8. Migrants' attitudes towards redistribution and poverty relief

The welfare state regimes described in Chapter 2 also result in very different levels of economic redistribution throughout society. The tax-financed universal benefits and services of the social-democratic welfare regime are believed to install a broad comprehensive redistribution of resources from the better off to the worse off, with the potential to alter the class structure created by capitalism. The insurance payments of the conservative welfare regime, in contrast, are believed largely to conserve existing class structures as the size and quality of benefits and services are closely connected to achievements at the labour market. Finally, the tax-financed targeted benefits and services of the liberal welfare regime, or more residual welfare states in general, are believed to, at best, lift “the poor” out of severe poverty. There is indeed clear evidence that the Danish welfare state has a large distributive impact. To paraphrase Castles and Obinger (2007) the more heavy spending Nordic countries tend to get more “distributional bang for their buck”. When comparing pre- and post-tax situations, the OECD has calculated that Denmark has the largest degree of redistribution throughout society (OECD, 2020b). As a result, inequality in Denmark is relatively low, compared to other countries. Going by the GINI coefficient, a commonly accepted measure of income inequality, then Denmark is among the 15 most equal countries in the world, though inequality has been increasing in Denmark and many other Western countries, mainly due to tax reform that has lowered marginal tax rates and taxes on capital gains (Juul & Andersen, 2017). However, it is still the case that natives and migrants are exposed to a context where historically inherited welfare institutions cause a redistribution of resources, which might influence the institutional logics of consequentiality and appropriateness.

The link between welfare institutions and attitudes towards redistribution is still something of a puzzle. A typical starting point of theorization is that attitudes to redistribution could be guided by self-interest. Following this logic, the classic Meltzer–Richard model suggests that support for redistribution increases with income differences (Meltzer & Richard, 1981). The larger the differences between the average income and the median income in a given society, the larger is the group with self-interest in taxing those with high incomes. This leads to the simple prediction that support for redistribu-

tion will be lower in a relatively equal society, like the Danish, compared to a more unequal society. This is sometimes known as a thermostatic adaption in attitudes, as the attitudes adapt to the policies like a thermostat adapts the level of heating to the room temperature (Soroka & Wlezien, 2005). Most studies of attitudes to redistribution and taxes find that income or social class matters a great deal for attitudes to redistribution (Corneo & Grüner, 2002; Kulin & Svallfors, 2013; Linos & West, 2003). For example, Linos and West (2003) find that in Germany, the US, Austria, and Norway, class, income, and education are some of the most important factors in determining attitudes to redistribution. Thus, there is substantial evidence for Meltzer and Richard's model at the micro-level, whereas the aggregated effect of larger support for redistribution in more unequal societies has been questioned in several studies (e.g. Larsen, 2016b), see below. From a self-interest perspective, we should predict that migrants' support for redistribution will depend on their socio-economic position (SEP) (box 3 in Figure 1.1). Thus, whether migrants assimilate into the natives' attitudes towards redistribution will be dependent on their socio-economic position in relation to the natives. From Chapter 5, we know that the average income of natives is higher than all the migrant groups. The difference between natives and migrants from Great Britain is modest, but for the other groups, the difference is substantial (see the first row in Table 5.2). We also know that in terms of the difference between tax payments and benefits received, there are substantial differences between the groups. While most of the migrant groups in the Mifare survey are not net-beneficiaries from the Danish welfare state, besides the migrants from Turkey, the migrants from Lebanon and Iraq had a substantial gain (see Chapter 5). This interplay between wage income, tax payment, and income transfer is expected to create differences in attitudes towards redistribution across the migrant groups, at least before the socio-economic position of the individual migrant is taken into account.

The self-interest perspective is challenged by a large literature, which finds that attitudes to distribution are also influenced by values and norms (box 2 in Figure 1.1). For instance, Andreß and Heien (2001) find that having egalitarian or anti-egalitarian values matters a great deal for attitudes to redistribution, controlled for the socio-economic position of the individual. This is hardly a surprise as the issue of redistribution is linked to the ideological left–right cleavage found throughout Western countries. This ideological component has led to the prediction that the support for redistribution should be bigger in countries that are more aligned to the social-democratic regime. However, as with a lot of research that tries to combine regimes and attitudes, the results have been somewhere between unclear and disappointing (Hedegaard, 2015; Jæger, 2006). This does not necessarily mean that egalitarian values and norms are absent in the Nordic countries. It might simply be a matter of the

effect of values and norms being moderated by the Meltzer–Richard effect. Furthermore, a perception element should also be included (box 2 in Figure 1.1). As argued in Chapter 6, the trustworthiness of state institutions might also influence redistribution, at least redistribution organized by the state. Thus, we know from previous literature that natives' attitudes to redistribution are influenced by a mix of self-interest, values, norms, and perceptions. Following this literature, one could also predict migrants' attitudes to redistribution to be guided by more than self-interest. Migrants' institutional trust has already been dealt with in Chapter 5. The tendency towards “over-confidence” in destination-country institutions should lead us to expect higher support for redistribution among migrant groups than among natives. Whether egalitarian values and norms from the country of origin affect attitudes towards redistribution is also up for discussion in the literature. Luttmer and Singhal (2011) show that a proportion of migrants' attitudes to redistribution can be explained by attitudes in the country of origin and level of income in the origin country. Hence, Luttmer and Singhal (2011) find that migrants from countries with more pro-redistribution attitudes tend to be more supportive themselves, and that this effect also is present for the second generation. They base this conclusion on a study of migrants from European countries establishing themselves in other European countries. In a recent study, Tabellini (2020) also shows a link between liberal voting among Native Americans and the inflow of migrants from the country with larger welfare states, which is theorized as the transmission of origin-country values and norms from migrants to natives. Thus, the literature points to potential origin-country effects (box 5 in Figure 1.1) mediated by norms and values (box 2 in Figure 1.1).

Finally, the previous literature has shown a large divide between attitudes towards overall retribution and attitudes towards poverty relief. Following the logic of the Meltzer–Richard model, one could expect that while a majority might have a self-interest in general redistribution, it is only a minority that has a self-interest in poverty relief programmes targeted at “the poor”. The attitudes of those reliant, or potentially reliant, on poverty relief programmes might be shaped by self-interest. However, for the other groups, their attitudes are shaped by moral assessment about the deservingness of “the poor” (Larsen, 2008; Petersen, 2009; van Oorschot, 2005). Previous research has found that native Danes have an extraordinary positive evaluation of the deservingness of “the poor”, which might be a matter of the presence of universal benefits and service (Hedegaard, 2014a; Larsen, 2008; Rothstein, 1998) and the media discourses that follow (Hedegaard, 2014b; Larsen & Dejsgaard, 2012). How migrants perceive the deservingness of “the poor” has not received much attention in the literature. In the American context, Luttmer (2001) finds that support for social assistance targeted at mothers living in poverty (AFDC) is shaped not only by self-interest but also by group interest. In communities

with many blacks receiving AFDC, the support for AFDC was higher; even when controlled for individual self-interest. Renema and Lubbers (2019) have studied whether the same group-loyalty effect could be found among migrants living in the Netherlands. They did find a link between group-dependence on social assistance/unemployment benefits and attitudes to social assistance, but they could not find this effect to be mediated by their measure of group-belonging (see Chapter 12 for further discussion).

In our data material, we only have a measure of attitudes to general redistribution in the Mifare-data. Thus, attitudes to general redistribution will only be studied utilizing this dataset. In the Comcon-data, we have a measure of attitudes towards giving to those worst off. Thus, attitudes to poverty relief will be studied using the Comcon-data. This is not optimal, as it gives this chapter a dual focus and makes results incomparable between the sections. However, the migrant groups included in the Mifare-data are more interesting for the attitudes to general redistribution, as they included both high and low-income earners. And the migrant groups included in the Comcon-data are more interesting for attitudes to poverty relief, as a larger part of the interviewed are dependent on the Danish poverty relief programmes.

ATTITUDES TO GENERAL REDISTRIBUTION

In Figure 8.1, we have plotted data from the International Social Survey Programme (ISSP) on attitudes to the government's responsibility to ensure redistribution between rich and poor, which we use as an indicator of support for general redistribution. Not all of the countries are represented in the figure, but a good selection of them are present, though mostly from the Mifare survey. The samples from the ISSP have been limited to the 18- to 60-year-olds, like the two surveys (see Chapter 3). The respondents were asked whether it should be a government responsibility to "Reduce income differences between the rich and poor". To this, the respondents could answer that it "definitely", "probably", "probably not", or "definitely not" should be a government responsibility. This has been recalculated into a 0–100 scale, where higher scores indicate more support for redistribution.

Figure 8.1 shows that the attitudes to redistribution vary considerably across origin countries. The lowest support for redistribution support is found in Denmark (average score of 54), USA (57), Japan (60), the Philippines (63), and Great Britain (64). On the other hand, we find more positive attitudes about whether redistribution should be a government responsibility in Spain, Turkey, Poland, and Russia, with average scores of respectively 81, 80, 77, and 77 in the countries. The low level of support for general redistribution in Denmark is in line with the expectations of the Meltzer–Richard model. However, the results also demonstrate the limitations of this theoretical pre-

Note: Migrants and natives in Denmark (Mifare survey) and residents in countries of origin (ISSP 2016 survey on the role of government). Scale ranging from “Definitely not” (0) to “Definitely” (100).

Source: Data collected from the ISSP Role of Government Module V (ISSP Research Group, 2018), except for Poland which is from the ISSP Role of Government Module IV (ISSP Research Group, 2008).

Figure 8.1 Attitudes to whether it should be the government's responsibility to ensure redistribution between rich and poor

diction. As the level of economic inequality is higher in the US, it is a puzzle that the support for redistribution is only a little higher than in Denmark, which points to the importance of values, norms, and perceptions. However, our main interest is the potential assimilation of migrants' attitudes to the less supportive attitudes of native Danes.

For the eight countries where we have both the attitudes for migrants living in Denmark and from the country of origin, we find little difference for six of the groups (see Figure 8.1). The migrants from the US, Japan, the Philippines, Great Britain, Turkey, and Spain living in Denmark hold more or less the same attitudes to general redistribution that can be found in the country of origin. Only the migrants from Russia and Poland indicate much less support for redistribution than what is present in the country of origin. Thus, our first indicator of assimilation, differences between migrants living in Denmark and attitudes in the country of origin, does not indicate a general pattern of assimilation though the migrants from Poland and Russia stand out. Our second indicator of assimilation, absence of differences between migrant groups living in Denmark and natives, neither indicates assimilation. In contrast, Figure

8.1 shows large variations across the groups living in Denmark. The average scores range from 51 to 83. The biggest support for redistribution is found among migrants that originate from Turkey (83), Spain (78), China (77), and Romania (71), while the migrants from Russia (58), Poland (58), Japan (61), the Philippines (61), the US (62), and Great Britain (63) are the most similar to the Danes.

EXPLAINING DIFFERENCES OF SUPPORT FOR GENERAL REDISTRIBUTION

To capture the differences between the groups we will use a series of statistical models, based on the literature presented above. The first model is a binary model that only contains a variable on the origin country, which should produce results similar to Figure 8.1. The second model controls for many of the compositional differences. Here we control for age, gender, household status, and education. The third model controls for factors related to self-interest by adding income, benefits, and employment to the mix. The fourth step adds egalitarian values, trust, and perceptions of corruption or unfair treatment in the public sector. The general egalitarian values are captured in the Mifare survey by a question about whether the government should be allowed to regulate the economy. Institutional trust is captured in a measure of perceived corruption among civil servants used in Chapter 6. Finally, the fifth model adds the length of stay in the country, citizenship, self-perceived language skills, and identification with Denmark/origin country as presented in Chapter 4. This final step contains variables that are only valid to the migrants and not the natives, that is, it can only be used to describe differences across various migrant groups.

Figure 8.2 shows the impact of the different variables on the difference in attitudes between Danes (vertical line) and the migrant groups. Similar to Figure 8.1 the results show that the migrant groups are more positive towards redistribution than the Danes are, as indicated by the positive scores on the x-axis. We see that the second and third models, containing variables on compositional differences and self-interest, do very little to explain this gap. We do find income to be significantly negatively correlated to attitudes to general redistribution and amount in benefits to be significantly positively correlated (not shown). However, the differences between the natives and the migrant groups are not only a matter of different socio-economic positions. Thus, there seems to be an impact of values, norms, and perceptions. This is also what we find in the final model, which adds indicators for values, social trust, and perceived corruption in the public sectors. These indicators close some of the gaps, for all but the migrants originating in Japan. Digging into the full models, we can see that it is the variable about the state's regulation of the economy,

Note: Mifare survey. Regression models comparing Danes (vertical line) to the migrant groups. OLS regression. Unstandardized coefficients with 95% confidence intervals. N=2,167.

Source: Data collected from the Mifare survey (2018).

Figure 8.2 Attitudes to general redistribution (0–100 scale)

which reduces differences across groups. Thus, in comparison to the migrant groups, the natives are not less supportive of redistribution once we take this variable into account. However, there is still a sizeable difference between native Danes and migrants from Spain, Turkey, and China, which cannot be explained by the model (see Figure 8.2). Finally, we find that holding Danish citizenship is negatively correlated to support for redistribution, which is further theorized in Chapter 12.

Figure 8.3 shows the difference across migrant groups, using the migrants from Poland as the reference point. As already shown in Figure 8.1, the migrants from Romania, Spain, Turkey, and China are more inclined to support redistribution than are the migrants from Poland. These differences do not disappear after control for the difference in socio-economic position, self-interest, or even trust and our indicator for egalitarian values. So, while values might explain some of the differences in attitudes between natives and migrants' groups, this measure is of little help to explain differences across migrants groups. Finally, we find a significant effect on language skills. Those who speak Danish "very well" are estimated to score 11 points lower on the 0–100 scale than those who do not speak Danish at all. Taking language skills

Note: Mifare survey. Regression models comparing migrants from Poland (vertical line) to the other migrant groups. OLS regression. Unstandardized coefficients with 95% confidence intervals. N=1,950.

Source: Data collected from the Mifare survey (2018).

Figure 8.3 Attitudes to general redistribution (0–100 scale)

into account, we find no significant effect from holding citizenship, length of stay in Denmark, or identification with Denmark.

DO ATTITUDES TO GENERAL REDISTRIBUTION TRAVEL?

In the sections above, we showed that the migrants' groups included in this book tend to be more supportive of redistribution and that this only partially can be explained by the dominant theories within the field. However, of the theories presented at the beginning, the ideas of Luttmer and Singhal (2011), that attitudes to redistribution travel with the migrants, have still not been applied. To test this we need a measure of attitudes to redistribution in the origin countries, which is exactly what we have in Figure 8.1. Here we presented attitudes to redistribution in the country of origin for most of the Mifare countries (US, Japan, Great Britain, the Philippines, Turkey, Spain, Russia, and Poland). Using this, we can see if migrants that originate from countries where the populations are more positive towards redistribution are

Table 8.1 *The impact of attitudes to redistribution in the origin country on attitudes to redistribution among eight migrants' groups in Denmark*

	Unstandardized OLS-coefficients	Standardized OLS-coefficients
(1) Effect, binary	0.34**	0.11**
(2) Effect, controlled for compositional effects	0.28**	0.09**
(3) Effect, controlled for self-interest effects	0.26**	0.09**
(4) Effect, controlled for values, social trust, and perceived corruption	0.27**	0.10**
(5) Effect, controlled for time lived in Denmark, identification, and citizenship	0.24**	0.09**

Note: * Significant at 0.05. ** Significant at 0.01. For the standardized coefficients, the weights are not used, as this is not possible to combine. Shown as five different models, with increasing numbers of control variables. OLS regression. Unstandardized and standardized coefficients. N=1,776.

Source: Data collected from the Mifare survey (2018).

also more positive towards redistribution. The question used in the Mifare survey is similar to the one used in the ISSP, which is where the data in Figure 8.1 comes from. To test for the impact of attitudes in the country of origin we substituted the country of origin with the values in Figure 8.1. The first model simply tests for the relationship between attitudes in the country and attitudes among the migrant group. The next models add the control variables also used in the figures above, so (1) compositional effects, (2) self-interest, (3) values, (4) trust and perceived corruption, and (5) time, identification, and citizenship. The effects are presented as both standardized and unstandardized coefficients. However, for the standardized coefficients, the weights are not used, as this is not possible to combine.

Table 8.1 shows the impact of attitudes to redistribution in the origin country on attitudes to redistribution among eight migrant groups in the recipient country. The binary model, which is not controlled for anything, shows us that being from a country where attitudes to redistribution are one-point higher leads to 0.34** higher attitudes among migrants in Denmark. This effect is reduced a bit to 0.28** when controlling for the compositional effects of age, gender, household status, and education. The next three models that add variables on self-interests and values, social trust, and perceived corruption does not change the effect. Finally, the effect size is lowered marginally to 0.24** by controlling for time lived in Denmark, identification, and citizenship. Most of the results throughout the book are shown as unstandardized results, as they are well equipped to working with categorical variables, such as country of origin. The unstandardized results, in this case, tells us about the “absolute” impact of

attitudes in the origin country. However, by standardizing the coefficient we can say something about the relative strength of the variable compared to other variables, in explaining attitudes to redistribution among the nine migrant groups. Here the results show that attitudes in the origin country are quite good at explaining the patterns in attitudes. For instance, we find that it is almost as strong an indicator as income and double the strength of perceived corruption (not shown). Thus, as for the question of attitudes towards general redistribution, we find, in line with previous studies, that migrants' attitudes are indeed shaped by the country of origin. In our case, it is a matter of migrants maintaining more positive attitudes to general redistribution than is the case for natives.

ATTITUDES TO POVERTY RELIEF

Turning to the question about poverty relief, we expect the native Danes to hold a more positive image of "the poor" than do most other cultures. To capture attitudes towards "the poor", we use the following item from the Comcon survey; "Do you think that the government should increase the effort to help those worst off in society, even if it means higher taxes". This question is specifically focused on "those worst off in society", which we expect to load moral deservingness assessments. The Comcon questions are answered on

Note: Comcon survey. Shown by origin country on a scale from 0 to 100, where higher scores indicate more support for poverty relief. Sorted by score.

Source: Data collected from the Comcon survey (2015).

Figure 8.4 *Attitudes to whether more money should be spent on helping those worst off, even if it costs more in taxes*

an 11-point scale, which we again arrange into a 0–100 scale. Higher scores indicate more support for poverty relief.

Figure 8.4 shows the results of the Comcon survey. Here we see that the Danes are more supportive of poverty relief than are the migrant groups, with a score of 57. Thus, despite Danes' moderate support for general redistribution, they do distinguish themselves by having a positive image of "those worst off in society", as expected from previous research. Among the migrant groups, we find that the migrants from ex-Yugoslavia (a score of 56), Lebanon (53), and Iraq (53), hold fairly similar attitudes as the natives, while migrants from Pakistan (49) and Turkey (43) are less supportive for poverty relief than are natives. Unfortunately, we do not have measures of attitudes towards poverty relief in the country of origin. Thus, we do not know whether this is more or less support for poverty relief than what is found in the country of origin.

EXPLAINING THE DIFFERENCES IN ATTITUDES TO POVERTY RELIEF

There is a large literature on explaining public attitudes towards "the poor" or those "worst off in society". The previous literature often uses public perceptions about control, attitude need, identity, and reciprocity as explanatory variables behind the moral assessment of the poor (e.g. van Oorschot, Roosma, Meuleman, & Reeskens, 2017). These indicators are not included in the Comcon survey, which leaves us with limited analytical possibilities. However, there is a question about "the poor" free-riding, which often is believed to be one of the most central indicators. Free-riding suggests that the "poor" are in control of their poverty, as poverty to some extent is chosen by the free-riders, and "the poor" as broken the norm of reciprocity. The wording is "How many, in your opinion, receive public benefits, without being entitled to it, when it comes to social assistance". The response category was "many" (used as reference), "quite a lot", "only a few", "almost none", and "don't know". We will add this variable to the standard variables, which we use throughout the analytical chapters. We also add satisfaction with the Danish democracy, which we used as a measure of institutional trust in Chapter 6.

The binary model in Figure 8.5 to the left simply shows the difference between the migrant groups and the native Danes, which is already depicted in Figure 8.4. When we control for compositional effects, the migrant group becomes even less supportive of poverty relief. We find women to be significantly more in favour of poverty relief than men, which is a standard finding. We also find employment and higher income to be related to lower support, and receiving benefits to be related to higher support, as one would expect from a self-interest perspective. Thus, taking the lower socio-economic positions of the migrants into account, the differences between migrants and

Note: Regression models comparing Danes (vertical lines) to the migrant groups. N=1,182 (left). Regression models comparing migrants from ex-Yugoslavia in Comcon to the other migrant groups. N=366 (right). OLS-models. Unstandardized coefficients with 95% confidence intervals.

Source: Data collected from the Comcon survey (2015).

Figure 8.5 Attitudes to poverty relief

natives increases. This is what is shown in the composition model. This points to the importance of the perceptions of free-riding, which we include in the full model. As expected, overall institutional trust, measured as satisfaction with the Danish democracy, goes together with higher support for poverty relief. Also, we find a strong negative effect from the perception that many receive social assistance without entitlement. Those who answer “almost none” are estimated to be 27 points more in favour of poverty relief than those that answer “many”, on the scale from 0–100. All the migrant groups perceive the free-riding to be higher than do native Danes, which, in line with previous research, shows a relatively positive image of “the poor”. When these perceptions are taken into account, the differences between natives and migrants are reduced again. This is what is shown in the “Full model”. However, even taking these differences into account, we are left with significant differences between the migrants from Turkey, Pakistan, and Lebanon, which the model cannot explain. Especially migrants from Turkey stand out as the most reluctant to support poverty relief.

The right-side of Figure 8.5 is based on models that analyse the differences across the five migrant groups. We use migrants from ex-Yugoslavia as references as this is the group that resembles the attitudes of natives the most. The “binary model” simply shows that migrants from Pakistan and Turkey are significantly less supportive of poverty relief than are migrants from ex-Yugoslavia; respectively estimated to score 12 and 7 points lower on the 0–100 scale. The next model controls for composition, which reduces the differences across migrant groups. Thus, part of the difference is caused by different socio-economic positions. We also find a strong negative effect from living in ethnic homogeneity couples (-7), while living in ethnically mixed marriages has the opposite effect (8); using the singles as a reference point. Our ad hoc explanation is that general acculturation in Denmark goes together with a more positive attitude towards poverty relief. This is what we find in the “acculturation-model”. We find a strong effect of having Danish language skills.

Those fluent in Danish are estimated to score 28 points higher on the 0–100 scale than those with “very bad” language skills. We also find that those who hold Danish citizenship are more in favour of poverty relief (4.2, significant at 0.09). Taking this into account, we find a weak negative effect from the length of stay in the country and no effect from national identification. Thus, apparently language skills, citizenship, and not living in ethnic homogeneous couples are what make migrants assimilate to the natives’ relatively high support for poverty relief. When these differences are taken into account, the differences between the migrant groups disappear, which is an indication of assimilation mechanisms at play. In the full model, we also include the free-riding measure and the measure of institutional trust used above. The

latter turns insignificant, whereas the former is still highly significant. Taking these perceptions into account, the differences between the migrant groups increase a little again, which leaves us with a difference between the migrants from Turkey and ex-Yugoslavia, which just turns significant.

PERSISTENT DIFFERENCES AND MECHANISMS OF ASSIMILATION

This chapter has shown how living in a social-democratic welfare regime among natives goes together with a (relative) reluctance to (more) general redistribution and a positive moral assessment of “the poor” or those worst off in society. This somewhat paradoxical pattern is in line with previous research. The chapter has also shown that the migrants we have interviewed do not fully assimilate to the attitudes of the natives. In terms of attitudes to general redistribution, the Mifare-data showed that migrants living in Denmark hold fairly similar attitudes as those living in the country of origin. This absence of assimilation was formally tested by including the attitudes in the country of origin in regression models. In line with previous research, we found that attitudes to general redistribution in the country of origin are positively correlated with attitudes to general redistribution in the destination country. We also found that these differences were not simply caused by migrants being in different socio-economic positions in the destination country. In contrast, some of the differences in attitudes to general redistribution could be explained by differences in attitudes to state regulation of the economy and institutional trust; these were variables, which made, at the least, migrants in the Mifare-data more supportive for general redistribution than was the case among natives. Still, the Mifare-data demonstrated persistent differences across the migrant groups, which we take as a sign of an absence of assimilation. Finally, in terms of mechanisms, we found a strong assimilative effect from language skills and attitudes towards general redistribution, while there was no consistent correlation with length of stay in Denmark or national identification.

In terms of attitudes to poverty relief, the Comcon-data shows that migrants living in Denmark are less supportive than are natives. Again, these differences were not simply a reflection of different socio-economic positions of migrants. In fact, taking the weaker socio-economic position of the migrants in the Comcon survey into account, the difference to natives increased. The survey did not include variables about deservingness perceptions. However, we did demonstrate that perceptions of free-riding were strongly correlated to support for poverty relief. Taking differences in perceptions of free-riding into account, the differences between natives and migrants decreased. In terms of support for poverty relief, the Comcon survey also shows differences across the migrant groups. However, in contrast to the attitudes towards general redistri-

bution, most of these differences could be explained by our models. We found that language skills, living in non-ethnic couples, and obtained citizenship go together with higher support for poverty relief. Thus, we find a very different dynamic than what Luttmer and Singhal (2011) found in the American context. Native Danes are largely in favour of poverty relief and the socio-economic position of the groups did little to explain differences. Whether this also holds true for attitudes to giving migrants entitlement to social assistance is further analysed in Chapter 11.