1. Introduction

This introductory chapter will be devoted to an outline of the main features and new insights which distinguish the analysis of socialism contained in this book. We shall briefly summarize and assess the content, structure and conclusions of the work and end the chapter by suggesting some possible lines of research which, if pursued with the proposed analysis as a basis, should be of interest and importance and thus inspire scholars to develop them.

1 SOCIALISM AND ECONOMIC ANALYSIS

The Historic Failure of Socialism

The fall of socialism in the countries of Eastern Europe was a historic event of the first magnitude, and there is no doubt that it caught most economics experts off guard. The issue is not only that economic science failed to rise to the occasion in the face of momentous historical circumstances which economists were unable to predict, but also, and this is even more serious, that it failed to provide humankind with the analytical tools necessary to prevent the grave errors committed. In fact, economists have often done quite the opposite: they have used their scientific aura and prestige to justify and promote economic policies and social systems which have been patently unsuccessful and involved a disproportionate cost in human suffering.

When confronted with this situation, western economists have not appeared uneasy or disconcerted; instead, they have carried on with their science as if nothing had happened. On those few occasions when a prominent economist has raised the uncomfortable question of why most professional theorists have been unable to adequately evaluate and predict the course of events in a timely manner, the answers have been naive and superficial, and thus unsatisfactory. For example, economists have referred to an “error” in the interpretation of statistical data from the systems of the former Eastern bloc, data which may have been accepted in the profession without sufficient “critical” thought. They have also mentioned the inadequacy of the scientific consideration given to the
role of “incentives” in the economy. The most distinguished members of the economics profession, and the profession in general, have made little further effort to admit responsibility. No one, or rather almost no one, has explored the possibility that the very root of the problem may lie in the methods which prevailed in economics during the twentieth-century period that saw the persistence of socialist systems. Furthermore, we can count on the fingers of one hand the economists who have undertaken the unavoidable, crucial task of bringing to light and reevaluating the content of the debate surrounding the economic impossibility of socialism. Ludwig von Mises started the debate in 1920, and it continued in the decades that followed. Aside from these isolated and honorable exceptions, it seems as if most economists have preferred to direct their research from this point on with a conscious disregard for all that has been written about socialism up to now, both by them and by their predecessors.

Nevertheless, we cannot advance beyond socialism’s chapter in history as if the failure of this system were to exert no influence on human scientific knowledge. In fact, the history of economic thought would suffer considerably if theorists again attempted to focus their concentration on the most urgent specific problems at all times, while forgetting the fundamental need to thoroughly and critically reevaluate and study the analyses of socialism carried out thus far, and particularly the need to produce a definitive, theoretical refutation of this social system. In any case, we must face the fact that economic science has again betrayed the high hopes that humankind is entitled to pin on it. In reality, as an abstract system of thought which is firmly rooted in the innate, rationalist arrogance or conceit of human beings, socialism will be destined to surface again and again if action is not taken to prevent it. To avert its reappearance, we must seize the unique, and perhaps unrepeatable, historic opportunity now before us to make a thorough examination of the theoretical conscience, to specify the errors committed, to entirely reevaluate the analytical tools used, and to ensure that no historical period is considered closed until we have first arrived at the necessary theoretical conclusions, which should be as definitive as possible.

The Subjective Perspective in the Economic Analysis of Socialism

Throughout this book, we propound and develop the basic thesis that socialism can and should be analyzed from the standpoint of a deep and clear understanding of human action and of the dynamic processes of social interaction it sets in motion. For the most part, the economic analysis of socialism carried out so far has failed to satisfactorily incorporate the methodological individualism and the subjectivist viewpoint
that Friedrich A. Hayek considers essential to the advancement of our science. In fact, he states: “It is probably no exaggeration to say that every important advance in economic theory during the last hundred years was a further step in the consistent application of subjectivism”.

Indeed, we have attempted precisely this in our socialism study; namely, to base it on a radical and consistent application of “subjectivism”, to build it upon the most intimate and essential characteristic of man: his ability to act in an entrepreneurial, creative manner.

In this light, we have made a sustained effort to free our work, without exception and in all contexts, from the remains of that “objectivism” which still, on either an overt or a covert, subconscious level, pervades many areas of our science and thus cripples its productiveness and severely hampers its future development. Although we can never be absolutely certain that the vain objectivism which floods our science has not furtively crept into our analysis (especially after the long years of academic misguidance all economics students endure while completing their university studies), we have done all within our power to break with the oppressive, prevailing paradigm. Hence, we have taken special care to resist the erroneous view that economic phenomena have a factual, “objective” existence outside of the subjective interpretation and knowledge of them which humans generate when they act. Therefore, we have come to conceive economics as a science which deals with “spiritual” facts, that is, with the subjective information or knowledge that people create in the processes of social interaction.

Our Definition of Socialism

Our expressed desire to apply subjectivism with the greatest possible rigor and consistency to the analysis of socialism manifests itself, above all, in our definition of this social system. Indeed, we have already stated our view that the core, or most characteristic feature, of human nature is the ability of all people to act freely and creatively. From this standpoint, we consider that socialism is any system of institutional aggression on the free exercise of human action or entrepreneurship. Later, in Chapter 3, we shall have the opportunity to explore in detail all elements and implications of our definition, and we shall examine its decided, productive comparative advantages over the other definitions used until now. At the moment it is sufficient for us to stress that our conception of socialism as the systematic and aggressive thwarting of action, institutional coercion in other words, inevitably and necessarily gives our analysis of socialism a wide relevance and makes it an entire economic theory on institutional coercion. Moreover, it becomes clear that to examine the theoretical
ramifications of the systematic attack on human action and interaction, one must first acquire a deep enough knowledge and understanding of the basic theoretical analysis of unfettered human action. In Chapter 2, which has been given the general title of “Entrepreneurship”, we focus entirely on providing this groundwork.

**Entrepreneurship and Socialism**

Our conception of entrepreneurship is both broad and precise. In a general sense, entrepreneurship and human action are considered to be synonymous. In a stricter sense, entrepreneurship consists of the typically human capacity to recognize the opportunities for profit which exist in one’s environment. Action is a typically entrepreneurial phenomenon, and we shall study in depth its main components and characteristics in Chapter 2. Among its features, the most outstanding is the creative and coordinating power of entrepreneurship. In fact, each entrepreneurial act generates new information of an unspoken, dispersed, practical and subjective nature and prompts the actors involved to modify their behavior or discipline themselves in terms of the needs and circumstances of others: it is in this spontaneous, unconscious manner that the bonds which make life in society possible are formed. Also, only entrepreneurship can produce the information necessary for *economic calculation* – understood as any estimation of the value in terms of market prices of the outcome of the different courses of action. If we correctly identify and clearly understand the essence of this remarkable process of social coordination and economic calculation, a process only entrepreneurship can initiate, we can comprehend, by comparison and contrast, the severe social discoordination and lack of economic calculation which necessarily follow any institutional coercion against entrepreneurial freedom. In other words, only through a correct understanding of the nature of market processes and society can we fully comprehend all the primary and secondary implications of the socialist system. In Chapter 3, we shall examine them from this viewpoint and consider the connections between them.

**Socialism as an Intellectual Error**

If socialism has been defended in scientific, political, and philosophical circles, it is because it was thought that the systematic use of coercion could make the process of social coordination much more effective. The entire first half of Chapter 3 is devoted to a theoretical refutation of this idea, and our argument is developed from two points of view, the “static” and the “dynamic”, which are distinct but complementary. We conclude
that in this light, socialism is simply an intellectual error, since according to theory, it is impossible to coordinate society by systematically imposing coercive measures.

The second half of Chapter 3 deals in part with the secondary implications of our basic argument and does so from an interconnected, multidisciplinary perspective. It also includes an explanation and defense of our definition of socialism as opposed to the alternative conceptions which have prevailed in the past. An anatomy of the different historical varieties or types of socialism closes the chapter. Although different in motivation, degrees of intervention, and other particular characteristics, all varieties of socialism share a common denominator: they all rely, to a greater or a lesser extent, on the systematic use of aggression against the free exercise of entrepreneurship.

2 THE DEBATE ON THE IMPOSSIBILITY OF SOCIALIST ECONOMIC CALCULATION

The analysis of socialism mentioned above reveals the need for a reevaluation of the debate which took place in the 1920s and 1930s between Mises and Hayek, on one side, and different socialist theorists, on the other, concerning the impossibility of socialist economic calculation. First, let us remember, as we argued earlier, that the historic fall of socialism in the countries of Eastern Europe obliges all serious, reputable researchers to review and reassess the theoretical observations on socialism which had already been offered by those who most diligently and minutely studied the problems involved. Second, our conception of entrepreneurship and socialism is the culmination of a theoretical synthesis which emerged in embryonic form at the start of the debate and gradually evolved and approached completion in the course of it. Hence, it is essential to analyze and reevaluate the controversy in order to clearly and fully grasp all of the implications of the socialism analysis that are put forward here. Finally, by studying the debate, one becomes aware that the mainstream paradigm, which rests on the analysis of equilibrium, has failed to explain the theoretical problems inherent in socialism. Indeed, as this paradigm is based on Newtonian mechanicism and the idea of equilibrium, “repetitive inaction” in other words, it becomes impossible even to distinguish the inescapable theoretical problem that institutional coercion poses. Furthermore, the fact that most authors of secondary sources on the debate and most experts who commented on these writings received their training within the above paradigm shows why they were unable to comprehend the nature of Mises and Hayek’s challenge; it also
explains why the “myth” that the socialist side had won survived for so many years.

**Ludwig von Mises and the Start of the Socialism Debate**

It was no coincidence that the controversy arose in the wake of Mises’s contributions shortly following the First World War. Indeed, only someone who, like Mises, had acquired a profound knowledge of the nature and implications of market processes driven by human action was able to intuit and comprehend the unavoidable economic-calculation problems that socialism involves. Chapter 4 is devoted to an examination of Mises’s seminal contribution and the background to it. Special care is taken to place Mises in the historical context in which he made his momentous contribution and in which a typically Marxist conception of socialism predominated. A concerted effort is also made to show that Mises’s socialism analysis is one of dynamic theory in the strictest Austrian tradition and therefore bears no relation to static equilibrium analysis or to the “pure logic of choice”, which was developed based on it. The chapter ends with a detailed critical study of socialist theorists’ first proposed “solutions” to the problem of economic calculation. These included calculation in kind, in labor hours, and in so-called “units of utility”, and none remedied the inevitable theoretical problems that Mises raised.

**The Unjustified Shift in the Debate toward Statics**

The idea that only the economic analysis of equilibrium, which underlies and pervades the mainstream paradigm, constitutes “theory” inevitably steered the debate toward the problems of statics. As we shall see in Chapter 5, economists either failed to comprehend Mises’s challenge, or they realized that his analysis was not of equilibrium and so considered it practical rather than “theoretical”, or, as happened with most, they interpreted the Misesian challenge in the narrow terms of equilibrium and of the strict “pure logic of choice”. In the last case, they neglected to recognize that Mises himself, from the very beginning, had very clearly established that socialism posed no problem whatsoever in a static sense, and that thus his theoretical argument against socialism was fundamentally dynamic and rested on his theory of the processes of human interaction which work in the market. The shift in the debate toward statics was irrelevant, since statics had nothing to do with the original theoretical challenge, as well as unjustified, since the deflection rendered the theoretical controversy entirely fruitless. (The static viewpoint prevented economists from discovering where the problem lay and from grasping its essential,
In Chapter 5 we also review socialist economists’ different attempts at a “mathematical solution”, beginning with the arguments of a “formal similarity” in static terms between the market and socialism, and ending with the more serious contributions of Taylor and Dickinson. Finally, we take a detailed look at the “trial-and-error method”, which was conceived as a practical strategy for solving the corresponding system of equations. Chapter 5 concludes with a critical analysis of “planometric” models based on the socialist theorists’ contributions covered in the chapter, models which economists have remained stubbornly bent on developing up to the present day.

Oskar Lange and the “Competitive Solution”

The notion that in terms of theory, Oskar Lange managed to refute Mises’s argument against socialism is possibly one of the greatest myths in the history of economic thought. In fact, the leading manuals and textbooks, as well as nearly all secondary sources on the debate, categorically offer this mythical and superficial version. In its turn, this illusion has been passed down, without any justification or critical analysis, to two entire generations of economists. For this reason, it is imperative to do a meticulous critical study of the “competitive solution” proposed by Lange. This study appears in Chapter 6, and its content, length and depth make it perhaps one of the most original and illustrative elements of our effort to apply subjectivist methodology to the economic analysis of socialism. Indeed, it will be sufficient if this study, along with other recent, related writings which will be cited when appropriate, at least helps to dispel once and for all the myth that Lange refuted Mises’s argument.

“Market Socialism” as the Impossible Squaring of the Circle

The seventh and last chapter completes our analysis of the competitive solution with a look at the contributions Dickinson, Durbin and Lerner made in this area at a time after Oskar Lange presented his ideas. In this chapter, we arrive at the conclusion that competition and socialism, like creative action and coercion, are radically and fundamentally contradictory concepts. Curiously, as we shall see, a whole school of socialist theorists led by Dobb has maintained this same position and has invariably labeled as hypocrites and visionaries those of their colleagues in favor of market socialism. Following a few reflections on the true meaning of the impossibility of socialism, we close the chapter with a brief summary of our most important conclusions.
3 OTHER POSSIBLE LINES OF RESEARCH

Logically, the theoretical analysis of socialism that is carried out here leaves plenty of room for future research. In fact, this study is the first step on a path toward a number of research possibilities which could lead to highly promising results if explored or reexamined from the methodological perspective established here. Among these areas of future research, the following appear particularly significant.

The Analysis of So-called “Self-management Socialism”

Discredited as “self-management” or “syndicalist” socialism, especially following the economic, social and political collapse of the Yugoslavian model, a study of this brand of socialism using our approach would be of great theoretical interest. This is particularly true in light of the specific coordination problems this model poses at all levels, as well as the fact that it has often been defended as a middle way capable of overcoming the obstacles associated with the traditional conceptions of both capitalism and socialism.

“Indicative Planning”

Although likewise practically forgotten nowadays, we feel that indicative planning should be studied for several reasons. First, this model had a large group of defenders, particularly in the 1960s, who attempted to justify their positions with a series of theoretical arguments which in essence closely resembled those underlying the “market socialism” model, and which went virtually unanswered at the time. Therefore, even though indicative planning has fallen into disuse, it is necessary to properly analyze it afresh before closing the theoretical file on it for good. Second, as a result of the curious phenomenon described above (the abandonment or forgetting of a number of theoretical positions without the prior, necessary scientific study and ruling on them), various Eastern European economists have sought to revive indicative planning as a panacea for their economies. Third and finally, we must point out that our socialism analysis is perfectly applicable to the theory of indicative planning, since the theoretical arguments which explain the impossibility of socialism, and which will be examined in this book, are precisely the ones that prevent indicative planning from achieving the intended objectives. The same is true of a whole set of techniques which, like input–output tables, many scientistic economists doggedly persist in attempting to use to make planning (indicative or otherwise) feasible.
The Healthy Acknowledgment of “Scientific Accountability”

The establishment and persistent propagation (for almost 50 years) of the myth that socialist theorists had “won” the debate on the impossibility of socialist economic calculation, and thus that socialism as a model posed no theoretical problem whatsoever, constitutes one of the most curious aspects of the controversy. Particularly responsible for the creation of this myth are the scholars who produced the secondary sources on the debate, as well as an entire legion of economists who, all these years, have either accepted the most popular version without bothering to do any in-depth study on their own, or simply disregarded the whole debate because they considered it obvious that socialism presented no theoretical problem. Although we can confidently assert that, with respect to the difficulty socialism poses, most social scientists have not lived up to the expectations that humankind had a right to place on them and have at least failed to fulfill their crucial scientific duty of informing and warning citizens of the grave dangers inherent in the socialist ideal, a substantial difference exists with respect to the bad faith, negligence, or mere ignorance attributable to each individual theorist. Hence, it becomes essential that we perform the very healthy, instructive exercise of acknowledging the responsibility of different scientists. With respect to ordinary citizens and the future of economic thought, such an exercise should portray each theorist, without regard to name or to current or transient reputation or popularity, in an appropriate light.10

Consequences of the Debate with Respect to the Future Development of Economics

Perhaps the most daring contention expressed in this book is that the fall of socialism will necessarily exert a major impact on the prevailing paradigm and on the future of economic science. It seems clear that a critical element in economics has failed when economists, barring extremely rare exceptions, have been unable to foresee such a momentous event. Luckily, at the present time, the heavy blow received has put us in a position to correctly evaluate the nature and degree of the theoretical short-sightedness that affects the mainstream paradigm, which until now has precluded economists from assessing and interpreting with sufficient clarity the most significant events of the social realm. Moreover, we shall not need to start from scratch, since many of the new analytical tools have been undergoing a process of development and refinement triggered by the efforts of Austrian theorists to explain, defend, and fine-tune their positions throughout the debate on the impossibility of socialist economic calculation.11

Although it is not possible to list here all of the areas of our discipline
which are affected, much less meticulously revise their content, we can offer a few examples. Perhaps we should begin with the method appropriate to our science. The factors which make socialism impossible (that is, the subjective, creative, dispersed and tacit qualities of the entrepreneurial information society uses) are exactly the same ones which render unattainable the ideals of empirical verification and precise measuring which until now economists have defended with equal degrees of eagerness and naivety. And not even mentioned are the adverse effects which mathematical formalism and the pernicious obsession with analyses based on complete information and on equilibrium have exerted on the development of our science. It is also necessary to abandon the functional theory of price determination in favor of a price theory that explains how prices are dynamically established through a sequential, evolving process driven by the force of entrepreneurship, in other words, by the human actions of the actors involved, rather than by the intersection of mysterious curves or functions which lack any real existence, since the information necessary to devise them does not exist even in the minds of the actors involved. In addition, we must abandon and reconstruct the flimsy, static theory of “perfect” competition and monopoly and replace it with a theory of competition understood as a dynamic and purely entrepreneurial process of rivalry, a theory which does away with monopoly issues in their traditional sense by rendering them irrelevant and focuses on institutional restrictions on the free exercise of entrepreneurship in any sphere of the market.

The theory of capital and interest is likewise profoundly affected by the subjectivist conception, which depicts as a capital good each and every intermediate stage, subjectively considered as such by the actor, within the context of the specific action in which he is immersed. The actor’s experience of culmination gives rise to the subjective idea of the passage of time. Capital appears as a mental category in the actor’s economic calculation or subjective estimation of the value of each stage in monetary market prices. This conception explains the leading role time preference plays in determining the interest rate; it also explains the absence of any causal relationship between the interest rate and capital productivity. The belief in such a relationship derives from three distinct but closely linked errors: the analysis of only a perfectly adjusted state of equilibrium, the idea of production as an instantaneous “process” that does not take time, and the notion of capital as an actual “fund” which is independent of the human mind and replicates itself.

The theory of money, credit and financial markets represents perhaps the greatest theoretical challenge our science faces in the twenty-first century. In fact, we would go so far as to assert that now that the “theoretical gap” created by the absence of an adequate analysis of socialism has been filled,
the least-known field, and the most important, is that of money, where systematic coercion, methodological errors and theoretical ignorance prevail in all areas. For the social relationships which involve money are by far the most abstract and difficult to understand, and therefore the knowledge they produce and incorporate is the most vast, complex and obscure, which makes systematic coercion in this area decidedly the most detrimental. The theory of interventionism, in general, and of economic cycles, in particular, fit in perfectly with the socialism definition and analysis that is proposed here, which clearly explain the disturbing effects systematic coercion exerts on market intra- and intertemporal coordination in all areas, especially in the monetary and fiscal spheres.

Economists have built the theory of growth and economic development upon macroeconomic aggregates and the concept of equilibrium and have overlooked the one, true protagonist of the process: humans and their alertness and creative, entrepreneurial ability. Thus it is necessary to reconstruct the entire theory of growth and underdevelopment and to eliminate all elements which justify the institutional coercion that until now has rendered the theory destructive and fruitless. We must refocus the theory on the theoretical study of the discovery processes which reveal development opportunities that have not yet been exploited, due to a lack of the essential entrepreneurial component. A similar observation could be made about all of so-called “welfare economics”, which rests upon the chimerical Paretian notion of efficiency and becomes irrelevant and useless, since its operative management requires a static environment of complete information, and such an environment never exists in the real world. Hence, more than on Paretian criteria, efficiency depends on and should be defined in terms of the capacity of entrepreneurship to spontaneously coordinate the maladjustments which arise in situations of disequilibrium. The theory of “public” goods has always been constructed in strictly static terms and based on equilibrium, and theorists have presumed the circumstances which give rise to “joint supply” and “nonrivalry in consumption” to be given and destined to always remain the same. From the standpoint of the dynamic theory of entrepreneurship, any situation in which a public good appears to exist offers a clear opportunity for someone to discover and eliminate it through entrepreneurial creativity, and therefore from the dynamic perspective of free entrepreneurial processes, the set of public goods tends to be left empty. Thus one of the stalest alibis used to justify, in many spheres of society, systematic, institutional coercion against the free exercise of entrepreneurship disappears.

Finally, we mention the theories of the public choice school and of the economic analysis of law and of institutions. In these areas, theorists currently struggle to throw off the unhealthy influence of the static model
based on complete information. This model is spawning a pseudoscientific analysis of many laws, an analysis grounded on methodological assumptions identical to those economists attempted to use at one time to justify socialism. Such assumptions totally bypass the dynamic, evolutionary analysis of the spontaneous social processes which entrepreneurship triggers and drives. It is manifestly inconsistent to strive to analyze guidelines and rules from a paradigm which presupposes the existence of complete information regarding the profits and costs derived from them, since such information, if it existed, would make the rules and guidelines unnecessary (it would be much more effective to replace them with simple orders), and if anything accounts for the evolutionary emergence of law, it is precisely the ineradicable ignorance in which humans are constantly immersed.

There are many other fields of research (the theory of population, the economic analysis of tax revenues and redistribution, environmentalism and so on), but the outline given above provides an adequate illustration of the direction in which economics will evolve in the future, once it has been rid of the theoretical and methodological defects the fall of socialism has exposed. As a result, hopefully a true social science at the service of humanity will emerge, a science which is much more wide-ranging, fruitful and instructive.

**The Reinterpretation and Historical Analysis of the Different Real Types of Socialism**

This line of research involves applying the economic analysis of socialism contained in this book to the redoing of work in the field of “comparative economic systems”, most of which has until now been plagued with serious defects, due to a lack of the necessary analytical tools. The aim, therefore, is to conduct a detailed study consisting of the historical reinterpretation of each and every one of the different types of socialism that have existed or still persist in the real world. The purpose of such a study is not only to illustrate theory, but also to reveal the extent to which events appear to support it as they develop.

**The Formulation of a Theory on the Ethical Inadmissibility of Socialism**

It is necessary to consider whether or not efforts to find a theoretical basis for the idea of justice and for its implications are tainted with the methodological and analytical flaws that are criticized. In other words, we need to strive to reconstruct the theory of justice, while abandoning the static paradigm of complete information and focusing instead on the creative and uncertain reality of human action, so that we can study the degree to
which socialism, besides being an intellectual error and a historic failure, is or is not also ethically unacceptable.

**The Development of a Theory on the Prevention and Dismantling of Socialism**

If it is concluded that socialism is ethically inadmissible, as well as a historic failure and an intellectual error, it will eventually be necessary to develop an entire tactical and strategic theory on the dismantling and prevention of it. The above will involve examining the concrete difficulties posed by the dismantling of each historical type of socialism (“real”, social democratic, self-management and so on) and evaluating the advantages and disadvantages of the different alternatives or courses of action, particularly “gradualism versus revolution”, according to the possible specific circumstances in each case. Finally, prevention takes on key importance, given the recurrent, deceptive and essentially corrupting nature of the mechanisms which at all times encourage the resurgence of socialism and necessitate unflagging alertness, not only in the scientific realm, but also with respect to the defense and development of the institutions, habits, principles and behavior patterns required by any healthy social framework free from systematic coercion.

**4 CONCLUSION**

It was necessary to outline the above considerations in order to place our study of socialism and institutional coercion in its proper context. Only an appropriate understanding of the general theory of human action can explain the consequences which invariably follow from any attempt to forcibly block the free exercise of entrepreneurship. Hence, our analysis centers on human beings, understood as creative, acting subjects who struggle tirelessly throughout history to express and act according to their most intimate nature, free from the fetters and coercion which would be systematically imposed on them under the most varied and unjustified pretexts.

**NOTES**

1. Now that it has become clear that economists had conducted little or no research in this field, which until recently was excluded from nearly all scientific research programs, it actually seems relatively unimportant that economic science was again found wanting when its help was required to accomplish the transition to market economies in the collapsed systems.
2. The leading economists of Eastern Europe have not followed suit, and we shall take an
extensive look at their reaction in the following chapters. Moreover, these authors are
the most aware of the theoretical deficiencies of western economics, a fact which often
causes in them a curious, theoretical apprehension or confusion which their arrogant
colleagues from the West have not managed to comprehend.

3. These were the only explanations offered by Gary Becker in the “Presidential Address”
he delivered at the regional meeting of the Mont-Pèlerin Society which took place in
Prague, Czechoslovakia, November 3–6, 1991 under the general title “In Search of a
Transition to a Free Society”.

4. Worthy of special mention among the works of these professionals is Don A. Lavoie’s
Rivalry and Central Planning: The Socialist Calculation Debate Reconsidered (1985c),
which has become required reading for all experts on the subject.

5. This is the thesis that Hayek presents in his book, Fatal Conceit: The Errors of Socialism
(Hayek, 1988).

6. Hayek (1952, 31). (See also the 1979 reprint from Liberty Press, Indianapolis.) In foot-
note 24, on pages 209–10, Hayek adds that subjectivism “has probably been carried out
most consistently by L. v. Mises and I believe that most peculiarities of his views which
at first strike many readers as strange and unacceptable are due to the fact that in the consistent development of the subjectivist approach he has for a long time moved ahead
of his contemporaries. Probably all the characteristic features of his theories, from his
theory of money to what he calls his apriorism, his views about mathematical econom-
ics in general, and the measurement of economic phenomena in particular, and his
criticism of planning all follow directly from his central position.” (As in the rest of the
notes of this book, in the absence of an explicit comment to the contrary, the italics have
been added and do not appear in the original text. Also, whenever possible, the direct
quotes have been provided in the language in which they were originally published,
though for convenience, an English translation is often supplied.)

7. The static argument is totally unrelated to the analysis of equilibrium or the static
conception which is so strongly criticized in Chapter 4 and, in general, throughout the
entire book. However, the term “static” is used for want of a better one, since this argument
deals with the dispersed nature of information which has hypothetically already been created, as opposed to the “dynamic” argument, which refers to the process by which new information is generated. Later it will be shown that from our perspective both arguments are equally dynamic and thus equally incompatible with equilibrium theory. In fact, both arguments refer to simultaneous, indistinguishable social processes which are discussed separately for educational purposes only.

8. The list is not meant to be exhaustive, as is clear, and corresponds to the outline of a
second volume on socialism, a possible follow-up to this one.

9. Such is the case with the scientistic economist Wasily Leontief, who, always desirous
of finding new “applications” for his “intellectual creature” (input–output tables), does
not hesitate to propose continual plans for intervention on society. See Lavoie (1985b, 93–124).

10. For an example of this line of research, see Lavoie’s fascinating paper, “A critique of the
standard account of the socialist calculation debate” (Lavoie, 1981).

11. Israel M. Kirzner has revealed the key importance this debate has taken on as a catalyst
for the development, refinement and proper articulation of Austrian school theories, in
general, and for the thorough analysis and comprehension of the theory of entrepre-
neurship and of the dynamic market processes of creativity and discovery, in particular.
See Kirzner (1988).

12. “The operation of the money and credit structure has, with language and morals, been
one of the spontaneous orders most resistant to efforts at adequate theoretical explana-
tions, and it remains the object of serious disagreement among specialists . . . The selective processes are interfered with here more than anywhere else: selection by evolution is prevented by government monopolies that make competitive experimentation impossible” (Hayek, 1988, 102–3). See also Huerta de Soto (2006).