1. **International terrorism and threats to security: implications for organizations and management**

Ronald J. Burke

Terrorism is the process of inducing fear in a civil population through violent acts that undercut trust and confidence, while creating a sense of personal vulnerability to random acts of evil.

(Zimbardo, 2002, p. 16)

**INTRODUCTION**

The events of 9/11 will likely have effects that will last a long time. International terrorism had existed for years before that date and includes a previous attack on the World Trade Center, the bombing of the USS Cole in Yemen, attacks on the US military base in Saudi Arabia, and attacks on two US embassies in Africa. In addition, there have been successful terrorist attacks in Spain, the UK and Bali, among other countries. The destruction of the World Trade Center (WTC) in New York City (NYC), however, stands out as a critical event. It happened on US soil, was the largest terrorist attack, cost almost 3000 lives and destroyed a symbol of American capitalism and commerce.

This chapter includes the following content: a brief overview of the impact of 9/11 on world events since these terrorist attacks, the effects of terrorist attacks and other disasters on people, the impact of 9/11 on human resource management (HRM) practices and organizations, individual coping and resilience, organizational coping and resilience, anticipating disasters, improving responses to terrorist attacks and disasters, and implications of 9/11 and related events over the past six years for organizations, their employees and their management.

This chapter considers the effects of 9/11 on various parties: those directly or indirectly affected by 9/11 – individuals, families, organizations, and communities, those in first-responder roles, those responsible for helping the various parties get back on their feet – parents, supervisors and
managers, HR professionals, counselors, and those responsible for preparing for the future – managers, risk assessors, and government policy makers. What was uniquely important about 9/11? Several features stand out. There was global collaboration in the attack. The planning of the attack took place over several years. There was support from local people. The attacks emanated from ‘friendly nations’. The attacks made use of advanced technology. The US was unprepared, though warning signs existed. The attacks were against the future (modernity), on a way of life. Finally, the attacks targeted a civilian population.

Since 9/11, there has been a continuation of terrorist attacks – not in the US but in the UK and elsewhere. There was a denial by the US of permission for Dubai to take over the ownership of seaports in the US. There has been increased border security resulting in greater costs and delays. We have seen heightened tensions between the Muslim and non-Muslim worlds through the publication of cartoons depicting the Prophet Muhammad in unflattering ways, raising the issue of Free Speech versus Blasphemy. Mobs in several countries attacked and destroyed the Danish and Norwegian embassies as a consequence. There have been continued violent insurgencies in Iraq and Afghanistan. There has been intensified conflict with Iran over its proposal to develop nuclear technologies, and increasing use of foreign aid as a bargaining chip in foreign policy. In late 2007, Iran captured 15 British sailors for purportedly entering Iranian waters with the intention of trying them on this charge. Escalating costs of the war on terror means taking resources away from pressing social issues in the US and elsewhere (for example, education, culture, the arts, poverty). Finally, the effects of international terrorism and 9/11 are compounded by other natural disasters that have hit the US and other parts of the world (tsunami, Katrina and other hurricanes, earthquakes and so on).

EMERGING ISSUES, CHALLENGES AND CONSEQUENCES

Tensions in the Middle East have driven oil prices up. The price of gasoline in North America rose dramatically in May 2004, hitting levels never before seen in the US. These increased costs have affected transportation costs and these latter increases are being passed on to consumers or borne by the providers of these services, cutting into their profits. The result is a jolt to economies in the developed and developing world. In June 2004, Alan Greenspan, US Federal Reserve Chairman, said that the risk of another large-scale terrorist strike in the US is the single biggest risk to the US economy.
Threats to security have increased levels of surveillance at airports and entry points to the US and many other countries. This has resulted in delays at airports and major border crossing points, slowing down the pace of business and tourist traffic flow. In addition, extra resources are being used in these efforts, increasing the costs of screening; these cost increases are again passed on to travelers and business or borne by various levels of government and eventually passed on to citizens through higher taxes or reductions of other services. Since 9/11, various countries have experienced anthrax-infected mail, letter bombs, bombs in packages and threats of bridge bombings and internet attacks.

Heightened fears have reduced the level of travel to and from various countries, resulting in a drop in air travel and tourism. Americans are traveling less, even to relatively safe destinations such as Canada. American attendance at Canadian stage theaters (Stratford Festival, Shaw Festival) dropped 20 percent in 2002. Terrorist attacks in Madrid, London, Bali, and the finding of explosives along parts of the French railway system have also reduced travel to these places (Ahmed, 2006).

The events of 9/11 have increased intergroup tensions within and across countries (Bar-Tal and Labin, 2001). Muslims and individuals of Arab descent have reported increased hostility from others in non-Muslim countries (Sheridan, 2006). There has been a heightened polarity between the Arab and the non-Arab world. The Muslim world reacted angrily to cartoons depicting the Prophet Muhammad in an unflattering way; to writers and filmmakers showing the Muslim world in a way they thought biased; and to the Pope’s comments in September 2006 in which he cited an ancient quotation indicating that the Muslim religion was associated with aggression. In September 2006, a Berlin-based opera company canceled the showing of an opera that potentially depicted Muslims in a negative way, for fear of violence.

These factors operate to increase instability worldwide. Such instability increases the uncertainty of supply-chain management. The internationalization and globalization of business has resulted in greater interdependence of suppliers and consumers of these goods and services. International tensions and instability have required organizations to reconsider sources of their goods and services and to build in redundancies to guarantee supplies of these goods and services in turbulent times.

The need to proactively identify and capture terrorists and their allies has increased surveillance of citizens within North America and elsewhere by their own governments (Bennett and French, 2003). This has raised concerns about invasion of privacy, the arrest and detention of people on suspicion of supporting terrorism, and the weakening of due process. Flagrant examples of bending the rules supporting civil liberties to counter terrorism are becoming increasingly common.
The events of 9/11 have increased soul-searching by the major economic powers. Why does the Islamic world hate the United States, or the West more generally? What can be done about this? How stable are particular Islamic republics? This is also reflected in a loss of innocence among US citizens who for years had believed that they were respected throughout the rest of the world.

There is a new debate now in some countries about the role of violence and proactive attacks on potential or real terrorists and states thought to support or harbor terrorists. Some people believe that the use of violence to prevent terrorism is never justified; other people argue that there is a need for whatever means necessary, including violence, in order to reduce violence by terrorists in the long term.

This polarity is reflected in heightened beliefs by many in the Arab world of the decadence and greed of the Western world, and views by many in the West that the Arab world is corrupt, undemocratic and hypocritical – indicating that they support the West but also indirectly supporting hostility toward the West and terrorism.

The events of 9/11 took place over six years ago, and security has been improved in target countries. What is not clear is how much more prepared countries now are for such disasters. Canada created the Ministry of Public Safety and Emergency Preparedness in December 2003. Canadians should be worried: its Auditor-General issued a report in early 2004 indicating that Canada’s anti-terrorism initiatives have been hindered by red tape, turf wars and bureaucratic incompetence. Information from surveys of first responders – those first on the scene in the event of a disaster – from 100 municipalities across Canada, indicated a sense that no one was in charge if a disaster struck, a condition similar to findings of the US 9/11 Task Force and analysis of the US government’s response to Hurricane Katrina in September 2005.

The European Union (EU) made a decision in early 2004 to use the Canada–US border security methods following the bombings in Madrid. Police and intelligence services in Canada and the US have improved their information-sharing arrangements following 9/11.

Organizations are increasingly integrating responsibilities for materials sourcing, manufacturing, warehousing, transportation and customer service, termed ‘supply chain management’. Border security issues complicate these linkages. Complex new border security arrangements are affecting supply chain management. Advance information must be provided to the US on all cargo entering or leaving their country by sea, air, truck or rail; similar measures have been implemented in Canada. Visitors to the US from particular countries must now be fingerprinted and photographed at airports and seaports. These measures add increased cost and complexity.
(more paperwork, driver overtime). Delays at the border can impact on just-in-time delivery schedules. Compounding these issues there was also disarray in the use of watch lists to identify terrorist suspects, mismanaged security alerts, delayed implementation of fingerprinting analysis technology, laxness in security screening at airports, and barriers to sharing intelligence between government agencies.

We need a strategic plan for counter-terrorism and security, better integration across government agencies, better analysis of terrorist threats, better use of technology to collect, analyze and share data, and the recruitment of talented men and women to work in intelligence and security functions.

There is the moral and ethical dilemma of whether Western-style democracies should resort to torture, assassination and the use of methods that violate their values and laws against enemies that do not uphold these values and laws in the war against terrorism. Ignatieff (2004) argues for a middle ground: societies may have to temporarily employ measures that run counter to their values and laws; these exceptions, however, must be justified and limited in their use. But can there ever be a ‘just war’?

The war on terrorism is also having effects on target countries. Chief among these is the strengthening of executive power (the president, prime ministers) at the expense of the courts, legislatures and the media. The war on terrorism is fought in secret, making it difficult to observe and be monitored by these groups. Democracy itself may be at stake in some cases. Someone needs to guard the guards.

The terrorist attacks and the war on terror are having an influence on the internal politics of various countries. The bombing of the Madrid railway station affected the Spanish election in 2004. The war in Iraq influenced the 2006 House of Representatives election in the US. The war in Iraq led to reduced support for Prime Minister Tony Blair in the UK. Israeli elections have always been influenced by terrorist attacks.

Al Qaeda has begun to attack the economic infrastructure in Saudi Arabia. Their efforts have targeted the Westerners that Saudi Arabia depends on to keep its economy working and their oil flowing: 8.8 million foreigners live and work among the 17 million Saudis. On May 29, 2004, gunmen killed 22 people in the Saudi city of Khobar inside two oil industry office compounds.

There is an increasing consensus that the six-year war on terror has in fact made the world a far more dangerous place. Osama bin Laden’s survival and the US-led invasion and occupation of Iraq have served as important recruiting factors for the Al Qaeda network. Following 9/11, Al Qaeda has claimed responsibility for attacks in Saudi Arabia, Indonesia, Turkey, the UK and Spain.
The threat of terrorism is obviously real. The state must ensure the safety of the general public. It is important that the state do so while protecting civil rights and liberties. Police and intelligence agencies must be accountable. Intelligence must not be obtained using torture. Targeted communities must be consulted; community outreach must be emphasized. Profiling must be based on information and specific behaviors of individuals.

My country (Canada) is thought by some to be doing a good job with immigration. Some Western European countries have an immigrant population that is failing to assimilate (culture clashes, surge of conservative Islam, citizens resent the welfare entitlements of newcomers). A backlash is building against these immigrants. The difficulty immigrants have in getting jobs is a major cause for concern. It is easier for immigrants to get jobs (poor ones in some cases) in North America than in some European countries. In addition, immigrants to North America tend to be more skilled and have other family members already there. Finally, North Americans, comprising immigrants historically, have little sense of ethnic or national identity.

According to the US State Department, the number of international terrorist attacks peaked at 666 in 1987 and fell to 348 in 2001 and 208 in 2003; the number of significant terrorist attacks in 2003 was 175, a 20-year high. Casualties from international terrorist attacks in 2001 were the highest – 3573 people killed compared with only 652 in 2003 (Gersham, 2004).

An examination of the anthrax attacks and other explosives sent through the post has identified procedures for effectively dealing with potentially dangerous materials, thoughts on how to view this new threat and plans for dealing with it (Babbs and O’Connor, 2003; Day, 2003).

In 2007, police in the UK issued a nationwide alert after linking seven letter bombs delivered over the previous three weeks (National Post, 2007). These attacks were not being treated as terrorism, but the motives were unclear.

International terrorism is on the increase in the Middle East and South Asia but has declined in most other parts of the world. Support for Al Qaeda and Osama bin Laden has dropped in the Western world. Media attention has made terrorism seem to be a larger concern than it should be. But the threat of terrorism is still real. Gathering and sharing information is critical to an effective anti-terrorism effort.

Reports from the 9/11 Commission (Kean and Hamilton, 2004) stressed the importance of understanding the organizational level – the way organizations operate, their structure and processes and their management practices and culture. The responses of employees are largely determined by their organization’s policies, HRM practices and cultural norms. Blaming government or asking government alone to fix it is doomed to fall short.
Canadian banks came under pressure from the US to tighten regulations involving customers holding dual citizenship (immigrant clients), customers who are citizens of Canada or those on a US government blacklist. Some of these customers do not live in Canada while others do (Globe and Mail, 2007).

Can we ever go back to business as usual? Do we even want this? National priorities need to be reconsidered. Spending more money on defense and security means spending less money on health and education. The events of 9/11 have forced countries to change, eliminate denial, work together and build cooperation. Developed countries need to better understand the complaints, fears and challenges faced by developing countries. They need to capture the hearts and minds of their critics.

**IMPACT ON PUBLIC ATTITUDES AND MORALE**

Research studies of disasters in general have shown increases in psychological distress immediately following the disaster, with decreases over time. These disasters included the Oklahoma City bombing (Sprang, 1999, 2000, 2001; Benight et al., 2000), the nuclear accident at Three Mile Island (Collins et al., 1983), responses of Israeli children to scud missile attacks in the Persian Gulf War (Weisenberg et al., 1993), and responses of children to the Northridge California earthquake (Asarada et al., 1999).

Kisoc (2006) examined stress-related symptomatology of people in Turkey one year after two recent earthquakes (1999). Stress symptoms were common and severe among affected people. These were higher in women, those losing family members and other relatives in the earthquake (over 20,000 people died) and those having less education. Some stress symptoms declined 15–18 months after the earthquakes but were still evident.

Researchers have also devoted considerable effort to chronicling the impact of 9/11 on the general public. Fischer (2002) finds that the disaster research model of behavioral response to disaster fit events following 9/11. These include: fear (but not panic) of survivors, altruism from other citizens, shock and psychological dependence, live broadcast coverage by the media, local decision making, a reduction in crime and an overestimate of damage, injury and the death toll.

A survey of 407 psychologists reported that about half of a sample of their clients brought up the terrorist attacks during the selected counseling session (Daw, 2002a). More than 20 percent of clients mentioned specific trauma or anxiety reactions associated with the events of 9/11. In addition, focus groups conducted in October and November following 9/11 found
that the attack caused fear, stress, anxiety and frustration and caused people to look inward and reassess their lives (Daw, 2002b).

Peterson and Seligman (2003) compared online e-survey responses to a questionnaire from individuals completing it before 9/11 and others completing it between September 12 and November 30 and found significant increases in six of 24 character strengths or virtues (love, gratitude, hope, kindness, spirituality and teamwork). These changes reflect what is now more important and suggest that other people rose in importance (see Wrzesniewski, 2002, for a description of how she changed after witnessing the WTC attack).

The American public did not respond with panic but instead with effective and adaptive action. Panic was prevented by providing timely and accurate information and instructions so that the public could make timely decisions. New heroes emerged, ordinary people, volunteers who made sacrifices for the well-being of others.

Six months after 9/11, Americans seemed to be getting back to ‘normal’, that is, the way things were on September 10. In the months following 9/11, the US was a wounded nation, having suffered the largest attack ever on its soil. In response, the US developed a common project and a higher cause. But the US is also a target. The citizens have generally rallied around President George W. Bush and he has performed in ways that have exceeded the modest expectations many people had for him.

But some things have changed. Americans have a higher opinion of how government can help than they had in previous decades. An increasing number of Americans have invested in family, neighbors and community. Many Americans are now more tolerant of bad news. But these increases may only be short-lived.

Liverant et al. (2004) studied anxiety responses and reactions to 9/11 among a sample of indirectly affected college students living in Boston. Anxiety was measured two and four months following 9/11, as were coping methods. About 20 percent of the first sample knew someone killed or injured in the 9/11 attacks. Furthermore,

- 44 percent saw the world as less safe after 9/11;
- 60 percent thought that another attack was likely;
- 83 percent thought that war was likely in the future;
- 68 percent reported being severely affected by 9/11;
- 67 percent felt severe anger about the attacks; and
- 19 percent changed their routine or travel plans as a result of 9/11.

Liverant et al. reported a significant decrease in anxiety over the two-month period. Those with a personal knowledge of a victim reported higher levels
of anxiety. Some coping responses (avoidance coping – denial, mental disengagement, behavioral disengagement) were associated with higher anxiety levels.

Schuster et al. (2001) collected data within five days of 9/11 and reported that 90 percent of Americans indicated one or more distress symptoms to some degree and 44 percent indicated one or more stress symptoms to a considerable degree. A study conducted in the two weeks following 9/11 by Smith et al. (2001) reported that 50 percent of Americans reported feeling very nervous and tense following the tragedy, 46 percent reported feeling dazed and 50 percent reported having trouble sleeping. Galea et al. (2002) examined reactions to 9/11 among people in NYC directly and indirectly affected; 80 percent indicated that they had post-traumatic stress disorder (PTSD), and 10 percent depression five to eight weeks following 9/11. Silver et al. (2002) reported that 17 percent of the US population outside NYC indicated PTSD symptoms two months after 9/11, with 6 percent reporting these symptoms six months after 9/11. Taken together, these studies show that stress reactions to 9/11 were present in a substantial number of people indirectly exposed to the terrorist attack.

Olivas-Lujan et al. (2004) considered the impact of 9/11 on cultural values and levels of cosmopolitanism of US university students. Data were collected before 9/11 (April 11) and in December 2001 and March and April 2002. They report increases in authoritarianism and hierarchy/power distance and decreases in cosmopolitanism. In addition, students placed a lower value on variety, adventure and challenge and a higher value on security and stability in their ideal job following graduation.

Esses et al. (2002) found that attitudes toward immigration in the US and Canada became more negative following 9/11. Threats to a group are often associated with in-group favoritism and out-group bashing. This produced an increasingly shared social identity, higher authoritarianism and increased stereotyping of the out-groups.

Wrzesniewski (2002) reported an increase in people changing jobs or occupations following the WTC disaster in their search for greater meaning in their work. The disaster became a catalyst for an examination of what their work was contributing to the wider world.

Smith et al. (2001) report, based on a random telephone survey of 2126 US residents, that national pride, confidence in institutions, and faith in people and human nature had all increased – support for both the military and government was very high (confidence in). Citizen participation in civic (charitable actions) increased. Positive feelings seemed not to be affected (psychological well-being) by 9/11, but New Yorkers showed more negative emotion. Data were collected between September 13 and 27.
In 2002, Rasinski et al. (2002) re-interviewed the initial respondents. The second-wave data were collected 3–5 months following 9/11. Pride in the country continued to remain high; pride by New Yorkers was lower than the national average. Confidence in institutions dropped to levels approaching pre-9/11. Respondent anger declined, levels of positive emotion remained the same, while levels of negative emotion dropped. Psychological well-being improved.

An overview of the research on the impact of 9/11 on the attitudes and behaviors of the general public (see North and Pfefferbaum, 2002; Schlenger et al., 2002) suggests modest negative effects immediately following the terrorist attacks, with most people moving back to pre-9/11 levels within a few months (Knudsen et al., 2005). Individuals closer to NYC, Washington DC, and Pennsylvania indicated a larger impact than those living farther away. Individuals losing family, friends or property (or who knew someone who had) indicated a larger impact than those having no such loss. Women tended to have stronger emotional reactions to these terrorist attacks (anxiety, depression) than did men.

Impact of 9/11 on Children, Youth and Parents

The media, primarily the television networks, replayed footage of the airplanes flying into the WTC and the collapse of the towers in what seemed to be an almost endless stream of coverage. What effect does watching replays of the 9/11 attacks have on children, youth and parents?

Recent research has begun to address this question. A sample of these studies include: Ahern et al. (2002); Aber et al. (2004); Gil-Rivas et al. (2004); and Gould et al. (2004).

The findings support three conclusions. First, children throughout the US were affected to a large degree (for example, Schuster et al., 2001; Schlenger et al., 2002). Second, children and young people spending more hours watching coverage of the terrorist attacks were more negatively affected (Ahern et al., 2002). Third, these effects appeared to diminish over time (Gould et al., 2004). Parents, and their level of support and parental self-efficacy, played an important role in ameliorating adolescents’ responses to 9/11 (Gil-Rivas et al., 2004).

Stein et al. (2004) report findings from a national longitudinal study of the psychological consequence of 9/11. They re-surveyed 355 people about two months after 9/11. Sixteen percent of adults had persistent distress reporting four or more substantial distress symptoms in both September and November. Adults with persistent distress also reported accomplishing less at work (65 percent), avoiding public gathering places (24 percent), consuming alcohol, medication or other drugs to sleep or feel better because
of worries about terrorism (38 percent). Seventy-five percent talked with family and friends, but 43 percent indicated feeling unable to discuss these feelings because it made them feel uncomfortable. Few turned to counselors or general medical practitioners for information and help (11 percent).

Mainiero and Gibson (2003) report the results of a survey of employee reactions three months after the September 11th attacks. The findings show that while managers dealt with employees’ physical safety concerns, they paid less attention to their emotional concerns. Three months after the event, common employee responses included fear, denial, and anger. Certain groups, women, employees with children, and those located closer to the crisis, were more likely to be emotionally affected. The authors suggest that managers should be trained to recognize and respond to employee trauma and offer suggestions on dealing with crisis events in ways that maintain employee morale.

Managers sometimes assume that events outside the organization will not affect employees within the organization. It is also likely that not all employees will be affected in the same way and to the same degree. Events outside the organization include: political instability around the world which has heightened following 9/11; negative views of the West, particularly the US and the UK; higher oil prices, increasing the costs of doing business; and new alliances against the West, the US in particular.

Mainiero and Gibson conducted an online internet survey of 5860 employees three months after 9/11. They asked whether employees were affected by 9/11, and if so, how? Were they more fearful; did they have difficulty concentrating; did they have less job satisfaction; did they limit their airline travel, delay a major purchase, or make changes to their values, goals and aspirations?

Women were more emotionally affected than men. The largest areas of change included more valued time spent with friends and family, less airline travel, changes to values, goals and aspirations and increased anxiety about personal safety.

What can managers do? Mainiero and Gibson suggest the following:

1. Demonstrate visible leadership, communicate, and be a role model.
2. Develop crisis contingency plans in advance of a disaster.
3. Clarify responsibilities for responding to the crisis.
4. Assess the overall emotional impact.
5. Create a positive climate for allowing employees to discuss their feelings.
6. Communicate to employees how business is affected by the crisis.
7. Address steps that the organization will take to improve security and manage employee risk.
8. Above all, be flexible.
9. Be prepared should another emergency occur.

**Effects of the Palestinian Intifada**

Since the beginning of the Al Aqsa Intifada in September 2000, Israel has had deaths – on a population size basis – equal to ten September 11ths. Zeidner (2006a) collected data from 770 Israeli adults (60 percent women) at the height of the Al Aqsa Intifada uprising (May–July 2002). Israeli women were more distressed by political violence than men, and appraised the crisis situation as more threatening and less manageable. Women also reported more somatic symptoms and more frequent PTSD symptoms than men did. Although both women and men used a mixture of coping strategies, women used both problem- and emotion-focused coping more than men did.

Hobfoll et al. (2006), in a study of 905 adult Jewish and Palestinian citizens of Israel, reported that exposure to terrorism was significantly related to greater loss and gain of psycho-social resources and to greater PTSD and depressive symptoms. Loss of psycho-social resources associated with terrorism was related to both PTSD and depression. The Israeli studies indicated that despite the distress and threats to safety, most Israelis adjusted with few mental health symptoms. But little is known about coping strategies likely to be effective in responding to the thrust of the actual terrorist attack.

Zeidner (2006b) reported that negative affectivity was strongly correlated with terror-related distress, appraisals, coping and mental health outcomes. Higher negative affectivity was correlated with seeing the threat as more stressful, more threatening and less controllable, with more emotion- and problem-focused coping and more reported symptoms.

**Effects of the Madrid Terrorist Bombing**

Miguel-Tobal et al. (2005) examined reactions to the March 11, 2004 terrorist attacks in Madrid, comparing districts in the general population (near the attack versus distant from the attack), victims and relatives and/or close friends, and emergency service personnel. They carried out three longitudinal studies at 5–12 weeks, 6–7 months and one year. Data were collected using interviews with 1589 people.

Women were more likely to indicate symptoms of panic attack than were men. About 11 percent of the general population reported such symptoms, 16.3 percent in the areas most directly affected by the attack. Women were more depressed than men; 8 percent of the general population were
depressed, almost 10 percent in the areas most directly affected. Those directly involved in the attacks (victims, those with dead friends or relations, those with injured friends or relatives) scored higher on all mental health measures.

Miguel-Tobal et al. (2006) surveyed residents of Madrid via telephone interviews, 1–3 months after the terrorist train bombing to assess the prevalence of PTSD and major depression. They found that 2.3 percent reported PTSD symptoms and 8.0 percent reported symptoms consistent with major depression. The prevalence of PTSD was low, but depression prevalence was comparable to estimates following the 9/11 terrorist attack in NYC. They conclude that the magnitude of the attack may have affected the prevalence of PTSD in the two cities.

IMPACT ON HRM AND ORGANIZATIONS

Kondrasuk (2004) believes that 9/11 brought about changes in most areas of HRM; the 9/11 attacks had an immediate impact on people: shock, sorrow, outrage. However, with the passage of time, the initial effects declined, and life generally returned to pre-9/11 levels. Acts of discrimination and anger against Muslims and Arabs increased, people donated money to the victims of 9/11. Employees spent more time with their loved ones and at home. People drew closer together. Employers created crisis management teams and made disaster plans. The government tried to improve coordination among law enforcement and intelligence agencies. The economy suffered, particularly in the airline, hotel, and insurance industries. Border security was tightened, increasing both the cost and time required to move goods.

HRM effects included giving employees time off work if required, less business travel, the cancellation of meetings, and the collection of money for victims and their families. A few months after 9/11, stress symptoms appeared to increase. Employees tried to get a better balance between work and family (Leonard, 2002a, 2002b).

AON Consulting conducts research on employee attitudes in the US on a regular basis. Their surveys have two broad objectives: to examine the commitment of employees to their current employer and to identify what employers are doing to heighten commitment. AON Consulting undertook a planned survey in February 2001, but following the events of 9/11 decided to collect new data in October 2001 (AON Consulting, 2001). This period (2001) also coincided with a slowing American economy. They found that employee responses had generally not changed significantly. Some exceptions were observed, however. First, employees indicated a shift in
work–life balance priorities, with more employees wanting to spend more time with their families. Second, employee commitment to their employers had increased. Third, employees had generally favorable views on how their employers had responded to the events of 9/11 as well as on the state of the economy. Fourth, employees expressed less confidence, however, about the future of their own employers.

Employees gave their employers their highest evaluation in terms of managing business issues, lower evaluations in providing for employee safety and effective leadership in helping their workforce deal with the attacks of 9/11 and their aftermath, and the lowest evaluations in helping employees cope with stress and anxiety arising from the terrorist attacks and future threats. Organizations directly affected by the attacks were likely to provide crisis counseling to their employees (Leonard, 2001a); employers less directly affected did less or nothing. Following 9/11, employees, had more positive perceptions of their organization’s recognition of the importance of personal and family life.

Kondrasuk (2004) pays particular attention to the effects of 9/11 on HRM. Employers set up crisis management teams, and disaster plans were revisited or developed. Business travel decreased, and increased border security slowed the movement of goods. Bernasek (2002) assessed the extra financial burden of 9/11 at $151 billion a year.

HR managers were actively helping their employees. These efforts included allowing employees to delay or cancel traveling, or to take time off; providing financial aid to victims; canceling meetings; encouraging employees to help each other; and expecting tighter security.

Gorman and McKee (1990) describe the short- and long-term effects of an office building fire on First Interstate Bank. Short-term issues included pay, time keeping, expenses incurred as a result of the fire, parking, and transportation. Different employee groups were provided trauma counseling with a different emphasis (senior management versus first responders). They offer practical steps for preparing an organization for a crisis, which include ensuring that the organization has a business resumption/disaster recovery plan, a human system back-up, communication vehicles in place, Employee Assistance Programs and over-communicates.

Poe (2001) believes that the effects of 9/11 on the workplace may be long-lasting. She argues that although organizations helped their workforce immediately following the attack, they also need to attend to the long term. Leonard (2001a) noted a dramatic increase in the use of EAP services following the terrorist attacks. Leonard (2001b) also reported that organizations faced higher healthcare costs as a result of 9/11.
Leadership Responses to 9/11

Bligh et al. (2004) analyzed George W. Bush’s speeches before and after 9/11. Following 9/11, these speeches referred more to the American people as a collective, included more patriotic and faith-based themes, were more aggressive and less ambivalent, but also tended to be slightly less optimistic. Bligh et al. undertook similar analyses of the media (newspapers, magazines, television news shows) and found generally similar results. After 9/11, President Bush achieved a balance between acknowledging the catastrophic events and painting a vision of a better future ahead.

Frohman (2006), and Frohman and Howard (2008), describe how an organization in Israel (headed by Frohman) continued working during the scud missile attacks of the first Gulf War. They offer three lessons learned: focus on long-term survival and long-term consequences, do the opposite of what people expect, and trust your instincts.

DIRECT AND INDIRECT EFFECTS ON ORGANIZATIONS

Impact on Property

The attacks on the WTC also destroyed or damaged cultural property such as buildings, artworks, historical and archeological artifacts, archives and libraries (Heritage Preservation, 2002). The WTC housed the records, archives and libraries of over 500 private and public sector organizations. Works of art worth an estimated value of $100 million were housed there (for example, Picasso, Hockney and Koenig). Damage to archival material also occurred at the Pentagon when American Airlines flight 75 crashed there.

Marketing

On a recent CNN television show, the correspondent interviewed a Pakistani small business man whose company produced a cola drink. Business was booming for him because Pakistanis were boycotting cola drinks made by US-based companies (Coke, Pepsi). Individuals in marketing, advertising and public relations are now concerned that their market research suggests that political developments, including opposition to the war in Iraq, are reducing the global appeal of US brands such as McDonald’s and Microsoft. As a consequence, efforts are now being undertaken to reinvigorate the US brand by relaunching a campaign highlighting things made in the US.
Supply Chain Management

Sheffi (2001) notes two major impacts of international terrorism on supply chain management: operating under heightened security and dealing with the aftermath of terrorist attacks. These both imply less reliable delivery lead times and less certain demand forecasts. In addition, organizations may need to build in supply redundancies to take care of increasing uncertainty. Firms are vulnerable to attacks on their own facilities but also to attacks on their suppliers, customers, transportation providers and communication lines.

The EU has imposed new security regulations at its ports which took effect on July 1, 2004. These measures have increased costs and extended container loading times.

It has been estimated that the cost of border delays between the US and Canada is $8.3 billion per year. A simple piston used in a car engine travels back and forth across the Canada–US border four times before the completed vehicle gets shipped to retail market.

Insurgents in Iraq have frequently targeted and sabotaged vital oil pipelines. Delaying and interfering with Iraqi oil exports cripples the Iraqi economy and may, over the long term, increase oil prices worldwide. Infrastructure attacks (oil, power stations) and the assassination of employees in these sectors has a negative effect on Iraq’s economic situation.

Economic Costs

The events of 9/11 have had significant short-term effects on some parts of the world. These include a loss of innocence, a heightened sense of vulnerability, the exploitation of freedom, grieving with the families of the deceased, compassion for those who suffered losses, confirming the centrality of the human condition, revitalizing bonds of social connection, recognizing the fragility of life and change events, and highlighting the need to work less, play more, connect more closely with family and friends, nourish one’s roots, and seek meaning and spiritual values in one’s daily transactions.

There are several ways in which terrorism can have an impact on a country’s economy (Alavosius et al., 2002). Fielding (2004), using time-series data, examined the relationship of various dimensions of the Palestinian Intifada (for example, Israeli and Palestinian fatalities, number of GreenLine border closures) on ‘capital flight’, defined as the percentage of Israeli capital wealth held outside the country. The data indicated support for casual links going in both directions: more violence leads to more capital flight and more capital flight leads to more violence.
There have been other serious economic costs as well. The September 11 attacks on the US will cost property insurers over US$20 billion for claims on the WTC and the Pentagon. The insurance industry will likely pay out over US$40 billion when other costs of property damage and related charges such as business-interruption insurance liability insurance, workers’ compensation, and life and health insurance losses are included (Leonard, 2001b).

**INDIVIDUAL RESILIENCE**

Who copes better with man-made or natural disasters? Friedberg et al. (2005) examined the relationship of forgiveness and ruminative tendencies and levels of trauma and stress experienced by NYC residents on the one-year anniversary of 9/11. Rumination predicted levels of trauma and perceived stress; lower levels of forgiveness predicted perceived stress but not trauma. Rumination mediated the relationship between forgiveness and perceived stress. Forgiveness served to buffer the effects of stress more in individuals low in rumination.

Zivotofsky and Koslowsky (2005) examined gender and coping strategies among individuals faced with a major perceived life-threatening stressor – the sniper(s) that terrorized the Washington, DC area in October 2002. Fourteen random shootings resulted in 10 deaths. Women’s behavior was more affected than men’s. Women reported greater use of both problem- and emotion-focused coping.

Assanangkornchai et al. (2004) found elevated levels of psychological distress in a sample of 590 Thai respondents following a severe flood in Hat Tai that killed at least 32 people, injuring about 1700 and causing severe property damage. Psychological distress was associated with respondents’ perception of the severity of loss, ability to collect possessions, and indicating a ‘negative’ response to the flood.

Ben-Ezra et al. (2005) examined the immediate post-traumatic reactions of rescue personnel exposed to the Hilton hotel bombing in Sinai, Egypt on October 7, 2004. They found that rescue personnel having previous exposure to the same type of trauma had a lower level of PTSD symptoms than those who were exposed for the first time – an immunizing effect.

Bonanno et al. (2005) considered resilience among people in or near the WTC, considering specifically, trait self-enhancement, and the tendency toward overly positive or unrealistic self-servicing biases. Self-enhancement was associated with resilience right after 9/11, but to poorer social adjustment 18 months later.
ORGANIZATIONAL RESILIENCE

When the worst happens, companies have to put their employee’s interests above all else.

(Argenti, 2002, p. 103)

Alpaslan and Mitroff (2004) examined the relationship between an organization’s ethical orientation and crisis management initiatives before and after 9/11. Two ethical orientations were considered: a principles- or rule-based orientation and a consequences or cost–benefit approach. Organizations with the former valued a proactive approach to crises; organizations with the latter valued a reactive approach. Alpaslan and Mitroff found that the crisis management performance of proactive organizations was superior and they also experienced fewer crises than did organizations having a reactive approach. The authors propose that training managers consistent with a principles-based orientation will produce a more proactive and more effective approach to crisis management.

Buenza and Stark (2004) studied a Wall Street investment bank that lost its entire office and trading technology in 9/11. The trading staff survived but were forced to move operations to a temporary site in New Jersey. One year later the bank had returned to Wall Street, and restored its technology, without losing any of the traders that relocated to New Jersey. Traders had to deal with questions of uncertainty about the firm’s future, the location of the firm should it survive, existential anxiety and their professional identities. This firm, prior to 9/11, had operated with a flat hierarchy. Groups of traders dealt with ambiguity, confusion and speed on a daily basis. The firm had HR policies that placed a high value on people. Immediately following the attack on the WTC, traders began calling each other to find out what was going on. The bank reopened immediately. The new offices were given the same labels as the old ones to restore meaning and order.

Buenza and Stark (2006) describe the actions of another investment bank adjacent to the WTC that moved to temporary quarters in New Jersey following the attack. Successful recovery following 9/11 involved a combination of ‘planning and spontaneity, of redundancy and self-organization typical of firms with non-bureaucratic and non-hierarchical forms’ (p. 1). Organizational responsiveness was less a function of contingency plans and hierarchical command structures than processes of self-organization and lateral coordination: easy access to managers, reduced emphasis on hierarchical status, emphasis on trust and sociability, physical proximity to colleagues and working collaboratively in networks. Six days after 9/11, this firm was trading again. No employee was hurt in the attacks. The
human element was key in the recovery process – social ties and personal knowledge.

Dutton et al. (2002a, 2002b) describe the responses of Reuters America to the 9/11 attack. Reuters America had a data center in the WTC and four at the facilities in NYC as well as in Washington, DC and in the Sears Tower in Chicago. Employees were also at conferences and in meetings in NYC and elsewhere. Dutton et al. conducted interviews with 30 employees of Reuters America between October 19 and November 8 to chronicle the organization’s responses. The following broad categories of action were observed:

1. **Turning chaos into order**  A command center was established about an hour and a half after the attacks. The major priority was to find their people and continue to serve their clients. Those in the command center began to develop an approach for dealing with the situation. They found that efforts in 2000 to deal with the new millennium proved useful now.
   - Establish clear priorities  People first, then customers, then the business.

2. **Searching for employees**  They were able to locate all but six employees, those having died during the attack.
   - Caring for the families  Managers contacted families and provided support and resources.
   - Mobilizing HR resources  HR established a link with the command center, helped locate employees and families, and located counseling help. Within two days, Reuters had counselors on site and names of counselors were provided to employees as well.
   - Town hall meetings  Three large town hall meetings were held on Friday September 21. Teleconferencing technology was used to allow employees across North America to take part.

3. **Technical recovery**  Reuters made a commitment to getting their operations up and running within days. Customers were contacted to see whether they were alright and what Reuters could do to help. Customers were offered free access to previously paid-for services. An urgent need was to replace a data system lost in the WTC with a system located in another facility. Employees worked unusually long hours in difficult work settings to rebuild these systems. Individuals worked in client sites and provided services as fast as they could; cost was no object.

These responses by Reuters America reflected its culture; Reuters was committed to its people. The organization became flexible and creative in
dealing with the crisis. Relationships between people became more open and trusting, both within Reuters and with clients. The importance of people was highlighted. The company was seen as more humane. The HR function gained in prominence. Reuters became more results oriented and less process oriented. Finally, Reuters developed procedures in the event that it faced another emergency.

Freeman et al. (2004) examined the losses and the recovery processes of Sandler, O’Neill & Partners, a financial services firm housed in the WTC but decimated in the 9/11 attacks. Sandler, O’Neill lost 39 percent of its workforce, two-thirds of its management committee and its entire office. Yet one year later, the firm had recovered and was performing at an even higher level. Freeman et al. identify Sandler, O’Neill’s use of moral purpose as the key element in its recovery. This sense of moral purpose unleashed motivation, made use of outside help and tapped high levels of physical and psychological resources. Leadership played a key role in handling anxiety and grief and the culture encouraged and supported team work and self-management (Barbash, 2003). Freeman et al. identified nine other organizations that suffered large numbers of deaths, and while none has become as successful post-9/11 as Sandler, O’Neill, all have recovered or are recovering. Situational factors also played a role in Sandler, O’Neill’s recovery. This firm had not suffered any previous attacks or crises. The attack was over quickly. The attackers were not known to the firm. The environment supported Sandler, O’Neill; they were attacked because they were a symbol of success. Finally, the firm was healthy prior to 9/11. The sense of moral purpose (survival, at war, don’t give in to terrorists, take care of the families) provided the motivation, but others outside the organization were sympathetic to Sandler, O’Neill (gave them better deals) and the employee deaths created opportunities for new leadership and change. Resources also played a role in how Sandler, O’Neill responded. These included cognitive abilities (knowledge and experience), financial resources, an organic structure, employee attitudes (excellence, responsibility, helping others) and effective management and containment of anxiety and grief. But a sense of purpose was the key.

Gittell et al. (2006), using data from the US airline industry, found that the maintenance of positive relationships with employees and financial reserves contributed to organizational resilience following 9/11. Financial reserves allowed some airlines to retain staff (positive employee relationships) instead of dismissing them, and that contributed to airlines’ recovery following the attacks. The data were collected from nine airlines, using publicly available sources. Financial resources included low levels of debt and high levels of cash on hand. Layoffs were measured using airline announcements. Performance recovery was measured by comparing
stock prices at four different times following 9/11 with stock prices on September 10.

Kelly and Stark (2002) interviewed executives and employees in financial services firms with offices in the WTC and adjacent buildings that began trading less than a week after the attack. They found that strong personal ties among employees, lateral self-organization in the form of teams and non-hierarchical relations were critical to the recovery process.

Although working under stress, fear and grief, the achievements of women and men in the days and months following 9/11 have been impressive. The consensus from those in the trenches was that ‘people’ made the difference. Interestingly, the use of technology helped with communication. In addition, factors that prepared the firms for the uncertainty and chaos that followed 9/11 were those factors that made these firms competitive in the marketplace. The events of 9/11 are requiring organizations to rethink their resources, locations, strategy and management structures.

Kendra and Wachtendorf (2003a, 2003b) studied the reconstitution of the Emergency Operations Center (EOC) following its destruction in the WTC attack, to better understand resilience. Although the physical EOC facility was destroyed in the collapse of the WTC, the organization that had been created to manage crises in NYC continued. This organization called on the resources of NYC and surrounding communities, states and the federal government. Human relationships that existed before 9/11, organizational response patterns and assigned roles contributed to EOC resilience following the attack. The research team began fieldwork within two days after the attack, and continued for two months.

Resilience can be defined as ‘an ability to sustain a shock without completely deteriorating; that is most conceptions of resilience include some idea of adapting to or “bouncing back” from a disruption’ (Kendra and Wachtendorf, 2003b, p. 41). Resilience is still best thought of as an art as well as the application of scientific knowledge and techniques (Sutcliffe and Vogus, 2003).

Organizational features associated with resilience include redundancy, the capacity for resourcefulness, effective communication and the capacity for self-organization in the face of unanticipated and huge demands. Resilience embodies attitudes about useful actions; it is about coping skills, creativity, improvisation, established roles in a social system, wisdom and straight talk, and rapidity, among others.

Argenti (2002), based on interviews with managers of their experiences and responses to the events of 9/11, distilled five lessons for any company facing a crisis that impacts on its employees’ confidence and motivation. Some involved preparation, having plans and mechanisms for emergency responses; others involved responding to the unexpected:
1. Get on the scene. Managers must be visible, need to indicate that dealing with the anxiety and distress of staff is their top priority, need to lead, and provide a sense of calm, reason and humanity.

2. Use communication channels carefully and creatively. See the mass media as allies.

3. Stay focused on the business. Focus on the work, capitalize on employees’ needs to help operate with both head and heart.

4. Have a plan in place. Identify contingency work sites, set up communication channels.

5. Improvise, but from a strong foundation the firm’s guiding values and principles were the best basis for guiding employee actions. Imbued with these, managers and employees will do the right thing.

Sheffi (2001, 2005, 2006) believes that organizational resilience is a supply chain issue. He and his colleagues studied how companies rebound – or fail to rebound – after a low probability/high impact event such as a terrorist attack, examining dozens of organizations. Their major conclusion was that an organization’s ability to return to business depends more on decisions made before the event rather than during and after. This involves organizational culture, communication and flexibility. Companies need to integrate corporate risk management into their business strategies. Parts and factories should be interchangeable (identical).

Resilient companies communicate obsessively. Decision-making power resides at low organizational levels. People have a passion for their work. They know the mission of their organization and buy into it. Resilient organizations are flexible and agile. Companies in fast-changing industries are more likely to be resilient.

Buenza and Stark (2003) conclude that successful recovery in the financial services companies they studied was a combination of planning and spontaneity, of redundancy and self-organization, typical of firms with non-bureaucratic and non-hierarchical forms. This hinged on a socio-technical network of relations, connections, policies and time-sensitive data that could not be seen from the outside, distributed intelligence being a key part in all of this.

Bashbash (2003) looked back at the 9/11 survivors of Cantor Fitzgerald, and concluded that working to rebuild the firm has been the key to healing.

**Evacuating Buildings**

Gershon (2006) studied individual organizational and structural factors on evacuation preparedness, and the evacuation process and decision making for survivors of the WTC attack. In the absence of leadership or direction,
many people delayed their decision to evacuate, or actually froze and did not respond to messages. People with disabilities were dependent on others for help, sometimes slowing movement on the staircases. Evacuees were unfamiliar with the building, and unaware of the fire exits. Once off their own floor, they became spatially disoriented. Once outside the building, evacuees were unsure of how to vacate the immediate area. People were relieved when they met members of the uniformed services (fire, police) in the stairs and lobby and followed their direction. Natural leaders emerged and helped people evacuate.

Gershon recommends the following:

1. Evacuation leaders should be identified and trained for all buildings 10 floors or higher.
2. Plans for the evacuation of the disabled or infirm should be made, identifying assistants, elevator use and so on.
3. All employees should be fully oriented to the building, including all exits.
4. Pre-planning is needed for mass evacuation from urban areas.

ANTICIPATING AND PLANNING FOR POSSIBLE TERRORIST ATTACKS

Watkins and Bazerman (2003) suggest that there are signs, if anybody had noticed, that would have predicted 9/11. These included Islamic militants willing to become martyrs for their cause; increasing hostility to the US; the 1993 car bombing of the WTC; the failed hijacking of an Air France plane in 1995 planned to hit the Eiffel Tower; a failed 1995 Islamic plot to hijack US commercial planes over the Pacific Ocean; plans to crash a light plane filled with explosives on to the CIA’s headquarters; and several US government reports indicating lack of airport security. Yet despite these signals, no precautionary measures were undertaken. Watkins and Bazerman attribute this to lapses in recognition of the potential disaster, low priority given to airline security, and the resulting failures by the airlines to mobilize resources to increase airline security. However, some surprises really are unpredictable.

Watkins and Bazerman identify three kinds of barriers to identifying predictable surprises: psychological, organizational and political. They propose a three-stage process for improving an organization’s ability to predict surprises: recognition, prioritization and mobilization:

1. Recognition – is the organization scanning the environment for emerging threats? Leaders need to pay attention.
2. Prioritization – did the organization give priority, based on cost–benefit analyses, to threats having the highest costs? Serious threats have to be identified.

3. Mobilization – did the organization take precautionary measures equal to the risks involved? Leaders need to respond effectively and appropriately.

Psychological barriers involve cognitive biases (for example, giving more weight to evidence supporting our position, see things as better than they are, try to maintain the status quo), which make it harder to anticipate surprises. Organizational barriers involve silos and fragmented information that make it difficult to get a complete understanding. Political barriers are political vulnerabilities (for example, imbalances of power) within an organization.

Watkins and Bazerman offer the following practical advice (pp. 79–80) to improve the prediction of ‘predictable surprises’:

1. Ask yourself and colleagues, ‘What predictable surprises are currently brewing in our organization?’.
2. Use scenario planning and risk assessment tools. Include outsiders in these exercises.
3. Create cross-functional teams.
4. Use action learning groups of high potential managers to collect information on and analyze business challenges.
5. Develop mechanisms and rewards to support information sharing and common objectives.
6. Develop informal and formal networks to influence potential decisions.

IS PLANNING AND PREPARATION REALLY POSSIBLE?

McConnell and Drennan (2006) think that planning and preparing for crises may in fact be ‘mission impossible’. Crises and disasters are low probability events that place huge demands on resources and have to compete with other priorities. It is difficult to order possible threats. Planning for crisis requires integration and synergy across various networks that are usually fragmented. Finally, planning and preparation requires extensive and costly training and exercises that typically only produce a symbolic or surface appearance of readiness.

Boin and Smith (2006) emphasize a new relationship of the private sector which operates critical infrastructures and public management. Thus,
private and public sectors must together deal with the prevention of attacks, effective communication of information across organizational boundaries and occurrence of crisis decision making – all in all a complex task.

IMPROVING RESPONSES TO DISASTERS

There appears to be common shortcomings in the nature of the responses when disasters strike. Gheytanaki et al. (2007) identified a dozen major failures that have occurred in major disasters including Hurricane Katrina:

- lack of efficient communication;
- poor coordination plans;
- ambiguous authority relationships: who is in charge;
- who should be in charge;
- counter-terrorism versus all-hazards response;
- ambiguous training standards and lack of preparation;
- limited learning in ‘lessons learned’;
- performance assessment not integrated into the process;
- the role of socio-economic and racial factors in responses;
- rumor and chaos;
- personal and community differences in levels of preparedness; and
- different views on disaster mental health and the role of mental health professionals.

Most writing to date has focused on the final stage of a disaster – dealing with trauma – rather than on prevention. There is material on a variety of sources that address failures of communication, coordination, planning, and command. We know something about the ways individuals behave in disasters. Basic research has been carried out for some time on learning, training and performance assessment. Progress is also being made in the training of disaster mental health professionals. Applying those resources to prevention – as well as disaster response – is long overdue.

PREPARING FOR THE FUTURE: OUR CHILDREN’S CHILDREN’S WAR

Canton (2006) lists terrorism as one factor that will shape the world over the next 20 years. He believes that terrorism is increasing and that
decreasing the gap between the developed nations (the haves) and the developing nations (the have-nots) is crucial. He concludes that if this gap widens, terrorism will increase; poverty and terrorism go together:

- Crime, drug and terrorist networks exploit impoverished war zones in Colombia, Somalia, Chechnya and Bosnia.
- Terrorists control trade in many conflict-ridden zones in Africa, Asia and the Middle East.
- Al Qaeda recruits among the poor in nations such as Malaysia, Iraq, Iran, Sierra Leone, Indonesia, Afghanistan and Pakistan.
- Al Qaeda also recruits from the West’s Muslim community in the US and Europe, as evidenced by recent bombings, arrests, and failed plots.

The events of 9/11 have dramatically changed America’s (and many parts of the world’s) vision of the future by raising fear and uncertainty to new levels. Thus, global security and terrorism became important priorities following 9/11. The forces of globalization have had a significant influence on the world today, in some cases magnifying the problems. These forces include linking the economies of various nations into an interconnected network, increased culture clash between nations, and has influenced terrorism, potentially increasing or decreasing terrorism levels.

Canton believes that the Third World War has already started, the first shot being 9/11. A new set of risks and threats are now upon us. Unfortunately most of the developed world is still unprepared for terrorism. It is hoped that the chapters that follow will naturally identify the most pressing needs here and point to necessary individual, organizational and national initiatives to address them (Felton, 2004; Baer et al., 2005).

NOTE

1. Preparation of this manuscript was supported in part by York University, Canada. Louise Coutu prepared the manuscript.

REFERENCES


AON Consulting (2001), United States back@work, Chicago, IL: AON Consulting.


Bonanno, G.A., Rennicke, G. and Dekel, S. (2005), ‘Self-enhancement among high-exposure survivors of the September 11th terrorist attack: resilience or


Leonard, B. (2001a), ‘EAPs pushed to the limit following the terrorist attacks’, *HR Magazine*, 46, 25.

Leonard, B. (2001b), ‘Employers’ healthcare costs may rise even more because of the attacks’, *HR Magazine*, 46, 28.


Poe, A.C. (2001), ‘Long after the initial shock of the September terrorist attacks has worn off, employees may need your continuing support. Aftershocks of the 11th’, *HR Magazine*, 46, 46–51.


