1. Migration, identity and wellbeing in China: recent developments and new research

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1.1 SETTING THE SCENE

The economic, social and demographic changes that are occurring in China are unprecedented. They are happening on a scale that has never occurred anywhere before and the implications will be felt all over the world. They have set in train massive population movements – both internally and globally. At the same time, the decades-long institutional legacy from the pre-reform era, especially the household registration system (*hukou*), still plays an important role in determining people’s migration behaviour and settlement patterns, as well as their integration, or lack of, into host communities.

Since the late 1970s, a large number of migrant workers from the countryside have lived and worked in Chinese cities, contributing to China’s rapid urbanization. The proportion of the population that was in urban areas was 18 per cent in the late 1970s, 36 per cent in 2000 and close to 50 per cent in 2010. That is, among the total population of 1.339 billion in China in 2010, 665.6 million were counted as urban population (Qin and Zhang 2014; World Bank 2014; Chan 2013). It should be noted that the urban population count in the 2010 census was *de facto* urban population: that is, it included both urban residents with local urban household registration status (*hukou*) and migrants who had been residing in urban areas for six months or more at the time of census (but without local urban *hukou*). More than half of the *de facto* urban population growth was contributed by rural–urban migration in the decade of 2000–2010 (Chen and Song 2014). The share of net-migration in total urban population growth in the previous two decades was even higher, ranging from 72 per cent to 90 per cent (Chen Guo and Wu 2011).

However, China’s urbanization is often regarded as ‘incomplete urbanization’, indicating the failure to transform rural migrant workers into urban citizens. One of the unique features of the ‘incomplete urbanization’ approach is that it encouraged the temporary migration of rural people to cities to facilitate industrialization and economic growth without enabling
them to use the services of the cities (Chan 2010). It was estimated recently that around 260 million residents in urban areas in China do not have local hukou and lack access to urban public services and social security (World Bank 2014). Therefore they could only be considered as de facto urban population, not fully converted local residents or urban citizens. While most rural to urban migrants are better off economically than their counterparts in the villages, their subjective wellbeing tends to be worse than those who have never left the villages (Knight and Gunatilaka 2010). Further, second-generation migrants are less satisfied with their jobs and lives than first-generation migrants, regardless of having higher wages in the cities (Cheng et al 2013). Recent media reports on suicide attempts by migrant workers indicate that labour markets in urban China, especially the sectors in which migrant workers are concentrated, are not well regulated and workers’ rights are not well protected (China Economic Review 2010; Tharoor 2014; Barboza 2010). Symptoms of depression are reported as being more prevalent among migrant workers than the general population (Qiu et al 2011).

It is widely accepted that China’s remarkable economic growth has been partially due to its advantageous population age structure, known as the ‘demographic dividend’ (Wang and Mason 2007; Peng 2005), and that about 20 per cent of China’s economic growth is attributable to rural to urban migration (Cai and Wang 2006; Cai 2009). It has also been argued that China’s competitive advantage, the so-called ‘China Price’, is in part due to the exploitation of workers who are paid low and irregular wages and experience poor working conditions and few employee benefits and welfare (Business Week 2004; Guo and Gao 2008). With the ageing of the labour force and a decrease in rural surplus labour, it is expected that there might soon be a shortage of labour and the cost of labour would increase accordingly. What is not clear is how much rural migrants would benefit from these changes.

Urbanization has been identified by the Chinese central and local governments as an important driving force of economic growth and prosperity in the past decades and it will continue to play this role in the coming decades (Tao 2011; Gao et al 2014; Li et al 2015). Under this policy orientation, all regions and cities in China have started another round of intensified urban expansion – expropriating farmlands for commercial and residential development and demolishing parts of cities in the name of urban renewal (Li et al 2015; He Huang and Wang 2014).

The 2010 population census provides us with updated information and an understanding of the recent geographic patterns and trends of migration within China. The coastal-bound, city-bound and wealthier region-bound migration patterns were identified in the 1990s and 2000s (Liang 2001). A number of major first tier cities and the most developed
regions were the major migration destinations during the 1990s and 2000s (Chen Guo and Wu 2011; Lu and Wang 2013; Shen 2013). In recent years, with skyrocketing housing prices in many first tier cities and the lack of affordable rental markets, many people have chosen to move to second or third tier cities. What remains to be seen is whether migrants have a stronger sense of belonging and are better integrated into urban societies if they move to smaller cities.

Most of the above-mentioned literature has been on rural to urban migration in China, focusing on its important contribution to the country’s rapid economic growth and the consequences of rural to urban migration. Recently, there has been some attention to urban to urban migration streams that exhibit different characteristics to rural to urban migration and provide some more nuanced analysis on the complexity of migrant groups in China (Guo and Zhang 2012; Cheng et al 2013).

The main focus of the vast majority of China’s internal migration literature has been on urban destinations. Studies focusing on rural destinations have mainly been on the return migration of previous rural–urban migrants and their contribution or their re-integration to rural communities. Studies suggested that returned migrants, equipped with more knowledge and experience, are more likely to invest in productive farm assets (Zhao 2002) and they are more likely to be entrepreneurial and help to revitalize rural economies and alleviate poverty in less developed regions (Demurger and Xu 2011).

However, studies that focus on rural–rural migration have been rare. Such studies have tended to focus on marriage migration (Fan 2008; Fan and Huang 1998), as it has been the main form of rural–rural migration, especially for rural women. Women in poor rural areas with low education, low social status and a lack of employment opportunities have tended to pursue migration by marrying into rural areas in more developed regions (Fan and Huang 1998). Traditionally most rural marriage migration occurred within small geographic areas and this possibly explained part of the large volume of intra-county migration (42.2 million) in the 2000 census (Fan 2008). A welcome recent study by Liu et al (2014), which analysed rural out-migration channels in China’s Sichuan province, has suggested that about 15 per cent of rural migrant workers found off-farm employment in their home villages, about 11 per cent found jobs outside of their home villages but within their hometown, 13 per cent got jobs within their home county, 15 per cent got jobs within Sichuan province and about 46 per cent pursued employment outside Sichuan province. In this case, intra-provincial migration was dominant while rural–rural migration for employment purposes, that is village-to-village, was far less important.
This volume does not include a chapter designated to rural–rural migration. This is partly a reflection of the current interests and research agenda of most China migration studies scholars. There is no general research on rural–rural migration as it is of little policy interest and most marriage migration research tends to focus on international migration.

China’s astonishing economic performance in recent decades has facilitated the rapid formation of upper-middle and elite classes that have accumulated wealth and resources in a short period of time. In the late 1990s, China experienced a period of ‘wealth concentration’ that benefited a minority, a class of elites, according to Xiang and Shen (2009). The increasing scale of Chinese international migration, especially student migration and skilled migration, is partly a reflection of this change.

Another major factor is the re-invigoration of ‘the Chinese migration legacy related to international trading in Chinese products’ (Thuno 2007, p. 14). From the 1500s this trade involved the selling of silk, tea and porcelain while now the trade is in clothes, shoes, toys and household items. One aspect of the economic reforms in China has been the development or re-orientation of many of the old townships and rural enterprises (TVEs) by local authorities to generate employment and increase rural incomes. At the same time this has generated new commercial opportunities for Chinese traders and entrepreneurs to ‘go abroad to both developed as well as developing countries to import and trade in inexpensive products manufactured in China’ (Thuno 2007, p. 13).

Coinciding with the changes in the composition of the outflow has been a change in the origins of international Chinese migrants. In the 1990s, the relative importance of cities such as Beijing and Shanghai as sources of the majority of registered international migrants comprised only 14 per cent whereas previously they, together with Guangzhou, had accounted for much more. On the other hand, the proportion from the rural areas of three coastal provinces, Fujian, Zhejiang and Yunnan, increased to 53 per cent of the total in the 1990s. Several reports also indicate that much of the irregular migration from China also stems from these three provinces (Pieke et al 2004).

Together with the changing composition and sources, there has been in recent years a shift in the international destinations of Chinese migrants – from a few traditionally dominant receiving countries to a variety of new destination countries. While the US, UK, Canada, Australia and New Zealand are still the main receiving countries of Chinese migrants, especially students and skilled/business migrants, an increasing number of Chinese have chosen to move to countries that were not favoured previously by Chinese migrants for investment and employment opportunities. South Africa, Israel, other countries in the Middle East, South America
and North and Eastern Europe have become important destinations (Lin 2015; Winders 2014; Thuno 2003; Li 2009; Nyiri 2003; Ceccagno 2003). The Chinese diaspora has also extended to remote countries/regions and increasing flows of Chinese entrepreneurs have found new frontiers (Haugen and Carling 2005; Lincoln 2009). Much of this dispersal is associated with the re-emergence of Chinese traders and entrepreneurs.

Unlike the generations of Chinese international migrants in history who were concentrated in low-skilled and poorly paid occupations in their destinations, an increasing number of Chinese international migrants are highly skilled and economically well-off (Benson-Rea and Rawlinson 2003; Zhang 2003; Dai et al 2011). But in spite of their increased human capital, Chinese migrants, especially women, may still experience problems in closing the gap in labour market outcomes with the general population (Wang and Lo 2005; Man 2004). In this respect they are similar to many international migrants who face difficulties in getting their human and social capital recognized in their destination.

Traditional Chinese communities, Chinatowns and other Chinese-concentrated communities in many migrant-receiving countries are no longer the settlement destinations of many Chinese. The Chinese diaspora has become very diverse and it could be argued that there are now many ‘diasporas’. All these changes require our updated understanding of the settlement patterns of Chinese international migrants in traditional and new destinations, their interactions with and integration into host societies and other ethnic communities and the formation and transformation of their identities and their sense of wellbeing.

With the advancement of technology, expanded availability of information, intensification of globalization and rapid rise of China there is no doubt that return migration to China and multiple migrations between China and other overseas destinations will escalate in years to come. Studies on return migration suggest that different stages of economic development and policy implementation result in different patterns of return migration. For example, Taiwan began to experience a ‘reversal of brain drain’ by attracting returnees in the 1980s, when the region’s economy started to take off.

China, and its many provinces and major cities, started in the 1990s to implement a series of favourable policies aiming at attracting skilled returnees (Luo et al 2003). The most successful scheme has been the establishment of various forms of ‘Science and Technology Parks’ in almost all Chinese major cities: returned overseas-educated entrepreneurs are granted seed funding and given other preferential treatment (Filatotchev et al 2011; Dai and Liu 2009). Universities in China have also set up special categories of recruitment, with favourable salary packages and start-up
research funding, to attract established overseas academic staff (Yi 2011). Studies indicate that highly skilled overseas-educated Chinese students and scholars also play an important role in influencing China’s outward foreign investment (Gao et al 2013). For many years, it was known in the job market that a person with an overseas qualification, known as a ‘sea turtle’ (haigui), would be treated more favourably than a locally-trained person, known as a ‘land tortoise’ (tubie) (Guo 2009; Pieke 2012). They were assumed to have knowledge and networks that would make them valuable to Chinese employers.

In the light of these changes it is timely to document and update the major internal and international migration trends and the implications of these movements for people’s identities, their wellbeing and their relationships and connections. This Handbook includes a collection of chapters by pre-eminent scholars who are currently conducting research on these issues. There is a cross-section of authors from China, Australia, Singapore, Spain, the UK and the US. It is particularly valuable to have contributions from people with very different perspectives and from different disciplinary backgrounds as to fully understand migration this is the best approach to take.

As each country uses words slightly differently, we have compiled a list of the most commonly used terms and concepts. We have tried to ensure consistency across the chapters so that the reader has a clear idea of the concept or term being used. The list is not exhaustive but includes the major concepts and terms used throughout the Handbook.

1.2 TERMINOLOGY

1.2.1 Migration and Mobility, Settlement and Resettlement

We make no distinction between the two terms, migration and mobility. Movement can be short-term, long-term, permanent or circular and may lead to return migration. Within China, short-term temporary migrants are frequently referred to as the ‘floating population’. This is a uniquely Chinese term that emerged to describe the mass movement of people throughout China since the late 1970s.

Settlement policies are not usually in place in relation to internal migration but China is a unique case, and the inadequacy of settlement policies will be shown to be a major factor in migrant integration. The policies attached to overseas resettlement range widely from assimilation, through integration to multiculturalism. They vary by country.

Assimilation comes from the Latin word to assimilate or to become
absorbed. Assimilation is commonly associated with the US ‘melting pot’ approach, where the mixture of ethnic groups has over time apparently resulted in an overarching culture to which immigrants are meant to conform. As Castles (1999, pp.5–6) states, the US concept of the ‘melting pot’, through which diverse immigrant nationalities would be ‘Americanised’, typifies the belief in the need for ‘cultural homogenisation’. It implies losing most or all of their ethnic, cultural traits and becoming like some national norm. In many countries assimilation continues to be the prevailing policy expectation while in others it has been replaced by policies of integration and/or multiculturalism.

Post-World War II immigration in many receiving countries was characterized by both its scale and rapidity. These two facts made ‘assimilation and acculturation impossible. Moreover, new forms of communication and transport made it much easier for immigrants to retain their cultural distinctiveness’ (Castles 1999, p.6). Western societies became culturally heterogeneous and began to deal with the difficult questions of culture, identity and citizenship. Australia, Canada, New Zealand and the US all moved from exclusionary policies, such as the White Australia Policy or its equivalent, to non-discriminatory entry systems. Some also introduced new settlement policies that no longer espoused assimilation. This stemmed from a realization that ‘culturally-distinct settler groups almost always maintain their languages and some elements of their homeland cultures, at least for a few generations’ (Castles and Miller 2003, p.14). Consequently many governments moved from policies of individual assimilation to acceptance of some degree of long-term cultural difference. This is manifested in various types of integration and multiculturalism policies.

The term integration in relation to societies commonly means to give or cause to give equal opportunity and consideration to a racial, religious, or ethnic group or a member of such a group. One unified whole is seen to comprise various separate parts that have some degree of differentiation. In the 1970s there was a move to multiculturalism, originally in Canada, but later in other countries. This involves a granting of minority cultural and political rights. Where such notions are rejected, immigrants tend to become marginalized ethnic minorities.

More recently, the term ‘transnationalism’ has come to be very widely used in relation to migrants, their sending country and their host country. Definitions vary but generally centre on exchanges, connections and practices across borders, thus transcending the national space as the primary reference point for activities and identities. With respect to migration, being connected to several places
at once – or ‘being neither here nor there’ – has long been a defining feature of the experience of being a migrant. Leading transnational, multi-sited lives means that exchanges and interactions across borders are a regular and sustained part of migrants’ realities and activities. These exchanges may take the form of ideas, values and practices, as well as political mobilization and economic contributions . . . transnationalism is used as a different way of looking at migration: the transnational lens places the spotlight on the connections that migrants establish between countries. (IOM 2010, p.1)

1.2.2 Identity

In the context of this Handbook, identity refers to social identity or a person’s self-definition in relation to others. It is different from personal identity. Social identity is a person’s perception that he or she belongs to a social category or group (Tajfel 1978). It relies on at least two important factors: (1) the person’s status in an existing hierarchical society, which assumes that the formation of one’s identity depends largely upon a named and classified world (Hogg and Abrams 1988; Stryker and Serpe 1982); and (2) social comparison (Tajfel 1978; Tajfel and Turner 1985) through which individuals adopt a certain standard to distinguish and label others as members of an ‘in-group’ or ‘out-group’.

One particular form of social identity is ethnic identity. Edwards summarizes ethnic identity as follows:

social identity refers to ethnic identity due to membership of an ethnic group. Ethnic identity is allegiance to a group – large or small – socially dominant or sub-ordinate – with which one has ancestral links. There is no necessity for a continuation, over generations, of the same socialisation or cultural patterns, but some sense of a group boundary must persist. This can be sustained by shared objective characteristics (language, religion, etc.) or by more subjective contributions to a sense of ‘groupness’, or by some combination of both. Symbolic or subjective attachments must relate, at however distant a remove, to an observably real past. (Edwards 1985, p.10)

Edwards argues that because of upward mobility, symbolic ethnicity becomes a visible quantity. ‘Symbolic’ identity is described as where:

involvement is a minimal one, does not require traditional ethnic culture or institutions, but does give importance to symbols . . . Presumably this reflects the fact that when ethnicity has altered to symbolic status only, it is no longer any sort of barrier to social advance and, as such, can be maintained indefinitely without cost. (Edwards 1985, p.10)

Cultural identity is a related concept that is not restricted to an ethnic group. Cultural identity when used to refer to ethnic groups encompasses ‘conventional patterns of behaviour, including values, beliefs, rules of
conduct, political organization, economic activity, and the like, which are
passed from one generation to the next by learning – and not by biological
inheritance’ (Hatch 1985, p.178). Language, religion and folkloric prac-
tices are the most common expressions of culture for ethnic groups.

The concepts of social and cultural identity are used interchangeably, to
describe the perceived sense of identity and belonging to certain groups/
communities by China’s internal migrants, especially rural to urban
migrants. Ethnic identity within China is touched upon in one chapter
in this book and it is also discussed in the chapters concerning the ethnic
identity of Chinese migrants overseas. Other social and geographic divi-
sions, such as between ‘rural’ and ‘urban’ areas, between ‘locals’ and
‘non-locals’ and between different provinces, are the focus when internal
migration is discussed within China.

1.2.3 Wellbeing

The concept of wellbeing is broadly adopted from Gough, McGregor and
Camfield’s (2007, p. 5) definition that includes both one’s objective cir-
cumstances and one’s subjective evaluation of these circumstances. ‘States
of wellbeing are continually produced in the interplay within the social,
political, economic and cultural processes of human social being’.

In the context of this book, one’s objective wellbeing is broadly defined
as one’s economic wellbeing (represented by level of income, occupational
status, and one’s ability to make a decent living). One’s subjective wellbeing
is roughly defined as one’s perception of their circumstances, such as overall
satisfaction with life, social status, social identity, respect by others, sense of
upward mobility, and sense of belonging or sense of inclusion or exclusion
etc. Sometimes, one’s identity and wellbeing are closely related. Upward
social mobility will often improve one’s sense of satisfaction and sense of
belonging, which in turn affects one’s sense of wellbeing. Lack of upward
social mobility or a lack of respect from people outside one’s social group
often results in a lack of willingness to integrate in the host community and
society. In addition, discriminations (economic, institutional, political or
otherwise) can affect one’s sense of belonging and sense of wellbeing.

1.3 NEW TRENDS IN INTERNAL MOBILITY
IN CHINA AND ISSUES OF IDENTITY AND
WELLBEING

China is unique in that, in the view of many scholars and researchers,
internal migrants have often been treated like international migrants.
Moving, for example, to a Special Economic Zone (SEZ) has been likened to moving to a foreign country as the physical landscape, living standards, culture, attitudes and policies are quite different from the rest of China. The household registration system, *hukou*, was an effective mechanism in regulating spatial movements of people for decades and it continues to have considerable impacts on many aspects of Chinese people’s lives, especially those who moved to places where they are not officially registered in the *hukou* system. Seven chapters in this book address various aspects of internal migration in China, from a range of disciplinary perspectives. The authors make use of the most updated data from censuses and a range of comprehensive surveys and fieldwork.

Chapter 2, Kam Wing Chan’s ‘Five decades of the Chinese *hukou* system’, presents a systematic and retrospective analysis of China’s *hukou* (household registration) system in the five decades since its promulgation, reviewing the history of that system from a broad socio-political perspective. More specifically, the chapter focuses on revealing trends in the development of the system over time and identifying many of its important ramifications for modern Chinese society. He examines the impact of *hukou* on the country’s industrialization, urbanization, rural–urban migration and social and spatial stratification. Kam Wing Chan argues that the *hukou* system now presents a major obstacle to China’s quest to become a modern, first world nation and global leader. This chapter sets an overarching background for other chapters where institutional mechanisms of migration regulation and policy reform are discussed.

In Chapter 3, ‘Changing spatial and temporal patterns of China’s floating population’, Yu Zhu, Baoyu Xiao and Liyue Lin examine changing spatial and temporal patterns of China’s floating population and the implications for understanding internal migration. The results suggest that the size of the floating population continued to increase rapidly in the period between 2000 and 2010, with coastal provinces in eastern China as the main receiving areas and inland provinces (especially those in central China) as the main source areas. But the analysis also indicates that the proportion of the floating population absorbed by the eastern region declined in the years leading to the 2010 census, suggesting a shrinking migration flow to the eastern part of China. In the meantime, while the Pearl-River Delta region and the Yangtze River Delta region continued to be the two most important destination areas of China’s floating population, their relative positions have changed, with the Yangtze River Delta region overtaking the Pearl-River Delta region to become the major receiving area of the floating population. In terms of temporal migration patterns of the floating population, the results suggest that short-term migrants still constitute the majority of the floating population, suggesting
that their unsettled and unstable nature has not changed much and that there is still a long way to go for them to settle down, either in their current or future places of destination or their place of origin. Finally, the chapter argues that these temporal and spatial patterns of the floating population have important implications for understanding their identity, their future development and their impact on both sending and receiving areas.

In Chapter 4, ‘Negative native-place stereotypes and discriminatory wage penalties in China’s migrant labour markets’, Margaret Maurer-Fazio, Rachel Connelly and Ngoc-Han Thi Tran present a thorough examination of the labour market outcomes of migrant workers, especially those from rural backgrounds. They argue that China’s linguistic and geographic diversity leads many individuals to identify themselves and others not so much as Chinese but as hailing from a particular province of origin. Negative personality traits are often attributed to people from different provinces: Henan people, for example, appear to be particularly singled out as possessing a host of negative traits. There is little question that prejudicial attitudes exist towards peoples from some provinces. Using data from the 2008 and 2009 waves of the migrant surveys of the Rural–Urban Migration in China Project (RUMiC), the authors explore whether native-place wage discrimination, based on province of origin, exists in China’s urban labour markets for rural-to-urban migrant workers.

Zhiming Cheng, Ingrid Nielsen and Russell Smyth in Chapter 5, ‘Determinants of wage arrears and their implications for the socio-economic wellbeing of China’s migrant workers: evidence from Guangdong province’, provide a comprehensive analysis of the impacts of unregulated labour market on migrants’ wellbeing from a fresh angle. The chapter examines the determinants of wage arrears among rural–urban migrants, the effect of wage arrears on economic wellbeing (represented by wages) and how the experience of wage arrears affects several subjective indicators of wellbeing, such as feelings of belongingness and discrimination in the city. The authors found that the percentage of people experiencing wage arrears ranged from 6 to 9 per cent in 2007–09 and males were more likely to experience wage arrears as were those working for private firms and micro-entrepreneurs. Those with lower wages, a labour contract, and membership of a trade union or a trade union in their workplace were less likely to experience wage arrears. Wage arrears affect many aspects of wellbeing, including a perception that life is difficult in the city and that their status is lower than others in the city. Thus it is an objective indicator that can be used to assess wellbeing.

Yue Zhuo and Zai Liang’s Chapter 6, ‘Migration and wellbeing of the elderly in rural China’, addresses an increasingly important but inadequately studied area. Although much is known about the causes and
economic consequences of internal migration, we know relatively very little about the impact of migration on the wellbeing of the left-behind, especially the elderly in rural China. Utilizing data from a national survey, this chapter examines the associations between adult children’s migration and multiple dimensions of elderly wellbeing in rural China. The results show that the rural elderly with migrant children received more money from their children than those without migrant children and were more likely to live in better quality houses. Living arrangements did not significantly differ between the two groups but having migrant children was linked to better health status, but lower levels of life satisfaction. The findings in this chapter are suggestive of a multidimensional framework for research on migration and the left behind, and the policy implications are discussed.

In Chapter 7, ‘Minority mobility in Guizhou province, with a focus on planned resettlement and its implications for ethnicity and identity’, Jiaping Wu and Robyn Iredale analyse the historical development of minority migration in one of the most important ethnic minority-concentrated provinces in China. The role of government intervention in resettling poor villagers has become very pronounced in China. Large resettlements have already been undertaken and it is expected that another 100 million people or more will be moved and resettled in cities and towns between 2014 and 2020. The majority of these relocations are taking place in regions of ethnic minority concentration. The consequences of such resettlement have barely been examined.

While resettlement was ostensibly developed for poverty alleviation purposes in China it is also deemed to ‘help’ the ‘modernization’ of ethnic minorities. Cities are seen as places of greater economic opportunities and the planned resettlement and urbanization of ethnic minorities is seen as a desirable policy option that achieves this goal. But there are major implications for ethnic identity as well as for wellbeing and the authors question the lack of adequate preparation and the short-sighted nature of China’s policies.

In Chapter 8, ‘Boundaries, exclusion and identity construction: experiences of rural–urban migrants in China’, Yeqing Huang and Fei Guo focus on the process of formation and the transformation of identity and sense of belonging and wellbeing among rural to urban migrants. It is argued that the concept of social exclusion has been widely applied to explain the marginalization of rural–urban migrants in contemporary China and yet aspects of migrants’ own perceptions of their identity have received little attention.

This chapter examines some of the underlying mechanisms of social exclusion in contemporary Chinese urban society by deconstructing
perceived boundaries between rural–urban migrants and local urbanites. Qualitative analysis of data collected from a rural village in central China suggests that migrants’ identities are shaped and reshaped by their hukou status, employment status, home ownership and social network. These factors are interwoven, leading to more than one identity in migrants’ narrative discourses. Most survey respondents, when asked to choose either a rural or an urban identity, were ambivalent, indicating apparently blurry identity boundaries. The authors conclude with a discussion about the institutional and market forces that impact on rural–urban migrants’ identity formation and transformation in urban China.

Because of the unique policy environment, many of the issues that emerge within China are also relevant to the issues discussed in the chapters on international migration. Many scholars have argued that internal migration within China to cities and special economic zones is akin to international migration for the nationals of other countries. Chinese internal migrants effectively have to cross ‘borders’ (due to the hukou regime) and experience the same dislocation, lack of services and discrimination as many international migrants. One could argue that they are ‘practised’ and therefore a move overseas would be less traumatic. However, it tends to be urban residents who migrate overseas independently, except for labour migrants (through labour export schemes) who are moved as part of a group of workers to a specific country and work on a specific site (Xiang 2003). In this sense, international labour migration shares some similarities with organized labour migration from one province to another within China, e.g. from Sichuan province to Guangdong province in the 1980s.

The first similarity is that both international labour export and organized labour migration within China tend to be temporary and project-based, and workers would be required to return to their country/place of origin upon completing the specific projects. Long-term and permanent settlement options for both types of migrant workers are not available. Second, migrant workers in labour export schemes and rural to urban migrants (organized or otherwise) tend to be low skilled. In addition, both migrant workers in labour export schemes and organized migrant workers within China utilize agents in their migration process. Both types of migrant workers are highly dependent on the agents throughout their migration process.

Unlike countries and regions such as Mexico and Africa where the connections between internal and international migration have long been known (Lozano-Ascencio Roberts and Bean 1997; Davis Stecklov and Winters 2002; Adepoju 1998), the connections between China’s internal and international migration have not been adequately researched and
established. Despite the call for an integrated framework proposed nearly one decade ago (Skeldon 2006), empirical research adopting this framework in the Chinese case has been lacking.

The general understanding in the current literature on China’s migration is that Chinese people have been increasingly mobile, both internally and internationally. However, internal migration in China tends not to be the start of a process that ends in international migration. The characteristics of the two groups are quite different, with internal migrants being less skilled and with less human capital than international migrants, who are likely to be urban residents and tertiary educated. Nonetheless they share much in common, such as seeking integration to the host community/country, deciding on a settlement outcome (or leaving) and developing their sense of belonging and identity (or lack of) at their places of destination.

1.4 INTERNATIONAL CHINESE MIGRANTS’ IDENTITY AND RELATIONSHIPS WITH THE PEOPLE’S REPUBLIC OF CHINA

Inevitably, what happens within the borders of China impacts on emigration and return migration. Changes have been so dramatic in recent decades that it is relatively straightforward to see distinct phases in patterns of movement and policies designed to influence or adapt to these patterns.

Elaine Ho’s chapter, ‘From *guiqiao* to *haidai*: diaspora engagement and the evolving politics of return migration in China’, compares two distinct phases of diaspora engagement in Mainland China. Historically China has encouraged co-ethnics abroad to retain their ties to the ancestral homeland while simultaneously assimilating into their countries of immigration. Between 1949 and 1979, however, the Chinese state accepted successive cohorts of co-ethnics fleeing unstable circumstances in Southeast Asia. Rather than categorizing them as refugees (*nanqiao*), China considered them returnees (*guiqiao*) and resettled them in state-owned farms, even though many were diasporic descendants who had not lived in the ancestral homeland before. The policy was motivated at the time by what the Chinese state considered its geopolitical claims to ethnic affinity with co-ethnics abroad.

In comparison, China’s diaspora engagement today is focused more on the economic benefits to be derived from the human and financial capital represented by its co-ethnics abroad and their potential return. This is reflected in the programs developed as part of China’s diaspora strategy
to court business and scientific knowledge in the Chinese diaspora. The initiatives today are also more likely to be targeted at highly skilled emigrants who left China after the 1980s. The contemporary diaspora strategy, however, neglects other types of returnees – such as the ‘middling’ category that have difficulty finding jobs after spending a period of time abroad. They are referred to derogatorily in Chinese parlance as *haidai* (seaweed), an extension of an earlier, more complimentary label *haigui* (sea turtles) used to describe returnees coming home after a period abroad. By juxtaposing these two phases of Chinese policy towards diaspora engagement and their outcomes, this chapter critically examines the politics of emigration and return migration in China.

In Chapter 10 on ‘Chinese in the United States: growth, dispersal and integration’, Weiwei Zhang and John Logan focus on the Chinese population in the United States. The rapid growth from less than a quarter of a million in 1960 (of whom the majority were born in the US) to over 4 million in 2012 (60 per cent foreign-born) is striking. While in the nineteenth century Chinese were almost entirely a West Coast population, about half now live in the West and about a quarter in the Northeast. This pattern is changing slowly, with notable growth now in the South. The relatively high socio-economic status of this minority group is similar on average to other Asian immigrants but they outperform non-Hispanic whites on some measures. A notable feature of Chinese in America, however, quite unlike other racial/ethnic groups, is its polarization – large shares with very high and very low incomes. These extremes reflect differences in immigrant origins, timing of arrival and the conditions under which they entered the country.

Zhang and Logan move from the general to specific examples by analysing the settlement patterns within two metropolitan regions with the largest number of Chinese residents, New York and Los Angeles. The high level of suburbanization, their separation from other groups and their location in relatively advantaged enclaves in both cities and suburbs is described. This new reality is the basis of a kind of ethnic community that has been called the ‘ethnoburb’. In these locales it is possible to maintain a strong Chinese ethnic identity without the usual costs associated with a segregated minority. The impact of these settlement patterns on issues of identity reveals interesting changes that we can best describe as the development of ‘symbolic identity’.

Dawid Wladyka and Ricard Morén-Alegret’s Chapter 11 examines ‘Chinese immigrants in the Sagrada Familia neighbourhood of Barcelona, Spain: their socio-economic viability and identity’. It provides a unique case study of one district in a major city in Spain. Chinese immigration to Barcelona has increased markedly since the 1980s and in 2013 Chinese
made up the largest share of the 18 per cent of the neighbourhood’s population that was foreign-born. Originally, Chinese immigrants established restaurants, which flourished in response to Spain’s growing affluence and the massive tourist industry. Later they diversified into other types of enterprises, including trading in Chinese manufactured goods. This contrasts with other countries, such as Italy, where garment/leather manufacturing marked the beginning of Chinese operations.

Chinese enterprises in Barcelona have been based on family-hiring practices and the Chinese have formed an enclave with the more recent emergence of a ‘Chinatown’. Chinese residents’ purchasing power could provide an opportunity for empowering others in the neighbourhood but the chapter describes escalating conflicting attitudes towards Chinese and limited mutual collaboration. The implications, in terms of the maintenance of strong Chinese links and community, will be described.

In Chapter 12, ‘Negotiating scientific identities: Chinese scientists in Australia and their networks’, Xiao Niu and Tim Turpin focus on the issue of an elite, highly educated group in Australia and the way they interact with co-ethnics in Australia, in China and elsewhere. They investigate the social dynamics of relationship-building between scientists working across Australia and China. The concept of dual identities is a common feature among transnational migrants and Chinese respondents in this study reflect a ‘global scientist’ identity and also a more localized Chinese identity. While the two identities and associated roles co-exist, the study shows that Chinese scientists have the choice of responding more to one or the other as they manage their relationships with colleagues, friends and employers. Those who respond more to their Chinese identity generally also maintain major links with the homeland and other scientists engaged in the Chinese diasporas. Those responding more to their global scientist identity are generally less concerned about maintaining relationships with the homeland.

Thus, far from being constrained within either component of their dual identity, these mobile scientists negotiate their progress through their careers making strategic decisions through a process of social exchange. This chapter provides important insights into the workings of transnational scientific networks and what can be gained from such collaboration.

Biao Xiang’s ‘The rise of China, changing patterns of out-migration and identity implications’ draws together a lot of the earlier threads and explores how emigration trends are related to general developments in China over the last 30 years and to the loosening of exit controls. The stock of international migrants from China increased to 9.3 million in 2013 and China is now the fourth largest source country of migrants, representing 4 per cent of the world’s migrants in 2013. Apart from this rapid increase,
Chinese emigration is characterized by a trend of ‘upward concentration’ in emigration – meaning that more wealthy and/or well-educated people are moving to a small number of the most advanced countries in the global north. By contrast, unskilled labour migration has increased much more slowly, the financial returns of migration remain stagnant and the conditions of labour migrants are uncertain – they are more vulnerable.

Biao Xiang argues that migration from China is increasingly a means of reinforcing and reproducing social inequality rather than a means of mitigating it. Further, economic development is likely to strengthen both the desire and the capability of the higher strata of the population to emigrate. It appears that how these people relate to and identify with China is changing. Identification with China is no longer based solely on common culture, language, history and ethnicity but now has a greater element of identifying with the state.

The final chapter draws all the threads together and provides an overview of current internal and international migration trends. Neither shows any signs of abating. The role of the state and the context for these developments is more important in China than in most other countries. The household registration policy, hukou, continues to be maintained, even in a context where it is widely flouted. The benefits to the state must outweigh the costs to wellbeing – that largely fall on rural migrants. Minorities have joined the major flows but are also over-represented in resettlement programs as they typically were driven into poorer regions in the past.

In the international arena, the impact of growing ‘nationalism’ and China’s drive to become a superpower are examined. What impact are these policies having on how international migrants are viewed and, in turn, how do they view China? In three decades they have gone from being viewed as ‘traitors’ to being wooed as highly valued co-ethnics. Relationships with China vary enormously and are very dynamic. The conclusion examines some of the ways that migrants respond to the state and the role of factors such as the time and circumstances of their departure, the nature of their integration into the destination and their perception of what they have to gain by returning to China, either permanently, temporarily or virtually.

REFERENCES


