high-level meetings? Rather, external representatives have tried finding a variety of channels to influence Chinese climate policy. But how do Chinese decision-makers receive these efforts? Looking at the factors shaping the Chinese policy on climate change, this book seeks to identify the domestic decision-making actors and their pattern of interaction with the United States and the European Union in particular. Which factors have shaped the stakeholders in the domestic policy network on climate change? Can external actors affect and engage with these stakeholders, and if so, to what extent? The central research question therefore reads:

What is the influence of other international actors on Chinese climate policy? How do external representatives interact with the Chinese policy-making system?

THE ARGUMENT

Drawing on the bureaucratic politics literature this book argues that adoption of an externally-inspired climate policy depends on a set of conditions of empowerment and rules of the game within the Chinese bureaucratic context: (i) *Empowerment*: A foreign climate policy is more likely to be adopted (a) if it contributes to the national climate interests according to the dominant domestic bureaucratic agency; (b) if it enhances the organization's essence³ of the dominant domestic bureaucratic agency; and (c) if it enlarges control and influence and opens new turfs for the dominant domestic bureaucratic agency. (ii) *Rules of the Game*: An externally-inspired climate policy is more likely to be adopted if the process obeys the rules of the game and involves elite decision-makers to develop long-term personal relationships (*guanxi*) with outside proponents. The book then identifies a pattern of policy adoption: First, certain interactions between external and Chinese counterparts take place, second, various bureaucratic actors position themselves for or against a certain policy concept, third, one actor or an alliance of actors emerge triumphant and finally, the new climate policy is adopted or not. The study finds that the European Union and the United States have taken the roles of agenda-setters and reference points for framing climate change policy. Their influence on actual policy-making, however, was mediated by bureaucratic politics within Chinese decision-making structures.

Externally-inspired policies are defined as policies that have been either pioneered by another country, such as the United States, or an area in which a certain country has had a unique and discrete policy approach. In the field of climate change policy, the European Union and its member states have for decades been forerunners of policy formulation and implementation. In the following text I will mostly refer to the United States and the EU (European Union), since they are the main actors that fulfil these criteria. However, other external policy promoters are countries (Australia, South Korea, Japan, Norway) and international institutions (United Nations, World Bank, IPCC (Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change)).

In the analysis, attention will be paid to China–EU relations, which were particularly pertinent in the time period under analysis. From a European perspective, China has always been a crucial country for a successful climate-related foreign policy. China has remained the biggest emitter of carbon emissions in the world and several parts of the Chinese territory have already been affected by environmental degradation and climate change effects.⁴ The latest IPCC Assessment Report (AR5), for example, predicted water scarcity to severely limit agricultural production by the 2020s (IPCC WGII 2014: 8). Besides the impact that Chinese climate policy can have on global climate change, China

is representative of many emerging economies that face the challenge of how to balance environmental protection and sustainable use of resources with their populations' demands for economic development. After China opened up to the international community in 1978, the question of whether the country could 'leapfrog' some of the developmental steps and resource-intensive and destructive practices that European countries had gone through in the previous centuries, became pivotal. Finally, China also serves as an institutional role model for many emerging and developing countries, because it is equipped with a resourceful state apparatus and strong central policy-making structures. Thus, understanding what drives Chinese climate policy-making and to what extent the European Union and the United States influenced policies might allow me to draw broader conclusions beyond the specific cases analysed in this book.

Climate policy has seen increasing attention both internationally and at national levels. In fact, the strong connection to developments at the multilateral level and the UNFCCC (United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change) are a defining characteristic of this policy area. While national actors involved in climate policy at the two levels often overlap, their constellations vary and there are differences in who dominates decision-making at which level. For instance, a country's Ministry of Foreign Affairs normally only plays a role at the international level. In the case of climate change policy, the multilateral level takes a particularly important role, as treaties such as the Montreal Protocol on Substances that Deplete the Ozone Layer of 1987, were negotiated internationally and imposed a ban on all the signatory states. In contrast, national climate policies, such as supporting renewable energy policies, are normally proposed and negotiated by ministries of environment and economy without a say for a Ministry of Foreign Affairs. That is why in the following analysis a distinction will be made between the two levels of decision-making – national and multilateral. Before turning to the theoretical framework explaining the climate policy adoption the following sections provide a short overview of climate policy-making in China and the EU's climate foreign policy.

CLIMATE CHANGE AS AN INTERNATIONAL ISSUE AND CHINA

Since the 'Limits to Growth' report by the 'Club of Rome' in 1972, climate change has become an increasingly international issue. Key milestones were the foundation of the UN Framework Convention on Climate Change at the Rio Earth Summit in 1992 as well as the signing of the Kyoto Protocol in 1997, which imposed binding emission targets on most developed countries (the United States left the Protocol in 2001). During this phase, most developing

nations did not take on any environmental commitments except for Russia (Walsh et al. 2011). This is reflective of the concept of ‘common but differentiated responsibilities’, which means that developing countries were participating in the protocol only through voluntary pledges as well as indirectly through the Clean Development Mechanism. The so-called Conference of the Parties (COP) is the supreme decision-making body of the UNFCCC and has been meeting on an annual basis to assess and advance the global fight against climate change through negotiated decisions. In the early 1990s, the COP agreed on the Kyoto Protocol. Since then the COP meetings were combined with the Conference of the Parties serving as the meeting of the Parties to the Kyoto Protocol, and as from 2016 the Conference of the Parties serving as the meeting of the Parties to the Paris Agreement. In the early twenty-first century additional meetings were introduced, so-called ‘inter-sessionals’ during which working groups and subsidiary bodies meet to prepare and negotiate for the high-level COP meetings. The decision-making in all these meetings is based on consensus. Another important international body is the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change, whose main mandate is to provide scientific input to the COP meetings. These meetings are thus the most important in advancing an international climate policy agenda. Most countries agree that climate change due to its transboundary nature can only be dealt with in a large coalition of countries.

In the first decade of the twenty-first century, awareness of climate change heightened due to increasing extreme weather events and negative predictions for the global climate. Most annual summits (COPs) in Copenhagen (2009), Cancun (2010), and Durban (2011), focused on developing a new and broader framework to replace the Kyoto Protocol, which expired in 2012 and entered a limited participation second commitment period with the Doha Amendment (2012, however not yet ratified by 2018). The main conflict was between those that called for emission cuts by present industrial countries, and those who also demanded emission caps for the present biggest polluters (mainly China and the United States). This cleavage has remained at the core of the UNFCCC and has dominated China’s position and suspicion towards the power play at work at multilateral negotiations. The years 2014 and 2015 witnessed a new Chinese approach on climate change. First, China announced an emissions peak for 2030 as part of a US–China agreement on climate change in November 2014. Second, setting the tone for the pre-negotiations in 2015, the alignment of the two major global economies was a crucial precondition for a legally binding Paris agreement that emerged in December 2015. While outside the timeframe of this analysis, President Trump’s announcement to withdraw from the Paris Agreement completely reverted the situation once more and effectively froze US–China climate relations.

Chinese cooperation with other countries can be considered key for international climate negotiations and climate policy. Trying to influence Chinese policy-making within its national and the international setting, has become a core goal for the European Union as well as other groupings within the climate negotiations. Chinese core interests in international climate negotiations were economic development, poverty alleviation and social stability. The issues of sustainable and low-carbon development and combating environmental and air pollution however rose on the negotiators' agenda since 2010 (Duggan 2014; Minas 2011: 1). At the negotiation table there was a firm alignment of the Chinese position with that of the Group of 77 (G-77), in particular in the debate on 'common but differentiated responsibilities'. Due to its emphasis of unity of developing countries, its economic might and the permanent seat on the United Nations Security Council, China saw itself in the role of the speaker for the developing countries (Heggelund 2007). Although China might actually have had the necessary weight to act alone, the G-77 could serve 'as protection against being singled out' (Lewis 2007: 162).

China joined other alliances and bilateral cooperation platforms to complement its main rooting with the "G-77 and China" group (Kasa et al. 2008: 121). In climate change negotiations China and India had been thrown together by fate, as there was an overlap on common issues on the interpretation of the 'common but differentiated responsibilities' principle, the choice of the negotiating instrument (emissions intensity versus levels) and the accountancy rules for emissions embedded in exports, amongst others (Tian and Whalley 2008). Finally, the grouping of BASIC countries – Brazil, South Africa, India and China – which formed in the climate negotiations became an important force at the Copenhagen Summit in 2009 (Vidal 2010). While the formation was largely viewed as a response to external pressure, the ministers for climate-related matters of these four countries at certain times even met quarter-yearly. Their initial commonality was that each of them 'made a pledge that was a significant deviation from business as usual emissions' during COP15 (Hallding et al. 2011: 15). G-77, BASIC and other regional dynamics set the background within which China was developing its position in international climate change negotiations.

Drawing a brief overview of the network of alliances and interests that include China within the international negotiations, provides both an idea of the channels of influence, but also clarifies the multitude of factors and policy approaches, the country was exposed to and could draw upon when designing its own climate policy. As the role of domestic decision-making structures is the focus of this book, the following section will take a closer look at how the responsibility for climate policy changed since the 1990s and moved from a niche policy into the focus of central decision-making.

CHINESE INSTITUTIONAL DEVELOPMENT IN THE AREA OF CLIMATE CHANGE

After China's economic and political opening in 1978, climate change was first treated as a scientific issue, which meant that the State Meteorological Administration had the responsibility for advising the government policy in international negotiations. In the late 1990s, the role of climate policy planning shifted to what is today called the National Development and Reform Commission, one of the main policy-formulating authorities in the PRC (Lewis 2007). The NDRC broadly oversees China's economic development. Around 2013, it was made up of 26 departments with 890 employees and reported to the State Council. The NDRC was of crucial importance to Chinese climate policy: It was the NDRC, not the Ministry of Environment as one might expect, that oversaw climate policy until a major government restructuring in 2018. In many ways, the NDRC was even more powerful than a ministry, as it wielded macroeconomic planning powers, oversaw the state-owned companies, which are impacted by any climate policy, and had direct access to the State Council. The NDRC 'sees climate policy through the prism of economy and energy' (Heggelund et al. 2010: 230).

Together with the Foreign Ministry the NDRC was responsible for China's overall position at international negotiations. At the international level, important other actors were the State Council, but the NDRC held the single most important role in determining the final negotiation position by drafting China's communications to the UNFCCC, coordinating the national coordination committee (see below) and providing the biggest part of the Chinese delegation at climate change negotiations (Department of Climate Change NDRC 2004; Minas 2011). The NDRC's work was informed by the key document 'National Assessment Report on Climate Change' which was published in 2006 and every five years since then and combined the efforts of 20 government departments (Chinese Ministry of Science and Technology 2006). Furthermore, there was the National Coordination Committee on Climate Change chaired by the Premier and reporting to the State Council, which oversaw climate activities within several government bodies.

Similar to other Communist systems and planned economies, the Chinese economy is structured according to so-called Five-Year Plans (or Five-Year-Guidelines since 2006), in which Chinese leaders prioritize strategies and measures for the country and its regions, which directly translates into the resources allocated to the respective causes. Until 2006 economic prosperity and GDP growth were the plans' key priorities, trumping all other social or environmental considerations. This changed considerably around 2006/2007 when China overtook the United States as the biggest emitter of

carbon emissions and the impact of environmental pollution intensified within China. Acknowledging the negative impacts of pollution on GDP growth, the 11th Five-Year Plan by the government explicitly included environmental measures, such as the unilateral reduction of major pollutant emissions by 10 per cent and an increase of total forest coverage by 20 per cent by 2010 (Lewis 2011; Walsh et al. 2011). In June 2007 China released its own long-term climate change plan. In the 12th Five-Year Plan, which ran from 2011 to 2015 the country set out some 'dramatic moves to reduce fossil energy consumption, promote low-carbon energy sources, and restructure China's economy'. Among the goals was to 'gradually establish a carbon trade market'. Key targets included 'a 16 per cent reduction in energy intensity (energy consumption per unit of GDP), increasing non-fossil energy to 11.4 per cent of total energy use; and a 17 per cent reduction in carbon intensity' (carbon emissions per unit of GDP, in order to reach the Copenhagen target of 40 per cent by 2020) (Lewis 2011: 1; Xinhua 2011a). In summary, the issue of climate change has seen a continuous rise in priority given by Chinese decision-makers, which has been reflected in the amount of budgetary and institutional resources spent (for instance the creation of a climate change department) as well as in the allocation of responsibility (climate change as high-level item included in international meetings and Five-Year Plans).

Chinese Climate Policies and Interests

Various analyses of Chinese behaviour in climate change have ranked so-called 'Chinese' interests in different ways. Typically, concerns about international image, economic development, sovereignty, and nationalism are deemed to play an important role at the multilateral level (Johnston 2007). More recently, the effects of climate change have increasingly been felt and impacted public health and the perception of China in the international arena.

Adaptation and resilience issues may not be directly linked to the mitigation discussions yet have surely been an important factor for China becoming increasingly aware of the risks and costs of climate change impacts on the country, and consequently also the need to reduce emissions. China's *National Adaptation Strategy*, released in November 2013, was launched at the Warsaw COP in 2013 coordinated by the NDRC involving 12 ministries and government agencies (such as the Ministry of Finance, China Meteorological Administration and Ministry of Agriculture). While there was still a lack of knowledge on the forward-looking macro and micro socio-economic impacts of climate change, the Third National Climate Change Assessment in 2015 demonstrated the severity of climate impacts, China was already facing, including increased water vulnerability and natural disasters. Managing climate risks requires guidance on priority areas for different levels of gov-

ernment to focus on and to develop their own provincial and local adaptation plans. The National Adaptation Strategy identified these as infrastructure, agriculture, water resources, coastal zones and maritime waters, forests and ecological systems, tourism and other industries and human health (Heggelund and Nadin 2017: 103–4). Many of the policy responses may lie along the spectrum of Sustainable Development, adaptation and disaster risk reduction (Heggelund and Nadin 2017: 105). Hence policies combating and adapting to climate change have climbed up in the ladder of importance (State Council of the PRC 2008; Nadin et al. 2015; Heggelund and Nadin 2017).

Regardless of this novel framing of climate change and the awareness of urgency to act, powerful existing interests and structures must be considered. According to Walsh the key issues at international negotiations included, ‘because of its reliance on coal, the large incremental cost China faces in moving toward higher-efficiency coal technology and in capturing the emissions from these plants’, data collection and transparency as well as technology transfers (Lewis 2007: 165; Walsh et al. 2011). The perspective and analysis of Chinese interests is at the core of my research and will also influence the outcome of the study. To clarify, the term ‘interest’ is used, borrowing from the literature on principled negotiation, to identify the underlying motivations, such as international image, domestic legitimacy and so on, as opposed to varying ‘positions’ that are taken in the course of the negotiations and denote standpoints on specific issues at specific points during the negotiations (Susskind et al. 1999).

In the domestic realm, an increasing recognition and experience of climate change, such as heavy droughts in northern China and direct effects from pollution in Beijing and most industrial areas have changed China’s attitude and public discourse, which was reflected in the domestic debate on ‘abatement costs, ecological vulnerability and principles of equity’ (Zhang 2013: 2). Issues such as transfers of technology and funds for innovation that could come with emissions reduction commitments had a potential to convince especially from an economic perspective. Besides, broad policy goals of continued GDP development, stability and control of domestic pressures for human consequences of climate change were the key factors influencing Chinese frames and behaviour on climate change. Returning to the initial question of the pattern of interaction vis-à-vis external actors, the capacity of the EU and the US to address and include such core interests of the Chinese climate network eventually determined their ability to influence actual Chinese policy-making and positioning.

Knowing the determinants of foreign policy goals and domestic policy constraints, however, must be complemented by an understanding of the Chinese structures of climate change policy. Next to a multitude of government ministries and agencies, there are other domestic influencers, such as the media,

academics and NGOs. It is important to note that this climate network is not a monolithic structure and the various actors emphasize different aspects of the broad interests outlined above. While the NDRC focused on how climate change relates to GDP growth and impacts state-owned enterprises, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs concerned itself with China's international image, Chinese media often argue in terms of an international power struggle, with developed countries using climate change to hold back Chinese development.

Chinese Institutional Setting and Government Agencies

This book's main focus lies on the explanatory power at the level of bureaucratic agencies. In contrast to other studies on Chinese climate policy, therefore, it delves deeper to open the 'black box' of decision-making. Since the policy area of climate change is cross-disciplinary in nature, combining scientific and political aspects amongst others, Chinese climate policy was informed by a variety of stakeholders. The NDRC held most power in terms of policy planning, although it was not the final decision-maker. Decision-making power rested with the State Council, its standing committee and the politburo.

Since bureaucratic reshuffling in 2003 and until the latest reform in 2018, the NDRC in its present form was the key climate policy-maker, while energy policy continues to be dealt with by the National Energy Administration (NEA). The NDRC's framing of climate change most closely aligns with the broad trends outlined above. Most importantly this policy-making body was strongly influenced by the increasing pressures of environmental degradation and perceived climate vulnerability (Gippner 2014). In the foreword to its 2012 White Paper on 'China's Policies and Actions for Addressing Climate Change', the NDRC starts with China's increased vulnerability to climate change with natural disaster affecting 430 million people and causing direct economic losses of RMB 309.6 billion (NDRC 2013: 2). The NDRC was actively looking to other countries for climate policy solutions, as witnessed by studies that were launched by the Chinese Academy of Sciences (CAS) and Social Sciences (CASS) to compare international policy experiments and experiences (Liu et al. 2009). At the same time, issues of saving face and not entering into commitments that might not be fulfilled constrain the NDRC decision-making spectrum. The European Union could thus play several roles through its contacts with various individuals in these institutions. On the one hand the NDRC in its policy-making actively drew on input from foreign experts. While these experts were not participating in the decision-making process, they provided input at a very early stage of the process. Second, the European Union delegation and the US embassy in China and several of its associated research institutes regularly organized joint workshops with the various ministries and government think tanks. A version of this were

the various sponsored study trips (which are often funded by foundations, such as the Alexander von Humboldt Foundation) whose single aim was to expose Chinese government officials and academics to German and European practices, policies, and sites. These kinds of occasions and channels were welcomed by the Chinese counterparts, although follow-ups about the impacts of such meetings must be further investigated. The fundamental emphasis on the principle of ‘common but differentiated responsibilities’ provided the natural boundaries for such an influence. At the same time, these might be some of the channels, where European policies and norms were communicated and could be traced respectively. Other important government actors were the Ministry of Finance, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the Ministry of Agriculture and the China Meteorological Administration (CMA).

Looking at these various perspectives on Chinese climate policy development, the current state of affairs is astonishing: China set a 2030 target to peak emissions and a national emissions trading system began operation in 2017. Influences have come from many places: domestic pollution, energy economics, as well as outside actors – the World Bank, the United States and the European Union. Particularly, US–China bilateral relations were strong during the Obama administration. They have also received more scrutiny given the global perception of an emerging G2. But the European Union was also a crucial actor, which, more quietly, has been influencing Chinese climate policy through technology transfers and capacity-building. Academically, more attention will have to be given to this second mode of influence between two major powers.

ENVIRONMENTAL LEADERSHIP AND ACTION: THE UNITED STATES AND THE EUROPEAN UNION

Within the emerging field of leadership research, increasing focus has been put on the role of individual actors in influencing international policy agendas and other countries. Several studies on climate leadership focused on the role of the United States (Betsill 2000; Nitze 1994), as the most influential global actor since the beginning of global climate negotiations. In the early twenty-first century novel international actors, such as the European Union, which, albeit not a state in its own right, combines elements of intergovernmental and supranational decision-making, have attracted attention. Behaving proactively and coherently on the level of international climate negotiations, the influence of European environmental policies and norms has been studied (Jung et al. 2007; Oberthür and Tänzler 2007; Rousselin 2012a; Torney 2012a, 2012b).

While the EU’s model of decision-making has been studied extensively (Devuyst and Men 2007) and is analysed with interest in other regions, including China (Ru and Liu 2013; Xie 2012), the EU’s special institutional

arrangement and history mean that other countries refrain from using it as a role model. The EU approach is considered weak when compared with the United States, in particular in the area of security policy (Putten and Chu 2011). Generally, the United States has been the core reference point for Chinese policy: merely looking at the number of overseas Chinese based in the United States or US-educated Chinese in business circles and circles of political decision-making. The United States is the most common host country for Chinese before all other countries, let alone regional blocs like the European Union. In 2010–2011 Chinese were the biggest group of international students in US higher education at 723,000 (23 per cent) (Lai 2012), and concepts, such as ‘brain circulation’, meaning the return of skilled workers and engineers to their home country are particularly pronounced in China (Saxenian 2005). The networks between Chinese Americans, their families back in China and overseas returnees carry concepts and ideas from the United States to Chinese discourses as well. The United States being by far the largest Western destination for overseas Chinese thus has become a much more familiar reference model within China when compared with other industrialized countries in North America and Europe.

In the field of environmental and climate policy and legislation, the United States has succeeded in internationalizing some of its domestic policies, dedicating considerable efforts whenever both environmental and industry actors considered legislation ‘acceptable and advantageous’ (De Sombre 2000: ix). Examples from the 1990s are the preservation of endangered species, regulation on air quality and conservation of fisheries (De Sombre 2000).

After 2001, however, the situation changed: while the United States used to be a leader on negotiating climate treaties starting from the Rio Conference until the Kyoto Protocol (Betsill 2000: 219), it had to give up its vanguard position when the lack of domestic broad-based support meant a diminished negotiation position during the Kyoto Protocol negotiations (Betsill 2000: 221). The Senate Resolution 98, also called ‘Byrd–Hagel Resolution’, of 1997 stipulated that any negotiated agreement would have to impose emissions targets on developing countries as well to receive Senate approval (105th Congress 1997). As the Kyoto Protocol excluded emissions targets for non-Annex I countries (broadly the developing countries), the Clinton administration never submitted the protocol for Senate consent. Finalizing the US withdrawal from the process, the first Bush administration rejected the Kyoto Protocol which had been negotiated by previous President Clinton and Vice-President Gore.

This led to a shift to the bilateral level of cooperation with countries like China. In fact, progressive states, such as California, which are global leaders on climate policy, organized their own development programmes with China. With the election of President Barack Obama, the United States and most

importantly domestic support from the grassroots level, a Congress controlled by the Democrats and from the business community paved the way for a more active and constructive engagement in international climate talks (Bang and Schreurs 2011: 248).

Another shift in Sino-US relations took place after April 2013, when the two countries initiated the US-China Climate Change Working Group, which worked on several issues of common interest, such as energy efficiency in buildings and industries, smart grids and greenhouse gas data (U.S. Department of State 2014). Yet, while the United States and China had identified areas for cooperation, and NGOs, such as the Natural Resources Defense Council (NRDC), formed part of the epistemic community and circle of scientific advisors informing Chinese decision-makers' opinions, the relationship faced several obstacles. Although 'opportunities for collaboration in fighting climate change are plentiful, [...the] two very different societies [...have] considerable suspicion for each other' (Lieberthal and Sandalow 2009: ix). Lieberthal and Sandalow identified four core obstacles to successful cooperation between the United States and China: 'mutual distrust, different expectations on technology, different expectations on finance, common expectations of high costs' (Lieberthal and Sandalow 2009: xiv).

The void created by an, with interruptions, limited US-China relation on climate policy, opened up space for other actors, more specifically the European Union. As hinted above, the European Union has been able to position itself as the global leader on climate change, particularly in the first decade of the twenty-first century. As Harris puts it, the European Union 'is a slow, faltering leader, with several member states clearly trailing behind, but it is a leader nonetheless' (Harris 2007a: 406). The EU's efforts to export its domestic foreign policy approaches towards third countries as well as influencing the policies and strategies pursued at the level of the international environmental and climate negotiations have been described with the term EU Environmental Foreign Policy (Barkdull and Harris 2002; De Sombre 2000: 4; Falkner 2013; Harris 2007a, 2009b; Jung et al. 2007; Lacasta et al. 2007; Oberthür and Tänzler 2007; Torney 2012b).

Thus, while China was at a crossroads of determining its own climate policy, it looked abroad to other countries for inspiration (Ru and Liu 2013; Stensdal 2012), the EU's approaches and policies were a natural point of reference. The interest created since 2006 on the Chinese side went beyond a mere comparing of practices and was matched by European agents actively trying to influence Chinese climate policy through high-level exchanges, joint projects or capacity-building. The European Union saw itself in the role of an environmental and climate leader. Having a special interest in a good relationship with China, any policy adopted by China was also considered a boost in Europe's

relevance to international politics more general – something the European Union has been aspiring to since the early 2000s.

For several years, the European Union made attempts to strengthen its influence on China. It was argued that the European Union has been following a ‘policy of unconditional engagement’ vis-à-vis the People’s Republic of China (PRC), pursuing its promotion of international engagement and multilateralism (Fox and Godement 2009: 2). ‘The EU sent over 450 delegations to China in 2009 in an attempt to improve its standing and leverage in Beijing’ (Lee 2010). In the field of climate change, the efforts by the European Union were summarized in a 2011 Joint Reflection Paper by the European External Action Service and the Commission. Outlining the broad interests and strategies for their climate relations with other countries, the two European Union institutions emphasized that in the EU’s climate diplomacy ‘special consideration will continue to be given to the United States, China, India, Russia, Brazil and South Africa’ (EEAS and European Commission 2011: 2).

In sum, the European Union started with a disadvantage in this endeavour as it was the United States which were widely seen as being the biggest influence on China – both as a point of reference and as competitor (Yan 2010: 291). In the multilateral negotiations under the UNFCCC the US resistance to ratifying the Kyoto Protocol and accepting absolute CO₂ emissions reductions was a core vehicle for Chinese rhetoric justifying its own inaction. In its most recent version, President Trump’s announcement to leave the Paris Agreement has changed these dynamics once again. On the other hand, Chinese imitation of the American model of development as well as integrated trade and cooperation relations meant a steady influence by US businesses, politicians, scientists and other advisers. Within this context, did the European Union have influence over China? And if so, how and under which conditions can a European policy become more attractive than others, say provided by the United States?

ENVIRONMENTAL FOREIGN POLICY

There are a variety of ways to approach the question of why policy and rules spread from one country to the other. They are usually divided into the ‘logic of consequences’ (Cortell and Davis 1996) and the ‘logic of appropriateness’ (March and Olsen 1989), motivating one country to adopt the policies of another. The ‘logic of consequences’ draws attention to either countries’ self-interest or the very real threats and conditionality that can be applied by the country exporting its policies. On the other hand, the ‘logic of appropriateness’ argument highlights countries’ considerations as members of an international community and transnational institutions. Implementing a new policy thereby cannot simply be explained by carrying out a cost–benefit analysis of policy alternatives.

In the field of climate policy, due to the global character of climate change, countries have had an interest in influencing other countries' domestic policies under two broad logics, bilaterally (under the assumption 'think globally, act locally') and by negotiating agreements at the international level (under the assumption 'global problems require global solutions') (Ott 2001: 277). Only if a critical mass of countries adopts proactive climate policies, can impact be created. The question of how countries influence each other's climate policies came to the fore after the foundation of the UNFCCC and the negotiations for the Kyoto Protocol.

Literature on environmental foreign policy has particularly dealt with the role of the United States (Harris 2000). After the US repudiation of the Kyoto Protocol a new strand of literature focused on the leadership role of the European Union and its environmental foreign policy as well as the role of other core countries (Harris 2009a).

Harris defines Environmental Foreign Policy (EFP) as 'the interplay between (1) domestic forces, institutions and actors involved in environmental decision-making and the implementation of environmental policies, and (2) international forces, institutions and actors' (Harris 2007b: 16). From a policy perspective EFP furthermore encompasses international environmental objectives and the methods used to achieve them. The term environmental foreign policy and climate foreign policy are often used interchangeably, although in recent years the term climate foreign policy has been used more frequently. Within this book I will mostly use the term Environmental Foreign Policy.

There are examples of policy diffusion between the European Union and China driven by considerations of market access, such as car emissions standards for new light and heavy duty vehicles, which were repeatedly upgraded after the European standards in 2000, 2004, 2007 (Ministry of Environmental Protection 2007; Rousselin 2012b). In bigger cities in Beijing the 'China V standard' equivalent to Euro V was introduced in 2013 (CNTV 2013). Clear economic arguments on the European side to internationalize domestic standards and environmental incentives from the Chinese perspective (De Sombre 2000; He et al. 2010) could explain the adoption of European standards: European car emissions standards, which were of a high level, have been adopted in more than 60 countries globally besides China. The global diffusion resulted from countries' efforts to stay competitive in the international market. 'Due to the pressure from importing countries and from economic competitors that have adopted standards, even developing countries adopt stringent emission standards to stay in the market', rather than creating a 'race to the bottom' (Saikawa 2010: iii).

Concerns about its international image, to avoid diplomatic isolation or international censure, have also led Chinese delegations to demonstrate their willingness to combat climate change at the UNFCCC ('logic of appropri-

ateness') (Johnston 1998: 195; 2007; Yang 2011: 145). The cases analysed in this book and presented above, however, are neither generic multilateral agreements nor do they display 'classic' characteristics of consequence-driven policy adoption. Thus, neither of the two 'logics' is able to fully account for policy adoption.

The third 'logic of arguing' comes closest to what this book is proposing. According to Risse (2000) this logic of interaction sees actors engage in truth-seeking activities, trying to determine whose norms and policies are correct. The bureaucratic politics approach, which claims that individual institutional actors do not agree on common principles, such as 'national interests', but are always influenced by their organizational bias, sees policy adoption as the outcome of a pulling and hauling over policies and norms.

There is evidence for all three logics to be present in the field of Chinese climate policy: Adopting car emissions standards to be compatible with the global market (logic of consequences), joining international climate initiatives to appear as a responsible actor (logic of appropriateness), and developing their own methodologies for measuring historical CO₂ emissions (logic of arguing). While it is important to be aware of these different logics, the focus of this book is at the level below that of national strategy and action. It argues that bureaucratic actors each define national interests and their identity differently and the final policy output is the result of their bargaining with each other. Depending on which bureaucratic actor succeeds, one of the logics will prevail.

Instruments to Influence Climate Policy

Instruments of influence can be divided into three categories: (i) *Manipulating utility calculations*: conditional market access, conditional payments and so on, providing incentives and punishment to push for the pursuit of environmental policy objectives; (ii) *Capacity-building*: enabling a country to pursue environmental policy objectives; and (iii) *Dialogues and negotiations*: argumentation, persuading a country to pursue environmental policy objectives (Adelle et al. 2018).

The United States focused on the latter two in its relations with China. After US–China bilateral relations cooled down in the aftermath of 1989. In 2005 the US and China founded a Senior Dialogue which later transformed into a Strategic and Economic Dialogue under the Obama administration. In 2009, Secretary Clinton elevated the issues of climate change and clean energy to top priorities in these bilateral talks (Wilder 2009). Since then climate change and clean energy became a beacon of cooperation in a climate of increasing distrust between the two great powers (Lieberthal and Sandalow 2009: 14).

In 2008, the government-wide US–China Ten Year Framework for Cooperation on Energy and Environment (TYF) was started. In November of 2009 the US–China Clean Energy Research Center (CERC) was launched. In April 2013, the Climate Change Working Group was established to prepare for that year’s Strategic and Economic Dialogue. The 2014 US–China Climate Agreement solidified the high-level alliance between the two countries. Supporting China in setting its first emissions target (peaking emissions by 2030), the US also fulfilled the main argument that the Chinese government held against taking international action: that unless the United States is part of a deal, China would not go ahead alone. The relationship on climate change strengthened with the successful Paris Climate Summit and subsequent presidential meetings. The logic of highest-level agreement continued with meetings in September 2015 and March 2016, during which the two countries vowed to sign the Paris Agreement and start its implementation – and was only put to a halt with the presidential elections of 2016 (The White House 2016).

In contrast, technical cooperation, summarized under the term capacity-building, on climate change and clean energy between the two countries has a much longer history (Lieberthal and Sandalow 2009: 3; Asia Society and Pew Center on Global Climate Change 2009). US-based organizations, such as the Natural Resource Defense Council have been working in China since the mid-1990s, but also the US embassy in Beijing has been funding and supporting climate-related project work. Since 2010, the EPA cooperated with the Chinese Ministry of Environment on a variety of capacity-building efforts.

However, not only international institutions, but also state actors and *sui generis* actors like the European Union can promote climate policy adoption. There are few established channels of interaction or connections between the European Union and China, say through former colonial ties, common cultural structures or political systems, although there are multiple interdependencies in the economic field. The institutional arrangement of the PRC’s central government on climate policy presents a variety of angles through which external actors could interact with government stakeholders in the decision-making process. The official meetings between the chief negotiators of China and other countries in multilateral settings aside, there are annual bilateral meetings within the EU–China dialogue on climate change. More informally, the European Union and several of its member states hold regular EU–China dialogue meetings. One expert interviewed for this study remarked that China is involved in more dialogues than any other country in the world. This coincides with other actors’ interest in understanding and influencing Chinese policy-making and has increased exponentially in recent years.

Besides that most of the channels of interaction happen via joint programmes and projects funded by the European Union or by both partners, capacity-building and delegation visits. These more pragmatic forms of inter-

action often involve government representatives, but very often also researchers and scientists, which are part of the broader Climate-policy network in China.

Key instruments used by the European Union vis-à-vis its 'strategic partner' countries, even before the 2011 explicit reflection paper on climate diplomacy mentioned above, included: awareness raising and high-level meetings, linking climate change with issues such as trade, best practices and capacity-building in the areas of emissions reductions, energy saving and low-carbon development, disaster relief and climate risk forecasting (EEAS and European Commission 2011, 2013). Apart from the efforts on disaster managements all the others – broadly summarized in engagement and capacity-building – were aimed at changing domestic practices or international positions by other countries to approximate European practices or achieve climate goals supported by the European Union.

INTRODUCING FOREIGN CLIMATE POLICIES – HOW TO MEASURE POLICY CHANGE?

The focus of analysis for this book is policies and their processes of adoption. Policy change manifests itself in declaratory documents and policy actions. During my interviews I asked representatives of the domestic elite and international climate experts to rank the level of adoption of individual policy concepts. Based on this I could identify a simple dichotomy between adoption and rejection: Did China adopt an externally inspired climate change policy or not?

The two values are extremes and the actual cases selected for the in-depth analysis in the following chapters are all situated closer to adoption, yet none of them is a full adoption, as there are always adjustments in instruments and timeline. To give an example, in the case of emissions trading, China has not yet adopted a nation-wide or wholesale emissions trading system, but instead introduced seven regional pilot systems, each displaying slightly different features.

An exemplary study of contrasting various theoretical models and their explanatory power has been carried out by distinguished political scientist Graham T. Allison in the *Essence of Decision* (Allison 1971; Allison and Zelikow 1999), where he provided three narratives explaining the events of the Cuban Missile Crisis, with very differing explanations depending on the depth of analysis. In three instances the United States and USSR are analysed following, first, the rational actor model, second, the organizational process model, and third, the bureaucratic politics model. All can somehow explain what happened but the more information becomes available the less likely a purely rational actor explanation becomes – that is how Allison challenged the MAD dogma.⁵ This book takes Allison's work as its inspiration to dig

deeper into the Chinese climate decision-making structure and the underlying causes for endorsing an external policy to enter domestic policy in some cases, but not in others.

A first starting point to address this puzzle would be to look at exogenous factors, which might influence the Chinese government: these could be the particular structure of a policy problem, the existence or non-existence of alternative policies or competitive pressures to adopt a policy in order to compete on a global market. While these considerations are important and have to be taken into consideration at first, the cases under investigation lack a so-called clear-cut ‘co-benefit’ logic: besides addressing the policy goal of reducing carbon emissions, some policies, such as support schemes for renewable energy technologies, have strong economic benefits once established. A mere cost–benefit analysis would then suffice to explain which policy was eventually adopted, regardless of where it originated. In order to be aware of possible exogenous determinants, a cost–benefit analysis was first carried out for each case study, thus establishing the need to look for endogenous factors and the preferences and beliefs by domestic decision-making actors.

Torney rightly pointed out, however, that from a Chinese perspective policy transfer ‘is conditioned by domestic political structure, conceptions of material interest, and pre-existing normative frames’ (Torney 2012b: 21). Although in each case, these factors do in fact create the background for Chinese climate policy in general, they do not allow for an explanation of variation – why some cases of EU policy transfer were successful and other cases were unsuccessful. That is why this book aims to look more specifically at unbundling the black box of domestic politics in the Chinese context.

My approach thus marries considerations from the literatures on diffusion and domestic politics in ‘recipient’ states. The reason this is complicated is characteristic for climate policy in most countries, where multiple levels of decision-making interact and foreign policy takes on a special role in both international and domestic climate policy.

Looking at how actors interact and possibly influence each other *within* this system makes the picture even messier, but countries are attempting this and it is thus the duty of the political scientist to develop models and ways to make sense of it, nonetheless. That there are open areas for criticism will remain a risk and this book aims to add a piece to the overall puzzle, which will be complemented by new and established theoretical approaches.

METHODOLOGY AND SOURCES

The analysis of the network of policy-making will start by asking three core questions: Who is involved? What are their interests? And how do these interests affect their stance on a particular issue? This approach acknowl-

edges that institutional actors pursue interests that are not only related to the rational best interest of the state as a whole, but also those interests that relate to the advancement of an individual's career within an institution as well as the 'turfs' of agencies vis-à-vis each other. As Halperin and Clapp explain, 'each participant may focus on a different face of the issue and sense different dangers and opportunities' (Halperin and Clapp 2006: 15–16). Secondly, we need to ask additional questions about the bureaucratic politics process itself. On how actors are chosen or appointed, what level of seniority they are in, whether they have recently joined their organizations or have a long track record. Similarly the policy environment has an influence: how visible is an issue, what constituencies or interest groups, for instance state-owned companies, are affected by the policy, and finally, what is the venue of negotiation – within an international setting like the UNFCCC or behind closed doors between two departments of the NDRC (Durbin 2014). Considering the inconsistencies of climate policy adoption in China, it can offer important insights into the reasons but also the mechanisms of successful policy transfer from one state to the other.

As an empirical, qualitative study, this book adopts a 'process tracing' approach to identify the causal mechanism linking EU-inspired policies and the role of the European Union to bureaucratic politics. The analysis is structured around three case studies, which all represent different degrees of adoption of EU-inspired climate policies. The research draws on over fifty-five interviews carried out in Beijing, Bonn, Berlin, London, Warsaw, Paris and Singapore from 2012 to 2015 to identify the frames used by Chinese and European stakeholders in climate change negotiations, to determine the core factors of Chinese climate policy and the actors involved in the decision-making. The book follows an interview-based 'ego-centric network nomination method' in its questionnaires, similar to the methods employed in *guanxi* research (Chen et al. 2013: 180). This means that each respondent was asked questions about the Chinese climate network, its relations to external actors and individuals and the type of relationships and hierarchies within the network. The advantage of this approach is that various responses can be triangulated and network characteristics can be traced by the researcher rather than by the respondent. In a second step it draws conclusions and attempts an explanation for the formal and informal channels of exchange and bureaucratic empowerment of respective bureaucratic entities. Using process tracing also increases the demands for transparency on the data collection (validity and data collection are dealt with in detail in the chapters on Research Design and Methodology). At several times during the case study analysis alternative explanations and theories will be considered. Located in the discourse before and after the landmark 2009 Copenhagen climate change conference it attempts to capture the global

dynamics that have been integral to the subsequent rounds of negotiation and epitomized in Chinese climate policy.

THE CASES

The case studies chosen are the norms of 2°C temperature target, the Emissions Trading System (ETS) pilots initiated in 2012, and carbon capture and storage (CCS). The analysis broadly covers the 10-year period from 2006 to 2016, mostly during the Hu–Wen leadership of the Chinese government. The cases were selected in a two-step process, first distinguishing between the multilateral level and the bilateral level. Secondly, they were chosen based on their differing speed and path of policy adoption. Finally, all three cases exhibit different actor coalitions, with varying levels of empowerment by the NDRC, which is the factor under analysis.

Case 1: Limiting average global warming to 2°C when compared to pre-industrial levels has become the guiding principle of the post-Copenhagen climate change discourse at the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC). In 2010 China along with the UNFCCC signatories officially endorsed the temperature limit, although it had resisted similar proposals before that. The 2°C had been proposed by the European Union for many years and before the Copenhagen Summit in 2009 was part of the EU's climate diplomacy at the level of the international negotiations, but also bilaterally with China, where the target was communicated to political and scientific communities. The EU's strategy of using channels of Chinese domestic decision-making, by addressing high-ranking individuals with the country's China Meteorological Administration (CMA), is one of the 'toolboxes' of measures in the EU's climate diplomacy. The case of the 2°C temperature target aims to expose bureaucratic politics and EU–China interactions by following the norm from European adoption in 1996 through the endorsement in the Stern Review and the interplay of administrative empowerment and personal ties, towards the Chinese endorsement of the target in 2009. The CMA, which used to oversee Chinese climate policy before bureaucratic reforms, took interest to the novel 2°C issue, preparing studies on its scientific value and lobbying the State Council, thus claiming the policy area as a new turf. The case is particularly interesting as it relates to a policy endorsed at the international level, where the European Union is only one of many actors. Second, the 2°C target has a potentially very large impact on global climate policy, as it is a norm guiding other domestic climate policies.

Case 2: In 2011 and 2013 China approved a policy to implement a national emissions trading system (ETS) and began with the establishment of ETS pilot schemes in seven cities and provinces. These pilots alone were expected collectively to cover carbon emissions equivalent to one-third of the European

carbon market, making China in effect the world's second-largest trader of emissions. The full national emissions trading system would be the biggest in the world. The case of emissions trading has been chosen as a most likely case for adoption of an externally inspired climate policy. Already in 2002, the US had supported a domestic sulphur trading system in China as well as experimented with trading in the United States. European–Chinese initiatives on emissions trading started in 2006 and were the first to consistently accompany the Chinese development towards emissions trading. Second, taking place in the bilateral arena between the European Union and China, several domestic bureaucratic actors (in its composition different from the actors' combination in the other two case studies) were involved in the adoption process. Prior to the introduction of the policy there were two main positions advocated – while the NDRC was supporting the ETS, the Ministry of Finance (MOF) strongly advocated a carbon tax. Thus, the two ministries were in competition with each other over the 'ETS turf'. The adoption of emissions trading furthermore was an important case study, as it was one of the first examples of China adopting market-based instruments for combating climate change, with a considerable impact on the country's state-owned enterprises as symbols for China's still existing planned economy.

Case 3: In 2013 the NDRC endorsed CCS (carbon capture and storage) technologies as part of the national strategy to combat climate change. Technologies of capturing and storing CO₂ in underground storage sites, such as depleted oil fields, was a novel, yet highly controversial, technology allowing countries in principle to continue the same level of industrial production while reducing overall emissions. European–Chinese initiatives on carbon capture and storage (CCS) started in 2005 and the 'EU–China Near Zero Emission Coal' project was the first to accompany the Chinese development towards CCS technology as a part of its climate policy. The case of carbon capture and storage has been chosen as a comparison case to the ETS adoption, as adoption was more cautious, and a different set of Chinese bureaucratic actors were involved. The Ministry of Science and Technology (MOST) took initial charge of the project, while the NDRC remained sceptical about the potential of CCS as a technology combating climate change. With a change in attitude supporting CCS following promising signs of the EU–China project around 2011, the NDRC in April 2013 issued a strategy on CCUS (carbon capture, utilization and storage) developing regulations and institutions to facilitate commercialization of CCUS technology. It also took charge of matters relating to CCS, effectively transitioning the turf from MOST. CCS development has halted in most parts of the world due to public opposition and the remaining high costs hindering commercialization, yet by 2017 most pilot sites and first commercial sites are situated in China, making this a highly relevant case for tracing European influence on Chinese climate decision-making.

STRUCTURE OF THE BOOK

The book is structured as follows: Chapter 2 develops the analytical framework based on the theory of bureaucratic politics. It links the adoption of externally-inspired climate policies with bureaucratic empowerment within the rules of the Chinese bureaucratic system. Process tracing describes a pattern of policy adoption consisting of three parts: External–China Interaction, Bureaucratic Politics, and Turf Allocation. Three cases are chosen based on their representativeness and comparability to trace the process to policy adoption, the role of the external actors and the interplay with bureaucratic empowerment. Chapter 4 surveys and evaluates the interests and positions of the core stakeholders in the Chinese decision-making structure and identifies the channels of influence and interaction with external actors, specifically the European Union. In Chapters 5 to 7 three case studies examine the path to Chinese policy adoption of the 2°C target, emissions trading system and carbon capture and storage. Each chapter begins with a policy analysis, and then follows the process of introduction along the three components of the causal mechanism proposed in the theoretical chapter. The structured analysis allows drawing out differences and similarities between the three cases in Chapter 8. It confirms the effect of bureaucratic empowerment for policy adoption of an externally-inspired climate policy and identifies three types of turf dynamics: turf claim, turf competition and turf transition. In the case of turf claim a new policy is introduced and a bureaucratic entity ‘claims’ it as belonging under its control; in the case of turf competition, two ministries actually compete over a new policy solution; and in the case of turf transition, one bureaucratic entity acquires control over a certain existing policy from another bureaucratic entity. The book fills a gap on the role of external policy promotion and the interaction with the ‘black box’ of climate decision-making in China.

NOTES

1. Disclaimer: The research for this book was undertaken during my time as researcher at Freie Universität Berlin and the London School of Economics and prior to me joining the European Commission. This work reflects the personal opinion of the author and does not necessarily reflect the views of the European Commission.
2. The Chinese government is structured into limited-term leadership teams making up the Standing Committee of the Politburo. From 2003 to 2013 the team with changing membership was led by President Hu Jintao (who was also the General of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China (CPC or CCP) and the CPC Central Military Commission 2002–2012) and Premier Wen Jiabao.

3. An organization's 'essence' is defined as what its members view as the core task of the organization's activity. See the definition and operationalization of essence in Chapters 2 and 3.
4. The IPCC's 4th Assessment Report (2007) identified several climate change impacts on China: 0.7°C temperature increase in Northwest China 1961–2000; 22–33 per cent increase in rainfall; increased frequency in short duration heat waves, extreme rains and floods (Parry et al. 2007: 470–6).
5. MAD stands for Mutual Assured Destruction, a doctrine, which has been used to describe the Cold War situation of two opponents being so armed, that each would be able to destroy the other side. Consequently, there is no incentive to launch an attack on the other, as it would also mean the aggressors own annihilation.