Introduction: urban growth patterns – trends and policy issues

M. Pacione

Introduction

Cities have a long history, but the growth of very large cities and the transition towards a global urban society date from the advent of industrial urbanism in the early nineteenth century. For much of this period the dominant direction of population movement in Western Europe and North America was from rural to urban areas, reflecting the emergence of urban-industrial society. Since the Second World War, a reversal of this long-standing pattern has become apparent, with people on both sides of the Atlantic, and in Australia, reoccupying peri-urban areas. Despite evidence of a reurbanization trend in some metropolitan regions, counterurbanization remains a major characteristic of contemporary Western societies. In contrast to the centrifugal pattern of urban population change in advanced societies, the centripetal processes of urbanization and urban growth continue to dominate urban population dynamics in the developing world.

Continuation of these trends will mean that by 2025, 65 per cent of the world’s population will be urban dwellers. In ‘the North’, continued deconcentration of population at the national level and decentralization at the local urban level are producing a ‘rurban’ settlement pattern in which urban lifestyles influence most of the country. In ‘the South’, levels of urban development vary between countries. While a minority of states, such as Ethiopia, Uganda, Afghanistan and Cambodia, have yet to experience rapid urbanization, the future social and settlement structure of most developing countries will be dominated by a growing number of primate cities, many of which will be megacities.

Urbanization and urban growth on this unprecedented scale pose fundamental questions as to whether this magnitude of urban development can be sustained. Key questions for policy in cities of the South include how will the urban population be fed, housed, employed and cared for? In addition to meeting these basic needs, how can the increasing demand for mobility, recreation and satisfaction of ‘higher-order’ needs such as self-esteem and human development be met? What effects will these concentrations of population have on local and global ecosystems? These and other related questions pose major challenges for governments and policy-makers responsible for the monitoring, management and improvement of cities in the twenty-first century.

In this introductory chapter I provide an analysis of contemporary patterns of urbanization and urban growth in the developing world. This establishes a framework for discussions of particular issues in succeeding chapters. I begin by setting urbanization and urban growth in the South in global context, and identify some significant contrasts and comparisons with the earlier processes in the North. I then present a statistical analysis of contemporary urban growth trends and patterns for the major regions and countries within the South. Based on these conceptual and empirical foundations I examine a number of key urban challenges and policy issues confronting cities of the South relating
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to (a) rural–urban migration, (b) the urban economy and employment, (c) provision of shelter for the urban poor, (d) urban environmental hazards, (e) health, (f) poverty, power and politics, (g) urban transport issues and (h) planning and urban form. Finally, I identify a number of major challenges for urban policy in countries of the developing world.

Urbanization and urban growth in the developing world

Since 1950 urbanization has become a worldwide phenomenon. Although the pace of change has varied considerably between countries and regions, virtually every country of the developing world has been urbanizing rapidly. Evidence of a slowdown in the rate of growth of some of the largest cities and of polarization reversal or spatial deconcentration into polycentric metropolitan forms does not contradict the conclusion that the developing world is becoming increasingly urbanized.

It is important to recognize that urbanization is not a uniform process that all countries go through in the course of ‘development’. Significantly, urbanization in the South exhibits a number of important contrasts with the earlier process in the North:

1. It is taking place in countries with the lowest levels of economic development, rather than the highest, as was the case when accelerated urbanization began in Western Europe and North America.
2. It involves countries in which people have the lowest levels of life expectancy at birth, the poorest nutritional levels, the lowest energy consumption levels and the lowest levels of education.
3. It involves greater numbers of people than it did in the developed world.
4. Migration is greater in volume and more rapid.
5. Industrialization lags far behind the rate of urbanization, so that most of the migrants find at best marginal employment in cities.
6. The environment in cities of the developing world is usually more healthy than in their rural hinterlands, unlike in the industrial cities of the West. Urban fertility is greater in cities of the developing world and net reproduction rates are higher than they ever were in most of the industrial countries.
7. Massive slum areas of spontaneous settlements characterize most large cities of the developing world.
8. Rising expectations mean that pressures for rapid social change are greater than they were in the West.
9. Political circumstances conducive to revolutionary take-overs of government are often present as a result of the recent colonial or neo-colonial status of most of the developing world nations.
10. Most of the developing world countries have inherited an intentionally centralized administration, with the result that government involvement in urban development is more likely in these countries today than it was in the nineteenth-century West.

Although there are similarities at a general level, the process of urbanization in different parts of the world is the result of a complex interplay of global and local social, economic, political, technological, geographical and cultural factors. We are dealing with several fundamentally different processes that have arisen out of differences in culture.
and time. These processes are producing different results in different world regions (Pacione, 2009a). Accordingly, in the following section we discuss the main trends and patterns of urban growth in major regions of the South.

**Latin America and the Caribbean**

In 1990 the population of Latin America and the Caribbean totalled 440 million, having doubled in size since 1960. Over this period the region shifted from being predominantly rural to predominantly urban. With 71.4 per cent living in urban areas in 1990, this represented a level of urbanization comparable to that of Europe. There is also a heavy concentration of population in large cities, with, in 1990, more people living in ‘million cities’ in the region than in rural areas. By 1990 most countries with more than a million inhabitants had more than half their population in urban areas. By 2001 these urbanization trends had strengthened, with more than three-quarters of the region’s population living in cities (Table 1.1). The rapidity of urbanization in the region is related to the scale of economic growth, with Brazil, Mexico, Colombia and the Dominican Republic experiencing both rapid economic growth and high levels of urbanization.

In general, all major metropolitan areas experience a decentralization of population and of production as they grow. While this process has gone furthest in the USA, where decentralization within a core region is commonplace, it is also evident in some parts of Latin America. In the Mexico City region mega-urbanization is linked to a process of territorial restructuring that is creating a polycentric extended metropolitan region. The expanded urban system and integrated road network have stimulated flows of people, commodities and capital among the constituent urban centres, and have tended to break down the differences between rural and urban activities.

It is difficult to predict the scale and nature of urban change in Latin America given that it is so dependent on economic performance. For countries that sustain rapid economic growth, urbanization is likely to continue. Whatever the economic performance, however, the dominance of the region’s largest metropolitan areas is likely to decline as a result of the emergence of new cities with a comparative advantage. These include important centres of tourism, and cities well located to attract new investment in export-oriented manufacturing or to benefit from forward and backward linkages from high-value export agriculture. In many of the higher-income countries in Latin America the factors that stimulated urban decentralization in North America and Europe, including the development of good-quality inter-regional transport and communications systems, will also exert an influence on urban structure.

**Asia and the Pacific**

In 1990 Asia contained three-fifths (3186 million) of the world’s population and an increasing share (32 per cent in 1990) of its urban population. In 2001 Asia had 58 per cent of the world’s population and 46 per cent of its urban population (Table 1.2). It also contains many of the world’s largest and fastest-growing cities, reflecting the presence of most of the nations with the highest economic growth rates since 1980. However, few generalizations are valid for the region, given the variety of countries, which range from the richest in the world to the poorest, and from the largest and most populous to the smallest and least populous. With almost two-thirds of the population still living in rural areas, Asia remains a predominantly rural continent. Significantly, however, this
The proportion of urban to rural population is partly explained by the criteria employed to define urban places. In Asia, if India and China were to alter their definitions of ‘urban centres’ to those commonly used in many European or Latin American nations the level of urbanization would increase to 50–60 per cent as hundreds of millions of those now classified as rural dwellers became urban.
Asia demonstrates how the growth or decline of cities must be understood in terms of the effects of the globalization of the world economy on the one hand, and economic, social or political changes that are specific to that city or region on the other. For example, the size and rapid growth of Delhi owe more to its role as capital of India than to a position within the global economy. Similarly, Karachi's population growth over recent decades to become one of the world's largest cities has been increased by immigration of refugees, including 600,000 from India after Partition, then from Bangladesh.

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Table 1.2  Population and urban change, 1950–2001, in Asian countries with 10 million or more inhabitants

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Urban population, 2001 (000)</th>
<th>% of population in urban areas (% of population in urban areas)</th>
<th>Change in level of urbanization (%)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Eastern Asia</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>China</td>
<td>471927</td>
<td>11.0</td>
<td>26.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Democratic People's Republic of Korea</td>
<td>13571</td>
<td>31.0</td>
<td>59.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Japan</td>
<td>100469</td>
<td>50.3</td>
<td>77.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Republic of Korea</td>
<td>38830</td>
<td>21.4</td>
<td>73.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>South-Central Asia</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Afghanistan</td>
<td>5019</td>
<td>5.8</td>
<td>18.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bangladesh</td>
<td>35896</td>
<td>4.2</td>
<td>15.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>India</td>
<td>285608</td>
<td>17.3</td>
<td>25.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Iran</td>
<td>46204</td>
<td>27.0</td>
<td>56.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nepal</td>
<td>2874</td>
<td>2.3</td>
<td>10.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pakistan</td>
<td>48425</td>
<td>17.5</td>
<td>32.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sri Lanka</td>
<td>4409</td>
<td>14.4</td>
<td>21.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>South-East Asia</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Indonesia</td>
<td>90356</td>
<td>12.4</td>
<td>30.6</td>
</tr>
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<td>Malaysia</td>
<td>13154</td>
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<td>Myanmar</td>
<td>13606</td>
<td>16.2</td>
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<tr>
<td>Philippines</td>
<td>45812</td>
<td>27.1</td>
<td>48.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Thailand</td>
<td>12709</td>
<td>10.5</td>
<td>18.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Vietnam</td>
<td>19395</td>
<td>11.6</td>
<td>19.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Western Asia</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Iraq</td>
<td>15907</td>
<td>35.1</td>
<td>71.8</td>
</tr>
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<td>Saudi Arabia</td>
<td>18229</td>
<td>15.9</td>
<td>77.3</td>
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<tr>
<td>Syria</td>
<td>8596</td>
<td>30.6</td>
<td>50.2</td>
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<tr>
<td>Turkey</td>
<td>44755</td>
<td>21.3</td>
<td>60.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Yemen</td>
<td>4778</td>
<td>5.8</td>
<td>28.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>340529</td>
<td>18.6</td>
<td>31.2</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

during the 1970s, and Afghanistan and Iran in the late 1970s and 1980s. By contrast, urban dynamics in Singapore are shaped more by the city-state’s role within the global economic system than by its acting as a political or administrative centre. Most of the other large cities in Asia come between these two extremes.

Urban trends in all Asian nations are also influenced strongly by government actions. A significant policy change during the 1980s was the relaxation of government controls on urban growth in various countries and the downscaling of programmes directing new investment into peripheral regions. The most dramatic change was in China. During the Maoist era (1947–77) urbanization had three main characteristics. First, the level of urbanization was low due to government migration controls and a system of food-rationing and household regulation (*hukou*). Second, industrial and urban centres were developed in inland areas at the expense of coastal areas, in pursuit of spatial balance and for national security considerations. Third, since the Chinese economy was isolated from the rest of the world its urbanization was unaffected by external forces, such as foreign capital. Following the introduction of economic reforms and the ‘open door’ policy in 1978 three main changes occurred in the pattern of Chinese urbanization. First, the rate of urbanization accelerated, fuelled by rapid rural–urban migration in the 1980s and 1990s. This was made possible by changes in the household regulation system that during the 1960s and 1970s had controlled migration, and by the growing private food and housing markets and employment opportunities that allowed people to find a livelihood outside the official system. Second, coastal areas, including Shanghai and the Pearl River (Zhujiang) delta, benefited from preferential policies, including fiscal incentives, administrative autonomy and, most important, designation as special economic zones and open development areas. Third, external factors, especially foreign direct investment, played an increasingly important role in shaping urbanization and urban growth. Much of this urban expansion has been concentrated in large cities. The post-Maoist urbanization process transformed a pre-reform situation of underurbanization, marked by achievement of high industrial growth without a parallel growth of urban population.

**Africa**

Most of the nations with the fastest-growing populations are now in Africa (Table 1.3). In the period since the early 1960s, when most countries gained formal independence, African cities have changed in four main ways:

1. Most have grown in size. There are two main trends. First, while the largest cities have continued to expand, rates of population growth have slackened since the spectacular increases of the 1960s and 1970s. Also, whereas the principal component of large city growth was rural–urban migration in the earlier post-independence period, natural increase is now the major growth element in many cities. Second, in many countries medium-sized cities are now growing at least as quickly as the largest cities, possibly owing to the deteriorating condition of infrastructure and public services in the major cities.

2. The deterioration of services and infrastructure is the result of the mismatch between economic and urban growth. As national and urban economies stagnate in absolute terms and urban populations continue to grow (at around 4.5 per cent per year for the region as a whole), the resources needed for roads, sewers, water systems,
### Table 1.3 Urban population change in African countries with 1 million or more inhabitants, 1950, 1990 and 2001

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Urban population, 2001 (000)</th>
<th>(% of population in urban areas (level of urbanization)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1950</td>
<td>1990</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Eastern Africa</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Burundi</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Eritrea</td>
<td>730</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ethiopia</td>
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<tr>
<td>Kenya</td>
<td>10 751</td>
<td>5.6</td>
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<tr>
<td>Madagascar</td>
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<tr>
<td>Malawi</td>
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<td>3.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mauritius</td>
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<td>28.8</td>
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<td>Mozambique</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rwanda</td>
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<tr>
<td>Tanzania</td>
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<td>3.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Uganda</td>
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<td>3.1</td>
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<td>Zambia</td>
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</tr>
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<td>Zimbabwe</td>
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<td>10.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Middle Africa</strong></td>
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<td></td>
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<td>Angola</td>
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<td>Cameroon</td>
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<td>Central African Rep.</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chad</td>
<td>1964</td>
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<tr>
<td>Congo, Republic of the</td>
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<td>30.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gabon</td>
<td>1038</td>
<td>11.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Zaire (now Dem. Rep. of Congo)</td>
<td>16 120</td>
<td>19.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>North Africa</strong></td>
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<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Algeria</td>
<td>17 801</td>
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<td>Egypt</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Libya</td>
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<tr>
<td>Morocco</td>
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<td>Sudan</td>
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<tr>
<td>Tunisia</td>
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<td>31.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Southern Africa</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Botswana</td>
<td>768</td>
<td>0.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lesotho</td>
<td>592</td>
<td>0.3</td>
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<tr>
<td>Namibia</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>South Africa</td>
<td>25 260</td>
<td>43.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>West Africa</strong></td>
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<tr>
<td>Benin</td>
<td>2774</td>
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<tr>
<td>Burkina Faso</td>
<td>1999</td>
<td>3.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Côte d’Ivoire</td>
<td>7197</td>
<td>13.2</td>
</tr>
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</table>
schools, housing and hospitals cannot keep up with demand. The impact of these adverse living conditions is distributed differentially between the small elite of upper-level managers, foreign diplomats, senior politicians and successful businessmen on the one hand and the growing number of low-income urban dwellers on the other.

3. Although most sub-Saharan states aimed to industrialize in the years after independence, most made only limited progress, and the import substitution model that was adopted proved costly and of only limited success. Marginalization in the world economy, deteriorating terms of trade for primary products, limited availability of domestic capital, failure to attract foreign direct investment, increasing indebtedness, wars and natural disasters, limited government capacity and economic mismanagement have contributed to low or negative rates of economic growth for most countries, for most of the time since the 1960s. As a result, many African towns and cities have economies that cannot support their growing populations. Also, the urban labour market has changed since the 1960s. In the post-independence decade the educational system was expanded and African graduates had little difficulty in finding good jobs in either the public sector or the large-scale private sector. Subsequent contraction and privatization of the public sector have reduced these opportunities. Most African cities also have a burgeoning informal economy which has arisen in direct response to the needs of the poor.

4. All these changes have had a major effect on city form. Where once the colonial central business district (CBD) was the focus of urban life, now the centre of gravity has shifted as more of the population have moved to the urban periphery where land is cheaper and more accessible, shelter can be constructed economically using locally available materials, and official planning regulations are rarely enforced. Urban encroachment on rural areas on the edge of cities leads to conflict. The peri-urban zone is an area of economic and social change characterized by pressure on

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Urban population, 2001 (000)</th>
<th>(%) of population in urban areas (level of urbanization)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1950</td>
<td>1990</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ghana</td>
<td>7177</td>
<td>14.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Guinea</td>
<td>2312</td>
<td>5.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Liberia</td>
<td>2414</td>
<td>13.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mali</td>
<td>3606</td>
<td>8.5</td>
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<tr>
<td>Mauritania</td>
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<td>Niger</td>
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<td>Senegal</td>
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<td>Sierra Leone</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Togo</td>
<td>1579</td>
<td>7.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td>303481</td>
<td>11.8</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

natural resources, changing employment opportunities and constraints and changing patterns of land use. While rising numbers of urban inhabitants seeking jobs, housing and waste-disposal sites have a clear interest in the expansion of cities into peri-urban areas, the residents of these areas are often some of the poorest in the city region, dependent on natural resources for food, fuel, water and building materials. The horizontal expansion of the African city attenuates infrastructure such as piped water, electricity, sewerage and roads beyond system capacity and adds significantly to the costs of education, health and other social services. The combination of peripheral expansion of cities and declining public resources to service them represents the major challenge for the planning and management of African cities in the twenty-first century.

Urban challenges and policy issues in the developing world
Having established the conceptual and statistical framework for contemporary trends and patterns of urbanization and urban change in the developing world we can now turn our attention to a review of some of the major challenges confronting policy-makers in cities of the South. Here we focus on eight key urban challenges. This overview will provide a foundation for many of the themes to be discussed in later chapters of this volume.

Rural–urban migration
The relative contribution of migration and natural increase to urban growth varies with level of urbanization. At an early stage of development, when levels of urbanization are low and rates of both urban and rural natural increase are moderately high, net migration generally contributes more to urban population growth than natural increase. At an intermediate stage of urbanization, natural increase predominates. At a later stage, with a high level of urbanization and low rate of natural increase, the balance reverts in favour of net migration. Although some developing world countries are now in the intermediate stage and many large cities are growing more from natural increase, migration remains a major factor in urban growth and, in view of the size of the rural reservoir of potential migrants, will continue to be so for the foreseeable future. Policy responses to large-scale rural–urban migration range from efforts at preventing flows via the imposition of migration controls to various means of accommodating the influx of population.

Migration controls
Many city administrations in the developing world have sought to limit rural–urban migration and even to reverse the flow by employing a series of measures including administrative and legal controls on population movement, police registration schemes and direct rustication programmes to relocate urban dwellers in the countryside. These strategies have had most success in socialist states. In China, in order to slow the rate of urbanization and reduce emerging income and welfare differentials between urban and rural areas, the government in 1958 introduced a population registration system (hukou), that classified people as either urban or rural residents. Limiting the number of citizens who could be registered as urban dwellers restricted the numbers moving opportunistically to cities in the hope of finding work. The registration scheme was supported by rationing of food, which was available in cities only to those in possession of an urban
household registration document. In the absence of a significant black market these measures proved highly effective in slowing the rate of rural emigration, albeit at a cost to personal liberty. Migration controls were complemented by rustication programmes that resulted in the movement of 30 million urban residents (including 17 million young people) into the countryside during the period 1966–76 (Devlin, 1999). These measures continued until the late 1970s, when the policy was relaxed to support China’s industrialization strategy, by permitting the ‘temporary’ migration of rural dwellers to work in urban areas (Fan, 2002). The distinction between temporary migrants (who do not possess an urban hukou and are therefore excluded from the better jobs) and permanent migrants (state-sponsored and selected migrants who are granted urban citizenship) is manifested in the ‘floating population’ of urban China which, in 1997, amounted to 100 million persons or 25 per cent of China’s urban population (Goodkind and West, 2002). The marginalization of this group, particularly in the housing and labour markets, has created what amounts to a new urban underclass. Whether the relaxation of controls on rural–urban migration since the 1980s will lead to the kind of urban growth rates and problems confronting other ‘Third World’ cities remains to be seen.

Accommodating migrants
In some states there is acknowledgement of people’s need and right to move to the city, and attempts are made to ameliorate the hardship of migrants. It has been suggested that the welfare of the migrant population could be improved by introducing regulations on minimum wages and working conditions, but since a majority work outside the formal sector of the urban economy, such legislative steps are unlikely to reach the mass of the poor. Of more direct relevance are schemes to provide training, start-up capital and marketing assistance for hawkers, and policies that legitimize squatter settlements. In general, however, the scale of urban poverty and the limited financial resources available mean that only a minority of cities pursue such programmes. The accommodation approach has also been criticized for dealing with the symptoms rather than addressing the causes of rural–urban migration. It may even attract more migrants into the cities, thereby exacerbating the problem in the longer term.

Dispersed urbanization
An alternative strategy is to accept the inevitability of rural emigration but seek to redirect flows away from the large cities. A common approach, based on growth-pole theory, employs a combination of carrot (such as tax incentives and infrastructure provision) and stick (such as relocation of public administrative functions) to stimulate the economy of designated medium-size secondary cities (Rondinelli, 1983) thereby providing alternative employment opportunities for migrants. Industrial decentralization strategies have been employed with some success in a number of Third World cities including Bombay (Deshpande and Deshpande, 1991), Mexico City (Gibson and Corona, 1985), and Seoul (Choi, 1990). More generally, however, the strategy has proved less effective, owing to the reluctance of companies and personnel to relinquish the amenities of the large city, the insufficient level of incentives, changing priorities and government economic policy, and, in particular, policy conflict between the goals of urban decentralization and national economic development. Most Third World governments acknowledge the difficulties in developing intermediate cities in peripheral regions as counter-magnets
to the primate city, and have instead sought to promote decentralization of population
and industry to satellite towns located around the main urban centres.

Transforming the rural economy
As most migrants move for economic reasons any policy that transforms the rural
economy will affect the scale and pace of urban development. Policies to redistribute
land to the poor may slow urban growth by raising agricultural incomes. Few Third
World governments, however, possess the political will or ability to implement proposed
land-reform policies. Other rural programmes may have the opposite effect: the green
revolution and other attempts to raise agricultural productivity through incentives to
commercial farming accentuated landlessness and stimulated rather than reduced the
flow of city-bound migrants (Griffin and Ghose, 1979).

As Parnwell (1993) concludes, the countries that have been most successful in influenc-
ing the pattern and level of migration have been those with either the financial resources
to fund adequate development programmes (for example South Korea and Malaysia) or
the political authority (for example China and Cuba) to implement their migration poli-
cies. Given that the majority of Third World governments do not possess the resources,
authority or political will to influence the pattern and process of migration, it seems
inevitable that rural–urban migration will remain a feature of Third World societies for
the foreseeable future. This raises the key issue of what happens to the migrants once
they reach the city. Central to this question is the structure of the urban economy.

Urban economy and employment
The contemporary character of the Third World urban economy reflects the incorpora-
tion of national economies into the world economic system. The economy of cities
in the South is based on peripheral capitalism. This mode of production consists of two
interrelated parts: a capitalist sector integrated into the world economy, and a range
of petty capitalist forms of production oriented more towards the domestic economy.
The well-being of individuals and households is dependent on their position within this
dual-sector urban economy.

Segmentation of the labour market is dependent upon the existence of forces that
control access to jobs of different types. These include institutional barriers and the char-
acteristics, credentials and resources of individuals. Significantly, for those who fail to
gain access to the better segments of the urban labour market it is by no means certain
that they will find easy-entry low-income jobs available. Much of the informal sector is
also highly protected by entry rules. As a result, many urban dwellers face a lifetime of
casual work eking out a living by taking on whatever menial jobs they can find. The more
open entry points into the urban labour market include portering, casual construction
work and domestic service. At the bottom of the scale are marginal activities such as
begging, prostitution, theft and other illegal operations.

For several decades, urban labour markets throughout the developing world have
experienced an excess of labour with limited skills. This has led to a growth in open
unemployment. Some writers maintain that in countries where few qualify for unem-
ployment benefits, unemployment is not usually representative of those in the most
desperate living conditions. It is argued that only the not-so-poor family can support an
unemployed member (for example an educated offspring) during an extended search for
employment within the protected labour force (Berry, 1975). For the poor, unemploy-
ment is a luxury they cannot afford. Although one should not dismiss the problem of
employment among middle-income groups, the bulk of evidence underlines the con-
centration of unemployment among the poor residents of Third World cities.

A second element of the urban labour surplus in the developing world is underemploy-
ment. This is seen in three distinct forms. First, fluctuations in economic activity may
occur during the day (for example at markets), over the week or month (for example
in recreational services) or seasonally (as in tourism). As activity ebbs, casual labour
is laid off and many self-employed people are left without work. Second, workers may
be so numerous that at all times a substantial proportion are less than fully employed
(for example street vendors). Third, hidden unemployment may occur where solidarity
groups continue to employ all their members rather than discharging them when there
is insufficient work to keep them fully occupied. Such generated employment is typical
of family enterprise but social ties (such as those based on common origin or shared
religion) can also promote a commitment to maintain every member of a community.

A third facet of urban surplus labour is misemployment, which refers to activity
that contributes little to social welfare and includes begging as well as the hangers-on
of the powerful and affluent, a role that is institutionalized in the inflated bureaucratic
structures of many contemporary Third World societies (Gilbert and Gugler, 1992).

Women in the labour force

The urban labour market is also segmented along gender lines. In general, women occupy
a less favoured position, being found disproportionately in the least remunerative and/
or lowest-status occupations (Nelson, 1997). Neo-classical economic theory attributes
male–female differentials in earnings to differences in productivity due to gender-based
differences in human capital (with women being less valuable because of a lack of physi-
cal strength, limited education and training, and family responsibilities that may give rise
to greater absenteeism and labour turnover). These factors, however, explain only part
of the wage gap. Feminist theories have emphasized the importance of socio-cultural
factors in restricting women’s access to and progression in the labour market. These
include the favouring of male children over female offspring in human-resource devel-
opment. The classification of certain types of employment as ‘women’s work’ and the
lower pay and security associated with such activities accentuate the gender segregat-
on of the urban labour market (Humphrey, 1997). Particular attention has been focused on
the traditional allocation of housework and child care (reproduction) to women, and
the limiting impact of this gender division of labour on women’s ability to participate in
non-domestic (production) work.

Women have increasingly been absorbed into wage labour within the formal sector as
part of the new international division of labour (NIDL). In countries such as Mexico,
India and the Philippines, export processing zones (EPZs) and free-trade zones special-
izing in light manufacturing and data-processing have led to a feminization of the labour
market as a result of employers’ demands for a low-cost, flexible and passive workforce
(Chant and McIlwaine, 1995). Despite their insistence on non-union agreements, dereg-
ulation of any existing national labour laws and long hours of work, most TNCs tend to
better local wages and working conditions, and for many women such jobs are prefer-
able to traditional alternatives such as domestic service. In most cities of the developing
world, however, the industrial labour force is small and the majority of female workers still find employment in the informal sector. Here, as in the formal sector, women are commonly found in low-waged occupations such as food preparation, petty commodity production, street trading or working in subcontracting.

Child labour
Child labour is also common in the South, where most children are required to make a contribution to the household economy (Fyfe, 1994). Child labour takes many forms, from paid work in a factory and other types of wage labour such as street-vending to bonded labour in which a child must work to pay off a family debt. Many children work in hazardous activities such as brick-making, construction and mining, do not receive adequate nutrition or health care, and have little or no formal education (Kathari, 1983). Child labour is a graphic representation of urban poverty and deprivation. The meagre earnings of children make a significant difference for impoverished families, and for many female-headed households the contribution of the firstborn is essential to family survival (Cupertino, 1990). In extreme cases, children may be sold into conditions little better than slavery. Child prostitution is an increasing problem in cities of Asia; in Bombay alone an estimated 100 000 are exploited in this way. In most cities of the South there is a growing population of street children who have left home or have been abandoned (Hecht, 1998). Legislative attempts to regulate child labour are largely ineffective, being almost impossible to enforce in cities where the mass of the population are engaged in a daily struggle to satisfy their basic needs.

Shelter for the urban poor
Access to decent, affordable housing is a basic requirement for human well-being, yet in most large cities of the South much of the population occupies the most rudimentary forms of shelter. The failure of government housing programmes to provide affordable housing has forced the mass of the urban population of the developing world into cheaper alternative forms of shelter, which range from inner-city slum tenements and peripheral squatter settlements to the pavements (sidewalks) of major cities. The shortage of adequate housing is exacerbated by high rates of population growth which leave no doubt that the lack of decent affordable housing for the urban poor represents an ongoing challenge.

Various explanations have been advanced for the limited investment of Third World governments in low-income housing. For Dwyer (1975), some urban authorities adopt a policy of inaction in the hope that migrants, whom they consider to be the cause of the housing problem, will return to their rural origins. The continuing expansion of Third World cities and growth of illegal settlements indicate the futility of this approach. Other explanations for government indifference include a fear of the latent political power of squatters, which forestalls any public reaction to their acquisition of land. This is equally unlikely. Even in Latin America, where squatters have mobilized in defence of their settlements, only rarely do they become enmeshed in more general political action. More pragmatic explanations for government inaction refer to administrative inefficiencies and a lack of information on land-ownership. Recourse to ‘master planning’ often accentuates inaction. The master plan for Dhaka covers only 40 per cent of the built-up area and was produced in 1959 for an anticipated population of 2 million (compared with a
present figure of over 6 million that is growing by 250,000 per year). In most developing world countries the conception of urban development as ‘planning–servicing–building–occupation’ is reversed for most of the population. Even where planning information is available, its effective use can be hindered by a corrupt political process in which the urban poor have little power. Nominal improvement of squatter settlements and partial recognition of tenure in the run-up to elections are both common strategies of most political groups in the developing world. Further, much of the land in the large cities is held by individuals or institutions for speculative gain (McAuslan, 1990). The inability of urban local authorities to appropriate a sufficient share of the benefits of economic growth through taxation undermines their capacity to improve the living environments of low-income citizens, even if the political will were there.

Public authorities in the developing world may also learn lessons from the development strategy of the illegal sub-dividers, which is successful because it is compatible with the actual socio-economic conditions of the poor. Thus, in addition to ensuring an adequate supply of land for low-income housing and supporting the extension of credit to borrowers with less conventional forms of collateral, governments might usefully consider the benefits of limited bureaucracy and the application of more ‘flexible’ planning arrangements, including less restrictive development-control procedures, that facilitate shelter construction by small-scale developers at lower standards (while ensuring structural safety and public health) over an extended period (Ogu, 1999). The incremental development approach adopted in Hyderabad and upgradable sites projects in Indian cities (Banerjee and Verma, 1994) are examples of public initiatives on low-income housing that address directly the reality of urban poverty in the South. Such projects acknowledge that ‘in the Third World city incremental building is the functional substitute for the incremental paying that takes place in countries with mortgage systems that reach the working class’ (Brennan 1993: 89). Rather than depending on an ‘enabling’ approach to provision of low-income housing based on market-led development and a trickle-down mechanism, government housing policies might usefully be informed by the experience of the informal sector in terms of land supply, housing standards, administrative simplicity, public participation and time scale for development (Mukhija, 2004). Plurality of provision is a prerequisite for addressing the housing problems in Third World cities.

**Environmental problems**

Urban environmental problems in cities of the South are evident at a number of geographical scales, from the internal environments of home and workplace to the neighbourhood and city levels. The various forms of poor-quality housing in the Third World city share a number of characteristics that contribute to poor environmental health. The first of these is the lack of safe and sufficient water supply. The second is the presence of pathogens or pollutants in the human environment because of a lack of basic infrastructure such as sewers, drains or services to collect and safely dispose of solid and liquid wastes. The third is the overcrowded living conditions, which increase the transmission of airborne infections, as well as the risk of domestic accidents.

Environmental hazards arising in the workplace are a major problem in Third World cities. They include dangerous concentrations of toxic chemicals and dust, inadequate lighting, ventilation and space, and lack of protection for workers from machinery and
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noise. The effects of workplace hazards are heightened by the general lack of social
security, with little or no provision by most employers of sick pay or compensation if
workers are injured or laid off. Certain industrial activities have long been associated
with high levels of risk for their workforce, as in factories extracting, processing and
milling asbestos, chemical plants, the cement, glass and ceramics industries, the iron and
steel industries, factories manufacturing rubber and plastics products, and the textile
and leather industries. In the informal sector of the Third World urban economy, many
small enterprises use chemicals that should be used only with special safety equipment
(Asgoy, 1976). Certain groups are particularly at risk from occupational hazards. Many
light industries prefer to employ young women to assemble products and often use haz-
ardous chemicals, such as PCBs, without adequate safeguards. This can pose a threat to
pregnant women and their unborn children. The widespread use of child labour exposes
minors to the risk of accident, injury and industrial disease.

At the neighbourhood scale tens of millions of urban inhabitants in Africa, Asia
and Latin America occupy land sites susceptible to natural hazards. Clusters of illegal
housing often develop on marginal land such as steep hillsides, flood plains or desert
land, or on the most unhealthy or polluted land sites around solid-waste dumps, beside
open drains and sewers, or in and around industrial areas with high levels of air pollu-
tion. Many low-income settlements also develop on sites subject to high noise pollution,
close to airports or major highways. Rarely do the poor occupy such sites in ignorance
of the dangers. These sites are cheap or can be occupied without payment because they
are dangerous and therefore unattractive to alternative uses.

The main problems at the city level refer to air and water pollution. In developed
countries, until the clean-air legislation of the 1960s and 1970s, most air pollution was
caused by the combustion of coal or heavy oil by industry, power stations and house-
holds, which produced a mixture of sulphur dioxide, suspended particulates and inor-
ganic components. These were the source of the infamous London pea-soup ‘smogs’
of the 1950s. They remain the main source of air pollution in many Third World cities.
China is home to 16 of the world’s 20 most polluted cities and is the world’s second-
largest producer of greenhouse gases (after the US). Over the period 1996–2006 the
concentration of pollutants in China’s air increased by 50 per cent. Chemical analysis
of particulate matter from Beijing, where a high proportion of all energy is produced
by coal-burning, identified high levels of organic compounds, including the carcinogen
benzopyrene (World Health Organization, 1992). In many cities in the South the concen-
trations and mixes of air pollutants are high enough to cause illness in more susceptible
individuals and premature death among the elderly, especially those with respiratory
problems. More recently, largely as a result of growing automobile use in Third World
cities, photochemical (‘oxidizing’) pollutants have become a major problem (the ‘Los
Angeles smog complex’).

The main sources of water pollution are sewage, industrial effluents, storm and urban
run-off, and agricultural run-off that can penetrate supplies of drinking water. Virtually
all Third World cities cause serious water pollution, and in many cases urban rivers are
literally open sewers. In Jakarta all the rivers are heavily polluted by discharges from
drains and ditches carrying untreated waste-water from households, commercial build-
ings and institutions, industrial effluent, solid wastes and faecal wastes from overflowing
or leaking septic tanks. Water-related diseases such as diarrhoea, typhoid and cholera

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increase in frequency downstream as the rivers pass through the metropolitan area. Sea water and sediments in Jakarta Bay are affected by the pollution load of discharging rivers. High concentrations of heavy metals, such as cadmium, mercury and lead, have been recorded and can enter the food chain through fish and shellfish.

In many cities of the developing world, such as Mexico City (Schteingart, 1989) and Dakar (White, 1992) a shortage of fresh water compounds the problem of dealing with liquid wastes, especially sewage and industrial effluents. Hundreds of urban centres that developed in relatively arid areas, such as Lima, have grown beyond the point where adequate supplies can be tapped from local or even regional sources. Many other cities face major financial problems in expanding supply to meet demand. Nearly 80 per cent of Jakarta’s residents use underground water, supplies of which have become steadily depleted. In low-lying northern parts of the city the extraction of water has led to land subsidence, which has increased the city’s susceptibility to flooding and allowed saline water to penetrate the coastal aquifers and pollute central city wells, 9 miles (15 km) inland (United Nations, 1989). Similar problems have been encountered in Bangkok, which sank by 5.2 ft (1.6 m) between 1960 and 1988 owing to ground-water extraction.

In addition to the site-specific risks from natural and human-induced hazards experienced by low-income urban dwellers, many cities occupy locations that pose threats to a large proportion of the population. In the event of a disaster, the concentration of population in major cities can mean a heavy death toll and substantial property loss. The earthquakes that struck Mexico City in 1985 and their aftershocks killed 10000 people, injured 50000 and made 250000 homeless. Damage amounted to US$4 billion (Degg, 1989). Urban floods also represent a major hazard in the South. Flooding often arises as a result of the extension of urban areas unaccompanied by the development of storm drainage systems, as in Benin City (Odemerko, 1993) and Nairobi (Krhoda, 1992). Urban floods can contaminate water supplies and are associated with epidemics of dysentery and other water-borne (such as ascariasis) and water-washed (such as leishmaniasis) diseases. Outbreaks of leptospirosis (usually caused by drinking water infected by rat urine) have been associated with floods in Rio de Janeiro and São Paulo, with those living in the poorest areas particularly at risk. Threat of inundation is especially severe in rapidly growing coastal cities, including Bangkok, Jakarta, Shanghai, Dhaka and Alexandria, which are particularly susceptible to the combined effects of sea-level rise and land subsidence (Nicholls, 1995).

The city’s ecological footprint
Cities impose an environmental impact on their hinterlands and, in some cases, on ecosystems far beyond the immediate region, owing to their demand for renewable resources, such as water, fossil fuels, land and building materials, which cannot be met from within the city’s boundaries. Cities are also major producers of wastes, much of which impacts upon the surrounding region. The more populous the city the greater its ‘ecological footprint’, which may be defined as the land area and natural resource capital on which the city draws to sustain its population and production structure (Rees, 1992). In the past, the size and economic base of any city was constrained by the size and quality of the resource endowments of its surrounding region, and a city’s ecological footprint remained relatively local. Today city-based consumers and industries based in wealthy nations have the capacity to draw resources from far beyond their immediate regions and
have increasingly appropriated the carrying capacity of rural regions in other nations, with little apparent regard for the environmental impact of their actions. In the South the urban imprint is generally less far-reaching, but nevertheless exerts a fundamental influence on ecosystems within the city region. Among the major challenges for most Third World cities is the need to address the range of environmental problems that has been termed the brown agenda (Williams, 1997). This focuses the attention of urban analysts and decision-makers on the primary requirement of providing safe, sufficient supplies of water to households and enterprises, and making provision for the collection and disposal of liquid and solid wastes in order to combat the effects of pathogens that underlie the high levels of morbidity and mortality characteristic of most Third World cities. A fundamental environmental hazard in cities of the South is that related to levels of morbidity and mortality.

**Intra-urban variations in health**

At an aggregate level, city health statistics generally seem better than those for rural areas of the developing world. This is misleading, however, since squatter populations are often not included in official statistics. Even when these settlements are included, health conditions in low-income areas are disguised by the figures for healthier and better-served middle- and high-income areas of the city.

Before the HIV/AIDS epidemic, tuberculosis was the main cause of death among adults in developing countries. The interaction of HIV and TB and the spread of multi-drug-resistant strains of TB raise concerns over a resurgence of tuberculosis, which kills one in four of the adult population in the South (Farmer, 1997). High-density low-income urban populations are potentially at risk. The socio-environmental conditions in such areas have also led to the emergence or re-emergence of vector-borne diseases, including malaria, filariasis, dengue, typhus and Chaga’s disease. Urban malaria is a major health problem in slums and squatter settlements where the carrier, the anopheles mosquito, breeds in stagnant pools of water caused by rain or a lack of sanitation or drainage. Epidemics of other vector-borne diseases such as dengue haemorrhagic fever are associated with the need of households to store water in iron drums or earthenware containers which provide ideal breeding conditions for the mosquito *Aedes aegypti*, the vector of dengue and yellow fever. Tuberculosis is prevalent in the slums and shanty towns, and malnutrition is widespread. The scarcity of clean water and lack of sanitation make diarrhoeal diseases a major health problem, while a variety of intestinal parasites, such as ascaris (roundworm) and trichuris (whipworm), are usually present. The crowded living conditions also increase the risk of meningococcal meningitis, and lead to a high incidence of preventable infections in children such as measles, whooping cough and polio.

As well as physical health problems, social and psychological difficulties may arise as a result of the disadvantaged position of the urban poor. Chronic stress may arise in those who feel depressed, cheated, bitter, desperate, isolated and vulnerable; who are worried about debts or jobs and housing insecurity; and who feel devalued and alienated from wider society. In the city the protection afforded by rural local communities and the extended family is less readily available. Single-parent households, often female-headed, are common, and with the need for women to work, children are often neglected. In addition, as we have seen, children may have to contribute to family income by working under sweatshop conditions, exposed to accidents and exploitation. The failure of
some migrants to adapt to city life can lead to problems of alcoholism and depression (Harpham et al., 1988).

**Primary health care and the urban poor**

In spite of the concentration of health resources in the cities compared with the rural areas, and the relative proximity of hospitals and other medical facilities, for those who live in the slums and shanty towns of the South, standards of health care fall below a reasonable minimum. Hart’s (1971) inverse care law, according to which those in greatest need of care have the worst access to it, operates to marked effect in the Third World city. Furthermore, the health-care services that are available tend to emphasize curative rather than preventive medicine, meaning that the underlying causes of ill health are unlikely to be addressed adequately.

Primary health care (PHC) has emerged as the favoured response to the health problems in Third World cities. At the heart of the PHC approach are the principles of equity in distribution, community involvement, a focus on prevention, use of appropriate technology, and a multi-sectoral approach that acknowledges the multiple aetiology of health problems. The main constituents of a PHC strategy are education about diseases and their control, the provision of safe water and basic sanitation and attempts to ensure maternal and child health, including family planning, immunization against major infectious diseases, treatment of common diseases and injuries and the provision of essential drugs (Phillips, 1990). Some have argued that this form of ‘comprehensive PHC’ is idealistic and unattainable in the Third World city and that, faced with the vast number of health problems of varying severity, priorities must be identified for reasons of practicality, cost and effective use of available resources (Walsh and Warren, 1979). This form of ‘selective PHC’ (SPHC) typically focuses on paediatric conditions, such as measles, whooping cough, neo-natal tetanus and diarrhoeal diseases. A lower priority is usually accorded to conditions such as polio, typhoid, respiratory infections, meningitis and malnutrition, since of this group only polio can effectively be controlled by medical intervention. The lowest priorities, in SPHC terms, are accorded to diseases such as dengue, filariasis and amoebiasis, since their control is difficult, largely socio-environmental and hence costly and requiring continuing efforts. This focus on interventions of proven efficacy acknowledges that the complex poverty syndrome of malnutrition, gastroenteric diseases and respiratory infection will not yield to specific programmes but requires social and environmental improvements such as better housing, potable water and safe sanitation. Without these wider initiatives, effective treatment of many conditions, particularly diarrhoeal and respiratory infections, may result only in cured children becoming rapidly reinfected. Critics of SPHC contend that the selective nature of the approach, and the tendency to focus on problems of paediatric and maternal illness, exclude much of the adult population, especially males. Others have argued that SPHC programmes negate the principle of community participation, are too technological, too cost-oriented and reflect a narrow definition of health (the absence of disease) compared with the WHO definition (a state of complete physical, mental and social well-being, not merely the absence of infirmity in an individual) (Unger and Killingsworth, 1986). In practice, each country designs PHC schemes to suit its own needs. Some schemes have significant community involvement (Dejene, 1991) while others are organized in a top-down manner and adopt an SPHC approach (Harrison, 1991).
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Integrated approaches seek to bring together a range of health and other initiatives to produce an outcome that is greater than the sum of the parts. Health improvement is seen as only part of an integrated approach, the goal of which is the total development of the community. This resembles the concept of comprehensive PHC. Despite its potential for building systematic linkages between physical improvements, social services and resident participation, the integrated community development approach is an exception in Third World cities. Community participation is a key principle in an integrated approach. Environmental improvements, such as the reconstruction of a slum community, may require some of the residents to give up part of their plot or building to allow improved streets and drainage lines to be installed. Failure to consult local communities in advance often leads to a subsequent lack of co-operation and problems with ongoing maintenance of the new infrastructure.

Effective introduction and implementation of integrated community-development initiatives requires co-ordinated action at a number of scales and is dependent upon close links between service providers and intended recipients. The complex of poverty-related problems in the most deprived urban communities, including low levels of education, limited resources and unfamiliarity with urban power structures, undermines the ability of the poor to mobilize resources for their health needs. In such circumstances non-governmental organizations (NGOs) and private voluntary organizations (PVOs) can play an important role in promoting community development (Silimperi, 1995). A public–private partnership between a city health authority and an NGO or PVO can provide the latter with a macro-scale perspective and framework for replication of successful projects. The public agency benefits by gaining a trusted mode of entry into a community, and the means to deliver community-based PHC services with an emphasis on prevention as opposed to the more common facility-based curative care. Moreover, it is important to recognize that ill health is only one facet of the problems of the Third World urban poor, and that strategies to address health issues cannot be undertaken in isolation from those required to improve the general well-being of the poor. In many instances it is not people’s poverty that drives illness but the incapacity or unwillingness of government institutions to provide them with the means to prevent ill health, in part through basic services. This, in turn, is related to unrepresentative political structures where the poor majority have little power and influence over public actions.

Poverty, power and politics in the city

As the pace of urbanization and urban growth has increased, the capacity of most Third World governments to manage the consequences of these trends has decreased. The social, economic and environmental impacts of this failure fall most heavily upon the poor, who are generally excluded from the benefits of capitalist urban development.

Patron–client relations

Individuals and households may try to offset their disadvantaged position within the urban polity by cultivating as patron someone in a position to further their employment prospects or assist them in a crisis. The patron–client relationship is a reciprocal one between two individuals. In exchange for the patron’s help the client gives political support and contributes to the patron’s status. The exchange is not based on legal or contractual requirements but is an informal understanding. The relationship is also a highly
unequal one. Not only does the patron have greater power, more economic resources and higher status, but he usually has numerous clients, and the leverage any one of them can exert on the patron is therefore narrowly circumscribed.

The scope for clientalism within the Third World city is a function of the lack of impersonal rules for allocating resources. If, for example, job entry and tenure were institutionalized and purely a function of qualification, performance and/or seniority, it could not be a source of patronage. Unlike in Western countries, where most political activity takes place during the input (policy-making) stage, in the South often a large part of individual and collective lobbying, representation of interests and the rise and resolution of conflicts takes place during the output (execution) stage of the political process (van der Linden, 1997).

Clientalism, both by individuals and organized on behalf of neighbourhoods, has a long tradition in many Third World societies (Desai, 1996). Clientalism may be interpreted either as a mechanism that responds to the demands of those in need or as a means of domination that excludes those who do not submit to it and that perpetuates the unequal status quo in society. Some communities have sought to make gains through collective action that eschews the electoral bargaining inherent in clientalism. This form of struggle to improve the quality of personal and collective consumption within marginalized communities is highlighted by the emergence of urban social movements.

**Community participation in Third World urban governance**

Grass-roots community organizations and urban social movements arise because the urban poor are excluded from effective participation in the formal political decision-making process. The political ideology of the state can have a critical influence on the extent of popular participation in urban development. The election of progressive local governments in the municipalities of Moreno, Buenos Aires (Hercer and Pirez, 1991) and Vila El Salvador in Lima (Peattie, 1990) was accompanied by decentralization of decision-making to the community level, while in several Brazilian cities, participatory policies of various kinds were introduced following the electoral success of the Workers’ Party in the late 1980s (Souza, 2001).

In practice, a vertical scale or ‘ladder of community participation’ may be identified for Third World urban society, which reflects varying levels of government support for community action (Chogoill, 1991). This comprises:

1. **Empowerment.** Community members initiate and have control over a project or programme, possibly with the assistance of outside organizations and with a supportive municipal government. The low-income community of Jardin Celeste in São Paulo, which undertook a self-help project to provide 1400 houses and neighbourhood facilities, was founded by a government agency (FUNACON) and assisted by an independent technical assistance team contracted by the local government (Denaldi, 1994).

2. **Partnership.** Members of a community, outside decision-makers and planners agree to share managerial responsibility for development projects. In Tegucigalpa, Honduras, the extension of a water supply to peripheral low-income communities
requires the community’s request to be approved by the national water authority to ensure that the applicants are able to construct and maintain the system. The central authority designs an appropriate system, covers many of the capital costs and provides technical assistance. The community forms a water association, then supplies the workforce to construct the facilities, purchases some of the materials, takes responsibility for the administration and maintenance of the completed system and collects user fees (Choguill, 1991).

3. Conciliation. Conciliation occurs when government devises a development strategy for ratification by the people. Community representatives may be appointed to advisory groups or even decision-making bodies but are frequently forced to accept the views of a more powerful elite. This top-down paternalistic approach to urban management is evident in the master planning strategy for the city of Curitiba, Brazil (Rabinovitch and Leitman, 1993).

4. Dissimulation. People are appointed to rubber-stamp advisory committees in order to achieve a semblance of participation, as in the case of the advisory board to the Urban Planning Unit of Campo Grande, Brazil, on which one representative of the low-income peripheral areas sat with twenty members of professional associations and groups involved in speculative development (Rezende, 1992). From this level down the ladder of participation, government increasingly leaves communities to fend for themselves.

5. Diplomacy. Diplomacy is also a form of manipulation in which the government, owing to lack of interest, shortage of financial resources or incompetence, expects the community to undertake any necessary improvement projects, usually with the aid of an outside NGO. This approach may involve government in attitude surveys, consultation with residents and public hearings, but with no assurance that projects will be implemented or that support for any community effort will be forthcoming. Government may provide some limited aid, mainly for political reasons, if it appears that a community is making real progress. When the low-income community of Baldia in Karachi initiated a major sanitation project in partnership with a foreign NGO, the metropolitan government subsequently surfaced roads, provided street lighting and improved the water supply (Turner, 1988).

6. Informing. Informing comprises a top-down, one-way flow of information from public officials to the community of their rights, responsibilities and options, without an opportunity for feedback or negotiation. The lack of community participation may lead to problems of excessive cost and poor ongoing maintenance, as in the scheme to relocate squatters on an area of flood-prone land to the north of Dhaka (Choguill, 1993).

7. Conspiracy. In this case, participation of low-income communities in the formal decision-making process is not even considered. The poor appear little more than an embarrassment to government, the most vivid examples being the forced evictions of squatters from urban areas throughout the Third World.
8. **Self-management.** Self-management indicates a situation in which government does nothing to resolve local problems, and members of a community, possibly with the aid of an NGO, plan and implement improvements to their neighbourhood, though not always successfully. In contrast to empowerment, self-management emanates from lack of government interest, or even opposition to the demands of the poor. An example of a successful self-management initiative is the installation of a sanitation system in the Orangi neighbourhood of Karachi (Hassan, 2006).

The political ideology and attitude of government are a key determinant of the success of initiatives to improve the living conditions of the urban poor in the developing world. Governments may support, manipulate, reject or neglect the demands of the poor. Strategies to improve the quality of life of the urban masses of the South must seek to reconstruct the relationship between the disadvantaged and the polity through enhanced participative democracy, meaningful dialogue and decentralized decision-making. It is also essential to adopt a long-term multi-sectoral approach to the problems of urban poverty. As the examples of ‘empowerment’ (in Jardin Celeste) and ‘self-management’ (in the Orangi project) indicate, individual and collective determination also play an important role in meeting basic needs, with or without government support. Nevertheless, in view of the disadvantaged position of the poor, in order to achieve long-term sustainable development, ongoing support from NGOs or government will be required at least to a point where community activities can become self-sustaining.

**Urban traffic and transport**

In recent decades the growth in number of cars in the world has been more rapid than the growth in urban population. Between 1950 and 1990 the number of cars on the world’s roads increased from 53 million to over 400 million. By the latter date the global number of trucks, buses and commercial vehicles had risen to 100 million. Although the majority of vehicles are in the developed world, certain countries in the South have experienced the most rapid growth in the number of road vehicles. Between 1975 and 1995 the number of passenger cars per thousand inhabitants doubled in Mexico, tripled in Botswana and Malaysia, and quintupled in Ecuador.

Although the nature and extent of traffic problems vary from one country to another virtually all Third World countries suffer from the following:

- Unplanned, haphazard development at the suburban fringe without adequate infrastructure, transport, and other public services;
- Limited network of roads, often narrow, poorly maintained and unpaved;
- Extremely congested roads with an incompatible mix of both motorized and non-motorized vehicles at widely different speeds;
- Rapidly increasing ownership and use of private cars and motorcycles;
- Inadequate roadway accommodations for buses and non-motorized transport;
- Primitive or often non-existent traffic control and management, often without even the most basic street signage;
- High and rapidly rising traffic fatalities especially among pedestrians and motorcyclists;
Introduction

- Overcrowded, uncomfortable, undependable, slow, uncoordinated, inefficient, and dangerous public transport;
- High levels of transport-related pollution, noise and other environmental impacts.

The rapid traffic growth in the developing world is concentrated in the larger cities, stimulated by increased incomes for some groups in society and a general expansion in urban economic activities. The physical spread of many Third World cities has also generated greater use of motor transport and longer trip distances (Dimitriou, 1992). Nearly all cities in the South have been affected by the advent of motor vehicles but few have been successful in coping with the rapid growth in road traffic. Major Third World cities face problems comparable to those of Western cities in relation to traffic congestion. Even with lower rates of car-ownership, the much lower provision for roads in Third World cities, poor road maintenance and poorly functioning traffic-management systems often ensure high levels of congestion. In densely populated central cities such as Mumbai and Dhaka traffic flow is also constricted by hawkers selling newspapers or washing windshields at road junctions, and pavement dwellers who take over sidewalks and force pedestrians into the streets. In major cities the economic cost of traffic congestion can amount to billions of dollars per year, and any city with serious congestion is likely to lose new investment to less congested rivals. Congested roads coupled with an insufficient public-transport system also mean high costs for low-income households, which comprise the majority of the population of cities in the South. In metropolitan areas without effective public-transport systems, low-income households may have to devote up to one-fifth of their income on transport (United Nations Centre for Human Settlements, 1994).

Those who own and use road vehicles rarely pay the full social and environmental costs generated. Much of the health risk associated with road vehicles is borne by non-road users. Road traffic accidents are a leading cause of death among adolescents globally. Around three-quarters of all traffic accidents now occur in the South, even though the level of vehicle-ownership is higher in advanced economies. In India there are more fatalities (60,000) each year from road accidents than in the USA, yet it has one-twentieth the number of vehicles. Most often it is pedestrians or cyclists who are killed or injured, and since it is generally low-income groups who use these modes of transport, the costs of road traffic accidents are borne disproportionately by this section of society. Traffic congestion combined with less efficient and poorly maintained engines, and higher levels of lead-based additives in gasoline, can also mean high levels of automobile-related air pollution, even when the number of road vehicles in use is substantially less than in Western cities.

Demand for transport in cities, whether of people or goods, is determined largely by the spatial arrangement of different land uses. In cities of the developing world, rapid urban expansion driven by in-migration leads to many new arrivals being forced to live at increasing distances from the job opportunities of the central city (Camara and Banister, 1993). The significance of informal economic activities also produces a pattern of travel demand with spatial and temporal characteristics different from those generated by the more formally organized economic activity of the Western city. The polarized distribution of income within the Third World city also affects levels of mobility and patterns of travel. The diverse demand for urban transport cannot be satisfied by
the kind of high-capacity radial transport corridors that serve Western cities. Since in most Third World cities scarcity of public finances is likely to be the major determinant of transport policy, there is little point in developing options that are unaffordable by either society or individual users. In view of this it would also be unwise to discount the likely continuing contribution of walking, non-motorized and motorized intermediate public transport, such as the auto-rickshaw, to mobility and accessibility in the Third World city.

Urban form in the developing world

One of the most striking features of the global urban pattern is the degree to which the urban population lives in giant cities that dominate the global urban and economic systems. Against the background of a general increase in the number of people living in urban places, discussed earlier, it is the metropolitan regions that are proliferating and expanding most rapidly.

While noting the difficulties of urban definition and cross-national comparison, we can identify a number of significant trends in the geographical distribution of megacities. Table 1.4 lists the fifteen largest urban agglomerations at different points in time, and enables us to map the major changes over the post-Second World War period. Tokyo, with a population of 27.9 million in 2000, has been the largest city in the world since 1970 and is projected to retain that rank. By contrast, New York is projected to continue to slip down the ranking over the next 25 years. Other expected changes include the entry of Lagos, Karachi, Delhi and Dhaka to replace Rio de Janeiro, Osaka, Buenos Aires and Seoul by the year 2015. By then, Lagos is expected to be the third-largest city in the world after Tokyo and Bombay. Comparison of the lists for 1950 and 2000 demonstrates the remarkable shift in the global distribution of largest cities from the North to the South, a trend that will continue for the foreseeable future.

Also, the largest cities are becoming larger; the average population of the world’s largest cities was over 5 million inhabitants in 1990, compared with 2.1 million in 1950, and less than 200,000 in 1800. The number of megacities (defined by the United Nations as cities with 8 million or more inhabitants) is increasing rapidly, particularly in the South. Whereas in 1950 only New York and London had a population of 8 million or more, by 1970 eleven cities had become megacities (Table 1.5). Three were located in Latin America and the Caribbean (São Paulo, Buenos Aires and Rio de Janeiro), two in North America (New York and Los Angeles), two in Europe (London and Paris) and four in Asia (Tokyo, Shanghai, Osaka and Beijing). By contrast, in 1994 16 of the 22 megacities were in the South, and by 2015 it is expected that 27 of the 33 megacities will be located in this region. The geographical shift in the focus of megacity growth is repeated in the distribution of ‘million cities’ (Table 1.6) and in the predicted emergence of metacities (defined as conurbations of more than 20 million people) in Asia, Latin America and Africa. Many of these metacities (or ‘hypercities’) will have populations greater than some countries – the population of Greater Mumbai is already larger than that of Norway and Sweden combined. While Tokyo is the only actual metacity today, by 2020 it is likely to be joined by others including Delhi, Mumbai, Mexico City, São Paulo, New York City, Dhaka, Jakarta and Lagos. Some of these giant cities have emerged as global or ‘world cities’.
Table 1.4  The fifteen largest urban agglomerations, ranked by population size, 1950, 2000 and 2015

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Rank</th>
<th>Agglomeration and country</th>
<th>Population (million)</th>
<th>Rank</th>
<th>Agglomeration and country</th>
<th>Population (million)</th>
<th>Rank</th>
<th>Agglomeration and country</th>
<th>Population (million)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1.</td>
<td>New York, USA</td>
<td>12.3</td>
<td>2.</td>
<td>London, UK</td>
<td>8.7</td>
<td>3.</td>
<td>Tokyo, Japan</td>
<td>6.9</td>
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<tr>
<td>3.</td>
<td>Tokyo, Japan</td>
<td>5.4</td>
<td>4.</td>
<td>Paris, France</td>
<td>5.4</td>
<td>5.</td>
<td>Moscow, Russian Federation</td>
<td>5.4</td>
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<tr>
<td>5.</td>
<td>Shanghai, China</td>
<td>5.3</td>
<td>6.</td>
<td>São Paulo, Brazil</td>
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<td>7.</td>
<td>Shanghai, China</td>
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<td>7.</td>
<td>Essen, Germany</td>
<td>5.0</td>
<td>8.</td>
<td>Beijing, China</td>
<td>5.0</td>
<td>9.</td>
<td>Cairo, Egypt</td>
<td>4.9</td>
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<tr>
<td>11.</td>
<td>Osaka, Japan</td>
<td>4.1</td>
<td>12.</td>
<td>Calcutta, India</td>
<td>4.1</td>
<td>13.</td>
<td>Los Angeles, USA</td>
<td>4.1</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>12.</td>
<td>Los Angeles, USA</td>
<td>3.9</td>
<td>14.</td>
<td>Seoul, Republic of Korea</td>
<td>3.9</td>
<td>15.</td>
<td>Milan, Italy</td>
<td>3.6</td>
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<tr>
<td>13.</td>
<td>Beijing, China</td>
<td>3.8</td>
<td>16.</td>
<td>Karachi, Pakistan</td>
<td>3.8</td>
<td></td>
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</table>
Types of urbanized regions

The increasing scale of urbanization, urban growth and development of national urban systems has also given rise to a number of different forms of urbanized regions. An important distinction is between monocentric forms of urban development (for example the city region) in which there is a single dominant centre, and polycentric urban areas that comprise a regional system of cities with complementary functions connected by a network of transport and communication links. The largest of these urban forms is the megalopolis, a term introduced by Gottmann (1961) to describe the urbanized areas of the north-eastern seaboard of the USA, encompassing a population of 40 million oriented around the major cities of Boston, New York, Philadelphia, Baltimore and Washington DC (Champion, 2001). Gottmann subsequently defined a megalopolitan urban system as an urban unit with a minimum population of 25 million. The central importance of transactional activities (in terms of international trade, technology and culture) would indicate a location at a major international ‘breakpoint’ (such as a port city). A megalopolis would typically have a polynuclear form but with sufficient internal physical distinctness for each constituent city to be considered an urban system in its own right. The cohesiveness of the megalopolitan system depends on the existence of high-quality communications and transportation facilities. This megalopolitan phenomenon was identified initially in six zones: the archetype model of the north-eastern USA, the Great Lakes area extending from Chicago to Detroit, the Tokaido area of Japan centred on Tokyo–Yokohama and extending west to include Osaka–Kobe, the central belt of England running from London to Merseyside, the North-West European megalopolis focused on Amsterdam–Paris–Ruhr, and the area around Shanghai. Since then, twenty-six growth areas of the USA have exhibited megalopolitan patterns, while similar trends are evident in Brazil (between Rio de Janeiro and São Paulo), in China and in Europe.

In many cities, such as Tokyo, Jakarta and Bangkok, population growth has extended outwards beyond the boundary of the metropolitan area, a trend which is often acknowl-

Table 1.5  Number of megacities, 1970, 1994, 2000 and 2015

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>World</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>33</td>
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<tr>
<td>Less developed regions</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>27</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Africa</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Asia(^a)</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>19</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Latin America</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>More developed regions</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>6</td>
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<tr>
<td>Europe</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
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<tr>
<td>Japan</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Northern America</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note:  \(^a\) Excluding Japan.

edged by governments in defining new planning regions (for example, the extended metropolitan region around Bangkok stretches some 60 miles (100 km) from the central core). Some Asian urban agglomerations cross existing (or former) national boundaries. Hong Kong, for example, is the centre of the Hong Kong–Zhujiang delta region, and a large part of Hong Kong’s manufacturing production has been relocated in southern Guangdong, where some 3 million workers are employed in factories financed and managed by Hong Kong entrepreneurs. At the same time Hong Kong has emerged as a centre of manufacturing-related producer services within the emerging transnational polycentric metropolitan region (Tao and Wong, 2002). In a number of Asian countries megacities have expanded to the extent that they form ‘systems of cities’ linked together functionally in networks of settlements encompassing huge tracts of highly urbanized as well as rural areas. The generic term of mega-urban region may be used to describe these agglomerations but in practice we can identify four types:

Table 1.6  Regional distribution of the world’s population in ‘million cities’, 1950–1990, and 100 largest cities, 1800–1990

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Region</th>
<th>World urban population (%)</th>
<th>World population in ‘million cities’ (%)</th>
<th>World’s 100 largest cities (no.)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Africa</td>
<td>4.5</td>
<td>8.8</td>
<td>1.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Eastern Africa</td>
<td>0.5</td>
<td>1.7</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Middle Africa</td>
<td>0.5</td>
<td>1.0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Northern Africa</td>
<td>1.8</td>
<td>2.8</td>
<td>1.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Southern Africa</td>
<td>0.8</td>
<td>0.9</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Western Africa</td>
<td>0.9</td>
<td>2.6</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Americas</td>
<td>23.7</td>
<td>23.0</td>
<td>30.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Central America and the Caribbean</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Northern America</td>
<td>14.4</td>
<td>9.2</td>
<td>21.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>South America</td>
<td>6.5</td>
<td>9.7</td>
<td>6.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Asia</td>
<td>32.0</td>
<td>44.5</td>
<td>28.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Eastern Asia</td>
<td>15.2</td>
<td>19.7</td>
<td>17.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>South-East Asia</td>
<td>3.7</td>
<td>5.8</td>
<td>3.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>South-Central Asia</td>
<td>11.2</td>
<td>14.8</td>
<td>7.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Western Asia</td>
<td>1.8</td>
<td>4.1</td>
<td>0.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Europe</td>
<td>38.8</td>
<td>22.8</td>
<td>38.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Eastern Europe</td>
<td>11.8</td>
<td>9.3</td>
<td>7.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Northern Europe</td>
<td>7.7</td>
<td>3.4</td>
<td>9.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Southern Europe</td>
<td>6.5</td>
<td>4.0</td>
<td>6.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Western Europe</td>
<td>12.8</td>
<td>6.2</td>
<td>14.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Oceania</td>
<td>1.1</td>
<td>0.8</td>
<td>1.6</td>
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International handbook of urban policy

(i) megacity-centred extended metropolitan regions, such as Bangkok, Metro Manila and Jakarta, where development emanates from a dominant urban core to envelope adjacent settlements;

(ii) extended metropolitan regions, such as the Shanghai-Nanjing-Hangzhou-Suzhou region and the Beijing-Tianjin-Tangshan national capital region, where a number of urban nodes form a regional network;

(iii) polynucleated metropolitan regions where no one city-region dominates but a number of highly urbanized settlements form a system of cities, such as in the Pearl River delta region made up of Guangzhou, Shenzhen, Hong Kong, Macao and Zhuhai;

(iv) true megalopolitan regions such as the Tokyo-Nagoya-Osaka bullet train corridor where several large megacities with their own extended metropolitan regions encompass an extensive highly urbanized area.

In general Asian mega-urban regions tend to be fragmented administratively and politically and are often characterized by an absence of unified or coordinated governance structures. The daunting challenge in Asia mega-urban regions, therefore, is to manage development to ensure that these agglomerations can continue to be economically productive, meet ever-rising levels of demand for urban infrastructure and basic urban services, foster civic involvement, promote social justice, and ensure the sustained liveability of the urban environment (Laquian, 2005).

At the international scale the notion of connectivity (though not necessarily physical contacts) among different cities has given rise to the concept of the trans-national sub-regional urban corridor – evident, for example, in the 1500 km BESETO urban belt stretching from Beijing to Tokyo via Pyongyang and Seoul and containing 100 million people and 112 cities of over 200,000 inhabitants. An even larger international urban system is envisaged based on flows of goods and services, investments, information and people between major, mainly coastal, metropolitan cities in the Asian-Pacific region. This international regional city system contains a number of smaller scale urban corridors such as BESETO, the Pearl River delta, and JABOTABEK (Lo and Yeung, 1995).

The era of globalization

As we have seen, in many parts of the South the period from 1980 onwards is characterized by the onset of economic liberalization (that is, the progressive opening up of markets and promotion of global free trade) and the emergence of a global economic system in which cities are key elements of capital accumulation. The position of cities in the global economic hierarchy is determined by the interplay of global (for example FDI) and local (for example government policy) forces. Cities that perform ‘gateway’ functions (typically large port-cities) are exposed to the global political economy (Han and Yan, 1999). In such cities globalization has sharpened the distinction between modern internationally oriented and traditional locally oriented sectors of the economy. Global economic competition among cities has induced strategies (such as EPZs) and reduced local–national influence over urban development. In addition, freed from the regulatory framework of colonial spatial planning, urban form and land use are now influenced to a large degree by market forces (Wu, 2001). The reorganization of the urban space economy has also produced new geographies of inclusion and exclusion. These are
revealed most visibly in the distinction between central urban areas consisting of modern office blocks, luxury apartments and associated retail and leisure facilities, and informal settlements lacking basic infrastructure and services that accommodate a majority of the urban population. While each city is embedded within a particular local context, the appearance of phenomena such as gated communities (Connell, 1999), urban sprawl (Zhang, 2000), gentrification (Jones and Varley, 1999), and the privatization of public services (Pirez, 2002) that mirror recent developments in many Western cities, underlines the influence of globalization on urban development in the South.

These trends also inform the concept of urban convergence that replaces the notion of a unique regional urban form with that of a regionally distinctive variation on a more general process of urbanization that is producing similar urban outcomes in major cities in both North and South (Dick and Rimmer, 1998). This is evident in Jakarta, where gated residential communities, condominium developments, shopping malls, freeways and suburbanization of industry and housing are indicative of a convergence of urban land use patterns between cities in each realm (Cybriwsky and Ford, 2001). Other examples of the convergence of urban forms are evident in Chinese cities with the introduction of landmark office towers, international hotels, foreign chain stores, shopping malls, and in the common processes of economic tertiarization, suburbanization and increasing socio-spatial polarization (Gaubatz, 1998). Furthermore, in several cities tertiarization is overtaking industrialization as the dominant economic process (Hutton, 2004) heralding the potential emergence of post-industrialism in parts of the Third World.

Fundamentally, the urban transformation of the South in the post-war period has led to unprecedented demands for basic services and infrastructure that most governments have been unable or unwilling to meet. These and related social, economic and political difficulties are characteristic of the phenomenon of peripheral urbanization.

Peripheral urbanization

The model of peripheral urbanization is an extension of dependency/world-systems theory which employs a political economy perspective to provide a generalized description of the impact of global capitalism on national urban systems in the developing world. The expansion of capitalism into peripheral areas is seen to generate a strong process of urbanization. This may be depicted in a number of stages (Gilbert and Gugler, 1992):

1. First, cityward migration increases, owing to the disruption of pre-capitalist forms of agriculture by commercial agriculture, and the competitive impact of cheap imports on traditional craft industry.
2. Second, surplus generated in rural/peripheral areas is extracted by national bourgeois groups and representatives of foreign capital interests based in the main urban centres. The process of extraction leads to the expansion of the main transportation and market centres, and to the rapid growth of the national capital and main ports.
3. Third, the growth of manufacturing within the national economy concentrates production still further in the largest cities, stimulates the growth of a national state bureaucracy to encourage the process of industrialization and leads to the concentration of higher-income groups in the major centres where the surplus is accumulated.
4. Fourth, labour is attracted to the largest cities in search of work and produces a surplus, through both wage labour and petty commodity production, which supports the expansion of the capitalist sector.

5. Fifth, the state acts to support industrial expansion by providing infrastructure in the main urban centres, and by legitimizing the continued functioning of the capitalist system through the provision of social services to selected groups.

6. Sixth, as metropolitan development accelerates, private capital begins to deconcentrate to areas within the metropolitan region but outside the main city in order to avoid rising land prices, labour costs and negative externalities such as traffic congestion. The state may encourage the process of deconcentration or introduce measures to promote decentralization.

The model of peripheral urbanization is a useful general description of urban growth processes in the contemporary South. Like all political-economy perspectives, however, there is an inherent risk that a deterministic acceptance of the power of global capitalism may obscure the diversity and potential of local responses to external forces. The importance of acknowledging a dialectic relationship between global and local forces for understanding the process of urban development in the South is evident in the concept of exo-urbanization.

**Exo-urbanization**

Transnational corporations (TNCs) use foreign direct investment (FDI) as a means of organizing production processes across national boundaries by creating an international intra-firm division of labour (NIDL). According to dependency-theory formulations based on Latin American experience, the negative effects of FDI are manifested in external economic dependence and weak links between foreign and local firms, and over-urbanization as a result of the concentration of investment in the primate city.

An alternative, more positive perspective on FDI has emerged from the experience of the newly industrialized countries (NICs) of South-East Asia. In some regions, notably the Zhujiang (Pearl River) delta of South China, this has resulted in a pattern of exo-urbanization characterized by labour-intensive and assembly-manufacturing types of export-oriented industrialization based on the low-cost input of large quantities of labour and land (Shen, 2002). This form of ‘urbanization from above’ based on the growth of industrial cities through central planning and investment is complemented by a phenomenon of ‘urbanization from below’ (Ma, 2002). This has been characterized by population in-migration, urban growth in predominantly smaller cities and towns, and a major transformation of the countryside landscape with the development of an intensive mixture of agricultural and non-agricultural activities.

Spatially, this foreign investment-induced form of urbanization has given rise to the kind of extended metropolitan region that McGee (1991) has characterized as a desa-kota, examples of which have been identified around cities such as Jakarta (Dick and Rimmer, 1998), Manila (Kelly, 1999), and Bangkok (Parnwell and Wongsuphasawat, 1997). The phenomenon of exo-urbanization underlines the varied forms of urbanization and urban growth, illustrates how international forces and, in particular, flows of FDI can affect local economic development and urbanization, and emphasizes the necessity of understanding global forces within the local context in order to understand the complexity of contemporary processes of urbanization.
Conclusion: urban planning and policy in the developing world

As discussed by Pacione (2009b), global restructuring has had major consequences for urban policy in the North. Urban development in the South is conditioned to an even greater extent by its interaction with the global political economy. Many Third World countries are currently undergoing a form of development which is dependent on the needs of multinational corporations, as evident in the process of exo-urbanization in the Pearl River Delta region of China where urban change has been driven by the demands of an export-oriented industrial economy. The urban consequences of a local economy oriented to external demands include a highly polarized class structure in which the mass of the urban population endures the diverse social and economic disadvantages which accompany urban underdevelopment. These generally include high rates of unemployment and underemployment, insufficient housing and shelter, inadequate sanitation and water supplies, overloaded transportation systems, environmental degradation, health and nutritional problems, and municipal budget crises. That urban conditions in the South are relatively superior to those in rural areas should afford little comfort for policy makers confronted with limited resources and an urban growth process of unprecedented proportions.

A variety of national, regional and urban policies has been employed in response to the urban crises of the South. As in the North, these reflect goals and priorities defined by the dominant political economy. As a result, in most cities of the South to date, policy outcomes have favoured political elites and growth coalitions at the expense of the urban majority. Resolving the social, economic and environmental problems of the urban poor represents the fundamental challenge for urban policy. This will require innovative approaches which recognize the historically specific context of the developing world’s urbanization and the individual complex of problems and opportunities that exist in every country. It is necessary to advance beyond policies and plans based on the urban experience of the developed world. National deconcentration and decentralization policies have generally failed to curb the growth of primary cities. Urban master plans have often been overtaken by events, and housing policies have been unable to provide shelter at costs that the intended beneficiaries can reasonably afford. Such failures have exposed the weaknesses in traditional approaches to planning and encouraged the search for policies that are based on an understanding of what is feasible as well as desirable.

The past decade has highlighted the problems of resource scarcity and the limitations of conventional planning. It has also focused attention on the potential contribution that people can make to urban development in an environment of scarcity. This reappraisal of the role of key elements such as squatter areas and the informal economy suggests that the main objective of urban policies in the developing world should be one of enhancing conditions for self-help and mutual aid, through forms of enabling action in support of locally determined, self-organized, and self-managed settlement programmes. Enabling actions are essentially institutional changes in administrative rules and regulations and typically cover the ways in which funds are allocated, credit generated and disbursed, decisions made and responsibility exercised. With respect to the key question of credit, for example, governments must intervene to provide initial capital and to assist in creating institutions that mobilize the often limited resources of those involved in the self-help and mutual-aid processes. A shift towards enabling strategies implies greater and not less involvement by governments. First, this approach requires governments and public
authorities to transfer certain decision-making powers to local organizations. This may include an enhanced role for non-governmental organizations (NGOs) to support grassroots action. Second, governments must remove obstacles to local initiatives whether in the form of restrictive building codes or conventional entrenched views on land holding and tenure. Third, enabling strategies imply that those professionals involved in urban development must learn to plan with, rather than for, people. Fourth, and most fundamentally, this strategy requires that governments accept the social demands of communities as legitimate bases for urban policy. These preconditions may be too demanding for some developing countries in which the economic elite also constitute a significant element of the political elite. Nevertheless, radical problems demand radical measures.

References