1. International migration: IPE perspectives and the impact of globalisation

Leila Simona Talani

INTRODUCTION

The dimensions acquired by the phenomenon of mass migration, the degree of involvement of organised crime groups in the smuggling of migrants, the appalling conditions in which immigrants often find themselves in the hosting countries, all pose a number of questions which make it imperative to investigate the underlying causes and consequences of the problem.

There seems to be a certain degree of consensus in the literature on the fact that the process of globalisation has indeed modified the terms within which migratory processes take place. However, scholars are still divided on the assessment of the ‘hows’ and ‘whys’ of the impact of globalisation on migration. This is partly due to the fact that the issues relating to migration tend to be interdisciplinary by their very nature, covering the most various academic fields, from urban studies to anthropology, and from sociology to political economy. Moreover, the definition of globalisation seems to be surrounded by a certain degree of mystery, often being invoked in different contexts or debates without a proper systematic attempt to define it.

The main objective of this chapter is to study the impact of globalisation on migratory flows from a distinct international political economy (IPE) perspective. The theoretical aims of the chapter are, first, to identify the theoretical IPE background to address the questions relating to migration and to understand the problem of migration, both legal and illegal, in the context of globalisation; and second, to assess the relationship between globalisation, marginalisation and national and regional responses to mass immigration from less developed countries. The chapter therefore focuses on the following theoretical questions:

- Which are the main approaches to migration from an international political economy standpoint?
- How is the process of globalisation related to the increase of migratory flows from less developed countries to Western ones?
• What are the main political and economic causes and consequences of migration, in general, and illegal migration, in particular?
• Is there tension between legal and illegal migration?

To sum up, this chapter explores the main IPE approaches to international migration, focusing in particular on the impact of globalisation on migration. Eventually, the chapter integrates the economic, the social and political dimensions of the phenomenon to produce an overall vision of the consequences of globalisation on the motivations for migration.

IPE PERSPECTIVES ON MIGRATION

Theories of international migration are far from being clustered in a well-defined theoretical paradigm. On the contrary, although there seems to be a sort of consensus in the social sciences on the kinds of questions to ask in approaching international migration, the perspectives from which those questions are answered differ substantially among the various disciplines. Brettell and Hollifield (2008), in an extremely useful compendium of migration theories, have classified such theories across disciplines according to their main research questions, levels of analysis, relevant methodologies and main hypotheses.

Historians tend to ask questions similar to those of social scientists, such as: What are the determinants and consequences of population movements? Who moves, when do they move, why do they move? Why do some people not move? How do those who do move experience departure, migration and settlement? These questions are generally answered with reference to single groups or, more frequently, individuals, thus adopting a distinct micro approach to the study of migration and traditionally using archives as their main methodological tool. Anthropologists also are usually more interested in the micro-level of analysis. They often adopt a case-study approach despite their endeavouring to engage in cross-cultural comparisons to allow for broader generalisations. The micro level of analysis is predominant in economics, too. Economists, starting from the assumption of the rational actor model, and adopting methodological individualism as their main heuristic tool, ask questions relating to motivations for migration, which are normally answered through maximisation models.

The macro perspective, on the contrary, prevails in sociology, demography and political science, whereas lawyers are more eclectic in their choices of levels of analysis and methodology. In sociology, traditional structuralist theoretical frameworks tend to emphasise social relations
as central to understanding the process of migration and integration of immigrants. The methodologies vary, implying the use of ad hoc surveys or more aggregated data.\(^5\) Demographers are concerned with the nature of population change, a question which is generally answered through the construction of predictive models and analysed by means of statistical tools.\(^6\) Finally, political scientists are most often interested in the macro-level of analysis.\(^7\) Their contributions to international migration have been grouped by Hollifield into three themes. One is the role of the nation state to control its borders and therefore migration, which implies the whole discussion about whether in the age of globalisation the nation state is still able to exert such control. The second theme is the impact of migration on international relations, especially the institutions of sovereignty and citizenship. The third is the question of integration of migrants into the host societies, with special attention to its political dimension.\(^8\) This chapter is set firmly within the political sciences approaches to international migration, in particular within the international relations and international political economy tradition. So what is the state of the debate in international relations and international political economy with regard to international migration?

MAINSTREAM VERSUS CRITICAL IPE APPROACHES: THE STATE IN THE DEBATE

The Political Economy of Immigration in the Realist Tradition

Myron Weiner (1995) is the most prominent representative of the realist IPE approach to international migration. His analysis starts from the consideration that the global migration crisis is mostly the consequence of state policies (ibid.: 25) in both sending and receiving countries. Sending countries have strong political and economic incentives to favour migration. From the political point of view, forced migration can be used to dominate ethnic communities, to eliminate political dissidents and class enemies, or as a foreign policy tool, especially to force neighbouring countries to accept undesired policies. As a macroeconomic tool, migration can produce relief from unemployment and the costs of the welfare state, can improve the balance of payments through remittances, and allows foreign technology to be obtained. In receiving countries, the increase of migrants is not so much the consequence of labour market needs, but of ease of access. Weiner believes that every society has a limited capacity to absorb foreigners and points to xenophobic backlashes in Western Europe as examples of the kind of security threat posed by uncontrolled
migration. After all, ‘States will not and cannot allow others to decide who will permanently live and work in their own societies’ (ibid.: 22). Hence states have the right to control their borders, and, as border controls are becoming less and less efficacious as a consequence of the globalisation of information, they have the right to identify more efficient internal controls on an ad hoc basis (identity cards, repatriation schemes, expulsions, and so on). After an analysis of the negative impact of immigration for receiving countries, Weiner concludes that Western governments have to be prepared to intervene in conflicts that are likely to produce large refugee flow.

Whereas some realist scholars tend to consider migration or refugee policy as a matter of national security, others (Borjas 1990) encourage states to open their borders when it is in their interest to do so (that is, when it will enhance their power and position in the international system). According to this latter interpretation, migration policy and flows are a function of internationally systemic factors; namely, the distribution of power in the international system and the relative position of the states. The decision to allow economic immigrants and refugees by governments is therefore a consequence of the desire to improve their relative position in the system and modify the balance of power. Borjas (1990), for example, although mainly an economist, proposes a similar realist political economy interpretation of migration. He equates the international immigration market with the regular labour market, stressing that migrants choose on a totally rational basis whether to move to one country or another according to which benefits countries have on offer. Starting from the assumption (empirically demonstrated and demonstrable) that immigration is an advantage to host countries (especially skilled migration), it then becomes imperative for a rational state (such as the US) to enhance its desirability for potential immigrants. This can be achieved by adopting the right public policies in the domestic context. For example, if it is proven – as it is – that education increases the productivity of the labour force, both national and non-national, then a state must do its best to attract a highly educated labour force from abroad; for example, by rewarding highly educated (both native and alien) workers with a higher income. Otherwise, other states will win this competition and attract the best migrants, thus increasing their power and capabilities in the international system (Borjas 1990: Ch. 13).

From this standpoint, immigration is a positive-sum game: all players gain from the immigration process: not only the immigrants, but also the receiving countries. Even illegal migration responds to the needs of the host countries, as ‘the existence and persistence of a black market for immigrants implies that all parties participating in these exchanges benefit from these voluntary transactions’ (ibid.: 58).
The immigration market approach, although still a realist approach, answers the question of whether a state should risk migration much more favourably than from the national security point of view. However, the principal weakness of realism is that it gives too much emphasis to politics and the capacity of the state to define migratory policies and control migratory flows. Moreover, this approach cannot explain effectively why migration is increasing worldwide.\textsuperscript{11}

More promising is the interest-based political economy approach to immigration proposed by Freeman. This is an inside-out, realist approach to international migration which keeps the state firmly at the centre of the international decision-making process and adopts an economic interests approach to the domestic decision-making process. The assumption is that states are still sovereign and can define their entry and exit policy, but in doing so they respond uniquely to organised socio-economic interests (Freeman and Kessler 2008). At the socio-economic level, the main problem remains whether ‘those who gain from immigration compensate those who lose to produce a net social gain’ (Freeman 2008: 3).

Freeman begins with the traditional realist policy dilemma between allowing immigration when it is in the interests of the state and controlling it when it is not. Then he traces back the interests of the state in some domestic variables and internal dynamics. He identifies in the internal institutional and interest groups configuration the main independent variables explaining a successful management of migratory issues. In particular, the centralisation of policy-making and capital labour relations is recognised as an important factor in the ability of the state to limit the negative aspects of migration.

Freeman then considers three major types of organised interest groups: economic, ethnic and issue or ideological (Freeman and Jupp 1992: 83). Employers are usually the most active in recruiting migrants abroad and lobbying in favour of a relaxed migratory policy. For example, in the US, the dominant coalition favouring expansive immigration policy is made up of organised business and its affiliated politicians, and liberals supporting immigration for humanitarian and ideological reasons (ibid.: 84). On the contrary, workers tend to dislike the increase of the labour supply due to immigration, and therefore lobby for more control (Freeman 1979: 255). However, their success is related to the strength of their organisations. According to Freeman’s analysis, labour strength impacts on immigration in three ways. First, organised labour’s ability to influence a state’s migration policy is related directly to the strength of its trade unions’ organisation; second, the increase in the labour supply as a consequence of immigration can be better controlled by a government if organised labour is strong; third, strong trade unions and working-class parties are
able to constrain the impulses of the lower classes when confronted with the increase in the labour supply following from immigration (Freeman and Jupp 1992: 17).

Economic models help to identify the range of coalitions positively or negatively affected by immigration and, therefore, to project their position in the political debate regarding the implementation of more or less restrictive migratory policies. However, these models are not consensual in hypothesising the societal effect of immigration, and can provide conflicting predictions. The product or output model, for example, predicts the traditional class cleavage between capital and labour based on the consideration that immigration increases the profits of the capital elite and decreases the wages of the working population. On the other hand, in the Heckscher–Ohlin context, immigrants enter into the production process according to their skills, and therefore their impact on labour is limited. In the specific-factors model, immigration is expected to depress the wages of citizens and residents of similar skills, but increase the incomes of other socio-economic actors. This creates sectoral cleavages in which mobile factors tend to gain and specific factors to lose (see Freeman 2008: Table 1). Introducing fiscal variables, the situation is even further complicated, leading to an array of possible coalitions. It could be possible to hypothesise tensions deriving from perceived competition for public goods, but questions of geographical concentration of groups, especially in a federal system, might produce different outcomes (ibid.: 4).

Looking at the incentives for interest groups to mobilise politically in favour of or against a certain government’s stance on migration, in a political economic context, Freeman identifies four possibilities. In a two-dimensional model, with economic costs (benefits) and political mobilisation on the axes, what is relevant to predict interest mobilisation is the level of concentration of groups (concentrated or diffuse) and the size of benefits/costs (large or small). Client politics is the policy-making modality ensuing from a situation of large economic benefits/costs and concentrated groups. If, however, the socio-economic groups are diffused and economic benefits/costs are large, we get interest group politics. When economic benefits/costs are small, the mode is entrepreneurial politics if political groups are concentrated, and majoritarian politics with diffuse groups (Freeman and Kessler 2008: 671). Despite the many different interest coalitions that immigration may produce, it is clear to Freeman that ‘migration is economically advantageous for leading economic sectors. Those for which it is not beneficial can be compensated for their losses, or if not, typically wield limited influence in national politics’ (Freeman 2008: 11).

Some criticisms can be moved to this approach. For example, as
Freeman himself recognises (ibid.: Conclusions and Implications), issues of identity and ethnicity cannot be discarded from the analysis of the impact of migration on host societies. Even in stable societies with overtly peaceful social relations, an acquired ethnic diversity can erode societal cohesion and trust, and produce public policies contrary to the interests of leading groups.

However, this does not diminish the importance of Freeman’s contribution: his political economy approach to immigration gains merit in emphasising the role of socio-economic interest groups in defining the state’s public policy preferences (Freeman and Kessler 2008). Nevertheless, the questions of whether and why migration is increasing in recent times still remain unanswered. Let us see whether a different approach can help to solve the problem. Attention is focused below on the second mainstream approach to IPE and its applications to the issues of international migration: liberal institutionalism (or neo-institutionalism).

**Liberal Institutionalism and Migration**

As Hollifield (2000) suggests, a liberal institutionalist approach to international migration should propose a number of hypotheses with regard to international migration. First, neo-institutionalists à la Keohane would predict that the increase in migratory flows is the consequence of the formation of coalitions of interests favouring them in the most powerful liberal states. Similar coalitions should coincide with those lobbying for the adoption of anti-protectionist and free trade policies. However, free trade coalitions are much less contentious than coalitions supporting the opening of borders to all immigrants, as the latter no doubt involve more cultural, social and even religious cleavages. Indeed, free trade coalitions are very rarely concerned also with opening borders to foreigners.

Moreover, from the perspective of neoliberal interdependence, states should be more prone to opening their borders, both to trade and to migration, in the presence of an international regulatory system or institution that can control and regulate similar flows. However, whereas in the field of trade, international institutions were more or less successfully established, in the case of migration no such regime has been set up. Despite this, international migratory flows did not disappear. On the contrary, they have continued to increase in exponential terms during the last decades. This clearly points to the lack of theoretical tools in the liberal institutionalist paradigm to grasp and explain the reality of international migration.

Indeed, the number of scholars offering a neo-institutionalist analysis of the problems relating to migration is limited. They tend to focus on
the interplay between institutions and ideas to explain why states accept migration. As detailed below, these differ from the globalisation theorists, who tend to focus more on transnational relations and less on the state, which is no longer considered the only, or even the most relevant, actor of the international system (see the next section; and Chapter 2 in this volume). Hollifield (1992, 1998, 2000) is one of the few addressing international migration from an inside-out neoliberal institutionalist perspective, which he terms the ‘liberal state thesis’ (Brettel and Hollifield 2008). This thesis claims that, irrespective of economic cycles, the play of interests and shifts in public opinion, immigrants and foreigners have acquired rights. Therefore, the capacity of liberal states to control immigration is constrained by laws and institutions (ibid.: 195). Moreover, it is possible to explain at least partially why migrants move, and therefore to explain the increase in migratory flows in the last three decades as a consequence of what Hollifield terms ‘the rise of the rights-based liberalism’ (ibid. 196). Migrants are attracted in growing numbers to liberal states because the latter attribute to them civil, political and social rights. This does not mean that rights cannot change, but once extended to foreigners they are difficult to withdraw. This, in the opinion of Hollifield, explains why many liberal states, especially in Europe, are not keen to change their national refugees or migratory laws.

How does Hollifield incorporate rights into his analysis of migration in empirical terms? In two ways: first, by analysing how policy changes impacted on migratory flows; second, by studying how the interventions of the judiciary have limited the capacity of the state to control migration. However, this perspective cannot be fully categorised within the liberal institutional paradigm, as according to Hollifield these rights do not yet derive from international institutions or regimes, but from the nation state. The reason for this is that no organising principle has emerged yet as the basis for international cooperation to regulate migration (Hollifield 2000). However, according to Hollifield, an organising principle can be identified in the rule of law and orderly movement of peoples. Its implementation would require centralisation of authority to overcome collective action problems; and this, in turn, would require a hegemon or a group of hegemonic states, something that remains unlikely to happen. A more likely strategy would be to adopt suasion, through international issue-linking and log-rolling (ibid.: 105).

The position of Soysal is more positive. According to this scholar, migrants have already acquired rights not only from the state, but also from the international institutional system. In her analysis, post-national citizenship, deriving from international human rights standards granted on the basis of universalistic notions of personhood, is the grounds on
which to root migrants’ rights of inclusion. This renders national citizenship almost irrelevant (Soysal 1998). Indeed, contemporary citizenship is based on two paradoxes that warrant transcending national definitions: (1) the increasing decoupling of rights and identities, the two main components of citizenship; and (2) the tendency to claim particularistic rights in the public domain, which is legitimised by a universalistic conception of personhood (Soysal 2000).

Soysal’s insistence on human rights and universalistic conceptions of personhood makes it possible to classify her approach within the liberal institutionalist tradition. Indeed, her analysis does not ground immigrants’ claims and mobilisation on identities or narratives, as constructivists would.

More systemic neo-institutionalist analyses of international migration are few, for the very reason that, until recently, there was little demand for international cooperation (or policy) in the area of migration. International migratory regimes are not being established, and therefore liberal institutionalists lack a dependent variable. It is true that there is now some demand for policies to control, manage or stop migration and refugee flows (Ghosh 2000), but this hardly accounts for the development of an international migratory regime and seems more easily accounted for by neo-realist readings of migration as a security issue. The only notable exception is the European Union and the Schengen system.12

Following Soysal, Geddes (2003) argues that the ‘transnational advocacy’ of migrants’ rights has acquired a significant degree of institutionalisation at the EU level, thanks to the technocratic and bureaucratic insulation of EU institutions. It is the institutional configuration itself of the European Union, especially the European Commission, the European Court of Justice and the European Parliament, that allows for a higher degree of inclusion of pro-migrant lobbying activity, as it disengages it from the national level where similar issues do not enjoy the favour of the electorates. All this happens, and is analysed by Geddes within the context of the emerging EU common framework for migratory and refugee policy.

According to Thielemann, the increasing ‘communitarisation’ of migratory and refugees policies responds to the increased attention by EU institutions to human rights, as well as to the spillover effects from previous policies and to considerations of efficiency (Thielemann 2004). However, the substantially economic nature of the European Union project and its institutional setting configure a model of inclusion of migrants’ rights that privileges economic rights over social and political ones (Geddes 2000b: 633). Moreover, there remain clear impediments to the full protection of migrants’ rights by the EU, as the dominance of the common migratory
and refugee policy by the securitisation agenda of the member states clearly demonstrates (Geddes 2006b: 646).

From a liberal institutionalist viewpoint, Guiraudon explains the securitisation of the EU’s home and justice affairs as a consequence of the competition of domestic actors to increase their power and enhance their position at the EU level. The transnationalisation game has favoured law and order officials and agencies; that is, those who are in charge of border controls seeking to gain independence from the national institutional constraints (Guiraudon 2000). Her main claim is that bureaucrats sitting in interior ministries and other police agencies ‘venue-shopped’ at the international level to escape domestic adversaries (such as the domestic judicial system) and pursue their own agenda in immigration and refugee policy. This led to the securitisation of the EU common approach to home and justice affairs (ibid.: 264). A similar focus on the role of security agencies and officials is proposed by Huysmans (2000), albeit in a more neo-constructivist fashion. Also intrinsically constructivist is the analysis proposed by Lavenex (2001). She embeds the antagonism between the ‘liberal’, human rights approach to migration and the ‘security’ realist perspective into the realm of how ideas are transmitted to the political system through institutions, following Risse.14

Concluding on the analysis of how mainstream approaches have dealt with international migration, it is fair to claim that neither neo-realists nor liberal institutionalists are in a position to shed light on the reasons why migration has been on the rise in recent decades. More promising in answering this question appears to be the globalisation thesis, to which I now turn.

The Globalisation Thesis: An Introduction

The bulk of empirical work in international migration has proceeded from the perspective of globalisation.15 In the next section, the notion of globalisation will be analysed and defined from a number of different IPE perspectives. In this introductory section, it is important to stress that although the globalisation arguments vary hugely, all globalisation theorists agree that the sovereignty and regulatory power of the state have been weakened by transnationalism, and that politics has been subordinated to economic forces (Brettel and Hollifield 2008).

Simply put, the globalisation thesis states that there was a process of economic globalisation at work in the late twentieth century, buttressed by transnational social networks and communities. Globalisation has led to the inevitability of migration and a loss of control of borders, to the point that sovereignty and even citizenship itself may be redundant. In this
context, the state loses its centrality in the international system, and migration processes are analysed as a consequence of globalisation.

The globalisation thesis was originally proposed by sociologists, but, as further elaborated below, many IPE scholars from non-mainstream perspectives have put forward interesting hypotheses concerning the impact of globalisation on migratory flows to Western countries. A concrete example of how the globalisation thesis has been developed by sociologists in the direction of a political economy interpretation is provided in Saskia Sassen’s early interest in migratory flows (Sassen 1998; 1981: Ch. 4) from developing countries with high levels of foreign direct investment (FDI), export processing zones (EPZs) and high level of growth of gross national product (GNP) (such as South-East Asia and the Caribbean Basin). The author underlines the existence of an enigma in the increase of migratory flows from those kinds of countries. The enigma is that foreign investment and job creation should have acted as a deterrent of rather than an inducement to migration. Why did this not happen? Sassen’s answer is that we need to specify the links between the occurrence of rapid export-led industrialisation and emigration. The steps to do so are the following.

First, it is necessary to analyse the characteristics of the new industrial growth in less developed countries, and to place it in the context of the countries’ economic organisation. Similar characteristics include the development of a world market for these countries’ exports, which is related to the creation of EPZs through FDI.

Second, we must study the employment effects of these new patterns of growth: they increase the employment rate. Indeed, export-oriented agriculture requires a large supply of low-wage workers at crucial periods in the production cycle. Export-oriented plants tend to be labour-intensive and are mostly concentrated in a given area for reasons related to servicing and transportation. Finally, large agglomerations of firms producing for export generate a range of additional jobs, from packaging to construction and operation of airports and harbours. Third, it is necessary to see how these labour needs are met. This happens through the mobilisation of large numbers of people into wage labour who were previously outside it – in particular, women, which leads to the feminisation of work.

Fourth, it is important to assess the migration impact of all this: does this imply the creation of a pool of potential migrant workers? The answer for Saskia Sassen is that yes, it does. Precisely because of the significant job-creation effect of export-manufacturing and its concentration in few areas, the extent of the mobilisation of new workers into the labour force has been considerable. In areas where the new industrial zones have been developed on a large scale, extensive mobilisation of women into the labour force can contribute to the disruption of traditional work.
structures in communities of origin. The disruption of traditional work structures resulting from an extremely high incidence of young female migration has further contributed to increase the pool of unemployed. It has stimulated the departure of men and women who may have not planned to leave.

Finally, it is necessary to examine whether the creation of a potential pool of migrants promotes the emergence of emigration as an option for individuals. This happens through the role of foreign investors who create the image of a better life in a foreign country (particularly the US).

To conclude, for Saskia Sassen, significant levels and concentrations of foreign investment comprise one, and only one, factor contributing to promoting emigration from less developed countries (LDCs) with high levels of growth and integrated in the world economy through:

- The incorporation of new segments of the population into wage labour and the associated disruption of traditional work structures. Both these phenomena create a supply of migrant workers.
- The feminisation of the new industrial workforce and its impact on the work opportunities of men, both in the new industrial zones and in the traditional work structures.
- The consolidation of objective and ideological links with the highly industrialised countries where most foreign capital originates; links that involve both a generalised Westernisation effect and more specific work situations wherein workers find themselves producing goods for people and firms in the highly industrialised countries.

Although Sassen successfully addresses the issue of the increase of migration from less developed countries to Western industrialised ones, her analysis is limited to those countries that are increasingly involved in the globalisation process and are improving their economic situation. It remains to be explained why emigration has also increased in the last decades in places which are increasingly marginalised from the global economy. To answer this question, the next section engages with the debate in IPE about globalisation and its impact on migration.

THE GLOBALISATION THESIS WITHIN THE GLOBALISATION DEBATE

The globalisation thesis is not available in a single, universally accepted version. On the contrary, it is the subject of as many debates as approaches
in the social sciences. However, as this chapter addresses the issue of the impact of globalisation on migration from the international political economy perspective.

Before proceeding to the consequences of globalisation for migration, it is important to define what globalisation is from the different IPE perspectives, and to examine which definition of globalisation is adopted here to assess its impact on international migration.

A Qualitative Definition of Globalisation

Anthony Giddens, in a lecture entitled ‘Globalisation: The state of the debate’ (UCLA, 7 November 2005), referred to the existence of three phases in the development of the globalisation debate. The first phase witnessed the debate between those who believed in the existence of globalisation (so-called ‘globalists’) and those who did not believe in it (sceptics). In the second phase, everyone acknowledged the peculiar characteristics of the phenomenon of globalisation, and the debate moved into the streets, where political activists, commonly referred to as anti-globalists, violently opposed the spread of globalisation, mainly identified with the economic neoliberalism and political imperialism. In the third phase, the current one, even the anti-globalist discourse has been overcome by a general acceptance of the inevitability of globalisation, and the debate revolves around how to make globalisation work also for the poor. In a few words, the has debate moved from the questions ‘Does globalisation exist?’ and: ‘Is globalisation good?’, to ‘How to govern globalisation?’

Giddens’s characterisation is interesting, but is itself globalist within an institutionalist perspective. In fact, there is still no consensus on what globalisation is, nor on whether it is a completely original phenomenon, neither among the different disciplines in social sciences nor, more specifically, among the different approaches in IPE. Limiting the analysis to IPE perspectives, it is possible to classify the positions adopted by scholars on the subject into three broad groups: those who deny the existence of the phenomenon of globalisation (e.g. Hirst et al. 2009), those who admit it yet tend to provide only a quantitative definition (e.g. Garret 1998) and those who adopt a qualitative definition.

The school of thought denying globalisation rests on considerations about the historical recurrence of periods of increased international and cross-border interactions. In reality, those who adopt a similar perspective deny the ‘originality’ of globalisation and its characterisation as a new phenomenon. Sometimes, they may go so far as to deny to the current phase of the world economy development any global, globalised or globalising nature. It seems, however, that whether you multiply the number
of ‘globalisations’ taking place in the course of history or even deny its occurrence in the present historical moment, the question of how to define globalisation remains unsolved. Ultimately, the terms of the debate rest on the dichotomy between the quantitative and the qualitative definitions of the phenomenon.

It might even be suggested that the denial of globalisation stems from the failure to identify the distinctive characteristics of the current phase of capitalist development by adopting a quantitative definition of the phenomenon. Indeed, from the quantitative point of view, globalisation is defined as: ‘The intensification of economic, political, social, and cultural relations across borders’ (Holm and Sorensen 1995: 12). However, this definition leaves unresolved a number of issues regarding, on the one hand, the means by which to measure the degree of economic, social and cultural relations across the border, as well as their intensification. On the other hand, it leaves unclear the kinds of relationships existing between the economic, social and political aspects of globalisation; indeed, it does not even specify whether there is any relationship at all. Moreover, by accounting for the phenomenon of globalisation only in quantitative terms, one can hardly succeed in grasping its causes and consequences. This makes it extremely difficult to relate it to other phenomena, such as mass migration from less developed countries. It is therefore necessary to deepen the perspective by adopting a qualitative definition of globalisation.

From the qualitative point of view, globalisation is defined as a process comprising a number of qualitative transformations, which in turn characterise the current phase of capitalist development. In this context, globalisation is identified as a qualitatively new phenomenon, comprising a number of components, all of them concurring to define globalisation as a process or, as Mittleman (2000) suggests, a ‘syndrome’. Moreover, these components tend to spill over, one onto another, without any predetermined single cause–effect relation but in a dialectical way, which makes it possible to identify the direction of the change, if not to react accordingly. The components included in such a qualitative definition of globalisation are represented by: technological transformation; financial transformation; geographical reallocation of production; the process of commodification; the polarisation of wealth; the subordination of politics to economics and the related decline of the nation state; and the emergence of a new global division of labour which produces mass migration from marginalised regions of the globe.19

Summing up, the globalisation thesis on international migration assumes that the state has lost the possibility to control and halt contemporary migratory flows, which are an inevitable component of the globalisation process.
The New Global Division of Labour and the Increase of Mass Migration

As noted above in the qualitative definition of globalisation, technological change represents the engine of a process of transformation, which interests both the productive and the financial structures. Leaving aside the latter, what is particularly relevant to frame the analysis of migratory flows is the geographical reallocation of production. This takes place through the creation of export processing zones in developing countries, through a policy of mergers and acquisitions or through straightforward FDI (Dicken 2003). As a consequence of production restructuring, the labour structure changes with a substantial reallocation of labour-intensive production by Third World countries. However, this outcome is compounded by the opposite effects of technological development in terms of the increase of distant work, and the increase of labour mobility, including mass migration and brain drain.

On the one hand, production tends to move to some specialised regions of the globe,20 where it is possible to exploit the advantages of lower production costs in the form of both lower labour costs and/or lower costs of primary resources. This phenomenon gives rise to the paradox of regionalisation within globalisation, characterised by the creation of economically integrated regions.21 This further increases the marginalisation of those zones of the globe that are not interested, for reasons too complex to analyse here, in the process of geographical displacement of production or by the globalisation of financial markets (see, e.g., Murshed 2002). On the other hand, however, the populations of those marginalised zones of the globe, whose economic conditions are likely to worsen as a consequence of the process of globalisation, experience an increased incentive to leave their home countries and move to the more developed regions of the world, looking for a better standard of life. This produces the two inter-related phenomena of the brain drain, when skilled or highly educated labour flees the country of origin; and mass migration, when unskilled labour migrates.

The ensemble of the above-described dynamics leads to a new global division of labour whose main characteristics comprise the geographical displacement of production alongside regional patterns and the increased use of Third World cheaper labour, and yet the increase of brain drain and mass migration from the regions left behind by the process of regionalisation within globalisation. One of the outcomes of this new division of labour is an overall decrease of production costs in both Third World and industrialised countries. Indeed, this process not only brings about lower production costs through the reallocation of production abroad or the hiring of immigrants, particularly illegal ones, but it also lowers the prices
of domestic labour by putting pressure on organised labour and reducing its bargaining power.

Moreover, mass migration, both legal and illegal, acquires regional patterns due to historical, geographic, social or cultural reasons. All responses to mass migration, therefore, take the form of regional policies, such as the US or the EU immigration policy. Here, a fundamental paradox arises. The paradox is between the advantages of immigration in terms of reduction of production costs and contribution to the sustainability of the welfare state (particularly given the ageing problem in the more developed world), and the implementation of stricter migration policies at the regional level.\textsuperscript{22}

In Europe, for example, the ensemble of public policy responses to mass migration both at the national\textsuperscript{23} and the community level has fuelled the debate over the creation of the ‘Fortress Europe’ (Geddes 2003; see also Chapter 13 in this book). The consequences of the adoption of a generally tight approach to migration from Third World countries have been an increase of irregular migration and the progressive ‘securitisation’ of migration. Of course, the main reasons for the adoption of similar responses to mass migration are the traditional concerns over political unrest, social conflict, cultural clashes or religious struggles. This became particularly relevant in the aftermath of the September 11th attacks on the World Trade Center in New York, which sparked a wave not only of securitisation of migration, particularly from Muslim countries, but also of straightforward Islamophobia (see e.g. BBC 2004). However, a further aspect of the issue is represented by the political economy consequences of illegal (as opposed to legal) migration, in terms of cost reduction and increase of bargaining power vis-à-vis organised labour. There certainly seems to be some evidence that the use of illegal migrant work reduces the wages of legal work and, consequently, the power of organised labour. For example, in Germany, studies have shown that a 1 per cent increase in the share of less-skilled foreign workers in the labour force leads to a 5.9 per cent fall in the wages of blue collar workers and a 3.5 per cent increase in white collar wages (Overbeek 2000). In this context, it would be interesting to carry out further investigation of the economic sectors involved in the use and exploitation of illegal immigration and to assess the political economy consequences of similar practices in terms of power shifts between different socio-economic actors.\textsuperscript{24}

Moreover, in analysing the dichotomy between legal immigration and illegal immigration, it is found that the second is more favourable to the neoliberal order then the first, because it allows for the flexibilisation of the internal labour market, while legal immigrants should be integrated in the existing welfare state provisions system.
To sum up, the political economy consequences of the increase of mass migration in the context of globalisation are:

- A precarisation of working conditions in both developed and less developed countries.
- An increase of the power of transnational companies at the international level.
- The reaction of the governments through the constitution of regional governance scheme, such as the EU, where the labour–capital dynamics are reproduced but with a strong reduction of power on the labour side (Overbeek 2000).

CONCLUSION

From the theoretical point of view, the following issues appear particularly relevant to understand the impact of globalisation on migratory flows:

- The paradox of regionalisation within globalisation, and its consequences in terms of the increase of intra-regional temporary migration.
- The paradox of marginalisation within globalisation and its consequences in terms of the increase of brain drain and mass migration from marginalised countries.
- The paradox of ‘Fortress Europe’ and its consequences in terms of illegal migration.

These paradoxes impact on the decision of people to migrate, and on their modalities and motivations for migration.

NOTES

2. Ibid.: Introduction and Ch. 1.
3. Ibid.: Introduction and Ch. 5.
4. Ibid.: Introduction and Ch. 3.
5. Ibid.: Introduction and Ch. 4.
6. Ibid.: Introduction and Ch. 2.
7. Ibid.: Introduction and Ch. 7.
8. Ibid.: Introduction and Ch. 7.
10. Contrary to the interpretation of Hollifield; see Brettel and Hollifield (2008: 202).
11. For a similar criticism, see Brettel and Hollifield (2008).
13. By securitisation is meant the transformation of migration and refugee policy into a security issue and the adoption of security-related tools to deal with it. See Huysmans (2000).
14. For more on the EU migratory regime see McMahon in this book, Chapter 13.
16. See, for example, Sassen (1988); also Sassen (1981), Castells (1975).
17. A similar distinction is contained in Dicken (1998: 5).
18. See, for example, Mittleman (2000). For the relations between globalisation and migration, see, for example, Sassen (1998) and Weiner (1995).
19. See also in this book: León and Overbeek, Chapter 2; and Roccu, Chapter 15.
20. Scholars refer to the ‘triad’ to indicate the three main zones of production of the globe: the Asia-Pacific region, the USA and Europe.
21. See, for example Breslin et al. (2002) and Hettne et al. (1999).
22. For a detailed analysis of the number of migrants necessary to cover the needs of EU member states, see United Nations (2001).
23. For a detailed analysis of some EU member states’ migratory policies, see Geddes (2003).
24. For data, see Ghosh (1999), also Harris (1995).

REFERENCES