## Index

Ackerman, B.A. 51  
Adams, C. 154  
aggregate tax burdens  
explained as bottom-up emergence  
139–40  
explained as political equilibrium  
137–9  
Alchian, A.A. 48, 50, 102  
Ammons, D.N. 124  
Anderson, L.R. 51  
Ardrey, R. 74  
Atkinson, A.B. 6  
Auteri, M. 106  

Backhaus, J.G. 6, 28, 49, 178, 180, 189, 200  
Barnett, A.H. 124  
Barro, R. 152  
Barzel, Y. 34, 50–51  
Bast, J.L. 15  
Baumol, W.J. 50  
Becker, G.S. 21, 124, 135–6, 187  
Beito, D.T. 27, 52  
Bélanger, G. 124  
Bendor, J.S. 124  
Benham, F. 8–10  
Benson, B.L. 23, 124, 178  
Berman, H. 41  
Bessley, T. 124  
Bish, R.L. 161  
Bismarck, O. 140, 154  
Blankart, C.B. 5  
Bode, K. 23  
Boettke, P. 60  
Böhm, F. 196  
Boudreaux, D.J. 172  
Bowles, S. 5  
Bradford, D.F. 160  
Brancato, K. 16, 184  
Brennan, G. 23, 51, 87, 98, 141  
Breton, A. 124, 135, 156, 160  
Breyer, L.J. 124  

Brosio, G. 5  
Brownlee, W.E. 154  
Buchanan, J.M. 5, 13, 18, 23, 32, 51, 84, 101, 141, 167, 178  
Buckle, S. 51  
Buckley, F.H. 51  
Bulow, J. 154  
bureaucracy 117–21  

Calvo, G. 154  
cameralism 140, 172, 189  
canons of good taxation 140–3  
Casson, M. 80  
Caves, D.W. 113  
Cheung, S.N.S. 29  
Christensen, L.R. 113  
Clapham, J.H. 182  
Clark, E.H. 40  
Clinton, H.R. 193–4  
Coase, R.A. 29–32, 101  
Coate, S. 124  
Coleman, J.S. 51  
collective property 36, 38, 42, 49–50, 88  
and limit of forbearance 45–6, 52–3, 55, 63  
as institutionally-mediated  
interaction 5, 25, 40–41, 44, 70–71, 83, 89, 129, 156–7  
combinatorial grammar of 40–41, 96–7  
competition among political  
enterprises 19–20, 127–8, 135–6  
compound vs. simple republics 155–9, 169–71  
Congleton, R.D. 55, 177–8  
Cook P. 144  
Cordato, R. 185  
Cornes, R. 160  
Coser, L. 43  
Cowen, T. 50, 110  
Crain, N.V. 153
Crain, W.M. 112, 153
Crampton, E. 50
Cropsey, J. 186
Cullis, J. 5
Da Empoli, A. 98
Davies, D.D. 124
De Alessi, L. 50
De Angelo, H. 108
De Jasay, A. 35
De Jouvenel, B. 40, 71, 90, 97, 111, 156, 186–7, 201
democratic despotism 193–4, 200
democratic oligarchy 156–7
Demsetz, H. 48, 102
Denzau, A.T. 124
De Tocqueville, A. 193, 200
De Viti de Marco, A. 8–10
Doig, J. 98
Downs, A. 119
Dreschler, W. 48, 51
Durkheim, E. 36
Dye, T.R. 165
Eckert, R.D. 69
ecology of enterprises 61–3, 80, 88
emergent character of 64–5, 92–4
tectonic clashing among enterprises 64, 67–70, 94–6
economic models
as institutionally-grounded logic 33, 39–41
as recipes for calculation 32–3, 38–9
inside-out vs. outside-in 22–3, 36, 41, 46–7, 49, 56, 101–2, 119
Edgeworth, F.Y. 6–8
Eisinger, P. 98
elections, limited significance of 96–8
Elias, N. 21, 23, 36, 187
emergence vs. teleological theorizing 1–2, 138, 181
Enelow, J.M. 76
enterprise space 69–70, 76–80, 92, 94
and connections between market and public squares 78–9, 83–5
turbulence within 94–6
Epple, D. 172
Epstein, R.A. 25, 51, 118
Eucken, W. 50, 141, 196–7
excess burden 136, 148–51
Fama, E.F. 102–3
federalism 155–77
and economies of scale 160–62
and generation of boundaries 164–9
and institutional framework for territorial governance 175–7
and inter-jurisdictional spillovers 162–4
and political competition 157–60, 171–5
Fiorina, M. 98
Fiscal commons 38–40
fiscal illusion 11–12, 146, 152
fiscal sociology 179–203
in relation to fiscal culture 189–94
Foldvary, F. 66, 175
Foss, N. 102
Frank, R.F. 188
Frederickson, H.G. 177
Friedman, D. 59
Frolich, N. 98
Fukuyama, F. 51
Gaebler, T. 98
Gaffney, M. 175
Gintis, H. 5
Glass, J.J. 124
Goldscheid, R. 74, 180, 189–90, 203
good government as talent collectively exercised 198–203
Gordon, S. 51
Gouyyette, C. 113
Granovetter, M. 177
Gray, B.
Grosseketter, H. 191
Grossman, H.I. 154
Groves, T. 40
Hall, R.E. 143
Hamilton, A. 198
Hamilin, A.P. 98, 177
Hammond, T.H. 124
Hansen, S.B. 154
Hargrove, E. 98
Harper, D.A. 82
Hayek, F.A. 2, 51, 78
Head, J.G. 203
Henderson, J.V. 160, 172
Hettich, W. 135, 137
Hickel, R. 74, 189, 203
Hilton, G.W. 69
Himmelfarb, G. 52
Hinich, M.J. 76
Hirshleifer, J. 43
Hobbes-like fables 34–6, 44
Holcombe, R.G. 172, 177
Holt, C.A. 51
Homans, G.C. 51
hotels as cities 65–7, 107–8, 173–5, 182
Hughes, J.R.T. 98
human association, science of 19
Hutt, W.H. 178
Ikeda, S. 78
institutions, hierarchy of 58
Jensen, M.C. 102
Jha, R. 11
jitney service 69
Johnson, D.B. 29
Jones, P. 5
Justi, J.H.G. 140–41
Kato, J. 124
Kayaalp, O. 5
Kekes, J. 203
Kenyon, D.A. 177
Keynes, J.M. 1–2, 150
Kincaid, J. 177
Kirzner, I.M. 80
Klein, D.B. 20
Klingner, D.E. 177
Knight, F.H. 80, 82, 88
Koppl, R. 98
Kraan, D. 153
Kuran, T. 109
Lachmann, L. 23, 58
Laffer curve 149–51
La Manna, M. 87
Landa, J.T. 50
Lash, C. 192
Lawson, T. 21
Le Bon, G. 74
Leijonhufvud, A. 2
Leipold, H. 141
Levi, M. 154
Levine, M.E. 51, 74
Levy, D.M. 60
Lewis, E. 98
lexicographic ordering vs. utility functions 56–8, 188, 194
Liebowitz, A. 112
Littlechild, S.C. 78
Loasby, B. 80, 102
Loeb, M. 40
Loewenstein, G. 124, 195
Lomasky, L. 98
Lorenzetti, A. 200
Lovejoy, A.O. 43
MacCallum, S.H. 66, 175
Macey, J.R. 98
Mack, E. 51
Maine, H.S. 41, 68, 196
Makowski, L. 108
Manne, H.G. 104
market square 45–9, 54–5, 58–61, 63, 84, 89, 93, 100–101, 120, 200–201
Marlow, M.L. 153
Marshall, A. 8
Marx, Karl 60
McCchesney, F. 95, 146, 203
McCormick, R.E. 65, 92, 124, 147
McGee, R.W. 74
Meade, J.E. 29
Meckling, W.H. 102
Menger, C. 41
Migué, J. 124
Miller, F.D., Jr. 51
mind and society 21–2, 36–7, 43–4, 187–94
Miron, J.A. 23
Mirrlees, J.A. 6
Mises, L. 23, 53, 60, 74, 119
Mitchell, M.S.
Mitchell, W.C. 124
Moe, T.M. 124, 157
Moore, M.J. 144
moral imagination 188–90, 192
Moran, M.J. 124
Morris, C.W. 51
Mungur, M.C. 124
Muris, T.J. 112
Murphy, L. 35
Musgrave, R.A. 23, 179, 203
Nagel, T. 35
Nalbandian, J. 177
Nelson, R.R. 102
Neyman, J. 147
Niksanen, W.A. 55, 124, 171
nonprofit firms 46, 105–6
Oates, W.E. 160, 163
Olson, M. 55, 89
Oppenheimer, J. 98
Ordungstheorie 141, 196–8
Orzechowski, W.P. 153
Osborne, D. 98
Ostrom, E. 38
Ostrom, V. 8, 18–19, 51, 92, 119, 124, 155, 161, 171, 193, 199
Pantaleoni, M. 20, 61, 64, 70, 115
parasitical political pricing 20, 54, 60–61, 64, 70, 116–17
Pareto, V. 21, 36, 110
parliamentary assemblies 99, 117–21, 126–7, 155
as catallactical arenas 63–5, 71–4, 90, 180
as peculiar investment banks 110–13, 120–21, 127
parliamentary budgeting 2–5
analogy to United Way 125–6
budgetary bridges 128–37
constitutional organization of 126–9
parliamentary procedure 71, 131
and collective property 112–13, 132
and parliamentary organization 136–7
Robert’s and other rules of order 112–13, 132
Pauly M.V. 87
Peirce, W.S. 124
Penrose, E.T. 102
Pescatrice, D.R. 113
Pestieau, P. 113
Petit, P. 51, 87
Peukert, H. 51
Pfiffner, J.P. 124
Pies, I. 141
Pigou, A.C. 8, 182
Plott, C.R. 51, 74
political enterprises 99–100, 106–23, 134
and agency 101–4, 108–10
and managerial recruitment 121–3
equity structure of 107–8, 113–16, 175
profit appropriation, forms of 114–16, 120–21, 168–9
political entrepreneurship 75–80, 85–98, 117–18
and construction of suitable network 88–9
sources of return to 86–9, 93–4, 118–19, 139
polycentric public finance 7–8, 18, 90–91
Popper, K.R. 109
Portney, P.R. 172
Poterba, J.M. 153
Potts, J. 2, 11, 78
pressure, in market and in politics 132–4
privatizing common property 48–9
property rights and theory of public finance 24–5, 38–41
public debt 151–3
public finance
and emergent-based theorizing 22–23, 37–8
and teleology 15, 28–33, 65, 92–4, 142, 151, 179, 181
as social theory 9–10, 13–15, 20–21, 25, 34, 63, 71, 92–3, 165, 180
as systems design 9–13, 28, 92, 183
catallactical orientation toward 6–7, 17–18, 71–4
political enterprise as core of 14–15, 18–21, 76–7
public goods 15–17, 19, 31
as empty box 16–17, 67
hypothetical illustrations of flood control 45, 84–5
lighthouses 29–33
mosquito control 47–8, 84–5, 129–30
refuse collection 44–5, 53, 91–2
Puviani, A. 11–12, 115, 146
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Authors</th>
<th>Pages</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Warren, C.</td>
<td>200</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Warren, R.</td>
<td>18</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Watts, R.</td>
<td>102</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Webber, C.</td>
<td>154, 190</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Weber, M.</td>
<td>58, 141</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Weingast, B.R.</td>
<td>124, 153</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Weinrib, L.L.</td>
<td>51</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Weisbrod, B.A.</td>
<td>164</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Welfare economics and public finance</td>
<td>28–33, 123, 179–89</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>and empty boxes</td>
<td>182–6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>in relation to fiscal sociology</td>
<td>186–9, 194–6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wicksell, K.</td>
<td>6–7, 136, 141, 153</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wildavsky, A.</td>
<td>154, 190</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Williamson, O.E.</td>
<td>102</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wilson, E.O.</td>
<td>24</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wilson, J.Q.</td>
<td>119</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Winer, S.L.</td>
<td>135, 137</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Winter, S.G.</td>
<td>102</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wintrobe, R.</td>
<td>124</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wiseman, J.</td>
<td>101</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wittman, D.</td>
<td>33, 124, 135</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Yandle, B.</td>
<td>124</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Young, O.</td>
<td>98</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Zelnitz, A.</td>
<td>172</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Zimmerman, J.</td>
<td>102</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Zodrow, G.</td>
<td>172</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Zwiebel, J.</td>
<td>23</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>