1. Migration and mobility in Europe: an introduction

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This collection contains an overview of different aspects of mobility and migration in the development of the enlarged European Union. The chapters address the forms which these phenomena are taking and the social, political and economic problems involved. The book has an introductory chapter followed by sections on the costs and benefits of migration, patterns of migration and mobility, problems of migration, and state control and citizen rights.

1.1 OVERVIEW

Migration out of, to, and within Europe is nothing new. Politically and religiously motivated displacement, the migration of the highly qualified, the seasonal migration of farm labourers, and the migration of trades people and students, had already existed before the nineteenth century in various forms. What changed with the industrialization of the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries was the quantitative degree of intra-European and intercontinental migration, as well as the average distance of migration. Geographical mobility exploded in the nineteenth century and the amount of long distance migration reached previously unseen numbers leading to this phase being labelled as the ‘century of the great drift’.

Europe is currently experiencing a new period of the great drift. The aggregation of national statistics (even with all their ambiguities and omissions) shows that in the EU27 the foreign born population constitutes about 40.5 million people, representing about 8.8 per cent of its total population. Less than half of them have adopted the citizenship of their respective country of destination. Around 22.9 million are still foreigners by citizenship. The highest absolute number of foreign citizens was reported by Germany, France, the United Kingdom, Italy, Spain, Belgium, Austria, Greece and the Netherlands. Living in those nine member states
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are 89 per cent of all of the foreign citizens in the whole EU27. When looking at the foreign born, a slight change in the rank list of the member states can be observed. The first five positions remain the same followed by the Netherlands, Austria, Belgium and Sweden. However, the highest proportions of foreigners in the total population of the country are found in the smaller countries of Europe like Andorra, San Marino, Liechtenstein and Switzerland where the foreigners represent one-fifth of the total population. In Luxembourg, which is part of the EU15, the proportion rises to a remarkable 34 per cent.

Many of the chapters in this collection demonstrate the constant demand for cheap labour in many economic sectors in most of the countries of the EU27. The demand itself is dependent on overall economic development. A growing economy entails a rising demand for labour if the factors ‘productivity’ and ‘work time’ are kept constant. External events may play a special role that leads towards an above-average increase in the demand for labour. Such developments may be large investments within short periods of time (such as world championships or Olympic games). They result in an especially strong demand in low wage sectors such as tourism, agriculture and building, as well as in industry and the service sector, which makes immigration an attractive option. Native employees leave low wage sectors if there are other job options in a growing economy and their jobs are subsequently taken by foreign workers.

The relative shortages in some branches are related to the dramatic demographic changes in Europe. Decreasing numbers of births lead – after a time delay – towards falling numbers of entrants into the labour market. The expansion of life expectancy accelerates the ageing process and is one the main drivers for a growing demand for labour in health, care and other personalized service sectors.

Finally, the ability of the EU and the member states to control immigration flows (i.e. entries and stays) is to some extent an illusion. The ability to control flows greatly varies between countries on account of a number of factors. In some countries it is considerable, in others very limited. This clearly affects the degree of consistency between policies and outcomes, which in turn may influence the public mood towards immigration. It also affects the relative weight of types of flows (regular or irregular, more or less asylum demand). However, migration persists despite the efforts to control or to stop it.

The countries of western Europe are undergoing a rapid and sustained change in their ethnical and cultural composition. The European Union is characterized by freedom of movement for capital, services and labour. Freedom of labour entails migration. The expansion of the EU to include eight former state socialist countries in 2004 and another two in 2007...
opened up (at least in theory) the possibility of over 100 million east Europeans being able to move to the western parts of the Union. As noted by many of the contributors below, the possibility of immigrants from low-income countries gives rise to concerns in the old member states. If existing trends continue they will have a dramatic impact and may have serious implications for social cohesion and national identity. There is growing public anxiety in western Europe about what is happening and opposition to immigration is increasing. Some of this opposition is based on cultural or racial grounds and some on economic considerations. Those who support a liberal immigration policy either play down the scale of the transformation that is now occurring, or else praise it on the grounds that greater racial or cultural diversity is to the benefit of the indigenous populations of western Europe. They also claim that large-scale immigration will be of great economic benefit to the existing inhabitants of western Europe.

1.2 COST AND BENEFITS OF MIGRATION

The book begins with a discussion of the costs and benefits of migration, which is of crucial importance. Do European societies need more migration, what are the societal and economic effects and who can benefit from further migration? The answers to these questions are influenced by normative ideologies and are often answered very controversially.

In the first part of the book, Robert Rowthorn discusses the winners and losers of migration in the European context (Chapter 2). The potential winners and losers – in general, people who are affected by migration – can be divided into three groups: the migrants themselves, the existing inhabitants of the receiving country, and those who remain in the sending country. As a general rule, those who migrate normally benefit from their decision. The impact of migration on the other parties involved is not so clear-cut. Some types of migration are beneficial to the existing inhabitants of the receiving country and others are harmful, and the same is true for those who remain in the sending country. For the migrants themselves, the financial consequences of migration are often large. This is mostly not the case for the other parties involved, although there are certain exceptions.

After discussing the economic impact of migration Rowthorn presents an economic overview of the demographic situation and migration within an enlarged EU and he examines the impact of outward migration from Eastern Europe on the labour market, age structure and government finance within the receiving countries of western Europe. He argues that
large-scale migration from eastern Europe to the west will have only a minor economic impact on the average citizen in the receiving countries. Some will benefit from the infl ow of migrants while others will lose. He contends that the often cited argument that large-scale migration can halt or reverse the ageing process of society is false. Rowthorn shows how little difference immigration makes in terms of the dependency ratio compared with improvements in the operation of the labour market. If the present underemployment of the European population continues, the dependency ratio will rise strongly, irrespective of the rate of immigration. Finding jobs for the existing labour force is far more effective than immigration to reduce this ratio. The chapter concludes by considering the implications of further EU expansion embracing Turkey, the Ukraine and eventually North Africa.

The question of the costs and benefits of international migration for the receiving countries is always answered based on collective interest. The costs and benefits are seen by unions and representatives from employees in a different way to employers. Franz Heschl, in Chapter 3, shows this debate with the Austrian example. In the first parts of his chapter he tries to describe the objective facts and figures linked to international migration. He shows that labour migration to Austria in the context of the European integration process is closely associated with the distribution of income and wealth. The increase in immigration has led to increases in unemployment, and a shift of income from labour to capital. However, he also concedes that labour immigration had positive effects on employment rates and economic growth in certain time periods. The rise in productivity is not passed on to labour, as the growth in supply weakens its bargaining position.

In Chapter 3, Heschl thematizes the often cited demand for more skilled migration and he emphasizes that such demands are part of a myth building process. With constant repetition, the myth of a shortage of skilled workers is believed as reality by wide sections of the public. What Heschl shows is that there is always a shortage of workers who will work more efficiently for lower wages than the existing workforce. The decade of membership of the EU, he concludes, coincides with a slower rise in real wages than was previously the case.

The discussion of the costs and benefits of migration is picked up by Didier Fouarge and Peter Ester in a different way. They focus on the migration intentions of Europeans and investigate the main determinants of such intentions. The authors use the special module on mobility of the Eurobarometer Survey (EB 64.1) carried out in September 2005. Data were collected in all 25 EU member states. The survey is the most comprehensive recent Europe-wide survey on mobility intentions. Their findings
indicate that most Europeans have no intentions to move to another country: only 5.4 per cent of the working-age population intends to move to another country within the next five years. Although intentional cross-border migration – percentage-wise – is not a widespread phenomenon in Europe, migration intentions in new member states (more specifically in the Baltics and Poland) are at a significantly higher level compared with the old member states. Furthermore, highly educated and single young Europeans – especially students – are the most mobile. Mobility intentions appear to be strongly linked to past migration: people who have migrated in the past are likely to migrate again in the future. Movers tend to stay movers. The reason for past mobility, however, plays an important role in future migration intentions. People who crossed borders for labour-market related reasons are likely to do so again in the future, and particularly, ‘study migration’ appears to be strongly significant. To the extent that this reflects a cohort effect, we could expect that Europe’s investment towards the mobility of students is likely to result in larger migration streams in the future.

Perceived labour market opportunities – better employment opportunities and wage prospects – are decisive motives for migration. People holding positive views about migration – in the sense that it is good for individuals and their families – apparently perceive larger returns to migration and are therefore more likely to express an intention to migrate. However, the findings of Fouarge and Ester do not imply that all people with an intention to migrate will actually do so: existing social ties and sociocultural differences, as well as language, represent important costs to cross-border migration.

David Cairns, in Chapter 5, researches the opposite question: why are the migration intentions of the young Portuguese population so low? Despite the occasional media panic regarding a potential youth exodus from Portugal, demographic analysis reveals that recent overall net migration from Portugal is at a lower level than the European average. Likewise, Eurobarometer statistics indicate that a very small number of people in Portugal, perhaps as few as 0.02 per cent of the population, have intentions to be transnationally mobile in the future. Other recent research at a comparative European level, and incorporating a qualitative dimension, has also revealed that Portuguese youth are among the least likely to migrate in Europe. The reasons seem to be low household income to finance student mobility, and a complex web of family, peer and communal attachments which effectively negate migration intentions. The strength of these influences is enough to keep these young people sedentary despite negative assessments of both their countries and their own economic prospects.
1.3 PATTERNS OF MIGRATION AND MOBILITY

Europe experiences not only a new period of inflows but also changing forms of intra-European migration patterns. As the internal borders of the European Union are removed, migration patterns within the continent take a different shape. Complementing free movement policies, cross-country transportation has expanded in scope, speed and cost; the price of travel has fallen significantly. Europeans conceive of international mobility on a continental scale offering more flexibility and diverse purposes. Yet, considerable increases in living standards and welfare entitlements in the traditional sending countries of southern Europe have at the same time reduced incentives for migration. The traditional migrant strategy of labour-led resettlement is being supplemented, if not entirely replaced, by multifaceted life-plans and strategies of mobility. Perhaps the lifting of the Iron Curtain and the inclusion of eastern European countries into the EU have recently led to a revival of the traditional guest-worker migration, given the extreme wage differences between some new member states and western Europe. But it is also plausible that such movements will weaken progressively due to economic convergence between east and west and a decline of fertility in the sending countries.

While there is a widespread awareness that this is the overall picture of the changing migration landscape within the EU borders, we know surprisingly little about the objective and subjective profile of the emerging population of free-moving Europeans. Official statistics, indeed, have great difficulty in tracking down mobility flows within the EU – be it for the inherent difficulties of mapping immigrants of all sorts, for the inconsistencies of national statistical systems, or for citizens’ reluctance to residence registration which is further boosted by the philosophy of free movement. Michael Braun and Ettore Recchi in Chapter 6 offer an overview on the 6.3 million EU non-nationals living in the EU15 in 2004 and they present the results of the ‘European Internal Movers’ Social Survey’ (EIMSS) including 4919 interviews with nationals who migrated there between 1974 and 2003.

Braun and Recchi’s chapter seeks to map out the objective and subjective differences within the rather loose category of intra-EU migrants in the five largest EU15 countries (Germany, the UK, France, Italy and Spain). By using multiple correspondence analysis, they draw a parsimonious portrait of western-European mobile citizens. This analysis leads them to single out two key dimensions that seem to extract two basic inputs and outputs of individual migration choices – namely, social status and integration. Migrants who originally came to study show the highest values on both dimensions. Those who came for love/family reasons are lower on the
status dimension than those who came for work reasons, but both groups share an above average integration into the target country. The least well integrated are those who moved exclusively to improve their quality of life – such as retirement migrants.

An example of the new pattern of migration and mobility within Europe are Polish citizens in the UK, often referred to as the ‘Polish plumber’ phenomenon. The influx of Polish workers into the UK requires a revision of migration theories and presents important empirical puzzles. Both problems stem from the specificity of this migration wave, which does not correspond to classical models. The inadequacy of classic migration theories is demonstrated by the inaccuracy of forecasts from before 2004. The ‘optimistic’ forecasts foresaw an influx many times smaller than the actual one. But the ‘pessimistic’ forecasts were wrong when expecting a large movement induced by a need to receive social benefits.

The chapter ‘A suspended status: the puzzle of Polish workers in the West Midlands’ by Guglielmo Meardi shows how the influx of Polish workers is different from previous migration waves. It is, at least in intention, short term, and includes a high proportion of young women. In addition, these workers maintain strong contacts and networks with their home country (through frequent travel, new communication technologies, etc.), they often compare living conditions between different European countries, and show an unforeseen willingness to join local trade unions. They live in two different societies (in that of the target country and of the country of origin), they interact in a transnational space and they develop, to some extent, something like a hybrid identity. The issue is whether these people qualify for the definition of (classic) ‘migrants’, or of ‘transnational migrants’ or even of ‘cosmopolitans’.

A further example of new patterns of mobility and migration are the citizens of western Europe in Turkey. For many decades, Turkey was an emigration country for guestworkers who were moving to Germany, Switzerland or Austria. However, Turkey has been a receiving country as more and more pensioners from Western Europe choose Turkey as a country of residence where they can spend their active years of retirement. International retirement migration (IRM) is a new form of international human mobility which entails the movement of people in their later lives to new places with different challenges and opportunities in pursuit of a better way of life. It can be considered as a combination of permanent and temporal/seasonal migration. It is more than long stay tourism in that there is a degree of permanence and long-term commitment.

The major immigration flows to Turkey have tended to consist of Muslim or Turkish expatriates. But Turkey has increasingly become a popular European retiree destination, particularly for British, German,
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Nordic and Dutch citizens. There are several cities in Turkey where significant elderly-immigrant communities have established themselves. Canan Balkır and Berna Kirkulak, in Chapter 8, present the results of their survey of retired migrants in one of the main destinations, namely Antalya and its districts. The research project involves intensive fieldwork including questionnaire-based surveys and in-depth interviews both conducted with the retired migrants and with the local community. The key questions asked included the motivations of retired migrants for coming to Antalya, the income and expenditure patterns, the problems encountered, housing patterns, their impact on the social and economic structure of the host community as well as the sensitivity of the local community concerning the international retirement migration.

The enlargement of the European Union to the east in 2004/2007 gave the EU some new neighbours. Countries that were formerly part of the Soviet Union (Belarus, Moldova, Ukraine, Armenia and Georgia) were now found on the ‘eastern frontiers’. Part of the accession negotiations involved strengthening the borders with those countries, yet migration from them has increased. Based on an ethnosurvey funded by the International Association for Cooperation with Scientists from the former Soviet Union (INTAS), Claire Wallace and Kathryn Vincent explore the migration of people between 2005 and 2007, into the EU and elsewhere using a survey of their homelands combining quantitative and qualitative methods. The chapter challenges conventional notions of migration based upon a one-way passage to a new land. It argues that recent migrations (at least post-1989) are characterized rather by temporary circulation of people and hence would not be classically called ‘migration’. They include both temporary employment and various kinds of studentship. The project focuses upon people who had already migrated and returned by 2004. It was found that the main destination country for migrants was Russia, reflecting the more welcoming migration policies there to fulfil labour needs. For the European Union, migrants went to northern European countries mainly by using schemes and agencies, while they went to the south and the new member states using more informal means.

Immigration to the EU is based in most cases on structural features in the receiving societies. One of the demand factors is derived from the ageing process. Immigrants are, in many European countries, the main care providers for the elderly. Raquel Martínez Buján, in Chapter 10, uses Spain as a unit to explore how care for the elderly becomes a new employment area for immigrants. The inclusion of women into the labour market, the peculiarities of the hidden economy and the lack of institutional provision where geriatric care is concerned, help to explain this process.
1.4 PROBLEMS OF MIGRANT INTEGRATION

The integration of different immigration groups in a given country are studied by some of our contributors. Research where this relation is considered is very rare: that is, one specific immigration group living within different country specific contexts. In a comparative study, Olga Kutsenko researches Turkish minorities or Turkish migrants living in five different national contexts: Bulgaria (Turkish minority), Germany (Turkish-speaking minority in Berlin), Moldova (Gagauz minority), Russia (Tatars in Tatarstan) and Ukraine (Crimean Tatars in the Crimea). Kutsenko analyses the interethnic integration between an ethnic community and a dominant society within certain national borders and under different economic, cultural and political conditions. Findings include mechanisms of societal ethnic-based integration as well as the types of integration strategies used by different ethnic communities under varying social conditions. The study of the roots of interethnic conflicts and their impact on societal integration, national security and stability makes evident that such processes are under the strong influence of economic and political interests.

Return migration is a highly important topic as the European Commission tries to implement new forms of circular migration. However, a comprehensive picture of return migrants' employment situation is still lacking. The fundamental reason is that, in most countries, there are no population registers allowing researchers to distinguish people who have lived abroad. Jan Saarela and Fjalar Finnäs attempt to fill this gap in our knowledge by using longitudinal population register data from Finland, and they provide some interesting results. Finnish return migrants, both men and women, have odds of employment that are only about half those of non-migrants, even when factors such as age, education, mother tongue and place of residence are accounted for. Within the group of higher educated people, return migrants are in a worse employment position than observably similar non-migrants. Employment opportunities tend to deteriorate with migration duration and improve with time subsequent to return migration. This suggests that there could be an effect of lost contact with the home country labour market while abroad, which may override any premium that accrues through human capital of foreign work experience or other practices gained. Also, return migrants with short stays abroad and long periods at home are in a poor relative position. The findings of Saarela and Finnäs illustrate that the return migrants are highly selected with regard to some latent personal characteristics with severe negative effects on job finding probability, and that this non-negligible group in the labour market should be given more policy attention.
1.5 STATE CONTROL AND CITIZEN RIGHTS

The fourth part of the book deals with control as one of the major dilemmas of migration. Control has not emerged as an isolated issue. It is a consequence of the growing levels of migration.

James Hampshire uses the concept of a ‘migration state’ to describe the fundamental dilemma with which every migration state is confronted. Migration states seek competitive advantage by opening their economies and societies to international migration, but at the same time they must also accommodate powerful political forces that drive them towards closure. Wealth creation, generally facilitated by immigration, has to be balanced with the provision of security – the increased risk of terrorism, and organized crime. Faced with these conflicting dynamics, migration states seek to manage migration in their interests by encouraging or ‘soliciting’ some flows, while preventing or ‘stemming’ others. Techniques of risk management are harnessed in the control of migration. Hampshire illustrates this development with the example of the UK where the reconceptualization of migration in terms of risk, and the reorganization of migration management as a form of risk management can be observed. These processes, he contends, have to be studied in the context of a conflict between expert knowledge (or risk assessment) and public and media opinion. The management of migration is as much about the public perception of migration risks as about the actual risk.

Dennis Broeders shifts the emphasis from migration within the EU to the issue of illegal migration and how nation states may control it. Such migration and asylum seekers have become prominent and controversial political topics. In a unified Europe, internal migration control means that national states also have to turn to the European level to construct the tools necessary for these types of exclusion. Broeders points to the ways in which border control is being tightened through different forms of electronic surveillance and he describes the Schengen Information System (II), the Eurodac database and the Visa Information System. These systems are able to ‘re-identify’ parts of the population of irregular migrants on the basis of digital traces of their migration history and are therefore a major, and growing, contribution to the efforts of those member states developing surveillance systems. However, the emphasis is changing and policies of migration control have shifted responsibility to employers and to the exclusion of (illegal) migrants from public services. The objective here is to eliminate illegal migrants from the labour and housing market. He also draws attention to the tendencies of ‘surveillance creep’, by which systems originally intended to meet specific problems are applied to new ones when required by changed political circumstances. In such cases, legal and other requirements are often disregarded.
Bente Puntervold Bø describes the recent tendencies in immigration control policies in Europe with particular reference to Norway. She emphasizes the threat of undermining legal safeguards and refugee protection. Countries, in seeking to control immigration, are often guilty, she contends, of breaking international law and conventions. She describes and discusses the limitations of people’s rights consequent on the war against terrorism. These difficulties are compounded by the de-professionalization of control regimes, the criminalization of asylum seekers, the regionalization of protection and the limitation of the scope of refugee protection.

Perhaps paradoxically, our book ends with policies which are at variance with those of the European Union with respect to migration. Those who live in the EU have the right to free movement within it – this is their human right and concurrently contributes to the wealth of the EU; whereas those whose birthplace is outside are increasingly excluded.