1. Human mobility in the pre-modern Mediterranean

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The importance of mobility in pre-contemporary societies is no longer in question. The image of a largely immobile population proposed by historical demography has been rendered obsolete by the research carried out in recent decades (Canny, 1994; Lucassen, 1999; Bade, 2002; Balard, 2006), due mainly to a revision and broadening of what is meant by ‘mobility’, ‘migration’ and ‘diaspora’ (Moatti, 2018). From the concept of migration, defined as a radical change of residence and social environment, and for a long time considered to be an exceptional phenomenon up until the Industrial Revolution (Zelinsky, 1971), has emerged the broader concept of mobility, understood as a social process, and thus socially decisive in addition to being inseparable from other social phenomena. It is important to consider the importance, in the structuring of social life, of regional micro-mobilities and seasonal mobilities, of the phases of mobility in individual lives, of the sharing of roles within families, over several generations, in chains of migrations, and of the close links between geographical and social mobility. The notion of diaspora has also evolved, moving away from the victim model. According to the English sociologists Robin Cohen (2008) and William Safran (1991, 1999), it is defined by three criteria: initial dispersion, absence of assimilation into the host society, and maintenance of the link with the origin. What differentiates diaspora from migration is therefore the role played by the country of origin across borders, in terms of identity and memory. Understood in such terms, the notion has been applied to situations never before considered to be diasporas, such as work, trade, knowledge and administration. The principle of these diasporas is that they allow the constitution of vast networks of exchanges (Delgado, 2017), while also favouring, through the diffusion of information and the constitution of reception structures, the dispersion of migrants towards ever more distant regions (Monge and Muchnik, 2019); and that they disappear when the members of the diaspora are integrated in the place of reception or return to their country. This broad use of the notion of diaspora has had several effects. In particular, it has made it possible to ‘decolonise’ the first Phoenician or
Greek migrations to the far West, while recognising their organised character, far from the chaotic images that the ideas of migration and mobility arouse.

By emphasising the importance for the structuring of social life of all these mobilities, these approaches have broadened the spectrum of human movement, taking into account local as well as distant mobility. Distance is always relative to the means of communication, and what we call local migration might in ancient times have been an uprooting phenomenon, such as migration flows in antiquity to and within the Italian peninsula and the rural exodus (Ducellier, 1992; Erdkamp, 2016; Zeller, 2003), or the exchanges in early modern times between supply areas and the demographic basins of cities. In contrast to the historians of demography, who thought in terms of concentric micro-spaces around a given place, historians of migratory flows have shown, despite the difficulties in quantifying their results, that in pre-modern periods, mobility, whether temporary or definitive, was indispensable to the life of rural villages because of the insufficiency of local resources; that cities were real hubs, which could compensate for the structural over-mortality of their population only through significant immigration (Hin, 2013; Pizzorusso, 2009).

Given the observation that Europe is a ‘peninsula made of peninsulas’ (Darwin, 2008: 95), it also seems to apply to the Mediterranean (Lestringant, 2002). In this space, which was rarely unified, and even often fragmented to the extreme, the circulation of people constituted, in the words of Fernand Braudel, a structural and structuring fact, which formed the very basis of the Mediterranean reticular system. A vision that the Ancients would not have denied, if we judge by the memory of archaic migrations in the ancient historiography, and by the omnipresence of travel in the first great texts: the account of the Egyptian Ounamon in the 11th century BCE, the saga of Ulysses, that of Aeneas, up to the experience of St Paul who hypostatises the figure of the stranger. To analyse this pre-modern mobility, it is necessary to distinguish three spatial scales – the Mediterranean scale, to highlight networks and migrations, while taking into account the importance of certain historical ruptures; the urban scale, to underline both the role of cities and towns in the history of mobilities, and the influence of these mobilities on urban development and on the formation of identities; and finally, the political scale, that of the states – to ask which policies have favoured or opposed the freedom of movement, a notion on which a more general reflection will be offered in the Conclusion to this chapter.

THE MEDITERRANEAN AS A RETICULAR SPACE

Fernand Braudel’s theory postulating cultural unity made this space a historical actor in a global history, dominated in early modern times by Europeans and obeying a historical process of communicating vessels – Mediterranean
decline and rise of the Atlantic world – where Venice and Genoa were to be replaced by Antwerp and Amsterdam. The rhetoric of personalisation that characterises this master narrative, according to which the ‘inland sea’ was a ‘world economy’ later relayed by other spaces, has not been taken up by the most recent works of synthesis. But the matrix of unity remains present, for example in interpretations of the Mediterranean as an ecosystem of great stability, where the natural connectivity of the sea constitutes essential risk management in the face of fragmentation and ecological uncertainties (Horden and Purcell, 2000; Tabak, 2008; contra Gambash, 2016; Moatti, 2021). Approaching the question from the angle of mobilities, their logic and their constraints permit an escape from this project: it opens up the possibility of thinking differently about discontinuity and transition, about transformations and innovations in this culturally saturated Mediterranean space endowed with an extraordinary historical breadth. In fact, the Mediterranean space has only gradually become a multipolar world, while the various mobilities that this space has experienced have not always structured it in a continuous manner: their history is also made up of reconfigurations and ruptures.

A Multipolar World

From the second millennium, Mycenaean trade in the south of Italy, Sicily and Sardinia, contact between Cyprus and Sardinia and the trade routes opened by the Iberian Peninsula, which the Greeks and Phoenicians developed in the following millennium (Broodbank, 2013), linked the different regions of the Mediterranean East together, as well as the West and the East, according to very extensive and progressively constituted networks. The Levantine groups, for example, did not move en masse in the 9th century BC towards a terra incognita to appropriate it, but did so in several waves as a result of established contacts and multiple partnerships of exchanges. Once there, they formed ‘economic enclaves’ (Portes, 1987), sites of settlement or centres of production. In all three cases, these mobile groups, heterogeneous in terms of sex, age, social class, occupation and ethnic origin, maintained a link with their place of origin. The dispersion of these peoples continued from the West for a long period subsequently, examples of which include Carthage to Sardinia, Sicily and the Iberian Peninsula (Mastino, 1985).

The intensity of the interactions and their reticular structure favoured an accumulation of benefits, progress in the technology of transport by sea (Arnaud, 2005), and urban development, whether cosmopolitan places of trade (emporia), such as Pithekoussai or Gravisca in Archaic Italy, or colonies (Riva, 2010; Malkin, 2011; Broodbank, 2013). They also brought about a certain commercial unification of the Mediterranean basin (Guarracino, 2007), and perhaps even the formation of a sort of ius mercatorum (Nörr,
From this perspective, the Roman Republic (509–527 BCE) did not immediately cause a fundamental rupture: it created new networks, negotiating first with Carthage, then with the rest of the Mediterranean basin from the 3rd century onwards by means of bilateral agreements and alliances. It also gradually tried to control maritime circuits, to the detriment of Syria, Rhodes, the Greek cities and Carthage, destroyed in 146. It was with the Roman expansion in the Mediterranean, in the 2nd century BCE, that both forced and free mobility towards Italy developed on a large scale (Tagliafico, 1995): Carthaginian, Illyrian and Greek slaves arrived en masse; commercial, artisanal, artistic and intellectual migrations from the eastern basin multiplied. At the same time, many Italian businessmen emigrated to the Greek cities of the continent, the Aegean islands or the micro-Asiatic regions, and also to the Iberian Peninsula, the south of Gaul, or to the allied kingdoms (Numidia and Mauritania, for example). With Caesar, and especially Augustus, the foundation of colonies in extra-Italian territories increased the diaspora of Roman citizens, mainly the poor and former soldiers. Under the Empire, commercial connections developed thanks to the creation of secure land and sea routes, or artificial ports, as was the case in Africa and the Near East (Hitchner, 2012; Stone, 2014; De Souza, 2000), accompanying the movement of goods (African or Spanish oil, wine from Gaul and Spain) (Morley, 2007). Movements multiplied within provinces (Haley, 1991) and between different regions (Lassère, 2006; Lefebvre, 2006); in Mauritania Tingitana (modern Morocco), constituted as a province under Claudius between 42 and 45 CE, migrants were career soldiers, and merchants of Spanish, Italian, Syrian, Arab, Greek, Dacian and Macedonian origin. Conversely, a large number of people from this province (and all African provinces) moved to the Mediterranean (Lassère, 1977; Handley, 2011).

The empire did not, however, form a globalised world (Morley, 2007): connectivity was not the same everywhere, and mobility was not limited to commercial movements. But unification had made the Mediterranean basin a secure space. And even the changes that occurred at the end of the 3rd century with the revival of piracy, and from the 5th century onwards with the decline of the Empire, invasions and crises, did not bring mobility to a halt; inscriptions even demonstrate a peak in the number of travellers in the 5th century (Handley, 2011).

During the entire imperial period, relations with neighbouring and even very distant regions (the Great North, the Red Sea, India, Ceylon, China) also developed rapidly. The Mediterranean had long been open to other seas and other spaces, notably the Black Sea and the Red Sea, but from then on it was the mare nostrum as a whole that opened up to the most distant worlds, for several centuries under the control and protection of the Roman state (Wilson, 2015). Provided that historians employ varied scales and multiple angles of
observation, what is visible in the imperial framework remains so following the political and religious fragmentation. Thus, seen from Cairo in the 9th century (on the basis of the Genizah documents; Goitein, 1967; Goldberg, 2012; Valérian, 2019), or from Cairo and Istanbul around 1600 (Hanna, 1998; Faroqhi et al., 1994), the Eastern Mediterranean appears to be a prosperous world; whereas the European perspective gives a darker picture. The Levant trade of Europeans in early modern times constitutes only a small part of the volume of the Ottoman Empire’s internal trade, and it does not sound the death knell of the intense caravan trade via the Arabian Peninsula and Persia with the Indian world (Kaiser, 2008a). The discovery of the Cape route, which constitutes a symbolic key event in the master narrative of the Mediterranean decline, in fact only acquired major importance in the 18th century (De Vries, 2003).

The Nature of Migration

Numerous works have focused on the reality of human mobility and have attempted to establish its causes. The political origins of migration flows have been highlighted: exiles and outcasts were thrown out of ancient or medieval cities as the result of internal political struggles, the annexation of territories by the Romans led to the emigration of administrators and colons, the Christian crusades were accompanied by permanent settlements in the Near East. Migration also has military origins: conquest opened markets and agricultural opportunities; it increased the quantity of servile labour, both male and female (Woolf, 2013), also leading to the displacement of populations. Finally, there are cultural origins, such as the attraction of philosophical schools in the classical world and of universities in the medieval period, or of pilgrimages in all eras. Migration was due as much to rational choices as to relationships of domination (Gastaut, 2016).

To explain mobility, much emphasis has also recently been placed on the unequal distribution of material and human resources (Horden and Purcell, 2000). It is said that it was the scarcity of resources that led to the expulsion of people, the search for new lands, and the increase in trade, and it was the scarcity of people and labour that led to the acceptance of, and even the granting of citizenship to, foreigners. It has long been argued that unequal distribution of wealth stimulates interaction (De Charruca, 2001). In the Middle Ages, this argument included a theological dimension that continues in early modern times to underlie pleas for free trade and free movement: the inequality of wealth was willed by God to encourage men to engage in gentle civilising trade (Perrot, 1992).
Mobility and Sedentariness

At a more modest and concrete level, a multitude of other causes of mobility can be identified, demonstrating that systematically positioning it in opposition to sedentariness is futile. Conceiving of these two categories together, instead of opposing them as norm and exception, is one of the achievements of recent work on human movement (Cavaciocchi, 1994; Hoerder, 2002; Morris, 2005). The complementarity between sedentary life and mobility is evident in, for example, the organisation of seasonal work or itinerant trade in the Mediterranean. In early modern Western Europe, the peddlers of Northern Italy who supplied Northern Europe with citrus fruits, or the booksellers and pastry cooks in Mediterranean cities who originated in Alpine villages, were examples of trade that linked very large and distant spaces (Fontaine, 1993). This temporary mobility, which follows the rhythm of the seasons or certain cycles of life, requires a very complex organisation, to replace the men who leave with other migrants, in addition to (well attested in early modern times) extensive credit networks for the transfer of benefits, inheritance systems and flexible family forms. Transhumance, too, has been the object of precise regulations and bitter conflicts since antiquity (see, e.g., Brun, 1996; Russo and Salvemini, 2007; Cardete, 2019; Costello and Svensson, 2018). Life on the move thus has nothing to do with the images of chaos that social fantasies portray. This is also true for those who made the frontier their resource, such as the nomads who freely crossed the territory of the Roman Empire, or the barbarian tribes who, sedentary on its margins, lived between the two spaces. In early modern times, real relays with distant worlds (Heather, 2017) occurred, including the rural clans in the margins of the Republic of Genoa who engaged in the arms trade with Milan (Raggio, 1990), the smugglers of the Iberian Peninsula (Aparicio, 2006), and the actors of the ransom economy who ensured the transfer of funds between the two shores of the Mediterranean (Kaiser, 2008b). Cabotage, the dominant ancient practice of maritime navigation and trade, also combined elements of sedentary life (possession of land) and phases of mobility (journeys in caravans, or from port to port) that could last several years (Horden and Purcell, 2000), and required largely implicit knowledge of the rhythms of production and markets (Buti, 2005; Salvemini, 2007).

Ruptures and Continuities

The existence, at different times, of the regular structures discussed in previous sections does not exclude the fact that reconfigurations caused by ruptures have occurred. The establishment of the Assyrian Empire in the first millennium BC, for example, led to a reconfiguration of the eastern basin of the
Mediterranean and to large-scale forced population movements (Broodbank, 2013); the Roman hegemony imposed on the whole of the Mediterranean area from the 2nd century BC provoked, as we have said, a dual movement of immigration of foreigners towards Italy, and emigration of Roman citizens towards the provinces. The economic needs of the Empire, peace and security then increased geographical and social mobility, which benefited North Africa in particular (Stone, 2014), while Roman military victories were followed by a new form of migration: the settlement of defeated barbarians on Roman territory or on its borders (Modéran, 2004).

As connectivity is not constant or identical everywhere (Bresc, 2004), many other events have modified the migratory paradigms, in the sense of increasing or reducing the phenomenon. Ruptures can be analysed not only on a local scale, with the abandonment of certain sites (for example, Carthage in favour of Tunis in the 7th century CE), or the development of others (Cyprus, which became a refuge for Near Eastern populations between 1260 and 1330, threatened by Mamluk raids and Mongol incursions into Syria–Palestine) (Balard and Picard, 2014); but also on a global scale, for example when the 7th-century Arab conquest, or the later Reconquista, forced a large number of exiles onto the roads. The early modern era also saw new configurations: the displacement of the Mediterranean slave trade towards the Atlantic coast (De Almeida Mendes, 2008) as a result of the drying up of ancient sources of slaves due to the Ottoman advance and, simultaneously upstream, to the European Atlantic expansion. In the 16th century, about 10 per cent of the population of Lisbon were black slaves and/or freedmen (Lahon, 2005). Other major causes of a reconfiguration of Mediterranean networks were the Ottoman penetration into the Balkans, which caused the flight of many people to the West, and the waves of expulsions of Jews and Muslims, new Christians or conversos and Moriscos from the Iberian Peninsula in the 16th and 17th centuries. The expulsion of more than 200 000 Moriscos strengthened the groups of ‘Andalusians’ in Morocco and in the Ottoman regencies in the Maghreb that were formed during the Reconquista. The expulsion of Iberian Jews increased the Jewish population of Istanbul and contributed to the development of intercultural trade hubs such as Livorno, where the Jewish ‘nation’ constituted 10 per cent of the population in the 18th century, and Salonika, where Jews made up more than half of the population in 1529 and nearly two-thirds in 1613 (Mazower, 2007). These reconfigurations in the wake of the expulsions had not been foreseen by the Catholic kings; on the other hand, they were clearly intended by the Grand Duke of Tuscany, who tried to attract the Jews by granting them privileges in the Livornina of 1593, even though he had created a ghetto in Florence shortly before. He understood that these migrants arrived not only with goods but also with skills and, above all, with contacts, including with their country of origin; this is attested by the winding paths of the people who crossed the shores, such
as Samuel Pallache, a Spanish Jew from Fez, in the service of the Moroccan sultan, agent of the King of Spain, trader, diplomat and privateer between Fez, Madrid, Amsterdam and London at the beginning of the 17th century (Garcia Arenal and Wiegers, 2003). Mobilities weave innumerable links that go far beyond contacts between states, sometimes creating ‘multi-territorialities’ (Badie, 1995). Their forms reflect the state of the Mediterranean world; the state of knowledge concerning the land and sea routes, ports, islands and cities; and also the inns, post offices and customs posts, which were staging posts for the travellers as well as sometimes control points.

CIRCULATION, PASSAGE AND RECEPTION STRUCTURES

Cities, hubs for the circulation of people and goods, are characterised in the long term by the tension between large migratory flows on which urban growth and prosperity depend, and a structural xenophobia whose institutional matrix is the sedentary nature and availability of the leading groups. The movement of people made it necessary to create reception structures, such as colleges, associations, stationes and xenodochia in ancient cities (see, e.g., Moatti, 2013; Fauchon-Claudon and Le Guennec, 2021), and hospitals which in medieval times welcomed the poor, pilgrims, merchants and soldiers. The intensification of exchanges is thus accompanied by a differentiation of places and institutions, and sometimes by their specialisation, which testifies to the development of asymmetries in intercultural relations. Thus, the ancient model of the Ḵān or funduq, established in the Middle East for the reception of merchants and goods, first spread widely in the medieval period (Concina, 1997). But, in early modern times, the enclosure and transformation of funduqs into storage depots in European ports of the Mediterranean was a clear sign of their inhospitality to Muslim merchants (Constable, 2004). The creation of a Fondaco dei Turchi in Venice at the beginning of the 17th century was clearly designed to reduce the visibility of ‘Turkish’ merchants (in reality often Ottoman subject Greeks) to a minimum, and to closely control their presence (Concina, 1997). Similarly, the French, English and Dutch funduqs built in Tunis in the mid-17th century served as a dual enclosure: that of the privileges granted and the regulations imposed which channelled contacts and made passage through intermediaries compulsory. The wall both protected and enclosed (Revault, 1984). In general, the mistrust or, at least, the ambivalent attitude of the authorities towards those who move is reflected in a whole set of practices whose modifications are indications of societal evolution.
Thresholds

Entering a city is a real initiation rite, through which the recognition of differences takes place. It is the moment of a double identification: of the place by the traveller, and of the traveller by the others. In some societies, the arrival of the foreigner even gives rise to certain rituals: duels, purifications, interrogations and the production of documents. Does this mean that the stranger is always viewed with suspicion, and that by entering the city, they would do it violence? Obviously, the arrival creates a world order with definition of boundaries, categorisation of people, and even new identities (Leed, 1991). Whether passing through the gates of ancient Rome, asking for a welcome at the funduq of the French in Aleppo in the 16th century, or that of the Turks in Venice in the 17th century, or arriving in the port of early modern Marseille, the moment of entry has a magnifying glass effect that highlights the variety of movements of populations and the welcomes reserved for them (Moatti, 2013). Depending on the time and place, the threshold to be crossed may be either at the gate or inside the city, or it may be organised in a succession of checkpoints. In early modern times, the presentation before an innkeeper was one of these thresholds, because the urban authorities required, in French cities and other European countries, that he declare the people he was lodging. In fact, if the authorities aspired to a quadrillage of the city, or aspired to, in 18th-century Europe, a police utopia of public order and happiness, realistically they had to rely on social practices and knowledge (Houte and Blanchard, 2019). The urban magistrates could only hope that the landlords would faithfully observe the norms established by them. The concrete application of their orders depended, however, on the reliability of these intermediaries, on their experienced eye and on their relevant judgement. Not only could controls be carried out in different places, but they sometimes involved real information networks and a multitude of actions. In Greek or Roman ports, the recognition of a fiscal or economic privilege generated a whole series of verifications that attest to the existence of a port bureaucracy, but also of real ‘logbooks’ (Bresson, 2000). In medieval, early and modern times, in order to protect the inhabitants from ‘plagues’, contagions and epidemics, the authorities demanded ‘health bulletins’ and ‘quarantine certificates’, set up lazarets and quarantine stations outside the cities and ports, created screening procedures and institutions such as health offices, a protective ‘cordon’ which was also used by the military (Hildesheimer, 1980; Cipolla, 1986; Chase-Levensone, 2021). All this required a great deal of information, which would help to identify people, but also to authenticate their documents. This information, which came from the political authorities, from corporations (leave documents for journeymen or soldiers) or from communities (certificates of Catholicity or Sephardic membership), helped to create a space for communication between
the political establishment, police and social controls. According to Georg Simmel’s formula the status of the ‘guest who stays’, that is, the resident ‘foreigner’, was characterised by plurality (Simmel, 1908; see also Schütz, 1944, 1945). A complex relationship of proximity and distance was established with the receiving society, which was built through successive passages and routes in the urban space, understood at the same time as social fabric, physical space and an institutional framework (Kaiser, 1999; Cerutti, 2012; Moatti, 2014).

Foreignness

An analysis of these routes and policies of reception highlights the gradations of status, which render futile any attempt to provide a unitary definition of the term ‘foreigner’. The effectiveness of the word lies in its formal character, which erases the multiplicity of situations of foreignness in Mediterranean cities (metics, peregrines, *incola*, host, *aubain*, manant, inhabitant, bourgeois, and so on) and thus reduces the complexity of experiences and relationships. This classificatory power to include and exclude is only fully deployed in pre-modern times when the term takes on the univocal meaning of ‘non-national’. The procedures of control and identification of people on the move were themselves subject to multiple logics (fiscal, demographic, political, sanitary and sometimes police) which, far from being mutually exclusive, were more often than not cumulative, creating a saturated social and cultural space. The control itself was not always the work of state authorities but also emanated from local initiatives: from antiquity to early modern times, Jewish communities constantly played this role; similarly, seasonal migration was regulated by village corporals, who made deals with large landowners and supervised movements from the mountains to the plains. The same characteristics are found in all pre-modern periods, but there is no problematic unity, nor is there a linear development until the constitution (and stabilisation) of the territorialised nation-state. In these periods, it was indeed plurality that characterised the attitude of the authorities and the populations towards the newcomer. The forms of reception varied according to political structures, and to events as well – famine, religious or political crises, and war – so that within each period several models could exist. However, in general, control was most often exercised not over the territory, but over certain categories of populations, in order to regulate trade, to protect those who held a privilege, or to maintain public order or peace.4

Mixed Identities and In-between

One of the essential questions raised by the study of the circulation of people is that of their integration into the host society. For a long time this question
has been thought of in terms of acculturation or cultural transfers, a concept which, assuming a reciprocal relationship between two identifiable poles, does not take into account the full complexity of the subject. It is more fruitful to question the forms of cultural circulation and to identify the strategies of actors in different contexts. One of the consequences of migration has indeed been the circulation of knowledge and cultural traditions, as well as of skills. This is true of forced migration: Portuguese Sephardic Jews entered thus into contact with Romaniote (that is, Hellenised) Jews in Istanbul, and Spanish conversos and Moriscos strengthened communities of ‘Andalusians’ in the Maghreb who maintained their links with their countries of origin and preserved cultural traits that are found in religious and culinary practices, in music as well as in poetry. Such cultural circulation also concerned those who converted to another religion, such as the European ‘renegades’ in the Maghrebian ports, who maintained relationships with their relatives in Christendom, and their massive presence in the ports at the end of the 16th and the beginning of the 17th centuries favoured the practice of the lingua franca made up of Arabic, Spanish, Italian and Greek words and expressions, a mixture that changed according to place and context. Of course, speaking the same language is not speaking with the same voice, but this language, which belonged to no one, created an intercultural space of interlocution that testified to a history woven in common (Dakhlia, 2008). Cosmopolitanisation is another form of cultural mixing. The multilingual inscriptions of ancient Rome reveal how immigrants, while maintaining a link with their homeland, accumulated different identities without trying to unify them. This phenomenon, which reflects their ‘imaginary ubiquity’, their feeling of being part of a network that they themselves had created through their mobility, is attested to throughout the Roman Mediterranean world; this is how the Empire was able to be thought of and constructed as a global world and as a reticular system (Moatti, 2013).

CONTROLS AND MANAGEMENT OF FLOWS

Many studies have focused on the free choice of migrants or on the environmental causes of mobility, sometimes forgetting the role of political power. In fact, the migration phenomenon involves a great diversity of actors with multiple forms of negotiation between them.

A Multitude of Actors

With the case of a group expulsion, it was necessary to count and to identify, that is, to have good demographic information, which sometimes led the administrations to stagger the measures taken. This is the case with the expulsion of the Moriscos from 1609 to 1614 (Benitez, 2009). The organisation of
the departure requires a whole range of logistics: sending commissioners, requisitioning means of transport, negotiations with foreign powers that became transit lands and host lands. Finally, even representatives of the expelled participated in the series of diplomatic negotiations necessary to settle the fate of the expelled or exiled outside the place of origin, either in another domestic territory or outside the borders. For a large-scale movement to be effective, institutional support is needed, which can be both normative and symbolic in relation to the rituals of expulsion. But the part played by social negotiation in the mechanism (the self-identification of the populations concerned, as well as their capacity for resistance or semi-clandestine organisation) is just as important. It is in the articulation between these three dimensions – technological, institutional and social – that the nature of power, and also historical ruptures, become apparent. In the Roman world, for example, although legal provisions concerning mobility multiplied during the Empire, the role of institutions was undoubtedly much weaker than social pressure. By contrast, the arsenal of norms and institutions of the early modern Spanish monarchy was pioneering, even if here again social negotiation played a role, as shown by the tolerance of the authorities with regard to fraud or even the granting of exemptions. Negotiation is also a question of relations between political communities, as such relations are not only of predation or domination, but also of reciprocity. In Hellenistic times, for example, the recruitment of mercenaries by a city gave rise to an agreement with their metropolis, which maintained links with them during their service, even to the point of controlling their return or the movement of their families (Chaniotis, 2004). In ancient republican Italy, despite a certain fluidity in terms of mobility, the cities sometimes tried to define the conditions of legal emigration (Broadhead, 2004). Negotiation could also concern the status of the displaced population. In the Middle Ages, mercenaries in Islamic countries, sent to the Maghreb as a result of unequal agreements between the Spanish and Muslim powers, were partly under the authority of the sultan, but partly under that of their king (Lopez-Perez, 2014).

**Freedom of Movement: A Negotiated Privilege?**

Trade regulations were another area of negotiation, especially since trade or work demands were one of the main causes of mobility (MacMullen, 1974). They could take the form of peace treaties with economic clauses or bilateral trade agreements, which aimed to establish the security of trade or offered relief from taxes on goods; this took place between Greek cities and between Carthage and Rome, which, as early as the 6th century BCE, provided their respective nationals with a public guarantee on their goods and transactions (Bresson, 2005). They could also be unilateral agreements, such as the ‘Capitulations’ of the early modern era, which the Ottomans
conceived as a *firman*, a revocable grace granted by the sultan to Europeans. Thus, in the Mediterranean, the control of goods implied the control of men. These examples reveal the very subtle link between freedom and control. Granting merchants the freedom to trade was a way of providing them with a certain guarantee, but also of monitoring them. Thus, in order to sell their goods freely in Muslim countries, Westerners in medieval times first had to unload them in ports with customs, pay taxes and obtain a receipt, a veritable safe-conduct (Valérian, 2004), a procedure reminiscent of the clauses of the Romano–Carthaginian treaties. However, ‘international’ negotiation was not only an instrument of external regulation: it could also have an internal impact, depending on the period, favouring the control by a state of its own nationals. In the 16th century, in order to trade with the Maghreb, Spanish merchants had to apply for royal permission: this trade functioned as a permanent exception and the fee to be paid to obtain permission can be interpreted as a tax on a specific sector of trade. Thus, the economic privilege was a source of profit, while being a form of both surveillance and protection (Corrales, 2001).

CONCLUSION: THE MEDITERRANEAN AS A SPACE OF FREEDOM?

It is necessary to imagine what it meant, in these Mediterranean societies, to leave one’s homeland and incur risks on the roads and in the cities. The ‘right of seizure’ or ‘right of reprisal’ on a foreigner, for example, was exercised from antiquity to early modern times, either in a private context, when a creditor obtained the right to seize the goods of a foreigner, because the latter belonged to the same homeland as the debtor who had fled; or in a public context, when a state made the nationals of another state pay for the injustices committed by their sovereign – what Jaucourt calls in the *Great Encyclopedia* an ‘imperfect war’ (Timbal, 1958; Bravo, 1980). Hence the need for the foreigner to be protected by privileges. Whether a question of the aftermath of war, the right to migrate, the establishment of commercial relations or embassies, a secure space was opened up by negotiations. This partially explains why the right of seizure disappeared under the Roman Empire. The Roman territory had indeed been constituted following victories and agreements, most often unilateral, under the terms of which conquered countries became provinces and their free inhabitants have become peregrines, that is to say submitted and identified foreigners. In this space based on different forms of negotiation, human circulation could seem fluid. In pre-contemporary Mediterranean societies, fluidity was always linked to the existence of regulations. For goods, freedom of movement meant immunity, but sometimes also constraints: the medieval *Stapelrecht* (right of storage), for example, obliged the passing merchant to offer his goods to the urban market; for people, it was most often synonymous
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with control and guarantees. Thus, freedom of movement was most often experienced in the Mediterranean not as a characteristic of free men, even less as a subjective right, but as a positive right, regulated by a set of institutions and whose recognition was in no way based on a natural principle, nor on simple norms, but on negotiation. It is the analysis of this mode of interaction and its transformation over the centuries that allows us to understand the evolution of societal practices and the phenomenon of migration, their historicity, that is to say their discontinuity.

ACKNOWLEDGEMENT


NOTES

1. Philip Curtin (1984), for example, a specialist in the slave trade in the early modern Atlantic space, used the concept of trade diasporas to trace the history of these communities of merchants who, although spatially dispersed, formed a nation distinct from both the society of origin and the host societies where they were settled and where they played the role of ‘cultural mediators’.

2. In the various treaties known in the Mediterranean of the first millennium, three common features can be found: the limitation of foreign trade to specific zones, which also corresponds to the practice of the Greek emporia; the control of trade by the local authorities, and the public guarantee given to this trade; the protection of foreigners, especially shipwrecked people. These measures were intended to remedy all forms of violence: piracy, kidnapping or land grabbing, but also the despoiling of the shipwrecked. Negotiations thus created a Mediterranean order that made it possible to secure trade.

3. An African inscription from the 3rd century CE (CIL VIII 11824), recalls in the first person the social promotion of a peasant who, born poor and of low status, was a seasonal worker in Numidia for 12 years, then a hirer of men (‘for eleven years I commanded teams of harvesters’), then a landowner and a notable. See also Tacoma (2016: Ch. 6).

4. Such are some of the conclusions of the programme ‘La mobilité des personnes en Méditerranée. Procédures de contrôle et documents d’identification’, directed by Claudia Moatti and Wolfgang Kaiser.

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