INTRODUCTION

Representative democracies all share a common concern: in order to maintain stability, viability and legitimacy, one pivotal source – political trust – may not run dry. There is widespread conviction that a reservoir of political trust helps preserve fundamental democratic achievements in times of economic, social and political crises. Similarly, a citizenry that puts trust in the competence and commitment of its elected representatives as well as in the effectiveness of political institutions facilitates the implementation of policies even when disagreeing with them. Political trust thus functions as the glue that keeps the system together and as the oil that lubricates the policy machine.

Mistrust, or rather political scepticism, plays an equally important role in representative democracy. Critical citizens are more likely to engage in political activities and to keep office-holders accountable. When mistrust turns into widespread distrust and cynicism, then the quality of democratic representation itself may change. Disenchanted citizens may decide to withdraw from politics altogether – resulting in even more disenchantment – or provide fertile ground for the emergence of anti-system political parties. Ultimately, politicians and scholars fear that the very survival of representative democracy and its institutions may be at stake when political trust turns into widespread distrust and cynicism.

These convictions are not unique to our times. As early as in 1975, after the so-called Trilateral Commission was formed to discuss common problems facing Japan, North America and Western Europe, one of the commission’s first reports – The Crisis of Democracy by Michel Crozier, Samuel Huntington and Joji Watanuki – set off a debate on what the authors called ‘the increasing delegitimation of authority’ in liberal democracies. The authors warned about the consequences of the rise of ‘anomic democracy’:

Dissatisfaction with and lack of confidence in the functioning of the institutions of democratic government have thus now become widespread in Trilateral countries. Yet with all this dissatisfaction, no significant support has yet developed for any alternative image of how to organize the politics of a highly industrialized society. (Crozier et al., 1975, pp. 158–9)

Crozier, Huntington and Watanuki were not the only scholars in the mid-1970s to suggest the erosion of political trust. Nor were they the only ones to relate trends in political trust to a broader systemic crisis of representative democracy in the Western world. Similar concerns were raised by Offe (1972), and Miller (1974) who wrote that a ‘democratic political system cannot survive for long without the support of a majority of its citizens’ (Miller, 1974, p. 951). Since then these concerns have permeated the burgeoning scholarly literature, which considers political trust a necessary precondition for democratic rule and therefore low and declining levels of trust in core democratic institutions.
like government and parliament a risk to the quality of representative democracy (e.g., Offe, 1972; Crozier et al., 1975; Klingemann and Fuchs, 1995; Kaase and Newton, 1995; Linz and Stepan, 1996; Mishler and Rose, 1997; Norris, 1999, 2011; Pharr et al., 2000; Dalton, 2004; Thomassen, 2015).

In his influential study, *Democratic Challenges, Democratic Choices: The Erosion of Political Support in Advanced Industrial Democracies*, Russell J. Dalton, for example, states that:

Contemporary democracies are facing a challenge today. . . The challenge comes from democracy’s own citizens, who have grown distrustful of politicians, sceptical about democratic institutions, and disillusioned about how the democratic process functions.

There are legitimate reasons to worry that such trends may erode the vitality of democracy, or eventually may undermine the democratic process itself. Indeed, the history of democracies seems to be punctuated by political analysts raising such concerns, even before there were public opinion surveys to provide supporting evidence. (Dalton, 2004, pp. 1, 157)

Politicians and opinion leaders have been equally adamant that democracy is facing a crisis in political trust. As early as the 1970s, Crozier et al. (1975, p. 2) reported that German Chancellor Willy Brandt (1969–74) and Japanese Prime Minister Takeo Miki (1974–76) feared for the future of democracy. The Economist quoted Brandt in 1974: ‘Western Europe has only twenty or thirty more years of democracy left in it; after that it will slide, engineless and rudderless, under the surrounding sea of dictatorship, and whether the dictation comes from a politburo or a junta will not make much difference’. Miki had warned that political trust had to be restored to prevent the collapse of Japanese democracy. Similar concerns are echoed today. In 2012, The Economist discussed a ‘headline slump in trust. . .due, above all, to the public losing faith in political leaders’. In 2014, Jean-Claude Juncker, the president of the European Commission, considered the ‘public negativity about politics and politicians, the resentment’ to be the biggest problem facing the European Union. And in early 2016, in an interview with the Spanish newspaper *El País*, philosopher Zigmunt Bauman bemoaned that ‘[w]e could describe what is going on at the moment as a crisis of democracy, the collapse of trust: The belief that our leaders are not just corrupt or stupid, but inept. . . The current crisis of democracy is a crisis of democratic institutions’.

While the supposed causes are many – ranging from institutional overload, evolution of party systems, and economic recessions to scandals or corruption affairs – the diagnosis remains the same: we ought to be concerned about a political trust crisis.¹

And yet, while this realm of research has been vastly expanding, empirical studies covering different time spans and different regions in the world have fallen short of drawing a similarly disturbing general picture (cf. Dalton, 2004; Norris, 2011; Van Ham and Thomassen, 2014). Rather, these studies suggest that (1) a decline in political trust may affect some political entities more than others – that is, politicians and political parties more than parliaments, legal systems and regimes; (2) the pronounced erosion of political trust in one established democracy – as observed, for example, in the United States since the 1960s – may not be generalizable to other democratic societies; (3) analyses covering shorter time spans yield fundamentally different results to studies covering the last 50 years; and, finally, (4) sharp declines in political trust may be rapidly restored.

This enhanced knowledge about the complexity of political trust can be attributed to scientific progress in a wide range of subfields, comprising theoretical accounts about the
nature of political trust and its democratic relevance, descriptive research into its longitudinal trends and cross-national differences, and explanatory research on its micro- and macro-level causes. Concurrently, new, prominent subfields are emerging, while recently collected data and advanced research methods provide scholars and policy-makers alike with both broader and more detailed empirical insights.

THE AIM OF THE HANDBOOK ON POLITICAL TRUST

Despite the theoretical and empirical relevance of, and lively interest in, political trust, no encompassing volume has yet been made available to an international readership. The need for such a handbook has become increasingly relevant as research on political trust has simultaneously broadened and deepened. In response to this major lacuna, our Handbook addresses most subfields and integrates contributions from leading international scholars to provide access to newcomers, to structure the debate and to identify remaining lacunae and new puzzles.

First and foremost, our Handbook aims to provide an integrated overview of the state-of-the-art political trust research. After more than 50 years of scholarly research and debate, the field of political trust has progressed immensely. It encompasses an increasingly wide range of subfields, theoretical approaches, research designs and data sets. Political trust is now studied across all regions of the globe. Ongoing specialization, however, makes it increasingly difficult to see the wood for the trees. To counter this shortcoming, the Handbook breaks down the literature via pointed narratives in a range of chapters. These chapters do not merely analyse the progress in our understanding of political trust in all its facets, they also point out knowledge gaps, theoretical puzzles and methodological caveats. In short, the Handbook’s authors take stock of past research and look ahead to encourage theoretical progress and to stimulate new research questions and methodological innovation.

The Handbook is constructed to be as encompassing as possible in various ways. First, it includes a wide range of themes and debates in the literature – from political theoretical accounts to questions of measurement, and from macro-level trends to macro- and micro-level correlates. Second, it covers manifold theoretical approaches to political trust, including biological, cognitive, emotional, socialization, heuristic and evaluative perspectives. Concurrently, despite analyses of survey data dominating the empirical literature on political trust, the chapters in this Handbook also draw on other research designs and diverse data sets, such as multilevel research, panel studies, case studies, interviews and experiments. Third, the Handbook is explicitly concerned with all regions of the globe. For decades our empirical understanding of political trust has been based on Western countries, and more recently on post-communist societies in Central and Eastern Europe. Other regions, by contrast, have not been studied systematically. Indeed, to some extent (mostly due to data limitations) the contributions in this Handbook reflect this bias in the literature. The Handbook, therefore, specifically addresses political trust in authoritarian settings from a normative perspective (see Chapter 4 by Rivetti and Cavatorta) and systemically inspects empirical levels, trends and correlates of political trust in previously neglected regions, including Latin America, Africa, the Arab region, Southeast Asia and the Pacific (see Chapters 23 to 28).
Finally, the Handbook aims to appeal to a broad readership by offering easily accessible overviews to readers still new to this field and seminal empirical findings to established experts. Accordingly, scholars and policy-makers alike may consider this Handbook as a long-awaited guide through the expanding universe of political trust research.

THE UNDERLYING CONCEPT OF POLITICAL TRUST

While the *Handbook on Political Trust* primarily employs the term ‘political trust’, many alternative concepts have been used more or less equivalently in the literature. These alternatives include ‘confidence in political institutions’, and (most notably in American studies) ‘trust in government’. Although the English language distinguishes conceptually between the labels ‘trust’ and ‘confidence’, and international surveys contain measures of ‘trust’ (e.g., European Social Survey) and ‘confidence’ (e.g., World Values Survey), empirically the two are hardly separable as indicated by strong correlates and the high similarities of trends.

Political trust is distinct from, and yet related to, the more general labels of political support and satisfaction (Van der Meer, 2016). Political trust is defined by a specific set of objects (political institutions and actors) and is both relational (having a subject and an object) and situational (characterized by a degree of uncertainty about the object’s future actions).

As a common denominator, all contributions in this Handbook follow the definition and conceptualization of political trust in accordance with the widely used approach presented by Pippa Norris (see Chapter 2). The Handbook limits political trust to a specific set of political objects. These objects comprise, on the one hand, the core institutions of liberal democracy – such as parliament, government and the justice system as well as the civil service, the police and the military – and on the other hand, incumbent political office-holders, such as party leaders, legislators and public officials.

Within the conceptual confines of political support, political trust is geared towards political actors and institutional performances, and is thus rather volatile. Concomitantly, this definition of political trust excludes more abstract objects such as the community or democratic principles, which are conventionally less contested and volatile. Conceptually, political trust is thus ‘a middle-range indicator of support’ (Zmerli et al., 2007, p. 41) concerned with the political institutions that link overarching democratic principles to everyday actors and policies. Ken Newton and Pippa Norris (2000, p. 53) argue that this understanding of political trust is ‘the central indicator of the underlying feeling of the general public about its polity’.

Political trust is fundamentally relational and situational. It is relational because it has a subject who trusts and an object that is trusted; we do not argue that person A trusts without reference to a trust object. Trust is situational since it is commonly given or withheld with reference to specific types of actions or environments. Trust is therefore expressed as ‘A trusts B to do X’ (Hardin, 2000, p. 26) or as ‘a state of mind for individuals, but...also a characteristic of a polity’ (Dalton, 2004, p. 162). Trust relationships are defined by the subject’s degree of uncertainty or vulnerability regarding the object’s future behaviour (Newton, 1999, p. 170; Van der Meer, 2016). This uncertainty, in particular, sets
it apart from more diffuse attitudes of political support that can be expressed when one is perfectly certain about outcomes.

Political trust may be contrasted to its counterparts. We may distinguish between political mistrust (i.e., the absence of trust), political distrust (i.e., the opposite of trust) and political scepticism (i.e., withholding one’s judgement) (Cook and Gronke, 2005). Particularly the latter distinction is important to normative theories about political trust (e.g., Lenard, 2008; Rosanvallon, 2008; see also Chapter 3 by Warren). Sceptical, critical or vigilant citizens do not give political authorities the benefit of the doubt by trusting them unconditionally, and by so doing, they strengthen democracy rather than weaken it (Mishler and Rose, 1997; Norris, 2011). A characteristic of monitoring (Schudson, 1998) or critical (Norris, 1999, 2011) citizens, scepticism stimulates political engagement (cf. Hibbing and Theiss-Morse, 2002). Although the rise of post-materialism eroded respect for authority, it raised support for democracy (Inglehart, 1997), suggesting that representative democracy had reached adulthood (Stolle and Hooghe, 2005, p. 163).

‘Democracy requires trust but also presupposes an active and vigilant citizenry with a healthy scepticism of government and a willingness, should the need arise, to suspend trust and assert control over government – at a minimum by replacing the government of the day’ (Mishler and Rose, 1997, p. 419). Unlike scepticism, however, attitudes of distrust may be off-putting as regards such engagement. In the worst case, distrust can turn into political cynicism – that is, the attitude that the political process and its actors are inherently corrupt, incompetent and self-serving (Van der Meer, 2016).

Despite these conceptual precisions, surveys conventionally measure only the presence of political trust, thereby distinguishing between trusting and non-trusting citizens but not between sceptical and actively distrusting ones (Cook and Gronke, 2005). This conflation is not the only mismatch between the refined conceptualization of political trust and the measurement instruments employed in survey research, from which most empirical knowledge is derived. In part, this mismatch reflects the vague and unspecified use of the term ‘political trust’ in daily life. One could even argue that survey measures of political trust may be too specific; many citizens do not draw clear lines between the aforementioned various objects of political trust (see Chapter 6 by Marien and Chapter 7 by Zmerli and Newton). As a consequence, political trust may not be as object-specific as the evaluative approaches in the literature heuristically assume.

Similarly, political trust may be defined via related concepts like political efficacy (office-holders’ responsiveness to citizens) and political cynicism (the negative evaluation of the inherent nature of politics). To the extent that political trust may be separated into various conceptual components – evaluations of the object’s competence to act on the subject’s behalf, care for the subject, accountability to the subject and predictability (e.g., Kasperson et al., 1992; Van der Meer, 2016) – efficacy and cynicism are related to some but not all of these components. Political efficacy primarily relates to the component of accountability – in other words, to the perception that citizens are able to influence government and hold office-holders accountable. Political cynicism, in turn, reflects a negative evaluation of the nature of the political process and its actors, who are considered to be inherently incompetent and to lack an intrinsic care for the public good.
ORIGINS AND DEVELOPMENTS IN THIS FIELD OF RESEARCH

The origins of the scholarly interest in political trust can be traced back to the aftermath of World War II and the height of the Cold War, when the promise of communism was considered by many as a valuable alternative to capitalist democracies plagued by seemingly striking social and political shortcomings. Accordingly, political scientists started to investigate the structural conditions for regime stability. Whether the research focus was aimed at the specificities of a society’s political culture (Almond and Verba, 1963) or at developing a more encompassing approach to political systems and their environments (Easton, 1965, 1975), strong consent evolved around the requirement of citizens’ favourable values and attitudes to regime principles, institutions and actors, which can take on various forms in accordance with corresponding levels of abstraction or categories (see also Chapter 2 by Norris, Chapter 14 by Gabriel and Chapter 21 by Liu and Stolle). With these conceptual navigators at hand, scholars were then better equipped to address separately and in more detail the correlates, causes and consequences of regime-stabilizing ingredients. In the subsequent 50 years, the literature split into various lines of research:

Crisis of Political Trust: Structural or Cyclical?

A first strand of literature on political trust revolved around its trends and implications for the state of democracy. Since the 1970s, there has been extensive debate whether the trends in political trust ought to be understood as single, structural crises (Crozier et al., 1975; Kaase and Newton, 1995; Pharr et al., 2000; Huntington, 2001; Dalton, 2004; Torcal and Montero, 2006; Denters et al., 2007) or as a series of fluctuations of varying length and intensity, with declines from which democracies may recover (Klingemann and Fuchs, 1995; Bovens and Wille, 2008; Norris, 2011; Van Ham and Thomassen, 2014), such as after the Great Recession hit Europe in 2008 (Armingeon and Guthmann, 2014; Van Erkel and Van der Meer, 2016). The two interpretations need not be exclusive, depending on the time frame that is selected. The United States, in particular, witnessed a structural decline between 1960 and 1980, with trendless fluctuations ever since (see Chapter 23 by Dalton).

Historically, the understanding of these trends as structural or cyclical has been tied to the implications of these two interpretations. An initial approach, originating in the 1970s, argued that the very survival of democratic regimes is at stake if political trust is low (e.g., Offe, 1972; Miller, 1974; Crozier et al., 1975). This approach was formulated at a time when political scientists were mainly concerned with the stability of democratic regimes (cf. Almond and Verba, 1963; Easton, 1965, 1975). These days this notion is less explicit, but allusions to the risk that trust crises pose to the survival of representative democracies continue to be made in scholarly and public debates, most notably in the literature on democracies in transition (e.g., Linz and Stepan, 1996; Mishler and Rose, 1997). In these democracies, trust is required ‘to bolster regimes through economic crisis or external shocks’ (Norris, 1999, p. 2) in the face of ongoing public support for alternatives to representative democracy (Listhaug and Wiberg, 1995, p. 299).

Since the 1990s, however, scholars have found that ‘strong support for democratic institutions coexists with strong dissatisfaction with their performance’ (Teixeira et al.,
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2014, p. 502). The crisis of democracy that had been predicted in the 1970s had not occurred. Rather than going into decline, it was argued that representative democracy can instead undergo ‘far reaching systemic change within the general category of representative democracies’ (Fuchs and Klingemann, 1995, p. 7). Examples of such changes are the transition from the Fourth Republic to the Fifth Republic in France during the 1950s, the breakdown and realignment of the Italian party system during the 1990s and the establishment of proportional electoral institutions in New Zealand in 1993 (cf. Kaase and Newton, 1995; Dalton, 2004).

A third, even more modest suggestion is that low levels of political trust do not cause but rather reflect democratic malaise (e.g., Pharr et al., 2000), like the canary in the coal mine that warns against gas leaks (Norris, 2011). ‘Growing dissatisfaction among citizens with the institutions of democracy and the major actors...might well lead to paralysis in the political decision-making processes without any structural change taking place, let alone the system collapsing’ (Fuchs and Klingemann, 1995, p. 7; see also Inglehart, 1997, p. 323; Hetherington, 1998, p. 804).

Causes and Correlates

Distinguishing between macro- and micro-level causes and correlates of political trust has proven to be useful in theoretical and empirical analyses, resulting in prolific subfields. One of the first, still prominent micro-level explanatory approaches to the decline of political trust – the so-called silent revolution – highlights generational value change and the relevance of circumstances of socialization (Inglehart, 1977; see also Chapter 11 by Mayne and Hakhverdian). With the advent of major technological developments in the medical sciences in the past few years, new evidence about the biological, psychological and cognitive antecedents of political trust as well as their interdependencies with the environment is making its way into the literature (see Chapter 9 by Mondak, Hayes and Canache, and Chapter 10 by Theiss-Morse and Barton).

From a macro-level perspective, the impact of economic performance took early centre stage in political trust research (Citrin, 1974; see also Chapter 17 by Van der Meer). Other explanations have also been proposed. The permeation of Western societies by mass media (in particular, television), the scandalization of politics, and the reduction of politics to entertainment are among the main suspects of diminishing levels of trust (Mutz and Reeves, 2005; Mutz, 2015; see also Chapter 22 by Newton). Some scholars point to the top-down effect of institutional structures that warrant democratic representation or accountability, such as the electoral system and procedures of government formation (Marien, 2011; see also Chapter 17 by Van der Meer); to procedural fairness of state bureaucrats with regard to citizens (Rothstein and Teorell, 2008; see also Chapter 16 by Grimes); to inclusive and non-discriminatory welfare arrangements (see Chapter 18 by Kumlin and Haugsgjerd); and most notably to corruption, which is consistently found to be detrimental to political trust (see Chapter 19 by Uslaner). By contrast, others underscore bottom-up processes. In particular, social capital – that is, virtues of trust, cooperation and a spirit for the common good that is associated with vibrant civil societies – has been argued to spill over into the political sphere, resulting in responsive, effective and accountable democratic institutions and, ultimately, trusting citizens (Putnam, 1993; see also Chapter 21 by Liu and Stolle). Finally, in recent years a major research focus has been...
immigration’s effect on trust in established democratic societies, among both native and migrant citizens (see Chapter 20 by McLaren).

Consequences

By contrast, systematic research on the consequences of political trust has remained remarkably scarce, as many scholars have acknowledged in recent years (Norris, 1999, p. 25; Dalton, 2004, p. 162; Torcal and Lago, 2006, p. 309; Marien and Hooghe, 2011, p. 268). This gap in our knowledge is especially surprising given the strong claims that have been made in this area since at least the 1970s. ‘It is striking to observe that most of this debate is being conducted in the absence of reliable knowledge about the possible social and political consequences of lower levels of political trust’ (Marien and Hooghe, 2011, p. 268). Scholars have suggested that at the macro level, low levels of trust would undermine the stability of the regime (e.g., Crozier et al., 1975) or, at best, signal structural challenges that require transformation of the regime’s institutions (Fuchs and Klingemann, 1995; Kaase and Newton, 1995, pp. 30, 38). At the meso level, low political trust is related to changes in the structures of party competition (e.g., Dalton, 2004) – most notably, by providing fertile ground for the electoral success of new or populist parties (Arzheimer, 2009; see also Chapter 15 by Bélanger). And finally, at the micro level, low political trust would induce support for democratic reform (Hibbing and Theiss-Morse, 2002; Dalton, 2004) and erode citizens’ compliance with the law (Marien and Hooghe, 2011). A contrary interpretation may also apply: when political reforms are unpopular but trust in political decision-makers is high, political trust functions as a heuristic to bolster support for these reforms (see also Chapter 12 by Rudolph). Nonetheless, systematic tests beyond cross-sectional, correlational analyses are scant (but for exceptions see, amongst others, Hetherington, 2005; Rudolph and Evans, 2005; see also Chapter 13 by Van Deth).

The empirical consequences of political trust are the biggest deficiency in the trust literature, and hence also in this Handbook. We simply lack systematic information on how much low and declining levels of political trust should be of concern to representative democracy. In part, this major gap in the literature reflects data limitations – that is, the lack of experimental, longitudinal and, in particular, panel data across a broad set of countries. Rather than testing the effects of increasing or declining levels of political trust, studies have predominantly assessed the correlates of high and low levels of trust at one point in time, and have thus been unable to separate cause from effect. With the increased application of experimental designs (see also Chapter 8 by Wilson and Eckel) and the increased availability of longitudinal survey data across the globe (see Chapters 23–28), this gap is likely to be filled over the next decades.

SET-UP AND STRUCTURE OF THE HANDBOOK ON POLITICAL TRUST

Set-up

The Handbook’s set-up reflects the diversity of strands in the political trust literature. Its primary contributions are twofold: first, narrative overviews of the state-of-the-art, and
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second, relevant new questions for future research. In addition, new empirical analyses are included in (1) three chapters that deal with the measurement of political trust via cross-national equivalence (see Chapter 6 by Marien), scaling (see Chapter 7 by Zmerli and Newton) and experimentation (see Chapter 8 by Wilson and Eckel); (2) those chapters where directed analyses help to fill gaps in the literature that are central to the chapters’ narratives (see Chapters 5, 11, 13, 19, 20, 22); and (3) all regional chapters, which provide an empirical overview of cross-national differences and longitudinal trends in countries across the globe (see Chapters 23–28).

The contributions in the Handbook are written by a strong team of scholars, all experts in their fields. The chapters speak to each other, with many cross-references between them. Similar studies may be discussed from different perspectives in different chapters. But while the authors have engaged with each other’s chapters, we purposely did not enforce any joint narrative, conclusion or policy suggestion across chapters. Rather, this Handbook discusses various points of debate, within as well as between chapters. We aimed for any diversity of interpretation to be explicit.

The authors share a common understanding of political trust as being directed to institutions – primarily government and parliament, but also the judiciary, parties or office-holders (see Chapter 2 by Norris). Due to the diversity of data sets and differences in measurement instruments, a common operationalization of this concept could not be realized. This has several important implications. Most notably, levels of political trust are not comparable across chapters – not even across the chapters in the section that describes political trust in regions across the globe.

Structure

The Handbook is divided into three main parts and a concluding chapter. The first part, encompassing seven chapters, presents a comprehensive overview of relevant concepts and methodology. The second and largest part (14 chapters) discusses the causes, consequences and correlates of political trust from a multitude of perspectives, and consists of two sections. The first section focuses on the foundations and consequences of political trust at the micro level, and the second, on the origins and implications at the macro level. The third part, by contrast, is concerned with the levels, trends and determinants of political trust in different regions worldwide. These aspects are discussed in six separate chapters. Although a straightforward comparison between levels of political trust across regions is not possible, the presentation of descriptive figures is uniform throughout all chapters; the subsequent analyses, however, differ, reflecting each chapter’s unique narrative. The Handbook concludes with a wide-ranging discussion on the role of legitimacy for democratic societies and its complex relationship with political trust.

Part I: Theoretical and methodological approaches

The Handbook’s first part starts out with Pippa Norris’s conceptual considerations on political trust. Her contribution offers a better understanding of the specificities of political trust and how it is embedded in the encompassing but nuanced concept of political support. As such, Pippa Norris’s chapter serves as the conceptual guiding line for the subsequent Handbook contributions.

Despite a broad acceptance of the idea that political trust functions as a stabilizer
of democratic regimes, few theoretical accounts elucidate its multifaceted relevance for democratic government. Mark E. Warren takes on this theoretical challenge in the following chapter and sketches the potential of political trust and the risks associated with it.

Subsequently, Paola Rivetti and Francesco Cavatorta scrutinize the various functions of political trust in authoritarian political regimes, putting scholars’ commonly favourable approach to political trust into perspective. The authors present and discuss the ambivalent political and societal implications of political trust, from both theoretical and empirical angles.

Jordi Muñoz, in turn, discusses the dynamics of trust in multilevel government structures. Focusing on the relevance of political institutions’ proximity and capacity, and on the relationship between trust in political objects at different governmental layers, his chapter offers insightful conceptual guidance and contributes original empirical evidence to a burgeoning realm of research.

The next three chapters address methodological issues. Sofie Marien discusses and analyses the measurement equivalence of instruments of political trust that figure prominently in comparative studies. More precisely, she first describes the equivalence of common measurement instruments and points to the pitfalls that result from cultural, institutional or language differences. She then complements and updates her previous empirical findings, drawing on data from the sixth wave of the European Social Survey (2012–13) to test the measurement equivalence of political trust.

Sonja Zmerli and Ken Newton’s contribution focuses specifically on the methodological aspects of the interrelationship between various objects of social and political trust. Testing three theoretical models by means of detailed, comparative empirical investigations, the authors enhance the understanding of scales and hierarchies that underlie the various objects of social and political trust.

A discussion on the value of experimental designs to advance trust research lies at the core of Rick K. Wilson and Catherine C. Eckel’s chapter. Drawing on three commonly used experimental designs, they inspect previous evidence about the causal underpinnings of political trust, provide new evidence about the same, outline noteworthy measurement issues, and suggest promising strands for future experimental research.

Part II: Causes, correlates, consequences

An innovative, analytical perspective on individual-level predecessors of political trust marks the outset of the second part of the book. Being concerned with biological and psychological influences, Jeffery J. Mondak, Matthew Hayes and Damaris Canache discuss whether relatively stable aspects of the individual shape political trust and which mediating micro- and macro-level factors may exist.

In a similar vein, Elizabeth Theiss-Morse and Dona-Gene Barton focus on yet another neglected individual-level factor. Contrary to the manifold studies on cognitive dispositions as precursors of political attitudes, scholarly interest in the role of emotions and the affect–cognition relationship has been marginal so far. The authors’ in-depth discussion of the subject matter concludes with a plea to dispense with the false dichotomy between cognition and emotion to better grasp their interdependent impact on political trust.

By contrast, education and socialization as individual-level correlates of political trust have already figured on the research agenda for some time. Yet, as Quinton Mayne and Armen Hakhverdian point out in their chapter, systematic causal studies are still largely
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missing. To some extent, this lacuna can be attributed to seemingly inconsistent effects. Taking the specificities of political conditions at the macro level into account offers, however, an analytical tool to predict more accurately the various consequences of education and socialization for political trust.

Next, Thomas J. Rudolph draws on psychological theories and comparative empirical evidence to outline the function of political trust as a heuristic or decision rule to support or oppose government action. With a particular focus on risk and sacrifice, he outlines the linkage between political trust and citizens’ policy judgements, and describes trust’s potential to bridge ideologically based differences in policy support.

An investigation into the causality between citizenship norms and political trust is at the heart of the ensuing contribution by Jan W. van Deth. He contends that citizens’ law-abidingness and compliance with rules—essential ingredients to democratic regimes—derive, in part, from citizenship norms. Pioneering empirical analyses of panel data are presented and embedded within extensive theoretical reasoning, and suggest that causality runs from citizenship norms to political trust.

Oscar W. Gabriel addresses a similar issue of causality in the subsequent chapter. However, his concern revolves around the interrelationship between social and political trust and social and political participation. In accordance with the state-of-the-art, the author discusses two distinct approaches. Whereas the first approach considers trust and participation as closely interrelated parts of a syndrome of civic attitudes and behaviours, the second explores trust as a prerequisite of participation. In light of inconsistent and patchy empirical evidence, the author concludes with numerous suggestions for future lines of research.

This part’s first section concludes with a chapter by Éric Bélanger, who elaborates on the consequences of political trust and distrust for one specific type of political participation—namely, voting behaviour. Starting with a general account of the relationship between political trust and voting, the author then discusses the specific implications of political distrust. As empirical evidence suggests, political distrust may result either in voting for populist parties or in abstention from voting. Little is known, however, about the underlying mechanisms, which are outlined as a promising avenue for future research.

Next, the Handbook scrutinizes correlates and causes located at the macro level—that is, the contexts in which citizens live. Marcia Grimes starts by assessing the multifaceted concept of procedural fairness and its linkage with political trust. Her contribution revolves around three major research questions that identify and address relevant procedures, their qualities and their accessibility. Finally, she points out a lacuna in our understanding: too little is known about the determinants of perceived procedural fairness, which is likely to be at least as consequential for political trust as objective procedural fairness.

Adopting a similar perspective, Tom W.G. van der Meer proposes several pathways of competing democratic input and institutional output to explain political trust. He begins with the assumption that political trust is evaluative in nature and then provides comprehensive theoretical and empirical evidence for the need to distinguish between objective input-oriented democratic procedures (i.e., representation and accountability through elections) and institutional output (i.e., macroeconomic performance), on the one hand, and citizens’ perceptions of these procedures and performances, on the other.

A different take on institutional output and its consequences for political trust is put
forward in the subsequent chapter by Staffan Kumlin and Atle Haugsgjerd. More specifically, the authors discuss how welfare policies, policy change and policy evaluations affect political trust. For this purpose, they focus on four major threads of research: personal experiences and evaluations of welfare schemes and services; austerity policies implemented in the wake of economic crises; welfare state generosity; and income inequality.

Corruption is commonly found to be antithetical to political trust. Eric M. Uslaner addresses the repercussions of corruption and inequality on political trust, both theoretically and empirically, based on original analyses. In accordance with several previous chapters, Uslaner’s account stresses the pivotal and universal role of individual perceptions of corruption and inequality, in particular.

In a similar vein, Lauren McLaren contends that individual perceptions of immigration and ethnic diversity are consequential for perceptions of political institutions and elites. She elaborates on three major lines of research. First, political trust may decline where ethnic diversity is perceived as a threat to a sense of community and identity. Second, different types of identity construction that are prevalent in different societies may moderate the impact of ethnic diversity. Third, migrants’ perceptions and levels of political trust need to be considered. Original data analyses, presented in this chapter, give further empirical evidence.

Contrary to the more recent scholarly interest in the correlates of immigration, the investigation into the nature of the relationship between social capital, civic culture and political trust has a long tradition. Christopher Liu and Dietlind Stolle’s comprehensive account of this relational complexity is structured along four lines of research. In addition to a historical overview of influential conceptualizations and empirical studies, this chapter addresses the strength of the relationship, the causal flow and the underlying mechanisms.

Finally, Part II’s last chapter, by Ken Newton, focuses on the crucial role of the mass media (the news media, in particular) in explaining levels and fluctuations of political trust. The author deals with two major aspects – the factors in the mass media that are associated with trust and the consequences of the news media’s presentation styles, particularly in Western societies, where the media are often argued to be increasingly sensational, superficial and negative.

Part III: Political trust across the globe
The core of the Handbook’s third part consists of investigations into levels and trends of political trust in countries across the globe during the last 20 years and beyond. This volume covers new ground by presenting original analyses of all regions worldwide. While all chapters are organized along similar lines and systematically discuss levels and trends of political trust, each addresses the subject matter from its own region-specific perspective.

All contributions complement their overviews with original empirical analyses of significant determinants of political trust. The decreasing levels of political trust in North America and the many reasons for this decline are the prime interest of Russell J. Dalton. Matías Bargsted, Nicolás M. Somma and Juan Carlos Castillo assess the evolution of political trust in Latin American consolidating democracies and the consequences of a more recent phenomenon – the widespread swing towards the left among governments. Mariano Torcal’s chapter on Western and Southern Europe, by contrast,
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is particularly concerned with the implications evoked by the Great Recession. The challenges to political trust posed by the triple transition of post-communist European societies guide the contribution by Gergő Závecz, who retraces the pathways from communism to democracy, from planned to market economy, and from satellite states to full stateness. Marc L. Hutchison and Kristin Johnson examine political trust in regions overtly neglected by previous comparative studies on political trust. Focusing on Sub-Saharan Africa and the Arab region, the authors contend that institutional capacity and external security are especially important determinants of trust in these two regions. Part III concludes with Chong-Min Park’s extensive empirical assessment of the Asia-Pacific region, which, by all standards, depicts the most heterogeneous political landscape worldwide.

Concluding chapter

Finally, the concluding chapter embarks on broadening the scope of the Handbook’s subject matter. With a particular interest in the competing concepts of legitimacy and its associations with political trust, Jacques Thomassen, Rudy Andeweg and Carolien van Ham offer a differentiated view on established approaches, substantiated by empirical evidence and complemented with suggestions for policy designs aimed at solidifying legitimacy and trust.

In summary, the Handbook on Political Trust offers a wide array of theoretical and empirical appraisals. We hope that it will serve students and scholars of political trust as a stimulating starting point for future inquiries and that it will provide valuable and thought-provoking guidance to policy-makers.

NOTES

1. The political trust crisis would be a response to, among others, institutional overload, too much democracy, too little democracy, the evolution of the party system (such as the polarization in Congress in the United States or the rise of populism in Europe), economics (most notably the Great Recession and its aftermath in the European Union) or various scandals – including Watergate in the United States (1970s), a range of corruption affairs (e.g., Belgium during the 1990s) or the declaration scandals in the United Kingdom in the late 2000s.

2. The nuanced difference in the English language between trust (Oxford Dictionary: ‘Firm belief in the reliability, truth, or ability of someone or something’) and confidence (Oxford Dictionary: ‘the feeling or belief that one can have faith in or rely on someone or something’) seems to be based on the distinction between a belief in the object’s inherent qualities and a somewhat more conditional belief, respectively. Many other languages rely on a single word. Compare, for instance, the French confiance, the German Vertrauen and the Spanish confianza.

REFERENCES

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Lenard, P.T. (2008), ‘Trust your compatriots, but count your change. The roles of trust, mistrust and distrust in democracy’, *Political Studies*, 56 (2), 312–32.


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