If negotiation is like a dance (Adair and Brett, 2005; Raiffa, 1981; Young and Schlie, 2011), then negotiation research needs to study its choreography. If negotiation is like an athletic contest (Gelfand and McCusker, 2002), negotiation research needs to study its plays and engage in match analysis. To understand the amount of applause and the final scores, assessing the series of moves negotiators undertake to reach those outcomes is critical.

The moves in negotiations are acts of communication. Negotiators communicate using oral and written messages, conveyed with various postures, facial expressions, rates of speech, and tones of voice, among other concerns (Putnam and Roloff, 1992). Negotiators communicate in ways that are guided by the setting and their initial goals, yet even the most casual observations show that negotiators respond to each other, adapting and reacting to specific communications. The most developed line of research on communication sequences in negotiation is the work on negotiation strategy and tactics (For a related discussion of negotiation stages and turning points, see Druckman and Olekalns, Chapter 13 this volume). There is also work examining sequences of additional aspects of meaning communicated in negotiations, such as nonverbal communication and emotions (see also, Van Kleef and Sinaceur, Chapter 5 this volume), which may ultimately be combined with work on strategy and tactics into a comprehensive account of how negotiators talk their way from “hello” to “sign here”.

In what follows, we first outline how scholars study the communication sequences that comprise the negotiation process. Then we examine findings on negotiation strategy and tactics, the primary emphasis of negotiation research on communication sequences. Next we examine findings on nonverbal communication. Finally, we consider lines of research that are opening up new kinds of sequences to explore.
STUDYING NEGOTIATION COMMUNICATION SEQUENCES

Studying the sequential process of negotiating requires content coding written correspondence, or audio and video recordings of negotiations. Scholars study sequences in naturalistic negotiations, such as labor-management negotiations or hostage crisis negotiations (Donohue et al., 1984; Giebels and Taylor, 2009; Putnam and Jones, 1982a; Putnam et al., 1990; Taylor, 2002). Applying the same methodologies in a laboratory setting that offers the precision of manipulation and the control of experimentation has been critical in isolating predictors of communication frequencies and sequences as well as the underlying causal mechanisms linking negotiation communications to outcomes.

The content analysis process (for a general overview, see Krippendorff, 2004) involves breaking the stream of communication into units for analysis. Those units might be single words, thought units, tactics, speech turns, emotional expressions, or whatever else the meaning under study indicates to be a primary building block (e.g., Bakeman and Gottman, 1986). Then those units are coded to evaluate the content negotiators are expressing. Researchers train coders to identify and differentiate units reliably, or select a computer algorithm capable of coding the units. There are many different coding schemes available; a selection of those generated specifically for the study of negotiation communication is listed in Table 12.1.

As an example, imagine that a negotiator angrily responds to a counterpart’s threat by shouting, “Don’t threaten me, I have plenty of other options I can turn to. I don’t need you.” Using a simple frequency code (e.g. Weingart et al., 1993), this statement could be unitized at the level of the thought unit (here, split at the comma) and coded as a Rejection (of the counterpart’s threat) and a Threat (reference to walking away). Alternatively, using a cue-response coding scheme (e.g. Donohue, 1981; Donohue et al., 1984), this utterance would be unitized in a similar way but coded first as a Defending response to the counterpart’s cue, and then as an Attacking cue that will prompt the counterpart’s subsequent response. Coding across speakers, this utterance in conjunction with the counterpart’s previous threat could be unitized together and coded as a Reciprocal Threat Sequence (e.g. Weingart et al., 1993). A researcher focusing on emotion might unitize emotional expressions (be they verbal or nonverbal), and code instead the tone of voice (angry, firm) or facial expressions (no smile, anger) used when the utterance was expressed (Semnani-Azad and Adair, 2011; in press). Or, as a final example, a researcher might unitize at the level of words and examine personal
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Coding Scheme</th>
<th>Reference</th>
<th>Main Code Categories (#sub categories)</th>
<th>Application</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Bargaining Process Analysis II, Revised</td>
<td>Putnam and Jones, 1982a</td>
<td>Substantive (5) Strategic (4) Persuasive (3)</td>
<td>Content and function of bargaining</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
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<td>Task related (6) Affective (2) Procedural (1)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Cue-Response Negotiation Coding System</td>
<td>Donohue, Diez, and Hamilton, 1984</td>
<td>Response: Attacking (3) Defending (3) Integrating (3)</td>
<td>Coding sequences, give-and-take</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Cue: Attacking (3) Defending (3) Integrating (3)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Negotiation Behaviors in Strategy Clusters</td>
<td>Wiengart, Brett Olekalns, and Smith, 2007</td>
<td>Integrative info (5) Create value (8) Distributive</td>
<td>Integrative versus distributive strategies</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>info (7) Claim value (7) Push to closure (2) Process</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>management (3)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Culture and Negotiation Coding Scheme</td>
<td>Adair, Okumura, and Brett, 2001</td>
<td>Information (9) Substantiation (3) Offers (3) Reactions (2)</td>
<td>East–West cross-cultural negotiation strategies</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Mutuality (2) Procedural (5) Clarification (1) Other (1)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Emotion and Vocal Fluency</td>
<td>Semnani-Azad and Adair, in press</td>
<td>Pitch (1) Expressiveness (1) Volume (1) Fluency (3)</td>
<td>Observer global ratings of vocal dynamics</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Thomas, 2008</td>
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</tbody>
</table>
Choosing or designing a coding scheme is an important step in the research process. Some considerations are the nature of the research question, the level of analysis, whether the code is to be theory or data driven, task or relationship focused, and include verbal or nonverbal codes. Weingart et al. (2004) provide a detailed description of the process of developing a coding scheme, which also indicates concerns in the selection of an existing coding scheme. As the study of communication sequences depends on the unit comprising those sequences, the choice of a coding scheme is likely to shape the kind of sequences scholars might find.

Most negotiation-specific coding schemes focus on the negotiation-specific function of statements—tactics—and cluster them into two main types, integrative and distributive (Deutsch, 1974). Integrative tactics facilitate the exchange of information and discovery of mutually satisfactory solutions, such as providing information on preferences or priorities, noting where parties have similar concerns, and posing multi-issue offers. Distributive tactics assist negotiators in the task of claiming value for themselves, such as references to alternatives or a bottom line, threats, demands, and arguments.

Researchers are generally in agreement about what tactics serve integrative versus distributive functions, but there are two areas in particular

### Table 12.1 (continued)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Coding Scheme</th>
<th>Reference</th>
<th>Main Code Categories (#sub categories)</th>
<th>Application</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Nonverbal Negotiation Inventory</td>
<td>Semnani-Azad and Adair, 2011, in press</td>
<td>Posture (4)</td>
<td>Nonverbal cues</td>
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<td>Head Movement (4)</td>
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<td>Hand Movement (3)</td>
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<td>Eye Gaze (3)</td>
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<td>Vocal Speech (2)</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Facial Expression (3)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Interests, Rights, and Power Process Code</td>
<td>Brett, Shapiro, and Lytle, 1998; Tinsley, 2001</td>
<td>Interests (3)</td>
<td>Interests, rights, and power</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Rights (2)</td>
<td>influence strategies</td>
</tr>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Power (2)</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Other categories (7)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Influence in Negotiations Coding System</td>
<td>Giebels and Taylor, 2009</td>
<td>Relational (3)</td>
<td>Influence in crisis</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Content (8)</td>
<td>negotiation context</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

references (“I”, “me”; see, e.g., Niederhoffer and Pennebaker, 2002; Taylor and Thomas, 2008) as a measure of self-concern.
where coding schemes vary substantially: conceptualization of offers and operationalization of influence tactics. In conceptualizing offers, the key gray area is the interpretation of single-issue offers, where one party stakes a claim on a single issue. In general, multi-issue offers, which highlight trade-off opportunities, are considered integrative (Weingart et al., 1990; Pruitt, 1983; Tutzauer and Roloff, 1988) whereas single-issue offers are considered distributive, as they often indicate that a negotiator is attempting to claim value. Thus, for example, Gunia and colleagues included “Substantiation and Single-Issue Offers” in a single code category capturing distributive strategies that were used more often when Indian and U.S. negotiators had low trust (Gunia et al., 2011); additional work on culture is discussed in this volume in Chapter 10 (by Aslani et al.) and Chapter 15 (by Crump). However, single-issue offers have also been categorized as an integrative strategy, because sequences of single-issue offers can lead negotiators to integrative solutions, either through heuristic trial-and-error (Pruitt, 1981) or as an indirect information search process when trust is low (Adair et al., 2007). As illustrated by the study of offer sequences, the function of a communication as an isolated statement may not be the same as the function of that statement within a sequence of communications (Olekalns and Weingart, 2008).

The challenge with operationalizing the communication of influence in negotiation is the sheer scope of the topic. Negotiators use influence to convince the other party to make a concession, change their limits, or revise their goals (Lax and Sebenius, 1986). To capture this distributive function of influence, many negotiation researchers have operationalized influence through power plays, such as stalling or making threats or demands (De Dreu et al., 1998; Pruitt and Lewis, 1975; Putnam and Wilson, 1989). Another operationalization of influence codes for “task-related information and logic” used to persuade the other party (Giebels et al., 2003). Other researchers have operationalized influence with tactics drawn from the social psychology of persuasion, for example measuring different forms of substantiation (e.g., good for you, good for me, good for both) (Adair et al., 2001; Putnam and Jones, 1982a), or coding for relational versus rational influence (Giebels and Taylor, 2009). Yet another approach to measuring influence codes for arguments that refer to negotiator’s interests, rights, or power in a conflict setting (Brett et al., 1998; Lytle et al., 1999). Adair and colleagues have recently developed a $3 \times 2$ model of influence strategies in negotiation that measures interests, rights, and power arguments that are framed to appeal to negotiators’ needs for information or negotiators’ needs to uphold social norms (Adair et al., in press). Thus, negotiation researchers have many ways of operationalizing and measuring influence that focus on both tactics and communication.
Such coding schemes can be expanded and refined as researchers study new kinds of tactics, new versions of existing tactics, or develop sub-types of existing tactics.

Once a negotiation is coded into a collection of tactics or other building blocks, researchers can then examine when they tend to occur, how frequently they occur, and how they fit into sequences. One common approach to studying sequences is conducting a lag-sequential or log-linear analysis that examines the likelihoods of different responses occurring after a given cue (Olekalns and Smith, 2000). More complex Markov chain modeling allows researchers to examine longer chains of behaviors (Weingart et al., 1999). A third approach, proximity analysis, considers the relationships among all behaviors, capturing more of the complex interconnections among behaviors in an interaction (Taylor, 2006; Taylor and Donald, 2006). Having unitized, coded, and assessed the succession of codes across a negotiation, negotiation scholars are then in a position to provide evidence on what kinds of communication sequences occur and what outcomes they predict.

NEGOTIATION STRATEGY AND TACTICS

Scholars examining negotiation communications have long focused on integrative and distributive strategy and their associated tactics to understand the negotiation process and negotiation outcomes (Drake and Donohue, 1996; Olekalns et al., 1996; Putnam and Jones, 1982a; 1982b; Weingart, et al., 1993; Wilson and Putnam, 1990). The reason is that negotiators have both cooperative and competitive goals, which guide the selection of negotiation strategy and convey it to the other party. Cooperative goals imply using integrative tactics, with the potential to create value for all parties. Competitive goals imply using distributive tactics, with the potential for negotiators to claim value for themselves. Thus, for example, negotiators with a cooperative orientation are likely to offer priority information and ask questions and negotiators with a competitive orientation are likely to make positional statements and threats (O’Connor, 1997; Olekalns and Smith, 1999). These communication choices then influence negotiation outcomes.

In both laboratory and field settings, the use and reciprocation of integrative tactics predict agreements that create value and the use and reciprocation of distributive tactics predict agreements that fail to create value or fail to form any agreement (Olekalns and Smith, 1999, 2003; Putnam et al., 1990; Simons, 1993; Weingart et al., 1990; Weingart et al., 1996). One source of evidence for the link between strategy and outcomes is studies
of tactic frequency, which examine how often negotiators use particular tactics (e.g., asking questions, providing information). The frequency of a given tactic is usually considered relative to the frequency of the other tactics used or the frequency with which a counterpart uses the same tactic. A meta-analysis of 28 frequency studies by De Dreu et al. (2000) confirmed that the frequency of integrative tactics, such as information sharing and problem-solving, predicted high joint gains and the frequency of distributive tactics, such as contending, predicted low joint gains.

Further, the meta-analysis and subsequent research show there are multiple moderators (e.g., power, social value orientation, negotiation situation type, national culture of the negotiators) that influence tactic use and the relationship between tactic use and joint gains (Giebels et al., 1998; Olekalns and Smith, 2003). For example, negotiators who are pro-social are more likely to use integrative tactics, whereas negotiators who are pro-self are more likely to use distributive tactics (e.g. Olekalns and Smith, 1999; 2003; O’Connor, 1997; see also Koning and van Dijk, Chapter 3 this volume). When negotiators are concerned with achieving their own high targets (i.e., have high resistance to yielding), these effects are particularly pronounced.

As a second example, due to norms for indirect communication and harmony maintenance, negotiators from East Asian cultures are less likely to state directly their preferences and priorities than negotiators from North American cultures (Adair et al., 2001). Instead, East Asian negotiators use sequences of offers to share and gather information that allows them to craft integrative solutions (Adair et al., 2007). Negotiators from national cultures with low trust (e.g., Russia, China) are unlikely to share information at all; their strategies are mostly distributive (Adair et al., 2004). Thus, communication tactics are a means by which negotiators exhibit and seek to attain their goals, but tactic types and frequencies are not fully indicative of eventual outcomes. The sequences in which those tactics are used also matter.

Patterns of reciprocity are common in negotiation, whereby counterparts respond-in-kind to both distributive and integrative tactics (e.g., Weingart et al., 1990; Adair, 2003). Reciprocated sequences of tactics convey information on how negotiators view their relationship with their counterpart (Giles et al., 1991). Integrative tactics such as noting mutual interests serve to generate affiliation and interdependence between negotiators, while distributive tactics such as threatening to walk away create distance between them (Taylor, 2002; Taylor and Thomas, 2008), as predicted by Donohue’s (2001) Relational Order Theory. In contrast, reciprocating distributive tactics can lead to conflict spirals and impasses, unless negotiators can break out of the cycle and refocus on interests (Brett et al.,
1998). Thus, it is not just a matter of what goals negotiators have initially, or what tactics they use, but how they coordinate their communications within sequences.

Sequences of tactics also influence the negotiation process and outcomes by gradually narrowing negotiators’ response options (Chartrand and Bargh, 1999; Weingart, et al., 1999). As negotiators establish regular patterns of reciprocal information exchange (an integrative tactic), it becomes less and less likely that either negotiator will switch to a distributive strategy such as making a threat (Weingart et al., 1999). Negotiators’ sequences of communications tend to become systematic, self-sustaining, and difficult to change (Lytle et al., 1999).

A strategy sequence is defined by the kind of relationship between tactics, with the three main categories of sequences being reciprocal, complementary, and structural. A reciprocal strategy sequence is defined as response-in-kind: a counterpart exactly matches the focal negotiator’s tactic. For example, if a focal negotiator shares priority information, the counterpart responds by sharing priority information. Reciprocal sequences indicate that negotiators are in-sync; they both have either an integrative or distributive focus, and they are both using the same type of tactic (Brett et al., 1998; Donohue, 1981; Olekalns and Smith, 2000; Putnam, 1990; Putnam and Jones, 1982a; Weingart et al., 1996).

Complementary strategy sequences are a less strict form of responding in kind. They are sequences in which negotiators use different tactics of the same strategic focus. For example, a complementary integrative sequence might consist of one negotiator sharing priority information and the other responding by noting a mutual interest. A complementary distributive sequence might consist of one negotiator offering a positional argument and the counterpart responding with a threat to walk away. Complementary sequences indicate that negotiators have the same strategic focus but perhaps different tactical repertoires (Adair and Brett, 2005; Weingart et al., 1999).

In contrast to reciprocal and complementary sequences, which mark synchronicity and tend to be self-sustaining, structural sequences occur when negotiators’ integrative tactics are met with distributive tactics, or vice-versa. Structural sequences signal that negotiators’ strategic foci diverge. Such sequences have also been called “transformational” because they can mark a shift between cooperative and competitive phases of a negotiation (Brett et al., 1998; Olekalns and Smith, 2000).

Strategy sequences do not have uniform effects, as shown in particular by studies of national culture. Negotiators are more likely to generate reciprocal sequences of culturally normative tactics than non-normative tactics (Adair, 2003). All forms of strategy sequences have been studied by
comparing low context and high context cultures. Low context cultures are defined by a reliance on words and direct communication, whereas high context cultures rely on nonverbal gestures and subtle contextual cues to convey meaning beyond what is said in words (Hall, 1976). For example, in the context of police interrogations, contrast sequences (a form of structural sequence) consisting of intimidation followed by a rational argument were effective in eliciting confessions from direct, low context perpetrators, but not indirect, high context perpetrators. Perpetrators from high context cultures seemed to be more responsive to contrast sequences that included the relational component of active listening (Beune et al., 2011). Advances in our understanding of the nuanced communication characteristic of high context negotiators offer many promising avenues for process researchers to investigate (Adair et al., 2009; Buchan et al., 2011).

Together, the existing body of research shows several reliable predictors of how negotiators use strategies and tactics in general and in patterned sequences. The strongest evidence lies in social value orientation and national culture, leaving the field open to examine many other possible predictors of how negotiators enact strategies and sequences, such as individual differences (e.g., self-esteem) as well as contextual variables (e.g., communication medium) (see also Elfenbein, Chapter 2, and Friedman and Belkin, Chapter 14, both in this volume). As noted by De Dreu et al. (2000), there are also important moderators of the strategy-outcome link. In addition, recent work has identified consistent use of triple-interact (i.e., cue-response-cue-response) sequences that predict outcome differentially depending on the communication content (Taylor et al., 2012). Thus, there is a need for researchers to examine more comprehensive causal chains that include predictors, moderators, and partner effects to better understand the emergence and effects of negotiation strategy.

NONVERBAL EXPRESSION

Negotiation tactics are coded from verbal communication, but the course of a negotiation is also guided by expressions and sequences of nonverbal communication. Nonverbal communication is the expression and perception of non-linguistic messages that can occur with or without the simultaneous use of words (Afifi, 2007). Nonverbal communication occurs through many different cues, for example facial expression, posture, gesturing, tone of voice, or rate of speech. Because nonverbal communication is often sub-conscious and automatic (although see Kopelman et al., 2006 for strategic use of emotion), some scholars suggest it is trusted more and thus can have an even greater impact than verbal communication (Afifi,
Still, negotiators clearly attend to both verbal and nonverbal communication when interpreting their counterpart’s actions and attributing strategic intent.

A review of nonverbal communication suggests a seemingly endless number of forms and functions that researchers might tackle, yet negotiation researchers have focused mostly on the topics of deception and emotion (Gordon et al., 2006). One example is Morris and Keltner’s (2000) analysis of the function of emotional expressions that negotiators use to achieve their goals. They developed a model of the phases (opening, positioning, problem solving, ending) through which negotiations likely proceed and the relational challenges (initiation, influence, trust and binding) likely to occur in each phase. Thus, nonverbal expressions of emotions, tied to particular functions and phases of a negotiation process, were argued to support and advance communicative moves.

There are several examples of main effect studies on nonverbal expression. For example, it has been shown that when negotiators are strangers, eye contact facilitates integrative agreements for female negotiators, who use eye contact to facilitate shared understanding, but not for male negotiators, who experience discomfort from eye contact (Swaab and Swaab, 2009). In a study linking national culture to nonverbal dominance expressions, Chinese male negotiators expressed dominance through taking up space (e.g., spreading out papers on the table) whereas Canadian male negotiators expressed dominance through leaning forward (Semnani-Azad and Adair, 2011). In another study, researchers coded nonverbal expression in just the first five minutes of negotiation and found that high activity, measured by time speaking, helped high status negotiators claim value, but linguistic mirroring helped low status negotiators claim value (Curhan and Pentland, 2007).

Recently, researchers have drawn on Osgood’s Semantic Differential Model and work conducted in the communication field by Manusov and colleagues (Manusov, 2005; Osgood and Suci, 1955, Osgood and Anderson, 1957) to predict nonverbal communication in negotiation. Semnani-Azad and Adair (2011) developed a typology of nonverbal expression in negotiation categorized according to semantic meaning. They primed negotiators with one of six negotiation approaches: actively involved, passively involved, dominant, submissive, positive affect, or negative affect. They videotaped negotiators and trained objective observers to code the frequency of nonverbal behaviors exhibited by negotiators in each condition. The authors identified distinct clusters of nonverbal cues that accompany negotiators’ general approach and therefore carry strategic meaning both within culture and across cultures. For example, Canadian negotiators are more likely than Chinese negotiators to vary
their posture when passively involved, and Chinese negotiators are more likely than Canadian negotiators to lean forward when they feel positive affect towards their counterpart. This research makes several steps forward in our understanding of nonverbal communication in negotiation by connecting nonverbal cues with specific negotiator approaches and demonstrating the moderating effect of negotiator culture.

Swaab and colleagues are also making strides in the area of nonverbal expression in negotiation by integrating theories on motivation and media richness (Swaab et al., 2012). The authors conducted a meta-analysis of negotiation research testing the presence/absence of visual channels (e.g., video-conference versus email), vocal channels (e.g., face-to-face versus computer chat), and synchronicity (e.g., face-to-face versus email). They found that having more communication channels does not always positively impact negotiation outcome, as would be predicted by theories such as communication richness (Daft and Lengel, 1986). Instead, they found that negotiating with more communication channels (e.g., visual, vocal, and synchronous communication), has a positive impact only when negotiators have a neutral orientation. Greater access to nonverbal cues through more communication channels had no effect on outcome for cooperatively oriented negotiators and a negative effect for non-cooperatively oriented negotiators. This line of research not only helps reconcile prior inconsistent findings on media richness in negotiation, but also offers many new directions for examining the interaction of negotiator approach and communication channels on nonverbal expression and meaning.

Sequences of nonverbal communication in negotiation are categorized as mimicry, mirroring, or entrainment, and represent subconscious nonverbal processes that reflect coordination and affiliation (Chartrand and Bargh, 1999; McGrath and Kelly, 1986). It has been found that nonverbal mimicry during negotiation has a significant impact on negotiation outcome, especially when it occurs in the early stages of negotiation. Maddux and colleagues illustrated that mimicry, or mirroring the nonverbal behavior of a counterpart in the negotiation context, for example pen tapping or leaning forward, improves both relational and economic outcome (Maddux et al., 2008). Swaab and colleagues report a similar effect for linguistic mimicry when negotiating on-line; mimicry improved negotiation outcome when it occurred in the first 10 minutes of negotiation, an effect that was explained through increased trust (Swaab et al., in press). Applying the concept of complementarity to nonverbal expression, Wiltermuth et al. (2012) demonstrated that negotiation partners naturally fall into dominant and submissive roles evident in nonverbal expression. When negotiators’ nonverbal behavior conveys one negotiator
is dominant (e.g., taking up space) and one negotiator is submissive (e.g., constricting body), this natural relational order positively impacts negotiation outcome in a cooperative context.

NEW DIRECTIONS

The research on communication sequences in negotiation that we have discussed emphasizes integrative and distributive strategies and their associated tactics, as well as patterns in strategic communication, emotional expression, and relationship development. The variables we have reviewed are related to communication form, patterns, channels, and context. In future research, these categories can be expanded and integrated, communication sequences can be studied in the context of virtual negotiation (e.g., Brett et al., 2007; also see Friedman and Belkin, Chapter 14 this volume), and across multi-round negotiations. It is also possible to consider additional kinds of meaning about which negotiators communicate and the sequences that result, and employ new methods to capture such variables as communication intent.

Capturing Communication Complexity

In new work on within-negotiator strategy sequences, Beune and colleagues (2011) examine the effectiveness of different influence strategies when paired together in different orders, such as influence-offer versus offer-influence. More generally, the idea of combining multiple tactics within a single communication turn is a far broader and important consideration. For example, one might examine the effects of pairing integrative and distributive tactics, or multiple emotional expressions, within a larger communication sequence.

The focus on combining tactics raises the prospect of studying mixed messages and their effects on the negotiation process. In research on learning, scholars have found that when simultaneous (verbal) statements and (nonverbal) gestures convey different information, it signals that individuals are noticing but not yet integrating multiple pieces of information (e.g., Goldin-Meadow et al., 1993). Verbal and nonverbal mismatches have also long been associated with low sincerity (i.e., lying; e.g., Friedman, 1979). Consequently, there are rich traditions for exploring effects of mixed messages and their influence on the negotiation process.

Researchers may also consider alternative ways of thinking about the mixing of multiple strategies. Work on strategy and tactics confronts the challenge of negotiators drawing from integrative and distributive strat-
egy. It might benefit from other approaches to how people deploy multiple mixed strategies, as people can, for example, both cooperate and compete with each other at the same time (e.g., Van de Vliert, 1999). Rather than thinking about individuals using one strategy, work by Siegler on microgenetic methods (e.g., Siegler and Svetina, 2006) suggests that people use a collection of strategies, that new strategies may not replace but work alongside previously learned strategies, and that performance variance increases just before people discover new strategies. The microgenetic approach is centrally concerned with observing people’s strategy use across attempts, so it raises the question of how negotiators’ patterns of strategy and tactic use change and develop over time. Most work on communication sequences has focused on single negotiations, and so stands to gain from considering commonalities and contrasts of the same negotiators conducting multiple negotiations (see also Elfenbein, Chapter 2 this volume).

A related direction is to consider alternative approaches to conceptualizing communication sequences. For example, it is possible to conceptualize the negotiation process as a progression through a script (Schank and Abelson, 1977). Rather than assume that negotiators generate completely novel sequences, negotiators may be guided by their expectations and prior experiences about the course of a negotiation. For example, novice U.S. negotiators seem to hold fairly consistent beliefs about the basic outline of a negotiation (O’Connor and Adams, 1999). Consequently, it seems likely that more advanced negotiators would also have expectations about the negotiation process, and this may vary by national culture (Adair et al., 2009). Accordingly, in addition to considering (low-level) tactics and (high-level) strategic orientations, it might also be useful to consider (mid-level) phases that capture the gist of what negotiators’ conversations are attempting to accomplish for some portion of their overall discussions (e.g., Brett et al., 1999). This proposal fits with a broader analysis of events, which are typically found to have hierarchical structures (Zacks and Tversky, 2001), enabling individuals (and presumably therefore also scholars) to consider events at a range of levels of abstraction. Scripts are not the only other way to conceptualize sequences either; it is possible to consider negotiations as a sort of routine (compare Feldman and Pentland, 2003), as dynamic planning (Sycara, 1990), as arguments (Rips, 1998), or as enacting precedent (Schauer, 1987; 2008), among other options.

Measuring More Meaning

Another direction building on existing strategy and tactic research is to separate relationship building tactics from problem solving tactics.
Although there are good reasons to associate the two kinds of tactics—relationship building provides the trust that fosters information sharing necessary for problem solving—there is also documentation that liking and social concern can foster concession-making and failure to create value (Baron, 1990; Fry et al., 1983; Jap et al., 2011). Also, forming a relationship with one’s counterpart is a dissociable outcome concern from agreement terms (e.g., Curhan et al., 2006; Pinkley, 1990). There are two broader issues raised by this consideration. One is that tracing tactic sequences, such as when considering complementary sequences, can depend on the categorization of tactics. The second is that tactics may not have a one-to-one match with broader strategic goals, or put another way, strategic goals may not be mutually exclusive. It is possible that a single tactic might advance multiple strategic goals rather than just one.

A new direction for communication sequence research is to consider sequences of additional kinds of meaning. For example, Prietula and Weingart (2011) examine the sequence of offers that negotiators generate. The tactics discussed earlier abstract over the content of the offers that negotiators generate and instead just focus on the broad type of offer made (e.g., single or multiple issue). As a result, they do not capture anything specific about the progression of offers. There is prior work on concession size and timing (Hilty and Carnevale, 1993; Kwon and Weingart, 2004), but this work has mostly examined patterns in the relative sizes of the concessions as an indicator of reaching a negotiator’s bottom line or reservation point, rather than as the extent and nature of parties’ exploration of possible agreements. Accordingly, there has been a latent opportunity to examine where, in some conceptual space of the possible offers negotiators might generate, negotiators begin, travel, and end. This is the sort of analysis is common in Raiffa’s (1981) classic text, among others, but that until Prietula and Weingart (2011) had not been used as a tool to assess empirically how negotiators progressed. They suggest that negotiators are first guided by the value of proposals and then are more influenced by the content of proposals, which implies that a coding system that just tracks one or the other kind of meaning would not be able to capture the full communication sequence negotiators are likely experiencing. Prietula and Weingart (2011) map out an approach to studying movements through an offer space for scorable games. It is open for future research to expand their general approach to the study of sequences of proposals more generally, either by first generating consensus scoring systems for them or through a qualitative evaluation process. It is also open for future research to integrate offer sequences with, for example, tactic sequences. For example, perhaps single issue offers are a distributive tactic when they focus on the same part of the offer space but an integrative tactic when they mark out different parts of the offer space.
This is just one of many possible reasons to consider linking the content of offers with the functions of negotiation tactics.

**Adding to the Methods Toolbox**

Most research on communication sequences in negotiation has studied naturally evolving sequences rather than trying to intervene and influence those sequences directly. Yet it is possible to influence, even experimentally manipulate, the strategies negotiators use through negotiation simulation role instructions. By manipulating the use of verbal and nonverbal communication at various points in a negotiation, researchers can make stronger claims about the causal relationships between strategy, timing, and outcome.

Negotiation communication researchers may also take advantage of existing approaches from the field of communication, such as the thought and talk method. Developed in the areas of communication and clinical psychology, this method involves participants viewing a videotape of their interaction and explaining in a continuous verbal stream what they were thinking and feeling during their discussion (Sillars et al., 2000). Thoughts can then be coded to identify speaker’s intent, selective attention, interpretation and attribution tendencies, perspective taking, and so on.

Another consideration is new content analysis tools that could open up additional possibilities. For example, there is a new stream of work showing that conversational mimicry generates liking using computer automated text analysis called linguistic style matching with Pennebaker’s LIWC dictionaries (Taylor and Thomas, 2008). For example, Ireland and colleagues (2011), in studying romantic couples, found that pairs who used prepositions, articles, and other function (or closed class) words in similar proportions were more likely to initiate and remain in relationships. It is possible to look at the emergence of linguistic style matching over the course of a negotiation, for example, and use it analogously to a measure of reciprocal strategy sequences.

As a second example, rather than tracking types of words in texts based on pre-existing categories, a new stream of work on computer-automated text analysis is deriving small sets of words, or topics, from the texts themselves (e.g., Blei, 2012). The possibility here is the prospect of assessing the topics negotiators are using over time as a potential basis for abstracting slightly away from any particular statement to characterize negotiation phases. But more important than any current guess, the larger point is that computer automated text analysis is a rapidly developing area and one from which negotiation research using content analysis likely stands to gain.
SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS

Negotiation outcomes, and effects of initial conditions and context on those outcomes, are the product of sequences of communications. These sequences are channeled by individual, situational, social, cultural and other factors, and how those factors exert their influences on negotiators’ communications are important topics of research. In addition, the sequences have dynamics of their own, as, for example, reciprocation entrains one line of discussion and so makes others less likely. Thus, understanding negotiators’ communications is a complex and necessary task.

Research on integrative and distributive strategy, enacted through sequences of cooperative and competitive tactics, has proven fruitful for understanding communication in negotiation. Examination of sequences of nonverbal behavior and emotions also shows patterns and demonstrates the importance of tracking more than the function of verbal statements to understand negotiation communication. In addition, we discussed new lines of work and a wide array of possibilities to explore. In short, the existing body of negotiation research shows how important communication sequences are in negotiations, and yet ample opportunity remains for new work to identify important new considerations. Integrating these into a more comprehensive account of communication sequences, one that can link antecedents and outcomes, awaits.

REFERENCES


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