Index

*a priori* method of belief fixation 6
abductive reasoning 91
abstract rules 47
*Accounting for Tastes* (Becker) 155
active experimentation 99
Adler, P. 243
administration, centralized 158–9
agent heterogeneity 2–3
Alchian, A. 243
Allais, M. 66, 160
Allais paradoxes 160
Andrews, P. 26–7, 28, 30
apriorist approach, human action 36–42
Arena, R. 3, 5
Arrow–Debreu general equilibrium model 17, 60–61, 62, 70, 182, 185, 187, 262; see also general equilibrium theory; Walrasian equilibrium
Arrow, K.J. 1, 17, 62
assets, redundant 69–71
asymmetric games 98
asymmetric information, and equilibrium 23
Aumann, R.J. 95, 97, 107–8, 121
Aumann’s canonical model 125–7
Austrian tradition 3, 35–56, 216
authority, method of belief fixation 6
autonomous communities 246
axiological rationality 164–6, 171, 175
Bacharach, M.O.L. 128–9
backward induction 94–5
bank runs 182
Barro, R. 188
basic knowledge (referential knowledge) 122
Bayes conditioning rule 91
Bayes rule 85
Bayesian decision theory, dynamic consistency 141–8
Bayesian rationality 86–7
Bayesian updating rule 139–41
Becker, G. 155, 156, 176
behaviour 36, 156–9
behavioural finance 189
behavioural learning 100
beliefs
  - circumstantial 45
  - co-ordination 256–7
  - collective, see collective beliefs
  - consistency 4–5
  - decision making 122
  - diffusion of 53–4
  - equilibrium 87
  - expectations 183–4
  - expected utility model (EUM) 162–4
  - factual 4–5, 86
  - fixation of 6–7
  - framing 162
  - game theory 1–2, 86–7, 107–9
  - individual, see individual beliefs
  - logic 84–6, 89–92
  - multiple prior 137
  - non-additive 137
  - probabilistic 5, 12, 87, 137–9
  - rationality 4–5
  - revision rules 96
  - role of 1, 4, 181–2
  - social, see social beliefs
  - social class 50–1, 54–5
  - strategic 4–5, 86
  - structural 4–5, 45, 86
Bertrand 188
‘best practice’ dissemination 246, 247
Binmore, K. 95, 117
Birner, J. 46
Böhm-Bawerk, E. von 35
bottom-up logic 186
Boudon, R. 3, 5, 44, 158
Bowles, S. 250, 262
Bowman, D. 73
Index

Brandenburger, A. 108
Brown, J.S. 240

Callon, M. 254
Cambridge, St John’s College 13
canonical model (Aumann’s) 125–7
capabilities, differentiated 28
cascades 228
Cass, D. 67, 68
causal decision theory 92
causal independence 97
causality, principle of 38
cautious monotony axiom 91
centralized administration 158–9
Chandler, A. 243
chaotic attractors 101
Chiappori, P. 189
Chichilnisky, G. 69
choices 31, 111
Christianity, influence of 13–14, 157
Cohen, M.D. 242
Cohendet, P. 3
Coleman, J. 156

collective beliefs
  collective rationality 261
  communities, self-organized 227–8, 232, 234
  communities, within firms 239, 240, 249, 255
  concept of 184–5
  corporate culture 256, 263
  definition of 190
  and individual beliefs 5–6, 35–6
  social rules 6–7, 47–9
  strategic vision of competences 244
  collective intentionality 5
  collective knowledge 6
  collective rationality 261
  collective representations 182, 240
  commercial disorganization 24–5
  common beliefs 190
  common knowledge, of game structure 4, 96
  common man 39–40
  common structure, of individuals 46
  communication, between communities 250, 251–6
  communication networks 241
  communication, quality of 252, 253–6
  communities
    autonomous 246
    co-ordination by 247–51
    co-ordination modes 257, 258–61
    communication between 250, 251–6
    concept of 243
    consumer, in electronic markets 223–36
    corporate culture 240, 256–8, 258–61
    definition of 226
    dynamic 262
    epistemic 246–7
    in firms 239–41, 245–58
    hierarchy in 251
    interaction of 251–8

cognitive economics 83–4, 203–4
cognitive frames 160
cognitive modularity 262
cognitive proximity 254
cognitive psychology 204
cognitive rationality 44, 95, 162–3, 165–6
  vs instrumental rationality 44, 162–3, 183–4, 186, 187–90
cognitive turning point 182, 183–4, 185, 189

Christianity, infl uence of 13–14, 157
Clifford, W.K. 14
cognition
  co-ordination and equilibrium 64–6
  co-ordination and knowledge diffusion advantages 247–9
  corporate culture 256–61
  vs hierarchical system 248, 250
  horizontal 242–3
  interactional analysis 240
  limitations 250–251
  vertical 242–3
  co-ordination games 120, 184, 192
  co-ordination in learning 74–6, 216
  co-ordination mechanisms 226
codifying knowledge 254, 255, 262
cognition
  co-ordination and equilibrium 64–6
  equilibrium 64–6
  importance of 19–20, 35, 38–9
  individual 185, 242
  and knowledge 44, 254
  role of 191
  social 190–200
cognitive economics 83–4, 203–4
cognitive frames 160
cognitive modularity 262
cognitive proximity 254
cognitive psychology 204

Causal decision theory 92
Causal independence 97
Causality, principle of 38
Cautious monotony axiom 91
Centralized administration 158–9
Christianity, influence of 13–14, 157
Circumstantial beliefs 45
Clark, J.B. 16
Clifford, W.K. 14
co-ordination and equilibrium 64–6, 74–6
co-ordination and knowledge diffusion advantages 247–9
  corporate culture 256–61
  vs hierarchical system 248, 250
  horizontal 242–3
  interactional analysis 240
  limitations 250–251
  vertical 242–3
co-ordination games 120, 184, 192
co-ordination in learning 74–6, 216
co-ordination mechanisms 226
codifying knowledge 254, 255, 262
Index

knowledge 239
of practice 246, 247
procedural authority 251
self-organized 223–36, 247
community values 172–4
compensation, effect of 215
competence-based theories of the firm 243–5
competences, developing 247
comprehension 164, 167
conditional reasoning 91–4
conditioning rule 91
confrontation principle 98
conjectures 86
consequential principle 93
consequential reasons for public opinion 167–70, 171, 172–4
consequentialism 150–151, 164, 167
conservation principle 90
conservative framing 121
consistent alignment of beliefs 5
consolidation in learning 216–17
consumer communities, in electronic markets 223–36
consumer theory 17–18
contaminated blood trial, public opinion 172–4
costs
short-run 24
sunk 240, 244, 248, 260
Cournot, A.A. 16, 188
Cowan, R. 246
creativity 22, 53
creators 39–40
Crémer, J. 241
cross-fertilization in problem solving 242
cultural context 195
cultural evolution, theory of 48–9
culture, corporate 239, 240, 256–61, 263
cumulative proportional reinforcement (CPR) model 100, 102
currency markets, social beliefs in 198–200
custom, human 20
cyclical attractors 101
Darwin, C. 14, 19, 20, 24, 25
dictionary, for player partitions 125–7
descriptive beliefs 167
descriptive learning 204
desynchronized economy 181
differentiated capabilities 28
differentiated learning 204
disembeddedness of economics 181
disorganization, commercial 24–5
diversity 250
division of knowledge 239
division of labour 19, 25, 239
doubt, states of 6
Doubias, M. 191
Dubois, D. F. 46

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Index

Duguid, P. 240
Durie, J. 102
Durkheim, É. 40, 159, 191
dynamic choice, and information 142–4
dynamic communities 262
dynamic competition model 62
dynamic consistency 141, 141–8
dynamic decision problems 139
dynamic equilibria
eductive game theory 89–98
 evolutionist game theory 101–3

Economic Development, Theory of (Schumpeter) 30
economic man 19
economic problem, the 28
economics
disembeddedness of 181
experimental 203–4
of innovation 216
and mathematics 41
of the mind 3–4
and psychology 18–20, 217
Economics of Industry (Marshall) 24
economies of scale, and increasing returns 22
editing phase, decision making 127–30
eductive game theory
dynamic equilibria 89–98
 equilibria 103–4
 vs evolutionist game theory 101
 static equilibria 84–9
eductive learning 75–6
eductive processes 2
egoism 164, 167, 176
elasticity, in organizations 22
electronic markets, consumer communities in 223–36
Ellison, G. 102
Ellsberg paradox 137–9, 147, 148, 151–3
emerging relations, knowledge creation 255
empathic preferences 117
environment, influence on learning 215
epistemic communities 246–7
epistemic independence 97
epistemic learning 100
equilibrium
 belief equilibrium 84
 and co-ordination 64–6, 74–6
cognition 64–6
dynamic 89–98, 101–3
eductive game theory 89–98, 103–4
evolutionist game theory 98–103
game theory 1, 83
knowledge 23–5, 64–6
learning 74–6
multiplicity 63–7, 89, 184, 189, 253
partial 16–18, 30
probabilities 23
rational expectations 60–63
static 84–9, 101–3
stochastic 71–2
subgame perfect 94
sunspots 71–4
see also Arrow–Debreu general equilibrium model; general equilibrium theory; Walrasian equilibrium
equilibrium of prices, plans and price expectations (EPPPE) 62–7, 72
Euclid 13, 14
Euclideanity 85
evaluation phase, decision making 127–30
evaluation principle 99
evaluative statements 165
evidential decision theory 92
evolutionary economics 216
evolutionary learning 74–5, 257
evolutionary processes 2
evolutionary psychology 14–15, 19, 20, 21
evolutionary vision of competences 244–5
evolutionist game theory 98–104, 117
exchange, sequential organization of 62–3
expectations
cognitive turning point 183–4
and EPPPE model 63–7
rational 183–4, 185–90
expected utility model (EUM) and beliefs 162–4
vs general rational model (GRM) 164, 166–74
influence, reasons for 156–9
rationality 155, 159–60, 163, 167
shortcomings of 159–60
weakness; sources of 162–4
Index

expected utility theory 3, 128, 139, 141, 147, 150

experience goods 227
experience, learning from 203
experimental economics 203–4
experimentation, and knowledge growth 21
experiments in learning 205–17
exploitation behaviour 99, 100, 101
exploration behaviour 99, 100, 101

factual beliefs 4–5, 86
fairness games 121, 128–30
false consciousness 175
Faust, J. 73
feedback, positive 226, 255
Festré, A. 3
fictitious play (FP) model 100
firm
analysis of 218
communities in 239–41, 245–58
corporate culture 256–61
definition of 29
hierarchy co-ordination mode 257, 258–61
market co-ordination mode 257, 258–61
theories of the 241–5
fixation of beliefs 6–7
Fleetwood, S. 43
focal principle 193
focusing message 90
forward markets 61
Foss, N. 257, 259

Foundation of Statistics (Savage) 123
framing
of beliefs 162
cognitive 160
of games 110, 114, 121–31
of problems 204
Fransman, M. 243
Frey’s paradox 176
functional groups, in the firm 245–6

Fundamental Theorem of Welfare 262

game theory
and beliefs 1–2, 86–7, 107–9
eductive learning 84–98
and equilibrium 1, 83
evolutionist 98, 104, 117
rules 4, 109
game tree 93, 98
games
definition of 109
framing 110, 114, 121–31
issues 109
players’ knowledge 109–21
plays 110–112, 116
rules 4, 109
structures 109, 118–21
Garrouste, P. 45
Geanakoplos, J. 128

general equilibrium theory
eductive learning 75–6
and game theory 1
heterogeneity, agent 2–3
individual beliefs 4
Marshall’s view 16–18
see also Arrow–Debreu general equilibrium model; Walrasian equilibrium
general explicit knowledge 43
general rational model (GRM) 164–6
vs expected utility model (EUM) 166–74
paradoxes explained 174–6

General Theory of Employment, Interest and Money (Keynes) 183
Gilbert, M. 5
Gilboa, I. 128, 139, 144, 149, 151
Gintis, H. 250, 262
global interactions 98
Gottardi, P. 69
governance, corporate 257–61
Grandmont, J.M. 67
Greenberg, J. 115, 121
Groenewegen, P. 13
group beliefs
autonomy of 196–200
concept of 184–5
text 194–6
definition of 190–192
Schelling salience 192–4
self-organized communities 228, 234

Growth of the Firm, Theory of the (Penrose) 29
Guesnerie, R. 2, 3, 4, 5, 62, 75

habits 51–2, 53
Hahn, F. 1, 5, 62
Hamel, G. 243, 244
Index

Hammond, P. 139, 141, 150
Hardin, R. 159
Hargreaves Heap, S. 5, 6
Hayek, F.A. von
  Austrian tradition 35–6, 51, 53, 55
  knowledge 27, 39, 42–9, 56, 262
  logical circularity 2
Hens, T. 72
herd behaviour 224, 232
heterogeneity, agent 2–3
Hicks, J.R. 14, 17, 26
hierarchical groupings, in the firm 245–6, 248, 250
hierarchy co-ordination mode 257, 258–61
Hildebrand, W. 76
historical context 188, 195
  History of Astronomy (Smith) 19
holism 40
Hollis, M. 156
horizontal co-ordination 242–3
human action 20, 36–8
  Human Action: A Treatise of Economics (von Mises) 36
Hume, D. 14
Hume’s theorem 166
hypothesis transformation function 92
imagination, and knowledge 28, 30, 32
imitative behaviour 3, 53–4, 224, 225
imprecision, reduction of 149
incentives 248–9, 251
inclusion axiom 90
increasing return, law of 26
  Increasing Returns and Economic Progress (Young) 25
increasing returns, law of 21
individual beliefs
  Austrian tradition 35–6
  collective beliefs 5–6, 35–6
  diffusion of 39–42
  general equilibrium theory 4
  human action 37–8
  inter-individual co-ordination 38–9
  and knowledge 44–5
  self-organized communities 227–8, 234
  vs social beliefs 196–200
  social rules 6–7, 45–7, 48
individual cognition 185, 242
individual intentionality 5
individual rationality 234, 261
individual representations 182, 188–9
individualism 164, 167, 257
Industrial districts 22–3
Industrial organization 28–9
industry, specialization in 26
ineffectivity theorem 68
infinite horizon models 66–7
influence, in social interaction 224
information
  collective choice 201
  content 148–50
  dynamic choice 142–4
  negative value 151–3
  Information and Communication Technology (ICT), consumer communities 223–36
information-dependant games 128
information goods 227
information principle 98–9
informational cascades 224–6
informational investment 99
informational mimesis 224–6
infra-classicality axiom 91
Inglehart, R. 167–8
initiative 22
innovation 53, 216, 240, 243, 245, 261
innovative behaviour 3
institutions 48
instrumental rationality
  vs axiological rationality 164–5, 166, 171
  backward induction paradox 95
  vs cognitive rationality 44, 162–3, 183–4, 186, 187–90
  and preferences 4, 6
insurance game 158
insurance, spot multiplicity 69
inter-individual co-ordination 38–9
interactions, between communities 240, 252–3, 261
intercommunity mimesis 253
internal organization, of the firm 27
intertemporal calculation 41
intertemporal equilibrium multiplicity 66–7
introspection 38, 84
issues, of games 109
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Index</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Jaffray, J.Y. 62</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jeffrey, R.C. 123</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>justice 188</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kahneman, D. 156</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kajii, A. 69, 71</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kandori, M. 102</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kantian philosophy 37</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kehoe, T.J. 66</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Keynes, J.M.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>diversity of beliefs 3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>probabilistic beliefs 137</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>rational calculation 183, 184, 189</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>typology of beliefs 5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>uncertainty 30</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>unemployment 24, 188</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Keynesian equilibrium 76</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Khaneman, D. 127</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kirman, A. 224, 261</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Knight, F. 27, 137</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>know-how 243, 247</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>knowledge</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>assumptions about 108–9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>co-ordination in diffusion 240, 242–3, 247–51, 256–61</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>codifying 254, 255, 262</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>cognition 44, 254</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>collective 6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>common 4, 96</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>communities 239</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>communities of practice 246, 247</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>definition of 43, 107</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>division of 239</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>emerging relations 255</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>epistemic communities 246–7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>and equilibrium 23–5, 64–6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>firm, theories of the 241–5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>forms of 43</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>games 109–21</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hayek’s conception of 43–4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>and individual beliefs 44–5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>leadership 259</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Marshall’s method 15–18</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Marshall’s problem of 13–15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>and organization 21–3, 25–6, 29–30, 250</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>and routines 253</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>social 44, 48–9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>stabilized relations 255</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>knowledge-based economies 3, 239–41, 254</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kreps, D. 194, 252</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kuhn, T.S. 11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kuran, T. 159, 163</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Laffont, J.J. 72</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Laidler, D. 188</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lamarckian mechanism 100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Langlois, R. 262</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>language, community communication 248, 253, 254</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Latour, B. 254</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>leadership 53–4, 259</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>learning</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>from action 249, 263</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>co-ordination 74–6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>context, influence of 215</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>continuous 257</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>definition of 204, 242</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>differentiated 204</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>environment, influence of 215</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>equilibrium 74–6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>path-dependent 204</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>process, experiment in 205–17</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>role of 203–4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>studies of 78</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>types of 148–50</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>see also knowledge</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Levine, D.K. 66</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lewis, D. 85, 91</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Loasby, B.J. 3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>local explicit knowledge 43</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>local interactions 98</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>logic, and beliefs 84–6, 89–92</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>logical circularity 2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>logical omniscience 84–5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MacClennen, E. 151</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>McGregor, D. 27</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Machina, M. 151</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>macroeconomics 187, 225</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Malmgren, H.B. 259</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>management by communities 258–61</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>management by design 258–61</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>management vision, and competences 244</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mansel, H. 13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>March, J.G. 243, 244</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Marengo, L. 242</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Index

marginal utility theory 17
market co-ordination mode 257, 258–61
markets
electronic 223–36
forward 61
as a process 40
Marshall, A.
equilibrium 23–5
knowledge, growth of 18–20
knowledge, problem of 3, 13–15
method of economic analysis 15–18
organization 21–3
post-Marshallians 25–31
Marxian analysis of investment 50
Mas-Colell, A. 69, 70
material rationality 94, 97
mathematics, and economics 41
mean field analysis 227
meetings 253
Mehta, J. 192
Menger, C. 35, 40
mental map 44
Merton, R. 189
metacode 255
methodological individualism 50
methodology of investigation 218
Mill, J.S. 14, 18
Mills, C.W. 161, 174
mimetic dynamics 234
Mintzberg, H. 252
Mises, L.E. von 35–42, 51, 53, 55, 56
Mithra cult 157
money, function of 41–2
mono-population games 98
monotony axiom 90
Moral Sentiments, Theory of (Smith) 170
Morgenstern, O. 2, 110
motives
economic 251
individual 4, 50–51
leaders 53
unconscious 51–2
moves, sequences of 111
multi-population games 98
multiple prior beliefs 137
multiple prior model 139, 149, 151–3
multiplicity
equilibria 63–7, 89, 184, 189, 253
expectations 188
spot markets 67–71
Muth, J.F. 62, 183
Nash equilibrium
dynamic equilibria 94
players’ knowledge 118–21
players’ rationality 115–18
static equilibria 88–9, 102
Nashian regulator 83
Natural State 39
negative introspection 84
Nelson, R.R. 243, 244
neo-Darwinian belief 25
Neumann, J. von 110
new institutional economics 216
Newcomb’s problem 92, 112
Ngo-Maï, S. 3, 4, 5
Nöildeke, G. 103
non-additive beliefs 137
non-Bayesian models 139, 150
non-consequential reasons for public opinion 170–174
non-contextual reasons for public opinion 172–4
non-cooperative games 109–10
non-empty communities, distribution of 227–33, 234–6
non-Euclidean geometry 14, 16
non-expected utility models 144
non-hierarchical communication 241
non-imitative agents 225
non-instrumental rationality 164–5
non-monotonic reasoning 91
Nonaka, I. 243, 259
normative beliefs 163–4, 167
normative mimesis 261
normative rules 48
normative statements 166
Novarese, M. 3, 6
Oberschall, A. 159
objectives, diversity of 242
opportunity cost 32
Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) 255
organization and disorganization 24–5
industrial 28–9
Index

internal 27
and knowledge 21–3, 25–6, 29–30, 250
organizational structures 251
Orléan, A. 3, 4, 5, 224, 253
overreaction paradox 161
Oxford Economists’ Research Group 26–7
Oxford University 28
Paoli, M. 244
Pareto optimal equilibrium 47, 68, 71
parlour games 110–112, 114
partial equilibrium 16–18, 30
passive experimentation 99
path-dependent learning 204
Patry, M. 252
Pearce, D. 128
peer-reviewed publication 246
Peirce, C.S. 6
Penrose, E. 29–30, 243
perfect competition, equilibrium 17
perfect equilibrium 94–8
Philosophical Investigations
(Wittgenstein) 7
players, framing of games 121–31
players’ knowledge 109–21
plays, and games 110–112, 116
polarization, of communities 234
Porath, B. 96
positive beliefs 162–4
positive feedback 226
positive introspection 84
positivism 157
possibilistic decision model 146–8
possibility measures 146–7
post-Marshallians 25–31
power laws 225–6, 230, 232, 234
Prahalad, C.K. 243, 244
praxeology 37
preference system 4, 6, 17
preferences
diversity 242
empathic 117
endogenously generated 155
instrumental rationality 4, 6
separability of 150
strong dynamic consistency 142–5, 150
weak dynamic consistency 145–50
preferential attachment hypothesis 226
preservation axiom 90
preservation property 92, 94
prices
expectations 59
informational efficiency of 186–7
short-run 24
temporary equilibrium 24
tool of action 41
principal–agent theory 28
Principe, A. 244
Principles of Economics (Marshall) 16–17, 21, 24
privileged activities (core-competences) 244
privileged learning platforms 253
probabilistic beliefs 5, 12, 87, 137–9
probabilities
belief 5, 12, 87, 137–9
equilibrium 23
semantics 85
probability distribution, common prior 88
problem-solving (Aumann) 107, 109–15
problem solving 204, 242
project teams, in the firm 245–6, 253
promoters 39–40
prospect theory 127
psycho-neurobiological processes 204
psychological games 6, 121, 128–30
psychology
cognitive 204
and economics 18–20, 217
evolutionary 14–15, 19, 20, 21
individual beliefs 189
Marshall’s interest in 14
public opinion 167–74
punctual opinion 101
purchasing power 41–2
pure coordination games 120, 192
pure economics 181
purposeful behaviour 36
qualitative information 146–7
Quarterly Journal of Economics (1937) 183
Quéré, M. 25
Rabin, M. 128
radical framing 123–22
radical subjectivism 36, 37
Radner, R. 3, 60, 62, 70
Radnitz, G. 162–3
Raffaelli, T. 14, 16, 18
random network theory 225–6
rational action theory, see rational choice model (RCM)
rational beliefs 5
rational bubbles 182
rational choice model (RCM) 12, 22, 156, 160
rational expectations 60–3, 183–4, 185–90
rational expectations hypothesis 62
rational optimizer 19
rationalisable equilibrium 87–8
rationality
axiological 164–5, 171, 175
and beliefs 4–5
cognitive 44, 95, 162–3, 165–6, 183–4, 186, 187–90
collective 261
and conditional reasoning 93–4
expected utility model (EUM) 155, 159–60, 163, 167
general rational model (GRM) 164, 176
hypothesis of 200–201
individual 234, 261
individual representations 189
instrumental 4, 6, 44, 95, 162–5, 166, 171, 183–4, 186, 187–90
material 94, 97
perfect equilibrium 94–8
rules 115–18
situated 185, 192, 257
solution concepts 115–18
substantive 94, 97
weak 139
Raybaut, A. 3, 4, 5
reduction of imprecision 149
redundant assets 69–71
referential knowledge (basic knowledge) 122, 257
reflexivity axiom 85, 91
regularities, behavioural, experiment in 205–17
relational proximity 254
religious belief 13–14, 157
replicator model 101
representations
co-ordination of 250–7
collective 182, 240
corporate culture 256
economic systems 11–12
individual 182, 188–9
of problems 204
Rescher, N. 164
resolution, of game players 96
resource allocation, and uncertainty 27–8
revising message 89
Richardson, G.B. 27–9, 30, 243
Rizzello, S. 3, 6
Roman soldiers 157
Root, H.L. 158
Rousseau’s political theory 158
routines
coordination by communities 248, 253
creativity 22
firm, theories of the 243, 244–5
knowledge 253
learning, experiment in 205–17
unconscious motives 51–2
rules
behavioural, experiment in 205–17
collective 253
communities 246–7
consolidation of 216
corporate culture 256
game theory 4, 109
general 47
players’ knowledge 118–21
preferences, separation from 6
rationality 115–18
shared 7
social 6–7, 45–9, 249
Ruse, M. 156
St John’s College, Cambridge 13
sampling 148
Samuelson, L. 101, 103
Samuelson, P.A. 26, 66
satisfaction principle 98
satisfaction property 92, 94
Savage, L.J. 107, 121, 122–5, 137, 139, 141–2
Savage’s framework 122–5, 132
Scarf agency 64–5, 67–71, 74
Schelling salience 192–6
Schelling, T.C. 120, 184, 192, 250, 260
Schmeidler, D. 128, 139, 144, 149, 151
Schmidt, C. 4, 6
Schumpeter, J.A. 16, 24, 30, 35–6, 40, 50–55
scientific communities 239
scientific method of belief fixation 6
selection function 97–8
self-fulfilling prophecies 182, 200
self-interest, and social order 46
self-organized communities
Communities of Practice 247
Definition of 226–7
Electronic Markets 223–4
Group beliefs 228, 234
Individual beliefs 227–8, 234
Non-empty Communities 227–33, 234–6
Research 224–6
Self-referential mimesis 224
Semantics 84–6, 90–92, 94, 121
*Sensory Order, The* (Hayek) 44
Sequential Hypothetical Beliefs 97
Sequential Model (Market Organization) 61–2
Sequential Organization of Exchange 62–3
Shackle, G. 30–31, 137, 146
Shared Beliefs 190
Shared Rules 7
Shell, K. 67, 68
Shiller, R. 195–6
Short-run Cost 24
Short-run Prices 24
Signalling Equilibria 182
Simon, H. 155, 218, 243, 244, 253
Situated Rationality 185, 192, 257
Smith, Adam 12, 19, 25, 170–172, 262
Social Beliefs
Autonomy of 196–200
Concept of 184–5
Context 194–6
Definition of 190–192
Vs Individual Beliefs 196–200
Schelling salience 192–4
Self-organized Communities 228, 234
Social Capital 262
Social Class 50–51, 54–5
‘Social Classes in an Ethically Homogenous Environment’ (Schumpeter) 50
Social Cognition 190–200
Social Contract 117
*Social Contract* (Rousseau) 158
Social Games 112–15
Social Knowledge 44, 48–9
Social Order, and Self-interest 46
Social Rules
Co-ordination by Communities 249
Collective Beliefs 6–7, 47–9
Individual Beliefs 6–7, 45–7, 48
*Social Situations, Theory of* (Greenberg) 121
Social State 39–42
Social Values 246
Socialization 156–7
Solal, P. 102
Solution Concepts, Rationality 115–18
Sophisticated Behaviour 151
Specialization, in Industry 26
Spencer, H. 20
Spot Markets
Arrow–Debreu General Equilibrium Model 61
Insurance 69
Multiplicity 59, 67–71
Price Multiplicity 63–7
Sunspots 72–4
Stabilized Relations, Knowledge Creation 255–6
Stachetti, E. 128
Stalk, G. 244
Stalnaker, R.C. 97
States of Doubt 6
Static Competition Model 62
Static Decision Problems 138–9
Static Equilibria
Eductive Game Theory 84–9
Evolutionist Game Theory 101–3
Stereotypical Preference 193
Stochastic Equilibrium 71–2
Stochastic Fictitious Play 100, 102
Strategic Beliefs 4–5, 86
Strategic Vision of Competences 244
Strong Dynamic Consistency of Preference 142–5, 150
Strotz, R. 151
Structural Beliefs 4–5, 45, 86
Structure, of Games 109, 118–21
Subgame Perfect Equilibrium 94
subjective opinion 175
subjectivism 36, 37
substantive rationality 94, 97
substitution, principle of 20
success axiom 90
Sugeno integral 147
sunk costs 240, 244, 248, 260
sunspots 67, 71–4, 182
sure-thing principle 137, 139, 144–6
symmetric games 98
syntactic 84–6, 90–92
tacit (unconscious) knowledge 43, 47
Takeuchi, H. 243, 259
Tallon, J.-M. 3, 4
tâtonnement process 1
team thinking 5
Teece, D.J. 243
teleology, principle of 38
temporary equilibrium 24
tenacity, method of belief fixation 6
Tocqueville, A. de 158
traditions 48
transaction-cost theory 28, 241–3
transactional theory 241–3
transitivity 85
translation, in communication 254, 257
*Treatise on Probability* (Keynes) 5
trembling hand, of game players 96
Trieb (urges) 53
trust 249, 253
truth 188
Tuomela, R. 5
Tversky, A. 127, 156
ultimatum games 129, 160, 175–6
uncertainty
decision making 122–5
knowledge 29, 255
Marshall, Alfred 16
resource allocation 27–8
unconscious (tacit) knowledge 43, 47
uniqueness property 94
updating message 89–90
utilitarian criterion 171
utility maximization principle 92
Vanberg, V. 46, 47
variable universe games 121, 128–9
Varoufakis, Y. 5, 6
Vergnaud, J.-C. 3, 4
veridicity 84
vertical co-ordination 242–3
vicarious learning 203, 216
Vienna School 36
virtual communities 223–36, 239, 251, 262
vision, in the firm 244, 256–8
voting, paradox of 159, 175
Walliser, B. 2, 4–5, 45
Walras, M.E.L. 17
Walrasian auctioneer 64–5, 83
Walrasian equilibrium 16, 24, 60, 76, 83; see also Arrow–Debreu
general equilibrium model; general equilibrium theory
wants, and knowledge growth 18–19
weak dynamic consistency of preference 145–50
weak rationality 139
weak sure-thing principle 146, 147, 149
*Wealth of Nations* (Smith) 170
Weber, M. 157, 159, 164, 166, 171
Weil, P. 189
*White Collar: The American Middle Classes* (Mills) 161
Wieser, F. von 35, 40, 50, 53, 54
Williamson, O. 242
Wilson, J.Q. 156
Winter, S. 243, 244
Wittgenstein, L. 6, 7
Wittgenstein’s paradox 112
Wright Mills paradox 174
‘Ye machine’ (Marshall) 14–15, 19, 20, 21
Young, A. 25–6, 29
Young, H.P. 102
Zadeh, L. 146
Zhang, J. 101