

1. Introduction

Nisi nomen scieris, cognitio rerum perit.

(If you don't know what to call things, you lose your awareness of them.)

– St Isidore, *Etymologies* 2.7.1. cited in J.C. McKeown, *A Cabinet of Roman Curiosities: Strange Tales and Surprising Facts From the World's Greatest Empire* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2010), p. 16.

PERHAPS the sentiments contained in the following pages, are not YET sufficiently fashionable to procure them general favor; a long habit of not thinking a thing WRONG, gives it a superficial appearance of being RIGHT, and raises at first a formidable outcry in defence of custom. But the tumult soon subsides.

– Thomas Paine, *Common Sense* (1776). Located at: <http://www.sacred-texts.com/aor/paine/cs/cs02.htm>. Accessed 27 April 2012.

This is a study of terrorism and extremist politics. Equally, this book examines political ideas and comparative politics. Indeed, the volume addresses, respectively, issues that are germane to understanding political thought and comparative political studies: the evolution of ideologies, and the extent to which it is possible to identify ‘the degree’ to which concepts, principles, paradigms and practices can ‘travel’ through time, space and culture to demonstrate continuities, contradictions and departures from earlier or later understandings and manifestations of political phenomena.¹ Specifically, the book queries the validity, accuracy and applicability of distinct continuity theses defined as ‘the view of an unbroken continuity’ between distinct political actors in different time periods, which view the ‘past as a single, undifferentiated tradition’ (S.F. Cohen 1985, p. 40). The present study interrogates the continuity theses that politicians, pundits and sometimes academics have espoused in relation to groups like al-Qaeda, Jema’ah Islamiyyah (JI), various ‘home-grown’ cells and the subculture and ideas that drive them – or what I refer to in this book as The Movement. First, that such groups have descended from, and constitute a new form of twentieth-century totalitarianisms, especially fascism² and Nazism; and second, that they are a direct continuation of Islamist thought, especially that which emphasizes the instrumentalization of jihad to achieve political objectives, or jihadism, which emerged following World War II. However, to date, most

commentators – particularly elected politicians – have utilized concepts or markers that have been value-laden and tinged with political bias to classify The Movement. As a consequence, they have not developed a comprehensive understanding of The Movement, nor have they identified its multi-faceted components. As Richard Mulgan has argued, ‘While political science does use the same language as those whose behaviour it observes and explains, some important terms need to be more carefully defined and analysed than they are in normal political discourse’ (Mulgan 1994, p. 1). We are therefore, without a useful, academically rigorous overview or classification of this complex political phenomenon. This is a serious conceptual and practical deficiency. This volume is an attempt to rectify this situation.

NEW APPROACHES FOR A NEW ENEMY

For well over a decade many countries have been combating terrorists, advocating a distinct form of religio-political extremism which initially emerged from amongst a comparatively small minority of Sunni Muslims who utilize acts of violence to establish sharia, including targeting non-combatants and civilians as part of a struggle that they argue is justifiable. The Movement presents counter-terrorism stakeholders with difficult dilemmas, such as how they can defeat it militarily and cease its physical threats to their citizens and others throughout the world. However, counter-terrorism stakeholders are also engaged in a thorough ideological battle against The Movement and its adherents. Leaders and officials of some of the countries involved in this struggle have indicated that The Movement constitutes a novel threat and that states will need to conduct innovative ways to defeat this enemy and the ideology it uses to justify its actions and to recruit supporters. Indeed, in one of his earliest post-9/11 comments, made during a meeting with his French counterpart Jacques Chirac, US President George W. Bush informed the American public:

This is a new kind of war. This war will require determination and patience. [...] It is new, and it’s important for the world to understand that there are no beaches to storm, there are no islands to conquer, there are no battle lines to be drawn. It’s a war that is going to take an international effort. It’s going to take all of us to gather the necessary intelligence, the necessary information, to be able to find the location of terrorists; to work with governments to smoke them out of their safe houses, to get them moving, and then have the courage to bring them to justice. (White House 2001)

Scotland Yard's Head of Counter-Terrorism, Peter Clarke, remarked that understanding and confronting contemporary terrorists who claim they are waging jihad, is unlike combating ethno-territorial groups like the Irish Republican Army (IRA). He argued that these contemporary terrorists constitute 'a whole new ball game with no defined rules of engagement or carefully delineated boundaries' (Walters 2006, p. 25). Similarly, Australian Prime Minister John Howard declared: 'This is a different, more elusive, menacing threat, and therefore, we need new contemporary, effective, relevant responses ...' (AAP 2006, p. 5). Given this supposedly new scenario, it is a paradox that politicians, pundits and even some scholars have attempted to frame their new enemies using what could be considered dated, pejorative terminologies such as the adversarial paradigms of various twentieth-century totalitarianisms. The Australian social and political commentator Hugh White has argued that 'before we can establish a more balanced, coherent, sustainable and successful approach to the problem of terrorism, we are going to need to start describing the problem in much more realistic ways' (H. White 2006, p. 13). Trying to establish such a term to identify The Movement is an appropriate place to begin this task.

It is therefore imperative that a central guiding question for this book is: to what extent is using terminologies such as Islamo-fascism, totalitarianism and even jihadism an accurate way to depict and develop a new and accurate understanding of The Movement, its objectives and ideology, and operations? Addressing what scholars have identified as the core components of these phenomena will help us to determine the extent to which The Movement shares ideological and practical commonalities with totalitarianism, fascism, Nazism, and jihadism. Consequently, a second guiding question flows from this analysis: if these categorizations are not adequate to apply to The Movement, what should we propose to use in their stead to reflect its key attributes?

Attempting to find an appropriate term to categorize The Movement is not merely an intellectual exercise. It is, in a very real sense, concerned with enhancing security. Indeed, Sun Tzu (2003, p. 19) wrote:

Know the enemy,
Know yourself,
And Victory
Is never in doubt,
Not in a hundred battles.

He who knows self,
But not the enemy

Will suffer one defeat
For every victory.

He who knows
Neither self
Nor enemy
Will Fail
In every battle.

Accordingly, this book takes as its point of action that among the first tasks of knowing this new enemy is properly identifying it. Indeed, using inappropriate and dated terminologies may have serious consequences on allied countries' abilities to combat this foe, and it may negatively affect those whom it could call upon as allies. Implementing dated terminology may generate the potential of creating false expectations and understandings about current realities as well as the adversaries' capabilities. Military commanders would not permit their troops to be equipped with obsolete material. Similarly, politicians, pundits, analysts and scholars must intellectually arm their constituents, readers, audiences and students with appropriate conceptual weaponry to interpret and identify successfully the threat that The Movement's ideology and terrorism pose to particular countries and the international system – and to Islam and Muslims. To use another analogy, when politicians and other opinion leaders make inaccurate statements about the nature of the enemy, it is akin to a physician misdiagnosing an ailment and its threat to a patient. Such mistakes, even when made with the best of intentions, are very costly and disastrous to the patient's health. It may be possible to argue that when politicians and political commentators perform sub-par diagnoses of their adversaries, their qualities and capabilities, they too create situations which could cause adverse affects upon the national body politic, and those who form its corpus. In this respect this study's aim is to generate a new understanding of terrorism and extremism whose perpetrators claim their actions are done in the name of Islam, and to do so by constructing a framework that strives to be more academically robust and precise so that our approach to comprehending and identifying these new enemies can transcend simplistic stereotypes and mobilizational rhetoric. It is to these areas that I focus this volume's attention.

THE SCOPE OF THE PROBLEM

Since 9/11 the search for a means to categorize, define and identify The Movement, al-Qaeda in particular, appears to have been dominated by an Islamo-totalitarianisms discourse, which initially emerged in 2001–02.³ This appears to have remained the dominant approach to categorizing these groups, at least during the tenure of President George W. Bush. Commentary from these quarters has sought to draw parallels between The Movement's participants and their supporters and the totalitarian regimes and movements of the twentieth-century such as Nazism, Italian Fascism, and the Soviet Union under both Bolshevik and Stalinist rule. It still retains currency within some neo-Conservative circles in the US and elsewhere. Also, as indicated elsewhere in this book, the FBI was referring to The Movement as akin to the Nazis in some of its training programmes, as late as 2011.

As this book's subsequent chapters will argue, these discourses, to their credit, identify that acts of contemporary terrorism that The Movement and its participants commit and aspire to enact are both religiously and politically inspired. They also significantly highlight various adversarial properties that these terrorist groups possess, particularly in relation to Western liberal democracy, and perhaps equally important at times from mainstream Islam as well.⁴

However, as this book will demonstrate further, some of the Islamo-totalitarianisms discourses' proponents, especially politicians and pundits, have by and large utilized these terms uncritically, and have generally failed to develop and unpack their meanings with thorough investigations and comparisons between The Movement and the respective totalitarian movements – notwithstanding some erudite and insightful contributions. Additionally, to date there has been no systematic approach to categorize The Movement despite the fact that commentators have provided us with a wide array of sound bites, statements and other interjections which can be the bases of tutorial debates and essay questions for semesters to come. Over a decade after 9/11 academics have not ventured much further out into the aforementioned scholarly terrain. Rather, journalists, public intellectuals and politicians have largely constructed the public discourse on how to categorize The Movement. To give one relevant example, although the Islamo-totalitarianism discourse is a prominent popular approach to categorize The Movement, only one of the many former Sovietologists, long the group (some would argue perhaps for too long) who employed the totalitarian paradigm in their research and teaching of the USSR, has used the framework in scholarship on a

militant Islamist group. However, in this case it was not in reference to al-Qaeda or a terrorist organization, but the so-called non-violent extremist group the Hizb ut-Tahrir (A. Cohen 2003).⁵

This can be viewed in one of three possible ways. First, that The Movement is so obviously a totalitarian entity that it does not warrant further elaboration. Second, it could also be the case that its use is so off the mark that it is not worthy of dignifying it by incorporating it into their analyses. Third, and probably most plausible, applying anthropologist Matt Tomlinson's arguments, it may be possible to suggest that the totalitarisms the commentators have identified are examples of memes, or words or phrases that are employed to generate specific understandings and produce particular behaviours based on those connotations (Tomlinson 2004).⁶ Hence, as we know what totalitarianism is, there is no need to provide further explanation on the subject. However, this runs the risk of tautology. The Movement has to be totalitarian because some key figures have called it totalitarian. Regardless of the reasons for the absence of commentary, notwithstanding David Charters' excellent conceptual paper on the relationship between contemporary Islamist terrorism and fascism, and some outstanding articles on the relationship between Islamism and totalitarianism generally – not al-Qaeda and similar groups, particularly – there exist no scholarly interventions on the Islamo-totalitarianisms discourse's merits or shortcomings at the time of writing.

Therefore, there is a need for an informed, rigorous engagement within the parameters of political science and related literatures to categorize and comprehend The Movement. Moreover, it is also imperative that any attempt to construct such a study approaches this topic as a movement that has emerged within the context of Islamic history, recent developments within Islamic and Islamist political thought, post-colonialism and globalization of technology, movements of people, commerce and ideas. These matters are all pursued in this volume.

The preceding discussion suggests that comprehending The Movement requires an analysis that transcends narrow conventional disciplinary borders, as in just a few paragraphs it has already been identified as relevant to political science, sociology, theology and its specific sub-disciplines such as terrorism studies, and Islamic studies. However, I would argue that The Movement is also a unique phenomenon that is a hybrid entity as well as world view, grand narrative and theological perspective. Therefore, to paraphrase the eminent scholars of new religious movements J. Gordon Melton and David G. Bromley (2002, p. xiv), I would argue that to see The Movement as only a religious movement, a terrorist movement, a paramilitary organization, and so on,

is to risk missing The Movement's nuances and significance (as well as accurately being able to assess its strengths, weaknesses, and by extension, threat capabilities).

This situation is reminiscent of the religious parable of the blind men and the elephant. For scholars and students of both terrorism and religious studies, this is an appropriate analogy. The story is present in several religious traditions (I first came across it reading about Buddhist teachings). Moreover, Andrew Silke has written one of the leading papers on how to define terrorism, using this parable. He has argued that scholars have noted terrorism is a little bit like war, a little bit like guerrilla warfare, a little bit like war crimes, etc. However, it is something unique in itself (Silke 1996). To summarize the tale briefly: an elephant is brought amongst a group of blind monks. Each monk is placed near a body part and told to touch the part and then to describe the animal. They come up with varying descriptions based on what they touched. Regrettably, none of the monks can describe the animal comprehensively.

My contention is that terms like those mentioned previously essentially concentrate on one feature of this movement. As a consequence, this has impeded our understanding of 'the whole beast'. Like the elephant, The Movement shares some 'body parts' with other forms of political or theological groupings, ideologies, etc. However, it is also unique. But The Movement's uniqueness is based on a combination of features, not just a single one. It is the same situation with the elephant. Elephants may share tough skin like their fellow pachyderms, hippopotami and rhinoceroses. However, like other mammals such as walrus, they have tusks. Nevertheless, it's probably safe to say we can distinguish the elephant from the rest of the animal kingdom based on the combination of its head, trunk and tusks. With respect to zoologists and in particular, pachydermologists, I shall desist with using animal anatomical analogies – and my affinity for alliteration. It is with this in mind that I hope to try and present the equivalent of the head, trunk and tusks of several contested terms: fascism, totalitarianism and jihadism, based on analysing key theoretical and theological sources, and to compare them to empirical data and primary sources on and from The Movement. As such, I shall attempt to establish the extent to which The Movement shares qualities with the existing concepts. Such a synthesis will determine whether the combination of features constitutes the equivalent of a head, trunk and tusks, and warrant whether The Movement can be understood using a new nomenclature. By engaging critically with political science, terrorism studies, comparative theology, Islamic studies, and related disciplines and sub-disciplines, and incorporating empirical data from

contemporary media, political and tactical documents, as well as artefacts from The Movement, this study proposes to offer a new understanding of The Movement that is simultaneously interdisciplinary and attempts to be attentive to The Movement's many characteristics and functions, as well as objectives and personalities and factions.

As a result of this investigation, comparison and application, I suggest that our present attempts to categorize and conceptualize The Movement have been inadequate due to narrow interpretations, ill-informed and poorly developed (although perhaps sometimes well meaning) statements and cursory analyses that fail to provide an accurate, comprehensive, yet technical and politically neutral classification and understanding of The Movement. By continuing to ignore The Movement's diversity and uniqueness, we are bound to fail to comprehend it properly. It is therefore imperative to devise a new label and analytical approach that reflects The Movement's hybrid nature, varying levels of activity, its global scope, emergence from within an Islamic context, yet its significant departure from traditional theological, jurisprudential and political thought and contemporary mainstream beliefs and practices, and the challenge that it poses to established social science and humanities disciplines. To employ one form of classification and to try to categorize it using imprecise terminologies would be unproductive and incomplete. Rather than constituting a definitional impasse, this situation has established a conceptual opportunity. At this stage in the discussion, the approach needs to be reframed from one that emphasizes 'or' to one that stresses and accommodates 'and'.

To encapsulate these diverse objectives and strands of inquiry I propose the term *neojihadism*. I develop this concept in much greater detail, and test it with reference to global and Australian evidence throughout the volume, notably rare transcripts of the listening device (bugs) and telephone intercept (wiretaps) recordings of actual conversations of terrorists plotting an attack. According to Marc Sageman, research based on these materials enhances understandings of terrorist organization and motivations, and provides counter-terrorism stakeholders with better insights into what they were thinking and planning in real time while they were under surveillance. He has argued: 'These conversations, captured without the knowledge of the perpetrators, are invaluable because they provide a window into the terrorists' minds and everyday behaviour unadorned with after-the-fact rationalizations' (Sageman 2008, p. 76).

At this stage it is possible to introduce the book's main points. The term *neojihadism* reflects a syncretic approach and definition process that combines political science, theology, sociology, cultural studies, media

and terrorism studies. It attempts to locate the phenomenon within proper historical and global contexts. Like all research in the social sciences and humanities, the suggested neojihadism approach cannot exist without shortcomings. However, I argue that the fusion of my analytical bases and interpretive frameworks, as well as my attempt to situate it where it will sit comfortably within a range of disciplinary approaches, may constitute an important step towards developing a more precise understanding of The Movement which may enhance diplomats', military and counter-terrorism practitioners', as well as scholars', students' and citizens' overall knowledge of these groups. To paraphrase David A. Charters – who wrote one of the best conceptual pieces on The Movement – interpreting The Movement 'may warrant a category of analysis quite different from straightforward comparison with fascism, totalitarianism and other anti-democratic entities, but determining what that is will require a new study' (Charters 2007, p. 86). This is the objective that I have set for myself in this volume. It is hoped that in the pages that follow, readers – both supportive and sceptical of this type of inquiry – will find some merit in my attempts to achieve these tasks. However, before proceeding further, it is imperative to establish working definitions of some of the key terms used in this study.

DEFINING KEY TERMS USED IN THIS STUDY

Terrorism

Terrorism has been a mode of political violence and a means to communicate political messages for nearly two millennia (Crelinsten 2008, p. 19; Rapoport 2003) and is among the most debated terms within scholarship and public discourse (Schmid 1993). However, most scholarly (and many countries' official) definitions of terrorism tend to indicate that terrorism involves 'non-state actors using or threatening to use violence against civilians, non-combatants and property in order to effect political change to achieve political goals by establishing a state of fear' (Lentini 2009, pp. 3–4, note 2). Throughout history, many non-state political actors espousing many different causes have justified their violence based on a range of secular ideas and sacred teachings (Laqueur 2001).

However, confining terrorism to allow only for non-state actors' violence raises some problems, particularly as it relates to the fact that military or other state actors also engage in deliberate or threatened acts of violence against citizens and non-combatants to establish fear to implement political change or achieve political objectives. As David

Wright-Neville argues: ‘over the twentieth century, while 34 million people were killed in conventional wars, another 170 million were killed by states acting outside the accepted parameters of inter-state warfare. By comparison, insurgents and other non-state actors using the tactic of terrorism, killed around 500,000’ (Wright-Neville 2010, p. x). However, he states further that using the term ‘state terrorism’ is:

particularly problematic, mainly because of the long tradition stretching back to the Treaty of Westphalia in 1648 which confirmed upon states the right to use violence to protect their political and territorial sovereignty. Exactly when a state is acting in accordance with this right, or when it is transgressing international laws and norms over the ‘legitimate use of violence’ is difficult to determine. (Wright-Neville 2010, p. x)

Additionally, representatives of states and armed forces who conduct acts of violence against civilians can be prosecuted under legal measures such as crimes against humanity, rules of war and other conventions (Lentini 2008b). In these circumstances, applying the term terrorism to such acts may be somewhat redundant. Neither deliberate non-state nor state violence against civilians and non-combatants of this type carries any greater morality. Both are equally immoral, illegal and deplorable. Hence, my use of the term terrorism is technical, to identify violence used by specific actors, in specific circumstances, against specific groups and individuals.

Extremism

Extremism is also an ambiguous term in the political and social sciences. At its most basic, ‘extremism means taking an idea to an excessive point, usually by means that are also excessive’ (Pipes 1998, p. 29). For Eatwell and Goodwin, ‘in a plural or social context, “extremism” is typically related to actions that lie beyond the moral and political centre of society’. Moreover, they indicate that this is not very clear cut, as the centre and extreme can often take on different meanings in varying political systems (2010, p. 8). Alain Van Hiel, expresses a similar opinion, noting that, ‘specific political ideas should be considered within their specific cultural-historical context. Ideas that are considered “very extreme” in one context may be “very moderate” in another’ (Van Hiel 2012, p. 166). According to Backes, ‘the idea of the political extreme is rooted in the ancient Greek ethics of moderation [wherein] every ... situation there is a midpoint (*mesotes*) between the too-great (*hyperbole*) and the too-little (*ellipsis*), a distinction between the excessive and the moderate.’ He argues further that the constitutionally governed liberal

democratic nation state probably best embodies idea of the *mesotes* for contemporary political observers. Backes contends that, ‘the extremes were the carriers of aberrant behaviour as well as the maxims of the social forces they were based upon. Extremes stood for depluralization and the concentration on violence: the mean stood for pluralism and the control of violence’. Further, he notes that either forces of ‘despotic tyranny’ or ‘the anarchic riots of the masses’ could initiate forces of depluralization and uncontrolled violence (Backes 2007, pp. 242–3).

Others have noted that extremism is multifaceted. Eatwell and Goodwin point out that extremism is based on ‘two dimensions – an *action*-based one and a *values*-based one’, and that extremism normally rests upon monism, which they define as ‘the belief that there is only one true way for society, one correct in interpretation’ (2010, pp. 10–11). Similarly, Jeffrey Kaplan and Leonard Weinberg argue (drawing on Lipset and Raab) that extremism involves both a style and a substance. The former normally involves ‘an outlook ... that is built around “monism” and “moralism” that “rejects ambiguity”, and considers “wrong” answers as not merely misguided but evil in some sense’; views ‘the world in [sic] black and white with no shades of gray’, and ‘identifies [sic] compromise as betrayal and a sign of weakness’ (Kaplan and Weinberg 1998, p. 11). In terms of behaviour, they argue that this feeling of superior morality frees an extremist from having to adhere and be ‘bound by the political rules of the game’ [sic], and as such

not feel constrained from using violence and various types of extralegal ‘dirty tricks’ directed against both the state and private groups to achieve their objectives. If public life is defined as a fundamental conflict between good and evil, then actions taken in the name of ‘goodness’ are by definition, good. (Kaplan and Weinberg 1998, p. 11)

As this book will argue, these broad criteria which Kaplan and Weinberg use to identify right-wing extremists in Europe and North America, are also applicable for The Movement under scrutiny.

Kaplan and Weinberg also maintain that the substance of extremism includes core beliefs and matters to which extremists are opposed (1998, p. 12), and they would correspond to the values-based dimension Eatwell and Goodwin nominate. Although developed in greater detail elsewhere in this volume, it is possible to identify six main features of The Movement’s extremist substance. They include:

1. Belief in the supremacy of Islam as a religion, way of life and sole legitimate basis for political rule, and if necessary, using force to

- impose it on others, particularly in Muslim-majority countries or in countries where Islam was formerly the dominant religion, to implement such systems.
2. Religious legitimacy and the religious duty to remove all obstacles from establishing systems governed by Islamic law, if necessary through violence.
 3. Using violence (or support for using violence) against civilians and non-combatants to generate fear to change states' (in Muslim-majority or non-Muslim-majority countries) behaviour, policies and other decisions that affect Muslims, especially in relation to military conflict, including actual or perceived occupations.
 4. Propagating messages and educating fellow Muslims to encourage them (religiously and sometimes martially) to strive towards implementing these systems, to eliminate those who may oppose such actions, or to engage in activities that would either accommodate their agenda or make individuals and states wary of offending or contradicting The Movement's proponents.
 5. Celebrating and striving to emulate those who embarked on quests or engaged in activities to further The Movement's aims.
 6. Opposing all other forms of religiously inspired or secular governance and participating in any forms of political activities that they consider to be colluding with unclean, immoral and illegitimate entities, which will offend Allah.

Islamism

The aforementioned activities would all fall within the rubric of Islamism. According to Farid Esack, at its most basic Islamism involves seeking to introduce sharia into political and legal systems (Esack 2002, p. xi). Both Sunni and Shiia groups have adopted Islamism. Indeed, the establishment of the Islamic Republic of Iran constitutes an Islamist project (Esposito 1999; Mozaffari 2007). For Mehdi Mozaffari (2007, pp. 21–3) “Islamism” is a religious ideology with a holistic interpretation of Islam whose final aim is the conquest of the world by all means.’ This ideology is linked by the three core elements of *deen* (religion), *dunya* (way of life) and *dawla* (state). Mozaffari contends that ‘Islamism is also a regressive ideology which is oriented towards the past (*salaf*).’ This, Mozaffari argues is also manifested in the manner in which Islamism views its approach to world conquest based on the two models of Medina under Muhammad’s rule and the Caliphate which existed from 623 to 1924. In these respects, ‘to the Islamists, the restoration of the Caliphate is the first step towards the “Islamisation” of the world’.

Bale contends that:

Islamism can be defined as a radically anti-secular and anti-‘infidel’ Islamic political ideology, based upon an exceptionally intolerant and puritanical interpretation of Islamic scriptures and Islamic law, which has both revolutionary and revivalist features. It can be described as revolutionary because in order for the Islamists to achieve their stated objectives, the existing international world order would have to be fundamentally transformed if not overturned, either to restore the pristine Islamic community that supposedly existed at the time of the Prophet Muhammad and his companions (*sahaba*) [...], set the Islamic ummah back on the ‘straight path’ [...] from which it has allegedly deviated, transform the ‘barbarous’ [...] contemporary world that is now governed by ‘satanic’ man-made laws and institutions (including democracy), and ultimately extend Allah’s sovereignty [...] over the entire planet by conducting missionary activity and/or waging armed struggle (*jihad*) against ‘hypocrites’, ‘apostates’, ‘tyrants’, ‘polytheists’, and ‘unbelievers’ as well as the first two generations of their successors. (Bale 2009, p. 79)

Basam Tibi maintains that ‘Islamism is nowadays the most popular public choice in the world of Islam’ (2009b, p. 136). Accordingly, he argues that Islamism exists at ‘the levels of a movement, political system and ideology’ (2007, p. 37) and that ‘it is a movement represented by a variety of political organizations that use the same patterns of mobilization within the framework of the totalitarian concept of *Hakimiyyat Allah* [God’s rule], an ideal that plans to convert the entire globe into the *Dar-al-Islam* (house of Islam)’ (p. 49). Tibi argues that Islamism has made four substantial contributions to modernist conceptions of Islam (2009a, p. 105–6):

1. *Politically* – the concept of *din wa dawla* [unity of religion and state], that is, interpreting Islam as a political religion that prescribes a divinely inspired order for the state which is to be run by an Islamic government.
2. *Legally* – the newly invented concept of sharia goes equally beyond the Qur’anic meaning of morality and beyond the traditional concepts of Islamic law [that is a] totalizing state law.
3. *Culturally* – The Muslim ummah is seen initially as a kind of gated community, but this existing gated community is not the final objective. Through proselytism (and/or jihad), this initial community will eventually be expanded to encompass all of humanity. This objective is, in reality, not only an expression of religious imperialism, but also a totalitarian mindset.

4. *Militarily* – The new jihad is rather a jahiliyya/jihadism that legitimates a war without rules; therefore, the waging of irregular warfare, in the understanding of holy terrorism – but for unholy ends.

Related to the latter point, he argues further that, ‘classical jihad is a form of warfare, although it might be irregular, but it is not primarily terrorism, as jihadism is now. Jihadism is a pattern different from the traditional Muslim regular warfare’ (Tibi 2009b, p. 155). Similarly, he contends that, ‘Islamist totalitarianism promotes [...] a model for peace that is dependent on Hakimiyyat Allah [...] over the whole of humanity. The clear implication is that there can be no world peace without the global domination of Islam’ (Tibi 2007, p. 45).

Most scholars acknowledge diversity within Islamism, but not democratic potential. According to Wright-Neville (2004), Islamism would include those actors he identifies as activists – those who advocate implementing their goals through the ballot box and civil society; militants, such as Hizb ut-Tahrir that notionally purport non-violent means to overturn systems (although they have backed coups in some Middle Eastern countries and supported violence against troops in various combat zones); and terrorists who will target non-combatants in their efforts to realize their political programmes, such as al-Qaeda and Indonesia’s JI. Bale argues that there is some degree of diversity, at least in regards to the ‘*means or methods*’ used to achieve power, whether it be through gradual means from below, violently from above, those that alternate the means (such as Hamas or Hizbollah) and those that distinguish between ‘near’ and ‘far’ enemies (Bale 2009, p. 80). Mozaffari has identified diversity amongst particular organizations. These include those groups that are engaged in violence to liberate their lands such as Lashkar e Taiba (LeT) and Hamas. In addition, he identifies others whose objectives transcend local concerns. He notes that Zawahiri proposed a four-stage plan for conquest. This included:

First, expel American forces from Iraq. Second, establish a Caliphate over as much of Iraq as possible. Third, extend the jihad to secular neighbouring countries, with specific reference to Egypt and the Levant, a term that describes Syria and Lebanon. And finally, war against Israel. (Mozaffari 2007, p. 30)

Tibi notes that ‘even Sunni jihadist political Islamist movements are diverse’ (2007, p. 47).

Nonetheless, although Tibi acknowledges that Islam is not incompatible with democracy and that there is diversity within Islamism that incorporates non-violent as well as violent actors, he is adamant that Islamism cannot be a democratic movement, ideology or system. For Tibi, 'Democracy is not only a system of voting, it is above all the political culture of an open society', and 'any Islamisation of democracy on the grounds of sharia would result in the opposite, that is, in a totalitarian order of religious fundamentalism' (Tibi 2009a, p. 101). He argues that even though Islamist parties in Iraq, and Hamas and even Hizbollah, have entered parliaments through electoral means, 'they maintain their terrorist militias and their related non-state military networks', such that Hamas has dismantled the 'constitutional court set up by the Palestinian National Authority' and put their 'foes in jail without trial', and the 'al-Madhi Army in Iraq prohibits the posting of flyers of other candidates who are competing with Muqtada al-Sadr' (Tibi 2009b, p. 142). Moreover, for Bale (2009, pp. 78–9, 84) Islamism cannot be democratic because it does not extend liberation to any but those who seek to restrict others' political dissent and freedoms, and 'exercises [sic] rigid control over their own cadres and rank-and-file members'.

There has been some discussion that perhaps Turkey's ruling Justice and Development Party, or AK PARTİ (AKP), might be considered more akin to a Christian-Democratic Party than other more repressive Islamist entities (Yusuf 2009, p. 15). Tibi argues that although the AKP is not a terrorist group, it is equally wrong to attempt to situate them in a democratic camp: 'Make no mistake, the AKP is an Islamist party and not, as has often been alleged, a conservative Islamic political entity analogous to the Christian Democratic parties of Western Europe' (Tibi 2009b, p. 138). He notes that they have a lock on key positions within the state and do not permit secular entities to share power; they have cracked down on opponents and have stifled debates by stealth by levying excessive taxes on opposition newspapers, replacing critical university presidents and secular judges with their supporters, increasing their influence within the military and armed forces, demonstrating anti-semitism and intolerance towards other minorities such as the Kurds and Alawis, and not adopting a constitutional provision for freedom of religion. Moreover, they are introducing 'creeping Islamisation' in Turkey as well as developing an 'increasingly Islamist foreign policy' that has seen the country develop stronger ties towards Hamas and Iran and increase tensions with Israel (Tibi 2009b, pp. 138–40, 142, 157).

Jihadism

Most scholars, pundits and even governments refer to those individuals and groups that conduct terrorism espousing Sunni Muslim causes as jihadists, and the ideology that motivates them as jihadism. In its recent Counter-Terrorism White Paper, the Australian Government notes that ‘the term “jihadist” is an imperfect descriptor that has multiple meanings. It is however, a term that has been appropriated by many terrorist groups to describe their activities, and is commonly used by security services and commentators across the world to describe them’ (Australian Government 2010, p. 7, note 1). Singer and Noor (2008) identify that jihadist is a problematic term, and that if they include it in their political lexicons, allied governments could face some policy problems:

It makes sense [...] for terrorists to associate themselves with a term that has positive connotations. For the United States to support them in that effort, however, is a fundamental strategic mistake.

First, to call a terrorist a ‘jihadist’ or ‘jihadi’ effectively puts any campaign against terrorism into the framework of an existential battle between the West and Islam. This feeds into the worldview propagated by al-Qaeda. It also serves to isolate tens of millions of Muslims who condemn the violence that has been perpetrated in the name of Islam.

Second, these words locate the ideological battle exactly where the extremists want it to be. The terms of discussion are no longer about the murder of innocents in terrorist acts; they are about theology.

Third, when American leaders use this language it sends a confusing message to the Muslim world, showing ignorance on basic issues and possibly even doubts about American motives. Why, after all, would we call our enemy a ‘holy warrior’? (Singer and Noor 2008)

In most circumstances scholars have used the term uncritically, failing to define it (and in earlier papers, I too have been guilty of this). Charters, however, ‘tentatively defines jihadism as’:

a revolutionary program whose ideology promises radical social change in the Muslim world. It displays a coherent set of beliefs and behaviours, which have grafted twentieth-century concepts of revolutionary politics onto selected Islamic doctrines appropriated from the Salafist and Wahhabist traditions. Together they give a central role to jihad as an armed struggle to overthrow ‘apostate’ regimes, to expel their *infidel* allies, and thus to restore Muslim lands to governance by Islamic principles. (Charters 2007, p. 69)

I agree with virtually all of the points raised by Charters in this definition. The difference lies in that I argue that what he identifies in this definition is relevant largely to the Cold War period, which generally

involved insurgent warfare and political assassinations, but not terrorism. Hence, my disagreement here is but of a degree. However, as indicated earlier in this chapter, these degrees of difference are central to making distinctions within political science. I discuss these points more fully throughout the book, especially in Chapter 3. However, I consider jihadism as an ideology that instrumentalizes jihad as a form of insurgency against agents of secular states in Muslim-majority countries in order to implement sharia-based systems. The writers I survey in Chapter 3 emphasize insurrection and rebellion, not terrorism. Hence, I view their writings and jihadism as precursors to The Movement.

DEFINING AND IDENTIFYING THE MOVEMENT

Those individuals and groups who adhere to those points listed above and engage or support the violence detailed throughout this book constitute what I refer to as The Movement. Indeed, it is plausible to acknowledge that what is identified as The Movement in this volume has characteristics that correspond very well with established definitions of social movements. Islamism, as some of the authors cited above would agree, constitutes a movement. Moreover, The Movement and its supporters would also be part of the Islamist movement, largely situated in what Wright-Neville identified in the terrorism category of his typology. Supporters of The Movement would be situated in this area because they accept the validity of the manner in which The Movement attempts to initiate political change, regardless of whether or not they engage in violence themselves.

According to Jan Pakulski, social movements are, 'recurrent patterns of collective activities which are partially institutionalized, value-oriented and anti-systemic in their form and symbolism' (1991, p. xiv). He also maintains that 'they operate both outside and inside political channels' (1991, p. xii). Verity Burgmann suggests that they 'reject [sic] both the aims and methods of prevailing avenues for change' (Burgmann 1993, p. 3). Hence, unlike political parties that normally mobilize aspects of a distinct demographic section of a society, normally a class, social movements transcend these social divisions. They harbour a more universal collective ethos to advocate for a specific form of social change. In the case of the groups examined in this book, the main objectives that The Movement's participants are committed to establish include forcibly removing obstacles that prevent the establishment of sharia-based states (normally in Muslim-majority countries) or to influence non-Muslim countries through the use of force to withdraw their militaries from

Muslim-majority countries, to cease interventions in these countries, and to alter policies that will be more favourable to these countries. In these respects favourable policies would include only those conditions that would be conducive to establishing sharia. The universal collective to whom they appeal is the ummah (literally, nation), the global community of Muslims, or what they consider constitutes their nation. Indeed, the desire to implement sharia involves moral concerns. Moreover, although there has been a global revival of Islam over the past half-century (Esposito 1999; Roy 2004), the manner in which The Movement seeks to introduce sharia and the overall antagonism they harbour towards and receive from existing countries, including in Muslim-majority countries, demonstrates that it is an anti-systemic entity.

Additionally, not only would The Movement correspond with the general definitions of social movements, they would also constitute what William Sims Bainbridge has established as a religious movement. He argues (1997, p. 3):

A religious movement is a relatively organized attempt by a number of people to cause or prevent change in a religious organization or in religious aspects of life. Religious movements have some similarities with political, cultural and social movements, in that they are collective human attempts to create or block change. But their religious character is a decisive part of their definition, and we cannot understand them unless we recognize their connection to human feelings about the divine. Such movements are special expressions that motivate religion of all kinds.

Although undoubtedly much of the activity that The Movement's members are involved in would be classified as political, much of it is quite intertwined with religious motivations or at least attempts to legitimate actions using religious rhetoric or arguments. These collective activities that Pakulski identifies would comprise various attacks performed in the name of the aforementioned cause or a variety of causes. They would also involve many interactions through interpersonal exchanges using information and communication technology (ICT), such as chat rooms, the consumption and viewing of DVDs, YouTube videos and web pages, to mention just a few. All of these would be used to gain further knowledge of The Movement, its participants, its narratives and myths, as well as in some cases gain operational knowledge. Although individuals might do this alone, it helps to connect them to the broader Movement and makes them feel included.

That Pakulski has suggested that movements operate both within and outside conventional political arrangements indicates that they contain diverse elements. Indeed, the eminent scholar of comparative communist

politics, Ronald J. Hill, has noted that the worldwide communist movement consisted of states governed by ruling Marxist–Leninist parties, various non-ruling parties in developed and developing countries, communist-affiliated trade unions, and women’s and youth organizations. It would have also encompassed insurgent movements attempting to establish communist rule in their countries (Hill 1990). Moreover, as Stephen White (1983) has argued, it also included countries which have harboured great antagonisms towards each other or that went to war with each other: from 1968 Romania stood outside the Warsaw Pact; from the late 1940s until the collapse of Communist Party rule in Europe the USSR and Yugoslavia were antagonistic towards each other; China and the USSR had brief military exchanges; and China invaded Vietnam.

The Movement shares similar properties. It contains a diverse array of participants. Moreover, it also contains within it other movements for national liberation. For example, it comprises actors such as al-Qaeda that seek to implement operations without borders, as well as affiliates in areas such as Iraq, Saudi Arabia and Yemen, and the Islamic Maghreb. It also has very close links with the Somali terrorist group al-Shabaab (Farrall 2011). However, there are also various organizations that seek to establish sharia within the confines of a single territory. These would include, for instance, organizations like those in Southern Thailand. Nonetheless, although they are involved in their own struggles, they also view themselves as part of broader struggles. In the case of the latter, such evidence is demonstrated in the ever-changing iconography, which has transformed from largely nationalist symbols to those that include references and images to other campaigns, conflicts and charismatic figures (Andre 2009; 2012). Similarly, *kavkazcenter.com*, the website that has for years been the mouthpiece of first the Chechen, now the North Caucasian resistance to Russia, certainly features its own campaign first and foremost in its media content. However, it also contains information about other conflicts involving Muslims and news about Muslim affairs in its *ummah* section. Hence, while the site’s operators and the North Caucasian fighters are advocating what they see as a struggle to implement sharia within a distinct region, they consider their efforts as part of a broader global movement wherein Muslims are engaging militarily with their opponents to establish Islamically governed states.

Most of The Movement’s participants acknowledge the centrality of Palestinian sovereignty and reclamation of land as a central objective and desire. However, I do not include these matters in this book, nor consider them part of The Movement. Largely, these feelings of solidarity have not necessarily been universal or reciprocated. Hamas considers the Palestinian struggle to be the most significant issue facing Muslims and that

Movement concerns with other campaigns diverts attention from this matter. Additionally, al-Qaeda has criticized Hamas for their participation in the 2006 Palestinian elections, and Hamas countered by protesting against al-Qaeda's slaughter of innocent (read Muslim) civilians in some of its terrorist attacks (Cragin 2009, pp. 577–8). Moreover, tensions between The Movement and Hamas in Palestine became lethal in August 2009 when members of Jund Ansar Allah, which shares a globalist philosophy with al-Qaeda and Hamas exchanged fire, leaving 24 dead and 130 injured (Levitt 2009, p. 15).

Given such diversity, and in some cases lethal internecine conflicts, it is necessary to query whether identifying these groups and their philosophy as a movement is appropriate. In a study on White Separatist Pagans, Mattias Gardell noted that their goals, organizational structures and theological stances were so diverse that it was more appropriate to view them as a milieu or counterculture rather than movement (Gardell 2003, pp. 71–4), which connoted greater levels of fluidity of membership, less rigid doctrinal orientations and levels of commitment, as well as outright enmity and hostility. As the following chapters will suggest, The Movement is sustained by and nurtures various milieus, countercultures and subcultures. However, I would argue that movement is an appropriate term to identify this contemporary phenomenon. First, their shared religious bonds stimulated many members to fight on various fronts for different organisations and for different liberation, and this forged bonds of solidarity. Second, its participants produced a homogenized grand narrative of global Muslim oppression, resistance and rebirth, and resistance that constructs all Muslim struggles as part of a single campaign, which they establish and reinforce through media culture.

THE BOOK'S STRUCTURE

Chapter 2 establishes some of the general properties associated with The Movement. In particular, it addresses how The Movement emerged, and as terrorism is among The Movement's most distinctive features, its significance amongst Sunni groups. Rather than a straight chronology marking The Movement's development, the chapter utilizes Richard A. Peterson's production of culture perspective (Peterson 1990) to identify the range of factors that facilitated The Movement's appearance in the post-Cold War period.

Matters of politics and theology are addressed in Chapters 3 to 5. Chapter 3 examines the phenomenon of jihadism. In particular, it

presents overviews of key texts that Sayyid Qutb, Muhammad Abd al-Salam Faraj and Abdullah Azzam contributed to jihadist thought. Readers familiar with studies of Islamism and terrorism perpetrated by Islamists will be aware that other scholars have engaged with these writers' works in other publications. However, I approach their treatises differently. My analysis concentrates on how they emphasized targeting, to establish the extent to which their works emphasized violence against civilians and non-combatants, key components of any definition of terrorism. Moreover, my contention throughout this book is that the emphasis on terrorism makes post-Cold War jihadist writings and teachings qualitatively different to those that appeared earlier. Additionally, I also pay particular attention to the geographic parameters where Qutb, Faraj and Azzam encouraged individuals and groups to conduct violence.

Chapter 4 fulfils two objectives. First, it provides an overview of Osama bin Laden's writings and public statements in order to establish the degree of continuity, contradiction and/or departure from previous jihadist authors' works and ideologies. Second, as this book contends that The Movement has both globalist and localist concerns, the analysis of bin Laden's work serves as a case study of the former.

Similarly, Chapter 5, which examines the teachings of the leader of a Melbourne terrorist cell that Australian authorities disrupted in 2005, serves multiple purposes. First, the chapter is a first of its kind case study on the theology and politics of a local cell leader. Second, the chapter also establishes the extent to which The Movement's global ideas are transmitted to a local level and adopted by self-activating cells, and the impact that they can have in altering local leaders' tactics and strategies.

Chapters 6 and 7 are concerned with matters pertaining to fascism and totalitarianism. Chapter 6 provides an overview of the formation of the popular Islamo-fascist and Islamo-totalitarian discourses, as well as scholarly analyses of Islamism as a totalitarian movement. The following chapter identifies what scholars have identified as some of fascism's and totalitarianism's core features and establishes working models to establish their 'heads, trunks and tusks'.

The book's conclusion (Chapter 8) synthesizes the theoretical material and discourses derived mainly from Chapters 3, 6 and 7 with the empirical and theological information contained in Chapters 2, 4 and 5. In so doing, the conclusion seeks to establish whether the book's contents and arguments make a case that The Movement constitutes part of 'an unbroken continuity' between fascism, totalitarianism or jihadism, or whether it is a new category of extremist and/or terrorist phenomenon

that requires a new way to understand it so that counter-terrorism stakeholders can confront it more appropriately and effectively.