

# Index

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- accounting practices, construction sector 32
- Acemoglu, D. 88, 161
- Aceron, J. 62, 66
- administration culture, development aid 191–2
- Afghan Central Bank (DAB) 177, 179–83
- Afghanistan *see* banking sector
- Africa, judiciary 70–72
- African National Congress (ANC) 71
- Afrobarometer 68, 83–5, 88, 103
- Ahmed, N. 141
- airport infrastructure, Spain 131–3
- Akram, S.M. 142
- Al-Kasim, F. 53
- Albalete, D. 129–31
- Alves, A.C. 148
- Amundsen, I. 140–42, 145
- Anderson, D.M. 86
- Andresen, A.F. 186
- Andvig, J.C. 85, 88–9
- Angola
- extractive sectors 53
  - see also* national reconstruction
- Annan, K. 165, 168
- Argentina, justice system 71
- Arvis, J.-F. 37
- Asia–Pacific region, judiciary 70
- Association of Construction Companies
- at the National Level (SEOPAN) 135
- Asuni, J.B. 50
- Ateneo School of Government, Philippines 66
- Attila, G. 89
- Automated System for Customs Data (ASYCUDA) 43
- Awami League (AL), Bangladesh 140, 143, 145–6
- Azizi Bank 179–80
- Baeza, M.A. 132
- Baines, S. 60, 64
- Baker, R. 47
- Bangalore Principles for Judicial Conduct 74
- Bangladesh
- justice system 68
  - see also* political positions sale
- Bangladesh Nationalist Party (BNP) 145
- Bangladesh Parliament House Rule 188(2) 141–2
- banking sector
- breaking scandal 179–80
  - creative banking 177–8
  - electoral funding 178–9
  - money for fake companies 179
  - policy lessons 183–4
  - pressure for reform 180–81
  - protective policies 181–3
- Barasa, T. 85, 88
- Bayart, J. 153
- Bel, G. 129, 131
- Benari, G. 51
- Besley, T. 104
- Bhattacharyya, S. 48
- Bhattbhatt, K.K. 186
- Bijlert, M. 178
- Boone, J. 178
- Borghì, J. 103
- Bourgouin, F. 168
- Boyce, J.K. 47
- Brautigam, D. 148
- Brazilian Development Bank 151
- Bridge, G. 50

- Brockington, D. 193  
 Brockman, C. 27–8  
 bureaucratic corruption, compared to  
   police corruption 85–6  
 Burkino Faso, education sector 58  
 businessmen, in political positions  
   140–43
- Cameroon, port sector 35, 37, 40–41, 43  
 Campbell, B. 50  
 Cardozo, A. 41  
 cargo dwell times 35–43  
 Carlisle, T. 48  
 cartels  
   construction sector 29–30  
   health sector 121  
   port sector 35, 38  
 Casas-Zamora, K. 165  
 Castells, P. 135  
 Central Independent Monitoring Unit  
   (CIMU), Indonesia 60, 64  
 Chabal, P. 153  
 Chartered Institute of Building (CIOB),  
   UK 30  
 Cheng, C.S. 175–6  
 Cheru, F. 168  
 China Export–Import (China Exim)  
   Bank 148–9, 154, 156–7  
   compared to other Angolan creditors  
   150–51  
 China International Bank 150  
 Chingaipe, H. 96  
 Chinsinga, B. 94–6  
 Chirwa, E.W. 97  
 Chua, Y.T. 62  
 citizen mobility, Kenya 86–7, 90  
 citizen-to-citizen grabbing 83–4, 86–90  
 civil servants, per diem payments  
   196–204  
 civil society, role in prevention of land  
   transfers 100  
 Clearing and Forwarding (C&F)  
   profession 37–8, 41  
 colonial rule  
   impact on land tenure 93–4  
   impact on policing 86–7  
 Columbia *see* public health insurance  
   funds
- community involvement, management  
   process 64  
 competitive tender system 26–8  
 conflict of interests 135, 141–3  
 confrontational politics, Bangladesh  
   145  
 Conroy-Krutz, J. 165–6  
 Conservative Party (Partido Popular),  
   Spain 133–5  
 Constitution  
   Angola 154–5  
   Colombia 116  
 construction sector  
   bribery and collusion 28–30  
   checks and balances, compromises  
     and informal systems 30–31  
   competitive tender system 26–8  
   delivering construction projects 24–6  
   policy options 31–2  
   and transport infrastructure 133–6  
 Construction Sector Transparency  
   (CoST) Initiative 26, 28, 31  
 Consumer Price Index (CPI), Uganda  
   166–7  
 container terminal operators 36–9  
 contracts  
   awards based on past performance  
     31–2  
   extractive sectors 50–51  
   bribery to win 28–9  
   collusion to allocate 29–30  
   renegotiation 26–7  
 Contraloría General de la Nación,  
   Colombia 120  
 contributive health insurance 115–16  
 Controller and Auditor General (CAG),  
   Tanzania 188, 190  
 Cooksey, B. 186, 196  
 corporate donations, political parties  
   144  
 Corruption Perception Index (CPI) 141  
 corruption, definition 3  
 cost estimates, construction projects  
   27–8  
 ‘cost-plus’ contracts 32  
 crime and policing  
   by thieves, robbers and the powerful  
     84

- and colonial origins of policing 86–7
- and economic development 87–8
- extent of 83–4
- police and regular bureaucratic grabbing compared 85–6
- and police corruption 85
- policy options 89–90
- Croese, S. 151
- customary land, Malawi 93–9
- customs agencies/brokers 36–40, 43
- customs auction practices 38, 43
  
- Daloz, J. 153
- Dar es Salaam port 35
- Davis, J. 28–9
- De Beer, H. 153
- Democratic Republic of the Congo, extractive sectors 48–50
- Department of Education, Culture and Sports (DECS), Philippines 61–2, 66
- ‘design-build’ approach 32
- Deutsche Bank 150–51
- development aid
  - administration culture 191–2
  - Afghanistan 175–7, 180–83
  - analysis of problems 190–94
  - contextual understanding 192–3
  - corruption, fraud and theft 187–8
  - fighting corruption in future-oriented perspective 193–4
  - focus on implementation 190–91
  - independent reviews 194
  - Norwegian Embassy’s reactions to corruption 188–90
  - pipeline problems and heavy workload 191
  - recipient responsibility principle 190
- diamond industry 48–9, 53–4
- disciplinary system, judiciary 75
- discretionary allowances, civil servants 199
- donor-funded training, compensation payments 187, 198, 200, 202–3
- Dorée, A.G. 30
- Dos Santos, President 152–6
- Douala port 35, 37–8, 43
- Doward, J. 51
- Downes, P. 65
- Drew, D. 28
- drug cost reimbursement, Colombia 117–24
- Dubosse, N. 148
- Durban port 35, 42
- Durkheim, E. 88
  
- Easterly, W. 192
- economic impact
  - crime and police corruption 87–9
  - electoral spending 166–7
  - national reconstruction 155–7
  - rents extractive in port sector 40–42
  - resource grabbing 54
  - transport infrastructure 130
- Education Management Information Systems (EMIS) 60–63
- education sector
  - explanatory factors 62–4
  - ghost teachers 60–61
  - policy options 64–6
  - school reconstruction 59–60
  - textbook industry 61–2
- Egypt, extractive sectors 48
- Election Commission
  - Bangladesh 144
  - Uganda 164
- elections
  - Afghanistan 178–9
  - Angola 155
  - impact of resource advantages on outcomes 165–6
  - increasing electoral quality 168
  - post-election inflation and protests 166–7
  - use of candidate application fees 143–4
  - use of public resources for electoral campaigns 161–5
- Empresas Promotoras de Salud (EPS)*, Colombia 115–18, 120–22
- Technical–Scientific Committees 116, 118, 121, 123
- environmental issues 47, 98
- equity versus transparency 65
- estate sector, Malawi 94–8

- Ethiopia, per diem payments 197–8, 200–203
- Europe, judiciary 70
- Extractive Industry Transparency Initiative 53, 100
- extractive sectors
- corruption 47–8, 52–3
  - illegal resource exploitation 47, 49–50
  - international anti-corruption initiatives 53–4
  - resource grabbing risks 52–3
  - tax evasion 47, 50–53
- Faccio, M. 135
- Fahim, Abdul Haseen 177–8, 181–2
- Fahmy, Sameh 48
- Fajnzylber, P. 88
- fake companies 179
- Falkingham, J. 103
- Farnood, Sherkhan 177–83
- Federación Médica Colombiana (FMC) 117–18, 120, 122
- Ferozi, Khalilullah 177, 180, 182–3
- Filkins, D. 177
- financial regulation, judiciary 72
- First Quantum Minerals 51
- Fitrat, Abdul Qadir 179–82
- Fjeldstad, O.-H. 85, 201
- Fondo de Solidaridad y Garantía del Sistema General de Seguridad Social en Salud (FOSYGA)* 115–24
- Fontana, A. 48
- Foreign Corrupt Practices Act 36
- foreign donations, political parties 143–4
- foreign investment
- Angola 157
  - extractive sectors 50
  - land 97–8, 100
- forest and climate programme (REDD+), Tanzania 189–90
- Fortis Bank 150
- Franco regime, Spain 134–5
- Freedom House 198
- freight forwarders 36–9, 42
- Futungistas* elite, Angola 152–4, 156–7
- Gamba, V. 153
- Garzón, Baltasar 73
- gas industry 36, 46, 48
- Gastrow, P. 49
- Ghana, construction sector 28–30
- ghost health-care institutions 119
- ghost teachers 58, 60–61
- Gibb, R. 166–7
- Gillies, A. 47
- Glencore 51
- Global Competitiveness Report (GCR) 130–31
- Global Witness 50, 54, 154
- Gloppen, S. 71–2, 76–7
- Golub, S. 70
- governance, lessons learned 14–17
- Government Watch, Philippines 61–2
- government facilities, use in election campaigns 163–4
- government officials, as source of election funding 164–5
- government-funded training, compensation systems 198
- government, role in prevention of land transfers 99–100
- grabbing
- definition 1–3
  - lessons for governance and sector regulation 14–17
  - overview of case studies 4–14
- Great Recession, impact in Spain 130
- Hallak, J. 59, 63–4
- Hamming, L. 61
- Hardoon, D. 23
- Hasanuzzaman, A.M. 143–5
- health sector payments
- discussion and policy options 110–12
  - literature on salaries and informal payments 104–5
  - research data 105–8
  - research results 108–10
  - see also* public health insurance funds
- health, right to 116, 118, 123
- Heinrich, F. 23
- Helle, S.-E. 163, 165–6
- Herbst, J. 153
- Higgins, A. 177

- High Office of Oversight and  
Anti-Corruption, Afghanistan 179,  
182
- Hodler, R. 48
- Hogan, M. 103
- Holden, S. 93, 95, 98
- Hollingshead, A. 51
- Holmstrom, B. 111
- Hsaio, W. 115
- Huffman, M. 177, 179–80
- human resource policies, port sector 43
- Human Rights Watch 198
- Huntington, S.P. 88
- Hussmann, K. 116, 119, 122
- Hyden, G. 192
- Iarossi, G. 89
- IBEX–35 135
- Igbanugo, H.A. 36
- illegal exploitation, extractive sectors  
47–50, 52–3
- import/export companies 36–9
- incumbent parties electoral funding  
162–5
- Independent Election Commission,  
Afghanistan 178
- India Exim Bank 150–51
- Indonesia  
education sector 59–60, 62–4  
extractive sectors 48
- inflation, Uganda 166–7
- informal payments, health sector  
103–12
- informal practices, construction sector  
25–6, 30–31
- information asymmetry 37–9
- infrastructure investment, Angola  
148–57
- Institute for Technical Evaluations of  
Medical Supplies, Colombia 123
- Institution of Civil Engineering, UK 32
- institutional weakness, Spain 131–3
- Integrity Watch Afghanistan 176
- International Bar Association 74
- International Commission of Jurists  
(ICJ) 73–5
- international donors, role in land  
transfers 100
- international initiatives, resource  
grabbing 53–4
- International Institute for Educational  
Planning (IIEP–UNESCO) 59
- International Monetary Fund (IMF) 40,  
148, 154  
Extended Credit Facility Programme  
180–82
- international players, grabbing due to  
interaction with 12–14
- Isaksen, J. 53
- Izama, A. 165
- Jahan 141–2, 145
- Jansen, E.G. 188, 196
- judicial appointments 71, 75–6
- judicial hierarchy, undue influence via  
72–3
- judicial independence  
addressing corruption 73–7  
corruption charges and disciplining  
judges 73  
implications of corruption 69–72
- Judicial Integrity Group (JIG) 74
- judiciary, Spain 130
- Kabul Bank 177–84
- Kabundi, A. 167
- Kambewa, D. 95
- Kangamungazi, E. 51
- Kanyongolo, F.E. 94, 97
- Karim, S. 66
- Karzai, Hamid 175, 177–82
- Kasimbazi, E. 71, 77
- Kaufmann, D. 131
- Kelsall, T. 168
- Kenya  
construction sector 25–6  
*see also* policing
- Khan, M.M. 141
- Kimberley Process 49
- Kodi, M. 47
- Kolstad, I. 48
- Korea Exim Bank 150
- Ladbury, S. 28–31
- Laffont, J.J. 17
- land reforms, Malawi 93–5

- impact of corruption 98–100
- land transfers
  - background and context 93–4
  - consequences and distortions 97–9
  - Malawi 94–7
  - policy suggestions 99–100
- Latin America, judiciary 70, 72
- Law of Public Probity (2009), Angola 152
- Le Billon, P. 51, 53, 152
- legal procedures (*tutelas*), health access 116, 118–23
- legal profession, addressing attitudes towards bribery 74
- Leite, C. 48
- Levačić, R. 65
- Lilongwe Land Allocation Committee 95
- Lindkvist, I. 103, 105
- local empowerment versus accountability 65–6
- local influences versus social control 66
- local participation, national reconstruction 149–53, 155–7
- localization, decision-making procedures 63–4
- Logan, C. 165–6
- Lomé port 35
- Longley, C. 98
- low-salary hypothesis, informal payments 104–12
- low-tax jurisdictions 50–51
- loyalty, use of per diem payments 198, 202, 204
  
- McLaren, J. 104
- McPherson, C. 49, 53
- MacSearraigh, S. 49, 53
- Mæstad, O. 103, 105
- Makande Tea Estate 95, 97–8
- Makinana, A. 71
- Malawi
  - justice system 72
  - land transfers 93–100
  - per diem payments 197, 199–203
- Management of Natural Resources Programme (MNRP), Tanzania 186–94
  
- Mangani, R. 199
- Marques de Morais, R. 152, 155–6
- Masood, Ahmed Zia 178
- mass protests
  - Bangladesh 145
  - Uganda 167
- Matas, Jaime 134
- Matei, A. & L. 75
- maternal health care 103
- Mawenya, A.S. 29
- medical cost reimbursement, Colombia 116–24
- merit-based promotions, health sector 104–12
- Messiant, C. 155
- Migdal, J. 152–4
- Milgrom, P. 111
- millennium development goals (MDGs) 103
- Mills, G. 153
- Minister of Lands and Physical Planning, Malawi 94–7
- Ministry of Education, Sierra Leone 60–61, 63
- Ministry of Finance, Angola 148
- Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA), Norway 186, 189, 191–2, 194
- Ministry of Health, Colombia 116, 118–19, 121
- Ministry of Natural Resources and Tourism, Dar es Salaam 187–90
- Mkandawire, R.M. 94
- Molele, C. 71
- Mombasa port 35
- Mopani Copper Mines 51
- Mudeg, N.N. 89
- Mulcahy, S. 132
- Mulli Brothers 96
- Museveni, Yoweri K. 71, 161, 164, 166–7
- Mwakasungula, U. 95, 97–8
  
- National Audit Offices 201, 204
- national champions 135–6
- National Pharmaceutical Policy, Colombia 122
- national reconstruction

- contextualising policy framework 153–4
- future prospects 156
- policy options 157
- socio-economic and political dimensions 155–6
- subverting policy framework 149–53
- National Resistance Movement (NRM), Uganda 161–2
- funding for electoral campaigns 163–5
- National Union for the Total Independence of Angola (UNITA) 155
- Ndikumana, L. 47
- Netherlands, construction sector 30–31
- Ng'ong'ola, C. 94
- Nigeria
  - construction sector 28–30
  - extractive sectors 46, 48–50
  - port sector 35, 40–41
- Nijhof, A. 31
- North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) 175, 180, 183–4
- North, D.C. 17
- Norway *see* development aid
- Norwegian Embassy, Dar es Salaam 186–92
- Nyamu-Musembi, C. 70
- oil industry 36, 46–50, 53
- Olaizola Elordi, J. 134
- Olson, M. 17, 202
- Open Performance Review Appraisal Systems (OPRAS) 111
- opposition parties, election funding 162–5
- opposition politics, Bangladesh 145
- Orre, A. 154–5
- Ostrom, E. 17
- Oubda, F. 58
- Palan, R. 50
- Pamir Air 179–80
- Panalpina World Transport (Holding) Ltd./Panalpina US 36
- Paquete de Beneficios de Salud* (POS), Colombia 116–21
- parliamentary committees, Bangladesh 142–3
- Parliamentary Elections Act (2005), Uganda 163
- Partnership Africa Canada 54
- party nominations, Bangladesh 141–3
- patronage systems 48, 152–3, 156, 163–5
- Pawson, L. 155
- payment practices, construction sector 26–7
- peace-building, Afghanistan 175–7, 183–4
- People's Movement for the Liberation of Angola (MPLA) 155–6
- Peprah, I. 199
- per diems
  - control deficits 201
  - donor interests 187–8, 202–3
  - explanatory factors 200–203
  - grabbing in three countries 197–200
  - management problems 201–2
  - policy discussion 203–4
- performance contracts, port sector 43
- performance incentives, use of per diem payments 197–200, 202, 204
- performance monitoring, transport infrastructure 132–3
- performance-based pay systems 111–12, 204
- Peru
  - extractive sectors 51
  - justice system 68
- Peters, P. 95
- petty corruption, judicial system 69–70, 74–5
- pharmaceutical market deregulation 123
- Philippines
  - education sector 61–4, 66
  - extractive sectors 51
- Pinker, S. 2
- Pinto de Andrade, V. 153
- Pinto, D. 115
- 'pipeline problem', development aid 191
- Poisson, M. 59, 63–5
- policing

- extensiveness of police corruption 85
- impact of crime on economic development 87–8
- police corruption compared to bureaucratic corruption 85–6
- policy options 89–90
- rotation of officers 86–7, 90
- policy implications
  - banking sector 183–4
  - construction sector 31–2
  - development aid 194
  - education sector 64–6
  - electoral corruption 168
  - extractive sectors 53–4
  - health sector 122–4
  - informal payments 111–12
  - judiciary 73–7
  - land transfers 99–100
  - national reconstruction 157
  - per diem payments 203–4
  - policing and crime 89–90
  - political positions selling 145–6
  - port sector 42–3
- political bias, judiciary 70–72
- political connections, banking sector 177–80
- political dimensions, national reconstruction 155–6
- political donations, Bangladesh 143–6
- political grabbing and sector/state function performance 10–12
- political positions sale
  - policy options 145–6
  - politics as profit-making investment 141–3
  - weak regulatory framework 143–4
- political pressure, judiciary 75–7
- politics–construction relationship, Spain 133–6
- Port Authorities 36–9
- port infrastructure, Spain 130–33
- port sector
  - consequences of corruption 40–42
  - explanations for corruption 39–40
  - pervasiveness of corruption 36–9
  - policy options 42–3
- port storage tariffs 35, 38–40
- Portugal Cosec 150
- Presidential Commission of Inquiry on Land Policy Reform (PCILPR), Malawi 93, 99
- presidential elections
  - Afghanistan 178–9
  - Uganda 164
- Presidential Elections Act (2005), Uganda 163–4
- Presidential Elections (Amendment) Act (2010), Uganda 163
- Prevention and Combating of Corruption Bureau (PCCB), Tanzania 193
- principal–agent problems 201, 203
- procurement procedures
  - education sector 62
  - transport infrastructure 132–3
- Proex 151
- professional background, MPs 140–43
- property investments, banking sector 178–80
- property rights 84, 88
- protective politics, Afghanistan 181–3
- public health insurance funds
  - lack of action on rent-seeking 119–21
  - openness to rent-seeking 117–19
  - policy recommendations 122–4
  - strategies to combat corrupt practices 121–2
- public–private partnerships (PPPs) 133
- Publish What You Pay (PWYP) 54
- quality/quantity indicators, transport infrastructure 131–2
- Raballand, G. 35, 38–9, 42
- Rado, E.R. 26
- rail infrastructure, Spain 130, 132–4
- recipient responsibility principle, development aid 190
- Reed, Q. 48
- regime legitimacy, Angola 149, 152–6
- regulatory frameworks, Bangladesh 143–4
- Reinikka, R. 58
- Representation of the People (Amendment) Order Act (2009), Bangladesh 143



- Reserve Bank, Angola 153  
 resource curse 53  
 Revenue Watch Institute 54  
 road infrastructure, Spain 130, 132–3  
 Robinson, J.A. 161  
 Rose-Ackerman, S. 17, 201  
 Rumyantseva, N.L. 58  
 Russian Federation, judiciary 70, 73
- Saffu, Y. 162  
 salaries  
   as deterrent to informal payments  
     103–12  
   judiciary 72, 74, 76–7  
   use of per diem payments to  
     supplement 196–204
- Santander Bank 150  
 School Improvement Grants  
   Programme (SIGP), Indonesia  
     59–60, 64
- school reconstruction projects 59–60  
   factors conducive to corrupt practices  
     62–4  
   policy options 64–6
- sectors  
   effect of political grabbing on  
     performance 10–12  
   grabbing at level of 8–10  
   grabbing explained by characteristics  
     of 5–8  
   lessons learned for regulation of  
     14–17
- Shaheen Exchange 177, 179  
 Shaxson, N. 152  
 Sierra Leone, education sector 60–61,  
   63  
 signature bonuses 50  
 Sikka, P. 51
- Sistema Nacional de Precios de  
 Medicamentos*, (SISMED),  
 Colombia 121–2
- skill levels, health workers 104–12  
 smallholder farmers, Malawi 95–8  
 Smith, N. 58  
 Smith, S. 183  
 Soares de Oliveira, R. 153  
 ‘social contract’ 2–3  
 social control versus local influences 66  
 social regulations, failure to respect 49  
 socio-economic dimensions, national  
   reconstruction 155–6  
 Socialist Party, Spain 134–5  
 Sogge, D. 152  
 Solvit, S. 49  
 Songstad, N.G. 111  
 Søreide, T. 48, 53–4  
 South Africa  
   extractive sectors 49, 51  
   justice system 71  
   port sector 42
- South Asia, construction sector 29  
 Spain *see* transport infrastructure  
 Spanish Road Association (AEC) 132  
 Stansbury, N. 23  
 state function  
   effect of political grabbing on  
     performance 10–12  
   grabbing at level of 8–10  
   grabbing explained by characteristics  
     of 5–8
- Stavrou, A. 84  
 Steele, J. 178  
 Sub-Saharan Africa *see* port sector  
 subsidized health insurance 115–16  
 sugar plantations, Malawi 95–6  
 supply–demand mismatches, transport  
   sector 129–36
- Taguas, David 135  
 Taliban 175–6, 183–4  
 Tanzania  
   construction sector 28–9  
   development aid 186–94  
   health sector 105–10  
   per diem payments 197–203  
 Tanzania Civil Engineering Contractors  
   Association (TACECA) 28–9  
 tariff duties 36–40, 42  
 Tavistock Institute 25–6, 30  
 tax evasion, extractive sectors 47–8,  
   50–53  
 Taylor, G. 50, 53  
 teaching staff 60–61  
   factors conducive to corrupt practices  
     62–4  
   policy options 64–6

- Tema port 35  
 tenure, judiciary 71, 73, 76  
 Textbook Count Consortium,  
   Philippines 66  
 textbook industry 61–2  
   factors conducive to corrupt practices  
     62–4  
   policy options 64–6  
 Therkildsen, O. 168  
 Tirole, J. 17  
 tokenism 154  
 Tokyo Declaration (2012) 183  
 trade diversification, impact corruption  
   41–2  
 traditional authorities, Malawi 94–8,  
   100  
 training programmes, compensation  
   systems 196–204  
 transfer mispricing 51  
 transparency versus equity 65  
 Transparency International (TI) 48,  
   68–70, 74, 85, 90, 130–32, 142,  
   144–5  
   Bribe Payer's Index 23  
 transport infrastructure  
   background in Spain 130–31  
   institutions and Spain's transport  
     policy 131–3  
   politics and construction behind  
     133–6  
 transport subsidies 133  
 travel compensation systems 196–204  
 Trillas, F. 135  
 Trivers, R. 2  
 Truex, R. 17, 54  
 Tumushabe, G.W. 165  
 Tunisia, justice system 73  
 Uganda  
   education sector 58  
   justice system 71, 76–7  
   *see also* elections  
 UK, construction sector 25, 30, 32  
 United Nations Office on Drugs and  
   Crime (UNODC) 84–5  
 Van de Walle, N. 154  
 Van Rijckeghem, C. 104  
 Vassallo, J.M. 132  
 Vian, T. 103, 196  
 victimization studies 83–5, 88–9  
 victimless crime 86  
 Villoria, M. 131  
 Weder, B. 104  
 Weidmann, J. 48  
 Wells, E.J. 25–6  
 Wilkerson, M. 165  
 Williams, A. 47  
 Williamson, O.E. 17  
 Willmott, H. 51  
 World Bank (WB) 49, 74, 95, 130–31  
   integrity department (INT) 29  
 Zakilwal, Omar 178  
 Zambia  
   extractive sectors 51  
   justice system 72  
 zero-tolerance for corruption principle  
   189