Introduction

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In the last and present century patent law has confronted itself with several critical issues. Emerging new technologies have seemingly shaken some of the very foundations of the system, modelled to accommodate the needs of the industrial sectors which emerged during the first industrial revolution. Thus, many commentators began to wonder whether it was still appropriate to maintain the traditional paradigm as it is, exclusively based on exclusive rights.

In the new millennium, not only have new sectors emerged but each one has developed its own features with regard to its own innovation process and the kind of output produced. Often the inventive process develops through a cumulative and incremental path, leading to small improvements built upon the knowledge entangled into previous innovations, rather than a sudden breakthrough innovation. Often, too, such inventive process leads to results which lie closer to pure knowledge than applied research. What is the role patent system plays in such a scenario? In particular, considering the different dynamics of innovation among ‘old’ and ‘new’ technological sectors – such as ITs and biotechnologies – should such a role be the same across all industries? Put another way, is the classical formula ‘one size fits all’ still appropriate for a twenty-first century patent system?

These questions have been posed and examined in the first two chapters of this book, respectively by Dan Burk and Mark Lemley, and by Valeria Falce.

In addressing such questions, it remains crucial not to lose track of the baseline assumption: patents are just a means to an end, which is the spurring of innovation. In sequence, ‘which innovation’ is worthy of patent protection is another fundamental issue that has recently re-emerged in both European and American jurisprudence. If patent protection is tailored to protect inventions, what is an ‘invention’ for the purpose of the patent system? In past years the concept of invention has been used to rule out some subject matters from the realm of patent law, this especially in the European patent tradition where that concept is intertwined with the
category of excluded subject matters listed in art. 52, 2° of the European Patent Convention. But what are the boundaries of patentable subject matter and how should they be construed? This intriguing issue has been deeply examined in the third chapter, devoted to the future of the requirement for – the existence of – an ‘invention’ in (European) patent law, by Justine Pila.

A proper construction of the concept of patentable subject matter obviously has an enormous impact on follow-on innovation. Drawing the line of what cannot be the subject of a patent appears of paramount importance as it outlines what room is left for other inventors to ‘take’, wholly or in part, the knowledge that has been used to make a previous patentable invention. In fact, not everything described and claimed in a patent document is excluded *tout court* from the public domain. The claims may contain reference to materials or tools which are widely known to technicians or whose protection has expired. However, thanks to the mandatory disclosure of patented inventions, even patented knowledge (i.e. the knowledge effectively claimed and embedded into a patent) should be, and actually is – albeit to varying extents related to specific different legal environments (just think of the EU and US) – at the disposal of other inventors for research purposes. What room exists – and should be preserved – for the application of the so-called ‘research use’ exemption is another crucial issue dealt with by one of the most fervent advocates of freedom of research, Vincenzo Di Cataldo.

The first part of the book ends with a contribution by Steve Anderman. While Justine Pila and Vincenzo Di Cataldo explore the pro-competitive ‘antibodies’, so to speak, built in within the patent system, Steve Anderman explores a second and ‘external’ source of pro-competitive limitations, namely: competition law. Although antitrust remedies have been mainly applied to cases involving copyright law, Steve Anderman argues that patents are well suited to be the next candidates.

The second and third parts of the book have been devoted to specific issues relating to the two sectors characterizing the contemporary stage of technological development: information technologies and biotechnological inventions.

Specifically, the second part of the volume concerns software and business methods inventions. Here, Reinier Bakels vividly challenges the idea that software patents really represent a category by itself. As is well known, patent protection of software *seems* to be banned in Europe by art. 52, 2°, lett. c) the European Patent Convention. Yet thousands of so-called ‘software patents’ have been issued by the EPO since the end of the 1980s. So, what is a ‘software patent’ and how does it differ from other patents? Is software a product or a piece of technology used to make
products, hence just a means to build an invention? A tentative answer to this question is also provided by the contribution by Reto Hilty and Christophe Geiger, whose attention is devoted to verify to what extent software should be the subject of patent protection and whether the latter really is the most appropriate tool to promote innovation in such a field of technology. In particular, the authors also take into consideration copyright law, as alternative tool of protection initially chosen by American and European legislators to protect software instead of patents. The authors contend that although copyright rules have been specifically adapted to confront the needs of the information society, this tool of protection has proven to be unsatisfactory as it only works against mere unauthorized copying of the program. Is then patent law the right answer? Several European commentators are not satisfied with the ‘technical contribution concept’, as recently developed by the EPO. The authors try to work out what the most appropriate means of protection should be, taking into consideration the associated economic and social consequences.

This section ends with the chapter by Jay Thomas who brilliantly provides us with an American perspective on the debate. As in Europe with the recent decision of the EPO Enlarged Board of Appeal, in the United States the boundaries of patentable subject matter have been (or should have been) reassessed by a recent Supreme Court decision (Bilski v. Kappos, 2010). It seems, however, that the so much awaited judgment has not brought the clarity and guidance it was supposed to. In fact, while the decision sounds like a ban on the patentability of business methods and abstract ideas in general, it does not shed any lights on the test or methodology to be used to concretely rule out such subject matters from patent protection. The contribution is particularly interesting as the author uses his analysis of the Bilski case, framing it, in historical perspective, within the recent line of decision by the Supreme Court, hence eventually challenging the widespread idea that judicial decisions always provide the best mechanism to reform patent law in the United States.

The last part of this book has been devoted to the study of the most intriguing issues which have recently emerged in the field of biotechnology. This section opens with a chapter by Sven Bostyn, a critical review of the European biotech directive after its recent tenth anniversary. Bostyn elucidates lights and shadows of this highly controversial piece of legislation which, nonetheless, had the courage to set the basis for common provisions on the patentability of such critical subject matters as the biotech inventions.

The section continues with Chris Holman’s chapter on the patentability of genes in the USA. Long before the adoption of the EU biotech
Biotechnology and software patent law

Directive, the United States’ Supreme Court in the famous *Diamond v. Chakrabarty* case paved the way to the patentability of biotechnologies. Today, the PTO Guidelines of 2001 have taken the position – very close to the provisions of the EU Directive – that even the mere isolation of a naturally occurring DNA sequence can result in a patentable product insofar as it differs from the gene sequence as it exists in nature. Nonetheless, the issue of biotech patentability, especially with regard to gene patents, is far from being entirely settled. Several commentators and scientists still fervidly oppose the patentability of such innovations, arguing that they impede rather than foster scientific progress. Holman takes the lead from the recent controversy brought by the American Civil Liberties Union (ACLU) against Myriad Genetics (exclusive licensee of the well known patents regarding genetic diagnostic testing for mutations in the BRCA1 and BRCA2 breast cancer susceptibility genes) to analyse the societal costs and benefits of gene patents, as well as their function in biotechnology research and innovation.

The third contribution of this section is focussed on the patentability of human stem cells. Patentability of human, and especially embryonic, stem cells has become a pivotal issue in biotechnology as such cells have proved to be crucial instruments in developing breakthrough research paths in the cure of several complex diseases. Unfortunately, this subject has been inconsistently dealt by the EU biotech Directive which on the one side does not address stem cells’ patentability, and on the other side poses a strong veto on the patentability of inventions using human embryos for industrial or commercial purposes, leading interpreters to question whether embryonic stem cells may be covered by a patent. Paul Torremans’ chapter analyses this topic, examining whether stem cells pose any patentability issues with regard to either the categories of patentable subject matter or their compliance with patentability requirements (this, even with regard to ethical considerations).

This section ends with Andrea Ottolia’s chapter providing an in-depth study of the intersection between patent law and ethics which, in this area of technology, proves more problematic than ever. Many commentators feel that patent law does not represent the appropriate framework where ethical considerations should come into play. However, the discipline embedded in art. 6 of the biotech Directive and 53(a) of the EPC, together with rule 28 of its Implementing Regulation, has provided much of a leeway for Courts and Patent Offices to elaborate a test strongly influenced by ethical considerations. However, this kind of considerations is deeply intertwined with national cultures and values, as it is clearly reflected especially in the jurisprudence of the EPO Examining Divisions. Ottolia’s chapter offers a critical analysis of the morality test developed by the
EPO jurisprudence from the *Oncomouse* case to the recent *Warf* decision, advocating that while exceptions to patentability rules might not be the right instrument to squeeze ethical considerations into patent law, they may nonetheless play, if properly interpreted and construed, a significant role in the harmonization of the system, even to the benefit of the internal market.

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