1. Introduction: security and development

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In an increasingly interconnected world, progress in the areas of development, security and human rights must go hand in hand. There will be no development without security and no security without development. And both development and security also depend on respect for human rights and the rule of law. UN Secretary General, 2005

As the Arab Spring swept across North Africa in 2001, the World Bank issued the World Development Report 2011: Conflict, Security and Development (World Bank 2011). This recognized something that the international community had been grappling with for some time, namely that repeated cycles of violent conflict whether through wars, criminality or civil conflict, directly and negatively affects development.

This chapter outlines the nature of current debates in the subject and establishes an overarching framework within which to locate the chapters that follow. It begins to investigate what is meant by the terms security and development and the framework that currently affects thinking on violence and conflict in the developing world and its relationship to development. In order to fully appreciate the chapters within this handbook to security and development, it is necessary to understand how we got to where we are and to have some shared concepts, even if those terms are effectively contested just within this volume let alone more broadly.

However contentious the terms themselves are, the policy implications of placing them together are equally problematic. There are implications for the idea of human security, for example, in integrating debates about development within debates about security – sometimes termed ‘securitization’. It also works the opposite way in looking at the ‘developmentization’ of security in particular in questioning traditional international relations theory that is based on the state exercising a monopoly of violence, along with concepts of security colonizing environmentalism, trade, migration and other subjects of an emerging critical security studies literature. Despite this, the President of the UN Security Council recognized the need for the construction of state institutions if the state is to survive at all in stating in 2008 that: ‘The Security Council recognizes that the establishment of an effective, professional and accountable
security sector is one of the necessary elements for laying the foundations for peace and sustainable development’ (UN 2005).

In addition, it is imperative to consider what ‘development’ might mean in the context of the rise in ideas of ‘fragile states’, ‘state-building’ and ‘peace-building’ in development discourse and policy. In particular, the widening of the analytical approaches to ‘security’ away from formal state institutions to less centralized organizations incorporating local actors and agents, and a deepening of security away from national security issues and towards security of the individual (human security), have been accompanied by a global shift in policy approaches that have partly driven an academic agenda that has lagged in some ways.

Whilst it is certainly true that many of the security and development approaches have grown out of practice that is then reflected back on to theory, the World Development Report 2011, the New Deal for Fragile and Conflict Affected States, and the current debates on the successors to the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs), all show a desire to reconnect practice with theory. In particular, they all attempt to build on what we know about why violent conflict happens in order to construct better development interventions that address the underlying conflict drivers.

At the same time, contemporary debates on development and security are linked to recognition of the complexity of new security threats ranging from state collapse, criminal networks, migration, human trafficking and environmental threats, and the inadequacy of much international relations theory to adequately explain real threats rather than elegantly modelled superpower games. With the end of the Cold War this also coincided with a shift within academic studies of security as former ‘Cold War Warriors’ shifted their gaze to different parts of the world and began to notice other security threats. This then produced a spectrum of activity ranging from the traditional state-centric view to the human security view, with several nuances in between.

This spectrum has framed the tension within debates around development and security since these approaches have different ideas about the relative balance of security approaches. In particular, a more traditional state-based approach has concentrated on reconstructing ‘failed’ states and rebuilding formal state institutions. This has been the main focus of much state building literature and the state building approach remains a core pillar of much security and development policy. However, this does raise questions about exactly whose security is being secured and the conventional state building approach is open to accusations of over-emphasizing the national security of the state with the aim of security of the international order of states, rather than ensuring the security of
people on the ground. This has been reflected in much domestic rhetoric within donor states. In 2008, for example, the UK National Security Strategy stated that:

In the past, most violent conflicts and significant threats to global security came from strong states. Currently, most of the major threats and risks emanate from failed or fragile states … Failed and fragile states increase the risk of instability and conflict, and at the same time have a reduced capacity to deal with it, as we see in parts of Africa. They have the potential to destabilise the surrounding region. Many fragile states lack the capacity and, in some cases, the will adequately to address terrorism and organised crime, in some instances knowingly tolerating or directly sponsoring such activity. (Cabinet Office 2008: 14, section 3.21)

Similarly, the US National Security Strategy of 2006 argued that:

The events of September 11, 2001, taught us that weak states, like Afghanistan, can pose as great a danger to our national interests as strong states. Poverty does not make poor people into terrorists and murderers. Yet poverty, weak institutions, and corruption can make weak states vulnerable to terrorist networks and drug cartels within their borders. (White House 2006)

Around 1 billion people, including some 340 million of the world’s poorest people, are estimated to live in a group of between 30 and 50 ‘fragile’ countries, most of which are in Africa. There is a current international consensus that, without better and more international engagement, these countries will continue to provide insecure environments for their populations. One core approach is therefore to construct states that can then be treated as members of the international community, can be held to account for their actions and can provide security for their populations. The key, however, may not be just in constructing institutions, particularly effective security institutions, in the absence of development activities, or political or governance developments.

This development of ‘meaningful governance’ links with the human security end of the spectrum where the emphasis is far more on security of the individual rather than the state. This also recognizes that dysfunctional states may be the chief source of insecurity for some citizens. Security institutions may be useful, but should a police officer concentrate on maintaining security of a state or regime, or should he/she offer day-to-day security to an individual on the ground?

Human security, as anything other than a negative comment on state-centric approaches, remains somewhat difficult to pin down as a concept, particularly in terms of the policy implications of taking a human security approach. In practice this has really meant emphasizing
participation in, and local ownership of, state building – in other words an altered approach to state building rather than a completely different set of policies. This is currently being developed in terms of hybridity and the recognition of ‘non-state actors’ who have not traditionally been included in conventional approaches to the state.

Such ideas are also closely related to ideas of ‘peace’ that go beyond narrow definitions of the absence of war to incorporate ideas around ‘positive peace’, or where individuals do not experience violence, the fear of violence or structural violence (Galtung 1996). This latter emphasis on structural violence in particular brings in a key role for development. If societal, economic and political structures are capable of inflicting violence, then it follows that the creation of a non-violent society involves deep structural change – or development – a theme picked up by the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) in their core concept of human security. Ending structural violence means creating a situation where the life chances of an individual and their ability to live a full, productive and happy existence are not curtailed by the political, cultural, social and economic structures of the society in which they live.

This then is a far more holistic view of security and it closely resonates with a holistic definition of development. Achieving human security through positive peace entails development and the transformation of institutional and social structures at the local, national and international level with the aim of positively affecting an individual’s life chances. This also chimes closely with Sen’s ideas of development as freedom and implies that actors that could be empowered by such an approach not only include the state, but also individuals, local groups, civil society groups and any organization engaged in an individual’s social life (Sen 1999).

Recognizing development as a tool for promoting human security necessitates a system-wide approach, mindful of how the initiatives of these multi-level actors may cause particular types of insecurity for specific groups and also the consequences of their interaction. It is this approach that informs the World Development Report 2011. The preamble describes insecurity as the ‘primary development challenge of our time’ (World Bank 2011: 1) and notes that at that time no low-income fragile or conflict-affected state had yet achieved a Millennium Development Goal. It also emphasizes the difference between poverty levels between conflict-affected states and the rest (ibid.: 4) and also the importance of conflict prevention in post-conflict contexts, arguing that very few countries are truly ‘post conflict’ and noting that every state in which civil war began since 2003 had experienced a prior civil war. The
notion of structural violence that leads to recurrence has therefore become mainstream.

THE DIALOGUE BETWEEN DEVELOPMENT AND SECURITY

It is an oft-cited truism that there can be ‘no development without security and no security without development’, but this rather glib comment hides a series of interlocking debates about these heavily contested concepts. Accounts of this relationship vary and different definitions of the ‘security-development nexus’ require critical interrogation. Those attempting to appreciate how the nexus manifests in various developing states and societies must identify the understandings which underpin particular explanations of the relationship. Despite the context-specific nature of the security–development relationship, there have been a few more or less successful attempts to create broad theoretical frameworks which identify how these concepts are linked across different case studies.

Duffield (2001) lays out an emerging system of global governance, or ‘political complexes’, created to deal with a growing range of threats to the security of the ‘North’ emanating from the underdeveloped and insecure ‘South’. Reflecting on the incorporation of war into development discourse, he argues that the politics of development has become ‘radicalised’, and that this is characterized by ‘the willingness within mainstream policy to contemplate the transformation of societies as a whole’. Furthermore, he asserts that this radicalization ‘derives its urgency from a new security framework that regards the modalities of underdevelopment as dangerous’ (Duffield 2001: 22). In this analysis, Northern states and institutions have identified underdevelopment in the South as a threat to global security, particularly as it is regarded as providing a permissive environment for the growth of shadow economies and, importantly in recent years, opportunities for rebels, terrorists and agents of disorder to exist and grow unchecked. As such, the North attempts to fundamentally transform developing, and especially African, societies to create security and stability, in a policy characterized as ‘enlightened self-interest’. The relationship between security and development in this analysis is therefore visible at the international and sub-national level. The security that is most important is that of the North, as a bloc and as individual states, and, to this end, technologies of development are employed to turn developing states into modern liberal
states (see below) or to discipline and provide containment and surveillance of potential threats.

This analysis, however, fails to account fully for important aspects of conflict in the developing world. In particular, the focus on global complexes significantly downplays the role of the region in shaping security and development at the state and sub-state level. It is increasingly recognized that aspects of instability and insecurity in a state’s immediate region or neighbourhood, as well as local geography, have a significant impact on security within those individual states. Weak states existing in conflict-affected regions are often unable or unwilling to control their borders, essentially constituting de jure states which exist in law but are unable to extend their reach across their territory. These failures of governance and state control, or at a minimum the failure of states to control their borders, have a significant impact on how conflict develops in such regions, influencing the means by which combatants sustain themselves, the ability of centralized state military forces to tackle conflict, and the success of strategies for achieving conflict resolution. The importance of regional dynamics is especially clear when looking at two regional conflict complexes in sub-Saharan Africa, the wars in central Africa (1996–2003) which drew in eight surrounding states, and West African conflicts centring on Sierra Leone, Guinea and Liberia.

The inability of these states to enforce their borders effectively means that such regions are fluid, and conflicts and underdevelopment in one state have frequently and significantly affected the others. This is partly a reflection of historical development of the border regions as sites of contested sovereignty or areas which have felt little control and influence from the centralized state. As much as the global and the local, an appreciation of the historical and contemporary dynamics which define the region in which a conflict takes place is therefore crucial in analysing that conflict and its implications for security and development.

Where Duffield adopts what could be considered a critical international political economy approach, Stewart’s analysis (2006) approaches security and development from a different perspective. She identifies three possible connections between security and development that engage in a circular relationship: the immediate impact of security/insecurity on well-being and consequently development achievements (or the ways in which security forms part of the definition of development) – i.e., security’s role as part of our objectives; the way that insecurity affects (non-security) elements of development and economic growth, or the security instrumental role; and the way in which development affects security, or the development instrumental role.
Such a circular and interrelated set of processes is closely associated with the labelling of older processes as security threats, hence becoming ‘new security threats’. This approach is closely associated with a process identified by the Copenhagen School of international relations scholars as ‘securitization’, whereby the process of defining something in terms of its impact on security leads to the legitimizing of particular strategies for tackling that threat. Abrahamsen’s work, for example, sees securitization as being a form of legitimating the reallocation of UK aid funding towards security sector reform and away from traditional development activities, accompanied by a shift in the discourse about Africa away from humanitarianism and towards a discourse of risk, fear and threat (Abrahamsen, 2004).

In the end, attempts to characterize the links between security and development therefore display both similarities and differences, reflecting the preoccupations and theoretical standpoints of particular authors, but these analyses also suggest differing responses to a range of key questions which this book seeks to unpack: who is security for; what is being secured; and how best can security be achieved to facilitate development? Further, what type of development is being promoted, who benefits from it, and how might it contribute to improving or diminishing security elsewhere and for particular groups? The debate about security and development retains a sense of circularity, whatever the theoretical standpoint of the authors or policy makers.

HISTORY, THE STATE AND SECURITY DEVELOPMENT

Contemporary approaches to security and development owe much (not always acknowledged) to the historical evolution of the relationship under colonialism, but perhaps more particularly in the post-colonial moment where tensions between security of the system of states and the security of individual citizens were severely tested. Specifically, the advent of the Cold War meant that the state itself became a prize resource, not only because it represented the main source of income for states where economies were in trouble, but also because the external support provided by either side allowed a certain degree of impunity for the elites that controlled them as long as they toed one line or another.

The effects of decolonization and the emergence of post-colonial states had implications for the types of states that emerged and the international systems that incorporated them, but, above all, they had implications for the people within those states as human security was entirely subsumed...
with security of states and regimes during the Cold War. As Jackson points out the ‘quasi-states’ that emerged from this had ‘the same external rights and responsibilities as other states’. However, they lack empirical statehood, which requires ‘an organised power to protect human rights or provide socio-economic welfare’ (Jackson 1990: 21).

The survival of such apparently weak states is argued by Jackson to be a product of changing norms within the international community. In the post-independence period, these norms precluded colonization and conquest to subjugate or administer weak states, and instead led to their being treated in some regards as international protectorates. This portrayal shows African states in particular as weak, their policies reacting primarily to the external influences on them, overwhelmingly dependent for their very survival on the vagaries of international norms and the support of the international community. However, the notion of quasi-states also highlighted the importance of the principles of non-intervention in the internal affairs of other states and respect for sovereignty that formed the basis for African interstate relations.

Free from interstate aggression, and direct external intervention as a result of the Cold War stand-off, African regimes focused on countering domestic challenges to their position, sometimes with extreme brutality. Human security thus ended up very low on the agenda.

The continued historical relevance of these structures is highlighted by Bayart (2000), when he points out that elite politics from the colonial to post-colonial periods, and then in to the Cold War, is constructed on security of specific regimes that need to satisfy two main constituencies in order to survive: an external donor or supporter who continues to provide largesse in return for political loyalty; and a domestic set of dependents who enjoy the patronage of the government. Critically this latter group usually includes the security architecture.

In such a regime, one can see clearly the effect of the withdrawal of Cold War support and the ending of the international largesse for elites. A breakdown on one side of this equation led to an inability to satisfy the domestic supporters, or at least part of them. This then led to some extremely harsh decisions coupled with an inability to manage the internal politics of states and disaffection by various factions as they scrambled to an ever-decreasing pool of resources. In this situation the state itself ceases to be a politically neutral structure and becomes just another resource, with the corrupted institutions of the state and supporting security services as simply one of a number of different factions contesting sovereignty and affecting the security environment.

The state thus remains central to the concerns of much security and development, even if it is the absence of an effective state that is the core
issue. In the analysis of most donors, including in the *World Development Report 2011*, such states, or polities, are unable to exercise effective security provision for their people, either through an absence of power in the face of armed violence, or as a result of weak or dysfunctional governance that relies on violence and repression that supports an elite desperate to hang on to power.

This then implies that development, security and politics need to operate hand in hand if both security and development are to be realized. The *World Development Report 2011* has been one part of a move to incorporate security and development more broadly, but perhaps one other initiative that shows the link clearly is the ‘New Deal’ signed in 2011.

In 2008, donors and a group of fragile and conflict-affected states, known as the G7, launched the International Dialogue on Peacebuilding and Statebuilding. This initiative reflected both the large amounts of aid going to these states and the likelihood that many of them would fail to meet any of the MDGs by 2015. They argued that to do so they would need to work towards building peace and security and building the capacity and legitimacy of their states in order to improve development outcomes. The initial G7 were joined by other fragile states, becoming the G7+, and in 2011 at the High Level Forum on Aid Effectiveness in Busan this group put forward proposals for a ‘New Deal for Engagement in Fragile States’, based on five peace-building and state building goals:

- **Legitimate politics**: foster inclusive political settlements and conflict resolution.
- **Security**: establish and strengthen people’s security.
- **Economic foundations**: generate employment and improve livelihoods.
- **Justice**: address injustices and increase people’s access to justice.
- **Revenue and services**: manage revenues and build capacity for accountable and fair social services delivery.

This is clearly linked to an ongoing set of developments that led to the *World Development Report 2011*, particularly on its emphasis on governance and development issues over just supporting security institutions themselves. In short, the *World Development Report 2011* and the New Deal both represent attempts to bring security and development together with broader processes of peace-building and state building.
LIBERAL PEACE-BUILDING AS THE CURRENT DOMINANT PARADIGM

This brings us to the predominant framework of state building as a mode of linking security and development: the much criticized paradigm of liberal peace-building. Since the 1990s, development and security have been dominated by successive attempts to define and find ways of developing liberal states. Partly driven by the end of the Cold War, this has been part of the shift away from state security and towards human security as perceived as the realization of human potential (Fukuyama 1993). As with the notions of development and security, there remains much debate as to what constitutes a liberal state. However, at its most basic we can consider the liberal state to be an attempt to enshrine, through particular political, economic and social frameworks, the values associated with liberalism, particularly individual freedom. If we accept that liberal values of individual freedom and equity are the ideological underpinning of the liberal state, the question is then what forms of political and economic organization are believed to be best suited to incorporate these values.

In this field the work of Paris (2004) provides perhaps one of the clearest expositions of the features of the liberal state and its place in an international community. In his analysis of international attempts to build peace after civil war, liberalization – the process of creating a liberal state – is seen to incorporate two key aspects: democratization and marketization. Between them these are seen to provide a path to sustainable peace and security, though Paris questions their applicability to such a wide range of contexts and in states with very different experiences of conflict. He goes on to argue:

Decades from now, historians may look back on the immediate post-Cold War years as a period of remarkable faith in the powers of liberalization to remedy a broad range of social ills, from internal and international violence to poverty, famine, corruption, and even environmental destruction. (Paris 2004: 35)

Note that liberal states require an international order of liberal states in order to flourish, not least as part of an international market, further encouraging trade and integration over conflict. This overarching global architecture requires law and regulation (which guarantees peace) and the ceding of sovereignty by the state, but also to the state by citizens, who expect a similar domestic regime of law. Note also that this is not seen as
giving up power, but as investing sovereignty in global structures to attain things beyond the power of individual states.

As part of this liberal drive, development plays a key role in developing democracy and markets, the aim being to create forms of the liberal state that provide the same wide range of benefits enjoyed by people living in developed liberal states. However, there is considerable concern over a ‘one size fits all’ model. For one thing, European states are not the same, and also clearly differ from Japan and the US, which rather begs the question of why would the West try to impose a single model on widely diverse local contexts?

At the same time, scholars such as Pugh (2005) have emphasized the divisive and intrusive effects of market liberalization, whilst Collier (2009) amongst others highlights the dangers of pursuing party-based democracy in immediate post-conflict or fragile environments. Both underpinning pillars of liberalism – marketization and democracy – are therefore contentious and highly political, and yet may be problematized by policy makers based on previous experience and therefore subject to resistance or spoilers. In the end, a programme based on liberal state building through these two processes may well lead to violence and conflict rather than to improvements in security.

LIBERAL IDEOLOGY AND LIBERAL PEACE

Liberal ideology can be reduced to four core themes: individualism (assertion of individuals over social collectivities); egalitarianism (moral equivalence of individuals); universalism (moral unity having primacy over historical association or cultural forms); and meliorism (belief in the ability to improve all political and social institutions). All of these elements surround the core principle of individual freedom. Thus a liberal peace exists when all of the above constitute normal social relations. For peace to exist, justice and liberty are required, and the liberal political arrangements that make this possible are seen as inherently peaceful. Critically, democracy and capitalism are viewed as the vehicles for peaceful competition underlying liberal structures where even groups that do not hold power can have faith in a system that does not oppress their beliefs.

To these normative foundations of liberalism can be added a belief in universal human rights as being the right to freedom from arbitrary authority, the social rights necessary to protect and promote freedom, and the right to democratic participation to protect the first two.
This has led to a number of important developments in terms of peace-building, not least the idea that a post-Westphalian international liberal peace requires non-liberal states to be liberalized in order for that peace to become sustainable. Consequently, the chief aim of peace operations and intervention, as will be discussed, changes from creating negotiated solutions between states to actively contributing to the construction of liberal states, economies and social structures intended to spread liberal democratic political structures. It is this idea that Mark Duffield claims lies behind the merger of security and development policy and the re-problematization of security as both the result and the precondition of development more broadly (Duffield 2001).

A further expression of the pacific and international nature of the liberal peace is the idea that human rights are universal and that they should be enforced as such, regardless of the wishes of states. The Rome Statute not only developed this idea further by outlining a consensus on universal human values but also created an international legal mechanism for independent enforcement of those values – the International Criminal Court (ICC).

The development of liberal states requires particular prescriptions in the realms of political development that aim to create a state which can take its place in an international system alongside other liberal states. This appears to lend itself to the state-centric notion of security, with its emphasis on the creation of institutions that can oversee and administer the territory of a given state and reproduce themselves in a sustainable and peaceful way. Such a state requires at the most basic level a monopoly on the use of force within its territory: that the violence produced by the state is legitimate and seen as such by citizens who have consented to be governed. However, in a context of often limited resources, developing states have looked to the organizations of the international community or to particular partner states for funds and technical support to enhance their security forces and achieve this monopoly of force.

During the Cold War, the ruling elites in states considered by the superpowers to be of strategic value received military support, training and aid to build up forces to maintain their position, often against ideologically defined insurgent movements. From Mozambique and Angola in Africa to Nicaragua and Costa Rica in Central America, groups sought to define their struggles against incumbent regimes in terms of the ideological East–West confrontation. Similarly, former colonial powers such as France provided military support to elites in what were previously their colonies as part of a broader strategy to retain influence.
Once the Cold War ended, as we have seen, there was an upsurge in civil conflict partly as a result of the various armed groups left behind, but also as a result of the power struggles over state resources outlined above. These ranged from state military forces and elite republican or presidential guards associated with the ruling regime to paramilitary groups, insurgent forces, local defence forces, foreign fighters, and ethnically and geographically defined militias. Whether formal or informal, these forces and the individuals that comprise them have become key actors in many developing and post-conflict states, where state provision of security is poor or the state has a history of violence against its people.

A key challenge to the creation of liberal states in the developing world has therefore been the complex nature and composition of the security sector, broadly defined, and its incorporation into a functioning, democratically accountable security sector. This has been partly attempted through comprehensive reforms like security sector reform, but latterly also in considering the legitimacy of non-state actors across the localities, including violent actors, justice mechanisms and thematic groups like women, and former combatant and youth groups.

The historical context of politics in many developing states, outlined earlier, suggests that, even if this model of a democratic, accountable, transparent and capable security sector exists in parts of the West, it cannot simply be exported to developing states. In developing and fragile states the ability of the state to control events within its sovereign space is often lacking, or, as seen earlier, the provision of security and the exercise of force is distorted by political economies based on predation and patrimonialism. Power and violence have frequently been exercised by a ruling elite, elected or otherwise, to maintain their own position and against citizens, either as a whole or as particular groups defined by ethnicity, geography, political affiliation or other markers of identity. Given a historically grounded understanding of power in such developing states, international efforts to support the development of security forces and their capabilities and institutions to regulate and oversee them can therefore be rendered extremely problematic. This takes us back to the key questions about whose security is being served by the development of security capabilities within states.

In this way, focusing on the security apparatus of developing states takes us back to the circularity of the discussions between Duffield and Stewart outlined above. On one hand, poor states are identified as a threat to the international order of states, but, on the other, there is also recognition that security cannot properly exist without underlying developmental change and a degree of human security – at least in the absence
of supporting repressive autocracies. Even here, the Arab Spring has done much to illustrate that even supposedly stable autocracies are, in fact, relatively unstable. Building up a state’s security capacity in a context of limited political oversight and weak state institutions creates conditions which may result in abuse of human rights by security forces and governments or even a higher threat of coup and conflict.

Liberal approaches are therefore seen as the only viable way forward, even if they are also perceived as imperfect and problematic. Indeed, international assistance for security is met with a degree of scepticism. Engagement with security forces, though not traditionally a focus of development, is now regarded as crucial for enhancing human security and creating an environment in which development can take place. The question then becomes how the development aspects of security sector reform can be achieved, focusing specifically on accountability, the development of civil society and enhancing democratic/civil control over armed forces. The security sector is envisaged in the model of the liberal state as a series of institutions, alongside others targeted under a programme of state building, that operate in a transparent and accountable way and can therefore mediate or negate the possible dangers of capture and abuse by political elites. Historical experience, though, has demonstrated the inventive and systematic way in which international assistance has been successfully subverted to the personal agendas of ruling elites, and this suggests that any ‘one size fits all’ approach to securing the liberal state will remain problematic.

BIBLIOGRAPHY

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