Index

Abrahms, M. 502
Abrajano, M.A. 337
Abramowitz, A.I. 336
Abrams, B.A. 276, 277
Abrescia, M. 163
abstention 21–2, 119–20, 121
abstract science of economic behavior 112
academia and rent seeking 322
Acemoglu, D.
autocracy 91–2
Botswana 211
colonial institutions 474
dictatorship and democracy 5, 61–3, 70, 94
agency problems
direct democracy 129–30
international organizations 452
agenda-setting function of committees 149, 221–3
Aggarwal, R.K. 342
Akerlof, G.A. 150
Albrecht, J. 432
Aldrich, J. 52
Alesina, A. 209, 251, 385
fiscal policy 274, 276
Alvarez, M.R. 225
American Association for Justice 350–51
American Trial Lawyers Association (ATLA) 351
Ames, R.E. 417
Ancient Greece 48, 66–9
Anderson, A. 432
Anderson, G.M. 225
Anderson, J.E. 303
anocracies 477, 478
Ansolabehere, S. 339, 340, 342
antitrust law 291–303
Apollonio, D.E. 333
Arce, D.G.
counterterror policy 495, 497, 499, 502, 505
political leadership 432
Ardagna, S. 274
Argys, L.M. 229
Aristotle 85
Arrow, K.J. 14, 15, 16–18, 49, 437
economics of healthcare 369, 370, 371
impossibility theorem 15, 17, 18, 49
and stability of political opinion 17, 435–6
Asch, P. 300
Aschauer, D.A. 268, 269
asymmetric information
and conflict 480
direct democracy 130–31
Athens, ancient 67–9, 175
ATLA (American Trial Lawyers Association) 351
attitudinal model, judges 243
auctions 420–21
autocracies 83–106
economic approaches 88–91
institutional theories 97–103
institutions 91–7
political science theories 84–8
and rent seeking 318, 328
Averch–Johnson effect 286
Ayittey, G.B.N. 202
Azam, J.-P. 479
Azzi, C. 400
Babst, D.V. 484
Baik, K.H. 326
Bailey, M.J. 350, 352
Baldassare, M. 383
Ballo, Z. 478, 480
ballot measures, campaign spending 342–3
Banerjee, A. 209
Bank of England Monetary Policy Committee 258
Bapat, N.A. 504
Barbieri, K. 487
Barkun, M. 203
Baron, D.P. 150
Barro, R.J. 270
Bartel, A.P. 286
Basuchoudhary, A. 500, 501
Battacharya, S. 130
Baumol, W.J. 17
Bearse, P. 389
Beck, N. 250, 251
Becker, E. 183
Becker, G.S. 400, 428
neoclassical paradigm 427
behaviorism 40
Benassy-Quere, A. 274
benefit–cost ratio, counterterror policies 498–500
benevolent governments 99

583
Index

Bercovitch, J. 479
Bernhard, W. 254
Bernhardt, D. 501–2
Bernholz, P. 482
Berry, C.R. 135
Berument, H. 230
Besley, T. 371
bundling of issues 131
conflict and state capacity 476
judicial behavior 239, 358
political competition and economic performance 277
regulatory policy 287
yardstick competition 180
bicameral legislatures 29, 162–3, 168–9
Bifulco, R. 393
Bittlingmayer, G. 299–300
Black, D. 12, 13, 14–16, 17, 49
Blanchard, O.J. 273–4
Blattman, C. 471, 480
Blomberg, S.B. 277
Boadway, R.W. 366
Boehmer, C.R. 487
Boehmke, F.J. 141
Boettke, P.J. 186
Boix, C. 67, 70, 94–5, 97, 103
Bomfordini, M. 333
Booker, K. 394
Borden, J.-Charles de 12–13
Bose, F. 364, 373–8, 379, 380
Bosswana 211
Boudreaux, D.J. 188, 296–7
Boulding, K.E. 432, 437, 443
Bowler, S. 136, 140, 342
Boyer, R. 436
Boyes, W.J. 286
Brabazon, J. 471
Bracon, P. 239, 357, 358
Bradford, D.F. 183
Braithwaite, A. 476
Brams, S.J. 504
Brandes, Louis 180
Brauninger, T. 277
Brender, A. 276
Brennan, H.G. 72, 78, 79, 112, 113, 186
Breyer, F. 371
Bronars, S.G. 339
Bronfenbrenner, M. 17
Brown, T.M. 18
Browning, E.K. 365
Brunner, E. 390–91, 397
Buchanan, J.M. 4, 18, 25–31, 31–2, 123, 275, 475
bicameralism 162
conventional political economy 72, 75, 78–9, 80
constitutions 41–2, 50, 51, 59, 71
costs of voting 205
direct democracy 128
evolutionary democracy 437
federal systems 180, 182, 185, 186, 187
logic versus science of electoral behavior 112
political behavior and public choice theory 45, 46
politics as exchange 187–8
pre- and post-constitutional decision-making 143–4
rent-seeking 307
vote trading 146
Buchanan’s paradox 50
Buddin, R. 393
budget approval process 169–71
budget-constrained bureau 36
budgets and bureaucrats 36
Bueno de Mesquita, B. 96, 97, 98
Bullock, C.S. 222
bundling and direct democracy 131
bureaucracies 34–7
and autocracies 104
and bribery 308
central banks 255–6
and regulatory policy 287
Buser, W. 185–6
Byman, D. 504
Cadigan, J. 497, 499
Calcagno, P.T. 120
Caldwell, M. 154, 166
California, ballot initiative spending 342, 343
campaign finance 331–44
capital punishment, influence of US election cycle 227–9
capitalist peace theory 486–9
Card, D. 396
Cardozo, Benjamin N. 244
career concerns, effect on judicial decision-making 240, 356–60
Carlson, L.J. 499
Carneiro, R.L. 201
Carsey, T.M. 225–6
Case, A. 180
Catholic Church, medieval 323–4, 402–13
central banks
as bureaucracies 255–6
influences on monetary policy 249–52
and time inconsistency problem 252–5
centralization in federal systems 191
...
centralized tribal systems 196, 197–201, 204, 206–7
Chahrour, R. 272
Chakrabarti, R. 392
Chan, P.C.W. 392
Chappell, H.W. 251, 252, 253, 257–8
charter schools 392–4
Chehabi, H.E. 87
Chen, H. 341
Chicago School and antitrust 291–4
China 65–6
Chiozza, G. 486
Choi, S.-W. 475
Christian Church, medieval 323–4, 402–13
Christiano, L.J. 273
Chu, A.C. 185
Cimadomo, J. 274
civil conflict and political institutions 476–8
Clark, J.R. 487
Clark, T.S. 358
Clark, W.R. 98
class actions, tort law 350
Clayton Act 297–8
Cleisthenes 68, 70
Coase, R.H. 17
Coase theorem 418–19, 420
efficiency of common law 355
information problem 48
Coate, M.B. 301–2
Coate, S. 131, 287, 337–8
corruption and rent extraction 318
Copher, D.C. 151, 222
Coleman, James 46
collective action
and (counter)terrorism 494–506
problems 51–2
rent seeking 315–16
tribal systems 203–6
collective choice 4
Botswana 211
Collier, P. 471, 481
Colonel Blotto games 500–502
colonial rule, effect on tribal systems 207–8
Commager, H.S. 69
committee preference outlier hypothesis 148–9
committees 147–51, 163
and campaign finance 334
congressional oversight 217–26
monetary policy decisions 256–9
common law efficiency 355
common-pool resource experiments 418–20
community decision problem 262–5
companies, see firms
competence of voters 139–40, 382–3
competition
in education 384–94
political 437–40
Competition Commission, UK 295–6
Conciliar movement 177
Condorcet, J.-A.-N. de Caritat, Marquis de 12–13, 49
Condorcet’s paradox 13, 14, 20, 48
Condorcet winners 421–2
cost 469–89
economic analysis 470–72
and institutions 472–82
Confucius 65–6
Congleton, R.D. 5, 175, 307
democratization 63
Congress, US, campaign finance and voting behavior 339–40
congressional dominance 163, 223–6
congressional oversight committees 217–21
congressional (presidential) systems 154, 166
Conover, P.J. 45
Corradi, V. 436
consensus model of parliament 155–6, 176–7
consent as basis of government 187–8
Constitutional Political Economy (journal) 51
constitutional political economy (CPE) 72–82
constitutional scope 50–51
constitutionalism 72–3
constitutions 41–3, 59–60
counterterrorism 494–504
costs
of collective action 26–7
of decision-making 59
of expressive voting 113–14
of information, international organizations 452–3, 460, 462
of repression and loyalty in dictatorships 90
of voting in tribal systems 205–6
Couch, J.F. 392
Council of Five Hundred 68
counterterrorism 494–504
Index

courts
  and direct democracy 141
  independence 239–42
  international courts of justice 464–5
  role of 234–6
Cover, A.D. 243
Cowart, A.T. 251
Cowling, K. 312
Crain, W.M. 151, 220–21, 222, 223
Crandall, R.W. 298
Crawford, V. 140
credibility dilemma, autocrats 103
credible commitment, peace negotiations 479–80
Crémer, J. 184
Crenshaw, M. 503
Cropper, M. 285
Crowley, G.R. 187
Curia Regis 176
Cusanus, N. 48
cynicism and rent seeking 309
Dacey, R. 499
Dahl, R.A. 85
Dalton, R.J. 135, 141
damage payments 348–9
Davis, D.D. 424
de Bartolome, C.A.M. 396
de Figueiredo, J.M. 139, 241, 343
de Resende, C.A. 273
de Soysa, I. 475, 481
de Vault, J.M. 226
decision-making costs 59
Declaration of the Rights of Man (France) 50–51
defense, tribal systems 205
defence, norm of 148
Delorme, C.D. 296, 320
demand-constrained bureau 36
democracy
  and civil war 476–7
  development of 61–4
  as a discovery process 437–8
democratic coherence problem 48–50
democratic peace theory 483–6
democratization and autocratic survival 87–8
Denslow, D.A. 383
Denzau, A.T. 149, 334
derouen, K.R. 479
desch, M.C. 486
dewey, J. 44
Diamond, M. 22
dictatorships, see autocracies
Diermeier, D. 84
DiLorenzo, T.D. 296
direct democracy 127–42; see also referendums
discipline, role of committees 150–51
Djakov, S. 340
Dodgeon, C. (‘Lewis Carroll’) 14
Donovan, T. 136, 140, 342
Dorsey, E.R. 372
Dorussen, H. 486, 488, 489
dow, J. 151
downes, A.B. 486
downs, A. 18–23, 146
bureaucracy 35
challenged by William H. Riker 24
on Calculus of Consent 31
on duncan Black 15
on Joseph Schumpeter 428
voter rationality 45
Doyles, M.W. 483
Drazen, A. 250, 276
Drescher, M. 501
Drinkwater, S. 120
dSGE (dynamic stochastic general equilibrium) model 271–3
dubois, E. 277
duncombe, W. 386
dundas, C. 196
dunne, S.W. 395
dyke, A. 229
dynamic stochastic general equilibrium
  (DSGE) model 271–3
dynastic interests, tribal systems 204–5
Easterbrook, F.H. 243–4
Easterly, W. 209, 270
economic development and conflict 480–81
Eddelberg, W. 274
Economies and religion 401
Eisenstadt, S.N. 196
efficiency and federal systems 185–6
ego-rents, politicians 307
Ehrenberg, R. 400
Ehrlich, I. 355
Eigen-Zucchi, C. 298
Eisenstadt, S.N. 196
Ekelund, R.B. 297–8, 324, 413
Elbadawi, I. 476, 481
elder, H.W. 239
elections
  and campaign finance 335–8
  and judicial decision-making 229, 357–8
  and monetary policy 249–50
  and political behavior 226–31
  and terrorism 499
electoral choice 112–13
electoral systems, tribal systems 206–7
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Page</th>
<th>Index</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>587</td>
<td>employees and regulatory policy 286</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Enkers, W. 504</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>enforcement mechanisms, autocracies 101–2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Enlightenment 69</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) 285</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>environmental regulation 284–5, 285–6, 287–8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Apple, D. 187</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Epstein, L. 243</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Epstein, R.A. 233, 234, 350, 351</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>equality as the state of nature 58</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Erceg, C.J. 273</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Escribà-Folch, A. 95</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Eskridge, W.N. 240–41</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>États-Generaux 176</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>ethnic diversity and post-colonial state failure 209</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>ethnic tensions and conflict 481</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>European Commission, salaries 462–3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>European Court of Justice 464–5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>European Parliament 458–9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>European Union 190–91, 453–4, 456</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>and interest groups 466–7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>and national governments 457–8, 459–60</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Eusepi, G. 78, 79</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Evans 395</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Evans-Pritchard, E.E. 196, 197, 198, 200,202, 204, 207, 211</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>evolutionary public choice 427–44</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>executions, influence of US election cycle 227–9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>executive, role in direct democracy 141</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>exit (inter-jurisdictional competition) 439–40</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>experimental public choice 415–25</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>expressive rationality 80–81</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>expressive voting 111–25</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Fagen, R.R. 25</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Faith, R.L. 300–301</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Farley, J.D. 504</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Farris, C.D. 23</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Fearon, J.D. 472, 473, 476, 478, 481</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) 225, 227</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>federal legislation, US 145–6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Federal Open Market Committee 256–8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Federal Reserve 229–30, 251–2, 255–6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>federal systems 179–94</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>and efficiency 185–6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>EU 190–91</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>information and incentives 189–90</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>and Leviathan hypothesis 186–7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>origins 181–2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Switzerland 191–2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>US 191</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>see also fiscal federalism</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Feld, L.P. 136, 142, 192, 234</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Feldman, S. 45</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Feldstein, M. 365</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>FEMA (Federal Emergency Management Agency) 225, 227</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Fenn, P. 240</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Fenno, R.F. 144</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Ferejohn, J.A. 147, 238</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Fernandez-Villaverde, J. 272</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Ferree, K. 161</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Ferris, J.S. 277</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Fielding, D. 477</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Figlio, D.N. 392, 396</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Finer, S.E. 64, 65, 66, 68, 69</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Fiorina, M.P. 421</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Fiorino, N. 164</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>firms</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>and campaign contributions 341–2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>and regulatory policy 285</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>rent seeking 321</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>fiscal federalism</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>and income 185–6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>and rent extraction 316–17</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>fiscal policy 260–81</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>long-run macro model 262–70</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>short-run 271–80</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Fisher, R.C. 385</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Fjelde, H. 475, 481</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Fleck, R.K. 236, 241</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Fleisher, R. 223</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Florida</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>referendum on school spending 395</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>school vouchers 388</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Foldvary, F. 183</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Folland, S. 371</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Forbes, K.F. 186</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>foreign aid and rent seeking 320</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>foreign conflict initiation, influence of election cycle 227</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Fortes, M. 196, 197, 198, 200, 202, 204, 207, 211</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>France 50–51, 176–7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>fraud, EU institutions 463–4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Frey, B.S. 136, 276, 459</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Friedman, M. 392, 487</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>functional and institutional theory 40</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Gaebler, T. 180</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Galasso, V. 367</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Galli, E. 277</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Gandhi, J. 92, 93, 94, 96</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Gardner, R. 419</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Garrett, E. 343</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Garrett, T.A. 225, 227</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Gartzke, E. 486, 487</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Gasiorowski, M. 488
Gassebner, M. 499
gatekeeper function of committees 149
Geddes, B. 87, 95
Gely, R. 240
Gennaioli, N. 209
Gerber, A. 336, 342
Gerber, E.R.
campaign finance 343
direct democracy 129, 130, 134, 135, 139, 142
Gerlach-Kristen, P. 258
Ghana 211–12
Gilbert, M.D. 141
Gilligan, T.W. 150
Glatzer, B. 201, 204, 206
Goemans, H.E. 486, 489
Goenner, C.F. 487, 488
Goetz, C.J. 182
Gokcekus, E. 391
Golembiewski, R.T. 34
Goodman, J. 355
Goodman, L.A. 18
Gordon, S.C. 239, 340–41, 358
Gouveia, M. 371
governability dilemma, autocrats 103–4
government
by coercion 188–9
by consent 187–8
intergovernmental relationships 182–5
performance, effect of direct democracy 135
and rent seeking 320–21
Grafen, A. 122
Great Britain, see United Kingdom
Great Merger Wave 299
Greece, ancient 48, 66–9
greed as cause of conflict 471–2
Green, D.P. 45, 336
Greene, K.V. 120
Grier, K.B. 229, 230, 250, 333
grievance as cause of conflict 471–2
Groscelose, T. 222
Guarnaschelli, S. 422
guilt and rent seeking 310
Gunnell, J. 44
Haber, S. 96–7
Hafer, C. 340–41
Hajnal, Z.L. 139
Hall, M.G. 239, 357, 358
Hall, R.E. 363
Hamilton, A. 182
Hamilton, B.W. 183
Hamilton, H.D. 394
Hamlin, A. 111, 119
Han Empire 66
Hanssen, F.A. 236
judicial behavior 239, 241, 357–8
judicial institutions 245
Harberger triangles 307
Hardin, G. 418
Harris, M.N. 258
Harsanyi, J.C. 16
Hart, C.M.D. 392
Hart, D.M. 333
Hasen, R.L. 141
Havrilesky, T.M. 251, 256
Hayek, F.A. von 327, 487
competition 439
evolutionary democracy 437, 438, 444
federalism 185
information role of prices 236
knowledge problem 47
role of judges 356
Haynes, S.E. 250
healthcare 368–73
Heckathorn, D.D. 203, 204
Heckelman, J.C. 230
Hegre, H. 471, 477, 485, 487
Helland, E. 239, 358
Henderson, E.A. 478
Hendrix, C.S. 475
Hess, G.D. 227, 277
Hibbs, D.A. 251
Hillman, A.L. 118, 119
Hillman–Samet all-pay auction 314
Hirshleifer, J. 355, 470
Hirschman, A.O. 150, 488
Hitler, Adolf 85
Hobbes, Thomas 57–8, 61, 328–9
Hochman, H.M. 188
Hodrick, R.J. 278
Hoeffler, A. 471, 481
Hoffman, E. 420
Holcombe, R.G.
coercion 188
congressional committees 222
federal systems 181, 185
school spending 383, 394, 395, 397, 398
Holmer, F. 16
Holyst, J.A. 441
homeowners associations, voting rights 188
Homo economicus 43–6, 75
homogeneity of society and costs of decision-making 28–9
Hornblower, S. 67, 68
Hotelling, H. 17, 21
Houser, D. 337–8
Hoxby, C. 387, 392, 397
Index

Huber, G.A. 239, 358
Huberman, B.A. 436
Huntington, S.P. 475

Iannaccone, L.R. 503
Ianni, A. 436
identification and expressive voting 119–20
identity and expressive voting 118–19, 124–5
ideology
  influence on fiscal policy 275
  influence on judicial decision-making 243, 356
Imazeki, J. 390–91, 397
IMF (International Monetary Fund) 462
impossibility theorem (Arrow) 17, 49
incentives and federalism 182–3, 189–90
income
  and conflict 480–81
effect of fiscal decentralization 185–6
independence
  Federal Reserve 255–6
  judiciary 237–44
individual choice 4
individual rationality 75–6
individualism 73–4
industry regulation 285
information
  autocracies and democracies 104–5
  and direct democracy 139–40
  and federalism 189–90
  role of courts 236
  role of legislative committees 149–51
information costs and international organizations 452–3, 460, 462
information problems 47–8
  direct democracy 130–31
initiatives 127
Inman, R.P. 183
innovation
  political 433–6
  and rent seeking 319–20
instability 49–50
institutional theories of autocracy 97–13
institutions
  and autocracies 91–7
  and conflict 472–82
inter-jurisdictional competition 439–40
interest groups 51–2, 366–7
  and direct democracy 141
influence on judicial decision-making 360
intergovernmental relationships 182–3
International Labor Organization (ILO) 456, 465–6
international organizations 451–67
investment games 416–17
Iossifov, P. 276
Ireland, P.N. 253
irrationality in politics 430
Isaac, R.M. 417
issue indivisibilities and conflict 482
Iyer, L. 209

Jackson, Henry ‘Scoop’ 222–3
Jackson, P. 472
Jaggers, K. 87
Jayachandran, S. 341
Jefferson, W.J. 338
Jennings, C. 111, 119, 120
Johnson, C.M. 219
Jones, B.F. 477
Jones, C.I. 363
Joulfaian, D. 187
judiciary 233–46, 354–60
  independence 237–42
  influences on 229, 239–40, 356–60
  institutional change 244–5
  roles 234–6
jury problem 12

Kahn, M.E. 140, 285
Kaja, A. 462
Kane, E.J. 251
Kang, M.S. 358
Karras, G. 270
Karrer, I. 459
Karsden, R. 203
Katz, A. 355
Katz, E. 313
Keech, W.R. 251, 252
Kenny, L.W.
  federalism 186, 187
  school districts 385, 386
  school spending 383, 395, 398
  school vouchers 389–90
Kim, H.M. 487
Kim, Y. 367
Kimenyi, M.S. 205, 209, 210
king-and-council template 175
Knight, B. 341
Knight, J. 243
knowledge function of committees 149–50
knowledge problem 47–8
Kontopoulos, Y. 276
Kopel, M. 441
Kormendi, R.C. 268
Kornhauser, L.A. 356
Kort, F. 16
Krasno, J.S. 336
Krehbiel, K. 84, 148, 150
Index

Kreps, S.E. 504
Kroszner, R.S. 334
Krueger, A.O. 52, 307, 424
Kubik, J.D. 227
Kuran, T. 432, 438
Kurosawa, Akira 60
Kwoka, J.E. 287
Kydd, A.H. 499
La Porta, R. 234
La Raja, R.J. 333
Laband, D.N. 121
Ladd, H.F. 393
Lagona, F. 169, 170, 172–3, 173
Landau, D.L. 270
Landes, W.M.
judicial independence 237, 244–5
judicial motivation 356
Latham, E. 33–4
law 345–61
as constraint on judges' behavior 243–4
legal system and rent seeking 322–3
see also judiciary
Lawson, R.A. 487
leaders' motivations and characters 85–6
Leaver, C. 287
Lee, S.J. 85
legalism, China 66
legislation cycle 171–3
legislative committees, see committees
Legislative Index of Electoral Competition (LIEC) 161
legislative organization theories 146–51
legislatures 143–51; see also parliaments
Leland, Marc 461
Loasby, B.J. 434
lobbying
international organizations 465–7
and rent seeking 308
and tort reform 352
Locke, J. 39, 58–9
logic of choice 112–13
logrolling 29
Lomasky, L.E. 113
Long, W.F. 294–5
long-run fiscal policy 262–70
Lott, J.R. 333, 339
Lowenstein, D.H. 139, 141, 342
Lowery, D. 186
loyalty costs 90
Lull, Ramon 48, 49
Lupia, A. 130, 135, 140
Mackay, R.J. 149
Mackie, G. 116–17, 118
Madison, James 68, 235, 465
Magna Carta 176
majority representation and direct democracy 137–9
Mandelbaum, M. 484
manipulation of voting 49
Mansfield, E.D. 484
Manweller, M. 141
Maoz, Z. 485
marginal approach to CPE 78–9
Marlow, M.L. 187
Marshall, A. 401
Marshall, M.G. 87
Marshall, W.J. 149, 219
Martin, L.L. 462
Marwell, G. 417
Maskin, E. 236
Matsusaka, J.G.
direct democracy 129, 130, 131, 135, 136, 137, 138, 140, 141, 142
voter preferences on environmental goods 285
Mayhew, D.R. 146
Mays, W. 16
McBride, M. 503
McCallum, B.T. 230
McCarty, N.
direct democracy 129, 130, 131
political action committees 333–4
motivations
  for dictators 85–6, 89–90
  individuals 19, 75–6, 80–81
  of legislators 144
  for political contributions 332
  politicians 19
  voters 19, 111–25
Mousseau, M. 484, 487
Mueller, D.C. 312, 415
Munger, M.C. 123, 151, 221, 223, 334
Munley, P. 340
Musgrave, R.A. 180, 182, 185
Mussolini, Benito 85
Myerson, R.B. 92, 94
Nagel, S.S. 239
Napolitano, G. 163
narrative approach to fiscal policy analysis 274
National Industrial Recovery Act (NIRA) 299–300
national insurance programs 362–4
natural experiments on rent seeking 326
natural resources and rent seeking 320
negative externalities 418–21
negligence 347
Nelson, M.A. 187, 385, 386
Nelson, P.J. 120
new institutional economics and autocracy 88
Nicolás of Cusa 48
Nifong, Mike 229
Niskanen, W.A. 34–7, 45
  budget-maximizing bureaus 185, 219, 223, 224
information problem 48
Nkrumah, K. 204
Nordhaus, W. 250, 275
Nordstrom, T. 487
norm of deference 148
normative individualism 74
normative motivations 81
North, D.C. 63, 238, 473
O’Driscoll, G. 47
O’Hara, E.A. 356
Oates, W.E. 180, 182, 183, 186
Olken, B.A. 477
Olson, M. 11, 31–4, 45, 489
  collective action 51–2, 203, 209
  collective action and terrorism 494, 495, 496, 506
interest group model of social security benefits 366
state as stationary bandit 60–61, 88, 99–100, 474–5

McChesney, F.S.
  antitrust 292
  rent extraction 316
McCormick, R.E.
  antitrust 303
  legislature size 162–3, 164
McCubbins, M.D. 140, 224
McDonald, J.A. 488
McDonald, P. 487
McGregor, R.R. 253, 257
McKenzie, R.B. 184
McKitrick, R. 284
McLean, I. 48
McMillan, R. 392
McGee, J.E. 30
median voter theorem 15, 365, 422
medical technology, state funding 371–3
Medieval, see Middle Ages
Mertens, K. 272
Mesnard, A. 479
Mesopotamia 64–5
Metcalfe, J.S. 441
methodological individualism 4, 73–4
Mian, A. 340
Miceli, T.J. 356
Middle Ages
  Church 323–4, 402–13
  parliaments 175–6
migration and rent seeking behavior 319
Miguel, E. 471, 480, 481
Miller, K.P. 141
Milligan, K. 383
Millner, E.L. 424
Minford, P. 251
minimal winning coalitions 24
Mises, L. 45, 48
Missouri, antitrust law 297
Mitchell, W.C. 37, 123
Mocan, H.N. 229
Moe, T.M.
  congressional oversight 224–5
  legislatures in presidential systems 154, 166
monarchy 58
monetary policy 249–59
Monetary Policy Committee, Bank of England 258
money, influence on votes 139
Monopolies and Mergers Commission (UK) 295–6
Moon, W. 335, 337
Moran, J.R. 227
Moreau, F. 441, 442
Morris, I.L. 252
Morton, R.B. 337
motivational symmetry 75, 80
William F. Shughart II, Laura Razzolini and Michael Reksulak - 9781849806039
Downloaded from Elgar Online at 08/19/2019 04:15:59PM
via free access
Index

Olson, W. 350
Oneal, J.R. 485
opinion formation 431–6
optimal voting rule 59
organizational design, autocratic institutions 96–7
organizations
international 451–67
terrorist 504–5
Orlean, A. 436
Orphanides, A. 227
Osborne, D. 180
Ostrom, E. 415, 419
over-dissipation of rents 325–6

PACs (political action committees) 333
Padovano, F. 169, 170, 172, 172–3, 277
Pagden, A. 68
Palfrey, T.R. 184, 421, 423
Pande, R. 209
Parker, G.R. 222
Parkinson, C.N. 35
parliamentarians and international organizations 457–9
parliaments 153–78
bicameralism 162–3, 168–9
budget approval process 169–71
characteristics 156–61
committees 163
determinants of characteristics 164–9
history of 175–7
legislation cycle 171–3
size 164, 166–8
types of 153–6
see also legislatures
partisanship
and fiscal policy 276–7
and monetary policy 249–52
Pauly, M.V. 369–70
Payne, A. 239, 358, 396
peace 482–9
Pecquet, G.M. 395
Peel, D. 251
Peltzman, S. 287
Pennock, R. 22–3
pensions 364–7
Perotti, R. 273–4, 274, 276
persisting rents 315
personal status and rent seeking 321–2
Persson, T. 172, 276, 476
Pietrantonio, R. 371
Pincus, S. 63
Pittman, R.W. 333
Plato 85
Plott, C.R. 421, 425
plurality vote rule 12
Polachek, S.W. 488
Poland 176
Polborn, M.K. 501–2
policy
economic, and autocracies 99–103
effects of direct democracy 133–7
in evolutionary context 440–43
politae 41
political action committees (PACs) 333
political business cycles 229, 250–51
political competition 437–40
political economy
of cooperation 482–9
of dictatorships 99–103
experiments 421–3
models and rent seeking 326–7
of oversight 217–26
political entrepreneurship 431–6
political ideology, see ideology
political influence
and elections 226–30
on fiscal policy 275–80
political innovation 433–6
political institutions
and civil conflict 476–8
and rent seeking 317–20
political philosophy 40
political reform and innovation 433–6
political repression and conflict 477–8
political science 39–40
and autocracy 84–8
and public choice 41–53
politicians 429
behavioral changes at election time 226–7
campaign finance and voting behavior 338–41
rent seeking 307
politics
as choice 74
as exchange 74, 187–8
popes, Roman Catholic 403–5
population density and tribal governance 198–9
pork barrel politics and antitrust 301–2
Posner, R.A.
antitrust 292–3, 300–301
costs of monopoly 312
judicial behavior 233, 243, 355, 356
judicial independence 237, 244–5
post-colonial governments 208–9
post-constitutional stage of decision-making 143–4
Potters, J. 326, 424
Pratt, M.D. 424

William F. Shughart II, Laura Razzolini and Michael Reksulak - 9781849806039
Downloaded from Elgar Online at 08/19/2019 04:15:59PM
via free access
Index 593

pre-constitutional stage of decision-making 143–4
predictive science of choice 112–13
preference outlier hypothesis 148–9
Prescott, E.C. 278
presidential systems 154, 166
price discrimination, medieval Church 410–11
Priest, G.L. 236, 355
principal–agent problems, see agency problems
Prins, B. 487
prisoners’ dilemma game and CPE 79–80
private sector rent extraction 317
Profeta, P. 367
Progressives 44
property rights definition, role of courts 235–6
Protestantism 323–4, 411–13
Przeworski, A. 63, 88, 92, 93, 94, 99, 184
public choice, origins and development 12–38
public goods experiments 415–18
purgatory doctrine, medieval Church 409–11
quantal response equilibrium (QRE) model 422
Rainer, I. 209
Raknerud, A. 485
Ram, R. 270
Ramakrishnan, S.K. 383
Ramey, V.A. 274
Ramirez, C.D. 238, 245, 359
Randazzo, K.A. 419–20
Rapoport, A. 419–20
Rapoport, D.C. 482
Rasmusen, E.B. 244, 356, 359
rational choice 19, 40, 43–6
and bureaucracy 35
rational ignorance about international organizations 453
rational opportunism 275
rational partisanship 251, 275
rational voter abstention 21–2
rationality 75
and conflict 472–3
and counterterrorism 497–502
and politics 430
and terrorism 502–4
Rauchhaus, R. 485
Ravn, M.O. 272
Rawls, J. 59, 76, 180
Ray, J.L. 485
Razo, A. 100, 102, 103
Razzolini, L. 500, 501
re-election motivation, committees 147–9
Rebei, N. 273
Rebelo, S. 270
referendums 127–8
on school spending 394–5, 397–8
reform, political 433–6
Regan, P.M. 478, 489
regime instability and civil war 477
regulatory policy 284–9
and federal system 184–5
and international organizations 453–7
Reilly, R.J. 424
Reinke, A. 186, 187
Reiter, D. 486
relational perspective, dictatorships 99–103
religion 400–413
and economics 401
medieval Church 402–13
and rent seeking 323–4
rent dissipation 311, 313–15, 325–6
rent extraction 316–17
rent protection 318–19
rent seeking 52–3, 307–29
academia and 322
autocracies and 100–101, 318, 328
collective action 315–16
and conflict 470–71
cynicism and 309
experiments 326, 423–4
firms 321
foreign aid and 320
government and 320–21
guilt and 310
innovation and 319–20
legal system and 322–3
lobbying and 308
migration and 319
models 311–16, 325–7
natural experiments on 326
natural resources and 320
personal status and 321–2
political economy models and 326–7
political institutions and rent 317–20
politicians 307
religion and 323–4
and revolutions 328–9
sacrifices as 324–5
societal resistance to 327–9
status and 321–2
taxation and 327–8
tenure, academic, and 322
unethical behavior and 320
voter dissatisfaction about 328
wars of attrition and 322
rent-seeking coalitions, ancient Athens 68
Renzi, R. 338
representation, tribal systems 202–3

William F. Shughart II, Laura Razzolini and Michael Reksulak - 9781849806039
Downloaded from Elgar Online at 08/19/2019 04:15:59PM
via free access
Index

repression
  and civil war 477–8
  costs, dictatorships 90
reputation
  and campaign finance 334
  and judicial decision-making 356
resource ownership, tribal systems 204–5
retention of office, effect on judicial behavior 239–40
Reuveny, R. 488
revenue-sharing and federalism 183
revolutions
  and political innovation 433–6
  and rent seeking 328–9
Ricardian equivalence 268
Ricciuti, R. 164
Richardson, G. 503
Riker, W.H. 23–5
  on *Calculus of Consent* 31
  democratic coherence problem 49, 50
  federal systems 180, 181, 182, 183–4, 190, 191, 192, 193
Roberson, B. 501
Roberts, B.E. 222
Roberts, K.W.S. 111
Robinson, J. 25
Robinson, J.A.
  autocracy 91–2
  dictatorship and democracy 5, 61–3, 70, 94
Rocco, L. 478, 480
Roden, J. 186–7
Rodgers, J.D. 188
*Roe v. Wade* 50
Röger, W. 273
Rogoff, K. 229, 250
Roman Catholic Church, medieval 323–4, 402–13
Roman Republic 175
Romer, C.D. 274
Romer, D.H. 274
Romer, T.
  agency problems in direct democracy 129
  agenda-setting power of committees 149
  local governments 187
  political action committees 334
  school spending 394, 397–8
Romero-Avila, D. 270
Roosevelt, Franklin 241
Rosato, S. 485
Rosenberg, J. 313
Rosenthal, H.
  agency problems 129
  committees as agenda setters 149
  school spending referenda 394, 397–8
  voter turnout 423
Rothenberg, L.S. 333–4
Rothstein, J. 387, 397
Rousseau, D.L. 487
Rousseau, J.-J. 39
Roux, G. 65
Rowley, C.K. 13, 52, 307
Rubin, P.H. 350, 352, 355, 359
Randquist, B. 225–6
Russett, B. 483, 485
Sachs, J.D. 251
sacrifices as rent seeking 324–5
salaries, international organizations 462–3
Salzberger, E.M. 238, 240
Sambanis, N. 476, 481
Samuelson, P.A. 117, 179, 185
Sandler, T. 495, 497, 498, 499, 502
Sass, T.R. 393
Satyanath, S. 471
Saving, J.L. 222, 225
Schelling, T.C. 25
Schmidt, A.B. 383, 385, 386
Schmitt, P.M. 497, 499
Schneider, F. 276
Schofield, N. 154
schools, US 382–98
  charter schools 392–4
  referendums on school spending 394–5
  school districts 384–8
  spending inequality 395–6
  vouchers 388–92
Schram, A. 423
Schubert, C. 440, 442
Schuessler, A.A. 118, 119
Schultze, L. 363
Schultz, T.W. 382–3
Schumpeter, J.A. 428–30, 431
Schwartz, A.J. 461
Schwartz, T. 224
science of electoral behavior 112
Seater, J.J. 268
security dilemma, autocrats 103–4
Segal, J.A. 243, 356
segmentary tribal systems 196, 197–9, 201–2
  collective action 204
  effect of colonial rule 208
  electoral systems 206–7
Seidman, L.M. 244
selective incentives and collective action 33
Selectorate Theory 96, 97, 98
self-interest 19, 195
semi-presidential systems 154–5
Seneca, J.J. 300
separation of powers 240–41
Serdült, U. 142
Index 595

Sergenti, E. 471
Seven Samurai (film, Kurosawa) 60
Shapiro, I. 45
Shapiro, J.N. 505
Shapiro, M.D. 274
Shapley, Lloyd 23
Shepherd, J.M. 239, 357, 358
Shepsle, K.A. 104, 147, 149, 220
Sherman Act 296–7
Shi, M. 276
Shogren, J.F. 326
Shon, J. 341
short-run fiscal policy 271–80
Shortland, A. 477
Showman, K. 387–8, 397
Shubik, Martin 23
Shugart, M.S. 274
Shugart, W.F. II 151
antitrust 299, 303
conflict 477, 481, 482
welfare state 366, 367, 370
Sibert, A. 250
Siegel, D.A. 505
signaling 121–2
Simons, Henry 291–2
Singer, J.D. 484
Singh, S. 161
single-peaked preferences 21, 15
Siqueira, K. 497, 499, 502, 505
Sjem (Polish parliament) 176
Sjoblom, K. 366, 372
Skaperdas, S. 476
Skilling, D. 277
Skocpol, T. 475
Slantchev, B.L. 479
Slenbeck, T. 433
Small, M. 484
Smith, Adam 120
benefits of educated electorate 383
judicial system 233
religious behavior and economics 400
Smith, J.L. 356
Smithies, A. 21
Snyder, Jack 484, 486
Snyder, James 333, 334
Sobek, D. 476, 480
Sobel, J. 140
Sobel, R.S. 187, 225, 227, 229
social contracts
and development of the state 57–9
enforcement role of courts 235
social insurance demand, modeling 373–8
social protection, tribal systems 204–5
socialism (Wilson) 44
socialist calculation debate 46–7
soft budgets in fiscal federal system 317
Solé-Ollé, A. 277
Solon 67
Sonnenmans, J. 423
Sonstelii, J. 390
Sorribas-Navarro, P. 277
Souva, M. 487
Spaeth, H.J. 243, 356
Sparta 67
spatial competition 18, 21
Spence, A.M. 122, 150
Spencer, C. 258
Spiller, P.T. 240, 241
spillovers, intergovernmental 182–3
Spitzer, M.L. 241, 420
SRRC (strategy of raising rivals’ costs) 454–7
Staaf, R.J. 184
Stalin, Josef 85–6
Stam, A.C. 486
state capacity as determinant of conflict 475–6
state pensions 364–7
stateless tribal systems, see segmentary tribal systems
states, origins of 57–71
stationary bandits
autocrats 99–100
states 60–61
status and rent seeking 321–2
Stevenson, R. 198
Stewart, C. 222
Stigler, G.J. 164
antitrust 292
regulation 285, 287
Stoddard, C. 393
Stokes, D.E. 45
Stone, J.A. 250
strategy of raising rivals’ costs (SRRC) 454–7
Stratmann, T. 139, 334, 335, 337, 337–8, 338, 339–40, 342, 343
Strauch, R. 270
Stringham, E. 48
strongman leadership, tribal systems 210
Sturm, D.M. 284
Stutzer, A. 136, 459
Su, X. 504
succession in autocracies 89
suicide terrorists 503–4
Suleiman, R. 419–20
Sullivan, J.T. 223
sultanistic regimes 86
Sumer 64–5
Sunstein, C.R. 432
supervisory boards, international organizations 461–4
Svensson, J. 276
Index

Svolik, M. 94–5, 97, 103
Switzerland 191–2
Tabarrok, A. 239, 358
Tanzi, V. 363
taxation
and federal system 184, 185–6
and rent seeking 327–8
see also fiscal federalism; fiscal policy
Tenhofen, J. 274
tenure
academic, and rent seeking 322
judges, influence on decision-making
357–60
Roman Catholic popes 403–4
Terrebonne, R.P. 355
terrorism 494–506
Thaize Challier, M.-C. 320
Thies, C. 476
thing (medieval parliament) 175
Thomas, L.G. 286
Tiebout, C.M. 179, 182, 185
Tiebout model 179, 186, 187
Tiller, E.H. 241
time inconsistency
and central bank independence 252–5
and judicial independence 237–8
Tirole, J. 236
Todd, A. 85–6
Tollison, R.D. 151
antitrust law 299
legislature size 162–3, 164
New Deal spending 225
rent-seeking 52, 307
Toma, E.F. 241, 360
tort law 346–54
total approach to CPE 79
totalitarianism 86
Trebbi, F. 333
Treechiel, A. 142
tribal systems 195–213
centralized 196, 197–201, 204, 206–7
collective action and public goods 203–6
defense 205
dynastic interests in 204–5
effect of colonial rule 207–8
electoral systems 206–7
political systems 196–203
post-colonial governments 208–12
resource ownership 204–5
segmentary 196, 197–9, 201–2
social protection 204–5
strongman leadership 210
voting and representation 202–3, 205–6
Tsebelis, G. 162, 435
Tullock, G. 18, 25–31, 31–2, 34, 35, 180, 371
autocracies 83, 89
bicameralism 162
on Bureaucracy and Representative
Government 37
constitutions 42, 59, 71, 72
costs of voting 205
direct democracy 128
political behavior and public choice theory 45
politics as exchange 187–8
pre- and post-constitutional decision-making 143–4
rent-seeking 52, 307, 310, 312, 320, 326, 423–4
vote trading 146
warfare 472
Tullock contest-success function 313–14
Uhlig, H. 272
unanimity rule 59
uncertainty and political behavior 20–21
unethical behavior and rent seeking 320
United Kingdom 62, 63
Monopolies and Mergers Commission
295–6
United States
antitrust law 296–8
attempts to change judicial institutions 241–2
congressional oversight committees 217–30
Constitution 50–51, 60, 69, 70–71, 181
direct democracy 132–42
education 382–98
Federal Reserve 229–30, 251–2, 255–6
federal system 181–2, 184, 191
influence on international organizations 460–61
legislatures 144–51
monetary policy decision-making 251–2, 256–8
rise of democracy 69–70, 70–71
tort law 346–54
universalism, norm of 148
unstructured institutions 104
usury and the medieval Church 408–9
utility income of voters 19
Vachris, M.A. 219, 221, 224
Vaubel, R. 456, 459
Veblen, T. 321
vector autoregressive analysis (VAR), short-
rung fiscal policy 273–4
veil of insignificance 75, 76–7, 80–81
Vengroff, R. 198

William F. Shughart II, Laura Razzolini and Michael Reksulak - 9781849806039
Downloaded from Elgar Online at 08/19/2019 04:15:59PM
via free access
veto power of president 30
Vogel, R.J. 370
Vogt, C. 326
Voigts, S. 70, 234
voluntary contributions to public goods 415–18
Von Hagen, J. 169
vote-trading in legislative process 146–7
voter paradox 18, 77, 422–3; see also
  Condorcet’s paradox
voter turnout experiments 422–3
voters
  abstention 21–2, 119–20, 121
  competence 139–40, 382–3
  and counterterror policies 499
  demand for social insurance 373–8
  and direct democracy 139–41
  dissatisfaction about rent seeking 328
  expressive voting 113–25
  and international organizations 452–7
voting and representation, tribal systems 202–3, 205–6
vouchers for education 388–92, 397
Wagner, R.E. 189
Walker, J.K. 419
Walker, J.M. 419
Wallace, C.J. 252
Walker, B.F. 499
war and peace 469–89
  election cycle influence on initiation of conflict 227
Ward, H. 486, 488, 489
wars of attrition and rent seeking 322
Wassmer, R.W. 385
Waters, M.D. 142
Weaver, C.L. 366
Weber, M. 86
Weede, E. 487
Weeks, J.L. 486
Weingast, B.R. 63, 149, 223
  committees 163, 219
  federalism 180–81, 182, 185, 190, 191
  judicial independence 238
Weintraub, R.E. 251
Weir, C. 295–6
welfare state 362–80
  and rent extraction 317
Werker, E.D. 462
Werner, S. 485
Westley, C. 120
Westminster parliamentary system 155
Whaples, R. 230
Whitman, D.G. 356
Wicksell, K. 59
Wildasin, D.E. 366
Williams, D.W. 185
Williams, J.T. 229, 230
Williamson, O.E. 403
Wilson, Woodrow 44
Winston, C. 298
Wintrobe, R. 83, 85, 89–91, 503
Witt, U. 427
Wohlgemuth, M. 437
Wolff, G.B. 274
Woo, G. 498
Wood, B.D. 303
Wood, E.J. 482
Woolley, J.T. 251
workers and regulatory policy 286
Wright, J. 95
Wu, F. 436
Yinger, J. 386
Young, M. 225, 227
Zampelli, E.M. 186
Zanzig, B.R. 387
Zardkoohi, A. 333
Zax, J.S. 187
Zeckhauser, R.J. 277
Zelenitz, A. 187
Zimmer, R. 393
Zywicki, T.J. 355