<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Term</th>
<th>Page(s)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>accountability</td>
<td>13, 28, 154</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>accounting procedures</td>
<td>67</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>accounting standards</td>
<td>2, 197</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>accumulation funds</td>
<td>64, 79</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>accumulation (total return) indices</td>
<td>160, 162, 163</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>active board members</td>
<td>151–2, 155</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>governance, funding and performance</td>
<td>183, 189, 192, 193, 194, 196, 199</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>activism, pension fund</td>
<td>1, 34, 57–8, 60</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>actuarial accrued liability (AAL)</td>
<td>186</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Administradoras de Fondos de Jubilaciones y Pensiones (AFJPs)</td>
<td>122</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Administradoras de Fondos de Pensiones (AFPs)</td>
<td>121</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Administradoras de Fondos para el Retiro (AFORES)</td>
<td>119–21</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>administration</td>
<td>87, 88–9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>functions</td>
<td>12–13, 79–81</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>and potential conflicts of interest</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>adviser-linked investments</td>
<td>82</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>advisers</td>
<td>24</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>assessment of 211, 215, 219</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>trust funds</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>agency, law of 70–71</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>agency risks</td>
<td>70</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Agosin, R.</td>
<td>58</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ahold</td>
<td>14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>All Ordinaries Index</td>
<td>160, 174</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Allen, F.</td>
<td>25, 100, 145</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>amortization period</td>
<td>189, 192, 194</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AMP Capital Sustainable Future Australian Share Fund</td>
<td>167–8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>analysis</td>
<td>105–6, 125, 126, 136</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Argentina</td>
<td>123</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Australia</td>
<td>111</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chile</td>
<td>121–2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hong Kong</td>
<td>125</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hungary</td>
<td>117–19</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ireland</td>
<td>114</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mexico</td>
<td>120</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>US</td>
<td>113</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Anglo-American reactive supervisory style</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Anglo-Saxon capitalism</td>
<td>145</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>approved deposit funds</td>
<td>62, 63</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Argentina</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>pension and corporate governance reforms</td>
<td>33–4, 55–6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>supervisory practice</td>
<td>122–3, 125–33, 134</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>assessment of advisers 211, 215, 219</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>asset management functions</td>
<td>12–13, 81–2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Atiyah, P.S.</td>
<td>24</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>attitudes, trustees’ 207–10</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>auditors</td>
<td>15, 24, 103</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Australia 25, 61–96</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>charges to fund management industry</td>
<td>85–9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>costs 84–9</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>functions of trustees and potential</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>conflicts of interest 74–83</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>funding of commissions 73, 91–3</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>main forms of regulatory protection 65–8</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>market, regulatory and institutional</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>failure 68–74</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>performance benchmarking see</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>benchmarking performance</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>returns 85, 93–4</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>supervisory practice 110–13, 125–33, 134</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>trustees’ perception of their role and</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>effectiveness see</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>trustees types of pension fund 61–5</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Australian Competition and Consumer Commission (ACCC) 69
Australian Prudential Regulation Authority (APRA) 61, 62, 64, 84, 110, 111
Australian Securities and Investment Commission (ASIC) 69, 78
Australian Taxation Office (ATO) 63, 64
Bank for International Settlements 118
banks 78, 84, 141
Basel Committee on Banking Supervision 118
Bateman, H. 201
Becht, M. 139, 140, 141, 142, 143, 144, 145
Beck, T. 101, 129, 130
behavioural persistence 187–8, 193, 194
beliefs, trustees’ 207–10
benchmarking performance 4, 158–75
Australian stock market indices 160, 173–5
benchmark design 163–6
benchmarks used by Australian pension funds 158–60, 161
funds, investment choices and the associated benchmarks 169–72
mismatches between benchmarks and investment styles 166–8
S&P/ASX 200 indices 158, 160–63, 164, 173
benefits
benefit adjudication functions 12–13
discretion over 81
structure and classification of Australian pension funds 64
Berger, A.N. 77
Besley, T. 150–51
Bhagat, S. 142
BHP Billiton 163
bifurcation of pension schemes 245, 246
Black, B.S. 142
Blake, D. 9, 72, 159
Block, S.B. 164
boards of directors 142–3, 144–5, 146
boards of pension funds 151–2, 153–4, 155
board cohesion 211, 214
composition 151, 152, 153
funding and performance of US public pensions 182, 183, 186, 189, 192, 193, 194, 196, 197, 199
equal representation 66–7, 74
functioning and organization 153
statements of investment policies 154
transparency and accountability 154
Bohn, H. 194
Bolton, P. 139, 140, 141, 142, 143, 144, 145
Bonafede, J.K. 179
bond prices 231–2
borrowing, by pension guarantee funds 238
budget carry-over practice 184, 191, 193, 194, 199
Bunt, K. 18
Burkart, M. 142
business opportunities 81–2
business plan 67–8
Caerlewy-Smith, E. 10, 18
California Public Employees’ Retirement System (CalPERS) 1
Campbell, J. 16
Canada Pension Plan (CPP) 147
Canadian Pension Plan Investment Board (CPPIB) 147–8
capital markets
development 129–30, 135, 136
domestic 31–2, 33, 35–6, 47–8, 48–52, 53
international 31–2, 33, 35–6, 37–42, 47–8, 48–52, 53
cap, premium 240–45
Carhart, M.M. 72
Carmichael, J. 154, 188
Cartwright, J. 24
celling on premium rate 240–45
Central and Eastern Europe 99
chained Laspeyres formula 160–62
Chan, H.W.H. 166
Chaney, B.A. 184, 191, 194
charges 85–9
administration 87, 88–9
distribution 86–8
investment management 87, 89
waiver on small accounts 68
Chile 60
- pension and corporate governance reforms 33–4, 56–8
  - supervisory practice 121–2, 125–33, 134
- civil law tradition 130, 136, 137
- claims 224, 245
  - simulating distribution of 235–8
- Clare, R. 69, 84
- Clark, G.L. 9, 10, 11, 12, 14, 18, 19, 23, 25, 200
- codes of conduct 13–16, 26
  - survey of Australian trustees 211, 215, 216, 218
- coherence principle 15
- Coleman, A.D.F. 72, 85
- collective action 71
- collective action problem 13
  - addressing for key stakeholders 152–4, 155
  - of shareholders 140–46
- collective principals 144–6
- Collin-Dufresne, P. 224, 230, 231, 232, 233
- Comisión Nacional del Sistema de Ahorro para el Retiro (CONSAR) 119–21
- commissions 73, 91–3
  - present system 91–2
  - previous system 91
- common law tradition 130, 136, 137
- communication 104–5, 125–6, 127, 136
  - Argentina 123
  - Australia 111
  - Chile 121, 122
  - Hong Kong 125
  - Hungary 117
  - Ireland 114, 116
  - Mexico 120
  - survey of Australian trustees 211, 213
  - US 113, 114
- comparative analysis 108–10, 125–33, 134
- compatibility principle 15
- compensatory actions 108
- competence of trustees 10, 19, 26
- comprehensive–exception based scale 109–10
- compulsory systems
  - pay-as-you-go system 32, 48, 50
  - supervisory practice 101, 102, 133
  - concentration of ownership 140–41, 146, 153
- conflicts of interest
  - Australia 3, 65–6, 70
  - functions of trustees and potential conflicts of interest 74–83
  - separation of ownership and control 140–46
- Conley, J.M. 74
- consistency principle 14–15
- consultants 23–4
  - decision making by 206–7
- contracts
  - classification of Australian funds by contractual party 63–4
  - governance through 23–5, 26–7
  - control, separation of ownership and 140–46
- Copley, P.A. 184, 191, 194
- Coronado, J.L. 184, 190
- corporate governance 1–2, 140–46, 200
- corporate governance reforms 3, 30–60
  - historical background 33–4
  - model 34–53
  - demographic structure and equilibrium with endogenous investor protection 46–8
  - economy description and decisions of a risk-neutral individual 34–46
  - effect of a pension reform 48–53
  - optimal decisions if cost of going public is sunk 36–42
  - optimal investor protection 42–6
  - pro-investor legal reforms 33–4, 55–8
- corporate pensions sector 197
- Australian corporate funds 62, 63, 74, 85, 86, 87, 202, 203
  - returns 93–4
- corporate trustee directors 83
- Corporations Act (2001) (Australia) 77
- Corporations Law
  - Argentina 55
  - Chile 56–7
- correction 107–8, 125, 126, 136
  - Argentina 123
  - Australia 111
  - Chile 121, 122
Hong Kong 125
Hungary 117, 119
Ireland 114
Mexico 120
US 113, 114
corrective–deterrent scale 109–10
cost efficiency 16
cost of going public 35
optimal decisions if this cost is sunk 36–42
credit-rating agencies 103
credit ratings 239–40
optimal decisions if this cost is sunk 36–42
cross-subsidy 225, 238–45, 245–6
'cults', investment 71–3
Cummins, J.D. 77
current trustee model needs rethinking 211, 215, 216, 219
Cyprus Social Security Fund 148

Dashtara, J. 179
dept 140–41, 146, 153
see also loans
decision making 201
model of pension and corporate
governance reform 34–46
optimal decisions if cost of going
government 36–42
rules and procedures 19–23, 26
survey of Australian trustees 211, 212–13, 214
default modelling 224, 230–38
approaches to 230–32
estimating the model 233–5
simulating the claims distribution 235–8
defined benefit schemes 12, 15, 23, 197
Australia 64, 79, 95
pension guarantee funds see pension
guarantee funds
defined contribution schemes 12, 15, 23, 201
delegation 80
demographic structure
Australian trustees 202–3, 204–5
pension and corporate governance
reforms 46–8
Department of Enterprise, Trade and
Employment (Ireland) 114
developing countries 99, 139, 147, 148
direct sales 78
directive–negotiated scale 109–10
directly invested funds 65
directors 147
boards of 142–3, 144–5, 146
corporate and life insurance 83
disclosure programmes 104
discretion 9, 10, 11–12
over benefits 81
over fees 82–3
distribution charges 86–8
functions of trustees and potential
conflicts of interest 74–9
dividends 166
domestic capital markets 31–2, 33, 35–6, 47–8, 48–52, 53
dot.com bubble 10
Dow Jones Industrial Average 164
economic development, stage of
100–101, 127–9, 135, 136
Edwards, S. 59
eligible rollover funds 62, 64
Ellison, R. 12
Employee Benefits Security Administration (EBSA) (US) 113
Employee Retirement Income Security
employer-sponsored funds 63, 74
employers key stakeholder 151–2
role of 78–9
ENDESA 60
ENERSIS 60
Engen, E.M. 184, 190
Enron 1, 14, 200
entrepreneur’s wealth 39, 42
optimal investor protection 43, 45
equal representation rules 66–7, 74
equally weighted benchmarks 164
Equitable Life 200
equities, restrictions on 148–9
Esho, N. 72, 85
executive compensation 143–4, 146, 153
executive directors 142
expense ratios 189
expertise of trustees 3, 10, 16–19, 26, 201
Australian survey of trustees 203–7
and decision making rules 20–21
Federal Thrift Savings Plan 201
fee-based system 92–3
fees, discretion over 82–3
Ferson, W.E. 72
fiduciary duties/responsibilities 23, 29, 56–7, 65–6, 70, 153
survey of Australian trustees 211, 214
financial intermediation 140–41, 146, 153
financial proficiency 211, 214
firm default see default modelling
fiscal stress 182, 184, 191, 194
Fisher, L. 144, 166
Fisher index 165
Fisher separation theorem 144, 156
flow funding ratio 180, 181, 183–4, 186, 187–8, 192–3, 194, 195, 196, 199
Fore, D. 197
foreign investments, restrictions on
148–9
Foresti, S.J. 179
Frances, J. 148
free float 162, 163, 164
French, D.W. 164
FTSE 100 index 231
functions of pension funds 12–13
and trustees’ potential conflicts of interest 74–82
functions of supervision 102–8, 125–7, 136
see also supervisory practices
fund managers see investment managers
funded scheme, change to 30–31, 33, 48–53
funding status see United States of America
Gale, D. 25, 100, 145
GDP per capita 127–9, 135
general mandates 147–8, 149
Ghana Social Security and National Insurance Trust (SSNIT) 148
Gigerenzer, G. 10–11, 21
Global Industry Classification Standard (GICS) 167
Glover, J. 65–6, 78
Goldstein, R.S. 224, 230, 231, 232, 233
good governance procedures 211, 214
government
final guarantor 238
key stakeholder 151–2, 155
guarantee funds see pension guarantee funds
guidelines for pension fund governance 2, 14–16
Hamilton, D.T. 231
Hawley, J. 11
Hebb, T. 14, 24
Hermalin, B.E. 143
Hess, D. 139, 147, 148, 149, 151, 190
Hill, J.C. 58
Hill, R.J. 164, 165
Hirshleifer, D. 142, 143
historical default rates 230, 231
Honduras 149
Hong Kong 123–5, 125–33, 134
hostile takeovers 141–2, 146, 153
Howard, P.F. 166
Hsin, P.-L. 182, 183–4, 187, 189, 190, 191, 193, 194, 195, 200
Huang, J.-Z. 232, 233–4, 235
Huang, M. 232, 233–4, 235
Hungarian Financial Supervisory Authority (HFSAs) 116–19
Hungary 116–19, 125–33, 134
hybrid funds 64
Iglesias, A. 57–8, 147, 149, 200
Ilkiw, J. 179
Impavido, G. 139, 147, 148, 149, 151, 154, 190
in-state investment 190–91, 192, 195
Income Tax (Assessment) Act (1936) (Australia) 66
Income Tax (Assessment) Act (1997) (Australia) 66
independent third parties 15, 24, 103
index number formulae 160–62, 165–6
Indian Employee Provident Fund 148
industry funds 62, 63, 68, 76, 85, 86, 87, 202, 203
REST 159, 169–70
returns 93–4
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Sunsuper 159, 170–72</th>
<th>Sunsuper 159, 170–72</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>industry issues 211, 215, 216, 218–19</td>
<td>industry issues 211, 215, 216, 218–19</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>information asymmetries 69</td>
<td>information asymmetries 69</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Inman, R.P. 182, 185, 194</td>
<td>Inman, R.P. 182, 185, 194</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>innovation 22–3</td>
<td>innovation 22–3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>institutional failures 71–4</td>
<td>institutional failures 71–4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>intensity scales 108–10</td>
<td>intensity scales 108–10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>interest groups 30</td>
<td>interest groups 30</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>interest rate 39–42</td>
<td>interest rate 39–42</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>optimal investor protection 43, 45</td>
<td>optimal investor protection 43, 45</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>intermediation cost reductions 31–2, 59</td>
<td>intermediation cost reductions 31–2, 59</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>internal contracts 24–5</td>
<td>internal contracts 24–5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>internal Revenue Service (US) 113</td>
<td>internal Revenue Service (US) 113</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>international capital markets 31–2, 33, 35–6, 37–42, 47–8, 48–52, 53</td>
<td>international capital markets 31–2, 33, 35–6, 37–42, 47–8, 48–52, 53</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>intertemporal investment theory of a firm 144</td>
<td>intertemporal investment theory of a firm 144</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Argentina 123</td>
<td>Argentina 123</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Australia 111</td>
<td>Australia 111</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chile 121, 122</td>
<td>Chile 121, 122</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hong Kong 125</td>
<td>Hong Kong 125</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hungary 117, 119</td>
<td>Hungary 117, 119</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ireland 114, 116</td>
<td>Ireland 114, 116</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mexico 120</td>
<td>Mexico 120</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>US 113</td>
<td>US 113</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>investable weight factor (IWF) 162–3</td>
<td>investable weight factor (IWF) 162–3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>investment choice and regulatory protection in Australia 67</td>
<td>investment choice and regulatory protection in Australia 67</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>function 12–13</td>
<td>function 12–13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>trustees and potential conflicts of interest 81–2</td>
<td>trustees and potential conflicts of interest 81–2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>manner of and classification of Australian funds 64–5</td>
<td>manner of and classification of Australian funds 64–5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>practices 183–4, 186, 190–91, 192, 195, 196, 199</td>
<td>practices 183–4, 186, 190–91, 192, 195, 196, 199</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>regulations 148–50</td>
<td>regulations 148–50</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>investment 'cults' 71–3</td>
<td>investment 'cults' 71–3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>investment grade ratings 242–4</td>
<td>investment grade ratings 242–4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>investment management charges 87, 89</td>
<td>investment management charges 87, 89</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>investment managers funds placed with 65</td>
<td>investment managers funds placed with 65</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>investment style and benchmarking performance 166–8</td>
<td>investment style and benchmarking performance 166–8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>performance 72–3</td>
<td>performance 72–3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>investment policies 148–50</td>
<td>investment policies 148–50</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>statement of 154</td>
<td>statement of 154</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>investment surpluses, reclaiming 229</td>
<td>investment surpluses, reclaiming 229</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>investor protection 31, 32</td>
<td>investor protection 31, 32</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>measures of 59</td>
<td>measures of 59</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>model of pro-investor legal reforms 34–54</td>
<td>model of pro-investor legal reforms 34–54</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>demographic structure and equilibrium with endogenous investor protection 46–8</td>
<td>demographic structure and equilibrium with endogenous investor protection 46–8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>effect of a pension reform 48–53</td>
<td>effect of a pension reform 48–53</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>optimal investor protection 42–6</td>
<td>optimal investor protection 42–6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>pro-investor legal reforms 33–4, 55–8</td>
<td>pro-investor legal reforms 33–4, 55–8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ireland 114–16, 125–33, 134</td>
<td>Ireland 114–16, 125–33, 134</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Johnson, R.W. 185, 194</td>
<td>Johnson, R.W. 185, 194</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>junk grade ratings 243–4</td>
<td>junk grade ratings 243–4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kakabadse, A. 4, 201, 203, 216</td>
<td>Kakabadse, A. 4, 201, 203, 216</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kakabadse, N. 4, 216</td>
<td>Kakabadse, N. 4, 216</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kaufmann, D. 101, 131</td>
<td>Kaufmann, D. 101, 131</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Keneley, M. 71</td>
<td>Keneley, M. 71</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>key stakeholders addressing the collective action problem of 152–4, 155</td>
<td>key stakeholders addressing the collective action problem of 152–4, 155</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>identifying for public pension plans 150–52</td>
<td>identifying for public pension plans 150–52</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Knight, B. 184, 190</td>
<td>Knight, B. 184, 190</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Korean National Provident Fund 148</td>
<td>Korean National Provident Fund 148</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kouzmin, A. 4, 216</td>
<td>Kouzmin, A. 4, 216</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kraay, A. 101, 131</td>
<td>Kraay, A. 101, 131</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>La Porta, R. 32, 59</td>
<td>La Porta, R. 32, 59</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lando, D. 242</td>
<td>Lando, D. 242</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Langbein, J. 9, 11, 25</td>
<td>Langbein, J. 9, 11, 25</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Latin America 30, 32, 52–3, 58, 99</td>
<td>Latin America 30, 32, 52–3, 58, 99</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>proactive supervisory style 100</td>
<td>proactive supervisory style 100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>see also under individual countries</td>
<td>see also under individual countries</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>law of agency 70–71</td>
<td>law of agency 70–71</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>legal failures 70–71</td>
<td>legal failures 70–71</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>legal systems 101, 130–32, 135–6, 137</td>
<td>legal systems 101, 130–32, 135–6, 137</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lend Lease 95–6</td>
<td>Lend Lease 95–6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>leverage ratio 232–3</td>
<td>leverage ratio 232–3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Levine, R. 101, 129, 130</td>
<td>Levine, R. 101, 129, 130</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>liability insurance 190</td>
<td>liability insurance 190</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>licensing 102–3, 111, 125, 126, 136</td>
<td>licensing 102–3, 111, 125, 126, 136</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Argentina 123</td>
<td>Argentina 123</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Australia 110, 111</td>
<td>Australia 110, 111</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chile 121</td>
<td>Chile 121</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hong Kong 125</td>
<td>Hong Kong 125</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hungary 117</td>
<td>Hungary 117</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ireland 114</td>
<td>Ireland 114</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mexico 120</td>
<td>Mexico 120</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
life insurance 76–8
  directors 83
  funds held through life insurance companies 65
Life Insurance Act (1995) (Australia) 83
liquidity 162
Llewellyn, D. 100
Lloyd’s of London 11
loans
  member loans 154
  restrictions on 148–9
Loayza, N. 101, 129, 130
log leverage ratio 232–3
London Stock Exchange 11
long term outlook 215, 218
Maitland, F.W. 11, 13, 25
management practices 183, 186, 189–90, 192, 193–4, 199
mandatory systems see compulsory systems
Mandatory Provident Fund Authority (MPFA) (Hong Kong) 124–5
Manzoni, K. 231
March, J. 16
Marcus, A.J. 224–5
Mark, S.T. 182–4, 194
market capitalization 162–3
market failures 68–9
market participation costs 35–6, 46–8, 50–52, 53–4
market trade-weighted benchmarks 164
markets, sophistication of 215, 218
Marshall, J. 10, 18
Martin, S.J. 231
master trusts 64, 202, 203
Mastruzzi, M. 101, 131
McCulloch, B. 148
McEwin, I. 69, 84
mean reversion 188, 194
mean-reverting leverage ratios 232–3
member-initiated funds 64
member loans 154
Merton, R.C. 232
Mexico 118, 119–21, 125–33, 134
mismatches between styles and benchmarks 166–8
Mitchell, O.S. 180, 182, 183–4, 185, 187, 188, 189, 190, 191, 193, 194, 195, 200, 201
monitoring 103, 126, 127, 136
  Argentina 122–3
  Australia 110–11
  by banks 141
  Chile 121–2
  Hong Kong 124
  Hungary 117
  Ireland 114, 116
  Mexico 120
  US 113
monopolistic practices 68–9
moral hazard 9–10, 12, 27–8, 190
  pension guarantee funds 224, 225, 238–45, 245–6
moral mandate 25
Morris review 2
multi-manager asset class options 159, 160, 161, 170, 171–2
multi-manager diversified options 159, 160, 161, 169, 170–71
multinational corporations 2
multiple-equation models 185
Munnell, A.H. 190, 195
Murphy, K. 143, 144
Myners review 2, 10, 17, 23, 26, 80, 201
Namibian Government Institution Pension Fund 148
National Australia Bank group 95–6
Nesbitt, S.L. 196
Netherlands, the 25
New Zealand Superannuation Fund 148
News Corporation 163, 164–5
non-executive directors 142–3
number of pension funds 132–3, 135–6
Oakes, G. 76–7
O’Barr, W.M. 73–4
obligation 11, 28
OECD
  guidelines for pension fund governance 2, 14–16
  principles of corporate governance 14
  opting out 28
  organizational form 3, 9–29
  codes of conduct 13–16, 26
  decision making rules and procedures 19–23, 26
  governance through contract 23–5,
26–7
pension fund form and functions
11–13
outreach and education programmes
104–5
outsourcing 80
ownership
concentration 140–41, 146, 153
dispersion 140–46
separation of control from 140–46
Paasche index formula 165–6
Palacios, R. 147, 149, 154, 188, 200
Parmalat 14, 200
past performance 72
Pastén, E. 58
pay-as-you-go system 46–8
change to funded system 30–31, 33, 48–53
compulsory 32, 48, 50
voluntary 31, 47–8, 49, 50
Pedrosa, M. 230–31
PENDAT surveys 180, 181, 191, 197
Pension Benefit Guaranty Corporation (PBGC) (US) 223, 225, 227, 234–5, 239, 245
Pension Board (Ireland) 114–16
pension fund activism 1, 34, 57–8, 60
pension guarantee funds 4–5, 223–46
cross-subsidy and moral hazard 225, 238–45, 245–6
fair risk-rated premium 240–41
quantification of the model 241–5
modelling the guarantee 225–38
determining the premium 227
dynamics of pension scheme funding 227–9
extending the model 229
model of firm default 224, 230–38
modelling scheme solvency 225–7
pension ombudsman 116
Pension Protection Fund (PPF) (UK) 5, 223, 225, 227, 245
pension reforms 3, 30–60
historical background 33–4
model of corporate reforms and 34–53
effect of a pension reform 48–53
performance 215, 219
benchmarking see benchmarking performance
investment managers 72–3
public pension funds 146–7
public sector pensions in US see United States of America
plan participants 13, 28
Poisson default model 234, 235, 236, 237, 238
political intervention 147
pooled superannuation trusts 62, 63
portfolio restrictions 33, 52
post-retirement streams 85, 86, 87
Prat, A. 150–51
pre-announcements of index replacements 166
premium 227, 229
cross-subsidy and moral hazard 238–45, 245–6
structural default model 234–5, 238
price indices 160–62, 163
price-weighted benchmarks 164
principal-agent problem 9–10, 12, 13, 27–8, 140, 190
proactive approach to supervision 100, 109–10
proactive–reactive scale 109–10
Probability and Impact Rating System (PAIRS) 112
problem solving 17–18
procedures, decision making 19–23, 26
productivity 39–42
optimal investor protection 43, 44
Productivity Commission 69, 71
pro-investor legal reforms see investor protection
prudent person rule 114, 115
public firms, number of 43–6
public offer funds 63–4, 76
Public Pension Coordinating Council (PPCC) 180
public pension funds 4, 139–57, 200–201
collective action problem of shareholders 140–46
governance, funding and performance in US see United States of America
governance practices 146–50
improving governance of 150–54
public sector funds in Australia 62, 63, 74, 85, 86, 87, 202, 203
Index

QSuper 159, 169
returns 93–4
punitive actions 107
QSuper 159, 169
qualifications 203–7
quantitative/normative standards 105
rates of return
Australia 85, 93–4
US public pensions 183–4, 186, 188, 192–3, 194–5, 199
rationality 16–17, 21
Rawls, J. 10, 20, 29
reactive approach to supervision 100, 109–10
rebalancing 163, 164–5
regulations, too many 211, 215, 216, 218
regulatory capture 71
regulatory failures 70–71
remedial actions 107–8
reporting practices 183, 186, 190, 192, 194–5, 196, 199
reserves 238
residual claimants 150–52, 155
restrictive–open scale 109–10
Retail Employees Superannuation Trust (REST) 159, 169–70
retail funds 62, 63, 64, 68, 76–8, 79, 85, 86, 87, 89
distribution charges 86–8
returns see rates of return
revenue diversion 36–7, 48
Rice, M. 69, 84
risk-based approaches 106, 111, 112
risk management planning 67–8
risk-neutral pricing measure 226, 227, 228–9
risk-rated premium 224, 239–45, 245–6
fair 240–41
Roberts, M. 88
Robinson, P. 4, 203, 216
Röell, A. 139, 140, 141, 142, 143, 144, 145
Roll, R. 230–31
rule of law 101, 130–32, 135–6
rules, decision making 19–23, 26
S&P 500 index 164, 167, 184, 191, 193, 195–6, 199, 231
S&P/ASX 20 160, 173
S&P/ASX 50 160, 173
S&P/ASX 100 160, 174
S&P/ASX 200 158, 160–63, 164, 173
broad structure of price and accumulation indices 160–62
features of 162–3
S&P/ASX 300 160, 173
S&P/ASX Industrial and Resources Indices 160, 174–5
S&P/ASX MidCap 50 160, 174
S&P/ASX Small Ordinaries Index 160, 174
salespeople 76–8
Sarbanes-Oxley legislation 1–2, 2–3
Saskissian, S. 72
scale 25, 26–7
Securities Law
Argentina 55
Chile 56–7
selection procedures for trustees 211, 215, 216, 219
self-investment 82
self-managed funds 62, 64, 88, 202, 203
shared philosophy about the future 215, 216, 218
shareholder value 144–6, 156
shareholders, collective action problem of 140–46
shelf fees 81
Shiller, R.J. 10, 22
Shleifer, A. 30, 34, 35, 37, 43, 53, 139, 141
Simin, T.T. 72
Simon, H. 17
Singapore Central Provident Fund 148
single-equation studies 182–4, 185
single manager asset class options 159, 160, 161, 171–2
single manager diversified options 159, 171
size 25, 26–7
skill mix 19, 214
small accounts, waiver of charges on 68
small funds 62, 64, 85, 86, 87
Smith, R.S. 180, 185, 188
social assets 21–2
social relationships 73–4
socially targeted investments 190
Sociedad de Inversión Especializada en
Fondos para el Retiro (SIEFores) 119, 121
solvency of pension plans 224
modeling 225–7
solvency ratio 227–9, 233
sophistication of markets 215, 218
specialization 167
Spitzer, E. 70
stakeholder capitalism 145
Stetson, A. 58
stock funding ratio 180, 181, 183–4,
186, 187–8, 191–4, 195, 196, 199
stock participation products 143, 144
stockbroking fees 81
Stolper, A. 58
Stone, M.S. 184, 191, 194
strong theory of rules 20–21
structural model of firm default 224,
232–8
styles
mismatches between investment styles
and benchmarks 166–8
supervisory 100, 125–7, 134, 136–7
Sunden, A. 190, 195
Sunsuper 159, 170–72
Superannuation Guarantee
(Administration) Act (1992)
(Australia) 66
Superannuation Industry (Supervision)
Act (SIS Act) (1993) (Australia) 66,
67, 77
Superintendencia de Administradoras de
Fondos de Jubilaciones y Pensiones
(SAFJp) 122–3
Superintendencia de Administrados de
Fondos de Pensiones (SAFP) 121–2
Supervisory, Oversight and Response
System (SOARS) 112
supervisory practices 4, 99–138
comparative analysis 108–10, 125–33,
134
cross-country evaluation 110–25
primary elements of supervision
102–8
methodology 108–10
theoretical framework 100–102
supervisory styles 100, 125–7, 134,
136–7
takeover, threat of 141–2, 146, 153
Taleb, N.N. 73
taxes, dedicated 189, 192, 193–4, 196
taxpayers 151–2, 155
Thakor, A.V. 143
timing of twin reforms 52–3
Timmermann, A. 72, 159
training 105, 206, 207
transparency 24, 154
trust institutions 11–12, 13, 25
trustees
Australian trustees’ perception of their
role and effectiveness 4, 200–219
beliefs, attitudes and working
relationships 207–10
decision making 211, 212–13, 214
industry issues 211, 215, 216,
218–19
survey instrument 202
trustee demographics 202–3, 204–5
classification of Australian funds
62
competence 10, 19, 26
discretion 9, 10, 11–12, 81, 82–3
discussion 3, 10, 16–19, 20–21, 26,
201, 203–7
fitness of 74
functions of and potential conflicts of
interest 74–83
underfunding 179, 182–4, 197
unemployment 191, 193, 199
union directors 74
United Kingdom (UK) 29, 88
distribution of pension schemes by
credit rating category 242, 243
mis-selling scandal in life insurance
70, 77
Morris review 2
Myners review 2, 10, 17, 23, 26, 80,
201
PPF 5, 223, 225, 227, 245
survey of large pension funds 4,
201–2, 203, 211, 216
United States of America (US) 12, 29,
70, 142, 200
EBFA 113
ERISA 115, 141, 193, 223

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Federal Thrift Savings Plan 201
IRS 113
PBGC 223, 225, 227, 234–5, 239, 245
public sector pension governance, 179–99
empirical methodology 185–91
empirical results 191–6
endogenous dependent variables 183, 187–8, 192, 199
explanatory variables 183–4, 188–91, 192–3, 199
overview 180–82
previous research 182–5
Sarbanes-Oxley legislation 1–2, 2–3
supervisory practice 113–14, 125–33, 134
Useem, M. 189, 190
Utgoff, K.P. 239
value-at-risk (VAR) model 117, 118
Viceira, L. 16
Vishny, R.W. 139, 141
voluntary pension systems 31, 47–8, 49, 50
pay-as-you-go supervisory practice 101, 133, 134, 135–6
wages, public sector 185
Wagner, R.K. 17–18
Watson Wyatt 2, 201
weighting schemes 162–3, 163–4
Weisbach, M.S. 143
Weiss, M.A. 77
whistleblower requirements 103
Williams, A. 11
Williams, R. 18
Williamson, O. 16–17, 74
Winkelvoss, H. 186
Winterbotham, M. 18
Wolfenzon, D. 30, 34, 35, 37, 43, 53
Wong, M. 72, 85
working relationships 207–10
WorldCom 1, 14, 200
Zulowski, W.H. 77