Index

9/11 attacks 45, 198–9, 224–5
conflict characterization impacts 257–8
counter-actions, self-defense justification 231
60-day clock 263–5

absolute necessity 159, 243–4
accountability
AWS, of 357–65
accidents 361–2
accuracy parameters 363, 435–6
command responsibility 360–61, 369, 413–15, 432–6, 440–41
criminal responsibility 387, 392–4
default settings 437–8
human operator role 358–63, 365, 369, 459–60
international law, implications 385–6
knowledge 359–60
meaningful human control 391, 401–4, 431–40
output reviews 435–6
predictability 388–9, 392–3, 459
programmer or manufacturer error 363–4, 392
programming limitations 351–2, 364–5
recklessness, and 362–3, 386
state responsibility, and 386–8
target identification capability, and 357–8
updates 435–6
war crimes, for 357–8, 365
willful intention 359–60
command responsibility 360–61, 369, 414–15, 432–6, 440–41

command and control
arrangements 365
international law applicability 393
dynamic diligence standard 441–2
criteria 406–7
dynamic assessments 434–6
dynamic parameters 436–40
flexibility requirement 407
human-machine interfaces 432–4
IHL compliance assessments, and 406, 414–15, 432–6, 440–41
military command structure, and 406
limitations 167
obligations
armed conflict, during 163–4, 167
human rights law, under 160–67, 178
IHL, under 160, 162–8
investigations 164–5, 167, 178
remote warfare, in 160, 168, 184
transparency, and 163

Afghanistan
armed conflict
US interpretation 115–17
use of force, justification 198–9
drone warfare 68–9
aggression
definition 199–200
pre-stationed forces, by 200

Akerson, David 344–5

Alston, Philip 115, 167
armed attack
civilian distinction requirement 203
cyber attacks, whether 280–84, 287–8
definition 195–8
dual-use infrastructure 203
information operations, as 196–7
interpretation 196–7, 451–2
non-state actors, by 198–9, 256
self-defense, as 198–9, 280
use of force, difference from 195–8
armed conflict, generally
see also international armed
conflict; non-international
armed conflict
accountability obligations 163–4,
166–8
cyber attacks
activities below threshold
287–94
law applicability to 121, 324–5,
330–31
role in 75–6, 274, 278, 324–5
unwitting involvement 75–6
definition 92–3, 110–13, 252–4
ambiguity 201–2
evolution of 110, 111–13, 119,
131–2
internal disturbances 201, 254–6
self-defense, and 115–16, 172–3
transnational armed conflict
257–8
US approach 115–17
use of force 81
distinction, principle of 52–6,
408–9
drone warfare, and
consent requirement 98–9,
313–14, 318–19
counter-terrorism justification
226–30
determination criteria 23, 97–107
human rights law, applicability
104–7, 315–16
international armed conflict,
whether 97–100
interstate requirement 99–100
law, applicability to 120, 314–15,
330–31
legal challenges 318–21, 331
non-international armed conflict,
whether 100–104
targeted killings 114–20, 225–44
geographical scope
challenges 107–9
criterion for 90–91
definition 86–90, 92
expansion 80–81, 89–90
judicial interpretation 91–5,
118–19
nexus approach 93–5
origin of attack, and 96
remote warfare, applicability
79–81, 89–90, 319–20
synonyms 87–90
territorial interpretation 93–5
human rights law, and
applicability 104–7, 315–16
law enforcement role 172–5, 179,
184–5
international humanitarian law, and
accountability, role of 124–5,
160, 162–8
applicability 50–51, 81, 84–5,
110–13
challenges 107–8
chivalric warfare principles
42–4
definition, importance 86–8
human rights law applicability
104–7
protracted armed violence 81,
100–101, 108, 201–2
temporal scope 119, 179
thresholds
armed forces utilization, and 201
exploitation 201
gaps 198
information operations 202–3
internal disturbances 201, 254–6
interpretation 201–3, 202, 253–4
lowering, implications of 120,
125, 130, 446–56, 478
violence beneath 201, 253–4
transnational armed conflict
257–8
transparency obligations 163–4,
166–8
armed force
see also use of force
definition 195
artificial intelligence
bayesian networks 417–19
dehumanizing effect of 374
development of 140–41
machine learning 415–20
pattern recognition 422–6
proportionality, understanding 352–3
remoteness, and 138–9
asymmetrical risk
historical development 18–21
new technology implications for 460–64
reduction
AWS 17, 33–5, 399–400
chivalric warfare, conflicts with 42–8
costs reduction, and 41–2
cyber attacks 16–17, 27–33, 312
defense incentive or disincentive, whether 37–42, 48–9
drones 22–7, 66–7, 248–9, 260–61
generally 35–6, 48–9
implications 36–7, 48–9
international law conflicts, and 40–41
jus ad bellum violations, and 36–42
negative impacts 44
number of attacks, influences on 37–8, 48–9
purpose 48–9
reputation, and 37–8
trends 16–17
autonomous weapons systems
accountability
accidents 361–2
accuracy parameters 363, 435–6
command responsibility 360–61, 369, 414–15, 440–41
criminal responsibility 387, 392–4
default settings 437–8
human operator role 358–63, 365, 369, 459–60
international law, implications 385–6
knowledge 359–60
meaningful human control 391, 401–4, 431–40
output reviews 435–6
predictability 388–9, 392–3, 459
programmer or manufacturer error 363–4, 392
programming limitations 351–2, 364–5
recklessness, and 362–3, 386
state responsibility, and 386–8
target identification capability, and 357–8
updates 435–6
war crimes, for 357–8, 365
willful intention 359–60
attitudes to 405–6, 443–4, 454
benefits 372–4, 405–6
characterization 1–2, 130–31
autonomous vs. automated 136–7, 140–41, 376
exclusions 136
human counterpart, comparison with 342–3
human role, and 136–8, 375–6
offensive vs. defensive 344–5
semi-autonomous 135–6, 140
types 135–8
Chinese policy 144
criticisms 373–4, 406
definition 123, 135–7, 339, 375–7
dehumanization implications 374
development 336–7, 368, 371
concerns 336–7, 372
implications 122–3
scope of 371–2
trends 372
disadvantages 373–4
distinction, principle of 67–71, 336, 342, 395–6
dynamic diligence standard 441–2
criteria 406–7
dynamic assessments 434–6
dynamic parameters 436–40
flexibility requirement 407
human-machine interfaces 432–4
IHL compliance assessments, and 406–7, 431–40
military command structure, and 406
ethical concerns 366–8, 373–4
debate, focus of 372
human rights law, and
dignity, principle of 152, 169–70, 184, 400–401
enforcement role 134
extraterritorial jurisdiction, and 155–6, 172
human responsibility, and 170
legality under 178–83
peacetime use of 171–5
right to life 149, 152–3
human supervision, and 135–7, 432–4
IHL, applicability 122–5, 369, 469–70
ability to comply, and 394–9
accountability, and 124–5, 160–68
challenges for 125, 383–90
in-the-loop weapons 136, 353–4, 377
international law, implications for ability to comply 394–9
generally 383–4
state responsibility 386–90
lethal autonomous weapons
armed conflict threshold impacts 120, 130, 446–56
asymmetric warfare impacts 460–64
compliance-based approach 468–70
cost vs. risk 41–2, 367, 455–6, 465
definition 444
national policy development, need for 471–3
proliferation implications 464–6
UN expert consultations 144–5, 445–7, 467–8
unintended engagements 456–60
US policy on 142–3, 368–9, 371–2, 434, 467–78
use of force, attitudes to 120, 130, 447–56
objections to 344
on-the-loop weapons 136, 353–4, 377
operating procedures
artificial intelligence 138–41
cognitive flaws 421–2
decision making 420–22
decision trees 428–30
errors 415–16, 419, 421–2
human bias, and 421–2
human-machine interface 432–4
interpretability, and 428–30
limitations 430–31
machine learning 415–20
movement actions 426–7
pattern recognition 422–6
probability calculations 416–20
validation 416
outside-the-loop weapons 354, 377–8
precautionary principle
attacks on other AWS 131, 345–6
cancellation protocols 354–5, 388
challenges 67–71, 327, 341–2
choice of options, and 355–6
collateral damage, and 340–41, 350–54
decisions, compared with human role 33–4, 123–5, 341–3, 345–6
feasibility of 328–9, 349, 398
human vs. computer, comparison 33–4, 123–5, 341–3, 345–6
limitations, programming 351–2, 364–5
remoteness, and 349–50
target identification 67–71, 336, 344–8
proportionality, and 344–5, 350–54, 396–7
purpose 15, 17, 33–4, 379
Index 483

remoteness concept, and 138–9
risk
asymmetrical risk 17
civilians, to 35
reciprocal risk, influences on 17
reduction impacts 33–4, 399–400
robotic infantry devices 34–5
Russian policy 144
state responsibility
accountability 386–8
attribution 386
cancellation protocols 388
criminal responsibility 388, 392–4
due diligence 388–9
liability, and 389–91
predictability, and 388–9, 392–3
recklessness and negligence, and 386–9
strict liability 389–91
surrender, recognition of 348–9
Swiss policy proposals 466–70
targeting, autonomous 33–4
accountability, and 124–5
benefits 34
criticism 344
law, applicability to 123–4
targeting, generally
accuracy 344–5
challenges 67–71, 327, 341–2
distinction, principle of, and 67–71, 336, 342, 395–6
human vs. computer, by 33–4, 123–5, 341–3, 345–6
nature-location-use-purpose test 59–60
objects 345–6
obligations 341–9
other AWS 131, 345–6
persons, direct participation 346–8
proportionality, and 344–5, 350–54, 396–7
types 135–6
UK policy on 143, 471
unintended engagements 456–60
US policy on 142–3, 368–9, 371–2, 434, 467–78
use trends
fully-autonomous systems 140–41
generally 139–40, 465
law enforcement and security, in 145–8
semi-autonomous systems 140
autonomy
definition 377–8
development implications 376, 385
interpretation challenges 378
meaningful human control 391, 401–4, 431–40
three-step test 377–8
Backstrom, Alan 345–6
Bates, E.S. 222
battlefield areas 87–9
combat activities in vicinity of 102–4
bayesian networks 417–19
Biontino, Michael 446–7
Blank, Laurie 66
Boelaert-Suominen, Sonja 112
Boothby, William 121–2, 130, 346
Bothe, Michael 62
botnets 75–6
Breedlove, Philip 196
Brennan, John 115–16
Brenner, Joel 279
Cameron, David 226–30, 238–40
Campaign to Ban Killer Robots 150, 373, 445, 467
Canning, John S. 345
cannons 19–20
China
AWS policy development 144
chivalric warfare 42–8, 318
civilians
identification
combatants, distinction from 74–5, 207–9
direct participation, interpretation 61, 70–71, 75, 208–9, 327, 346–8
weapons, possession of 70–71
protection
AWS risks 35
choice of attack options 355–6
collateral damage 24–7, 29, 44, 324, 355–6
cyber actions 29, 324
drone strikes 24–5, 317
exclusions 61, 70–71, 75, 208–9
immunity codification 53–4
obligations 25–7, 44, 51–2, 203, 207–8
precautionary principle 339–56
risk, absence of 16
technological advantages for 16
transference of risk 25, 317
risks to
cyber warfare, from 29, 32, 74–5
drone strikes, from 24–5, 317
targeting
military functions, carrying out 61
misidentification 67–71, 342–3
Clinton, Bill 266
collateral damage
AWS, calculation by 350–54
civilian protection obligations 340–41
cyber actions 29, 324
drone strikes 24–5
obligation to reduce 24–7, 29, 44, 340–41
precautionary principle 340–41, 350–54
proportionality 350–54
risk, absence of 16
transference of risk 25
collateral damage, and
choice of attack options, and 355–6
combat
preparation for, interpretation 62
purpose 48–9
combat zones 87–90
combat activities in vicinity of 102–4
combatants
fair dealing requirements 203–4
identification 52, 75, 224, 327
direct participation 61, 70–71, 75,
208–9, 327, 346–8
misidentification 67–71, 342–3
moral equality 43–4
non-combatants, distinction from 207–9
targeting rules 60–1
terrorists, as 224
command responsibility
AWS, and 360–61, 369, 414–15, 432–6, 440–41
international law applicability 393
principles 413–14
computer network attacks (CNA) 71
computer network exploitation (CNE) 71
conduct of hostilities rules 173–5,
184, 253
Convention on Conventional Weapons 2016 123–4
cowardice, remote killing as 44–5
Crotof, Rebecca 403
crossbow 20
cruise missiles 21
customary international law
civilian protection obligations 203
interpretation 126–7
Lotus principle 202–3
Martens Clause 43, 202–3
non-intervention principle, and 191–4
self-defense of state, against an individual 233–8
use of force prohibition 195–6
cyber attacks
acknowledgment 273, 290
anonymity
attribution, and 310, 312
challenges of 27, 122, 288–9, 310, 312
plausible deniability, and 310
armed conflict
activities below threshold 287–94
law applicability to 121, 324–5, 330–31
role in 75–6, 274, 278, 324–5
unwitting involvement 75–6
asymmetrical risk 16–17, 27–33, 310, 312
civilian impacts 29, 32, 74–5
collateral damage 29, 324
cost asymmetries 310
counter-measures
active defenses 285–6, 291–2
anticipatory 283, 288–9
cascading effects, consideration 328–9
effectiveness 285–6
feasible precautions 328–9
limitations 279, 285–6
necessity, and 283–4
non-forceful 284–6
non-intervention principle, and 284–5
non-state actor attacks, to 285–6
regulatory development 291–2
reprisals, and 32–3, 310
self-defense justification 278–84, 286–7, 297
state responsibility 284–5
terrorism 281–2
cyber exploitation 290–91
definition 71–3, 121–2, 275–6, 321
distinction, principle of, and applicability 208–9, 323–7
benefits for 72–4, 77
challenges for 74–6, 325–7
remoteness, and 76–8
implications 274, 278
information operations 187–8
international humanitarian law 121–2, 209, 290–91
non-intervention principle, and 192–3, 284–5
proportionality 30–31, 326
targets, interpretation 29–32, 327
use of force 276, 278–81
interpretation
armed attack, whether 280–84, 287–8
challenges 122, 129–30
distinction principle, applicability to 208–9, 323–7
drone strikes, differences from 27–9
information operations 187–8
intervention, as 192–3
limitations 72, 311–12
military uses
advantages 309–11
disadvantages 311–12
intelligence and surveillance 307–8, 311
non-intervention principle, and 192–3, 284–5
non-state actor role 274, 285–6, 306–7
precision 73–4
purpose 1, 15, 28–9, 72, 275–6, 330
intelligence and surveillance 307–8
military role 307–9
non-destructive impacts 311
regulation
activities below armed conflict threshold 287–94
ad hoc approach 287–8
basis for 129–30
challenges 275–7, 279, 287–8, 296–7, 322–3, 331
development 291, 322–3
international law applicability 30–32, 121–2, 209, 275–7, 289–91, 321–3
Talinn Manual 1, 72–3, 121, 275–6, 321–2, 327–8
US strategy 280, 289–94
reprisals, fear of 32–3, 310
source or location, ability to identity 27–8
sources
identification challenges 27–8, 276, 279, 288–9, 310, 312
responsibility, and 28, 277–8
date responsibility attribution challenges 289
countermeasures 284–5
targets 29, 274
data, as military object 327–8
dual-use infrastructure 29–30, 74–5, 203, 311–12, 326
military vs. civilian, identification 74–5, 327
non-lethal 311
revenue-enhancing operations 31–2
terrorism, and 275–6, 278–9, 281–4
time and location benefits 309–10
traditional weapons, differences from 330
trends 273–5, 308–9
use of force, and 196–7, 276, 278–81, 287
vulnerability risks 16, 274
cyber-exploitation 290–91
de Vattel, Emmerich 213–14
dignity, principle of 152, 168–70, 184, 400–401
Dinnis, Harrison 197
Dinstein, Yoram 197
direct participation
IHL applicability 208–9
targeting, interpretation 61, 70–71, 75, 208–9, 327, 346–8
disarmament treaties 380
discrimination, principle of 46
distinction, principle of
achievement mechanisms 51–3
AWS 67–71, 336, 342, 395–6
challenges 52–3
codification 55–6
combatants vs. non-combatants 207–8
cyber attacks
applicability to 208–9, 323–7
benefits of 72–4, 77
challenges of 74–6, 325–6
remoteness, and 76–8
definition 54–5
drones/ drone warfare
benefits of 65–7, 77
challenges of 67–71, 336
safeguards 66–7
generally 51–2, 78, 325, 408–9
historical development 53–6
importance 51
obligations under 51–2, 58, 207–8
practical application
challenges 62–3
generally 57–8
obligations, negative and positive 58
rules of engagement 57–8
targeting rules 58–62
precautionary principle, and 336, 397
proportionality, and 52, 326
purpose 53
remote warfare, and
benefits 63, 65–7
drones/ drone warfare 65–71
remoteness, relevance of 76–8
targeting rules
objects 58–60, 345–6
persons 60–62, 346
'Dogo,' the 146
domaine réservé concept 190, 192
Dörö, Oliver 196
drone warfare
accuracy 67–71, 77, 248, 304–5
armed conflict, in
applicability of law of 120, 314–15, 330–31
consent requirement 98–9, 313–14, 318–19
determination criteria 23, 97–107
human rights law, applicability 104–7, 315–16
international armed conflict, whether 97–100
interstate requirement 99–100
legal challenges 318–21
non-international armed conflict, and 100–104, 259–60
transnational armed conflict, role in 259–60
attitudes to 249–50
benefits 15–16, 22, 29, 83, 247–50, 259–60, 270–72
breach of sovereignty, as 22–4, 452–4
challenges
civilian/ military target misidentification 67–71
latency 67–8
video quality 68–9
collateral damage 24–7
constitutional war powers, and 265–6, 268–70, 272
cyber attacks, differences from 27–9
distinction, principle of
benefits for 65–7, 77
challenges for 67–71, 336
remoteness, and 76–8
extraterritorial jurisdiction 222–4, 240–41, 320
human rights law, and applicability to 81, 106–7, 315–16
due diligence obligations 222–3
law enforcement, and 171, 179, 184–5
War on Terror, in 171
whether violation of 24–5
international humanitarian law, and applicability to 24–5, 80–81, 120, 314
obligatory use potential 270
law on, generally
basis for 129, 313–14
conflicts 246–7
legality of 316–18
non-international armed conflict classification as 100–104, 259–60
political pressures, and 260–61
remoteness, relevance of 76–8, 317–18
risk transference 25, 303
safeguards 66–7
self-defense justification 22–3, 172–3
against individuals 230–44, 320
targeted killings 81
armed conflict law, applicability 114–20
non-international armed conflict, and 108
Reyaad Khan, of 226–44
self-defense, and 225–44
transparency and accountability 160–61
unwilling or unable test 23, 238, 249, 270–71, 318–19
use of force
breach of sovereignty, as 23–4, 452–4
self-defense justification 23–4, 225–44
use trends 62–3, 80, 139–40, 465
drones
accuracy 67–71, 77, 248, 304–5
asymmetrical risk reduction 22–7, 66–7, 248–9, 260–61
characteristics 64–5, 301
other weapons, similarities and differences 247–50, 270–71, 302, 316–18, 330, 461–2
consent requirement 98–9, 313–14, 318–19
definition 62, 301
development 301–3
disadvantages 83
equipment 64–5
limitations 22–3, 302–3
purpose 15, 29, 62–5, 301–3, 316–17
counter-terrorism 305–6
intelligence and surveillance 301, 303–5
range and duration of flight 64–5, 304
regulation
conflicts and challenges 220, 247, 331
international law applicability 220–21, 330–31
limitations 224–5
necessity 221
risk transference 62, 303
security concerns 221–2
self-defense implications 221
sovereignty, and 22–4, 452–4
targeting
accuracy 16, 67–71, 77, 304
immediacy of response 304–5
use of
non-state actors, by 82–3, 142, 466
trends 62–3, 82–3, 139–40, 301
dual-use infrastructure
targeting 29–30, 74–5, 203, 344–5
cyber attacks 29–30, 74–5, 203, 311–12, 326
due diligence obligations 222–3, 388–9
dynamic diligence standard see accountability
effective control test 206–7
effective remedy, right to 149, 162–3
Egan, Brian 449–50
espionage 290–91
Estonia
cyber attacks 76, 290
Fallon, Michael 117
force, interpretation 195, 197
see also use of force
forced migration, as use of force 196
France
drone use policy 454
terrorism counter-measures 219
Friendly Relations Declaration 190
Geiß, Robin 74
General Robotics Ltd 146
Geneva Conventions 1949
Additional Protocols 127–8
Martens Clause 43, 202–3, 381–2
precautionary principle 339–56, 397–8
technology, keeping up with 381–2
definitions 55, 89
armed conflict, generally 111–12, 119, 252–3
combatants vs. non-combatants 207–8
geographical scope 90–92
international armed conflict 98–100, 252
limitations 122, 126
non-international armed conflict 101–4, 252
IHL applicability under 110–13, 131, 252–3
customary law interpretation 126–7
remote warfare, and 128–9
purpose 55, 128–9, 131, 203
travaux préparatoire 128
geographical scope
armed conflict
challenges 107–9
criterion for 90–91
global scope 116–19
judicial interpretation 91–5, 118–19
nexus approach 93–5
origin of attack, and 96
remote warfare, applicability 79–81, 89–90, 319–20
US approach 115–17
War on Terror 115–17
definition
importance of 86–7
synonyms 87–90
interpretation challenges 87–8
non-international armed conflict 91
Georgia
cyber attacks 76, 290
Germany
drone use policy 454
Gilli, Andrea 466
Gilli, Mauro 466
globalization 10, 116–18
Gray, Christine 119
Gross, Oren 270
Grotius, Hugo 217
Hamas 142
Harman, Harriet 240
Henderson, Ian 345–6
Heyns, Christof 119–20, 145–6, 152, 169, 378
Hezbollah 142
High Contracting Party, territory of 91, 290–91
Hobbes, T. 217–18
Hollis, Duncan B. 187, 196–7, 202–3
Horowitz, Michael C. 403–4
human rights law
accountability 160–67, 178
remote warfare, in 160, 168, 184
armed conflict, and
applicability to 104–7
law enforcement role 133–4, 172–5, 184–5
AWS
dignity, principle of 152, 169–70, 184, 400–401
extraterritorial jurisdiction 155–6, 172
human responsibility, and 170
ICRC position on 150–51, 156
international discussions on 148–53
peacetime use of 171–5
common principles 159
derogable rights 154
dignity, principle of 168–70
remote warfare, applicability to 152, 169–70, 184, 400–401
drone warfare
applicability to 81, 106–7, 315–16
counter-terrorism justification 226–30
targeted killings 81
whether violation of 24–5
due diligence obligations 222
extraterritorial jurisdiction 154–5, 172, 204–5
avoidance 156
drone strikes 222–4, 240–41
remote warfare, applicability 155–6, 172
targeting 155–6
triggers 104–5
freedom of assembly 149, 152
freedom of expression 149
IHL, and
as complement to 133, 153–70
harmonization 166–7
influences of 149–50
role instead of 133–4
investigation obligations 164–5, 167, 178
jurisdiction
effective control, and 105–6
international obligations, and 105–6
state agent authority exception 106–7
law enforcement, and 152–3, 179
use of force justification 172–5, 179
lex specialis, as 157–8
necessity, principle of 104, 159, 175–6, 243–4, 250–51
peacetime, in 154, 171–5, 204–5
proportionality, principle of 104, 159–60, 176
use of force 176, 179, 181–3
public emergency, and 154
remote warfare, applicability to 157, 184
dignity 152, 169–70, 184
extraterritorial jurisdiction 155–6, 172
legality 177–83
peacetime, in 171–5
psychological remoteness 138–9, 183
transparency and accountability 160, 168, 184
right to effective remedy 149, 162–3
right to fair trial 149
right to life 149, 152–4
right to privacy 149
right to security 224–5
targeting
drone strikes 81
extraterritorial jurisdiction 155–6, 172
IHL, relationship with 158–60
targeted killings 81, 108
use of force, and 180–81
torture, prohibition of 169–70
transparency 160–68
use of force, and
accountability 178
law enforcement 172–5, 179
legality 177–8, 251
necessity 175–6, 179, 181–3, 243–4, 250–51
precautionary principle 176–7, 179–83
proportionality 176, 179, 181–3
human security
definition 216
self-defense justification 213–17
humanitarian interventions
international law violations, as
40–41
humanity, principle of 43, 170, 203, 382
in-the-loop weapons 136, 353–4, 377
information operations
see also cyber attacks
armed conflict thresholds, and 202–3
definition 187–8
dual-use infrastructure, and 29–30, 74–5, 203
IHL, applicability to 203–4, 204–5
use of force, as 196–7
intelligence and surveillance
cyber attacks, and 307–8, 311
drones, and 301, 303–5
Intercontinental Ballistic Missiles (ICBMs) 21
internal disturbances, interpretation 201, 254–6
international armed conflict
definition 98–100, 252–3
International Committee for Robot
Arms Control 373
International Committee of the Red
Cross
AWS, position on 150–51, 156, 447
cyber attacks, position on 121
drone warfare, position on 118
human rights, extraterritorial jurisdiction 156, 172
International Court of Justice
customary international law, interpretation 127
effective control test 206–7
International Criminal Court
geographical scope of armed conflict, definition 92–3
international criminal law
command responsibility 360–61, 369, 393, 413–15, 432–6, 440–41
International Criminal Tribunals
armed conflict
definition, evolution of 111–12
geographical scope, interpretation 92–5, 118–19
International Human Rights Clinic
151
international humanitarian law
applicability, generally
customary international law
interpretation 126–7
cyber attacks 30–32, 121–2, 209, 275–7, 290–91
drone strikes 24–5, 80–81
information operations 203–5
peacetime, in 154
public emergency, and 154
armed conflict, and
accountability 124–5, 160–68
applicability 50–51, 81, 84–5, 110–13
challenges 107–8
chivalric warfare principles 42–4
conduct of hostilities rules 173–5, 184, 253
definition 86–8, 110–13
human rights law, applicability to 104–7
internal conflicts, applicability to 254–6
AWS
ability to comply, and 394–9
accountability, and 124–5, 160–68
applicability to 122–5, 369, 469–70
challenges for 125, 383–90
common principles 159
cyber attacks
applicability to 30–32, 121–2, 209, 275–7, 290–91
drone strikes
applicability to 24–5, 80–81, 120, 314
obligatory requirement potential 270
geographical scope
challenges 107–9
definition 86–8
nexus approach 93–5
origin of attack, and 96
remote warfare, applicability 79–81, 89–90, 319–20
human rights law, and
as complement to 133, 153–70
harmonization 166–7
influences of 149–50
law enforcement justification 172–5
role instead of 133–4
humanity, principle of 170
*lex specialis*, as 157–8
necessity, principle of 104, 159, 175
non-international armed conflict, and
applicability 81, 84–5
cross-border spillovers 100–104
geographical scope 81, 86–8, 91
non-state fighters, cross-border retreat 102–4
protracted armed violence
requirement 81, 100–101, 108
territory of High Contracting parties 102–3
perfidy, prohibition of 203–4
proportionality, and 30–31, 104, 159–60
purpose 128–9
technology, keeping up with 381–2
use of force 251
war crimes, investigation obligations 164–5
international law, generally
basis for 313–14
disarmament treaties 380
military operations, of 313
new weapons/ technology
ability to comply with 394–9
AWS, implications 383–401
humanity principle test 382
keeping up with 378–83
prohibited weapons 380–81
review obligations 151, 382–3, 411–12, 470–71
purpose 41–2
sovereignty, and 313
strict liability 390–91
intervention
armed attack, compared 191–2
coercion, as 191–2
countermeasure, as 194
cyber operations, as 192–3
definition 191–2
humanitarian, as international law
violation 40–41
non-intervention principle 189–92
prohibited acts 191–2
propaganda, as 193–4
right to self-determination, and 194
thresholds 191–2
Iran
Stuxnet cyber attack 1, 16, 73, 200, 273, 290
Iraq
drone warfare 57–8, 69
Iron Man 141
ISIS 142
Janjua, Tehmina 460–61
jus ad bellum
  conflicts 40
  self-defense, right of 216, 231–8, 450–52
just war theory 291
Kendall, Frank 141
Khan, Reyaad 226–44
Kiai, Maina 152
killer robots see robotic infantry devices
Koh, Harold 267
Lahmann, Henning 74
latency, problem of 67–8
Lauterpacht, Hersch 126
law enforcement and security
human rights law, and
  armed conflict, and 133–4, 172–5, 179, 184–5
  IHL, and 172–5
remote warfare 152–3, 171, 179, 184–5
use of force justification 172–5, 179
remote warfare, and
drones 171, 179, 184–5
human rights implications 152–3, 179, 184–5
psychological remoteness, and
  138–9, 183
use of 133–4, 145–8, 152–3, 172–5, 179
Law of War Manual (US) 294
legality, principle of 177–80
legally saturated violence 215
lethal autonomous weapons see autonomous weapons systems
Libya
  air strikes 267
Lieber Code 43, 53–4
Locke, John 217
Lotus principle 202–3
Lubell, Noam 129–30
meanings of human control 391, 401–4, 431–40
Mégret, Frederic 462
migrants 188, 196
military objectives
  definition 58–9
  identification challenges, cyber attacks 327
  location, influences of 59–60
nature-location-use-purpose test 58–60
military personnel
  misidentification 67–71, 342–3
  targeting rules 60–1, 346
monitored autonomy 377–8
morality
  chivalric warfare 42–8, 318
  death by algorithm 400–401
  killing at a distance 46–8
  risk to life, and 46–7
  risk vs. cost 41–2, 310, 367, 455–6, 465
nature-location-use-purpose test 58–60
necessity, principle of 43–4, 151–2
  absolute necessity 159, 243–4
cyber attack, self-defense 283–4
human rights law, and 175–6, 179, 181–3, 250–51
  IHL, compared with 104, 159
  self-defense, against an individual 234–5, 243–4
  status-based vs. threat-based 159
non-international armed conflict
  acknowledgment 254–6, 271
  armed conflict
    applicability 110–13, 173
    classification as 202
    conduct of hostilities rules 173–5, 253
cross-border spillovers 100–104

492  Research handbook on remote warfare

Columns Design XML Ltd / Job: Ohlin-Research_handbook_on_remote_warfare / Division: Index / Pg. Position: 14 / Date: 21/9
pin-prick theory 284
precautionary principle

AWS
attacks on other AWS 131, 345–6
cancellation protocols 354–5, 388
challenges 67–71, 327, 341–2
choice of options, and 355–6
collateral damage, and 340–41, 350–54
decisions, compared with human role 33–4, 123–5, 341–3, 345–6
feasibility of 328–9, 349, 398
human vs. computer, comparison 33–4, 123–5, 341–3, 345–6
limitations, programming 351–2, 364–5
remoteness, and 349–50
target identification 67–71, 336, 344–8
cyber attacks 328–9
feasibility standard 328–9, 349, 409
necessity, and 336
proportionality 344–5, 350–54
remoteness, and 349–50
suspension of attacks 354–5
targeting
accuracy 344–5
challenges 67–71, 327, 341–2
distinction, principle of, and 67–71, 336, 342
human vs. computer, by 33–4, 123–5, 341–3, 345–6
international obligations 341–9, 409
nature-location-use-purpose test 59–60
objects 345–6
persons, direct participation 346–8
treaty obligations 339–56, 397–8
use of force, and 176–7, 179–83
propaganda 193–4
proportionality, principle of AWS, and 344–5, 350–54, 396–7
collateral damage 350–54
cyber attacks, and 30–31, 326
distinction, principle of, and 52
human operator, role of 124, 151–2
human rights law, and
IHL, applicability 30–31, 104, 159–60
use of force 176, 179, 181–3
precautionary principle, and 344–5, 350–54, 397
purpose of 159–60
self-defense, against an individual 235–6
protracted armed violence 81, 100–101, 108, 201–2
psychological operations 187–8
public emergency, international law applicability 154
Randelzhofer, Albrecht 196
reciprocal risk
see also asymmetrical risk
AWS, of 17
chivalric warfare, and 42–8
cyber attacks, of 16–17
professional conduct of soldiers 46–7
remote-controlled devices 141–2, 149, 152–3
remote warfare, generally
see also AWS; cyber attacks; drone warfare
accountability, and 357–65
armed conflict, increases in 120, 125, 130, 399–400, 446–56, 478
attitudes to 143–5, 336–7, 367
classification 128–9, 298, 317
common features 135
definition 338
development 134–5, 141–2, 335–6
ethical concerns 366–8
human rights law, and
applicability to 157, 184

Jens David Ohlin - 9781784716998
Downloaded from Elgar Online at 06/20/2019 08:50:39PM
via free access
dignity 152, 169–70, 184, 400–401
enforcement role 133–4
extraterritorial jurisdiction 155–6, 172, 222–4, 240–41
legality 177–83
lex specialis, as 157–8
peacetime use 171–5
psychological remoteness 138–9, 183
targeting 158–60
transparency and accountability 160, 168, 184
impunity concerns 137–8
law enforcement and security role 145–8
human rights implications 152–3, 179, 184–5
use of force justification 172–5
precautionary principle obligations 340–56
remoteness
definition 138–9, 338
psychological 138–9, 183
temporal 179, 184
right to life, and 149, 152–3
risk
influences on 336, 399–400
vs. cost 310, 367, 455–6, 465
UN CCW meeting of experts 143–5, 445–7, 467–8
remote weapons systems, generally
see also AWS; cyber attacks; drones
definition 123, 135–7
force protection benefits 15–17
human rights law, and
ICRC position on 150–51, 156
international discussions 148–53
legality under 178–83
law enforcement and security role 145–8
human rights implications 152–3, 179, 184–5
use of force justification 172–5
new weapons/ technology
review obligations 151, 382–3, 411–12, 470–71
psychological remoteness 138–9, 183
types 135–8
use of 139–48
development trends 141–2
functions 139
law enforcement, in 133–4, 145–8, 152–3, 172–5, 179
lethal force, and 147
peacetime, in 171–5
trends 62–3, 80, 82–3, 139–40
remotely piloted vehicles see drones
remoteness
artificial intelligence, and 138–9
definition 138–9, 338
human control, and 138
imminence of threat, and 179, 221, 231–8
precautionary principle, and 349–50
psychological remoteness 138–9, 183
robotic infantry devices 34–5
temporal remoteness 138, 179, 184, 221, 231–8
Riotbot 146
risk
see also reciprocal risk
autonomous targeting, and 33–4
collateral damage in absence of 16, 25
remote warfare implications 336, 399–400
reprisals, cyber attacks 32–3
transference of risk 25
vs. cost 41–2, 310, 367, 455–6, 465
robotic infantry devices
ban, calls for 150–52, 373, 445, 467
human rights law challenges for 151–2
proportionality, and 124, 151–2
remote-controlled humanoids 141
remoteness, and 34–5
right to dignity, and 152, 169–70

Index
495
Rothenberg, Daniel 77–8  
Rousseau, Jean Jacques 54, 218  
rules of engagement 57–8  
Russia  
AWS policy development 144, 454  
Crimea, military force in 39–40, 188, 200  
cyber attacks 273, 290  
Rwanda  
international intervention 41  
Sassoli, Marco 60–1, 340, 342–3, 355, 367–8  
Scharre, Paul 403–4  
Schmitt, Michael 130, 193, 287, 363–4  
self-defense  
anticipatory acts 236–8, 283, 288–9  
armed conflict, whether 115–16, 172–3  
attack, proof of 218–19  
collective self-defense 243  
cyber attacks, against 278–84, 286–7, 297  
drone warfare, legal conflicts 221–2  
imminence of threat, and 213, 221, 223–4, 226, 229, 231–8, 283, 319–20  
individual, against 230–38, 320  
criminal law, under 232, 241–2  
extraterritorial jurisdiction 232–3, 320  
human rights law, under 232–3  
international law, right under 233–4  
legal principles, generally 231–2  
necessity 234–5, 243–4  
pre-emptive actions 236–8, 283  
proportionality 235–6  
UK targeted killing of Reyaad Khan 226–38  
unwilling or unable test 238, 270–71, 318–19  
individual right of 213–15, 219  
justification  

human rights law, legality under 178–9  
human security 213–17  
individuals, against 230–44, 320  
non-state actors, against 198–9, 256  
peacekeeping 242  
provocation 233–4  
punishment 229–30  
sovereign right and duty 213–18, 452–4  
terrorism, and 218–19, 226–30  
limitations 452  
terrorism, and counter-measures as 218–19  
due diligence obligations, and 222–3  
justifications for 218–19, 230–44  
UK drone strikes 226–30  
time delay implications 229–30  
self-determination, right to 194  
Serbia  
international intervention 41, 266  
Shamoon virus 273–4  
Sharkey, Noel 398  
'shift cold' 305  
Simon-Michel, Jean-Hughes 446  
Singer, Peter 66–7  
Snipers 46–7  
Snowden, Edward 274  
Solis, Gary 121–2  
Somalia  
international intervention 41  
Sontag, Susan 45–6  
sovereignty  
drone strikes as breach of 22–4, 452–4  
international law, and 313  
self-defense, right and duty 213–18, 452–4
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Term</th>
<th>Page(s)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Space Liability Convention</td>
<td>390–91</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>St Petersburg Declaration</td>
<td>1868</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>State responsibility</td>
<td>54</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AWS</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Accountability</td>
<td>386–8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Attribution</td>
<td>386</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cancellation protocols</td>
<td>388</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Criminal responsibility</td>
<td>387, 392–4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Due diligence</td>
<td>388–9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Liability, and 388–9 392–3</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Recklessness and negligence</td>
<td>386–7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Strict liability 389–91</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cyber attacks</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Attribution challenges 289</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Countermeasures</td>
<td>284–5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Due diligence, and 222–3 388–9</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Effective control test 206–7</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Human security, and 213–17, 221–2</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>International law obligations</td>
<td>250–52</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Overall control test 206–7</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Scope of 205–6</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Self-defense, legal principle</td>
<td>231–2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Transboundary harm, prevention obligations</td>
<td>388–90</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Strategic stability 447–8</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Stuxnet cyber attack 1, 16, 73, 200, 273,</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>290, 326</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Surrender</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AWS, recognition by 348–9</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Surveillance see intelligence and</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Surveillance</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Switzerland</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AWS policy proposals 468–70</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Syria</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cyber attacks 308</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Targeted killings</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Armed conflict law, applicability</td>
<td>114–20, 317–18</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Drone warfare/strikes</td>
<td>81</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Non-international armed conflict, and 108</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Self-defense of state, in</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Counter-terrorism justification</td>
<td>225–44</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Counter-terrorism strategy, as 226–30</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Reyaad Khan, of 226–30</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Targeting</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Accuracy 10, 47–8, 181</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Drone warfare 16, 67–71, 77, 304</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Autonomous targeting 33–4</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Accountability, and 124–5</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Benefits 34, 342</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Criticism 342, 344</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Law, applicability to 123–4</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>AWS, by</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Accountability, and 124–5</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Accuracy 344–5</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Autonomous 33–4, 123–5, 344</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Benefits 34</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Challenges 67–71, 327, 341–2</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Criticism 344</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Distinction, principle of, and 67–71, 336,</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>342, 395–6</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Human vs. computer, by 33–4, 123–5, 341–3,</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>345–6</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Law, applicability to 123–4</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nature-location-use-purpose test 59–60</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Objects 345–6</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Obligations 341–9</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other AWS 131, 345–6</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Against other AWS 131, 345–6</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Persons, direct participation 346–8</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Proportionality, and 344–5, 350–54, 396–7</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Civilians</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Direct participation 61, 70–71, 75, 208–9,</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>327, 346–8</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Military functions, carrying out 61</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
misidentification 67–71, 342–3
cyber attacks 29, 274
data, as military object 327–8
dual-use infrastructure 29–30,
74–5, 203, 311–12, 326
military vs. civilian, identification
74–5, 327–8
non-lethal 311
revenue-enhancing operations
31–2
distinction, principle of 67–71, 336,
408–9
drone strikes
accuracy 67–71, 77, 304–305
challenges 66–7
criteria for 65–6
legality 317–18
self-defense justification 223–4,
230–44
economic activity, objects involved
in 31–2
human rights law, and
implications 158–60
use of force legality 180–81
IHL, and
applicability 158–60, 171–2
human rights law, and 158–60
individuals 230–38, 320,
409–410
criminal law, under 232, 241–2
extraterritorial jurisdiction
232–3, 320
human rights law, under 232–3
international law, right under
233–4
legal principles, generally
231–2
necessity 234–5, 243–4
pre-emptive actions 236–8, 283
proportionality 235–6
UK targeted killing of Reyaad
Khan 226–38
unwilling or unable test 238,
270–71, 318–19
location, influences on 59
military objectives
definition 58–9
identification challenges, cyber
attacks 327
use and purpose 59
military objects 334–46
data as 327–8
disguised 59–60
interpretation 30–32, 327–8
rules 58–60, 327–8
military personnel
misidentification 67–71, 342–3
rules 60–1, 346
persons, rules regarding 346
direct participation, interpretation
61, 70–71, 75, 346–8
military functions, carrying out
61
military personnel 60–61
preparation for combat, and 62
self-defense conflicts 221, 223–4
situational/signature targeting
410–11
stages 409–410
target identification 409
categorical targeting 409
challenges 67–71, 327, 341–2,
408–9
distinction, principle of, and
67–71, 336
human vs. computer, by 33–4,
123–5, 341–2, 345–6
international obligations
341–9
nature-location-use-purpose
test 59–60
proportionality, and 344–5
technology, generally
dehumanization effect 374
development influences 220–21,
244–5
law keeping up with 378–83
strict liability, and 390–91
Technorobot 146
terrorism
9/11 attacks 45, 198–9, 224–5,
231, 257–8
counter-terrorism 305–6
geographical scope 93–4
justification 226–31
Index 499

drone strikes
  counter-terrorism role 226–30, 305–6
  justification 226–30
lone wolf terrorists 172–3
protracted armed violence, as 101
self-defense, and
counter-measures as 226–31
due diligence obligations, and 222–3
right and duty 218–19
use of force as 22–3, 172–3
targeted killings
  Kahn, Reyaad 226–30
technology impacts on 215
terrorists as combatants 224
warfare methods, impacts on 84, 257–8
Thomas, A. J. 194
Thomas, Ann van Wynen 194
threat of force 197
transboundary harm, prevention
  obligations 388–90
transnational armed conflict 84–5, 257–8
transparency
  accountability, and 163
  armed conflict, obligations during
    163–4, 166–8
  definition 161
  effective remedy, right to 162–3
  human rights law obligations
    160–68
  IHL obligations 160, 162–8
  importance of 161–2
  limitations 162–3
  remote warfare, in 160–68
UAVs see drones
UN Certain Conventional Weapons
  informal meetings of experts 143–5, 445–7, 467–8
unintended engagements 456–60
United Kingdom
  AWS, policy on 143
counter-terrorism drone strikes
  justification 226–30, 238–44

legality 230–44
targeted killings, Reyaad Khan 226–44
United States
  armed conflict, interpretation 115–18
  War on Terror 117–18
defense policy development
  60-day clock 263–5
  applicability 267
  AWS 142–3, 368–9, 371–2, 434, 467–78
  concerns and conflicts 268–70
congressional opposition 264–8
  constitutional war powers (WPR)
    263–72
Conventional Arms Transfer Policy 475–7
cyber attacks 280, 289–94
dе minimis risk approach
  267–70
drone warfare 265–6, 268–70, 272
generally 261–2
  historical development 262–4
  Law of War Manual 294
  post-enactment practices 264–5
  principles of use requirements 476–7
  purpose 264–5
  unmanned aerial vehicles see drones
  unmanned robotic weapons see
  autonomous weapons systems
  unwilling or unable test 23, 238, 249, 270–71, 318–19
  use of force
    aggression, compared 199–200
    alternative weapons 177–8
    armed attack
      compared 195–8
      interpretation as 280–84, 287–8, 451–2
      consent of territorial state, and
        449–50
      cyber attacks 196–7, 276, 278–81, 287
defensive obligations 177–8
definition 195
drone strikes
  breach of sovereignty, as 23–4, 452–4
  targeted killings 81
escalation of force procedure
  180–81
forced migration, as 196
human rights law, and
  accountability 178
  law enforcement 172–5, 179
  legality 177–80, 251
  necessity 175–6, 179, 181–3, 243–4, 250–51
precautionary principle 176–7, 179–83
  proportionality 176, 179, 181–3
IHL, applicability under 251
imminence of threat, and 213, 221, 223–4, 226, 229, 231–8, 283
interpretation approaches 196–7
intervention, and 189–95
justification
  law enforcement 172–5, 179
legally saturated violence 215
lone wolf terrorists, and 172–3
non-military nature, of 196
pre-stationed forces, and 188, 200
prohibition 195–6, 313–14
  challenges 196–7
  exceptions 449–50
information operations 196–7
thresholds
  gaps 198
  lowering, implications of 120, 125, 130, 446–56, 478
  self-defense against non-state actors 198–9, 256
  time delays, implications of 229–30
Vanguard Defense Industries 146
war crimes
  AWS role in 357–8, 365
excuses for 44
investigation obligations 164–5
war, generally
see also armed conflict
characterization
  conflict type, changes in 83–4, 298–9
  migrant movements, and 188, 196
  modern features 186–7, 298–9
  non-state actors role 85–6, 188, 202
  peace keeping forces role in 188
  pre-stationed forces, and 188, 200
chivalric warfare principles 42–4, 318
constitutional powers 261–2
historical development 262–3
protection of nationals abroad 262
definition 111–13, 251–3
dehumanization 374
globalization 119
illegal wars, discouragement 41–2
information operations 186, 202
just war theory 291
Lotus principle, and 202
  norms of 43–5
  personal risk, morality of 45–6, 399–400
  psychological operations 186–7
  reciprocal risk, and 44–5
  strategic stability 447–8
  subversive activities 186–7
terrorism impacts 84
War on Terror
armed conflict
  geographical scope 115–17
  IHL, applicability of 115–16
  self-defense justification 115–17, 198–9
  UK policy 117–18
  US policy 115–17
human rights law, applicability to 115–16, 171
Watts, Sean 283
Waxman, Matt 288, 292
weaponry

see also autonomous weapons systems; cyber attacks; drones; remote warfare
ban campaigns 150–52, 373, 445, 467
biological 412
chemical 340, 380
historical development
  air and naval power 20–21, 298–9
  artillery 19–20
  ballistic missiles 21, 299
  bow and arrows 18–19
  firearms 19–21, 46–7
  generally 18–21, 50, 79, 82, 84–5, 298–9
new weapons/technology
asymmetric warfare impacts 460–64
  cost vs. risk 41–2, 310, 367, 455–6, 465
humanity principle test 382
IHL applicability 381–2
informal consultations 143–5, 445–7, 467–8
international law, keeping up with 378–83
lowering armed conflict thresholds, whether 120, 125, 130, 446–56, 478
predictability 388–9, 392–3, 459
prohibited weapons 340, 380–81
proliferation implications 464–6
review obligations 151, 382–3, 411–12, 470–71
unintended engagements 456–60
prohibited weapons 340, 380–81
Wilmshurst, Elizabeth 131