1. Introduction: Japan’s gradual transformation in corporate governance

Luke Nottage, Leon Wolff and Kent Anderson

Like other major post-industrial democracies around the turn of the 21st century, Japan is undergoing a ‘gradual transformation’ in socio-economic relations (Streeck and Thelen, 2005). Unlike the ‘great transformation’ that engendered the welfare state in the mid-20th century (Polanyi, 1944), the current shift is back towards more market-driven governance. Yet entrenched legal and social norms and institutions mitigate the pace and influence the direction of this shift. Consequently, the ways in which it occurs and the overall extent of the transformation vary among countries, although some identifiable patterns are emerging from this transition worldwide.

One common but relatively low-key means of effecting a ‘gradual transformation’ is ‘layering’. This means adding new institutions to see whether innovations will percolate through to other fields (Streeck and Thelen, 2005a). In policy initiatives and practices in Japan, layering seems particularly popular. One recent example is the superimposition of new postgraduate ‘Law School’ (hoka daigakuin) programs on top of undergraduate legal education since 2004. This reform is aimed at boosting the quality and quantity of law graduates able to qualify as bengoshi lawyers, public prosecutors and judges (Miyazawa, 2007). A second example of newly layered institutions is the greater use of lay participation in legal arenas. For example, in 2009 Japan will introduce a quasi-jury system (saibanin seido) for serious criminal trials. This may, as promised by the reformers, have much broader ramifications for both criminal justice and civic engagement (Anderson and Nolan, 2004; Ambler, 2007). A third example is the introduction of more lay participation in civil trials. This trend can be seen in complex matters such as construction disputes and the new specialised Tokyo High Court for appeals in intellectual property disputes (Nottage, 2005a).

All of these wide-ranging reforms emerged from recommendations in 2001 by the blue-ribbon Judicial Reform Council (JRC). The JRC sought to transform Japan from a system based on ex ante regulation by public authorities into one involving more indirect socio-economic ordering based more on ex post remedies pursued primarily by citizens themselves. Yet implementation
of these radical proposals has been limited by incrementalist ‘reformist conservatism’ (Nottage, 2006b). More generally, gradualism characterises policy initiatives adopted by Japan dating back centuries, including key junctures such as the nation’s re-opening to the West and the Meiji Restoration in 1868. Japan tends to delay reactions, shoring up anachronistic institutions and sometimes adding new ones. Either this succeeds in meeting the new challenges, or more radical changes become necessary. In the latter case, the gradual changes already implemented mean that the new situation evolves as a progressive step rather than a big leap (Gluck, 2007; see also Hunter, 2006).

Nonetheless, Japan is far from unique in its slow but steady responses to its economic woes over the 1990s. Other rich countries also tend to delay reforms in such situations, for various reasons (La Croix and Kawaura, 2006, pp. 32–3). First, accumulated wealth provides a buffer. Indeed, unlike Korea, Japan did not really perceive itself to face an economic crisis, except perhaps over the year or so following the failures of securities firms and a major bank in late 1997 (Cargill, 2006, p. 135). Second, rich countries recently have already committed to economic reforms and, therefore, see less need to initiate more far-reaching changes. Third, by their very nature in complex societies, institutions cannot be too pliant. Finally, there are now fewer successful models to emulate or adapt, compared with the situation facing Japan in the 19th century. Even the US has only regained economic momentum since the early 1990s. More broadly, social theorists like North (2005) also expect large-scale institutional change to be incremental (due to opposition from existing organisations to others that have adapted more readily to the new environment) and path dependent (shaped by the knowledge and skills that organisations have invested in).

Corporate governance is a topical area that provides a useful lens to test and apply such broader theories of socio-economic change, especially in Japan. During the boom times of the 1980s, the Japanese company was regarded as an attractive alternative to counterparts in the West, especially in the US. With its emphasis on employee welfare (notably, the guarantee of lifelong employment: Rebick, 2005), interlocked shareholdings (often among members of *keiretsu* or corporate groups: Okabe, 2002) and monitoring by a key debt financier (the ‘main bank’ system: Aoki et al., 1994), Japanese corporate governance was regarded as equally – if not better – suited to achieving strong business results than the ‘insider’ model emphasising shareholder primacy. But when Japan slumped into recession, the Japanese company was increasingly no longer regarded as a viable alternative.

Massive reforms to Japanese corporate and commercial law, culminating in the consolidated Company Law (No. 86 of 2005: Takahashi and Shimizu, 2005) and the 2006 amendments to securities regulations (outlined further
below in the Appendix), promised a more market-responsive and transparent model of corporate governance. In the eyes of some, Japan capitulated to an ‘Americanization’ of key corporate governance institutions (Kelemen and Sibbitt, 2002). This trend was reportedly triggered by political fragmentation in the early 1990s, combined with economic liberalisation and more emphasis on legal services and the formal legal system.

Yet is this really the case? With Japan back to steady economic growth since 2002, and many new legal reforms firmly in place, it is timely to reconsider how Japanese corporate governance has changed during the era following the collapse of Japan’s ‘bubble economy’ of the 1980s. Has Japan really reached the ‘end of history’ (Hansmann and Kraakman, 2001), forsaking its own institutions for a shareholder primacy model centred on more arms’ length market-driven relationships? Or has there been evolution rather than revolution, perhaps even a salutary reaction to shareholder primacy (Iwai, 2006)?

Various authors in this book, as in other recent works (Blomstrom and La Croix, 2006b; Vogel, 2006; Aoki et al., 2007), generally conclude that there has indeed been a gradual transformation rather than radical upheaval. Shifts are occurring at various levels, however, and may reveal somewhat different patterns from those evident in other post-industrial democracies moving towards more market-based approaches. Nonetheless, proving such changes in corporate governance poses several analytical challenges. If only to make effective comparisons across insider- and broader stakeholder-based systems, the way companies are governed needs to be analysed not just in terms of the relations between shareholders and managers, the traditional concern of Anglo-American corporate law and corporate governance scholarship (Berle and Means, 1933). Relationships with further stakeholders also need to be considered, especially with creditors and core employees. Others include supplier firms and customers, the government itself, community groups and NGOs (especially in this era of corporate social responsibility or CSR: Keizai Doyukai, 2004; Welford, 2005). In particular, corporate governance scholars and practitioners have highlighted in Japan the important de facto roles played by main banks and core (lifelong) employees as monitors of managerial performance in many Japanese corporations (Nottage and Wolff, 2005). This book follows such an approach to corporate governance, thereby opening a

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window onto contemporary capitalism generally, as well as its interaction with politics, law and social norms.

From a theoretical perspective, this allows our findings to draw on – and feed back into – the broader theory of ‘gradual transformation’ currently being elaborated by experts in political science and political economy (Streeck and Thelen, 2005a). This approach to corporate governance also raises important practical implications for the rising numbers of foreign investors, businesses trading with Japanese corporations, and policy-makers interested in tracking or guiding the changes underway in Japan. Thus, the book offers fresh and up-to-date perspectives on developments in Japanese corporate governance, especially in the early years of the 21st century.

The authors herein approach a range of interconnected topics drawing on their diverse backgrounds. They comprise practising lawyers as well as academics, interested in ‘black-letter law’ as well as wider social and political theory. They are familiar with developments not only in Japan and the US but also in Australia, Canada and Europe. Consequently, the chapters take seriously another methodological lesson for comparative corporate governance scholarship: the consideration – explicit or implicit – of multiple jurisdictions for comparison. Comparing just two, such as Japan versus the US, tends to lead to over-emphasising either their divergences or instead their similarities. In addition, the authors generally clarify and justify their choice of timeframe, since a longer timeframe may tend to highlight greater transformation. All consider both socio-economic context (often suggesting continuities) and black-letter law (often suggesting change). The authors also make clear any normative preferences for change over continuity, since this often colours others’ assessments of what is going on in corporate governance in Japan today. Finally, some authors look closely at the processes of law reform, not just the specific outcomes. The idea here is that, even if the latter turn out to involve minor changes, a new process in policy- or law-making could indicate a significant transformation, particularly for future developments.

As well as elaborating such core methodological points, Nottage’s Chapter 2 offers a critical guide to the burgeoning and increasingly divided literature in English regarding contemporary corporate governance in Japan. He questions two variants of the view that no significant change is occurring at all. One variant, propounded especially by John Haley (2005b), emphasises stasis in core employment practices and norms in large Japanese corporations. The other, advanced by Mark Ramseyer, argues that no change is occurring only in the sense that post-war Japan has been governed anyway by market forces. In his view, except perhaps for ‘lifelong employment’, key components of the conventional wisdom about Japanese corporate governance constitute myths or fables (Miwa and Ramseyer, 2006). Nottage introduces studies that rebut this iconoclastic and idiosyncratic account either directly (see also Freedman
and Nottage, 2006), or indirectly by revealing gradual changes in those conventional components of the system (for example, Aoki et al., 2007). Nottage’s engagement with the more specific model of ‘gradual transformation’ proposed by Streeck and Thelen (2005b) as well as other work by political scientists (Gourevitch and Shinn, 2005) also results in a critique of the view, common among the financial press, that Japan has already achieved full-scale change and convergence on a so-called ‘American model’.

Wolff’s Chapter 3 looks more closely at labour relations, in particular, the system of lifelong employment for core employees. Lifelong employment has long been held out as not only the centrepiece of Japanese industrial relations but also an emblem of Japan’s stakeholder model of corporate governance. After the decade-long recession in the 1990s and early 2000s, some commentators are now predicting its ‘death’ (or de-institutionalisation). Others, however, are insisting that the institution remains – and will remain – largely in place. According to Wolff, this raises the stakes in the debate. If lifelong employment is dying, does this signal the end of Japan-style stakeholder capitalism and the triumph of Western-style shareholder primacy? Or does the Japanese model still endure as a ‘variety’ of capitalism?

Wolff argues that lifelong employment has been abused as a metaphor of Japanese stakeholder capitalism. Lifelong employment is not a typical form of employment relations in Japan. Even in the minority of cases where it does exist, it is neither a benign form of employee welfare nor an inefficient practice that has brought corporate Japan to its knees. Nor is it naturally occurring – either as a cultural form of cooperative, communitarian capitalism or as the institutional constituent of an alternative economic design to self-equilibrating markets. Instead, it is a politically invented tradition, initially created to ensure industrial peace in post-war Japan and subsequently preserved to support Japan’s ensuing regime of accumulation. The law has sustained this strategic choice by erecting a regulatory framework of ‘flexicurity’ – a balance between flexibility of working practices and security of employment tenure.

This alternative understanding of lifelong employment, Wolff suggests, allows a reinterpretation of recent developments in industrial relations in Japan. Employment patterns are clearly undergoing important changes. But the empirical data do not support conclusions of a convergence to a market-based, termination-at-will system of employment, nor the persistence of Japan-specific institutions and norms of employee welfare. Instead, a transformation is indeed taking place, one based on the intensification of existing regulatory modes of ‘flexicurity’. This intensification might very well lead to a crisis in the labour–management nexus in Japan (as predicted, for example, by Blomstrom and La Croix, 2006a, p. 11), or perhaps even its wholesale overthrow. So far, however, no new political compromise has been struck.

Wolff’s conclusions open up provocative theoretical challenges. First, since
‘culturalist’ and neo-institutional theories fail to explain the developments in industrial relations in Japan, new theories are needed to understand the dynamic change in Japanese legal and economic institutions. Second, since lifelong employment is a governance technique that is not universal, ahistorical nor neutral, new theories are required that take seriously the heterogeneous, transient and political dimensions of corporate governance. Third, since Japanese capitalism is a regime of accumulation like any other, yet with its own defined set of strategic choices, new analytical tools are called for to interpret the roots of the Japanese political economy (not just its institutional manifestations) and for reaching informed assessments about its normative value (not just calibrating assessments to Japan’s fluctuating business cycle).

Puchniak’s Chapter 4 turns to main banks, another major distinctive component conventionally associated with post-war corporate governance in Japan. He rejects Ramseyer’s free-market theory by summarising empirical and case study evidence showing how Japanese banks systematically persisted in lending trillions of yen to ‘zombie’ firms at below-market interest rates to save them from bankruptcy over the ‘lost decade’ (1990–2002). A matrix of unique institutional incentives (such as capital–asset ratios required under the Basel Accord) made it worthwhile for banks, especially main banks, to engage in behaviour that Ramseyer would view as impossibly irrational. The survival of main banks over that difficult era suggests that they will continue to play a considerable role in Japanese corporate governance. Hopefully, they now enjoy once again a less perverse institutional environment. Yet banks face a new regulatory environment following the implementation of Japan’s ‘Big Bang’ reforms in the late 1990s (outlined in this chapter’s Appendix and in more detail by Kozuka, 2005, and Cargill, 2006). Banks are also increasingly subjected to scrutiny through the court system. Further, the ongoing role for main banks as actual or potential monitors of their client firms depends on the evolving environment influencing core employees, shareholders and other key components of Japan’s corporate governance system.

2 For example, as noted in Kozuka’s concluding chapter, the Supreme Court (28 January 2008) recently upheld the decision of the Sapporo High Court (2 March 2006, 1946 Hanrei Jiho, p. 128) establishing directors’ liability regarding loans extended by the Hokkaido Takushoku Bank (which collapsed in 1997). As remarked by Takahashi and Sakamoto (2007, pp. 267–70) in the context of the High Court decision, many actions have been brought against directors of failed financial institutions, especially by the Resolution and Collection Corporation (RCC) set up by the government to help resolve Japan’s banking crisis. The case law has tended to hold them to higher standards of care than directors of general business corporations. Courts in Japan (as in Germany, but not the US) have developed a version of the ‘business judgment rule’ that tends to scrutinise the substance of business decisions, not just the process by which they were reached and whether any conflicts of interests existed.
Matsui’s Chapter 5 tells a relatively untold story, even in the vast literature in Japanese: corporate governance issues in closely-held firms. In Japan as elsewhere, the vast majority of indigenous companies are small in size and owned by a few shareholders, often a parent corporation or family members. As such, they command an important economic presence in the market and play a unique role in Japanese industry. The new Company Law provides a new future for the governance of smaller enterprises. Giving voice to an industrial policy aimed at promoting market entry for new, innovative venturers, the new law provides smaller companies with the ability to customise their management structures and \textit{ex ante} share schemes to better suit their business needs. Smaller companies also generate unique types of shareholder conflicts in the form of minority oppression. Under the mandatory provisions of the old Commercial Code, the oppression remedy had limited scope (Shishido, 1990). However, under the new law with its relaxed share-class provisions, shareholders in smaller companies are able to be more strategic in their relations with one another. Courts may also start to turn to the emerging takeover jurisprudence for public companies in developing the oppression doctrine to resolve the conflicts that will inexorably emerge as a result.

Only then does this book turn to the more conventional concerns of Anglo-American corporate governance theory and literature: developments directly affecting public companies. Lawley’s Chapter 6 adds an innovative qualitative study to uncover patterns in the limited uptake of the option offered to Japan’s large corporations since 2004 of replacing a more German-inspired board system with a more Anglo-American ‘committee-based’ system (Puchniak, 2003; Gilson and Milhaupt, 2005). Such ‘elective’ corporate law reform, and its so far limited direct impact, provides another excellent example of the ‘layering’ method of achieving a gradual transformation, particularly in Japan.

Three chapters then focus on overlapping aspects of Japan’s rise of hostile takeovers in recent years, prefigured in Matsui’s chapter. The numbers remain very small, and no major Japanese company has actually been taken over (Puchniak, 2008). However, hostile takeovers remain a major area of debate and concern in the corporate and legal worlds, both within Japan and abroad.\footnote{See also, for example, Economist Intelligence Unit (2005), Schaede (2006), Takahashi and Sakamoto (2006) and Osugi (2007). Interestingly, hostile takeovers have emerged in Germany and continental Europe as part of those countries’ own gradual transformations (Baum, 2005).} Dooley’s Chapter 7 identifies this controversial field as one where the Japanese courts have provided less guidance. Fewer cases have reached them, although there are some continuities with judgments resulting from a small run of takeover disputes in the late 1980s (Kozuka, 2006). Hostile takeovers also represent one of now very few areas which the legislature has still not
addressed comprehensively. Instead, ‘soft law’ reform has played a prominent role. A major impetus came from Guidelines released in May 2005 by the Ministry of Economy, Trade and Industry (METI) together with the Ministry of Justice (MoJ), following a report by METI’s Corporate Value Study Group. They proposed a rebalancing between facilitating hostile takeovers (to directly or more diffusely promote better corporate governance in actual or potential target firms) and allowing certain defensive measures by directors and/or shareholders (to limit abusive ‘greenmailing’). The Guidelines and some contemporaneous case law seemed to prefer the more flexible test favouring incumbent managers developed in Delaware (Milhaupt, 2005a), rather than Anglo-Australian law’s much stricter protections for target shareholders and concomitant advantages for bidders (Nottage, 2008b). Dooley’s main innovation, however, is his proposal for Japan to adopt and adapt a specialised tribunal outside the regular court system, modelled on the Takeovers Panels found in the English law tradition. This follows from problems facing Japan in relying on regular court processes, more independent directors, or informed shareholder participation. However, contrasting features of such panels in England and Australia (Armson, 2005), a speedier and more informal process may need to be counterbalanced in Japan by more formal substantive rules less favourable to target managers. That may also be necessary to assuage concerns particularly on the part of US investors, who are used to litigating takeover disputes through the formal court system – albeit before the expert judges and tailored processes in Delaware courts.

On the other hand, Japan’s courts now seem to be diverging from the substantive law applied by their counterparts in Delaware. Chapter 8 by Kamiya and Ito, lawyers in Tokyo familiar with the US approach as well as experienced in many of Japan’s recent hostile takeover disputes, highlights and questions a significant shift. In the recent Bulldog Sauce litigation, the first to go all the way to the Supreme Court (27 September 2007, 1983 Hanrei Jiho, p. 56), more weight was given to the role expected of target shareholders regarding defensive measures. Kamiya and Ito are sceptical about the ability of shareholders in Japan to make informed decisions on such measures, despite the dramatic rise of (especially institutional) foreign investors. It remains to be seen how far this line will be pursued by other Japanese courts. Already, the complex case law development lends weight to Dooley’s call for a more streamlined and market-sensitive dispute resolution body that functions outside regular court processes.

It may also be significant that the 2007 judgments came in the wake of a second Report of the Corporate Value Study Group published on 31 March 2006 (Corporate Value Study Group, 2006). This appears to give much greater weight to disclosure, to minimise information asymmetry so shareholders can give informed consent to defensive measures proposed by the board. It also
explores existing and potential improvements in means for shareholders, especially institutional investors, to become engaged in this process. The Report compares approaches in the US, the UK and the rest of Europe, and generally refers to finding a balance between the interests of bidders and target shareholders vis-à-vis target management. Indeed, the Introduction (p. 1) refers to the original Report (Corporate Value Study Group, 2005) and the related Guidelines (METI and MoJ, 2005) as ‘rules prepared by those who defend’. It then contrasts takeover rules and reviews developed by the ‘acquirer’s camp’. The Report mentions reviews by the Financial Services Agency (FSA) that resulted in the 2006 reforms to securities law (outlined in this chapter’s Appendix), as well as a comprehensive set of ‘Proposals Regarding Fair M&A Rules’ issued in July 2006 by the Corporate Governance Committee of the ruling Liberal Democratic Party (LDP). It goes on to note that the Study Group membership was expanded, involving in particular more institutional investors, and that the Group ‘held repeated discussions on rules’ from the dual perspectives of the ‘defensive side’ and the ‘acquiring side’ (p. 2).

A closer comparison of the two Study Group Reports (Corporate Value Study Group, 2005, 2006) confirms, for example, that six members were added. Three represented securities firms (Daiwa, Nikko Citigroup) and the Pension Fund Association, but two others represented the Mitsubishi UFJ Trust and Banking Corporation (itself created in 2005 after a messy takeover battle) and a famous international investment bank (Lazard).4 This may reflect an existing or emerging political battle involving very high financial stakes. A parallel would be the conflict during the 1960s in the UK, pitting blue-chip companies and merchant bank advisors against maverick hostile bidders and institutional investors. The latter won out and entrenched the UK City Code system from 1968. This not only enforced substantive rules highly unfavourable to target management, but also enforced them through a Takeovers Panel that relied on informal hearings and highly effective socio-economic sanctions (Armour and Skeel, 2007). A rather similar battle took longer to play out in Australia (Nottage, 2008b). Although the substantive rules also favoured bidders, vis-à-vis target management, a Takeovers Panel really only took over from the courts in 2000. It is also more formal in its operations than its UK prototype, and was recently subject to a further constitutional challenge for usurping ‘judicial power’.5

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4 The sixth new member was another law professor, joining two senior colleagues, as well as two professors of business. The original Study Group had included only one representative from securities firms, namely Nomura. Incidentally, as of February 2008, METI’s website provides the lengthy second Report in full translation (Corporate Value Study Group, 2006).

5 The High Court of Australia, however, restored the trial judgment and rejected
This may be making too much of the METI Study Group’s importance, but it suggests the importance of politics as well as economics, particularly in the field of takeovers and M&A. Pokarier’s Chapter 9 takes this notion much further, locating the field in the broader context of the latest page in the story of Japanese regulation of foreign direct investment (FDI). The government maintains a commitment to expanding inbound FDI towards the levels found in other major world economies, and Japan is now formally very open to FDI. Yet FDI has grown much more slowly than portfolio investment from abroad, and Pokarier points out that there remains widespread ambivalence within government and broader policy-making circles. Recent developments potentially adversely affecting foreign investors include considerable scope for deploying defensive measures against hostile takeovers, and some imminent expansion of screening and restrictions especially for certain sensitive sectors such as airports.

Pokarier tests this policy mix against three models of political markets where state actors supply policy compromises to frequently contending constituency demands, involving interests and ideas – including economic nationalist ideas. Some evidence can be found for and against each model. First, the ‘privatisation of economic nationalism’ involves the government pursuing FDI liberalisation abroad, including via burgeoning bilateral free trade agreements (FTAs), at the cost of formally liberalising Japan’s own regime for investment from abroad. But the government devolves the task of minimising foreign control to Japanese firms themselves, via poison pills and so on. Secondly, and less duplicitously, the ‘discretionary public interest’ model further devolves to firms the broader decision about whether to promote or resist greater foreign ownership, just as it leaves to them the (often overlapping) decision whether or not to adopt a more Anglo-American committee-based corporate form. Thirdly, a ‘discretionary private interest’ model involves more complex contention between recognisable domestic constituencies for and against FDI liberalisation, mediated through the public policy process. Discretionary responses tend to be popular, but on this account (as in the other two) discretions are being devolved from the public to private sectors, revealing parallels to Japan’s liberalisation in the 1960s. It is too early to conclude whether this will result in informal barriers or, underpinned by competition in product markets and other pressures on entrenched interests, facilitate the ‘adaptive efficiency’ identified by North (2005) as essential to economic...
growth. Meanwhile, this broader context for takeover activity and corporate restructuring underscores Japan's messy 'gradual transformation' since the late 1990s.

As Kozuka concludes in Chapter 10, teasing out further interconnections within all the authors’ combined picture of corporate governance in Japan, it is clearly therefore over-hasty to decide that there has been an 'Americanisation of Japanese law'. This can be seen through his innovative analysis: a comparison of key features of Japan’s largest companies in 2008 and 1988, and how these interrelate with various changes to laws and practices. Empirical analysis shows that many remain in the 'Top 40'. However, many companies are now organised through pure holding companies, after a post-war prohibition was abolished in 1997 in line with Japan’s ‘Big Bang’ financial sector reforms. Further, many large companies have gone through divestitures and restructuring, reflecting and prompting successive corporate law reforms in that field since the late 1990s (summarised in this chapter’s Appendix). Greater flexibility in corporate finance, another feature of the reforms, is evident in the remarkable displacement of banks and insurance from among the top three shareholders in today’s blue-chip companies. Nominees, probably institutional investors (including ever-growing foreign investors), have taken their place. Among Japan’s largest companies, greater diversity is also reflected in various shifts in employee numbers. On the other hand, corporate law reforms have had less effect in other areas, such as the committee-based corporate form and caps on directors’ liability exposure. The impact appears more diffuse, as in the practice of downsizing boards of directors while introducing more executive officers. An emerging ‘shareholder fundamentalism’ in takeovers law may be tempered by shareholders still taking into account broader stakeholder interests, even when approving defensive measures submitted by the board.

More generally, this field and the areas such as directors’ duties (Fujita, 2005) remain heavily based on case law developments, which are inevitably messier and more long-term in their impact. Such developments may come as a surprise for those who emphasise the continental European roots of Japan’s civil and commercial law system. However, the role of Japan’s formal court system in influencing policy and practices is also apparent in neighbouring fields. For example, growing activism since the late 1990s has constrained high-interest unsecured consumer lending, in turn impacting on Japan’s core banking sector (Kozuka and Nottage, 2007, 2008). Nonetheless, Japan’s Supreme Court is certainly not the US Supreme Court.

In sum, applying different perspectives and methodologies to analyse a set of interconnected topics, all our authors agree that Japanese corporate governance has been undergoing a gradual transformation especially over the last decade, but this certainly does not amount to a reverse ‘great transformation’
now dismantling the welfare state. Such broad-based support for Japan’s grad-
ual transformation, moreover, accords with compelling accounts recently from
experts in Japanese history or Japanese studies (Kingston, 2004; Blomstrom
and La Croix, 2006b), and corporate governance (Vogel, 2006; Aoki et al.,
2007), as well as political scientists and others comparing other post-industrial
democracies (Streeck and Thelen, 2005a).

At first glance, those conclusions may not seem so exciting for readers
familiar with the ever-expanding English-language literature on Japanese law
(Baum and Nottage, 1998). That has tended to prefer ‘grand theory’ in various
incarnations. Contributors to this book do not subscribe to the ‘culturalist’
view, still found in recent academic literature (for example, De Cruz, 2007, pp.
213–17) and especially in the popular press, asserting that the Japanese don’t
like law, due to traditional Confucian values. Nor are they completely
convinced by the ‘institutional barriers’ perception that the Japanese can’t like law,
due to problems accessing the courts and so on, or the ‘elite management’
theory holding that the Japanese are made not to like law (Upham, 1987), since
such barriers are maintained to constrain unpredictable socio-economic
change. Nor do they adopt Ramseyer’s more recent account, derived from
neoclassical economics, that the Japanese do like law – rationally settling
disputes out of court and otherwise behaving in accordance with the relatively
clear shadow cast by the law.

Instead, analyses of the range of corporate governance topics in this book
draw on some insights from each theoretical paradigm while criticising other
aspects, and the analyses apply a range of techniques guided by the broader
methodological strictures outlined in Nottage’s Chapter 2. In these ways, they
largely accord with recent ‘hybrid theorists’ in Japanese law studies, who find
generally that the Japanese sometimes like law, but sometimes don’t (Abe and
‘the new generation’ of scholarship on Japanese law and the economy.
## APPENDIX

**Table 1.1  Summary of Japan’s corporate and securities law reforms since the 1990s**

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<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Main corporate law developments</th>
<th>Main securities and financial markets law developments</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>1990</strong></td>
<td>Liberalisation of some aspects of legislation for closely-held companies, but increased minimum capital bases</td>
<td>New tender offer bid rules Requirement to disclose shareholdings of 5% or more</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>1991</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td>Prohibition on securities firms offering compensation to clients for trading losses</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>1992</strong></td>
<td>Institutional Reform Law enacted: Securities and Exchange Surveillance Commission launched (but linked to MoF)</td>
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<td><strong>1993</strong></td>
<td>Caps on court filing fees for derivative actions Introduction of a board of auditors in a large company Relaxation of the requirements for shareholders to exercise their right to inspect the books of the company</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>1994</strong></td>
<td>Deregulation of stock repurchase (lifting the prohibition for purposes of an employee’s stock plan or cancellation of the stock by shareholders’ meeting)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Year</td>
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| 1996 | Liberalisation of corporate bond issuance  
      | (Major securities firms and a bank go virtually bankrupt) | 
| 1997 | Introduction of the stock option system  
      | Deregulation of stock repurchases (lifting the prohibition for purposes of a stock option plan)  
      | Deregulation of stock repurchases (simplifying the procedure by which public corporations can repurchase shares from the market, or by way of a tender offer bid)  
      | Corporate restructuring (merger procedures)  
      | Increase of penalties against companies’ payments to corporate racketeers (*sokaiya*) | Anti-Monopoly Law amendments (enacted 1997)  
      | abolishing prohibition of pure holding companies extended to financial institutions  
      | Law for Securitisation of Specified Assets by Specific Purpose Companies (SPC Law) enacted  
      | Financial System Reform Law enacted: Financial Supervisory Agency launched (independent of MoF)  
      | Other laws enacted for financial markets reconstruction: |
1999  Corporate restructuring (introduction of share-to-share exchange and share-transfer procedures)

2000  Corporate restructuring (introduction of the ‘demerger’ procedure)

- Easier entry into securities business: licensing becomes registration system; abolition of prohibition on securities firms engaging in non-securities activities
- Securities firms allowed to offer asset management services (for example, ‘wrap accounts’)
- Banks fully allowed to sell mutual funds; company-type funds and private equity funds allowed
- New regulations for proprietary trading systems
- Full abolition of fixed commissions for securities brokers (partially liberalised from 1994)
- Full liberalisation of mutual entry among banking, securities and insurance industries through subsidiary or holding companies; reduced ‘fire-wall’ regulations

1999 Corporate restructuring (introduction of share-to-share exchange and share-transfer procedures)

2000 Corporate restructuring (introduction of the ‘demerger’ procedure)

Consolidated (from 1999) and market-value accounting of financial assets, based on International Accounting Standards
Liberalisation of the SPC Law (renamed the Asset Securitisation Law) and the Securities Investment Trusts and Securities Investment Companies Law (renamed the Investment Trusts and Investment Companies Law, allowing Japanese versions of real estate investment trusts or ‘REITs’)

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<th>Year</th>
<th>Main corporate law developments</th>
<th>Main securities and financial markets law developments</th>
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| 2001 | Deregulation of stock repurchases (completely abolishing the prohibition, and lifting the ban on ‘treasury stock’)  
Deregulation of the minimum size of shares  
Simplification of the procedure relating to the reduction of statutory reserve fund  
Authorisation of the electronic documentation of corporate information  
Corporate finance (authorising the company to issue call options for its shares) | Securities and Exchange Law (SEL) amendments:  
- Stock exchanges allowed to become for-profit organisations (companies)  
- Disclosure system liberalised to allow electronic filings (in effect from 2001)  
Financial Products Sales Law enacted (in effect from 2001): suppliers (including banks and securities) to explain risks in financial products, lower requirements for clients to claim damages for breaches  
Legislation reforming securities settlement systems:  
- Dematerialisation of commercial paper  
- Centralised Securities Depositories permitted to incorporate |
Simplification of the procedure for stock options
Corporate finance (deregulation of the issuance of various kinds of shares)
Authorisation of the limitation of directors’ liability
Improvement of the procedure for derivative actions

2002
Creation of optional ‘company with committees’ modelled on the Anglo-American corporate governance system (in effect from 2003, first round of elections from 2004)
Creation of ‘Important Asset Committee’
Relaxation of the requirements for super-majority voting at the shareholders’ meeting
Corporate governance/corporate finance (introduction of class voting for the election of management)
Introduction of the registration system for lost securities
Simplification of the reduction procedure for legal capital and the mandatory statutory reserve fund
Deregulation of foreign companies

2003
Deregulation of stock repurchases (simplified procedure for public corporations to repurchase shares on the market, or by way of TOB)

2004
Electronic public notice system

2005
Consolidation of corporate legislation into new Companies Act (in effect from 2006), using modern Japanese language:

Dematerialisation of corporate securities
Table 1.1 Continued

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Main corporate law developments</th>
<th>Main securities and financial markets law developments</th>
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<td>• Abrogation of yugen kaisha (similar to GmbH in Germany), now generally treated as kabushiki kaisha (KK or joint stock companies, like AG); introduction of godo kaisha (limited liability companies, quite like the LLC in the US) and yugen sekinin jigo kumiai (limited liability partnerships, quite like the LLP); but</td>
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<td>• KK divided into large and small companies either category of which can be established as closely or publicly held (with large and publicly held companies requiring a more complex governance structure – including the option still of a board with committees – whereas closely held companies need not always treat all shareholders equally, statutory auditors can be limited to reviewing only financial statements and not business operations of directors, and all such officers can have terms extended for up to ten years)</td>
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<td>• For KK, optional accounting consultant (as an officer to assist directors in preparing</td>
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financial statements), only one director possible (instead of at least three), minimum capital requirement abolished, freedom to distribute profits whenever (not up to twice per annum)

- Triangular mergers to allow the absorbing company in a merger to provide cash or other assets (for example, parent company stocks) to shareholders rather than issuing shares from the newly merged company (but full effect delayed for foreign companies until 2007)

Tougher enforcement of the SEL, especially penalties (in effect from July 2006)
Takeover law amendments, such as: bids for more than 30% share must proceed by TOB, bidder can modify terms if target splits shares, target must express view on bid (but if it questions bidder, latter must respond), mandatory bid if more than 70% (in effect from December 2006)

Replacement of SEL by the Financial Instruments Exchange Law (in effect from September 2007):
Table 1.1  Continued

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<th>Year</th>
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<td>- Scope broadened, for example, to cover more</td>
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<td>derivatives and collective investment schemes, to</td>
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<td>encompass businesses hitherto not regulated by</td>
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<td>- Better disclosure: quarterly reporting for listed</td>
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<td>companies, and internal compliance reporting</td>
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<td>(J-SOX) (in effect from 2008)</td>
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Note:  Shaded corporate law reforms come from Bills submitted by individual politicians, not the government (traditionally, the MoJ).