6. Migrants' trust in Danish institutions

Whether migrants assimilate to the welfare attitudes of native Danes is intimately linked to trust in state institutions. Trust in public institutions and those in charge of them is pivotal for public support for building and maintaining a welfare state. This is one of the most basic theoretical arguments derived from rational choice-inspired political scientists (Levi, 1997). Corruption and arbitrariness in public administration makes the public question whether taxes are collected and spent/redistributed in a procedurally just and efficient way. Thus, institutional trust is believed to be a necessary condition for supporting a welfare state (Larsen, 2008; Levi, Sacks, & Tyler, 2009; Rothstein, 1998). The argument goes that even a person highly in favour of the moral principle of redistribution from rich to poor will not support state intervention if he or she distrusts state institutions (Svallfors, 2013). Even the most altruistic person will refrain from being the sucker that supports a corrupt and inefficient system. Attitudes towards redistribution are analysed in Chapter 8. In the Danish context, it is primarily a matter of evaluating and maintaining an existing welfare state; it is not about building a welfare state from scratch. Whether institutional trust is a sufficient condition for supporting a welfare state is more questionable, especially the redistributive elements.

Denmark is not just a country with the normal European standard of institutional quality. It is known to be a best-case for the absence of corruption and arbitrariness in the public administration (Fukuyama, 2011; Jensen, 2013). From 2012 to 2016 Denmark was ranked as the country perceived to be the least corrupt in the world by Transparency International. Denmark is together with Norway and Sweden also ranked at the top by the World Governance Indicators. That native Scandinavians have high institutional trust is well-described in previous research, while the institutional trust of migrants is less explored. Previous research in other destination country contexts has found that migrants display higher trust in destination state institutions than natives do. Mexicans in the US (Weaver, 2003; Wenzel, 2006), migrants from non-democratic countries in Canada (Bilodeau & Nevitte, 2003), and Caribbeans and South Asians in the UK (Maxwell, 2008) are found to have higher trust in destination country institutions than natives. The same has been found in the European context, based on the heterogeneous pool of migrants responding to the general European Social Survey (Maxwell, 2010; Röder & Mühlau, 2011; 2012) and in a Danish survey study comparing a number of

migrants, descendants, and native Danes (Gundelach & Nørregård-Nielsen, 2007). The higher institutional trust among migrants is somewhat puzzling as (the studied) migrants have a lower socio-economic status than natives (see previous chapter) and potentially have experiences with discrimination in the destination country context. The dominant explanation for the puzzle has been that migrants use the state institutions in their country of origin as a reference point. This interpretation is supported by the empirical findings: (1) that migrants' institutional trust is less dependent on (lower) socio-economic position (SEP) and (negative) evaluation of concrete policies in destination countries than is the institutional trust of natives, (2) that the difference between natives and migrants is largest upon arrival, (3) that the difference diminishes with the length of stay in the destination country (Maxwell, 2010; Röder & Mühlau, 2012; Weaver, 2003; Wenzel, 2006), and (4) that the difference is absent among descendants (Röder & Mühlau, 2012). More directly, Röder and Mühlau (2012) found that the difference between the quality of origin and destination countries (measured by the World Governance Indicators, WGI) helped to explain the higher institutional trust among migrants, in the overall European context. They also found the expected effect of acculturation, measured by the length of stay, language skills, and citizenship. The longer the migrants had stayed in the destination country and the better they spoke the native language, the lower trust they had in the institutions of the destination country.

From the previous research on migrants' institutional trust and our knowledge of the Danish context, one might arrive at different expectations. Based solely on previous research in different contexts, the standard expectation would be: (1) that migrants in Denmark indicate higher institutional trust than natives do, (2) that migrants' institutional trust in destination country institutions varies reversely with conditions in the country of origin, and (3) that migrants' "over-confidence" in destination country institutions declines with length of stay and identification with Denmark. Another perspective is that the institutional quality of the Danish destination country is so genuine that it will be difficult to find these general effects. This might be caused by migrants' and natives' actual experiences with the Danish institutional context. As already mentioned in Chapter 2, there is previous evidence that migrants' experiences with high-quality Swedish universal services such as childcare, libraries, hospitals, and the national dental service seem to increase interpersonal trust (Kumlin & Rothstein, 2005). Thus, it is plausible that personal experiences with Danish public institutions could generate institutional trust. However, there might also be a more social constructivist perspective emphasizing interpretation. One could imagine that the presence of a large developed welfare state underpins the perception that natives, with a lifelong experience of living in this institutional context, apparently have faith in these state institutions,

that they apparently pay into them, and that the track-record of economic prosperity and a well-functioning society could be assigned to institutional quality. This might set Denmark and the other Nordic countries apart from other contexts, where the quality of the destination country institutions is lower and where migrants will come to discover that natives display limited trust in their own institutions; for example, the case where Mexicans acculturate in the American context or where Romanians acculturate in the Italian context. Thus, based on our contextual knowledge about Denmark, our more context-specific expectations are: (4) that migrants' "over-confidence" is absent as native Danes also display exceptional high trust in state institutions, (5) that the effect from differences in the institutional quality of the origin country is limited as the difference between these countries and Denmark, in any case, is sizeable, and (6) that migrants' institutional trust does not decline over time and with destination-country national identification.

PERCEPTION OF INSTITUTIONAL QUALITY – OVERALL PATTERNS IN THE MIFARE-DATA

From the Mifare survey we use a standard International Social Survey Programme (ISSP)-item about the perceived number of politicians involved in corruption as a rough measure of perception of overall trust in public institutions. The answers have been transformed into a scale from 0 to 100, where an average score of 0 would indicate that "almost none" and 100 that "almost all" politicians are involved in corruption (see note to Figure 6.1). As expected, the perception of corruption is by international standards very low in Denmark. In the ISSP data from 2016 (a representative sample of all adult Danes), the score is 21. It is the lowest measured in any of the 35 countries that conducted the ISSP survey in 2016. In the Mifare native control group (natives, 18–60 years old), the score is 27, that is, somewhat higher but still low by international standards. In the migrants' country of origin, the average perception of corruption is higher. Figure 6.1 is sorted after the score measured in 2016 for the eight available countries. In the countries of origin, the lowest level of perceived corruption was found in Great Britain (46) followed by Japan (56) and the US (57). The highest score was found in Spain (81) followed by the Philippines (72) and Russia (71). Thus, perception of corruption is more widespread in all countries of origin (we assume Romania and China included) but it still comes with large variations. The difference between the score in Great Britain (46) and Spain (81) is 35 (81–46). If one turns to the answers behind the scale, 5 per cent of the British (living in Great Britain) answer "almost all", while the same score is 41 per cent of the Spaniards (living in Spain). Thus, judged by the perception of corruption in the country of origin, the surveyed migrant groups do indeed represent, if not "most different", then at least "different" cases.

Note: Migrants living in Denmark (Mifare survey) and in the country of origin (ISSP survey on the role of government). Scale ranging from “Almost none” (0) to “Almost all” (100).

Source: Data collected from the ISSP Role of Government Module V (ISSP Research Group, 2018), except for Poland which is from the ISSP Role of Government Module IV (ISSP Research Group, 2008).

Figure 6.1 *Perception of the number of politicians involved in corruption*

The perception of corruption in Denmark among the ten migrant groups living in Denmark is low and on average seemingly lower than among natives. The average scores vary between 17 (China) and 30 (Poland). There is a tendency to lower scores among migrants from countries of origin with a widespread perception of corruption. Whether this is significant after control for composition effects remains to be seen. If the native Danes in the Mifare-data are used as a reference, there is a tendency to less perception of corruption among migrants from China, Spain, and Russia, while there seems to be no difference to migrants from Poland, Turkey, US, Japan, Great Britain, and the Philippines. Whether this holds true after control for composition effects also remains to be seen. In any case, at first sight, Figure 6.1 displays all the three indicators we have for assimilation, see Chapter 1. The difference between migrants in Denmark and the residents of their origin country is sizeable, the difference between migrants and native Danes seems minor, and the differences between the (most different) migrant groups living in Denmark also seem minor.

PERCEPTION OF INSTITUTIONAL QUALITY – PATTERNS IN THE MIFARE-DATA

The patterns of perceived corruption in the Mifare-data is further explored by means of (OLS) regression, as it allows for cross-model comparison. The binary model in Figure 6.2 simply tests the statistical significance of the score differences between the average of the migrant groups and the Mifare native reference group in Figure 6.1. Migrants from China (-10.2), Spain (-9.8), Russia (-4.8), and Romania (-4.1) indicate significantly less perception of corruption among Danish politicians than natives do. This is in line with previous research that finds more institutional trust among migrants. However, for the six other migrant groups, there is no significant difference relative to the natives, and the overall explained variation of the binary model is low (0.04). This supports the proposition that it is difficult for migrants to have over-confidence in comparison to a group of natives with extremely low levels of perceptions of corruption. In general, the country of origin is a bad predictor of the assessment of corruption among Danish politicians. The composition model in Figure 6.2 controls for different composition of gender, age, education, income, employment, and household composition. There is no effect from gender, age, and household composition. Being highly educated and having a high income reduces perceptions of corruption (coefficients not shown in the figure). However, these individual background variables are also bad predictors of perception of corruption, as seen in the very small increase in explained variation (from 4 to 5 per cent). That there is little effect from the SEP on migrants' institutional trust is also in line with previous research. The main result is that the limited effects from the country of origin are not altered much. Thus, also after control for composition effects, migrants from China, Spain, Russia, and Romania are significantly less inclined than natives to indicate corruption while there is no significant difference between natives and the six other migrant groups included in the model. Furthermore, the "over-confidence" of migrants is at maximum only around 10 points on a scale from 0 to 100. For example, migrants from Spain indicate 8.4 points less corruption (controlled for composition effects) than native Danes in the Mifare-data. However, in the ISSP, the difference between native Danes and residents living in Spain is around 60 points. Thus, despite significant differences in the Mifare-data, there are clear indications of assimilation to the institutional trust levels of native Danes.

The models shown in Figure 6.3 only include migrants as indicators of years in the country and national identification is not meaningful for natives. The "binary model" shows that there are some significant variations across the groups; migrants from Poland are used as a reference in order to maximize

Note: Mifare survey. Regression models comparing Danes (vertical line) to the migrant groups. OLS regression. Unstandardized coefficients with 95% confidence intervals. N=2,769.
Source: Data collected from the Mifare survey (2018).

Figure 6.2 Perception of the number of politicians involved in corruption (0–100 scale)

differences. Migrants born in China (-13.4), Spain (-13.0), Russia (-7.6), Romania (-8.2), and the US (-4.8) are significantly less inclined to find Danish politicians corrupt relative to migrants born in Poland. This gives some support to the idea that the institutional trust of migrants varies across groups. However, again the differences are modest, and the explained variation is low. Control for background variables in the “composition model” does not alter the pattern, despite the effect of being a migrant from the US turning insignificantly. Thus, the difference across migrants *cannot* be explained with differences in their SEP in Denmark.

The next model in Figure 6.3 includes years since the first settlement in Denmark. In line with previous research, we find a significant effect (controlled for background variables). The coefficient is 0.16. The longer the time since the first settlement, the larger the perception of corruption in the destination country. However, again the effect is not large, and the explanatory power of the model is modest. Being ten years in Denmark is estimated to increase the perception of corruption with a 1.6 percentage point on the scale from 0 to 100 (10×0.16). That the relationship is so weak supports the proposition that Denmark is a context where the higher trust in destination country institutions

Note: Mifare survey. Regression models comparing migrants from Poland (vertical line) to other migrant groups. OLS regression. Unstandardized coefficients with 95% confidence intervals. N=2,464. All models controlled for gender, age, wage-income, benefits, education (in three brackets) and employment situation (degree of employment), household composition.

Source: Data collected from the Mifare survey (2018).

Figure 6.3 *Perception of the number of politicians involved in corruption (0–100 scale)*

does not fade out as it tends to do in other contexts. This is also seen by the fact that including years since the first settlement does not help to explain (the minor) differences in perception of corruption between migrants from Poland and those from Romania, Spain, China, and Russia. Thus, it is not a matter of the latter groups being longer in Denmark than migrants from Poland. The next model includes our 5-point scale indicator for national identification (and excludes years in the country). The model shows a significant negative correlation with perceptions of corruption. The coefficient is -1.2 (after control for background variables). Thus, the stronger the identification with Danes, the lower the perception of Danish politicians being corrupt. Thus, in contrast to the international findings, the tendency is, in Denmark, that those migrants that identify more with the destination country assess the institutional quality of Denmark to be higher than those identifying less with Denmark. The effect of going from “not at all” feeling a belonging with Danes to “very close” is estimated to 4.8 points of the 0–100 scale (4 times 1.2). The last model in Figure 6.3, the “Full model”, shows that the two latter effects are significant

when included in the same model. In fact, they are strengthened a little. So, the general effect of becoming more sceptical about destination country institutions over time is moderated by increased destination country identification, which in Denmark goes together with higher trust in institutions. Finally, additional analyses indicate no effect from holding citizenship, no effect from language skills, and a weak effect from religiosity (the more religious, the lower institutional trust). However, again Figure 6.3 and the additional analyses clearly indicate that (the minor) differences between migrants from Poland and migrants from Romania, Spain, China, and Russia are not a matter of the latter groups feeling a stronger attachment to Danes, having spent more time in Denmark, or variations in language skills and religiosity.

PERCEPTION OF INSTITUTIONAL QUALITY – OVERALL PATTERNS IN THE COMCON-DATA

In the Comcon survey, we use a question about overall satisfaction with the way democracy works in Denmark as a measure of perception of overall distrust in public institutions. This is supplemented with analyses of trust in fair treatment in the public administration (see below). We do not have these questions asked in international surveys in the country of origin, as it was the case for eight of the Mifare countries. As an alternative, Figure 6.4 includes the WGI indicator for “voice and accountability” for the five origin countries. We use the rank the country has from 0 (the best-ranked country) to 100 (the worst-ranked country) among the world's countries; 2016 estimates. Denmark was in 2016 ranked as a country in the best first percentile in terms of “voice and accountability”, only surpassed by Norway and Sweden. The five Comcon origin countries belong to the group with little voice and accountability. Bosnia-Herzegovina is ranked in the 58th percentile, that is, 58 per cent of the world's countries are judged to have better voice and accountability. Iraq is ranked in the 78th percentile, that is, 78 per cent of countries are ranked better. Lebanon, Turkey, and Pakistan are ranged to be around the 70th percentile. Figure 6.4 is ordered after this score in the WGI. Thus, in terms of the institutional quality of the country of origin, there is less variation in the Comcon-data than was the case in the Mifare-data. Bosnia-Herzegovina stands out as the country with a somewhat decent institutional quality, while the other four countries are characterized by low institutional quality.

Turning to public perceptions, the natives indicate little dissatisfaction with the way democracy works. In the Comcon-data, the answers are again transformed to a scale from 0 to 100, where 0 indicates low dissatisfaction and 100 indicates high dissatisfaction (see note to Figure 6.4). The score in the Danish Comcon native reference group is 39. It reflects that 3 per cent of the natives were “not at all satisfied with democracy”, 24 per cent were “not particularly”

Note: Migrants living in Denmark (Comcon survey) and in the countries of origin (World Governance Indicators 2016 for “Voice and accountability”). Scale ranging from “Very satisfied” (0) to “Not at all satisfied” (100) (inverted percentile rank for WGI data).

Source: Data collected from the Comcon survey (2015) and World Bank (2020). In the latter case we substituted ex-Yugoslavia with Bosnia-Herzegovina.

Figure 6.4 Dissatisfaction with the way Danish democracy works

satisfied, 59 per cent were “fairly satisfied”, and 13 per cent were “very satisfied”. The ISSP citizenship survey from 2014 had a parallel question about the function of democracy rated on a scale from 0 to 10. Only 1.6 per cent of Danes gave an answer on the negative end of the scale (0–4). This was the second lowest share found in the 34 surveyed countries, only surpassed by Norwegians’ satisfaction with the way Norwegian democracy works. Thus, the Danish reference point is low. The Comcon-data shows that migrants in Denmark share this perception and on average seem to be more satisfied with the Danish democracy than the natives themselves. This is again in line with the previous international research. The migrants born in ex-Yugoslavia, Lebanon, Pakistan, and Iraq indicate less dissatisfaction with the way the Danish democracy works than do natives, see Figure 6.4. The only exception is migrants born in Turkey, which do not indicate lower dissatisfaction than native Danes. Despite some variation in the institutional quality of the country of origin, the variation across the groups is modest. Thus, two of our three indicators of assimilation seem to be present. The difference between native Danes and migrants is modest (and when a difference is there, it is an over-confidence in Danish institutions) and the difference between the (most-different) migrant groups also seem modest.

The Comcon-data also included a question about mistrust/trust in getting fair and good treatment by the public administration, exemplified by caseworkers

in the municipalities. As expected, distrust among natives is low. The average score is 37 on a scale from 0 to 100 (see note in Figure 6.5). The average reflects that 17 per cent answered on the negative side of the 0–10 scale, 21 per cent in the middle category (5) and 62 per cent on the positive side of the scale. Unfortunately, there are no international questions available from the country of origin and the WGI data have no good proxy for institutional quality at the local level. Thus, we cannot make any comparison between the country of origin and perception of migrants from these countries living in Denmark. Nevertheless, the levels of distrust among the latter groups are shown in Figure 6.5. The overall pattern is that the answers of the migrants resemble those of the natives. There is a tendency to more trust among migrants born in Lebanon (33) and Pakistan (34) than among natives (37). Whether this is a significant difference remains to be seen. In contrast, migrants from Turkey (42) and Iraq (43) tend to indicate a bit less trust than do natives. However, the overall pattern is that there is a high level of trust and that the variation across the groups of migrants is close to absent, which we again take as an indication of assimilation.

Note: Migrants and natives living in Denmark (Comcon survey). Scale ranging from “Very high trust” (0) to “No trust at all” (100).

Source: Data collected from the Comcon survey (2015).

Figure 6.5 Level of distrust in fair and good treatment in public administration

PERCEPTION OF INSTITUTIONAL QUALITY – PATTERNS IN COMCON-DATA

The patterns of distrust in Danish institutions measured in the Comcon-data are also explored by means of regressions (OLS). Figure 6.6 shows the patterns of dissatisfaction with the way Danish democracy works. The “Binary-model” on the left side simply shows that the level of dissatisfaction among migrants from ex-Yugoslavia (-10.9), Lebanon (-9.9), and Pakistan (-9.8) is significantly lower than the dissatisfaction found among natives, which is what can be expected from international research. However, this model also shows that this is not the case for migrants born in Turkey and Iraq. Overall, the effects are again modest, and the explained variation is low (4 per cent), which indicates that country of origin is a bad predictor for dissatisfaction in the way Danish democracy works. The “Composition-model” on the left side controls for our standard background variables. As in the Mifare-data, there is no effect from gender and age. In terms of household composition, the singles are more dissatisfied. As in the Mifare, the highly educated and those with high salaries are again less dissatisfied. Once these differences are taken into account, the country of origin effects increases a little. Thus, taking the relative weak socio-economic positions of these groups into account, it becomes clearer that these migrants display more confidence in destination country institutions than do natives, except for migrants born in Turkey. The level of explained variance increases to 6 per cent but even with background variables included, the explanatory power of the model is modest.

The models on the right side of Figure 6.6 only include migrants. The “Binary-model” shows that there are significant differences across the countries of origin; using migrants born in Turkey as a reference in order to maximize the chances of differences. The migrants from ex-Yugoslavia (-10.5), Pakistan (-10.5), and Lebanon (-8.0) are significantly less dissatisfied with the Danish democracy than are the migrants born in Turkey. This holds true after control for differences in the composition of the five groups (not shown). The “Composition plus time” model shows that dissatisfaction with the way Danish democracy work does seem to *increase* by the number of years since the first settlement in Denmark, in line with previous international literature. However, it is a weak effect. Ten years in the country is estimated to increase dissatisfaction by 4.1 points on the 0 to 100 scale. However, it is a significant effect and it remains significant after control for background variables (coefficients not shown). Finally, the “Composition plus identity” model shows that national identification increases dissatisfaction, in contrast to the Mifare-data where the opposite effect was found. However, again it is a modest effect and the correlation turns insignificant after control for background variables.

Figure 6.6 Dissatisfaction with the way Danish democracy works (0–100 scale)

In a model with both years since first settlement and national identification included, the latter also turns insignificant (not shown). Finally, a full model indicates no effect from holding citizenship, no effect from language skills, and no effect from the level of religiosity.

The patterns in distrust in good and fair service in the Danish public administration is shown in Figure 6.7. The “Binary-model” on the left-hand side shows that the migrants from Lebanon (-5.6) and Pakistan (-5.1) have significantly less distrust in fair treatment in the public administration than have natives. However, at the same time, migrants from Turkey (5.0) and Iraq (4.5) have significantly more distrust in fair treatment than have natives, which is difficult to explain in our framework; see discussion at the end of the chapter. There is no difference between migrants from ex-Yugoslavia and natives. The “Composition-model” on the left-hand side shows the results controlled for composition effects. Again, the pattern is that highly educated and those with high incomes have more trust in the institutions (not shown). The origin-country pattern remains stable after control; besides the differences between natives and migrants from Iraq turns insignificant and the difference between migrants from ex-Yugoslavia turns significant. However, again the explanatory power of the model is weak (5 per cent explained variance).

The models on the right-hand side of Figure 6.7 show the differences between migrant groups, using the most distrusting group as reference group, the migrants from Iraq. The migrants from Lebanon (-8.9) and Pakistan (-8.0) have significantly less distrust in fair treatment in the local municipality than have migrants from Iraq. This pattern is stable after control for background variables. It is difficult to give the finding any substantial interpretation based on the country of origin. The institutional quality of Iraq does not seem to be much better than the institutional quality of Lebanon and Pakistan. The “Composition plus time-model” on the right-hand side shows that distrust in fair treatment increases with the years since the first settlement in Denmark; in line with previous findings. The less distrust among migrants from Lebanon and Pakistan also remains stable. Finally, the “Composition plus identity-model” shows that there is no significant effect of national identification. This both holds true with or without control for background variables. It also holds true for models including national identification as a categorical variable and including the years since first settlement in Denmark. Thus, in contrast to the Mifare-data, the level of national identification does not go together with institutional trust/distrust. Finally, the full model indicates no effect from having citizenship, no effect from religiosity, and no effect from language skills. The worse language skills, the less belief in fair treatment at the local municipality (model not shown).

Note: Comcon survey. Regression models comparing native Danes (vertical line, left figure) and migrants from Iraq (vertical line, right figure) to other migrant groups. Years since first settlement and national identification also shown (right). OLS regression. Unstandardized coefficients with 95% confidence intervals. N=366. Composition means controlled for gender, age, wage-income, benefits, education (in three brackets) and employment situation (degree of employment), household composition.

Source: Data collected from the Mifare survey (2018) and the Comcon survey (2015).

Figure 6.7 Distrust in fair treatment in public administration (0–100 scale)

MIGRANTS' INSTITUTIONAL TRUST IN THE CONTEXT OF INSTITUTIONAL QUALITY

The overall take-away message from this chapter is that migrants in Denmark display very high trust in the Danish state. This holds true for all the 14 most-different migrant groups. Thereby one of the fundamental necessary conditions for supporting a welfare state is fulfilled. This is an important precondition for migrants' assimilation to the welfare attitudes of natives in general. This finding is consistent with previous research, which has found migrants in other contexts to display an "over-confidence" in destination country institutions. In our data material, there were also indications of migrants having more trust in the Danish destination country institutions than have natives. This was the case for perceptions of corruption of Danish politicians assessed by migrants born in China, Spain, Russia, and Romania. It was also the case for satisfaction with the way Danish democracy works assessed by migrants born in Lebanon, ex-Yugoslavia, Pakistan, and Iraq. Finally, migrants born in Lebanon, Pakistan, and ex-Yugoslavia express significantly more trust in fair treatment in local public administration than natives.

However, there are some specific patterns among migrants living in Denmark, which we believe are caused by Denmark being a country with exceptionally high institutional quality. The "over-confidence" in Danish institutions was modest and for some groups absent. The migrants born in Great Britain, US, Japan, Turkey, Poland, and the Philippines did not indicate lower levels of corruption than did native Danes. Neither had migrants born in ex-Yugoslavia, Turkey, Pakistan, and Iraq more confidence in fair and good treatment in the public administration than had native Danes. The migrants from Turkey were neither more satisfied with the way Danish democracy works or had more trust in equal treatment at the local public administration than had natives.¹ One simple interpretation is that natives have extremely high institutional trust. In our data, we did find a potential effect from the institutional quality of the country of origin. The chapter did not establish measures that allowed us to statistically test this effect, but we did analyse differences across the migrant groups. There were significant differences across groups in the perception of corruption, satisfaction with democracy, and belief in equal treatment at the local public administration. The migrants from China, Spain, Russia, and Romania have significantly higher trust in Danish institutions than had migrants from Poland. This could be a matter of institutional quality in the country of origin. In the Comcon-data, migrants from ex-Yugoslavia, Pakistan, and Lebanon had more trust in Danish institutions than migrants from Turkey and Iraq. These differences are more difficult to explain with institutional quality in the country of origin, which could point to the possibility of migrants

from Turkey and Iraq having negative experiences with Danish institutions. However, measured by the explanatory power of these group differences, the effects are weak. One simple explanation is that this is caused by the fact that the difference between Danish institutional quality and origin-country quality is sizeable for all groups.

Finally, it was difficult to find the general pattern of increased distrust as migrants acculturate. We did find that time since the first settlement significantly increased mistrust in destination country institutions; it held true of all three measures used. However, the effect sizes are moderate. Furthermore, identification with Denmark actually had a (weak) significant effect in the Mifare-data. Thus, the stronger the identification, the higher the belief in institutional quality. This supports the proposition that Denmark is a special case where acculturation does not lower institutional trust. However, the findings were a little different in the Comcon-data. For these groups, we found no (significant) link between national identification and institutional trust. Thus, the second overall finding is that migrants' initial "over-confidence" in destination country institutions is only weakly moderated by acculturation in Denmark.

NOTE

1. Given the fact that we do find somewhat different patterns between the two surveys, even for the Turkish groups who should be comparable, this shows that we maybe are picking up on slightly different perception in the two surveys.