Introduction
Mason A. Carpenter

It is nearly impossible to open an edition of the Economist, Wall Street Journal, Financial Times, Business Week, Fast Company, or other business press outlet without seeing mention of the exploits, excesses, strengths, or failings of a Chief Executive Officer (CEO), her or his management team, or board of directors. Similarly, almost every issue of our top academic journals like Administrative Science Quarterly, Academy of Management Journal, Academy of Management Review, and Strategic Management Journal has an article or more about top management teams (TMTs) and the upper echelons – TMT and upper echelons are the collective terms for research concerning executives, TMTs, and their boards of directors. Whether due to actual causal or reciprocal relationships between executives and organizational outcomes, or simply our romance with leadership, most people perceive there to be a real relationship between leaders and features of their organizations, including firm performance.

While decades ago there was disagreement as to whether top managers mattered or not, there is ample cumulative evidence today from management (Carpenter et al., 2004), psychology (Peterson et al., 2003), and financial economics (Bertrand and Schoar, 2003), that executive effects on organizational outcomes are both statistically and practically significant. As a result, the emphasis of TMT research has shifted from questions about if managers matter, to questions about under what conditions they matter. Importantly, some of the new research exploring the upper echelons highlights when, where, and how senior executives contribute to innovation, accounting and stock market performance, and firm survival; at the same time there is ample research showing how TMTs seek to game the system through impression management or unethical or illegal business practices. Therefore, it is fairly safe to say that not all TMT research is laudatory, and that we are in fact learning a great deal about the good, bad, and ugly of upper echelons’ effects.

MOTIVATION FOR THE HANDBOOK

The primary motivation for the Handbook is to articulate and stake out new research directions about the upper echelon – executives, TMTs, and their boards. The guiding premise of this area of research is that organizations are a reflection of their executives, TMTs, and boards of directors (though see Mooney and Amason in Chapter 2 for a different spin on this), which collectively comprises their strategic leadership. Credit for this premise is often given to Hambrick and Mason’s (1984) seminal theory paper on the upper echelons perspective. When I and colleagues reviewed the upper echelons literature for the Journal of Management in 2004, Hambrick and Mason (1984) had racked up well over 500 ISI citations (Carpenter et al., 2004); my cite count for Hambrick and Mason (1984) as of the date I’m writing this introductory chapter (mid-2010, just six years later) is an astonishing 1057 in ISI, and a Google Scholar citation count of over 1.
2 The handbook of research on top management teams

2500! Thus, interest in the upper echelons shows no signs of slowing down. Indeed, our review and others have chronicled and documented the dramatic growth of research in and around the spirit of the upper echelons perspective (see, for instance, additional comprehensive reviews in Finkelstein and Hambrick, 1996, and Finkelstein et al., 2009).

As Finkelstein et al. (2009) note inside the front book-jacket cover of their indispensable and authoritative tome on strategic leadership:

in order to understand why organizations do the things they do, or perform the way they do, we need to deeply comprehend the people at the top – their experiences, abilities, values, social connections, aspirations, and other human features. The actions – or inactions – of a relatively small number of key people at the apex of an organization can dramatically affect organizational outcomes.

It is in the spirit of elaborating on that description that the chapters of the Handbook have been written and compiled.

Beyond this topical description of what the Handbook covers, it is important to also note that a secondary motivation for this collection is to let the Handbook authors aggressively lay out new research avenues related to executives, top management teams, and boards of directors. It is true that most published empirical and theoretical articles sound out new research directions, or at least they should. This is also the objective of recent review pieces like Carpenter et al. (2004) and Finkelstein et al. (2009). In the case of the Handbook, however, I gave authors greater license and the “stretch goal” to talk about the research implications of their chapter for future work in pretty expansive terms – implications for their own work and, perhaps most importantly, the innovative and game-changing work of others. As a result, I hope you will agree that the Handbook’s authors have identified and staked out some really important and novel new ground.

ORGANIZATION OF THE HANDBOOK

Given the researchers’ common interest in top executives, the 15 chapters in the Handbook are all somewhat interrelated, though at the same time there are clusters of the chapters that are organized into five respective parts: (I) Definitions of top management teams, (II) Personalities and profiles of top executives, (III), TMT experience and strategy, (IV) How executive actions affect strategy, rivalry, and entrepreneurship, and (V) The context surrounding changes in the executive suite (see Table 0.1). I review each of the parts and chapters briefly below.

Top Management Teams Defined

The Handbook opens with three chapters on top management team definition. Two of the papers are conceptual (Jones and Cannella; Beckman and Burton), and the third is empirical (Mooney and Amason). Chapter 1 (Jones and Cannella) builds on the seminal work of Thompson (1967), wherein he established that top managers are responsible for setting the strategic direction of the firm. As such, Jones and Cannella argue that the TMT is the most appropriate level of analysis to use when studying firm outcomes. Their work expands the upper echelons discussion by dissecting the TMT; specifically, they
distinguish the role of the CEO from other non-CEO TMT members. At the same time, they develop a clearer sense of which executives participate in strategic decision making. Their goal, based on the contention that more accurately identifying the executives who are included in the TMT will strengthen the explanatory power of the upper echelons perspective, is to develop theory to improve the ability to predict executive involvement in strategic decision making based on the decision context.

Chapter 2 (Mooney and Amason) also draws on Thompson (1967) to revisit the definition of the TMT. They note that Thompson introduced the notion that an inner circle of top management team members exists, and that the CEO relies heavily on this small group when making strategic decisions. Although much research has been done examining top management teams, Mooney and Amason are among the first to give explicit research attention to executive inner circles. In their chapter, the authors argue and find empirical evidence that some but not all TMT members are involved in strategic decision making. These results support the idea that an inner circle indeed exists. Mooney and Amason also explore how the CEO selects the inner circle and present competing theoretical arguments of similarity/attraction and information processing. Moreover, their data suggests that CEOs have a tendency to select inner circle members that share similar characteristics and experiences as the CEO. Importantly, they conclude that their evidence suggests that, rather than the organization being a reflection of its TMT (Hambrick and Mason, 1984), the organization may more appropriately be a reflection of an inner circle of the TMT, who in turn reflect the CEO.

Chapter 3 (Beckman and Burton) takes a different tack by exploring the temporal determinants of TMT composition. The authors note that TMTs continuously morph as the definition of top management roles evolve and as individual executives come and go, yet these structural and temporal dynamics have received limited direct attention from scholars who study top management team demography. This is surprising given that many of the oft-studied demographic characteristics of teams – age, tenure, experience – change over time. In their chapter, Beckman and Burton illustrate how attention to organizational structure and a broader understanding of time and change open new opportunities for research.
research avenues. They demonstrate how individual mobility and top management team role definitions are subject to temporal and historical forces that influence our ability to make inferences and accumulate knowledge across research studies. Beyond conceptual arguments they illustrate their points using functional and tenure heterogeneity as two examples. Beckman and Burton conclude their chapter with an agenda for longitudinal top management team research that distinguishes roles from individual incumbents and incorporates an understanding of time and change.

**Executive Personalities and Profiles**

Those who study top management teams using demographic characteristics and other executive data available through archival sources are familiar with the oft-mentioned caveat that future research should go inside the black box. A number of my own published studies, for instance, state something like this:

As a result, by following the norms of upper echelons research we have “black-boxed” important underlying processes and causal mechanisms and ignored other characteristics that may have been pertinent to our arguments. Research is still needed to further illuminate the nature of the relationships between TMT characteristics and the actual cognitions and behaviors of upper echelon executives. (Carpenter and Fredrickson, 2001, p. 543)

This caveat is an essential limitation and commonplace feature of the TMT research landscape.

However, the chapters in this part need no such caveat in their discussion sections. In fact, the novelty common to all four chapters is that they provide valuable exemplars of empirical work that does go into the hard-to-access black box of executive teams to help us better understand executive personalities, profiles, and their consequences. Two of the chapters (4 and 5) look at the psychological profiles of individual executives, while two of the chapters consider TMT profiles (6 and 7).

In Chapter 4, for instance, Sangster studies the personality profiles of US top executives (the head of a business and that person’s direct reports). He finds important personality differences across businesses, and between these top executives and the US population as a whole. Top executives materially differ from the average citizen on four out of the five dimensions of personality (openness, conscientiousness, extraversion, agreeableness, and neuroticism – the Big Five Factor Model). Moreover, for at least one dimension of personality, top management is more homogeneous than the citizenry, as a whole. Though four out of five dimensions of personality differentiate top executives from the US norm, the fifth dimension differentiates top management teams from each other. Sangster concludes by noting that his study’s findings imply the need to understand one’s competitors not only in terms of their technology and physical capital, but also in terms of their human and psychological capital.

Stajkovic, Carpenter, and Graffin (Chapter 5) develop a theoretical framework that links charismatic leadership to the extensiveness of an executive’s social networks, and then predicts that such network extensiveness can subsequently be related to an individual’s motivation to set challenging personal career goals. This chapter complements Sangster’s in the sense that they link psychological and social capital (i.e., managers’ social networks) both theoretically and empirically. To assess the generalizability and
boundary conditions of their theory, they test it in two samples of senior managers: one from the United States (an individualistic culture) and the second from China (a collectivistic culture). In the first part of the study, Stajkovic and colleagues find that charismatic leadership is positively related to social network extensiveness and that culture moderates this relationship. In the second part, they find that social network extensiveness is positively related to the setting of challenging career goals. This latter finding held up in both the individualistic and the collectivistic cultures. The authors note that TMT research either ignores managerial social networks or assumes they are the primary explanatory mechanism, and conclude by calling for research that looks at the possible causal and reciprocal relationships between executive personality and social network extensiveness and structure.

The research in Chapter 6 shifts attention from individual executives to the level of the TMT. Peterson and Zhang draw on a sample of 67 TMTs to examine the associations between TMT members’ collective psychological characteristics and business unit performance. More specifically, the authors tested whether TMT members’ collective core self-evaluations (comprised of self-esteem, generalized self-efficacy, locus of control, and emotional stability) and psychological capital (comprised of hope, optimism, task-specific self-efficacy, and resilience) predicted business unit performance. Their results revealed that TMT collective psychological capital was positively associated with business unit performance but TMT collective core self-evaluation was not. In addition, transformational leadership of the TMT leaders moderated the relationship between TMT collective psychological capital and unit performance. When levels of transformational leadership were high, the relationship between collective TMT psychological capital and unit performance was stronger than when levels of transformational leadership were low. Peterson and Zhang conclude their chapter by discussing the theoretical and practical implications of these results, highlighting the importance of studying TMT-level psychological characteristics.

Chapter 7 (Clark and Maggitti) emphasizes the fact that TMTs are charged with making critical strategic decisions. Often these decisions carry long-lasting implications for the health of the firm and they are made under time pressure and in conditions of novelty and ambiguity. TMT researchers continue to make strides to overcome the unique methodological challenges they face. In their chapter, Clark and Maggitti discuss some of these challenges and issues involved in overcoming them. To illustrate, the authors present a dual-method study of TMT confidence and strategic decision-making outcomes. Using data collected from an intensive field study of TMTs, they employ a positivist theory-testing approach to establish the importance of top management team potency (confidence) followed by an inductive outlier analysis in the discussion part that was used to develop propositions concerning functional vs. dysfunctional potency. Clark and Maggitti conclude the chapter with a proposed research agenda for further articulating the role of TMT confidence. They also discuss the need for continued improvement in TMT research methodology.

**TMT Experience and Strategy**

The two *Handbook* chapters in this part, one based on a novel field study setting and the other drawing on career histories of Chinese corporate elites, address questions related
to the sources of executive experience. One of the most-cited papers in the area of executive effects is Hambrick and Mason’s (1984) upper echelons perspective. They theorized that prior experience of TMT members affects organizational strategies because it shapes their fields of vision, selective perceptions, and interpretation of environmental and organizational stimuli. The two chapters in this part both contribute to Hambrick and Mason’s seminal perspective on the role and effects of experience in predicting executive choices and behaviors.

For instance, the authors of Chapter 8 (Miner, Gong, Baker, and O’Toole), open their chapter with the observation that important research has, consistent with the upper echelons perspective (Hambrick and Mason, 1984), theorized that prior TMT experiences affect organization strategies through the development of executive perceptions and cognitive filters of environmental and organizational stimuli. Based on inductive field research on founding TMTs, the authors advance an additional causal pathway by which TMT prior experience shapes later firm actions and outcomes: the impact of exposure to pre-existing organizational routines. Miner and colleagues first present an inductive study of founding top management teams, which suggests that they import and re-deploy organizational routines based on their experience in prior firms and with advisor networks. Specifically, the teams they study (1) automatically import routines from their prior experience, (2) selectively import routines, (3) re-deploy prior routines for new purpose, (4) recombine routines from diverse prior organizations, and (5) recombine routines from informal advisory networks. The authors go on to generalize to argue that TMT experience in ongoing organizations will also affect organizational strategy through routine-based processes, and that this offers an important but relatively unexplored causal path in the TMT literature. Their chapter illustrates how the routines approach would provide an alternative account for some important prior TMT research results, and they then offer six testable propositions grounded in their framework. The authors show how testing these propositions will help explore the relative and joint impact of cognitive or routine-based processes, and the impact of different routine-based processes on key outcomes such as speed of change. Consistent with the spirit of the Handbook, the authors note that their paper is exploratory, and invite others to probe whether and how the additional causal pathway has useful theoretical or managerial implications.

The authors of Chapter 9 similarly break new ground by helping us to better understand how career histories build up accumulated experiences to affect executive choice. Specifically, Sanders and Tuschke use detailed career histories of members of the Chinese corporate elite to study how formative experiences affect the propensity of Chinese firms to adopt western-styled corporate governance reform. They identify forms of western experiences and government positions and work experiences as formative in affecting the values and mindsets of the corporate elite and their propensity to adopt corporate governance changes (e.g., adding independent directors to the board). In doing so, they first account for the possible path dependency of these formative experiences as well as the mutual selection process that may match firms with top leaders with certain back-grounds. Consistent with their expectations, Sanders and Tuschke find that greater levels of government experiences within the corporate elite is positively associated with firms following the directive of the central government to add more independent directors to their boards. However, contrary to their expectations, they found that greater levels of
western experience were negatively associated with such changes. Sanders and Tuschke’s work, resonating with some of the observations made by Beckman and Burton, suggests that a viable and intriguing avenue for future research is to turn attention to the developmental pathways that senior managers follow.

Consequences of Executive Action

Whereas the prior part of the Handbook considered sources of executive experience, this part looks at how such experience might affect different organizational outcomes. Chapter 10 (Martin) helps us understand how executive leadership groups provide firms with a form of dynamic managerial capability, Chapter 11 (Hughes-Morgan, Ferrier, and Labianca) shows how TMT characteristics and competitive behaviors jointly affect firm performance, and Chapter 12 (Simsek, Heavey, Prabhakar, and Huvaj) consider how strategic leadership might play out in an emerging context they describe as strategic entrepreneurship.

Martin’s chapter (Chapter 10) is developed from a broader research program of organization and strategy in highly dynamic markets. He draws on recent empirical studies of cross-business collaboration and dynamic managerial capabilities, along with novel incentive and demographic data, to develop a practice theory of executive leadership groups. In addition, a practice theory lens is used to add greater understanding to the emerging conceptualization of dynamic managerial capabilities. Specifically, Martin’s chapter describes how the system of organizational relationships within executive leadership groups creates affordances and constraints in the resource actions they sense, formulate, and ultimately take. Overall, his chapter considers inertia and adaptability to be two sides of the same coin, rather than distinct attributes of particular structures, processes, or individual agency in executive leadership groups.

In Chapter 11, Hughes-Morgan, Ferrier, and Labianca integrate core ideas from upper echelons research with competitive dynamics. Their chapter summarizes their study of how a firm’s stock market performance is jointly influenced by its top-level human capital and the pattern of competitive behavior the firm carries out against rivals. More specifically, they drew a sample of Fortune 500 firms that carried out nearly 2000 competitive actions over a seven-year time period and tested the interaction between a composite measure of TMT heterogeneity and three characteristics of the firm’s competitive strategy – strategic complexity, strategic volume, and strategic heterogeneity – on monthly stock returns and firm-specific unsystematic risk. Owing to the firm’s higher stock returns and lower levels of stock risk, their findings provide strong evidence that investors value the “fit” between TMT experiential and cognitive breadth and how the firm maneuvers in the marketplace. Thus, their chapter suggests that the complex, dynamic relationships among managerial capabilities, competitive strategy, and stock-market-based performance cannot be disentangled from one another.

In the third chapter of this part of the book (Chapter 12), Simsek and colleagues introduce and develop the notion of strategic entrepreneurship (SE), defined as entrepreneurial action with a strategic perspective. They argue that SE has emerged as an exciting construct for strategic management and entrepreneurship researchers. Although strategic leaders (SL) including CEOs, TMTs, and boards of directors play a pivotal role in SE behaviors and outcomes, there has to date been no systematic thematization of the
SL–SE nexus in terms of central constructs, research evidence, and an overall conceptual framework. Toward that end, the authors first adopt a typological perspective of SE, articulating and juxtaposing its advantage-seeking and opportunity-seeking dimensions to yield four archetypal forms – refinement, replication, rejuvenation, and revolution. Using these four forms, they then undertake a comprehensive review of previous studies dealing with the nexus of SL–SE, over a 30-year period (1978–2008), spanning 12 management journals. Synthesizing their typology and review, Simsek and colleagues develop a conceptual framework and trace the implications of this framework for future research directions.

The Context Surrounding Executive Succession

The final part of the Handbook brings us full circle in the study of executives, TMTs, and boards to consider executive succession. For instance, in Chapter 13, Ward, Amason, Lee, and Graffin argue that organizations hire chief executives, in part, to assume the symbolic responsibility for organizational performance. Essentially, in the view they espouse, new CEOs agree either to perform up to expectations or to become scapegoats should performance fall short. This implicit agreement works like an insurance policy, whereby the CEO provides the board protection against adverse selection and the board provides the CEO premium payments commensurate with the risk underwritten. Thus, the compensation paid to a new CEO should relate directly to the performance expectations for which the chief executive is assuming responsibility. Ward and colleagues test this proposition by looking at the compensation of new CEOs in the Fortune 500 from 1995 to 2002, and new head football coaches in NCAA Division I schools from 1998 to 2004.

An essential part of the chapter by Ward and colleagues is the introduction of the Expectations Index (EI) construct. Investment opportunity set is a term used to describe the present value of a firm’s future investment options. That present value reflects the return potential of the investments, as well as the likelihood of realizing those returns successfully. In other words, the investment opportunity set should reflect the performance expectations of key stakeholders, such as the board who are aware of the investments being made by the firm to develop and capitalize upon future options. As such, the authors term this construct the EI. Over time, EI is the present value of the future returns, if the firm makes the right decisions and executes as necessary to realize the potential of those opportunities. Their results support their hypotheses that an organization’s EI predicts CEOs’ fixed compensation, the gap between CEO pay and that of other top managers, and the proportion of total compensation that is guaranteed.

In Chapter 14, Zhang helps us better understand the domain of research evaluating the entire spectrum of a CEO’s tenure, including before he or she joins the firm and after she or he has departed it. She opens the chapter by reiterating how the question of “how do CEOs matter?” has attracted significant scholarly attention in the past decades. In her view, most studies on this topic have focused on what happens when CEO leadership changes: either when a CEO is newly appointed or when a CEO leaves office. Recent studies have also examined how the length of CEO tenure in office can affect organizational outcomes such as strategy and performance. In her chapter, Zhang goes on to review recent developments in this literature and develops an agenda for CEO leadership
research. Specifically, she divides a CEO’s career into five major stages and identifies key issues at each of the stages: (1) appointing a new CEO, (2) taking charge, (3) tenure as CEO, (4) departure, and (5) post-departure. More importantly, she discusses the connections between these stages; that is, what happens in an earlier stage can affect what happens in a later stage. With this evolutionary and holistic perspective, her chapter can help us better understand the impact of a CEO on the firm that he or she leads and the impact of the firm on the CEO.

In our closing chapter of this part and the Handbook, Beck and Wiersema (Chapter 15) note the significant increase in the frequency of CEO dismissal (involuntary turnover), not just in the US, but in Germany, France, and Japan as well. Previous theoretical models of CEO dismissal have focused on board expectations, perceptions, and attributes, while empirical investigations have largely focused on the role of poor firm performance. However, in order to better understand CEO dismissal, the authors argue that it is necessary to broaden the conceptualization of the firm’s governance context in our model of CEO dismissal, specifically taking into account the role of both internal and external monitors of the firm. In this chapter, Beck and Wiersema propose an integrated model of CEO dismissal that acknowledges the role of the firm’s broader governance context, thus arriving at a better understanding of the conditions that lead to CEO dismissal. In particular they examine investment analysts and institutional investors: important external constituents who, in their respective roles as information intermediaries and informed investors with sizeable holdings, have a powerful influence on how the board evaluates the CEO. In the case of institutional investors, these external constituents have become directly involved in the monitoring role of the board itself. In developing their framework, Beck and Wiersema incorporate prior empirical work in both the finance and management literatures on the contextual conditions surrounding CEO dismissal. Their revised model of CEO dismissal demonstrates that the financial community, as represented by investment analysts and institutional investors, has multiple paths of influence connecting it to the board, and thus to the CEO dismissal decision.

THEMES IN RESEARCH ON EXECUTIVES, TOP MANAGEMENT TEAMS, AND BOARDS

Even if you are new to the study of TMTs, I hope that it is apparent to you that the chapters of the Handbook fit readily into the larger set of research themes you would expect to see on executives, top management teams, and boards of directors. The broader upper echelons research themes are summarized in Table 0.2, and the interparts of the respective chapters with these themes are summarized in Table 0.3. Each of the papers is identified with a primary research theme, and one or more secondary themes. For instance, Jones and Cannella are primarily concerned with who to include in theoretical and empirical conceptualizations of the TMT, though their chapter also has important implications for research on TMT’s, changes in TMT composition, and executive compensation.

While the Handbook’s chapters collectively mirror the full spectrum of TMT research, our treatment is in no way exhaustive. However, the chapters do touch on those themes and topics that are state of the art; areas where we both know the most, but also about which we need to know much more. At the same time, future TMT research is likely to
### Table 0.2: A list of TMT research themes

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<tr>
<th>Top Executives</th>
<th>Individual Differences</th>
<th>Team and Team Member Differences</th>
<th>Changes in Team Composition</th>
<th>Boards of Directors</th>
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<td><strong>Who are they?</strong></td>
<td><strong>How do they affect executive action?</strong></td>
<td><strong>Teams versus groups</strong></td>
<td><strong>Determinants</strong></td>
<td><strong>Roles of boards</strong></td>
<td><strong>Determinants</strong></td>
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<td><strong>What do they do?</strong></td>
<td><strong>Psychological differences</strong></td>
<td><strong>Who comprises the top team?</strong></td>
<td><strong>Consequences</strong></td>
<td><strong>Structure</strong></td>
<td><strong>Consequences</strong></td>
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<td><strong>Do they matter?</strong></td>
<td><strong>Demographic differences</strong></td>
<td><strong>Differences in power</strong></td>
<td><strong>Succession processes</strong></td>
<td><strong>Composition</strong></td>
<td><strong>Structure</strong></td>
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<td><strong>Under what conditions do they matter?</strong></td>
<td><strong>Consequences of individual executive characteristics</strong></td>
<td><strong>Team member and CEO interaction</strong></td>
<td><strong>CEO change</strong></td>
<td><strong>Consequences of board structure and composition</strong></td>
<td><strong>Economic, political, and social explanations</strong></td>
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<td><strong>Romance of leadership</strong></td>
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<td><strong>Determinants of team characteristics</strong></td>
<td><strong>Executive change</strong></td>
<td><strong>Board of director change</strong></td>
<td><strong>Distribution</strong></td>
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Examples:
- Determinants
- Consequences
- Structure
- Composition
- Economic, political, and social explanations
- Distribution
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<th>Section/Chapter</th>
<th>Top Executives</th>
<th>Individual Differences</th>
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<td>II. PERSONALITIES AND PROFILES OF TOP EXECUTIVES</td>
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<td>III. TMT EXPERIENCE AND STRATEGY</td>
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<td>IV. HOW EXECUTIVE ACTIONS AFFECT STRATEGY, RIVALRY, AND ENTREPRENEURSHIP</td>
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<td>V. THE CONTEXT SURROUNDING CHANGES IN THE EXECUTIVE SUITE</td>
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ferret out blind spots in our current map of research themes. It is unlikely though that future research will lead us to discard the entire set of themes we have covered in the Handbook, and in my humble view no TMT researcher should embark on work in our area without first consulting it.

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REFERENCES