1. The new unelected

In September 2018, the embattled Trump presidency suffered yet another embarrassment. In an anonymous letter to the *New York Times*, a leading figure in the White House administration described how they had repeatedly disobeyed orders from the president and withheld crucial information from the commander-in-chief. This, they claimed, they had done in order to save the country from pending foreign policy disasters resulting from Trump's erratic and unpredictable behaviour.¹

Some observers saw these as patriotic deeds to save the US from the dangerous actions of an unhinged president. Others were more hesitant to lend their full support to such clearly egregious acts as withholding information from the elected president. Most seemed relieved, however, that there were at least some people in the White House who had some common sense and integrity. The purported 'adults in the room' would save the US and the world.

Former president Barack Obama would have none of it. In a speech at the University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign on 7 September 2018, he made his position clear:

And, by the way, the claim that everything will turn out okay because there are people inside the White House who secretly aren't following the President's orders, that is not a check – I'm being serious here – that's not how our democracy is supposed to work. (Applause.) These people aren't elected. They're not accountable. /.../ That's not how things are supposed to work. This is not normal.²

From Obama's speech you would clearly get the impression that having unelected and yet politicized office holders affecting major political decisions was an exception and an aberration. However, earlier that summer, his own former staffer Ben Rhodes had published his memoirs of his time in the White House. A review thus summarized the position of Rhodes under the Obama presidency:

By title, he was first Obama's speechwriter for foreign policy and then the deputy national security adviser for communications. Unofficially, he was more than that. Rhodes was the White House official who decided which countries Obama would visit and whom he would meet overseas. He took on special assignments and portfolios, including the secret negotiations that resulted in the establishment of diplomatic relations with Cuba. Above all, Rhodes was the adviser (colleagues like Susan Rice claimed) who had a kind of 'mind meld' with the president – putting Obama's

ideas into words and speeches, deciding on the administration's line about events, sharing ideas with Obama, translating for the bureaucracy how Obama would think.³

No one would claim that Rhodes had ever overstepped his authority in the way officials in the White House regularly did under Trump. But the fact that unelected and yet partisan actors have considerable sway over how politics is made is neither new nor exceptional. It is now routine in any advanced democracy, and something that has become more widespread and significant in virtually all polities. This clearly raises issues related to accountability, legitimacy, and trust. From an even more sinister polity, an important account of the 'court' of advisors to Vladimir Putin reminds us that 'in trying to divine the intentions of their leader, his associates effectively materialized their own wishes' (Zygar 2017: 346). Might a democrat have reason to worry?

Rhodes went on from the White House to become a political commentator and to form National Security Action, 'bringing together and mobilizing an unparalleled network of former senior officials and policy experts, academics, and civil society leaders who are dedicated to a progressive vision of American global leadership'.⁴ Such moves between government, interest organizations, think tanks, lobbying firms, and other organizations dedicated to political advocacy and policy change are quite typical for actors of Rhodes' ilk. We find them across the rich democracies, in various forms and guises. They are not always very visible and yet they are present in almost all important political and policy-making processes.

This is a book about these political actors, whom I call *policy professionals*. Their numbers extend far beyond the central government offices of powerful nations – and have increased substantially over time. The book is neither an attempt to castigate them as the villains of the modern political drama nor to hail them as the unsung heroes of politics and policy making. Contemporary dramatizations of political life contain plenty of both, as seen on screen in series such as *West Wing*, *Borgen*, *In the Thick of It*, and *House of Cards*.

The book is instead the final result of a multidisciplinary research effort to understand the characteristics of this category of political actors. Who are these people, in terms of their modus operandi, backgrounds, driving forces, and careers? What are they doing, why do they do it, and how do they do it? What specific skills do they bring to the political power game and how do they deploy them? And ultimately, what do their actions, their increasing numbers, and their trajectories across organizations imply for our understanding of how democracy works and how political power is wielded?

How should policy professionals be delineated in contrast to other categories of political actors? In this book, the defining characteristics of policy professionals are as follows: they constitute a heterogeneous set of actors who

are employed, on a partisan basis, in order to ultimately affect policy. Each of these defining elements needs some elaboration and caveats.

Policy professionals are *employed* and not elected or appointed; they are hired to do policy advocacy and give political advice. This distinguishes them from politicians, who are elected and can be voted out of office. But it also distinguishes them from political actors who are appointed to specific boards or for particular missions; policy professionals work on a regular basis to affect policy and politics. The work of policy professionals can vary in the extent to which it is tied to specific tasks or clients, but it is nevertheless enduring and regular rather than episodic and extraordinary.

Policy professionals are hired on a *partisan* basis, which is not the case for civil servants and other public administrators. They are supposed to share the employing organization's (or client's) values and interests and work for specific causes and orientations. 'Partisan' does not necessarily mean being attached to a specific political party or ideological orientation (although many policy professionals are), but it does mean being committed to promoting causes and values rather than to providing value-neutral expert advice.

Making this distinction does not imply that civil servants and other public administrators never become attached to specific interests and causes, or are never affected by particular ideologies. The recent history of public policy provides plenty of examples of how ostentatiously neutral civil servants or experts harbour certain policy preferences, based on a mixture of academic research and ideological beliefs, and vigorously (and sometimes successfully) pursue these preferences (Babb 2009, Christensen 2017, Fairbrother 2019, Fourcade 2009). However, the basis on which they were hired and the shape of their careers are not tied to a specific partisan orientation in the way they are for policy professionals.

Policy professionals ultimately try to affect *policy*, hence their name. This does not necessarily imply that they are specialists in any particular policy – for example, that they would be experts in social insurance legislation or environment regulation. Some of them certainly are, but their prime expertise – as will be discussed throughout this book – lies in knowing how to influence politics in the broad sense in order to affect policy. Such an intended policy impact does not necessarily mean working to promote policy change; just as often, policy professionals are concerned with trying to stop or slow down policy change. Sometimes the time scale is glacial, such as when think-tankers try to affect the terms of the political debate; sometimes it concerns the here-and-now, such as when a political advisor tries to come up with an immediate solution in a political emergency. And the policies in question do not have to be on a grand scale, affecting the fate of nations and populations; they are more often small and mundane and affect particular constituencies and social groups.

Policy professionals thus constitute a *heterogeneous* set of actors, stretching from political advisors in government offices and parliaments to political support staff in parties, think-tankers, interest organizations' policy experts, and political consultants and lobbyists of various stripes. Although what a political advisor in the government offices does is somewhat different from what a think-tanker, a political director at an interest organization, or a lobbyist does, they share enough characteristics and ways to work to make it fruitful to see them all as part of a broader category of political actors.

The lens chosen for this study is therefore wider than the one previous research in the field has deployed. As will be discussed in Chapter 2, most of this research focuses on specific organizational types or office holders. I argue that looking at policy professionals as a broad, varied, and yet specific category of boundary-spanning political actors – actors that inhabit a particular field in which certain 'rules of the game' apply in the form of explicit and implicit expectations about how to act – will make us see things that organization-specific analyses typically cannot. The policy professionals' careers, networks, and modus operandi span an organizational landscape, and success in their field depends on being able to navigate in this landscape. Organizational and personal commitments matter, as we will find, but ultimately we cannot understand the policy professional phenomenon without taking their whole field and their trajectories in this field into account.

To take the archetypical social democratic welfare state Sweden as an example, the rise of the policy professional category and field has been spectacular in terms of numbers. Even though the appearance of unelected political actors in Sweden is not a recent phenomenon – the first policy professionals had made their entrance already by the early 1950s – they were for a long time only a handful of the people employed as independent experts in the trade unions and business associations, or as special advisors in the government offices. Today, any interest organization that wants to matter employs scores of policy and political specialists, and the number of political appointees in the government offices has gone from 24 in 1975, to 109 in 1995, to close to 200 today (Dahlström 2009, Regeringskansliet 2018). In parliament, the ratio of political secretaries to MPs has gone from roughly 1/10 in the early 1980s to roughly 1/1 today (author's own computations based on parliamentary statistics). Think tanks barely existed in Sweden until the late 1980s; today there are at least a dozen of them that claim some influence on national politics and debate.

Political consultants among PR firms were even later to appear on the scene. In the 1970s there were only two such firms, and it was not until the mid-1990s that they first started to make their impact felt (Tyllström 2013: 14–15). Since then, there has been a virtual explosion of firms that provide political expertise to private business and organized interests. Today, this is an industry with

around 1500 employees (Tyllström 2013), at least 200 of which are full-time public affairs consultants, political communication advisors, and others that advise clients on how to proceed politically (Garsten, Rothstein, and Svallfors 2015: Ch. 2).

The total number of policy professional positions in Sweden is now somewhere between 2000 and 3500, depending on how wide the net is cast (Garsten, Rothstein, and Svallfors 2015: Ch. 2). If we include all the people who work as lobbyists at the public affairs departments of large firms, we add several hundred more.

These developments are, of course, not restricted to Sweden and its particular polity. All over the democratic world the number of people who are involved in politics and policy advocacy on a professional and yet partisan basis has grown substantially over the course of the last few decades. Their increasing numbers and more accentuated role in many ways challenge and change politics and policy making as traditionally conceived, and this book is an attempt to show why we should care about these changes.

The aim of this book is not primarily to explain this remarkable rise of policy professionals, but to analyse what their increasing numbers and sophistication mean for democracy and the use of political power. Still, a few words need to be said about the possible driving forces behind their growth in the rich democracies. The literature suggests (at least) three interconnected causes behind this development. One is increasing political complexity. Increased multilevel governance, including various supranational and subnational units, and greater interdependency among policy areas and political outcomes are two of the most important sources of this increased political complexity. But other sources include the multiplying of relevant political actors and stakeholders, and the decline of established forms of collaboration and conflict resolution. All in all, increased political complexity is tackled by bringing in new policy specialists and political advisors to help navigate this complicated landscape.

A second important cause of the expansion of the policy professional field is the intensified mediatization of politics. ‘Mediatization’ refers to something broader and deeper than simply increased media attention to politics. It includes a far-reaching adaptation of politics to the media logic and to constant media exposure. It means crafting political messages to fit into current modes of mediated communication, and it includes being on constant alert for possible media fallout from decisions and debates. The mass media society of yesteryear at least had things such as newspapers going to the printer and scheduled TV programmes that brought temporary relief from media pressure. In the age of the web and social media, the game has turned into a 24/7 pursuit. Hence, there has been an increasing demand for press secretaries, communication advisers, media specialists, etc., which has further swelled the policy professional ranks.

A third, more contentious, cause of increased policy professionalism is the atrophy of political parties and many civil society organizations. In many places, declining member numbers and ageing member populations is the dominant trend among most political parties and long-standing member organizations. One effect of this is that new political ideas and input have to be sought elsewhere than in ossified member congresses and stifled internal debate. Hence, one attempted solution to this problem is to bring in professionals to generate political ideas and policy proposals that can be of use for the cause.

All three of these tendencies include self-enforcing mechanisms that further increase the demand for policy professionals. Policy professionals not only represent an attempt to tackle increased complexity, they also *contribute* to such complexity through their activities. Policy professionals not only become necessary in a mediatized political environment, they also *drive* the mediatization of political life. And policy professionals not only act as alternative engines for new ideas in parties and organizations, they may also make lay actions to influence such organizations look futile when members are faced with a cadre of highly professional political actors, acting on behalf of the organizational leadership and party leaders.

To further strengthen such self-enforcing tendencies, the very fact that some organizations hire policy professionals makes it imperative for other organizations to hire their own policy professionals so as not to be left behind in the political influence arms race. And the more policy professionals that are hired, the more the supply of their specialized knowledge increases. It is easy to see that it may only be the lack of financial resources that hinders an ever-increasing policy professionalization of the political world.

In this book, the work of policy professionals is approached analytically using a double lens. First, it is analysed as a specific profession with particular acquired skills, which are necessary for successfully accomplishing work tasks and which are in demand across the policy professional labour market. Second, it is studied in relation to issues of political power and democracy, since the work of policy professionals is key to understanding how political influence and democratic accountability function in contemporary advanced democracies.

Hence, in approaching policy professionalism as a specific choice of work and career, which has implications for the functioning of political power and democratic governance, I ask a set of ostensibly naïve questions: *What do policy professionals actually do? How do they do what they do? Why do they do what they do?* These questions relate on the one hand to the skills that policy professionals bring to bear on the political process, and the demand and use for such skills in various organizations in and beyond the policy professional field. On the other hand they relate to the motivations that drive policy professionals

in their pursuit. Why are they engaged in political influence work, and why do they prefer to do it in this particular form? The questions relate both to their daily work in a particular organization and to their careers and trajectories across organizations and positions.

This is a different take on the issue than would be typical for a political scientist, who would presumably be most interested in the influence of this group of political actors and ask to what extent this could be measured and evaluated. Their influence would then be compared to that of other elite groups such as capital owners, party leaderships, or university intellectuals. While such a study could certainly be valuable, that is not what this book is. The attempt is not to try to measure the causal impact of policy professionals, or to tell whether they have more or less power than others who are involved in politics and policy making. The question about causal impact is extremely hard to answer in any clear-cut way, since an answer would basically involve re-running history with a different set of actors to see how different processes and outcomes then became.

The purpose of this book is rather to probe the characteristics of this particular set of political actors from a sociological perspective and to ask what their professional skills are made up of and how these skills are deployed in their daily work and throughout their careers. What makes this group of actors particularly intriguing in a sociological perspective is a number of paradoxical traits: they possess skills that are both generic and context-bound; their particular expertise is rare and useful and yet something that cannot be learned in dedicated study programmes; they are both fascinated and repelled by personal or mediatized visibility; their careers span an organizational landscape and yet they face a 'golden cage' problem; they both despise and admire elected politicians; and ultimately they both undermine and invigorate representative democracy. Before the end of this book I hope to put meat on the bones of all these and other fascinating features of policy professionals and their world.

The focus of the book is on the present day rather than on the developmental history of this field of political influence. I will certainly make historical arguments and sometimes ask 'where stuff came from', but the intention is to analyse the policy professional field of action as of today and in the near future.

SWEDEN IN COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVE

The main setting of the book is Sweden, long regarded as the paradigm of social democratic hegemony and a long-standing corporatist structure for cooperation and conflict resolution. Recently, this political landscape has been swiftly transformed in the direction of a more decentralized, quasi-pluralist, and network-based mode of interest articulation and political advocacy (Lindvall and Rothstein 2006, Lindvall and Sebring 2005, Svallfors 2016). In

this transformed institutional setting, the role of various policy professionals has become more accentuated, and their numbers have increased substantially, both inside and outside government (Garsten, Rothstein, and Svallfors 2015).

We may think of Sweden as an interesting test case of how the policy professional field is set up and functions in a post-corporatist country with strong interest organizations and long-standing political parties and divisions. In order to contextualize and contrast findings from Sweden, I therefore bring to bear comparative data from a selection of small European states: the Netherlands, Ireland, and Latvia. I also contrast the findings from the Swedish context to those from Swedish policy professionals working at the European Union (EU) level in Brussels.

The selection of country cases is strategic, focusing on a small selection of comparable country cases that are all democracies, parts of a European frame, similar in size, with proportional electoral systems, and constituted as unitary rather than federal states, but which still represent substantial variety in terms of the political and administrative structure that constitutes the opportunity structure for policy professionals. The case selection therefore includes a long-standing pluralist and yet highly organized setting (the Netherlands), a more personalized political system where local constituencies are key (Ireland), and a more rudimentary and fleeting organizational landscape where the party system, the public administration, and civil society organizations are much more recently formed and substantially weaker than in the long-established democracies of Western Europe (Latvia).

Without trying to write a full comparative institutional analysis of the four countries, a few stylized facts can be brought out to highlight some key similarities and differences among the four countries in how the policy professional organizational field is composed.⁵ First, the system of political advisors in government looks strikingly similar across all four countries. In all countries, ministers have a fairly limited number of political advisors (one to three), who are tied to the fate of that particular minister. The same similarity basically applies to the advisor roles in parliaments, where there is a mixture of advisors that are tied to specific MPs and advisors that work for the whole parliamentary group. It seems that in Sweden parliamentary assistants/advisors are least connected to particular MPs, while Ireland displays the strongest links between particular advisors and specific MPs, but differences among countries are not large in this respect.

But once we turn outside politics as narrowly defined, differences in the policy professional field among the four countries become more pronounced. The policy professional capacity among trade unions and major business associations differs substantially across the four countries. Sweden employs scores of policy professionals among such organizations, and a fair deal of what would typically be seen as belonging to the world of think tanks is done

in-house in major organizations in Sweden. In the Netherlands, trade unions and employer federations instead jointly host a large research centre, which is geared towards provision of neutral advice and statistics rather than politicized policy professionalism. In Ireland, the policy professional aspects of trade unions and employer federations are lodged in specific think tanks rather than in-house. And in Latvia, the independent analytical capacity of trade unions and business associations is weak almost to the point of non-existence.

The world of think tanks also looks quite different across the four countries. In Sweden, think tanks were virtually non-existent for a long time, no doubt because of the crowded organizational field as described above, and even today most think tanks are financially and organizationally strongly dependent on business associations or trade unions. In the Netherlands, each political party with parliamentary representation hosts its own think tank, which is financially and organizationally separate from the party but provided with a mission to think of long-term issues of a particular ideological orientation. Other think tanks are virtually non-existent. In Ireland, we find a mixture of think tanks attached to trade unions and think tanks financed by philanthropies (of various political and intellectual orientations). In Latvia, there are basically one or two independent think tanks, with a centrist orientation towards the promotion of good governance and fact-based policy making rather than with any specific ideological orientation.

Finally, the world of political PR and lobbying also differs among the four countries. The most crowded lobbying scene is found in the Netherlands, and it is also here that lobbying by private organizations towards government is most long-standing and most accepted as a form of political action. In Sweden, the lobbying/PR business was much later to appear than in the Netherlands, and although it has grown rapidly in the last decades, it is not as widespread nor as legitimate as in the Netherlands. The same lack of legitimacy goes for Ireland, which has a more restricted political lobbying/PR sector than the Netherlands and Sweden, basically restricted to a handful of Dublin firms. And in Latvia, the sector is virtually non-existent; there are only a few small firms in Riga which specialize in political lobbying/PR, and a handful of individual lobbyists.

My aim with the strategic country comparisons is emphatically not to arrive at strong causal statements on the development and strategies of policy professionals, where institutional traits are used to explain similarities and differences across countries. It is rather to contextualize the findings about policy professionals and to arrive at 'a historically informed style of social inquiry that favors properly contextualized generalizations' (Katzenstein 2003: 13). In such a perspective, the facts about the policy professional organizational field are used to interpret and make sense of what we learn from the interviews, and

information about certain institutional elements is used to back up interpretations of the findings.

As suggested long ago by Peter Katzenstein, a focus on small states may be highly rewarding in questioning or complementing findings that were based on research on larger countries (Katzenstein 1985, 2003). As he aptly puts it, '[I]f you give a party in the capital, you can easily invite all the important political players. This makes a difference to both politics and policy' (Katzenstein 2003: 11). And it certainly does so for the policy professionals, dependent as they are on their networks and contacts.

The book is mainly based on a large set of semi-structured interviews with policy professionals in Sweden, Ireland, Latvia, and the Netherlands, and with Swedish policy professionals at the EU level in Brussels. Some of the Swedish interviewees have been interviewed twice with about five years in between. These interviews were designed to cover different aspects of the lives and work of policy professionals, and were recorded, transcribed verbatim, and coded for pertinent themes. In addition, my research team quantitatively mapped Swedish policy professionals in 2012 and 2018 in order to study their social composition and careers. All details regarding selection, fieldwork, and coding are found in the Methods Appendix at the end of this book.

WHAT THIS BOOK ADDS

As will be discussed in the next chapter, previous research has had plenty to say about the influence of political and policy experts, about the roles of unelected political actors, and about the importance of political information and know-how. The current book hardly starts from scratch. Yet, something seems amiss. Most research implicitly paints a picture of a political world in which actors and their actions are all part of organizational containers or perhaps silos. We get to know quite a lot about what political advisors do for their principals, or about how think-tankers broker knowledge, or what experts do in policy making. But we are seldom invited to take a broader view, in which we try to understand the systemic consequences of all these various unelected professional political actors and see their activities as spanning a whole organizational landscape.

Although what a political advisor in the government offices does is different from what a think-tanker does, or what a research officer in a trade union does, what they all do is apply expert knowledge in the particular domain of politics. As I will discuss throughout this book, such knowledge can only be acquired on the job; it is highly useful for a variety of organizational types and specific organizations; it can be turned into a marketable commodity; and it is the basis for hierarchy, prestige, and loyalty. For all these reasons, we need a broad inter- and cross-organizational perspective on policy professionals, one that

sees them as inhabitants of a social field rather than as purely organizational representatives. Their networks and their careers span organizational borders, and their trajectories in the field shape both them and their organizational destinations.

By analysing policy professionalism and policy professionals as organization-spanning actions and actors, I therefore aim to make one more specific contribution with this book, and two more general ones. The specific contribution is that it will add important aspects to our current understanding of contemporary politics and policy formation. The book will focus on a little-analysed group occupying key positions of influence and power in the political and organizational landscape. It brings in a comparative perspective that will shed light on the role of policy professionals in political and policy processes.

But the book is also intended to provide a more general contribution to normative democratic theory. The rise of the policy professionals – since they are employed to do politics and affect policy rather than being elected to do so – challenges traditional notions of representative democracy (Manin 1997). Legitimation of binding decisions through representation by people elected to office is a cornerstone of democratic theory and practice. The professionalization of politics and policy making that this study taps into challenges this notion in fundamental ways. In the long run, is this dynamic leading towards delegitimization of political power? Or should policy professionals be seen as based in a different form of legitimation – one of professional competence rather than representation (cf. Rothstein 2009)?

Lastly, the book is intended to make a general contribution to the analysis of political power. The work of policy professionals fuses knowledge and power: their field of action includes the mobilization of networks and other social and cognitive resources, and yet it is a highly invisible form of power making (cf. Culpepper 2011, Rhodes 2011). Political power is now restructured in a different mode from what used to be the case in the heyday of mass parties and (quasi-) corporatist decision structures, but social and political science research are still struggling to make sense of the new political power order. In many respects, the current mode of organizing political power increasingly displays curious similarities with pre-democratic modes of organizing it. The how, what, and when of this exercising of power is therefore key to understanding contemporary politics and policy making.

In the chapters that follow, I tell the story about policy professionals from a variety of angles. Chapter 2 provides an overview of the scattered research field to which this book contributes, and discusses key concepts for the analyses.

In Chapter 3, I turn to the action repertoires of policy professionals and discuss what their most important skills are and how they deploy them in the

course of action. I highlight the peculiar ‘glocal’ structure of their skills and actions; they are almost completely context-bound and almost fully generic and context-free at the same time.

Chapter 4 focuses on the motivations of policy professionals. In particular, I ask why they prefer to be involved in politics and policy making in the form they are – why are they neither politicians nor public administrators? I argue that their special relations to issues of visibility and responsibility are what make them prefer politics in the particular policy professional mode.

Chapter 5 (co-written with Niels Selling) turns to the policy professionals’ careers. We maintain that the special skill set they acquire and use is very fungible across a broad set of policy professional positions, at the same time as it is mostly limited to these particular positions in the labour market. This creates a certain ‘golden cage’ problem for policy professionals, one that they try to handle in various ways over the course of their careers.

Chapter 6 (co-written with Anna Tyllström) contains a case study of policy professionals in action, using the peculiar case of the privatization of the Swedish welfare state. We show what a special subset of policy professionals, those employed as lobbyists for the private welfare sector, actually do when they argue their case and serve their principals. Or is it actually the principals serving their policy professionals? As we will find in this chapter, it is far from clear.

The last chapter of the book tries to bring the threads together in an extended discussion of what the policy professional field, and the actions, skills, motivations, and career trajectories that take place in it, actually mean for broader issues of governance, political power, and ultimately democracy in the 21st century. Are policy professionals the gravediggers of representative democracy as we have come to know it, or are they, on the contrary, injecting life and energy into stale structures and procedures? What issues of accountability, representation, and legitimacy do their appearance and proliferation entail? What are their relations to the recent populist and sometimes anti-democratic surge in Europe and across the globe? Should we worry and, if so, what about, exactly?

NOTES

1. <https://www.nytimes.com/2018/09/05/opinion/trump-white-house-anonymous-resistance.html> (accessed 15 January 2019).
2. <https://eu.usatoday.com/story/news/politics/elections/2018/09/07/president-barack-obamas-speech-transcript-slamming-trump/1225554002/> (accessed 15 January 2019).
3. New York Review of Books, no. 14, 2018, p. 22, <https://www.nybooks.com/articles/2018/09/27/ben-rhodes-bliss-dawn-to-be-alive/> (accessed 15 January 2019).

4. <https://nationalsecurityaction.org/> (accessed 15 June 2019).
5. The description of the policy professional organizational field in each country is mostly based on information from the interviews, but also on country descriptions (e.g., Andeweg and Irwin 2014, Aurs 2015, Crotty and Schmitt 2014, Hardiman 2012, O'Malley and MacCarthaigh 2011, Tyllström 2013, Ullström 2011).

REFERENCES

- Andeweg, Rudy B., and Galen A. Irwin. 2014. *Governance and Politics of the Netherlands*. Basingstoke/New York: Palgrave Macmillan.
- Aurs, Daunis. 2015. *Comparative Politics and Government of the Baltic States. Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania in the 21st Century*. Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan.
- Babb, Sarah L. 2009. *Behind the Development Banks: Washington Politics, World Poverty, and the Wealth of Nations*. Chicago, IL/London: University of Chicago Press.
- Christensen, Johan. 2017. *The Power of Economists Within the State*. Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press.
- Crotty, William J., and David A. Schmitt, eds. 2014. *Ireland and the Politics of Change*. London: Routledge.
- Culpepper, Pepper D. 2011. *Quiet Politics and Business Power: Corporate Control in Europe and Japan*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Dahlström, Carl. 2009. 'Political Appointments in 18 Democracies.' In *QoG Working Paper Series*. Göteborg: Quality of Government Institute.
- Fairbrother, Malcolm. 2019. *Free Traders: Elites, Democracy, and the Rise of Globalization in North America*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Fourcade, Marion. 2009. *Economists and Societies: Discipline and Profession in the United States, Britain, and France, 1890s to 1990s, Princeton Studies in Cultural Sociology*. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.
- Garsten, Christina, Bo Rothstein, and Stefan Svallfors. 2015. *Makt utan mandat. De policyprofessionella i svensk politik*. Stockholm: Dialogos.
- Hardiman, Niamh, ed. 2012. *Irish Governance in Crisis*. Manchester: Manchester University Press.
- Katzenstein, Peter J. 1985. *Small States in World Markets: Industrial Policy in Europe*. Ithaca, NY/London: Cornell University Press.
- Katzenstein, Peter J. 2003. 'Small States and Small States Revisited.' *New Political Economy* 8 (1): 9–30.
- Lindvall, Johannes, and Bo Rothstein. 2006. 'Sweden: The Fall of the Strong State.' *Scandinavian Political Studies* 29 (1): 47–63.
- Lindvall, Johannes, and Joakim Sebring. 2005. 'Policy Reform and the Decline of Corporatism in Sweden.' *West European Politics* 28 (5): 1057–74.
- Manin, Bernhard. 1997. *The Principles of Representative Government*. New York: Cambridge University Press.
- O'Malley, Eoin, and Muiris MacCarthaigh. 2011. *Governing Ireland: From Cabinet Government to Delegated Governance*. Dublin: Institute of Public Administration.
- Regeringskansliet. 2018. *Regeringskansliets anställda*. Stockholm, <http://www.regeringen.se/regeringskansliet/regeringskansliets-anstallda/> (accessed 1 September 2019).
- Rhodes, R.A.W. 2011. *Everyday Life in British Government*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

- Rothstein, Bo. 2009. 'Creating Political Legitimacy: Electoral Democracy versus Quality of Government.' *American Behavioral Scientist* 53 (3): 311–30.
- Svallfors, Stefan. 2016. 'Politics as Organized Combat – New Players and New Rules of the Game in Sweden.' *New Political Economy* 21 (6): 505–19.
- Tyllström, Anna. 2013. *Legitimacy for Sale. Constructing a Market for PR Consultancy*. Uppsala: Department of Business Studies, Uppsala universitet.
- Ullström, Anna. 2011. *Styrning bakom kulisserna. Regeringskansliets politiska staber och regeringens styrningskapacitet*. Stockholm: Stockholm Studies in Politics.
- Zygar, Michail. 2017. *All the Kremlin's Men. Inside the Court of Valdimir Putin*. New York: Public Affairs.