1. Introduction

Denmark is known for its comprehensive welfare state. It has carried such labels as a Nordic welfare state, a universal welfare state, a social-democratic welfare state, a generous or encompassing welfare state, or simply a third way between liberalism and socialism. A long line of research has studied this particular way of organizing a society and its consequences (e.g. Esping-Andersen, 1990; 2000; Fritzell, Hvinden, Kautto, Kvist, & Uusitalo, 2005). These studies are often fuelled by an interest in the social outcomes accompanying this welfare state, such as relatively high levels of economic prosperity and equality, at least among the native insiders. Denmark is also known for having a people that support this way of organizing society. This is both a matter of *the people* getting what they want, through democratic processes, and a matter of *the will of the people* being shaped by long-standing institutional structures (Larsen, 2008; 2013; Rothstein, 1998). The public support for welfare states is both embedded in values and norms (ideas about how society should be) and perceptions (ideas about how society is). We use welfare attitudes as the overall concept for the individuals' positive or negative assessment of various parts of the welfare state, with reference to a standard definition of an attitude being "... an individual's disposition to respond favourably or unfavourably to an object, person, institution or event, or to any other discriminable aspect of the individual's world" (Ajzen, 1989:241).

The welfare attitudes the Danish people (and the neighbouring Nordic people) hold towards various parts of the welfare state have been studied in a long line of research (e.g. Andersen, 2011; Edlund, 2007; Hedegaard, 2015; Svallfors, 1997; 2012). Thus, it is empirically well-documented that contemporary Danes are highly in favour of the ways social services and benefits are organized by the state; including the relatively high taxes that follow. They are also highly in favour of the ways the labour market and the family are organized and regulated, which is intimately linked to the organization of the welfare state. The Danish welfare regime comes with high minimum wages, a regulated labour market, many public employees, and a dual-earner family structure. Less is known about what the growing number of new residents – the migrants – think about this way of organizing society. This is what the book sets out to explore. We use the term migrant to denote a person who has crossed a nation-state border and settled in this new destination country (see

Chapter 3 for more specific definitions). Thus, we use the term immigrant and migrant synonymously. We ask the following two research questions:

1. *To what extent do migrants assimilate to the welfare attitudes of native Danes?*
2. *What are the mechanisms of migrants' assimilation to the welfare attitudes of the native Danes?*

Following the emerging literature on welfare attitudes of migrants in the Northern European welfare states, the book demonstrates that in general migrants *do* to some extent assimilate to the welfare attitudes of native Danes. Therefore, we chose “The Danish Melting Pot” as the subtitle of the book. It is with reference to the idea of an American melting pot, where settlers from a large variety of nations, like small pieces of metal, melted together into a new substance. The exact character of this new American substance was, and is, difficult to specify (Brubaker, 2001). The idea of transforming, melting, migrants has also been heavily criticized. However, as a mental image and a national narrative, the melting pot idea has influenced three centuries of American thinking about migrants' settlement (Smith, 2012). We do not use the melting pot term to signal that migrants *should be* transformed or melted to use the images of the metaphor. We use the term to describe what seems to take place; at least when it comes to values, norms, and perceptions related to the welfare state. We are well aware that the “assimilation” concept opens up connotations to a long debate on the exact meaning of this concept (e.g. Alba & Nee, 2003; Brubaker, 2001). In Chapter 2, we clarify the concept in this specific welfare state context. Basically, we refer to a social process rather than a desirable, unavoidable outcome and we refrain from making judgements about when a person is assimilated enough. “Danish” is added to the title as both the drivers of assimilation and the end results are believed to differ from the North American context. The American melting pot has its specifics. One thing is the absence of a well-developed welfare state. The Danish melting pot has its specifics. One thing is the presence of an already well-developed welfare state.

The book provides a solid basis for answering the first descriptive research question. The book is based on two large survey studies combined with unique Danish register data, which allow us to establish representative samples of migrants born in Lebanon, Pakistan, Iraq, ex-Yugoslavia (primarily Bosnia), Turkey, the Philippines, China, Japan, Russia, the USA, Great Britain, Spain, Poland, and Romania. The book provides more tentative answers to the difficult second question about causality as we are limited by the cross-sectional nature of our data material, as most other studies in this field. However, we

will develop a causal theoretical argument, which is accompanied by data approaching a most-different design logic (elaborated further below).

OUR INTEREST IN THE MIGRANT PERSPECTIVE

We have several reasons for finding the question of migrants' assimilation into the welfare attitudes of natives interesting. First, it is interesting in its own right to investigate whether the residents of a given state, migrants included, find existing institutions and policies to be legitimate. Second, most public statistics are concerned with how migrants enter socio-economic domains, especially the level of employment, education, and crime. These measures are indeed interesting and important. However, they do not tell the full story and one cannot infer from these structural data what migrants "think". If we are to describe what migrants think, in general, migrants need to be asked. This is a rather difficult and time-consuming process, but it can be done (see Chapter 3). Third, migrants' welfare attitudes could be seen as a valid indicator of more overall assimilation. If migrants, in large, turn out to be supportive of the current way of organizing the Danish society, one could argue that they share some of the most prevalent values and norms of native Danes. Fourth, one could imagine that what migrants think about the welfare state could have political consequences. As the share of migrants and descendants increases, so does their democratic political power; at least among the group that obtains citizenship. If migrants turn out to be supportive of the welfare state, one could imagine that it could counterbalance the theorized decline of support from the natives (see below). These four reasons are all related to contemporary public discussions about migrants and their impact on Northern European welfare states.

We also have two more pure academic reasons for writing the book. The first is that the literature on what migrants think and their subjective orientations is dominated by data collected in the US, which is distinguished by less generous welfare benefits and a smaller role for universal services than what is found in Western Europe, in particular in Northern Europe. Thus, Denmark is a vastly different setting, where an impact from public institutions on the minds of migrants is much more likely to be found. We contribute to migration studies by bringing in insights from the Nordic welfare state context. The second reason is that migrants' welfare attitudes might tell us a more general story about how the existing institutions and policies shape the public mind. We follow emerging literature that uses migrants' relocation as a "natural experiment" that changes the cultural and institutional environment of the individual. Thereby, we also hope to deliver a contribution to general institutional theory, which has been the point of departure for our theoretical reasoning.

Finally, we would like to stress that it is an open question whether assimilation into the welfare attitudes of native Danes is something desirable. That the trust levels are high among all groups in a society is difficult to dislike. However, whether migrants *should* assimilate into the prevailing norms for example about public childcare is more contested. As always, it depends on your normative point of departure.

THE INSTITUTIONAL CONTEXT OF THE WELFARE STATE

The term welfare state refers to major publicly organized benefit schemes such as pensions, disability benefits, unemployment insurance, and social assistance as well as service schemes such as education, healthcare, childcare, and elderly care. As for the benefits, nearly all industrial societies have developed public schemes to provide economic security during times of sickness, disability, unemployment, and old age. The collective effort to cover these social risks started at the end of the 19th century. Germany was a frontrunner with the introduction of compulsory insurance systems for urban workers in the 1880s, which since has been labelled a Bismarckian welfare state. Denmark was also a front-runner but entered a different path, as general tax payment was favoured over compulsory insurance contributions paid by employers and employees (except for the risk of unemployment) (Ebbinghaus & Gronwald, 2011; Kangas & Palme, 2005). This developed into what is often labelled a universal welfare state, where the whole population (not only the insured) is entitled to economic security in the case of absence of work-income. The classic Danish example is the tax-financed Danish people's pension, which in 1891 was introduced to cover all residents in (deserving) need and later in 1956 came to cover all residents independent of need. The classic pension schemes have been adjusted, changed, and supplemented throughout the 20th century but one still finds universal elements in many Danish benefit schemes (Kongshøj, 2014). This holds for the Danish people's pension, disability pension, unemployment insurance (which is characterized by high tax-financing, high coverage, and de facto flat-rate benefits despite insurance-based eligibility), child allowances, parental leave schemes, and student allowances. As for services, close to all industrial societies also developed collective systems for schooling and basic healthcare. In the Danish case, the Danish people's school (Almueskolen) was established in 1814, including a demand for compulsory schooling of all children (Buchardt, Markkola, & Valtonen, 2013). The Danish healthcare system started as a voluntary insurance movement but was backed and subsidized by the state in the first legislation in 1893. In 1971 it turned into a fully fledged tax-financed universal system (Christiansen, Petersen, Edling, & Haave, 2005; Kongshøj, 2014). A marked characteristic of the Danish welfare state is that the

public service sector expanded tremendously especially in the second half of the 20th century. Denmark developed a fully tax-financed educational system, including free public universities, and a close to fully tax-financed child- and elderly-care systems. To that should be added public libraries, health visitors, education guides, employment services, and integration workers. Thus, by 2017 close to 30 per cent of all Danish employees work within the tax-financed public sector.

The welfare state is, in our view, not merely a collection of functional institutions that cover the risks of individuals living in industrial and post-industrial societies. It is also a way of organizing society, which relies upon and reproduces a broad set of values and norms. Values can broadly be defined as beliefs about what is good/desirable and bad/undesirable, while norms are more specific guides to actions in particular situations. The Danish welfare state often carries the label of being a social democratic welfare regime; denoted by Esping-Andersen in his classic book *The Three Worlds of Welfare Capitalism* (Esping-Andersen, 1990). Thus, social democratic ideological values about state intervention being desirable, possible, and effective (reformism) and economic redistribution from the more advantaged to the less advantaged are often believed to be embedded in this kind of welfare regime. The book will investigate whether migrants support the very idea of state intervention in different areas, whether they think state intervention is effective and functional (institutional trust) and whether redistribution from rich to poor is desirable. The values, norms, and perceptions of the Nordic welfare state do not only concern the sphere of the state. The regime term was used by Esping-Andersen to point out that the organization of welfare benefits and services are interlinked with the organization of the family and the market, especially the labour market. The classic example is that the Nordic universal provision of child- and elderly care both generated new jobs in the public sector, largely occupied by women, and freed women from family responsibilities. The establishment of these schemes relied on acceptance of such tasks being a public responsibility. At the same time, the contemporary presence of these schemes generates values and norms about dual-earner family structures and gender equality. Therefore, the book also investigates migrants' support for values and norms about female labour force participation and childcare.

The literature that focuses on *values* tends to see the Nordic welfare state as the democratic realization of what is desired by "the people"; with the addition of institutional feedback effects. In a historical chronology, the expansion of the welfare state did indeed go together with the establishment of democracy, the mobilization of an "imagined" shared civic identity of being a Danish citizen, and a social democratic party that embraced national solidarity over worker solidarity (Anttonen, 2012; Baldwin, 1990). It is also true that the Nordic countries still score high on happiness, life satisfaction, and democratic

involvement. This is the bright side of the story. However, there is also a literature on the more prescriptive *norm* enforcing side of the Nordic welfare state. One could call it the darker side of the story. The point of departure is that the European welfare schemes were established in pre-democratic times with ambitions by the elites to construct an obedient and compliant population willing to pay tax, go to war, and reluctant to support revolutionary movements (Tilly, 1994). It is telling that the German legislation of the 1880s was established by the conservative non-democratic chancellor Otto von Bismarck, who had military ambitions and a need to keep the recently united German federation together. In this perspective, the Danish welfare state schemes can be seen as a culmination of state centralization of power. The state and its employees in the intervening “service-sector” set harsh prescriptive norms, for example about parenthood and healthcare, which can be sanctioned by strong state authorities. This can be described as the central state’s use of expert-knowledge regime (Foucault, 1983) or as a more open dialectic civilizing process needed in a highly functional differentiated society with citizens embedded in long chains of mutual interdependence (Elias, 1998). To study these aspects of the Nordic welfare state, the book also investigates migrants’ assessments of whether most people can be trusted. Belief in the high trustworthiness of other people could be a precondition for functioning in a highly functional differentiated society like the Danish (Luhmann, 1979). We also study attitudes towards the exclusion of migrants from social benefits and services.

MIGRANTS AND THE WELFARE STATE

The link between welfare states and migration has received a lot of public and academic attention within the last two decades. The main concern has been whether the existence of a generous welfare state and immigration is incompatible in the long run. Or in more popular terms, whether the Nordic model is only possible in a world with little migration. The argument goes: (1) that generous welfare schemes will be a magnet for low-skilled migrants with little chance at the labour market, which generates an unsustainable economic burden on the welfare state (Borjas, 1999; Freeman, 1986), and (2) that the solidarity needed for generous welfare schemes will erode as publics get divided between “them” and “us” (Alesina & Glaeser, 2004; Goodhart, 2004).

Research into both questions has proliferated and results are decidedly mixed and nuanced. Generally, welfare generosity matters little, if at all, next to more important factors for migration flows such as geographical proximity, network/diaspora effects, inclusion policies (citizenship, etc.), wages and employment, returns to education, or asylum policies (Brekke, Røed & Schøne, 2016; Giulietti, 2014). Some studies have found that minor “welfare magnet” effects apply in regimes of free movement of labour (intra-EU or

intra-US migration), but also that generous welfare states may attract both high- and low-skilled labour on the longer term (Razin & Wahba, 2015).

As regards the more fundamental question of whether immigration and ethnic diversity pose a threat to solidarity within nation-states, the literature does not offer any easy answers here either (Holtug, 2020; Schaeffer, 2013; Van der Meer & Tolsma, 2014). An attempt at a short and insightful summary would be that increasing ethnic diversity might be a challenge for solidarity and trust, but that there is no simple one-way route between ethnic diversity and solidarity and trust. Rather, context matters and contingent effects abound. At the macro-level, economic equality and fair, impartial, and non-corrupt public institutions have been found to alleviate negative links between ethnic diversity and social trust (Charron & Rothstein, 2018; Kesler & Bloemraad, 2010; Larsen, 2013). The political mobilization of anti-immigrant sentiments exacerbates negative associations between immigrant stocks and social trust (Helbling, Reeskens, & Stolle, 2015). While research into the local or neighbourhood levels has found greater support for negative effects of diversity, also in Denmark, residential segregation of ethnicities is a major culprit behind negative effects upon social trust (Dinesen & Sønderskov, 2015; Uslander, 2011; Van der Meer & Tolsma, 2014). At the individual level, socio-economic deprivation further exacerbates negative links, while high labour market integration of migrants has been found to eliminate negative links between immigration and support for redistribution (Burgoon, 2014; Mau & Burkhardt, 2009; Sturgis, Brunton-Smith, Read, & Allum, 2011; Tolsma, Van der Meer, & Gesthuizen, 2009). In short, economic equality, just and well-performing institutions, benevolent political alignments, residential and economic integration as well as economic security all help mitigate potential negative effects of diversity upon social cohesion, which is not to say that it is not a major political challenge to achieve such cocktails of benevolent circumstances.

The aim of this book is not to enter this heated debate about migrants' potential negative impact on welfare states. Rather, we want to emphasize that, until recently, what the migrants themselves think about the welfare states in their destination countries has been puzzlingly absent from these discussions. When the migrants' perspective occasionally enters the equation, it often takes the form of bold assumptions about migrants being rational agents optimizing living conditions (as in the welfare-magnet thesis) or cultural doped agents clinging to norms and values in the country of origin (as in the "us" and "them" solidarity argument). Thus, the book aims to open the black box of what migrants think about the welfare state.

There are reasons to believe that migrants' welfare attitudes could be more complex. From a self-interest perspective, it is clear that some groups of migrants (like other groups) have vested interests in benefits and services schemes. As will be shown in Chapter 5, some migrants take more out of

the Danish welfare state than they put in through taxes. At a very general level, this holds for migrants that came as asylum seekers or through family unification with former asylum seekers. However, even from a self-interest perspective, these migrants might have an ambivalent attitude to a welfare state with high minimum wages and a regulated labour market, which makes it difficult to enter the formal labour market or find supplementary work in the black market. At the same time, Danish policymakers have limited migrants' access to social assistance and made it, in general, more difficult to enter and receive unemployment benefits (Andersen, 2007; Breidahl, 2012; Sainsbury, 2006, see Chapter 5 for further introduction to migrants' access to benefits and services). It is also clear that other groups of migrants take less out than they put in through taxes. At a very general level, this holds for the high-skilled workers that entered through guest workers programmes and for the increasing number of especially East European workers that entered through the right to free mobility of workers within the EU. From a narrow self-interest perspective, one should anticipate these groups of migrants to be sceptical about the Danish welfare state.

From a sociological perspective, one could also anticipate migrants' support for the Danish welfare state to be complex. The groups of migrants explored in this book have been socialized in nation-states from all over the world. Some of them have been raised in nation-states that leave more responsibility to markets and families and less responsibility to the state, that provide less redistribution from rich to poor, where (formal) female employment is lower and trust in institutions and fellow citizens is also low. Others have been socialized in a context with a communist legacy, where state responsibility, at least in ideological terms, was more pronounced than in the Nordic countries. The religious backgrounds of migrants also differ. Most of the migrants we study have been socialized in more religious societies than the Danish, but variations are large, from Muslims and Catholics to Buddhists. Thus, as a point of departure, one could expect at least some migrants to be sceptical about the norms and values in which the Danish welfare state is embedded.

In our view, the self-interest perspective and the values/norms perspective just presented are too simple. In Chapter 2, we present a theoretical framework rooted in the field of migration studies and comparative welfare studies. From the migration studies, we adopt the idea that migrants do not arrive with fixed preferences and cultures. On the contrary, the preferences and cultures of migrants seem to be highly flexible and adaptive. From the comparative welfare studies, we adopt the idea that existing institutions shape perceptions, norms/values, and attitudes; both those of natives and migrants. In combination, this adds up to the overall thesis of the book, namely that migrants' welfare attitudes to a high extent assimilate into those of native Danes despite large differences in self-interests and cultural backgrounds. This is "The

Danish Melting Pot”. The book presents several different analytical results and nuances, but we do find support for our overall thesis, as the omission of a question mark in the title indicates.

THE ANALYTICAL APPROACH – A COMPARISON
ACROSS MOST DIFFERENT GROUPS

Our overall theoretical approach is shown in Figure 1.1. Following the previous research tradition on general welfare attitudes, we assume that respondents' welfare attitudes (1) are influenced by values/norms/perceptions related to the welfare state (2), which again are influenced by socio-economic positions (3). Finally, all these variables at the individual micro-level are either directly or indirectly influenced by the institutional and broader cultural context of respectively the destination (4) and origin (5) country. The theoretical argument is further developed in Chapter 2.

Figure 1.1 Overall theoretical framework

Studying assimilation denotes a process. Thus, the optimal design would be to follow different groups of migrants over time; preferable from the country of origin and at different time points after entering a destination country. Unfortunately, such panel data is not available and very difficult to establish. Our alternative analytical strategy is to compare across different groups interviewed at the same point in time. We will use the following three indicators to capture assimilation processes. First, when data are available, we compare the welfare attitudes of migrants in Denmark with the welfare attitudes of residents in their specific country of origin. If these two groups have very different welfare attitudes, we take it as a sign of assimilation in the former group. Second, we compare the welfare attitudes of migrants with those of native Danes. Here we take an absence of differences as a sign of assimilation. Third, we compare the welfare attitudes of specific migrant groups in Denmark with each other. Again, we take an absence of differences in welfare attitudes between migrant groups living within Denmark as a sign of assimilation.

In comparisons between native and migrants and between specific migrant groups, we utilize a data design that in many respects approaches a most-different design logic: The 14 groups of migrants we analyse are selected to be very different in terms of the institutional and cultural context in the country origin (box 5, in Figure 1.1) and in terms of socio-economic status in Denmark (box 3, in Figure 1.1). Thus, as a point of departure, one could expect differences in welfare attitudes. The most-different design logic is strong in the case where one finds similarity on the dependent variable, in our case similar welfare attitudes, despite a plethora of very different origin countries and different socio-economic positions in Denmark. Such a pattern makes it easier to single out the few things that the most different cases have in common. In our case, the most obvious candidate is that migrants and native Danes have a common experience of living in Denmark (box 4, in Figure 1.1). Thus, the absence of differences across most-different groups is our main empirical evidence of a strong influence from the institutional and cultural destination-country context (box 4), which overrule the potential influence from the origin country context (box 5).

The comparisons across groups provide indications of assimilation and potential causality. However, we are well aware that the design does not deliver bulletproof evidence of assimilation. The comparison between immigrants in Denmark and residents in their country of origin is troubled by the fact that particular kinds of people choose, or are forced, to migrate. In other words, forces of selection or self-selection might be at play. So small differences vis-à-vis native Danes and large differences vis-à-vis the origin countries might not (only) be a matter of a process of assimilation in Denmark. Thus, we will be cautious in our interpretation of these differences. It is indeed a possibility that some migrants choose Denmark because they already in the country of origin supported a Danish-type welfare state. Thus, an absence of difference between migrants and natives and between groups of migrants might not (only) be a matter of assimilation. In our view, the self-selection into Denmark is not a major concern as other motives for immigration are much more prominent than (support for) the Danish welfare state, as discussed briefly above on the “welfare magnet” hypothesis. Furthermore, when comparing across natives and migrants and across specific migrant groups, we control for differences in a large number of background variables. If comparisons still indicate an absence of differences in welfare attitudes, we take it as a fairly clear indication of assimilation.

The drivers of assimilation processes will be theorized in Chapter 2 and within each specific chapter, covering a specific domain of the welfare state. The specific drivers will be empirically assessed in statistical models, which only include migrants. Across almost all chapters, we will explore the impact of the number of years in Denmark, the level of national identification, the

level of Danish language skills, the level of religiosity, and having a Danish citizenship. As assimilation is a process, it is fairly easy to imagine that it takes time. Whether the time effect is present, and how strong it is, is a central empirical question. The impact that national identification, language skills, and religiosity have on assimilation is more disputed. We will address it as an empirical question, well aware that time, national identification, language skills, the impact of having a Danish citizenship, and the level of religiosity are interrelated.

The main analytical pitfall of our approach is an implicit tendency to perceive migrants from the same country of origin as a homogeneous group. This is not the case, and Chapter 4 delves into variations within nationalities across a range of variables. However, at least our country of origin approach produces more nuances than studies that treat migrants as one group or apply the rough distinction between EU-/non-EU migrants or alternatively Western/non-Western migrants. The latter distinction is often used in Danish debates and national Danish statistics. Finally, we will only welcome future research, which looks even more specifically at differences across groups of migrants from the same country of origin.

THE SELECTED MIGRANT GROUPS

The selection of very different groups of migrants is not only a convenient analytical tool. It also reflects the substantive development that immigration into Denmark over time has become more mixed; both in terms of various reasons for migration and various countries of origin. The number of migrants in Denmark has increased from 135,000 in 1980 to 614,000 in 2019. We follow definitions by Statistics Denmark in which migrants are foreign-born with neither of the parents born in Denmark as carriers of Danish citizenship (if there is no information on the parents, but the person has been born abroad, he or she is also defined as a migrant). The numbers are shown in Figure 1.2.

In 1980 the largest three groups were migrants born in neighbouring Germany (24,000), Sweden (14,000), and Norway (12,000), while the Turkish coming mainly as guest workers in the 1960s and early 1970s was the fourth largest group (12,000). These four groups constituted almost half of all migrants. In 2019, the four largest groups were born in Poland (41,000), Syria (36,000), Turkey (33,000), and Germany (30,000). These four groups only constituted one-quarter of all migrants. Thus, as it is the case in most other Northern European countries, “migrants” have become a larger and more diverse group. The 14 groups covered by the book constituted 41 per cent of the group of migrants in 2019, see Figure 1.2. The three largest of the groups covered are migrants born in Poland (41,000), ex-Yugoslavia (34,000),

Figure 1.2 Number of migrants in Denmark from 1980 to 2019 by selected 14 groups and others

and Turkey (33,000). The three smallest groups are migrants born in Russia (6,000), Spain (6,000), and Japan (1,800).

The number of descendants from migrants (born in Denmark with both parents being migrants, as defined above) has also increased and become more mixed. In 1980, 18,000 descendants lived in Denmark. By 2019 the number had increased to 186,000. In 1980, the four largest groups of descendants were of German, Swedish, Pakistani, or Turkish descent (around 2,000 in each group). In 2019, the four largest groups were descendants with parents from Turkey (31,000), Lebanon (14,000), Pakistan (11,000), and Iraq (11,000). What the descendants think about the Danish welfare state is not covered by the book, although one of our surveys did include descendants. See Chapter 3 for a further introduction to the data material.

THE STRUCTURE OF THE BOOK

The book is structured in four parts. The remainder of the first part is divided into two chapters. In Chapter 2, we discuss the concept of assimilation, review previous literature, and elaborate our theoretical position. In Chapter 3, we introduce our data material in detail; data collection, weighting procedures, and so on.

In the second part of the book, Chapters 4 and 5, we describe the migrant groups and demonstrate how they are indeed most-different cases. Chapter 4 describes the composition of the 14 migrants across the length of stay in Denmark – gender, household composition, education, labour market position, naturalization, level of religiosity, and national identification. Chapter 5 describes in detail the mixed self-interest the 14 migrant groups have in the Danish welfare state. Using register data, the chapter shows their exact wage incomes, tax payments, and various forms of benefit receipt. The chapter demonstrates that some groups are indeed net receivers whereas others are net providers.

In the third part of the book, Chapters 6, 7, 8, 9, and 10 we turn to the main dependent variables. In Chapter 6, we analyse to what extent migrants assimilate to the trust levels exhibited by natives in public institutions. In Chapter 7, we analyse to what extent migrants assimilate to natives' attitudes towards state responsibility. In Chapter 8, we analyse assimilation to preferences for redistribution and poverty relief. In Chapter 9, we analyse assimilation to natives' preferences for female employment. Finally, in Chapter 10, we analyse assimilation to preferences for public childcare. As already mentioned, the overall pattern provides us with evidence for assimilation but there are important nuances and different mechanisms across the different areas covered by the book.

In the fourth part of the book, Chapters 11, 12, and 13, we describe assimilation to values, norms, and preferences that are a little more distant to the welfare state than those analysed in Part III. In Chapter 11, we analyse assimilation to natives' preferences for the extent to which migrants should have access to welfare benefits and services. In Chapter 12, we analyse assimilation to high interpersonal trust levels among natives. The fourth part of the book shows less assimilation than the third part of the book. Thus, migrants' assimilation to the welfare states does come with limitations. Finally, we end the book with a conclusion that summarizes the overall findings, discusses limitations, and points to future areas of research.

The book provides a detailed insight into 14 specific migrant groups, assimilation into a specific Danish welfare state context. In our view, such insights at the micro- and meso-level are pivotal for a research field, which sometimes is haunted by bold claims about the compatibility or incompatibility of welfare states and migration.