

List of figures

3.1	Relationships between citizens, mobile property, territorial property and states	98
3.2	Cattle farmer bargains to raise more cattle and control more plots of land (without transaction costs)	110
3.3	Latent state bargains to enact policy and control its own citizenry (without secession costs)	111
3.4	Latent state unable to bargain for policy authority and control of its own citizenry (with secession costs)	112
3.5	No latent state and no need for bargaining (without secession costs)	112
4.1	Pairwise political-jurisdictional possibility frontier curve	124
4.2	Three-dimensional political-jurisdictional possibility frontier curves	126
4.3	Three-dimensional political-jurisdictional possibility frontier surface	127
4.4	Political-jurisdictional possibility frontier curves for three polity-economies	128
4.5	Graphical illustration of political-jurisdictional possibility frontier surfaces for three polity-economies	129
4.6	Transition between political-jurisdictional possibility frontier curves	131
4.7	Transition between political-jurisdictional possibility frontier surfaces	132
4.8	Economic possibility frontier and political-jurisdictional transformation frontier	135
4.9	PJTF (a), pairwise PJPF curve (b), and PJPF surface (c) illustrating an incomplete, suboptimal transformation	137
4.10	PJTF (a), pairwise PJPF curve (b), and PJPF surface (c) illustrating an optimised transformation (political-jurisdictional innovation)	139
4.11	PJTF (a), pairwise PJPF curve (b), and PJPF surface (c) illustrating an incomplete, suboptimal transformation (shift in PJPF)	140

4.12	PJTF (a), pairwise PJPF curve (b), and PJPF surface (c) illustrating an optimised transformation (shift in PJPF and political-jurisdictional innovation)	141
5.1	Secession-proof and cryptosecession-proof tax rates	164
5.2	Extensive-form representation of the cryptosecession game	167
5.3	Backward induction solution of the cryptosecession game	175
6.1	Spectrum of jurisdictional orders	187