

# Subject index

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- ability to pay (fines) 136, 137, 230, 273
- abuse of dominant position 2, 4, 77
- administrative offences
  - classification 260
  - legal consequences 257–8
  - procedure 258–9
  - Germany 257–62
- administrative sanctions
  - fines 2
  - The Netherlands 313–14
- Amino Acids case, fining 234
- Amnesty Plus policy
  - Corporate Leniency Program, US 4, 88, 139, 140
  - and ‘leniency plus’ 165
- Amsterdam Competition Day 314
- anti-cartel criminal program, US 50
- Antitrust Division, US *see* Department of Justice, US (Antitrust Division)
- antitrust enforcement *see* enforcement
- antitrust injury plaintiffs, limitations on ability to recover 279–80
- Articles 81 and 82 EC
  - and modernization of competition law 5
  - violations of 14
    - Commission, limitations on competence 15
    - EU institutions 66
    - EU Member States 13, 70–74
    - and imprisonment 85, 90
    - Malta 71
    - and national competition laws 71–4
    - Regulation 1/2003 66, 67, 69–74
      - see also* Regulation 1/2003
      - standard of proof 69
- ASCAP cartel 220
- Assistant Attorney Generals 120
- Austria
  - Articles 81 and 82 EC, criminal enforcement for violation 71
  - bid-rigging 297–8
  - decriminalization of antitrust enforcement 74–5, 295
  - Lombard club case 298–300
  - national competition authorities 300
  - (re)criminalization of antitrust law enforcement and criminalization 301
  - normative background 301–3
  - outlook 303
  - paper tiger 296–7
  - reform of year 2002 297
- Bagatellunrecht 260
- Belgium, leniency programmes 164
- beyond reasonable doubt
  - cartel offence 250, 255–6
  - proof 62, 69
- bid rigging
  - Austria 297–8
  - as fraud 262–3, 297, 298
  - Criminal Code, Germany 262–6
    - cases 266
    - material features 263–4
    - practical issues 264–6
    - procedural features 264
    - reasons for introduction 263, 266
  - United States 3, 222
- BMI cartel 220
- bounty, posting of 293
- Bundeskartellamt 266
- burden of proof
  - cartels, US policy 45–6, 49
  - see also* standards of proof
- Carbonless Paper, base fine 225
- Cartel Directorate 14–15
- Cartel Investigations Branch, 254
- cartels
  - anti-cartel criminal program, US 50
  - burden of proof 45–6, 49
  - civil regime, UK 253–4

- colluding firms, internal organization 141–3
- coordination 44–5
- criminal enforcement norm 49–53, 54
- criminal nature 178–9
- criminalization of
  - antitrust law, cost 134–5
  - price-fixing 133–4
- cross-border 13
- destabilization, consequences for 206–7
- detection 43, 46–7
- duration, average 79
- enforcement of law
  - class action 293
  - goals 291
  - incentives 291–2
  - institutional remedies 292–4
  - public enforcement 294
  - punitive damages 293
- EU anti-cartel enforcement, characteristics 202–4
- fines 89
  - as inadequate deterrent 2, 180–81
- hard-core *see* hard-core cartels
- international 241–5
  - cooperation 242
  - jurisdiction and restraint 242–3
  - research agenda 243–5
- Ireland 271–2
- liability, substantive rule of 45, 49
- nature 11, 184, 290–91
- Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development
  - Cartel Recommendation 1998 111, 182
  - Reports 112–13
- prosecutions 43, 47–8
- sanctions 48–9, 110–32
  - benefits 115–21, 143–4
  - costs 121–5, 143–4
- secret nature of 184
- self-discipline 145, 146
- United Kingdom *see* United Kingdom, cartels in
- US remedy against 45–9, 239–47
  - case law 45
  - cooperation with foreign governments 47
  - criminal antitrust law 240–41
  - electrical equipment cases 50–51
  - modern history 48
  - prosecution 47–8
  - sanctions 48–9
- Christie's/Sotheby's case 191, 249
- class actions
  - cartel law enforcement 293
  - detection 140
  - opt-out 5
- coercion test, leniency 164
- collusion
  - cartel policy 42–3
  - effect on consumer and producer surplus 220
  - internal organization of firms 141–3
  - and modernization 5
  - and price-fixing 183
  - prosecutions, US 51
  - social cost 133, 134
  - welfare effects 221
- Commission *see* European Commission
- compensation, objective of 270, 276–80
- competence
  - limitations on, violations of Articles 81 and 82 EC 15
  - national competition authorities 202, 203
  - for prosecutions, Germany 258–9, 264
- competition authorities
  - condemnation of harmless behaviour 219
  - enforcement instruments available 3
  - Ireland 189
  - multiple involvement, and leniency programmes 167
  - see also* national competition authorities
- Competition Disqualification Orders *see* disqualification orders
- competition law
  - decentralization of enforcement (Regulation 1/2003) 14
  - modernization 13
  - nature, and criminalization of enforcement 10
- Competition Law Annual, EUI, Florence 6, 30–35, 78

- competition policy, and cartels 41–59
  - coordination of cartels 44–5
  - ‘equilibrating tendencies’ 42
  - framework applied 42–4
  - law, decision to obey 42–5
  - liability, substantive rule of 45, 49
  - sanctions 41
    - US 48–9, 51
  - sources of insight 41
  - US strategy 45–9
    - burden of proof 45–6, 49
    - criminal program, building 50
    - detection 46–7
    - development of criminal enforcement 50–53
- concerted action, burden of proof 45–6, 49
- consumer surpluses 220, 271
- contingency fees 5
- cooperation agreements 242
- Corporate Leniency Policy, US 4, 66, 88, 139, 140
- cost-benefit analysis
  - cartel sanctions *see* costs of criminal sanctions (cartels)
  - criminalization of competition law 7–12
  - leniency applications 203
  - management 10
  - social costs 133, 134, 135
- costs of criminal sanctions (cartels)
  - direct 121–3
  - indirect 123–5
  - Member-State-first scenario 126
- Cournot-Nash equilibrium 183
- Court of First Instance 153
  - and Commission cartel decisions 122
  - and human rights 64
- Court of Justice *see* European Court of Justice
- Criminal Code, Germany 257
- criminal intent 62
- criminal law
  - case law, human rights 63–4
  - defence, criminal rights of 62
  - distinguishing characteristics 61–3
  - links 63
  - EC/EU law, no definition of ‘criminal’ 60–61
  - European Convention 63–4
  - imprisonment 61
    - see also* imprisonment
  - investigation, criminal powers of 62
  - moral condemnation 62
  - penalty and harm, less strict
    - relationship between 62
- criminal offences
  - classification 260
  - Germany 257–62
  - legal consequences 257–8
  - procedure 258–9
- Criminal Procedure Code, Germany 258, 259, 264
- criminal sanctions
  - in cartel cases 110–32
  - characteristics of criminal law 61
  - implementation of provisions 204–6
  - implications of introducing 201–2
  - Ireland 185
  - and leniency programmes 20, 162–3
  - see also* sanctions
- criminalization
  - advantages 135
  - alternatives possible, cartels 135–41
- cartels
  - antitrust law, cost 134–5
  - colluding firms, internal organization 141–3
  - cost of antitrust enforcement 134–5
  - price-fixing 133–4
  - and competition law, nature 10
  - costs and benefits 7–12
  - definitions 19, 60–4, 177–8
  - drawbacks 135–6, 143
  - EU level
    - Constitutional Treaty 96–8
    - EC Treaty 94–6
    - legal possibility of criminalization 94–8
  - and leniency 176–95
  - programmes 172
  - Member States *see* Member States
  - national level, EU level distinguished 31–2
  - see also* criminal law
- culpability score, base fines 223
- custodial sanctions *see* imprisonment; leniency
- Cyprus, Articles 81 and 82 EC
  - criminal enforcement for violation 71

- damages
  - exemplary, and prejudgment interest 280
  - private claims 3, 4, 87
  - punitive 293
  - threat of, and oral statements 166
- dawn raids 14, 36
- deadweight-loss triangle, fines 220
- decriminalization
  - Austria 74–5, 295
  - Germany 260
  - Member States 74–6
- defence, criminal rights of 62
- defence bar, United States 274–5
- Denmark, Articles 81 and 82 EC, violations 61, 71
- detection
  - cartels 43, 46–7
  - class action suits 140
  - escaping 9–10
  - and imprisonment 79–80
  - probabilities 2, 229
- deterrence
  - combination of instruments, desirability 17
  - effective, enforcement conditions for 87
  - fines, inadequacy of 2, 81, 272–3
  - general and specific 281, 292
  - imprisonment, benefits of 20, 83–4, 200, 274
  - individual 291, 292
  - Ireland 271–6
  - objective of 270
  - optimal 220, 272
- DG Competition 2, 14, 161
- directors
  - disqualification of 86–7
    - see also* disqualification orders
- dishonesty, ‘Ghosh test’ 250
- disqualification orders
  - civil regime, UK 253–4
  - corporate actors punished through 200
  - deterrent effect 8
    - see also* directors: disqualification of
- distribution channels, and cartels 277, 278
- Department of Justice, US (Antitrust Division)
  - actions brought by 3, 184
  - association meetings, attending 165
    - on criminal sanctions 120, 125
  - electronic surveillance 47
  - leniency programs 4, 47, 52, 66, 177
  - Lysine cartel or Tapes 7, 11, 181, 191
  - National Criminal Enforcement
    - Section 87
  - omnibus question 88
  - recovery by 49
  - sanctions 48, 51
  - wire-tapping 47
- drug companies, price fixing among 255
- dual criminality, and extradition proceedings 252
- EC Treaty
  - Article 83 16, 34
  - Articles 81 and 82 *see* Articles 81 and 82 EC
  - Commission, lack of competence 15
  - criminalization of antitrust enforcement, institution-level 94, 96
  - effects doctrine, US 241
  - electronic surveillance 47
  - employees, corporation liability for illegal acts of 8
  - enforcement
    - anti-cartel, characteristics, EU 202–4
    - assessment of effectiveness/efficiency 2
    - combination of methods, US example 17
    - cost issues 134–5
    - criminalization
      - Member States 76–7
      - see also* criminalization of competition law
    - decriminalization, Member States 74–6, 260
    - desirability 60, 78–90
  - Estonia 21, 307–11
    - Articles 81 and 82 EC, criminal enforcement for violation 71
    - Code of Criminal Procedure 308, 309
    - Competition Board 307–8, 309, 310
    - investigations 309–10
    - and Modernization Regulation 310
    - Penal Code 307, 308

- Estonian Competition Board 307–8, 309, 310
- EU Constitution 96–8
- European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC Treaty) 75, 77, 218, 226
- European Commission
- anti-cartel enforcement 121–2
  - corporate culture of 33
  - Guidelines on fines 2, 68, 224–6
  - investigation powers 68, 69
  - Leniency Notices (1996 and 2002) 33, 34, 161
  - leniency programme 4, 13, 14, 168–9
  - modernization package 5, 13–14 and NCAs 16
  - oral corporate leniency statements 166
  - on sanctioning 2, 197–8
  - see also* European Union
- European Commission of Human Rights 63
- European Competition Network
- establishment 14
  - Notice 167
  - work allocation within, and leniency programmes 169–70
- European Convention of Human Rights 63–4, 177
- European Court of Human Rights 63–4
- European Union
- characteristics and history of anti-cartel enforcement 202–5
  - ‘criminal’, no definition in law of 60–61
  - damages, private claims 3
  - DG Competition 2
  - enforcement
    - at institution level 66–9, 94–8
    - in US 4, 5, 65–6, 77
  - fining Guidelines 2, 68, 218, 224–6
  - harmonization of criminalization *see* harmonization
  - institution level, enforcement at 66–9
    - EC Treaty 94–6
    - legal possibility of 94–8
    - new Constitutional Treaty 96–8
  - leniency, requests for 161–75
  - leniency programmes 188
  - Member State level, enforcement at 69–74
  - Articles 81 and 82 EC *see* Articles 81 and 82 EC
  - national competition laws only 71–4
  - Regulation No. 1/2003 69, 90–92
  - see also* Member States
  - modernization package 5, 13–14
  - see also* European Commission; (Treaty on European Union)
- European University Institute
- Competition Law and Policy Workshop, Florence (2001) 6, 30–35, 78
- evidence
- burden of proof *see* burden of proof
  - criminal and civil investigations
    - contrasted 252–3
  - criminal sanctions, deterrent effects 116
  - gathering of 1
  - leniency programmes 165
  - ‘marker’ systems 165
  - ‘smoking gun’ 10
  - standard of proof *see* standard of proof
- ex ante* assessment and licensing, merger control 1
- extradition, cartel offence, UK 252
- Federal Central Register of Crimes, Germany 258
- Federal Sentencing Guidelines Manual, US 222–4
- Federal Trade Commission, US 3
- establishment 47
  - FTC Act, sanctions 48
  - and imprisonment 90
- fining
- ability to pay 136, 137, 230, 273
  - actual 2
  - administrative 2, 177
  - base 223, 224
  - calculation 138, 181, 225
  - cartels 2, 89, 180–81
  - constraining 230–31
  - corporate 2, 3, 10, 87, 138, 273
  - employees, monitoring of 8
  - exemplary 219
  - Guidelines, EC 2, 68, 224–6
  - high level of, and imprisonment benefits 78–81

- as inadequate deterrent 2
- on individuals 85–6
- infringements, major and minor 225
- and marginal costs 220, 221, 222
- maxima, institutional 230–31
- Netherlands 316–18
- optimal
  - breaches of competition law 219–22, 230–31
  - calculation 138, 181
  - EC fining Guidelines 224–6
  - fixed enforcement costs excluded 226
  - US Sentencing Guidelines 222–4
- personal 5, 8
- public 5
- revenue, annual 217, 218
- United States 3
- vitamin cases 2, 52–3
- Finland
  - Articles 81 and 82 EC, violations of 62
  - leniency programmes 76, 163
- ‘first in the door’ principle, leniency programmes 164
- Framework Directive on environmental offences 15
- France
  - Articles 81 and 82 EC, criminal enforcement for violation 71
  - decriminalization of antitrust enforcement 74
  - leniency programmes 76
- fraud, bid rigging as 262–3, 297, 298
- Germany 20–21
  - abuse of a dominant position, prohibition 77
  - administrative offences
    - classification 260
    - criminal contrasted 257–9
    - infringements as 260–62
  - Articles 81 and 82 EC, criminal enforcement for violation 61, 71
  - bid rigging
    - as fraud 262–3
    - Criminal Code 257, 263–6
  - Constitutional Court 260
  - criminal and administrative offences
    - classification 260
    - differences between 257–9
    - legal consequences 257–8
    - procedure 258–9
  - Criminal Procedure Code 258, 259, 264
  - decriminalization 260
  - Federal Central Register of Crimes 258
  - governing principles, and leniency programmes 259
  - Guidelines for Criminal and Administrative Offence Procedures 264
  - investigations 259
  - leniency programme 76, 162, 163, 259
  - Ordinance against the Abuse of Economic Power 77
  - prosecutions, competence for 258–9, 264
  - ‘get tough’ movement, United States 120
  - Greece, Articles 81 and 82 EC, criminal enforcement for violation 71
  - guarantees, The Netherlands 315–16
  - Guidelines
    - Criminal and Administrative Offence Procedures, Germany 264
    - European Union 2, 68, 224–6
    - harm of infringement, assessing 228
    - Method of Setting Fines 218
    - Sentencing, US 78, 222–4
    - Federal Sentencing Guidelines Manual 222
    - limits on fines 231
    - mark-ups 228
  - habilitation procedure 36
  - Harberger triangle, social cost of collusion 133, 134
  - hard-core cartels
    - activities 143
    - description 176
    - imprisonment and fines 89
    - OECD Reports 79, 112
    - price-fixing, illegal 249
    - as theft 270
    - UK 74, 250
    - US 53
    - violation of prohibition against 33

- harm
  - costly estimation of 227–9
  - and penalty size 62
- harmonization
  - compulsory 202
  - of criminalization 15–16, 92–4
    - legal possibility 94–8
  - of national laws already in existence 16–17
  - spontaneous 202
  - voluntary, leniency programmes 170
- Hoffman La Roche, fine imposed on 217
- horizontal agreements, and imprisonment alternatives 90
- horizontal restraints, rule of reason standard 42–3
- immunity, and leniency programmes 163, 178
- imprisonment
  - alternatives to 85–90
  - arguments for 8, 78–84
  - criminal law 61
  - duration of custodial sentences 282
  - as effective deterrent 20, 83–4, 200, 274
  - at EU level 34
  - and fines, drawbacks 78–81
  - and leniency 196–213
  - moral message 84
  - objections to custodial sentences 275–6
  - of price-fixers 180–83
  - prosecution, separation from custodial sanctions 206
  - types of violations desirable for 84–5
  - and violence 144
- incentive constraint 146
- incentives
  - cartels, enforcement of law 291–2
  - conflicting 198–9
  - revenge 154
- Individual Leniency Policy 66, 88
- individuals
  - criminal enforcement versus civil enforcement 61
  - fines on 81, 85–6
  - roundtable on sanctions against 113
- institutionalized representative, and class action 293
- intention, and criminal law 62
- interest, prejudice, and exemplary damages 280
- international cartels 241–5
  - cooperation 242
  - jurisdiction and restraint 242–3
  - research agenda 243–5
- investigations
  - cartel offence, UK 252–3
  - Commission powers 68, 69
  - criminal powers 62
  - dedicated investigator, need for 87–8
  - Estonia 309–10
  - Germany 259
  - parallel criminal/civil 252–3
  - powers, adequate 88–9
  - terminating tariffs, The Netherlands 314–15
  - ‘white-collar’, UK 254–5
- Ireland 270–89
  - and administrative fines 177
  - Articles 81 and 82 EC, criminal enforcement for violation 71
  - cartels 271
  - compensatory objective 276–80
  - and Competition Act 2002 76, 270, 271
  - Competition Authority 189
  - cost of enforcement issues 134–5
  - criminal sanctions 185
  - criminalization of antitrust enforcement 76
  - custodial sentences 274
    - objections to 275–6
  - deterrence 271–6
  - fines/monetary payments, insufficient deterrence 272–3
  - leniency programme 163
  - plaintiffs, limitations on ability to recover, exemplary damages, and prejudice interest 280
  - see also* United Kingdom
- juries 4, 120, 250
- leniency
  - cartel offence, UK 251
  - coercion test 164
  - conditions for 253
  - and criminalization 176–95
  - and custodial sanctions 196–213

- definitions 177–8
- and imprisonment 196–213
- multiple authority involvement 167–8
- Netherlands, The 316–18
- prevention of applications 166–7
- programmes *see* leniency programmes
- qualification for 203
- requests for 161–75
- ringleader test 164
- US 4
- Leniency Notices (1996 and 2002),
  - European Commission 33, 34, 161
  - and immunity from fines 199
  - instigators, treatment of 163
  - leniency applications, prevention 167
  - and national law 168
  - termination of infringement 164
  - United Kingdom 164
  - voluntary harmonization of leniency programmes 170
- 'leniency plus' 165
- leniency programmes
  - association meetings, attending 165
  - Corporate Leniency Policy, US 4, 66, 88, 139, 140
  - and criminal sanctions 20, 162–3
  - Department of Justice 4, 47, 52, 66, 177
  - description 177–8
  - differences between 162–6
  - ECN, work allocation within 169–70
  - effectiveness 81–3, 135, 146, 188, 189
  - European Commission 4, 13, 14, 168–9
  - European Union 188
  - evidence to be provided 165
  - Finland 76, 163
  - 'first in the door' principle 164
  - France 76
  - Germany 76, 162, 163, 259
  - and immunity 163, 178
  - impact 187–90
    - overstatement 190–91
  - incentive power 139
  - Individual Leniency Policy, US 66, 88
  - instigators/ringleaders, treatment of 163–4
  - Ireland 163
  - Member States 76
  - multiple schemes 196
  - Netherlands, The 76
  - and one-stop-shop principle 167, 171
  - and oral statements 166
  - personal sanctions, combining with 9
  - sanctions, credibility, need for 185–7
  - solutions possible 169–71
  - Sweden 163
  - termination of infringement, timing 164
  - UK 163
  - US 47, 52
    - Corporate Leniency Policy 4, 66, 88, 139, 140
    - vertical restraints 163
    - voluntary harmonization 170
- liability
  - corporate 9, 12
  - illegal acts of employees 8
  - personal 12
  - substantive rule of, cartels 45, 49
- licenses, blanket 219
- liquidation, and ability to pay 273
- Luxembourg, decriminalization of antitrust enforcement 74, 75
- Lysine cartel and Tapes 7, 11, 181, 191
- Mafia 143, 144, 145
- Malta, Articles 81 and 82 EC, criminal enforcement for violation 71
- marginal costs, and fines 220, 221, 222
- market allocation agreements, and fines 222
- market sharing, US 3
- Member States
  - antitrust enforcement 69–74, 90–93
    - Articles 81 and 82 EC, violation 13, 70–74
      - see also* Articles 81 and 82 EC
    - criminalization 76–7, 90–92
    - decriminalization 74–6, 260
    - national competition laws only 71–4
    - sanctions imposition 2, 15
  - criminalization of antitrust enforcement 76–7
  - harmonization 92–4
  - and Regulation No. 1/2003 69, 90–92

- leniency programmes 76
- personal liability of directors 12
- merger control, *ex ante* assessment and licensing 1
- Microsoft, fine levels 2, 217
- modernization, EU 5
  - White Paper (1999) 13–14
- Modernization Regulation, and Estonia 310
- moral condemnation, criminal law 62
- Mutual Legal Assistance Treaties 242
- ‘naming and shaming’ policy 9
- national competition laws, limitation on enforcement 71–4
- national competition authorities
  - Austria 300
  - cartels, pursuit of 196
  - and Commission 16
  - competence 202, 203
  - and oral corporate leniency statements 166
  - Regulation 1/2003, amending 171
  - US style penalties, installing in Europe 5
  - see also* competition authorities, European
- nemotenetur* principle, The Netherlands 316
- Netherlands, The 21, 312–18
  - administrative sanctioning 313–14
  - decriminalization of antitrust enforcement 74
  - finances and leniency 316–18
  - guarantees 315–16
  - history of Dutch competition law enforcement 313
  - leniency programmes 76
  - Netherlands Competition Authority 312, 316, 318
  - toolkit 314–15, 317
- New Zealand
  - gain-based fines 232
  - individuals, penalties faced by 182
  - review of criminal enforcement system 124
  - ‘no action letters’ 173, 253
- Norway
  - criminal sanctions 119
  - gain-based fines 232
- Office of Fair Trading, UK
  - cartel investigations 251, 323
  - Cartel Investigations Branch 254
  - director disqualification 86, 253, 254
  - evidence of cartel activity 165
  - ‘Ghosh test’ for dishonesty 250
  - investigation powers 252, 255
  - ‘no action letters’ 173
  - surveillance powers 76, 252, 255
  - see also* United Kingdom
- Oireachtas, proscribing of cartel behaviour in Ireland 280
- omnibus question, Department of Justice 88
- one-stop-shop principle 167, 171, 208
- opportunity costs, criminal sanctions regimes 121
- optimal pecuniary sanctions 2, 20, 217–38
  - circumstances, aggravating/attenuating 229–30
  - determination 226–32
  - Federal Sentencing Guidelines Manual, US 222–4
  - finances 219–22, 230–31
    - ability to pay 230
    - constraining of 230–31
    - EC guidelines 2, 68, 224–6
  - harm, costly estimation of 227–9
  - proportionality/fairness considerations 231–2
  - theory, optimal fining 219–22, 231, 232
- oral statements, and leniency programmes 166
- Organic Peroxides, fining of 229
- Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development
  - cartel sanctions 111–13, 151
  - Cartel Recommendation 1998 111, 182
  - costs and benefits 114–15
  - individuals, roundtable discussions 113
  - lessons 113–25
  - Reports 79, 112–13, 114
  - Competition Committee 110, 111, 112
  - on legality of activities 183
  - on penalties 189
  - Reports 79, 112–13

- Fighting Hard Core Cartels* Report (2002) 32  
 New Zealand 147  
 Second Cartel Report 110, 112, 113, 114
- participation constraints 146
- penalties  
 corporate 7–8  
 criminal 61  
 excessive 219  
 size of, and harm 62  
 UK cartel offence 250–53  
 in US 51  
 US style, installing in Europe 5  
*see also* fines; sanctions
- Penalty Plus policy, Corporate Leniency Programme, US 4
- personal sanctions  
 argument for 198–9  
 combining with leniency and compliance programmes 9  
 effectiveness 182, 199–201  
 and fines 5  
*see also* imprisonment
- plaintiffs, limitations on ability to recover, ‘antitrust injury’ 279–80
- plasterboards, fine levels 2
- plea bargaining systems 4, 118, 119
- Poland, leniency programme 163
- Posner rectangle, and price-fixing 133
- predatory pricing, and deterrence 272
- predominant prohibition principle, Austria 295
- prejudgment interest, and exemplary damages 280
- price-fixing  
 cost 133–4  
 imprisonment of price fixers, case for 180–83, 274  
 market for 145–6  
 as theft 270  
 UK 255  
 US 3, 222  
*see also* cartels; hard-core cartels
- prices, ‘supra-competitive’ 1
- prisoners’ dilemma game 187
- Privatbeteiligtenanschluss (civil damages, criminal court) 296, 297
- proof *see* burden of proof; standards of proof
- prosecutions  
 agents, prosecutors as 297, 301  
 cartels 43, 47–8  
 UK 251  
 CEOs, individual 9  
 competence for, Germany 258–9  
 effective prosecutor, need for 87–8  
 separation from custodial sanctions 206
- punishments  
 detective work/evidence gathering combined with 1  
 escaping 9–10  
 harsher, within cartel 11  
 potential, threat of 4  
*see also* fines; imprisonment; penalties; sanctions
- Qui Tam provisions 140
- Regulation 1/2003  
 adoption of 14  
 amendment, and leniency 171  
 Articles 81 and 82 EC, violations of 66, 67, 69–74  
*see also* Articles 81 and 82 EC  
 Commission, investigation powers 69  
 and criminal law 60–61  
 ‘criminal’, notion of, and human rights 64  
 and criminalization of antitrust enforcement 76  
 and decriminalization of antitrust enforcement 75  
 Member States, and antitrust enforcement 69–74, 90–93  
 reform of competition policy 176  
 sanctions added to 34  
*see also* Member States
- remedies  
 design 18–19, 41–59  
*ex post* 1  
 institutional 292–4  
*see also* fines; imprisonment; penalties; sanctions
- resources, misallocation (unidentifiable victim) 277
- restraints of trade 4, 11
- revenge incentive 154
- ringleader test, leniency 164

- rule of reason standard, horizontal restraints 42–3
- sanctions  
 administrative 313–14  
 Austria *see* Austria, semi-penal sanctions in  
 benefits of criminal regime 115–21  
   deterrent effects 115–18  
   institutional set-up/procedural rules 118–19  
 cartels 48–9, 110–32  
   benefits of sanctions 115–21, 143–4  
   costs of sanctions 121–5, 143–4  
   OECD work 111–13, 114, 151  
   UK 254–5  
 Commission's policy 2, 197–8  
 costs  
   direct 121–3  
   indirect 123–5  
 credibility, need for 185–7  
 criminal *see* criminal sanctions  
 custodial  
   and leniency 196–213  
   *see also* imprisonment  
*ex post* 1  
 France 74  
 Germany 257–69  
 and leniency programmes 162–3  
 Member States, imposition by 2, 15  
 non-monetary 8–9  
 OECD work, cartels 111–13, 114, 151  
 optimal pecuniary *see* optimal pecuniary sanctions  
 personal  
   argument for 198–9  
   combining with leniency/  
     compliance programmes 9  
   effectiveness 182, 199–201  
 price-fixers 136  
 social and institutional support for 119–21  
 UK 254–5  
 US 3, 48–9, 51, 120  
*see also* penalties  
 Second Report on Effective Action Against Hard Core Cartels 110, 112, 113, 114  
 self-incrimination, privilege against, US Constitution 89  
 Sentencing Commission, US 229  
   Recidivism Research Series 235  
 Sentencing Guidelines, US 78, 222–4  
   Federal Sentencing Guidelines Manual 222  
   limits on fines 231  
   mark-ups 228  
   OFT, Memorandum of Understanding with 255  
 shareholders, as owners of companies 198  
 Slovak Republic, Articles 81 and 82  
   EC, criminal enforcement for violation 71  
 social costs 133, 134, 135  
 standards of proof 5, 10–11  
   Articles 81 and 82, violation 69  
   cartel policy 43  
   criminalization drawbacks 135  
   defence, criminal rights of 62  
   *see also* burden of proof  
   state of mind, criminal 62  
   support, political and public 89  
 surveillance, by OFT 252  
 Sweden  
   on criminal sanctions 124  
   leniency programme 163  
 Taiwan, criminal sanctions provision 119  
 terminating tariffs, investigations into 314–15  
 Tetra judgment, mergers 153  
 turbine generators, prosecutions against producers 50  
 UCAR, fining of 227  
 undertaking  
   fines on persons 'identified' with 197, 198  
   terminology problems 66  
 unilateralism 243  
 United Kingdom  
   Articles 81 and 82 EC, criminal enforcement for violation 71  
   cartels in 20, 248–56  
   changes in law 248–9  
   civil regime 253–4  
   extradition 252

- hard-core 74, 250
- investigations 252–3
- leniency 251
- offence 250–53
- penalty and prosecution 251
- procedural framework 118
- sanctions taken 254–5
- see also* Ireland
- coercion test, leniency 164
- cost of enforcement issues 134–5
- fines 182
- Leniency Notices (1996 and 2002) 164
- leniency programmes 163
- Mutual Assistance Treaty with US 252
- price-fixing 255
- sanctions 254–5
- United States of America
  - anti-cartel enforcement, monopolization of 242
  - bid rigging 3, 222
  - cartels, strategy against 45–9
    - burden of proof 45–6, 49
    - case law 45, 242–3, 244
    - cooperation with foreign governments 47
    - criminal antitrust law 240–41
    - detection 46–7
    - electrical equipment cases 50–51
    - liability, substantive rule of 45, 49
    - modern history 48
    - prosecution 47–8
    - sanctions 3, 48–9, 51, 120
  - cooperation agreements 242
  - Corporate Leniency Policy 4, 66, 88, 139, 140
  - defence bar 274–5
  - Department of Justice *see* (Department of Justice, US) (Antitrust Division)
  - ‘effects doctrine’ 241
  - enforcement
    - combination of policy instruments 17
    - criminal norm, gaining acceptance for 49–53
    - and EU enforcement 4, 5, 65–6, 77
    - incremental development 50–53
    - methods 3
    - Federal Trade Commission 3
    - felonies, description of 3
    - ‘get tough’ movement 120
    - grand jury system 4
    - leniency policy 4
    - leniency programmes 47, 52
    - market-sharing 3
    - Mutual Assistance Treaty with UK 252
    - plea bargaining system 4
    - price-fixing 3, 222
    - prison sentences in 120
    - sanctions 3, 48–9, 51, 120
    - self-incrimination, privilege against 89
    - Sentencing Commission 229
    - Sentencing Guidelines 78, 222–4
      - Federal Sentencing Guidelines Manual 222
    - whistle-blowing programmes 4
  - utility theories 7
  - vertical restraints
    - as imprisonment alternative 90
    - leniency programmes 163
  - Verwaltungsungehorsam (infringements of technical nature), Germany 260
  - victims
    - primary 277
    - secondary 277–9
    - single 291, 292
    - tertiary 279
    - unidentifiable 277
  - vitamin cases 2, 52–3
  - whistle-blowing programmes
    - increased effectiveness 81–3
    - rewards 142
    - United States 4
  - White Paper (1999), modernization of EC competition law 13–14
  - willingness to convict, need for 89
  - wire tapping 47
  - X – inefficiency 134