1 INTRODUCTION

Political science has its distinctive subject matter – the exercise of power and its consequences for society – and its distinctive set of assumptions, concepts, theories and methods. These shape the way in which its practitioners identify topics and transform them into subjects worthy of being taught, researched and published. In a ‘normal’ physical or social science, such foundational elements are virtually invisible since they are regarded as givens and accepted without controversy. Political science has only rarely been a ‘normal’ science in this sense. The scholars who have practiced it since Plato and Aristotle have frequently disagreed on what these are – even though all of them ultimately draw on the same accumulated wisdom of their predecessors. They engage in endless disputes about basic assumptions and core concepts; they draw both of these from contending, if not contradictory, theories and they apply a wide range of methods – both empirical and normative, quantitative and qualitative.

The core of their problem rests with the changing nature of the discipline’s subject matter: power. Its exercise can be omnipresent but elusive; obvious when it involves force or coercion, but invisible when it focuses on manipulating preferences or invoking conformity to norms. Actors often pretend that they are not acting politically – while doing so – and virtually everyone has an incentive not to admit what his or her true objectives are. Maddeningly, the most powerful actors often have to do nothing since subordinates have already been programmed to obey or are convinced that it is in their best interest to do so. The consequences produced by the exercise of power are always risky, but usually calculable when circumscribed by established rules and practices; however, during periods of rapid change, they are fundamentally uncertain and, hence, incalculable. They are usually bundled together with allegedly ‘natural’ social, cultural or economic phenomena from which they are exceedingly difficult to disentangle. Of decisive importance as the discipline has become more self-proclaimed ‘scientific’ is the fact that power is not only
difficult to define, but singularly difficult to measure, especially quantitatively. Experimentation, controlling for existing conditions and measuring precisely for the effect of deliberately introduced conditions, is usually not possible and even when it has been used the results can be misleading. One of the most salient features of politics involves so-called ‘fallacies of composition’. What is true or workable at one level of aggregation produces very different results when practiced on a larger – or smaller – scale. Democratic individuals do not necessarily produce democratic regimes, and the inverse can be the case for autocratic individuals. If, as Aristotle noted, a science should only ‘look for precision in each class of things just so far as the nature of the subject admits’, then, political scientists face a more daunting task of being precise than any of the other social scientists.3

Their science rests on seven foundational components, all of which can be and have been ‘essentially’ disputed: (1) agents; (2) units; (3) motives; (4) mechanisms; (5) regimes; (6) methods; and (7) theories.

2 AGENTS

This is the most distinctive feature of a human science as opposed to a natural or physical science. It begins with the assumption that the objects of research are also its subjects. In the case of politics, this means that agents can make relevant choices that are not completely determined by the conditions in which they find themselves. If this were not the case, if as contemporary politicians have so often proclaimed, ‘There Is No Alternative’ were really the case, there would be no politics and, hence, no political science. Binding collective decisions would be made by the experts who know what that only alternative is and how to apply it.

Agency also implies that the subjects have the capacity for reflexivity. They are historical in the sense that their present actions are influenced by reflections (‘memories’) from the past, and, hence, by learning they may alter their responses (‘lessons’) when faced with analogous situations in the present. Inversely, agents may find themselves anchored in habits of obedience (‘standard operating procedures’; for example, March and Olsen 1989) that can be difficult to break when new opportunities appear. Moreover, the very process of researching the power relations among actors – past or present – can produce changes in the behavior or expectations of those who are being studied (‘anticipated reactions’).

The vast majority of political science researchers presume that these agents are individual and autonomous human beings faced with and capable of making choices between alternative and consequential actions. They may agree that these actors are uniquely capable of exerting political agency,
but they differ considerably over the properties that humans are capable of bringing to bear on their choices. Recently, thanks to the wholesale importation of assumptions from neo-liberal economics, these individuals are supposed to have pre-established and relatively fixed preferences, are able to rank these preferences consistently, possess adequate information about alternative courses of action and theories about their effects, and will predictably choose the course that they think best realizes those preferences, and still have the same preferences once the consequences of their choice have been experienced. This generic conception also reflects the much deeper ideological commitment of modern social and political thought to liberal individualism and rational progress. Shifting to a different micro-foundation would seem to declare that politics is a ‘passionate’ activity rooted in raw emotion, blind faith, mindless imitation, instinctual tradition, collective stupidity and/or random events – and, hence, incapable of collectively improving the world that we live in.

Without going so far, there are two grounds for calling this time-worn foundation into question. The first has to do with the sheer complexity and contingency that surrounds the contemporary individual. He or she cannot possibly know what are the ‘real’ (or, even less, all of the available) alternatives and what all of their eventual consequences will be – which means that he or she must rely on the surrounding social milieu in order to make these choices. Moreover, this individual is very likely to discover upon reflection that he or she has many conflicting interests or passions – especially over different time horizons – and, hence, cannot rank them consistently. Also, if those reasons were not enough, he or she is typically acting within a multilayered and polycentric set of institutions capable of making binding collective decisions affecting him or her – some public and some private. All of which implies that agent preferences cannot be fixed, but are always contingent on which policies are being proposed and by whom, and they will probably change during the course of political exchange between the various layers and centers of power.

The second reason for resetting the micro-foundations of political science is even more subversive of the prevailing orthodoxy. What if most of the significant actors were permanent organizations, not individual persons? Granted that these organizations are composed of individuals and some of them may depend very closely on the contributions and allegiance of these persons, but many do not and have developed elaborate rules and sources of support that cannot be reduced to such individual actions. They embody collective choices made long ago and have acquired a reputation and legitimacy of their own. Also, not infrequently, these political parties, interest associations, social movements, non-governmental organizations, business firms, government agencies and private foundations are in the
business of teaching individuals what their preferences should be and committing them to obeying policies made in their name.

If we switch to organizations as the principal actors, the political scientist’s task is greatly facilitated. By their very nature, these organized actors have internal processes for dealing with the diverse motives of their members and followers – and for coming up with a mediated expression of their interests, convictions and passions that is publicly justifiable and normatively appropriate. Granted, there is plenty of room for dissimulation, strategic action and outright hypocrisy on their part, but revealing these will be facilitated by the more abundant and public nature of the information that organizations are compelled to provide.

3 UNITS

Ever since Aristotle collected the constitutions of 158 Greek city-states, the privileged unit in political science for both observation and analysis was supposed to have a relatively autonomous economy, a self-governing polity and a distinctive collective identity – all institutionalized and coinciding with one another in a given territory. Eventually, thanks to the evolution of European polities and their overseas empires, almost everywhere this unit became the sovereign national state. It is usually presumed that only within the sovereign national state are agents capable of making choices and implementing them effectively, individuals or organizations capable of calculating their interests and passions, mechanisms of competition and cooperation capable of operating, and most regimes capable of developing stable and complementary institutions. Nothing is more firmly rooted in the foundations of political science than this assumption.

However, what if this unit of analysis can no longer be taken for granted? What if that presumed coincidence between autonomy, capacity, identity and territory has been disrupted beyond repair? In the contemporary world, no political unit can realistically connect cause and effect and produce intended results without regard for the actions of agents beyond their borders. Virtually all of these political units have persons and organizations within their borders that have identities, loyalties and interests that overlap with persons and organizations in other polities. Nor can one be assured that polities with the same formal political status or level of aggregation will have the same capacity for agency. Depending on their insertion into multilayered systems of production, distribution and governance, their capacity to act or react independently to any specific opportunity or challenge can vary enormously. This is most obviously the case for those units that are subordinate parts of empires; it also is the case for
national states that have entered into *supra-national arrangements*, such as the European Union (EU), or signed *binding international treaties*, such as those of the International Monetary Fund (IMF) or the World Trade Organization (WTO). Not only do they occasionally find themselves publicly shamed or found guilty by such organizations, but also they regularly anticipate such constraints and alter their behavior accordingly.

If that were not enough, many national polities have granted or recently been forced to concede extensive powers to their *sub-national units* and, in some cases, these provinces, cantons, or *départements* have even entered into cooperative arrangements with equivalent units in neighboring national states. Political scientists need to dedicate much more thought to the units they choose and the properties these units supposedly share with regard to the specific agent, motive, mechanism or regime that they are examining. There still remains a great deal of variation that can be explained only by conditions prevailing at the national level, but exorcising or ignoring the increasingly complex external and internal settings in which these allegedly sovereign national units are embedded can result in a serious analytical distortion (Hooghe et al. 2014).

### 4 MOTIVES

Establishing who the agents are does not tell us what is driving their political actions. Again, contemporary political science has its orthodox response: *self-interest* (sometimes tempered by the caveat, ‘rightly understood’). Presumptively, the individual political agent can invariably be relied upon to maximize, that is, choose the alternative that best satisfies his or her own and highest ranked preference at the lowest cost and without reference to anyone outside the immediate family. Needless to say, for this motive to dominate, the agent must have a comprehensive knowledge of what these alternatives are and a reliable understanding of what consequences they may produce – not to mention, the time to make such a calculation. There is a simpler solution which, nevertheless, is still rooted in self-interest. He, she or it can choose to minimize, that is, to choose the alternative that seems to avoid the worst possible outcome in terms of either cost or ranking. In between the two lies the reasonable possibility of ‘satisficing’, that is, mini-maxing his or her or its course of action somewhere between the two extremes (Keman 1998).

The scenario changes when the presumed motive is other-regarding rather than strictly self-regarding. In this case, actors have *convictions* about what is at stake in any given political transaction. Historically, analysts of politics tended to stress such motives as family honor, ethical
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responsibility, personal glory, religious belief, conformity to tradition or, even, justice and fairness. The emergence and eventual dominance of capitalism demonstrated the enormous advantage to the individual in pursuing his or her own interest in economic advantage without regard for others; but why should this always be the case in politics where the response of others (strategic or not) is a crucial condition for success and may not always be rooted in purely material terms?

Human beings can also have passions that cannot be reduced either to self-interest or conviction. They care about expressing themselves emotionally, about participating with each other in collective actions, about fulfilling their potential, even about caring for the welfare of the whole society or political unit in which they live. Without some degree of irrational passion, it would be impossible to understand why individuals choose to participate in ‘lost causes’, to devote such energy and resources to ‘utopian ideals’ or, even, to vote in ‘elections with obvious winners’ where, objectively, their contribution to success or failure is irrelevant or meaningless.

Finally, the most banal (and probably most frequent) motive of all is habit. Established regimes – whether democratic or not – cultivate a wide range of routinized behaviors that are simply expected of their subjects or citizens. Granted, some of these are ‘shadowed’ by the prospect that non-conformity may result in a coercive response by authorities; however, most of them are apparently voluntary – but do not involve any of the motives mentioned above.

5 MECHANISMS

The mantra of the discipline (especially where it is practiced in ‘real-existing’ democracies) is competition. Agents exercise their relative power by competing with each other in order to better satisfy their respective interests, convictions or passions. This usually presumes the existence of a pre-established institutional context, that is, a regime, in which conflicting motives are channeled by mutually respected rules into a process that limits the use of power resources and the range of possible outcomes, that is, by the existence of a government and state. The American science of politics was literally built upon the presumption these rules would be constitutional in form and democratic in process. Elsewhere – in continental Europe, Latin America, Africa and Asia – this should not be taken for granted (Lijphart 1977). Only recently and only in some units has the exercise of power been domesticated in this fashion to the mutual benefit of the agents involved.
The major distortion within the discipline comes when political scientists assume that electoral competition is the major expression of this process. The fact that political parties compete with each other for the representation of territorial constituencies and the right to form governments – even when these elections are freely and fairly conducted, and their outcomes uncertain – does not exhaust the mechanisms whereby political agents compete with each other. Not surprisingly, these other mechanisms are populated less with individuals than with organizations: competition between interest associations to influence public policy; demonstrations by social movements to set the public agenda or to block the implementation of policies. All of these are important (and often highly institutionalized) features of competition in modern polities that deserve at least as much attention as the more sporadic and routinized conduct of elections.

If these rules defining the mechanisms of competition do not exist or are strongly contested, political agents are likely to engage in unruly conflict not bound by such de jure or de facto constraints and to exercise their power primarily by threatening or exercising coercion to impose their respective interests, passions or convictions. Here the assumption is that all political units are plagued with multiple social cleavages whose interests, passions and convictions cannot be simultaneously satisfied or managed. Classes, sectors, professions, genders, generations, religions, regions, clans and clienteles – not to mention, the growing number of cleavages rooted in lifestyle preferences – want different treatment from public authorities. Not all of these can be domesticated according to mutually acceptable rules. What is crucial for understanding the outcome of these power conflicts is whether they are distributed cumulatively so that they reinforce each other or they are cross-cutting (‘pluralistic’) such that they tend to produce momentary coalitions and different sets of winners and losers over time and across issues.

The intra-disciplinary line separating the study of domestic politics from international relations has long depended on this distinction in which the former supposedly involved orderly competition and the latter rested on a presumed ‘anarchy’ of conflict without binding rules. More recently, this line has become less plausible as a barrier within the discipline of political science, since conflict has become at least as significant within states (especially failed ones) as between them and since a large number of interstate units – regional and functional – have emerged to regulate competition across national borders.

Another mechanism also deserves a more prominent place in the foundations of political science, namely, cooperation. If competition is not to degenerate into conflict, political agents have first to cooperate by agreeing upon the rules – formal or informal – that limit and channel their use
of power. Many of these are habits or strictures inherited from previous
generations (‘path dependence’), but they are continuously subject to chal-
lenges as power relations and the identity of agents change and therefore
require re-affirmation by contemporary agents. Moreover, politicians also
cooperate in order to ally with each other, both to modify the pre-existing
rules of engagement and to affect present policy outcomes. While it is
understandable that political science should privilege competition – if only
because its presence is much more visible and consequential – cooperation
deserves more status and attention than it usually receives. So does its
perverse form, *collusion*, that is, when inside agents act in agreement to
prevent outsiders from competing through the usual mechanisms (Katz
and Mair 1995).

The third mechanism is *conformity*. This is the mechanism that is the
least obvious and the most difficult to explain. Most of political science
presumes the manifest presence of its subject matter (not to mention its
importance to human beings). How, then, do we observe and explain its
opposite, namely, seemingly apolitical behavior – actors doing nothing
in situations where they might, even should, have acted for one motive
or another? The temptation is to explain this as a matter of habit or of
having no interest, passion or conviction concerning what is at stake, but
this would be to ignore two very important and omnipresent mechanisms
of political life. *Fear* is the most obvious of these. Actors conform because
they fear the effect that their actions may have upon their rulers. The more
desirable of the two is *legitimacy*. Actors conform – even when it violates
or offends one or another of their motives – because they regard their
rulers as entitled to exercise authority for any one of many reasons (for
example, Weber 1922 [1972]): genealogical inheritance, divine providence,
victory in war, protection from predation, technical expertise, charismatic
leadership or, as has become increasingly common, selection by winning a
competitive election.

The fourth mechanism is *rebellion*. We might regard this as simply an
exaggerated form of conflict, but it involves more than that. Through
this mechanism, actors do not just use force (or the threat of it) to obtain
concessions or subordinate opponents. Rebels seek to apply violent means
to eliminate their opponents from the political game, to change its rules
unilaterally and, in some cases, to change the very boundaries of the unit
itself. In its most exaggerated version, *revolution*, they do not limit their
efforts to changing the strictly political regime, but go beyond this to alter
(presumably, irrevocably) the rules and routines surrounding other, social
and economic, regimes.
6 REGIMES

Most students of contemporary politics assume that the unit they are analyzing has a relatively stable configuration of institutions that are complementary with each other, that is, it has a regime, presumably as the result of a prior historical experience of searching among alternatives and eliminating incompatible ones through competition or conflict. The actions produced by its agents, motives and mechanisms are somehow – functionally, ideationally, intentionally or constitutionally – related to each other at a higher level, such that their nature or importance cannot just be assessed alone. They are embedded in an institutionalized whole that conditions what roles can be played by individuals or organizations, self-or other-regarding interests, passions or convictions, competitive, conflictual or cooperative mechanisms, and so on. These regimes are given labels and it is presumed that those in the same generic category will share many foundational elements. At one time, there were three such labels: democratic, totalitarian and authoritarian or autocratic. More recently, ‘totalitarian’ has dropped out, thanks to the collapse of the Soviet Union and the transformation of China, and been replaced with ‘hybrid’ or some other diminutive version of democracy or augmentative version of autocracy. Each of these can be broken down further by the analyst into sub-types when exploring the performance of more specific agents, motives or mechanisms. The recognition of such diversity means giving up the quest for universalistic ‘covering laws’ that can be applied to any agent, motive or mechanism. Individuals or organizations do not behave the same way in democracies and autocracies; the ‘reasonableness’ and ‘appropriateness’ of interests, passions or convictions depend on the institutions to which they are addressed; and mechanisms such as competitive elections or cooperative multiparty alliances can take on different meanings depending on their complimentary relationship with other arrangements for competition/conflict or cooperation/collusion.

7 METHODS

The study of politics has been ‘multi-methodological’ since its beginning – and seems to be becoming more so with time. Plato and Aristotle could not have used more different methods for drawing their respective inferences. Ever since then, new methods have been introduced and very few have been eliminated. For most purposes, political science has been precluded from applying the most powerful of scientific methods,
namely, the use of controlled experiments. The consequences of exercising power – not to mention the controversies surrounding it – are simply too great to permit the student to introduce some treatment and hold all other potential sources of variation constant. Politics is a continuous activity that is embedded in a multiplicity of contingencies that cannot be halted or controlled at the will of the researcher. Granted that small-scale laboratory-like experiments have increasingly been attempted by political scientists, but they face very serious problems of inference when shifted to another level of aggregation (or when conducted with groups recruited on a different basis). ‘Quasi-experiments’ in which real world data over time are subjected to some specific policy treatment and the subsequent results are monitored have been more successful, but they also suffer from serious problems of inference because they cannot control for simultaneous treatments in related domains.

This leaves most of political science dependent upon data generated by the political process itself: descriptive accounts by journalists, memoires by participants, documents from official and unofficial sources, statistical reports from government agencies, and so on. The simplest and most comprehensible method has always been to tell a plausible story (usually a chronological one) using explicitly defined variables and identifying (usually inductively) the relationships between them – something that has been more recently and elegantly termed ‘process-tracing’. This is usually based on qualitative observations, but can also include quantitative observations. More complicated is the statistical manipulation of exclusively quantitative data for the variables postulated as relevant and testing for the magnitude, direction and significance of their interrelationships. This has the distinct advantage of appearing more scientific (and less subject to observer bias), but is contingent upon whether the data are valid indicators of what they claim to be. The fact that we can put a number on virtually anything is less important than whether that number is meaningful in terms of the variable being measured.

One method that is widely regarded as distinctive of political science is the measurement of public opinion through surveys of randomly selected, representative samples of the population. Leaving aside that the method was transplanted from social psychology, data from this source has become an important original contribution to the understanding of politics for mass publics, but also for elite groups and individual politicians. At one moment in the evolution of the discipline, it was even claimed that this ‘behavioral’ data was sufficient for understanding all of politics (at least in liberal democratic regimes). Since then, the claims for this method have become less ambitious. Today, there remains a persistent competition among political scientists as to which method should best be applied
to which subject, but most would agree that no single method would suffice for all subjects.

8 THEORIES

A theory is some combination of the elements outlined above, expressed by means of a specific set of concepts, their relationships (sometimes expressed in terms of explicit hypotheses) and their putative outcomes. Needless to say, given the variety of agents, units, motives, mechanisms and regimes, the combinations and permutations would seem to be virtually unlimited, although at any one moment in time within the discipline only a few are likely to be regarded as plausible.

In Table 1.1, you will find a spatially schematized and temporally compressed representation of the genealogical roots, trunks and branches that have evolved into contemporary and empirical discipline of political science. Its deepest root lies in *sociological constitutionalism* as invented by Aristotle and subsequently nourished until 1900 by Polybius, Machiavelli, Montesquieu, Alexis de Tocqueville, Karl Marx, Moisei Ostrogorski, Max Weber, Emile Durkheim, Roberto Michels, Gaetano Mosca, and Vilfredo Pareto. Through various extensions and permutations this has become the branch subsequently labeled as *historical political sociology*.

*Table 1.1   Family tree or genealogy of political science over time*

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<tr>
<th>COLLECTIVISM</th>
<th>INSTITUTIONALISM</th>
<th>INDIVIDUALISM</th>
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<td>Multi-level</td>
<td>Political</td>
<td>Electoral</td>
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<td>and regional</td>
<td>development</td>
<td>Public policy</td>
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<td>governance</td>
<td>Democratization</td>
<td>and public</td>
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<tr>
<td>International</td>
<td>and transition</td>
<td>choice</td>
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<td>relations</td>
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<td>International</td>
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<td>Interest</td>
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<td>relations</td>
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<td>Political</td>
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<td>economy</td>
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<td>HISTORICAL</td>
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<td>Bodin, Burdeau,</td>
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<td>Lowell, Duguit,</td>
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<td>Social</td>
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<td>Machiavelli</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Polybios</td>
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The other deep root lies in ‘normative speculation’ practiced by Plato and later to be converted into legal constitutionalism fertilized around the turn of the twentieth century by distinguished Anglo-French jurists such as Léon Duguit, Georges Burdeau, James Bryce, A. Lawrence Lowell and Woodrow Wilson. Political science became a voracious consumer of conceptual and methodological innovations from other, increasingly professionalized, social science disciplines – first, from social psychology with the so-called ‘behaviorist movement’ and later (and somewhat more surreptitiously) from anthropology with the ‘structural-functionalist approach’. Political scientists have always borrowed ideas and concepts from economics, especially from such early political economists as Adam Smith, Karl Marx, John Stuart Mill, David Ricardo, Jeremy Bentham, Friedrich List and Adolf Wagner, but the real novelty of the past few decades has been the transfer of neo-liberal root assumptions, deductive thinking and mathematical modeling techniques from economics into the study of political institutions.

Currently, the genealogical matrix of theory in political science is more or less a ‘fuzzy set’, it is not a neat and structured development. It is certainly not single, tapered with an elegant peak. Its most curious aspect, however, is the number of practitioners who are settled there and who seem content with sharing the same generic label: institutionalists. Closer inspection reveals that this matrix of theory contains an extraordinary variety of issues. All they seem to agree upon is that ‘institutions matter’. They differ widely on what institutions are, how they come about, why is it that they matter and which ones matter more than others. Moreover, some of those settled there will even admit that other things also matter: collective identities, citizen attitudes, cultural values, popular memories, external pressures, economic dependencies, even instinctive habits and informal practices – not to mention the old favorites of Machiavelli, fortuna and virtù – when it comes to explaining, and especially to understanding, political outcomes. Strangely, if the genealogy illustrated in Table 1.1 is at all valid, almost all of those now nested in the canopy seem preoccupied with explaining why ‘their’ specific type of institutionalism is more important than the others and how ‘their’ institutions have a greater impact on individual behavior and unit performance. The twin trunks in Table 1.1 suggest that they should be at least as concerned with explaining how some combination of social forces and cultural conditions or of legal framing and economic calculus created them in the first place and is still supporting such a variety of institutions.5

How do we choose the right theoretical mix to apply when studying politics? The potential combinations are virtually unlimited, especially if we
add to the seven foundations all of the sub-components of each. Granted, at any one moment in time not all of them will be regarded as plausible. Aristotle probably had the best idea: the mix should depend on the objective characteristics of the subject matter you have chosen to explain. Plato would probably have replied, no, it ought to depend on the normative purpose you are trying to fulfil. A more historically minded researcher might be guided by the subjective perception of the agents involved – their ‘discourse’ when trying to explain what they are doing. A more career-minded political scientist would probably respond by picking what is currently fashionable in the discipline. None of these ‘shortcuts’ through the maze of foundational elements is a guarantee of success, but each of them definitely points the researcher in a different direction and, worse, may lead to quite different conclusions about power, its uses and its consequences.

9 CONCLUSION

Aristotle famously argued that political science was the ‘master science’ since all of the other human sciences depended upon the order or disorder produced by politics. Ironically, this assertion of its superiority has also been a source of weakness. Political science is bound to be an ‘open science’. It reaches into and affects crucial aspects of other realms of human behavior and is, therefore, bound to be penetrated by assumptions and concepts coming from them. Law, philosophy, sociology, psychology and, especially, economics have all claimed to be more closed and, therefore, self-referential sciences. Each of them has attempted to penetrate the deepest foundations of political science. At times, this has threatened to deprive the discipline of its distinctive focus on the use of power and its conversion (sometimes) into legitimate authority to resolve conflicts and achieve collective purposes. In recent decades, attempts have been made to reduce the study of politics to the voluntary exchange of information, the joint product of individual opinions, the rational search for optimal institutions or the deliberative discourse between consenting persons or organizations. This may have served to illuminate some of its peripheral aspects and to expand its scope of inquiry, but they have all floundered when trying to explain situations in which ‘the preferences, desires or intentions of one or more actors bring about conforming actions, or predispositions to act, of one or more other actors’ (Dahl 1982, p. 16). When some person (and, even more, when some established public or private organization) can alter the distribution of information, manipulate the attitudes of individuals, restrict the range of ‘acceptable’ solutions or distort the course of deliberations, the outcome becomes different – often
radically different – than that envisaged by any of these models. If political scientists were to narrow their research agenda to situations where these conditions were not present, not only would they be depriving their discipline of the cornerstone of its foundations, but they would also become incapable of providing useful knowledge to the politicians, representatives, citizens and subjects who have to cope with the very real existence of power and its consequences.

NOTES

* This is a substantially combined, revised and expanded version of two previously published articles: Schmitter (2009) and Schmitter (2013). By permission of Oxford University Press.

1. Machiavelli thought there should be two political sciences: one masculine, the other feminine. In the former, power was channeled by ‘dikes and dams’ so that its exercise was relatively institutionalized and its consequences were more predictable. In the latter, power flowed erratically in accordance with the whims of *fortuna*. He lamented being condemned to living in female times and, therefore, having to invent a ‘new science of politics’. Almost all contemporary political scientists assume (implicitly) that they are living in male times and this will be (explicitly) presumed in this chapter.

2. There have been moments when political scientists seemed to be in agreement on these fundamentals, for example, constitutionalism at the beginning of the twentieth century; behaviourism with its exclusive reliance on individual attitudes in the 1950s and 1960s; structural-functionalism with its attention to the performance of core tasks necessary for the survival of the political system in the 1970s and 1980s; and rational choice with its assumption that actors seek to maximize their (imputed) preferences at the margin in each successive transaction in the 1990s and early twenty-first century. However, even during these periods of the relative hegemony of a paradigm, there were always detractors within the discipline and, eventually, all of them ended up being discredited or pushed to the periphery. The comparison with economics is striking where the orthodoxy of neo-liberalism installed itself and managed to drive out all practitioners of competing paradigms.


4. Which is also why, with few exceptions, political scientists are banned from using the method of participant observation.

5. A major exception to this generalization is the burgeoning literature on democratization which might even be characterized as ‘obsessed’ with both the social and cultural origins and the legal and economic aspects of institutions that may emerge in the aftermath of autocracy.

FURTHER READING

*Introduction to Thinking about Politics*

Aristotle, *Politics*.
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