INDEX

Abbott, F. 8.178, 9.23, 9.24, 9.27
Abbreviated New Drug Application (ANDA), US
product hopping 19.14
product-hopping 14.28–31
reverse payments 2.165–166, 14.9–13, 14.20
abridged procedures, medicinal products for human use see medicinal products for human use, abridged procedures
Active Pharmaceutical Ingredients (API)
China 16.72
mergers in pharmaceutical sector 6.32–33, 6.38, 6.59
patents and supplementary protection certificates 12.105–106
reverse payments 2.20
adaptive licensing, medicinal products for human use see medicinal products for human use, adaptive licensing
Addanki, S. 2.43, 2.50, 2.51, 2.52, 2.56, 2.72–74
administrative monopoly, China 16.102–108 see also monopolies
Advanced Therapy Medicinal Products (ATMPs) see medicinal products for human use, Advanced Therapy Medicinal Products (ATMPs)
adenosine
and mergers in pharmaceutical sector 6.52, 6.56, 6.58
Spain, competition law 17.16, 17.57
and US product hopping 14.40, 14.46
affordable drugs
access to, and free movement and competition 11.22
Affordable Care Act, US 14.58
Article 102 TFEU, patent filings as dominant position abuse 5.3, 5.28
China 16.90, 16.97
economic perspective 1.14, 1.69
trade law 9.8, 9.42
Aghion, P. 2.6
Amarnath, A. 18.32
Amils, R. 12.1–127
Anatomical Therapeutic Classification (ATC)
mergers in pharmaceutical sector 6.5–12, 6.30
Spain, merger control 17.91
UK competition and trade, Competition Act 15.20, 15.51, 15.67
Anderman, S. 4.4, 4.10, 4.11, 4.14, 4.25, 4.28, 4.40, 4.46, 4.47, 4.50, 4.51, 4.82, 4.93, 4.95
anticompetitive effects
agreements prohibition, Spain 17.4
as antitrust offence, Article 102 TFEU 5.6, 5.20, 5.26, 5.32, 5.34–35, 5.41–44, 5.79, 5.88, 5.90–91
reverse payments see reverse payments, anticompetitiveness determination see also competition; dominant position abuse
antitrust
anticompetitive effects as antitrust offence, dominant position abuse 534–535, 5.6, 5.20, 5.26, 5.32, 5.41–44, 5.79, 5.88, 5.90–91
new antitrust activism, Article 102 TFEU 5.27–53
new patent–antitrust interface, Article 102 TFEU 5.54–75, 5.92–102
and public procurement see public procurement and antitrust practices
US laws see US, antitrust laws see also competition
Antón Juárez, I. 10.98

761
appeals, UK competition and trade
15.36–41, 15.56–59, 15.95–103,
15.115–121
Arfwedson, J. 11.12
Arkinstall, J. 9.7, 9.25, 9.41
Armengod, H. 11.36
Arrow, K. 1.81
Article 101 (3) TFEU exemption
IP licensing agreements 4.44, 4.66, 4.69,
4.86, 4.101, 4.115
and IP licensing agreements, competition
enforcement in innovative industries
4.11, 4.14
IP licensing agreements, Technology
Transfer Block Exemption
Regulations (TTBER) 4.27
Article 101 TFEU
IP licensing agreements, competition
enforcement in innovative industries
4.9, 4.13–15
parallel trade, competition law 10.48–62
Article 101 TFEU and horizontal
cooperation agreements 3.1–267
ancillary restraints 3.44–45
applicable competition rules 3.6–50
Block Exemptions Regulations 3.27–43
competition in new pharmaceuticals,
biosimilar and biological medicines
3.262–267
counterfactual assessment 3.18, 3.153,
3.158
de minimis effects 3.21, 3.27, 3.33–34
exceptions 3.24, 3.27–43, 3.47–48
hardcore restrictions 3.14, 3.29, 3.38
individual agreements and assessments
3.27, 3.46–50
market power effects 3.20
research and development agreements
3.35–40
restriction by effect 3.17–21
restriction by object 3.16
safe harbours 3.28, 3.31–43
self-assessment 3.8–9, 3.26–27
specialisation agreements 3.41–43
voiding of decisions 3.23
Article 101 TFEU and horizontal
cooperation agreements, horizontal
agreement issues 3.69–261
authorised generic agreements 3.241–245
blockbuster medicines and monopoly
profits 3.77
Bolar exemption 3.75
eyear entry agreements 3.236–240
genetic producers of active pharmaceutical
ingredients (API) 3.79, 3.114
and human health protection 3.75
incentives to delay or to prevent entry of
genetic medicines 3.76–79
information exchange 3.251–261
information exchange, formal cooperation
3.254–255
information exchange, informal settings
3.256–259
information exchange, sensitive
information 3.258–259
information exchange, via third parties
3.260–261
interplay between originator and generic
companies 3.73–79
patent exclusivity rights, relevance of
3.80–83
patents and Supplementary Protection
Certificate 3.82
potential competition role 3.84–88
R&D agreements 3.246–252
R&D agreements, Article 101(3) TFEU
restrictions 3.251–252
R&D agreements, no-challenge clauses
3.139, 3.249
R&D agreements, non-compete clauses
3.250
value transfers, relevance of, and side
deals 3.89–94
Article 101 TFEU and horizontal
cooperation agreements, horizontal
agreement issues, co-marketing
agreements 3.217–226
ARCA/Novartis-Italfarmaco case (Italy)
3.222–225, 3.254
INDEX

Article 101(3) TFEU exemption 3.218, 3.220
EISAI/Pfizer case 3.220–221
first-mover advantage 3.221
information exchange 3.224
non-compete obligations 3.226
promotional activities control and minimum market share 3.225
Article 101 TFEU and horizontal cooperation agreements, horizontal agreement issues, co-promotion agreements 3.180–204
Article 101(3) TFEU exemption 3.182
Fentanyl case see under EU cases, Fentanyl pay-for-delay agreement 3.183
Article 101 TFEU and horizontal cooperation agreements, horizontal agreement issues, market sharing agreements 3.205–216
pay-for-delay agreements 3.207
Servier case see under EU cases, Perindopril (Servier)
Article 101 TFEU and horizontal cooperation agreements, horizontal agreement issues, patent settlement agreements 3.95–179
exemptions under Article 101(3) TFEU 3.163–179
exemptions under Article 101(3) TFEU, ‘obligation to litigate’ argument, rejection of 3.174–176
exemptions under Article 101(3) TFEU, ‘scope of the patent’ test, rejection of 3.177–179
generic companies’ independent efforts to enter 3.114, 3.193
Lundbeck, restrictions of competition by object see under EU cases, Lundbeck Paroxetine, restrictions of competition by object see under EU cases, Paroxetine patent validity uncertainty 3.122
potential competition test 3.109–113, 3.120
restrictions of competition by object 3.103, 3.104–151
reverse agreements exclusion 3.102
Servier, restrictions of competition by object see under EU cases, Perindopril (Servier) value transfer 3.115–117
Article 101 TFEU and horizontal cooperation agreements, horizontal agreement issues, patent system use agreements 3.227–235
dissemination of misleading information 3.232–235
divisional patents 3.228–229
Article 101 TFEU and horizontal cooperation agreements, sector inquiries, relevance of 3.51–68
competition between originator and generic companies 3.53–55
competition between originators 3.56
monitoring of patent settlements 3.57–59
national level 3.60–68
Article 102 TFEU, patent filings as dominant position abuse 5.1–102
abuse concept 5.69
affordable drugs 5.3, 5.28
anticompetitive effects as antitrust offence 5.6, 5.20, 5.26, 5.32, 5.34–35, 5.41–44, 5.79, 5.88, 5.90–91
competition law role 5.6–8, 5.17, 5.19, 5.23–26, 5.54–55, 5.57–58, 5.61, 5.85, 5.93
competition on the merits assessment 5.85–87
consumer welfare issues 5.58–61
deregistration tactics 5.39–44, 5.83–84
divisional or secondary patents and delaying of entry of generic competitors 5.4, 5.8, 5.45–53, 5.78, 5.87, 5.95
dominant position concept 5.69
ever-greening strategies 5.4
exclusive rights and exclusionary abuses 5.16–18, 5.19, 5.37–44, 5.53, 5.69, 5.75, 5.77–78, 5.82, 5.89–90, 5.95
Freiburg School and ordoliberalism 5.55, 5.57
Harhoff Report 5.30–31
INDEX

and innovation 5.16, 5.19, 5.52, 5.69
intellectual property rights 5.15–16, 5.23,
5.25, 5.55–56, 5.61, 5.100
market power issues 5.15–17
new antitrust activism 5.27–53
new patent–antitrust interface 5.54–75,
5.92–102
patent clusters 5.4, 5.31
Pharmaceutical Sector Inquiry, Final
Report 5.6, 5.28–35, 5.41, 5.76,
5.92, 5.98
regulatory process abuse 5.41–43, 5.49,
5.80–82
special responsibility of dominant
undertakings 5.69–70, 5.73
strategic use of second generation
products 5.31
supplementary protection certificates 5.37,
5.50
traditional approach 5.14–26
see also EU cases, AstraZeneca; Italy, Pfizer
Australia, Competition and Consumer
Commission v. Pfizer Australia 2.5

Baker, B. 9.30
Baker, J. 5.100
Bart, T. 11.13, 11.16, 11.42
Barton, J. 5.97
Basheer, S. 18.34
Bastidas Venegas, V. 4.3, 4.64
Bateman, R. 12.71
Baudenbacher, L. 11.36
Bayley, D. 5.18
Behrens, P. 5.57
beneficial settlements, reverse payments
2.10–13, 2.67
Bennato, A. 1.76
bid rigging
avoidance see public procurement and
antitrust practices, bid rigging
avoidance
BRICS and developing economies 18.32
and public procurement see public
procurement and antitrust practices,
bid rigging and collusion
public tenders, Spain 17.8, 17.36, 17.40
bidding, Centralised Bidding Procurement
system, China 16.84–87
bilateral trade agreements as harmful to
access to essential medicine 9.33–36
see also trade law
bio-similar products
medicinal products for human use,
abridged procedures 13.111–114
mergers in pharmaceutical sector 6.20–22,
6.23–24, 6.56–57
see also new pharmaceuticals
biological medicinal products 13.23–42
see also medicinal products for human use
Biologics Price Competition and Innovation
(BCPI) Act, US 2.162, 2.168,
2.170–172
Blalock, N. 2.1–157
Blanco Thomas, S. 3.1–267
Block Exemptions Regulations
Article 101 TFEU and horizontal
cooperation agreements 3.27–43
Technology Transfer Block Exemption
Regulations (TTBER) see IP
licensing agreements, Technology
Transfer Block Exemption
Regulations (TTBER)
blockbuster medicines
and monopoly profits 3.77
and reverse payments 2.5, 2.30–32, 2.41,
2.73
Bolar exemption
Article 101 TFEU and horizontal
cooperation agreements 3.75
patents and supplementary protection
certificates 12.82–88
see also exemptions
Boldrin, M. 5.1, 5.100
Bond, E. 18.19
borderline products 13.20–22
see also medicinal products for human use
Bosnia, Pharma-Mauc 8.194–195
Brazil
competition law 18.10
competition problems 18.19–25
distributor boycotting 18.19

764
exclusive marketing rights request 18.21
generic pharmaceutical companies 18.16, 18.20, 18.23, 18.25
innovation capacity 18.15
patent extension request 18.22
pay-for-delay agreements 18.24
see also BRICS and developing economies, competition law application challenges
Bremer, J. 12.78
Bremmer, I. 18.7
Brewster, R. 9.11
BRICS and developing economies, competition law application challenges 18.1–77
bid rigging 18.32
cartel activity 18.31
competition and patent clash 18.6–18
competition problems 18.6–42
distribution contracts 18.30, 18.37–38
distributor boycotting 18.19
dominant position abuse 18.39
EU cases, lessons from 18.43–64, 18.71–75
excessive pricing 18.40–41
exclusive marketing rights request 18.21
generic companies 18.16, 18.27, 18.33–35, 18.36, 18.44–54, 18.55, 18.56–58, 18.63–64
generic entry prevention 18.20, 18.23, 18.25
innovation capacity 18.15–17, 18.71
mergers 18.16
patent extension request 18.22
patent infringements 18.34–35, 18.62
patent settlement agreements and restrictions by object 18.44, 18.56–61
pay-for-delay agreements 18.4–5, 18.24, 18.36, 18.46, 18.56–58, 18.65–70
private sector distortions 18.3
refusal to supply 18.29
reverse payment settlements 18.34, 18.47, 18.48, 18.51, 18.53, 18.67–70, 18.71–75
supplementary protection certificates (SPC) 18.64
US cases, lessons from 18.47, 18.51, 18.65–70, 18.75
see also Brazil; China; developing countries; India; Russia; South Africa
Brekelmann, H. 10.3, 17.1–94
Burgers, P. 12.104
business strategies and marketing data 20.23–42
Butler, H. 2.43
Caballero Candelario, C. 10.1–109
Callo, P. 20.1–53
Cammarotta de Abreu, F. 18.19
Campoloni, M. 12.88
Carbonnelle, N. 8.1, 13.1–210
cardiovascular devices, and mergers see mergers in medical devices sector, cardiovascular devices
Caro de Sousa, P. 11.1–61
Carrier, M. 19.1–55
Carroll, N. 19.16
cartels
BRICS and developing economies 18.31
collusive practice types see public procurement and antitrust practices, cartels and collusive practice types in drugs and related markets
leniency provisions, Spain 17.7
secrecy, bid rigging and collusion 8.15
see also dominant position abuse
Caves, R. 2.54
Cheng, J. 1.48
Cheng, T. 18.6, 18.15
Chile, Insulin and serum cartel 8.14
China, competition law 16.1–129
Active Pharmaceutical Ingredients (API) 16.72
administrative monopoly 16.102–108
affordable drugs 16.90, 16.97
allopurinol and price fixing 16.27–28
INDEX


competition enforcement 16.7–13

competition problems 18.36–38
distribution contracts 18.37–38

Drug Administration Law 16.14, 16.74, 16.78

enforcement and penalties 16.7–13, 16.22–29

estazolam and price fixing 16.29

exemptions 16.20–21

extra-territorial application 16.4–6
generic companies 18.16, 18.36

horizontal agreements between competitors 16.15–29

innovation capacity 18.15

market allocation 16.27–29

pay-for-delay agreements 18.36

Price Law 16.4, 16.6, 16.14, 16.25

price-fixing 16.25, 16.27–29

Rainbow (Ruibang) Medical Equipment & Supplies Co. v. Johnson & Johnson Medical 16.38, 16.45–46

see also BRICS and developing economies, competition law application challenges

China, competition law, anticompetitive agreements between trading partners (vertical agreements) 16.30–47
civil litigation 16.44–47

Draft Penalty Calculation Guidelines 16.37

enforcement and penalties 16.35–47

exemptions 16.33–34

Kweichow Moutai and Wuliangye cases 16.39–41

Medtronic case 16.42

resale price maintenance 16.31–32, 16.40–43

China, competition law, market dominance 16.48–72

Anti-Price Monopoly Rules 16.58–59

Chongqing Qingyang Pharmaceutical 16.68–71

collective dominance 16.54, 16.56, 16.66
demand-side and supply-side substitutability 16.53
dominant position abuse 16.57–63

enforcement activities 16.66–72

excessive pricing 16.72

exclusive dealing 16.60, 16.66–67

penalties 16.62–63

promethazine hydrochloride distributors 16.66–67

refusal to deal 16.68–71

relevant market, establishing 16.52–56

State-Owned Entities (SOEs) 16.64–65

unfair pricing 16.58, 16.61

Zhejiang Second Pharma and Tianjin Handewei Pharmaceutical 16.72

China, competition law, merger control 16.109–129

Baxter – Gambro 16.128

competition review 16.116–126

concentration consideration 16.111

confidential information protection 16.126

consulting firms’ surveys 16.129

enforcement activities 16.127–129

established revenue thresholds 16.112–114

filing requirement 16.110–115

and market impact 16.120, 16.128

and market shares 16.119

Novartis AG – Alcon 16.128

Pfizer – Wyeth 16.128

Thermo-Fisher – Life Technologies 16.128

China, competition law, pricing behaviour investigations 16.73–101

Centralised Bidding Procurement system 16.84–87

Draft Guidelines on Pricing Conduct 16.81–83

ex-factory price 16.76

government-led centralised price negotiations 16.88–91

government-set maximum retail drug prices 16.74–77, 16.85

government-set maximum retail drug prices, partial lifting 16.78–80

local enforcement activities 16.98–101

market-oriented pricing 16.94

Maximum Retail Price (MRP) 16.75

766

Pablo Figueroa and Alejandro Guerrero - 9781785362613
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price-fixing and excessive pricing 16.94–96
public hospitals and marking-up drug prices 16.97
Chowdhury, A. 4.99
Civan, A. 1.27
civil litigation, China 16.44–47
clinical trials see medicinal products for human use, clinical trials
co-marketing agreements see Article 101 TFEU and horizontal cooperation agreements, horizontal agreement issues, co-marketing agreements
co-promotional agreements see Article 101 TFEU and horizontal cooperation agreements, horizontal agreement issues, co-promotion agreements
Coates, K. 4.32, 4.51, 4.61
Cole, M. 5.4, 20.49
Colino, S. 18.44
collective dominance
China 16.54, 16.56, 16.66
and marketing data 20.40
Spain 17.58
see also dominance abuse
collective recommendations
public procurement, bid rigging and collusion 8.24–25
Spain, competition law 17.31
compassionate use
medicinal products for human use, market access 13.95
supplementary protection certificates 12.110
see also emergency care
competition
BRICS and developing economies 18.6–42
China see China, competition law and marketing data 20.1–13
mergers see mergers in medical devices sector, competitive assessment and patent system, R&D investment 1.28–34
price competition benefits 1.37
see also anticompetitive effects; antitrust complementarity, patent protection and IP licensing agreements 4.12–15, 4.50, 4.52
compulsory licensing
patents and supplementary protection certificates 12.89–91
Spain 12.90
trade law 9.51–53
trade law, TRIPS and access to essential medicines 9.12–13
see also licensing
concentration project or agreement, Spain, merger control 17.81–85
conglomerate merger 7.109, 7.113, 7.115
see also mergers in medical devices sector
Constantine, S. 4.12, 4.48
consultant firms’ accountability, and public procurement 8.201
consumable medical devices, and mergers see mergers in medical devices sector, consumable medical devices
consumers
free movement and importation for personal needs 11.53
free movement and welfare implications 11.14–15
parallel trade, conflicting interests of stakeholders 10.15, 10.107–108
welfare and excessive pricing, US 14.55
welfare issues, and dominant position abuse 5.58–61
continuity of supply issues, UK Competition Act 15.106–107, 15.111
Cook, T. 9.31, 12.80
Cornish, W. 5.16, 5.17
Correa, C. 9.41
Coscelli, A. 10.38
Costa-Font, J. 1.61, 1.69, 10.10, 10.94
 Cotter, T. 18.70
counterfactual assessment
Article 101 TFEU and horizontal cooperation agreements 3.18, 3.153, 3.158
IP licensing agreements, Technology Transfer Block Exemption Regulations (TTBER) 4.32–34
INDEX

counterfeit drugs, and parallel trade, UK 10.91–93
countervailing buyer power demand and pricing of pharmaceutical products 1.84–92
Spain, merger control 17.86
cover bidding, public procurement and cartels 8.36, 8.38, 8.55–61
Crespo, A. 12.96, 12.102
cross-licensing, IP licensing agreements 4.5, 4.51, 4.108
see also licensing agreements
Cuchiarelli, A. 8.178
Czerw, A. 10.28
D’Amore, C. 5.46
Danzis, S. 19.14
Danzon, P. 10.96
Darbà, J. 11.15, 11.53
Daskin, A. 2.50, 2.51, 2.52, 2.56, 2.72–74
data
marketing see marketing data
recording, medicinal products for human use, pharmacovigilance 13.198–202
De Luca Drago, B. 18.19
de minimis effects, horizontal cooperation agreements 3.21, 3.27, 3.33–34
De Sadeleer, N. 11.25
decision-making procedure, medicinal products for human use, market access 13.73–83
Denmark, national sector inquiries 3.61
deregistration tactics, Article 102 TFEU, patent filings as dominant position abuse 5.39–44, 5.83–84
Desogus, C. 10.3, 10.19, 10.24, 10.27, 10.45, 10.98
dependent countries
BRICS see BRICS and developing economies
patents and supplementary protection certificates 12.11
Dhar, B. 18.16, 18.33
diagnostic imaging devices, and mergers see mergers in medical devices sector, diagnostic imaging devices
Diaz de Escauriaga, B. 10.9, 10.77
DiMasi, J. 1.25, 1.26, 1.39, 2.26, 2.163, 12.2
Dini, F. 8.178
direct to pharmacy (DTP) model, UK 15.10, 15.11, 15.144–145, 15.147–150
disparaging generic version 1.52–54
see also economic perspective, generics, delaying entry of disparate prices and parallel trade see parallel trade, disparate prices and access to pharmaceutical products
distribution contracts
BRICS and developing economies 18.19, 18.30, 18.37–38
parallel trade, conflicting interests of stakeholders 10.12–14, 10.87
restrictive distribution programs, US 14.53
Diveley, A. 14.55
divisional patents
Article 102 TFEU, patent filings as dominant position abuse 5.4, 5.8, 5.45–53, 5.78, 5.87, 5.95
Spain 17, 67, 17.68
see also patents
doctors’ management contracts, Spain 17.75
see also trade law
Dolin, G. 8.129
Dolmans, M. 4.37, 4.52, 4.54
dominant position abuse
BRICS and developing economies 18.39
China 16.57–63
collective dominance see collective dominance
generics, delaying entry of 1.50–51
marketing data, market dominance 20.41–42
parallel trade, competition law 10.63–75
Paroxetine 3.150
and patent filings see Article 102 TFEU, patent filings as dominant position abuse
and public procurement see public procurement and antitrust practices, dominant position abuse
Spain see Spain, competition law, dominant position abuse and Article 102 TFEU
UK Competition Act 15.17, 15.24–25, 15.28, 15.37, 15.44, 15.54, 15.56, 15.68, 15.86, 15.92–93, 15.102, 15.104–126
see also anticompetitive effects; cartels; excessive pricing; exclusivity; market dominance
dossier requirements, medicinal products for human use 13.66–68, 13.171
Drahos, P. 9.34
Drexl, J. 4.9, 5.40, 5.92
Dreyfuss, R. 4.8, 4.11, 4.12
drug product selection (DPS), and US product hopping 19.16–19, 19.21, 19.39, 19.47
dual pricing and parallel trade 1.57, 10.55–60 Spain 17.43–45, 17.48–49
see also pricing
dual-status medicines, and mergers in pharmaceutical sector 6.14–15
Duchêne, A. 3.169
Duns, J. 18.10
Durand, B. 1.1–100
Duso, T. 1.69
early entry agreements, Article 101 TFEU and horizontal cooperation agreements 3.236–240
economic perspective 1.1–100 affordable drugs 1.14, 1.69 market power effects 1.15–20 medical insurance effects 1.17 price setting issues 1.11–14 price setting issues, and parallel imports 1.13–14 economic perspective, demand and pricing of pharmaceutical products 1.78–100 countervailing buyer power 1.84–92 and health insurance schemes 1.82–84 healthcare comparison 1.80–83 in-hospital and out-of-hospital pricing 1.93–100 and R&D 1.90 regulator’s bargaining power 1.86–89 economic perspective, generics, delaying entry of 1.35–54 disparaging generic version 1.52–54 dominant position abuse 1.50–51 information campaigns by originator companies 1.54 patent clusters 1.42 and patent system, strategic use of 1.41–47 price competition benefits 1.37 product hopping and composition changes 1.48–51 settlement agreement and reverse payment 1.43 economic perspective, generics, delaying entry of, parallel trade effects 1.55–77 dual pricing system in low-price countries 1.57 and health insurance 1.69 innovation and R&D 1.70–77 parallel imports development in EEA and price differentials 1.60–64, 1.66, 1.68–69, 1.72–76 parallel imports, effects on prices 1.65–69 price discrimination 1.66–68 profit generated from arbitrage 1.68–69 see also parallel trade, economics of economic perspective, R&D investment 1.6–10, 1.12, 1.21–23 and cash flow 1.26 competition and patent system 1.28–34 competition and patent system, public domain 1.31 exclusivity rights 1.31–33, 1.38, 1.41 expected returns 1.25, 1.26 and innovative treatments 1.22–23, 1.32–33
intensity determinants 1.24–27
and pricing of medicines 1.27
Supplementary Protection Certificate 1.34
EFTA Court, *Pharmaq v. Intervet* 12.110
El Said, M. 9.33
Ellison, S. 1.85, 1.96
embryonic and umbilical cord blood tissues
13.38
see also medicinal products for human use
Emch, A. 18.13
emergency care
supplementary protection certificates
12.110
treatment in another Member State
11.23, 11.50
see also compassionate use
Engelmann, C. 10.28
English clauses, marketing data, market
dominance 20.42
entry control
marketing data 20.27, 20.28, 20.49
merger control and minimum purchase
obligations, Spain 17.90
UK competition and trade 15.26–34,
15.40, 15.54, 15.56, 15.60–75,
15.128–135
equivalence doctrine, patents and
supplementary protection certificates
12.67–71
Ermert, M. 9.38
essential medicines
access over IP protection see trade law,
esential medicines access over IP
protection, favouring
and TRIPS see trade law, TRIPS and
access to essential medicines
ethical neutrality, Advanced Therapy
Medicinal Products (ATMPs)
13.36–38
ethics committees’ role, medicinal products
for human use, clinical trials
13.128–131, 13.138, 13.140,
13.142–143, 13.152, 13.156
EU cases
*3i/Vedici Groupe* 6.39
*A&C/Grosspharma* 6.39, 6.43
*A/S v. Commission* 8.68
*AB Voleo v. Erik Veng* 5.25
*Abbott/Guidant* 7.43, 7.45, 7.46, 7.100
*Abbott/Solvay Pharmaceuticals* 6.50, 7.13,
7.16, 7.19, 7.20, 7.24, 7.98
*Actavis v. BI* 12.106
*Actavis v. Boehringer* 12.106, 12.114
*Actavis v. Sanofi* 12.106, 12.114
*Actavis/Allergan* 7.58
*Adalat* 10.50–54
*Agfa–Gevaert/Sterling* 7.25, 7.26, 7.32
*AGS Assedic* 11.46
*Airports v. Commission* 20.40
*AKZO Chemie v. Commission* 15.24
*Akzo/ICI* 6.62
*Allen and Hanburys v. Generics* 11.30
*Alliance Boots/Andrea–Noris Zahn* 6.39
*Alliance Boots/Cardinal Health* 6.39, 6.43
*Allianz Hungarian Bizottsági* 3.17, 3.152,
18.72, 18.73–74
*Angelini/Phoenix/JV* 6.39
*AOIP/Beyrand* 4.14, 4.44, 4.65, 4.67, 4.86
*AOK–Bundeverband* 17.24
*Apax/Kinetic Concepts* 7.51, 7.71, 7.73,
7.92, 7.114
*Apax/Mölnlycke* 7.69, 7.73, 7.76, 7.82,
7.114, 7.115
*APHL/Netcare/General Healthcare Group*
6.39, 7.69, 7.73, 7.74, 7.75, 7.76,
7.80, 7.92, 7.114
*Apathekerammer des Saarlandes/ECLI*
11.25, 11.27
*APW/Nordic Capital/APS/E/Capio* 6.39,
7.61, 7.62, 7.69, 7.73, 7.76, 7.78,
7.80, 7.81, 7.82, 7.92, 7.114
*Aragonesa* 11.27
*Arrow Group and Arrow Generics v.*
*Commission* 17.41
*Asprofar and Edifa* 10.60
*Association of Pharmaceutical Importers*
11.40
*Astellas v. Polpharma* 12.88
*Astra Zeneca*
dominant position abuse 1.51, 3.229,
4.107, 5.5, 5.11–12, 5.36–44, 5.69,
5.71, 11.58, 15.18, 17.91, 18.4,
18.43
fraudulent representation 5.26
relevant market definition 6.3, 6.27, 6.30, 12.118, 15.67, 17.14
weakness of approach 5.76–91

**Atlantic containers lines v. Commission** 5.69

**Avastin/Lucentis** 3.24

**Aventis v. Kohlpharma** 11.39

**BAI v. Bayer** 10.7, 10.50–54

**Bain/Hoechst – Dade Behring** 7.13, 7.19

**Barclays/RBS/Hillary** 6.39

**BAT v. Commission** 4.107

**Baxter International/Gambro** 6.62, 7.55, 7.78, 7.95, 7.115

**Bayer Healthcare/Roche** 6.10, 6.62

**Bayer v. Süßhöfer** 3.179

**Bayer/Chiron Diagnostics** 7.13, 7.18, 7.19, 7.22, 7.24

**Bayer/Gist-Brocades** 4.97

**BBC Brown Boveri** 4.77

**Becton Dickinson and Company/CareFusion** 7.56, 7.63, 7.66, 7.70, 7.114

**Beecham/Park Davis** 4.56

**Beef Industry Development and Barry Brothers** 3.13

**Béguelin Import** 3.21

**Bertelsmann and Sony Corp v. IMPALA** 20.40

**Biogaran v. Commission** 3.88

**Biogen** 12.112

**Boehringer Ingelheim** 11.36, 11.39, 18.62

**Boehringer v. Swingward** 11.39

**Boston Scientific/Guidant** 7.43, 7.47, 7.48

**Bouchara** 11.35

**Boussois/Interpane** 4.46, 4.67, 4.80, 4.96, 4.97

**BPB Industries v. Commission** 20.41

**Breeder’s rights – maize seed** 4.14, 4.91

**Bridgepoint/EdRCP** 7.57, 7.58, 7.92, 7.114

**Bristol-Myers Squibb v. Paranova** 11.29, 11.37, 11.38, 11.39

**Brocacef/Mediaq Netherlands** 6.43

**Burroughs-Desplanque** 4.46

**Campari** 4.77, 4.86, 4.91, 4.92

**Celesio/Sainsbury’s UK pharmacy business** 6.43

**Centrafarm and de Peijper v. Winthrop** 11.16, 11.29

**Centrafarm v. American Home Products** 4.14

**Cephalon** 3.59, 18.43, 18.63

**Ciba-Geigy/Sandoz** 6.27, 6.30

**CICCRA v. Renault** 5.25

**Class International** 9.27

**Coditel v. Cine-Vog Films** 4.79

**Commission v. Austria** (2001) 11.43

**Commission v. Austria** (2004) 13.21

**Commission v. Austria** (2008) 11.43


**Commission v. Finland** (2003) 11.43

**Commission v. France** (1994) 11.53

**Commission v. France** (2005) 11.53

**Commission v. Germany** (1992) 11.27, 11.53

**Commission v. Germany** (2004) 13.21

**Commission v. Germany** (2008) 11.27, 11.53

**Commission v. Italy** (1988) 11.43

**Commission v. Stichting Administratiekantoor Portielje** 8.10

**Compagnie Royale Asturienne des Mines (CRAM)** 3.13

**Compagnie Maritime Belge Transports v. Commission** 20.40, 20.42

**Consten and Grundig v. Commission** 4.13, 4.79, 5.3, 5.23

**Corus UK v. Commission** 3.176

**CVC/Teva’s Women’s Health Business** 6.9, 6.11, 6.12, 6.13, 6.17, 6.40, 6.47

**Daichi** 12.102

**Dalmine v. Commission** 3.176

**Danaher/Beckman Coulter** 7.13, 7.18, 7.20

**Dansk Rerindustri A/S v. Commission** 8.97

**Dansonsville** 11.60

**Davidson Rubber** 4.46, 4.79, 4.98

**De Peijper** 11.18

**Decker** 10.34, 11.50, 11.52

**Delattre** 11.25, 11.27, 13.19, 13.21

**Delimitis** 3.19, 20.29

**Delta Chemie/DDD** 4.46, 4.86, 4.96

**Dentsply/Sirona** 7.57, 7.111
INDEX

Deutsche Parkinson Vereinigung 11.44–45, 11.60
Deutsche Post AG: Interception of Cross-Border Mail 5.70
DIP SpA v. Comune di Bassano del Grappa 20.40
DocMorris 11.27
DSM/Roche Vitamins 6.65
DSM/Sinochem/JV 6.32
Duphar 10.33, 11.48
EAEPC v. Commission 10.61, 17.47–48
Ebooks 20.42
EISAI/Pfizer 3.220–221
Eli Lilly v. HGS 12.1–6, 12.105
Elopak/Metal Box – Odin 4.30, 4.46, 4.58
E.ON v. Commission 3.86
EQT VI/BSN Medical 7.61, 7.69, 7.72, 7.75, 7.80, 7.92, 7.114
EQT VI/Terveystalo Healthcare 7.61, 7.62, 7.72, 7.73, 7.74, 7.75, 7.92, 7.114
Eurim-Pharm 11.27, 11.36, 11.37, 11.38, 11.39
European Night Services and Others v. Commission 3.85
Evans Medical 10.34
Facebook/Whatsapp 20.14, 20.45–46, 20.49
Farmitalia 12.101–102, 12.104
FENIN v. Commission 17.22–23, 17.25
FENIN/Selseq 8.184–191, 8.204, 8.206–208
Fentanyl 2.123–128, 15.76, 18.4, 18.43, 18.55
copromotion agreement 2.125–126, 2.128, 3.59, 3.87, 3.91, 3.98, 3.184–204
economic context 3.195
independent efforts to enter the market 3.193
non-entry mechanism 3.197–198
parties’ intentions 3.200–204
pay-for-delay agreements 3.188
potential competition 3.189–192
restriction by object 3.203–204
reverse payments settlements 2.127–128
value transfer 3.194
Ferring v. Eurim-Pharm 11.17, 11.18, 11.32
Football Association Premier League 3.102
Fresenius/Helios 7.92, 7.114
Galenica/Fresenius Medical Care/Vifor
Fresenius Medical Care Renal Pharma JV 7.55, 7.65, 7.92, 7.114
GE/Abbott Diagnostics Division 7.13, 7.18, 7.19, 7.55, 7.81, 7.92, 7.114, 7.115
GE/Amersham 7.25, 7.26, 7.27, 7.28, 7.30, 7.31, 7.55, 7.81, 7.92, 7.115
GE/Instrumentarium 7.25, 7.26, 7.32, 7.52, 7.53, 7.78, 7.81, 7.101, 7.112
General Motors 3.13
Generics and Harris v. Smith Kline 11.30
Generics (UK) v. CMA 3.150
Generics (UK) v. Commission 3.88, 17.41
Generics (UK) v. Synaptitech 12.96
Generics v. Smith Kline 11.33
Generics/AstraZeneca 3.246
Georgetown 12.102, 12.114
Glaxo Wellcome/Smithkline Beecham 6.15, 6.27, 6.30, 17.46
GlaxoSmithKline 1.57–58, 3.17, 3.50, 3.120, 3.152, 6.15, 10.55–59, 10.101, 11.60, 17.43–44
GlaxoSmithKline Spain 11.58, 17.11, 17.46, 17.49, 17.51, 17.53, 17.55
GlaxoSmithKline/Novartis Vaccines Business/Novartis Consumer Health Business 7.60
Google/DoubleClick 20.14, 20.49
Groupement des cartes bancaires (GCB) 3.2, 3.16, 8.10, 18.73–74
Hässle v. Ratiopharm 12.117
Hoffmann-La Roche 3.24, 3.229, 20.36, 20.42
Hoffmann-La Roche v. Centrafarm 4.14, 5.23, 5.66, 11.29, 11.39
Hoffmann-La Roche/Boehringer Mannheim 7.11, 7.13, 7.18, 7.19, 7.22, 7.24, 7.105, 7.115
Höfner and Elser v. Macrotron 17.24
LAZ 3.13
IMS Health 5.23, 5.25, 20.16, 20.42
IMS/Cegedim 20.49
Industrial bags 8.43
Intel v. Commission 20.42

772

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<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Entity</th>
<th>Page References</th>
<th>Other Details</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Investor/Morgan Stanley/Möllycke</td>
<td>7.69, 7.73, 7.78, 7.80, 7.82, 7.92, 7.114</td>
<td>reverse payments 2.7, 2.20, 2.33, 2.36, 2.64, 2.78–80, 2.82, 2.110–122, 3.108, 3.116–117, 3.121, 3.122, 3.176, 15.76, 18.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Irish Sugar</td>
<td>20.42</td>
<td>value transfer 2.118, 3.115–117</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>J&amp;J/Actelion</td>
<td>6.27, 6.66</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Javico International v. Yves Saint Laurent</td>
<td>4.77</td>
<td>Lupin v. Commission 3.88</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Johnson &amp; Johnson/DePuy</td>
<td>7.33, 7.35, 7.37, 7.104</td>
<td>Magill TV Guide 5.23</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Johnson &amp; Johnson/Guidant</td>
<td>7.43, 7.44, 7.45, 7.46, 7.47, 7.48, 7.55, 7.100, 7.115</td>
<td>Medtronic/Covidien 6.62, 7.11, 7.43, 7.44, 7.46, 7.49, 7.78, 7.94, 7.114, 7.115</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Johnson &amp; Johnson/Pfizer</td>
<td>Healthcare 6.62, 6.63</td>
<td>Menarini 10.35, 11.43</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Johnson &amp; Johnson/Synthetis</td>
<td>6.61, 7.11, 7.33, 7.38, 7.39, 7.40, 7.41, 7.90, 7.96, 7.115</td>
<td>Merck, Sharp &amp; Doehme v. Deutsches Patent 12.120</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Johnson &amp; Johnson/Guidant</td>
<td>7.43, 7.44, 7.45, 7.46, 7.47, 7.48, 7.55, 7.100, 7.115</td>
<td>Merck v. Commission 17.41</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kabelmetal-Luchaire</td>
<td>4.77, 4.96, 4.97</td>
<td>Merck v. Primecrown and Beecham 4.14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kodak/Imation</td>
<td>7.11, 7.25, 7.26</td>
<td>Merck v. Primecrown v. Europharm 11.30</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kohl</td>
<td>11.50, 11.52</td>
<td>Merck v. Stepharm 11.16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kohlpharma</td>
<td>11.18</td>
<td>Merck/Schering-Plough 6.50</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Krka v. Commission</td>
<td>3.88</td>
<td>Merck/Sigma-Aldrich 6.33</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>La Roche/Syntex</td>
<td>7.13, 7.19</td>
<td>Michelin 5.69</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Laboratoires Lyocentre</td>
<td>13.21</td>
<td>Mitchell Cotts/Sofila 4.46, 4.83, 4.86, 4.97</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Langnese-Iglo</td>
<td>20.29</td>
<td>Monsanto/Pharmacia &amp; Upjohn 6.30, 15.21</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Latvian Copyright</td>
<td>15.119</td>
<td>Monteil and Samanni 11.25, 11.38</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lonza Group/Capsugel</td>
<td>6.38</td>
<td>Montex Holdings 9.27</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lonza/Teva/IV</td>
<td>6.24</td>
<td>Moorehead/Whitbread 4.91, 4.100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Louis Erauq-Jacquéry v. La Hersignonne</td>
<td>4.79</td>
<td>MPA Pharma v. Rbône-Poulen: Pharma 11.39</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lundbeck</td>
<td></td>
<td>Mylan v. Commission 3.88</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>competition restriction</td>
<td></td>
<td>Mylan/Abbott 6.5, 6.11, 6.12, 6.15, 6.19, 6.25, 6.32, 6.34, 6.47, 6.50, 6.62</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>assessment</td>
<td></td>
<td>Mylan/Perrigo 6.13, 6.27, 6.47</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>generic companies' independent efforts to enter 3.114</td>
<td>Nordic Capital/Convatec 7.73, 7.82, 7.99</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>generic entry delays</td>
<td>1.45, 2.112–114, 2.116, 2.121, 3.77, 17.41, 18.43</td>
<td>Nordic Capital/Ghd Verwaltung 6.39, 6.43, 7.61, 7.67, 7.73, 7.77, 7.114</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>generic entry effects</td>
<td>2.117</td>
<td>Nordic Capital/Möllycke Clinical/Kolmi 7.69, 7.80</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>mono-criteria tests</td>
<td>8.131</td>
<td>Novartis 1.46, 12.99, 12.118</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>patent validity uncertainty</td>
<td>3.59, 3.122</td>
<td>Novartis v. Sun Pharmaceutical Industries 12.78</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>potential competition test</td>
<td>3.109–113, 3.120</td>
<td>Novartis/Alcon 6.14, 6.15, 6.64</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>restriction by object</td>
<td>3.105–122</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
### INDEX

**Novartis/GlaxoSmithKline Oncology Business** 6.27, 6.29, 6.51, 6.53, 6.62

**Novartis/Hexal** 6.58, 6.62

**Nungesser v. Commission** 3.102, 4.13, 4.73, 4.79, 4.91

**O2 (Germany) v. Commission** 3.18

**Ordre National des Pharmaciens en France (ONP)** 3.47

**Orfanopoulos** 11.46

**Orifarm and Paranova Danmark v. Merck Sharp & Dohme** 11.39

**Ottung v. Klee & Weilbach** 4.66, 4.67

**P&G/Teva OTC Business** 6.58

**Panasonic Healthcare/Bayer’s Diabetes Care Business** 7.13, 7.18, 7.62, 7.92, 7.114

**Paranova Läkemedel** 11.18

**Paranova Oy** 11.18

**Paroxetine** 2.9, 3.88, 3.103

- dominant position abuse 3.150
- restriction by object 3.146–154
- restriction of competition effect 3.152–162

**Pasteur Mérieux – Merck** 4.17, 4.73

**Pasteur-Mérieux/Merck** 4.55, 4.57

**Penneys** 4.107

**Perindopril (Servier)**

- competition in the absence of the agreements 3.158–160
- competition restriction assessment 1.47, 1.90, 2.104–105, 3.77, 3.88, 3.247, 4.15, 15.102, 18.43
- contractual obligations 3.137–138
- early entry agreements 3.239–240
- economic context 3.135, 3.156
- exemptions under Article 101(3) TFEU 3.170–171
- generic entry delays 2.95, 2.98–105
- generic entry effects 2.109
- independent efforts to enter 3.130
- licence agreement 3.211–212
- market-sharing agreements 3.208–216
- no-challenge obligations 3.139–140
- non-compete obligations 3.141–143
- non-compulsory by-effect analysis 3.152–153
- potential competition assessment 2.102–103

- potential competition and patent barriers 3.127–129
- preliminary request on Paroxetine 3.146–151
- relevant market position 3.157
- reverse payments 2.7, 2.21, 2.47, 2.64, 2.70, 2.78, 2.80, 2.94–109, 2.130, 3.123, 3.132, 3.136, 3.155–160, 15.76, 18.4, 18.56
- royalty payments 3.212

**Pfizer + Hoechst Marion Roussel** 3.40

**Pfizer/Hospira** 3.264–265, 6.9, 6.11, 6.14, 6.18, 6.19, 6.20, 6.21, 6.22, 6.24, 6.27, 6.40, 6.64

**Pfizer/Wyeth** 6.30, 6.51

**Pharmacia & Upjohn** 11.39

**Pharmacia Italia** 12.117

**Pharmon v. Hoechst** 11.30

**Philips and Nokia** 9.26–30

**Philips/Agilent Health Care Solutions** 7.25, 7.29, 7.93

**Philips/Intermagnetics** 7.25, 7.28, 7.52, 7.90, 7.114

**Philips/Marconi Medical Systems** 7.25, 7.30

**Philips/Respironics** 7.52, 7.53, 7.59, 7.78, 7.114, 7.115

**Pohl-Boskamp** 11.43

**Polo/Lauren** 9.27

**Poucet & Pistre** 11.18

**Procter & Gamble/Teva** 6.15, 6.40

**Promuptia de Paris** 4.92

**Queensland** 12.102

**Quinine** 3.206

**Raymond – Nagoya** 4.14, 4.46, 4.77, 4.97

**Reckitt Benckiser/SSL** 6.34

**Rhône-Poulenc** 11.17, 11.18, 11.32

**Rich Products/Jus-rol** 4.46, 4.67, 4.73, 4.91, 4.96, 4.97

**Río Tinto Alcan** 4.37, 4.92, 4.93

**Roquette Frères** 3.6

**Roussel Labatorieria** 10.32, 11.42, 11.43, 11.45, 11.58

**Sandoz Prodotti Farmaceutici** 10.49

---

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INDEX

Sanofi Aventis/Genzyme 6.30, 6.59
Sanofi-Aventis/Zentiva 6.9, 6.15, 6.19, 6.27, 6.30, 6.40, 6.57, 6.60, 6.62
Sanofi-Synthelabo/Aventis 6.30
Sanofi/Google/DMI JV 7.13, 7.18, 7.54, 7.92, 7.114, 7.115
Schumacher 11.27, 11.53
Seattle Genetics v. Österreichisches Patentamt 12.119
Siemens/Bayer Diagnostics 7.13, 7.19
Siemens/Dade Behring 7.13, 7.18, 7.19, 7.20
Siemens/Drägerwerk/JV 7.53, 7.78, 7.102, 7.113
Smith & Nephew Primecrown 11.18
Smith & Nephew/Beiersdorf/JV 7.73, 7.74, 7.75, 7.82, 7.103
Smith & Nephew/Centerpulse 7.33, 7.35, 7.37
Société Technique Minière 3.13, 3.45
Sat. Lelos kai Sia EE v. GlaxoSmithKline AEVE Farmakéftikon Proxionton 1.58, 10.7, 10.70, 10.88, 11.58, 11.60, 17.60
Sun Pharmaceutical Industries and Ranbaxy (UK) v. Commission 17.41
Swedish Match Svergie/Skanidavisk Tobakskompagni 20.42
Syfait I 10.64–70, 10.101, 10.102, 11.60
Syfait II 10.70–75, 10.101, 10.102
Syntac 12.96
T-Mobil Netherlands 3.17, 3.152
Takeda/Nycomed 6.32, 6.42
Telefonica UK/Vodafone UK/Everything Everywhere/JV 20.49
TeliaSonera Sverige 3.6, 5.69
Teva UK v. Commission 3.88
Teva/Allergan 6.9, 6.11, 6.13, 6.14, 6.27, 6.39, 6.40, 6.44, 6.47
Teva/Barr 6.9, 6.11, 6.32, 6.42, 6.55, 6.62
Teva/Cephalon 6.34, 6.50, 6.57, 6.59, 6.60
Teva/Ratiopharm 6.5, 6.11, 6.12, 6.19, 6.23, 6.24, 6.25, 6.29, 6.30, 6.32, 6.34, 6.35, 6.39, 6.41, 6.42, 6.50, 6.55
Thermo Fisher/Phadia 7.11, 7.13, 7.19, 7.81, 7.114
TPG/IMS Health 20.16
Treuhand v. Commission 8.201
Tyco International/US Surgical Corp 7.72
Tyco/CR Bard 7.61, 7.81
Tyco/Mallinckrodt 7.61, 7.68, 7.81
Unichem Laboratories v. Commission 3.88
Union royale belge des sociétés de football association and Others v. Bosman 3.69
United Brands v. Commission 15.30, 15.109, 15.117
Valassis/Moris 4.14
Valmont Pharmaceuticals International/Bausch & Lomb Holdings 6.5, 6.14, 7.58
Velcro/Alpix 4.14, 4.73, 4.92
Vera Europe and Visa International v. Commission 3.85, 15.97
Vitamins 3.14, 3.206
Volk v. Veng 5.23, 5.88
Watson/Actavis 6.5, 6.11, 6.34, 6.35, 6.36, 6.42, 6.50
Wellcome Foundation v. Paranova 11.39
Windsurfing International 3.139, 3.175, 4.14, 4.16, 4.65, 4.89, 4.92
Xelita Pharmaceuticals and Alpharma v. Commission 17.41
Yamanouchi/Fujisawa 6.59
Yeda 12.102
Zimmer/Biomet 6.61, 6.62, 7.11, 7.33, 7.35, 7.38, 7.39, 7.42, 7.78, 7.93
Zoja/CSC/ICI 6.38
EU-India free trade agreement 9.37–42
Eudralex rules, medicinal products for human use 13.12
EudraVigilance web-platform 13.192
European Federation of Pharmaceutical Industries and Associations (EFPIA) 1.3, 1.21, 5.33–34
European patent with unitary effect (EPUE) 12.15–19
Evans, D. 4.7, 4.8
excessive pricing 18.40–41

775

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INDEX

China 16.72, 16.94–96
public procurement and antitrust practices 8.176–178
Spain 17.78
UK Competition Act 15.16–43, 15.109–114, 15.117–119
US, antitrust laws 14.49–56
see also dominant position abuse; pricing exclusivity
Article 101 TFEU and horizontal cooperation agreements 3.80–83
blockbusters, loss of exclusivity 2.30–32, 2.41
China 16.60, 16.66–67
IP licensing agreements 4.14, 4.72–76, 4.91–92
marketing data 20.27, 20.42
public procurement and antitrust practices 8.179–183
R&D investment 1.31–33, 1.38, 1.41
reverse payments 2.20–21, 2.27–29, 2.38, 2.40–45, 2.49–50
US, antitrust laws 2.3, 2.20–21, 2.163–164
see also dominant position abuse exemptions
Advanced Therapy Medicinal Products (ATMPs) 13.40, 13.41–42
Article 101 TFEU and horizontal cooperation agreements 3.24, 3.27–43, 3.47–48, 3.163–179
Bolar see Bolar exemption
China 16.20–21, 16.33–34
patents and supplementary protection certificates 12.79–88, 12.82–88
public procurement and antitrust practices 8.194–201
Technology Transfer Block Exemption Regulations (TTBER) see IP licensing agreements, Technology Transfer Block Exemption Regulations (TTBER)
experiments, drug experiments during patent term, US 19.12
Farquharson, M. 10.26
Feldman, R. 2.5, 2.152
Ferrara, E. 9.7, 9.55
field of use restrictions, IP licensing agreements 4.89–90
Figueroa, P. 6.1–67
filing requirement, China, merger control 16.110–115
first-mover advantage
co-marketing agreements 3.221
UK competition and trade 15.25
Flynn, M. 18.39
foreclosure
and marketing data 20.27, 20.28–30, 20.49
and most favoured nation clause, Spain 17.79
vertical agreements and illegal market foreclosure, Spain 20.30–34
Foroohar, R. 18.7
Foster, A. 16.1–129
France
Buprenorphine 8.157–160
Emergency transport 8.196
Ethicon 8.30–31
GlaxoSmithKline France 8.164–172
Groupe L’Air Liquide 8.88, 8.90, 8.94, 8.180–183
national sector inquiries 3.62
Pharmacists of Lower Normandie 8.197
public procurement and antitrust practices, statement of exemption 8.196–198
refusal to supply 20.42
Sanofi-Aventis 1.54
Schering-Plough 1.54
Sorin Biomedica France 8.65
Yachting repair in the Mediterranean 8.198
Frankel, S. 9.19
free movement and competition 11.1–61
access to affordable drugs 11.22
consumer movement and importation for personal needs 11.53
demand side 11.21–25, 11.41–53
distribution and availability 11.24–25, 11.44–47
health insurance 11.39, 11.48, 11.49

776

Pablo Figueroa and Alejandro Guerrero - 9781785362613
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INDEX

mark-ups 11.15
market structure 11.4–25
and parallel trade 10.5–6
pharmaceutical products case law 11.26–53
pharmacy margins 11.24, 11.44
public health protection 11.25, 11.40
quality verification 11.35
repackaging and labelling 11.36–38
repackaging and labelling, trademark owners 11.37–39
replacement of generics for branded products 11.40
supply side 11.7–20, 11.28–40
therapeutic (new, patented, innovative products) competition and protection of IP rights 11.8–10
free movement and competition, intra-brand competition and parallel imports and exhaustion of IP rights 11.11–19, 11.20, 11.29–30, 11.60
trademarks 11.29, 11.37–39
uniform marketing authorisation (MA) procedure 11.17–19, 11.31–33
uniform marketing authorisation (MA) procedure, parent authorisation withdrawal 11.32
uniform marketing authorisation (MA) procedure, timing of grant to generics 11.33
welfare implications 11.14–15
free movement and competition, pricing and reimbursement 11.21–23, 11.41–52
mail-order pharmacies 11.44–45, 11.46
prescription and non-prescription drugs distinction 11.21
protectionist measures 11.43
reimbursement rules 11.48–53
transparency measures 11.23, 11.43–47
and treatment in another Member State and emergency cross-border care 11.23, 11.50
Frondorf, E. 2.5, 2.152
Gal, A. 19.24
Gallasch, S. 5.20, 18.71
Gallego Montoya, A. 10.28
Ganino, M. 17.1–94
Gannon, O. 2.1–157
Ganslandt, M. 10.16, 10.84
gene therapy trials 13.140–141
see also medicinal products for human use, clinical trials
generic medicines
Anatomic Therapeutic Classification (ATC) 6.11–12
Article 101 TFEU and horizontal cooperation agreements 3.73–79, 3.76–79, 3.79, 3.114, 3.241–245
China 18.16, 18.36
delaying entry see economic perspective, generics, delaying entry of delaying entry, Article 102 TFEU, patent filings as dominant position abuse 5.4, 5.8, 5.45–53, 5.78, 5.87, 5.95
delaying entry, Spain 17.41, 17.64–71
delaying entry, US 1.44
entry prevention, BRICS and developing economies 18.20, 18.23, 18.25
galenic formulation, mergers in pharmaceutical sector 6.25
medicinal products for human use, abridged procedures 13.108–110
mergers in pharmaceutical sector 6.11–12, 6.16–19, 6.17–19, 6.56–57
public procurement and antitrust practices 8.156–172
and reverse payments see reverse payments seizures of generic medicines transiting through the EU 9.23–24, 9.25–31
trade law and compulsory licensing 9.51–53
UK competition and trade 15.13, 15.143

777

Pablo Figueroa and Alejandro Guerrero - 9781785362613
Downloaded from Elgar Online at 12/06/2021 04:07:36AM via free access
INDEX

US, antitrust laws 2.20–21, 2.163–164
geographic markets
mergers in pharmaceutical sector 6.40–44
public procurement and antitrust practices 8.137–143
Spain 17.91
Geradin, D. 1.45, 5.52, 5.53, 5.82, 5.98
Gerber, D. 5.57
Gerhardsen, T. 9.52
Germany
Clinical Trials I and Clinical Trials II 12.81
hospital purchasing groups 1.95
Lyrica® case 12.78
merger thresholds 20.47
patents and Bolar exception 12.88
Giacotto, C. 1.27
Giannino, M. 18.64
Gilbert, P. 12.105
Giocoli, N. 5.61
Glynn, D. 11.15
Golec, J. 1.27
Goodfellow, H. 12.97
Gopakumar, K. 18.16, 18.33
Grabowski, H. 1.26, 2.26, 2.38, 10.99
grant-back clauses, IP licensing agreements 4.14, 4.94–99, 4.116
Grigoriadis, G. 11.13, 11.14, 11.45
Grossman, G. 1.75
Guerrero, A. 6.1–67
Haith, Farley, C. 9.35
Hancher, L. 3.98, 11.5, 11.7, 11.10, 11.16
Harapcea, G. 8.114
hard-core restrictions
Article 101 TFEU and horizontal cooperation agreements 3.14, 3.29, 3.38
IP licensing agreements 4.40–41, 4.68–70, 4.72, 4.77–80, 4.87–88
Harhoff Report 5.30–31
harm assessment, trade law, essential medicines access over IP protection 9.25–31
Harmon, R. 2.6
Harper, P. 18.73
Harris, B. 1.43
Harris, G. 12.78, 12.104
Harrison, P. 18.72
Hartzenberg, T. 18.14
Harvey, T. 9.3
Hasik, D. 9.28
Haucap, J. 1.85
Hay, G. 14.1–64
health insurance
demand and pricing of pharmaceutical products 1.69, 1.82–84
economic effects 1.17
free movement and competition 11.39, 11.48, 11.49
medicinal products for human use, pricing and reimbursement 13.176–177, 13.181–183
and parallel trade 1.69, 10.10, 10.87
healthcare, comparison with demand and pricing of pharmaceutical products 1.80–83
healthcare professional databases, marketing data 20.16, 20.18
Hecker, P. 9.1–56
Heimler, A. 10.3
Heithecker, J. 7.1–115
Hempill, C. 1.42, 1.44, 2.6
Hentschker, C. 8.128
herbal medicinal products 13.50–55
see also medicinal products for human use
Hernández, F. 5.1–102
Hestermeyer, H. 9.13, 9.34, 9.36
homeopathic medicinal products 13.46–49
see also medicinal products for human use horizontal agreements
Article 101 TFEU see Article 101 TFEU and horizontal cooperation agreements
China 16.15–29

777

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<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th><strong>mergers in medical devices sector</strong></th>
<th>7.89–105</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Spain</strong></td>
<td>17.29–41</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>see also vertical agreements</strong></td>
<td>horizontal temporary business associations (TBAs), public procurement, bid rigging and collusion</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>hospitals exemption, Advanced Therapy Medicinal Products (ATMPs)</strong></td>
<td>13.40, 13.42</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>in-hospital and out-of-hospital pricing</strong></td>
<td>1.93–100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>prices below purchasing prices in sale of medicines</strong></td>
<td>17.77</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>public hospitals and marking-up drug prices, China</strong></td>
<td>16.97</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Hostenkamp, G.</strong></td>
<td>1.97</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Hovenkamp, H.</strong></td>
<td>5.14, 18.66</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>hub and spoke agreements, public procurement and cartels</strong></td>
<td>8.115–123, 8.202</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>human use, medicinal products for see medicinal products for human use</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Hungary PharmAudit</strong></td>
<td>8.201</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>public procurement and antitrust practices, statement of exemption</strong></td>
<td>8.201</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>hybrid procedure, medicinal products for human use</strong></td>
<td>13.107, 13.117</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Hylton, K.</strong></td>
<td>4.7, 4.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Idot, L.</strong></td>
<td>8.212</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>immunological medicinal products</strong></td>
<td>13.25–27</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>see also medicinal products for human use</strong></td>
<td>in-vitro diagnostics (IVD) devices, and mergers see mergers in medical devices sector, in-vitro diagnostics (IVD) devices</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>incentives delaying or preventing entry of generic medicines</strong></td>
<td>3.76–79</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>innovation 4.13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>orphan drugs 13.62–63</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>paediatrics 13.59</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>reverse payments see reverse payments, incentives to settle</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>independent efforts to enter the market 3.114, 3.193</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Inderst, R. 1.85</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>India bid rigging 18.32</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Competition Act 18.12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>competition problems 18.32–35</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>EU-India free trade agreement 9.37–42</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>generic pharmaceutical companies 18.16, 18.33–35</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>innovation capacity 18.15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>patent infringements 18.34–35</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>pharmaceutical patent agreements 2.9 Varca Druggist &amp; Chemist v. Chemists and Druggists Association 18.35</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>see also BRICS and developing economies, competition law application challenges</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>industrial application requisite see patents and supplementary protection certificates, industrial application requisite</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>information exchange Article 101 TFEU and horizontal cooperation agreements 3.251–261</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>co-marketing agreements 3.224</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>confidential information protection, China 16.126</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>dissemination of misleading information, patent system use agreements 3.232–235</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>generic entry delays and campaigns by originator companies 1.54</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>marketing data 20.2–11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>public procurement and cartels 8.39–41</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>publicly available information, pharmacovigilance 13.189</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>reverse payments 2.15–18, 2.46–47</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
INDEX

Inman, P. 12.104
innovation
   Article 102 TFEU, patent filings as
do dominant position abuse 5.16, 5.19,
5.52, 5.69
BRICS and developing economies
18.15–17, 18.71
China 18.15
harm assessment, IP licensing agreements
4.57–58
incremental, reverse payments 2.44
innovative industries see IP licensing
   agreements, competition enforcement
in innovative industries
innovative-product requirements, lack of,
and public procurement and bid
rigging 8.14
own technology/innovation restrictions, IP
licensing agreements 4.87–88
parallel trade effects 1.70–77
potential competition role 4.55–58
predatory, public procurement and
dominant position abuse 8.173–175
and product differentiation, mergers in
pharmaceutical sector 6.49–52
protection, mergers in medical devices
sector 7.84, 7.93–94, 7.100
US, product hopping 14.41
see also R&D
intellectual property
   Article 102 TFEU, patent filings as
do dominant position abuse 5.15–16,
5.23, 5.25, 5.55–56, 5.61, 5.100
essential medicines access see trade law,
essential medicines access over IP
   protection, favouring
mergers in pharmaceutical sector 6.51
parallel imports and free movement see
free movement and competition,
intra-brand competition and parallel
imports and exhaustion of IP rights
parallel trade 10.40–43
protection, and trade law 9.7–8
and reverse payments 2.6
trademarks, intra-brand competition and
parallel imports 11.29, 11.37–39
TRIPS Agreement see TRIPS Agreement
intellectual property licensing agreements
4.1–117
ancillary restraints 4.45–46
Article 101 (3) TFEU exemption 4.44,
4.66, 4.69, 4.86, 4.101, 4.115
competitive assessment drivers 4.47–52
exclusive sourcing restrictions and quality
requirements 4.91–92
field of use restrictions 4.89–90
grant-back clauses restrictions 4.94–99,
4.116
hard-core restrictions 4.68–70, 4.72,
4.77–80, 4.87–88
innovation and potential competition role
4.55–58
innovative harm assessment 4.57–58
inter-technology and intra-technology
   competition impact 4.53–54
non-challenge clauses restrictions
4.100–102, 4.109, 4.116
non-compete clauses restrictions 4.85–86
output limitation concerns 4.68–70
own technology/innovation restrictions
4.87–88
price fixing restrictions 4.59–60, 4.65
production restrictions and exclusive
licensing 4.72–76
R&D incentives 4.3
reciprocal and non-reciprocal agreements
4.51–52
restrictive clauses 4.50
royalty calculations 4.61–67, 4.115
royalty calculations, based on
   non-contract product sales 4.65–67
royalty calculations, reciprocal running
royalties 4.62–64
sales restrictions and territorial protection
4.77–84
sales restrictions and territorial protection,
active/passive sales 4.77–80
sales restrictions and territorial protection,
on licensee 4.83–84
sales restrictions and territorial protection,
on licensor 4.82
settlement agreement licensing restrictions
4.106–110

780
Pablo Figueroa and Alejandro Guerrero - 9781785362613
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settlement agreement licensing
restrictions, cross-licensing 4.108
technology licensing agreements and
Article 101 TFEU 4.19–117
technology owner's market share 4.4
technology pools restrictions 4.111–117
termination clauses restrictions 4.103–105
territorial/customer restrictions 4.71–84
tyling restrictions 4.93
intellectual property licensing agreements,
competition enforcement in innovative industries 4.7–18
and Article 101 (3) TFEU exemption
4.11, 4.14
Article 101 TFEU 4.9, 4.13–15
complementarity and patent protection
4.12–15, 4.50, 4.52
exclusivity justifications 4.14
grant-back clause 4.14
incentives to innovate 4.13
interactions with IP law 4.16–18
and market definition 4.10
monopolies 4.8–9
static v. dynamic competition 4.7–11
and subject-matter of IP rights 4.15
intellectual property licensing agreements,
Technology Transfer Block Exemption
Regulations (TTBER) 4.19–41
Article 101 (3) TFEU exemption 4.27
competitive relationships between the
parties 4.28–34
counterfactual assessment 4.32–34
hard-core restrictions 4.40–41
market share thresholds 4.35–39
market share thresholds, and royalties
4.37
non-assertion and settlement agreements
4.25
potential competition 4.29–31
safe harbour and market share thresholds
4.26, 4.37, 4.85, 4.88
technology rights 4.21–23
technology transfer 4.24–39
Vertical Block Exemption Regulation
(VBER) 4.28
International Council for Harmonisation of
Technical Requirements for
Pharmaceuticals for Human Use
(ICH) 13.17
invalidity see patent invalidity
inventive step requisite, patents and
supplementary protection certificates
12.35–42
inversion mergers, US 14.57–58
investigational medicinal products
13.134–137
see also medicinal products for human use,
clinical trials
Ioannidou, M. 18.1–77
ISO IDMP (Identification of Medicinal
Products) implementation 13.102–104
see also medicinal products for human use,
market access
Italy
ARCA/Novartis–Italfarmaco 3.222–225,
3.254
Avastin/Lucentis preliminary ruling
3.230–235
national sector inquiries 3.63
Pfizer 5.5, 5.12, 5.45–53, 5.80, 5.95
Procedures for the supply of devices for ostomy
8.69
Prodotti disinfettanti 8.14, 8.83, 8.139,
8.201
Risonanza Magnetica 8.100–101
Tests diagnostici per diabete 8.13, 8.41
Jaeger, T. 9.19, 9.42
Jhingran, S. 18.12
Jones, A. 5.69, 5.86
Jorde, T. 4.3
Kallaugher, J. 4.4, 4.10, 4.14, 4.25, 4.40,
4.47, 4.50, 4.51, 4.82, 4.95
Kanavos, P. 1.61, 1.69, 10.9, 10.10, 10.11,
10.16, 10.80, 10.94, 10.95, 11.123,
15.74
Kapczynskit, A. 18.33, 18.34
Killick, J. 10.77
Kirkwood, J. 5.59
Kjolbye, L. 5.8, 5.77, 5.93
Kobayashi, B. 2.56
Koenig, C. 10.28
Köhler, C. 1.85
Köhler, J. 11.13

INDEX
INDEX

Kokkoris, I. 18.1–77
Korah, V. 4.11, 4.25, 4.30, 4.36, 4.64, 4.79, 5.24
Kovar, R. 8.212
Kowal, S. 10.9, 10.11, 10.16, 10.80
Kumar, S. 9.22, 9.35, 9.41
Kyle, M. 1.64, 1.69, 10.23, 10.41, 10.77, 19.20

Lacatus, A. 3.67
Lai, E. 1.75
Lai, J. 2.26, 2.40, 2.48
Lande, R. 5.59
Łapinska, A. 9.28
Lemley, M. 1.41, 1.42, 1.44
Leopold, C. 8.1
Levine, D. 5.1, 5.100
Li, C. 1.71, 10.96, 10.100
Lianos, I. 4.8, 4.11, 4.12
Liberatore, F. 10.76, 11.13

licensing

adaptive, and timely access to new medicines 13.99–101
compulsory see compulsory licensing
intellectual property licensing agreements see intellectual property licensing agreements
out-licensing, mergers in pharmaceutical sector 6.35–37
see also patents

Linnosmaa, I. 10.94

literal test, supplementary protection certificates 12.103–104

Lithuania

national sector inquiries 3.64
price fixing and anticompetitive vertical agreements 8.117–119

Lowe, P. 5.58

loyalty rebate system, Spain 17.73–74
Luchianov, L. 3.1–267
Lunze, A. 12.104
Lybecker, K. 9.10

McCulloch, A. 12.78
McHale, J. 9.3
Mahon, J. 10.10
Maier-Rigaud, F. 2.1–157
mail-order pharmacies 11.44–45, 11.46

see also free movement and competition, pricing and reimbursement

Maira, K. 9.23
Maloney, M. 1.27
Malueg, D. 1.68, 10.84
Maness, R. 2.57
Manheim, B. 2.170

mark-ups

China 16.97
free movement and competition 11.15

market access

Advanced Therapy Medicinal Products (ATMPs) 13.39–42
medicinal products for human use see medicinal products for human use, market access
market authorisation as medicinal product, supplementary protection certificates 12.108–110
market classification approach, mergers in medical devices sector 7.86, 7.93, 7.98

market definition

IP licensing agreements, competition enforcement in innovative industries 4.10
mergers in pharmaceutical sector 6.2–39
public procurement and antitrust practices, dominant position abuse 8.127–143, 8.168
UK Competition Act 15.20–23, 15.50–52, 15.56, 15.67, 15.84–85, 15.102, 15.107, 15.116

market dominance

China see China, competition law, market dominance
marketing data see marketing data, market dominance
see also dominant position abuse
market exclusivity, patent exclusivity comparison, and reverse payments 2.40–45, 2.49–50

market power

Article 102 TFEU, patent filings as dominant position abuse 5.15–17
China, merger control 16.120, 16.128
economic perspective 1.15–20
source, and marketing data 20.24

782
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market share  
China 16.27–29, 16.119  
IP licensing agreements 4.4  
marketing data 20.27, 20.49  
mergers in medical devices sector 7.91  
minimum, co-marketing agreements 3.225  
public procurement and cartels 8.33, 8.74–90  
relevant market see relevant market, establishing  
Spain 17.37, 17.40, 17.92–93  
market share thresholds, Technology Transfer Block Exemption Regulations (TTBER) 4.26, 4.35–39, 4.85, 4.88  
market structure, free movement and competition 11.4–25  
market studies, UK see UK competition and trade, market studies and investigations  
market-oriented pricing, China 16.94  
marketing authorisation, medicinal products for human use 13.3, 13.27  
marketing data 20.1–53  
barriers to entry data 20.27, 20.28, 20.49  
business strategies 20.23–42  
business strategies, competitive concern 20.23–24  
and collective dominance 20.40  
competitive role 20.1–13  
data access and use 20.6–11  
data collection sources 20.15–18  
data-mining 20.8  
exclusivity justifications 20.27  
Facebook/Whatsapp merger 20.14, 20.45–46, 20.49  
foreclosure data 20.27, 20.28–30, 20.49  
Google/DoubleClick merger 20.14, 20.49  
healthcare professional databases 20.16, 20.18  
information society and big data 20.2–11  
market power source 20.24  
market shares analysis 20.27, 20.49  
market transparency 20.24  
marketing analysis in competition precedents 20.14–22  
marketing related activities and prescription drugs 20.12–13  
merger control 20.43–49  
merger control, data use 20.49  
merger control, thresholds 20.43–48  
network effects 20.24  
non-rivalrous nature of data 20.10  
open data 20.5  
primary market research (PMR) and real-world evidence (RWE) data 20.16  
sales tracking data 20.16, 20.17, 20.21–22  
sell-out and sell-in data 20.21–22  
third party access restriction 20.25–27  
and vertical restraints 20.26, 20.27, 20.30–34  
marketing data, market dominance 20.36–40  
dominance abuse 20.41–42  
English clauses and “most favoured nation” clauses (MFNs) 20.42  
exclusive dealing 20.42  
refusal to supply 20.42  
selective price cutting 20.42  
Markush formula, supplementary protection certificates 12.104  
Marquis, M. 18.7  
Martens, M. 8.1, 13.1–210  
Martinez, A. 18.19, 18.20, 18.21, 18.25  
Martínez Lage, S. 10.3, 17.47  
Maskus, K. 1.71, 10.16, 10.84, 10.96, 10.100  
Masson, A. 19.17  
Maximum Retail Price (MRP), China 16.75  
medical devices sector, mergers see mergers in medical devices sector  
medicinal products for human use 13.1–210  
biological medicinal products 13.23–42  
borderline products 13.20–22  
decisions, recommendations and opinions 13.9  
directives and regulations 13.7–8  
Eudralex rules 13.12  
guidelines 13.10–12  
Heads of Medicines Agencies (HMA) 13.17  

783
Heads of the National Competent Authorities 13.17
herbal medicinal products 13.50–55
homeopathic medicinal products 13.46–49
immunological medicinal products 13.25–27
immunological medicinal products, batch-to-batch consistency 13.27
International Council for Harmonisation of Technical Requirements for Pharmaceuticals for Human Use (ICH) 13.17
marketing authorisation 13.3, 13.27
medicinal product definition 13.18–19
medicinal products derived from human blood and human plasma 13.28–31, 13.93
orphan drugs 13.60–63, 13.71, 13.98
orphan drugs, incentives 13.62–63
paediatrics 13.56–59
paediatrics, incentives 13.59
patent expiry for originator biological products 13.24
radiopharmaceuticals 13.43–45, 13.93
stakeholders 13.13–17
Supplementary Protection Certificate (SPC) 13.59
medicinal products for human use, abridged procedures 13.105–117
bibliographic procedure 13.115
biosimilars 13.111–114
generics 13.108–110
hybrid procedure 13.107, 13.117
medicinal products for human use, Advanced Therapy Medicinal Products (ATMPs) 13.32–42, 13.71, 13.93
Committee for Advanced Therapies (CAT) 13.39, 13.42
embryonic and umbilical cord blood tissues 13.38
ethical neutrality 13.36–38
hospital exemption 13.40, 13.42
market access 13.39–42
special exemption 13.40, 13.41–42
medicinal products for human use, clinical trials 13.118–167
adverse events and reactions, notification of 13.148–157
applicable legislation 13.118–122
application assessment, new 13.163
commencement 13.138–141
conduct 13.142–145
conduct changes due to circumstances 13.144–145
classified outside EU 13.158
Directive 2001/20/EC requirements 13.123–159
end of trial 13.146–147
ethics committees’ role, timescales 13.130–131, 13.140, 13.143
genetic therapy trials 13.140–141
guidance 13.159
investigational medicinal products 13.134–137
investigational medicinal products, labelling and Good Manufacturing Practice (GMP) 13.136–137
investigational medicinal products, manufacture and import 13.134–135
minors 13.127
monocentric and multicentric trials 13.132–133
new Clinical Trials regulation 13.160–167
new Clinical Trials regulation, EU portal single-entry point 13.162
protection of trial subjects 13.124–127
risk evaluation 13.124
medicinal products for human use, market access 13.64–104
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Topic</th>
<th>Page(s)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Adaptive licensing and timely access to new medicines</td>
<td>13.99–101</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Centralised procedure</td>
<td>13.69–83</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>'Compassionate use' exception</td>
<td>13.95</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Decision-making procedure</td>
<td>13.73–83</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dossier requirements</td>
<td>13.66–68</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Evaluation procedure time limit</td>
<td>13.76, 13.80</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ISO IDMP (Identification of Medicinal Products) implementation</td>
<td>13.102–104</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mandatory procedure for certain types of products</td>
<td>13.71</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Medicinal product containing new active substance</td>
<td>13.72</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Medicinal products intended for research and development trials exception</td>
<td>13.93</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Medicinal products prepared in a pharmacy exception</td>
<td>13.93</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Monitoring</td>
<td>13.90</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>National routes</td>
<td>13.84–88</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>National routes, decentralised procedure</td>
<td>13.88</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>National routes, mutual recognition procedure</td>
<td>13.86–87</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Product obligation exceptions</td>
<td>13.93–95</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Scientific advice and protocol assistance</td>
<td>13.96–98</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>'Specials regime' exception</td>
<td>13.94</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Validity term and renewal</td>
<td>13.89–90</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Variations and extensions</td>
<td>13.91–92</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Medicinal products for human use, pharmacovigilance</td>
<td>13.184–207</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Data recording, reporting and assessment</td>
<td>13.198–202</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Data recording, reporting and assessment, periodic safety update reports</td>
<td>13.200–202</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Data recording, reporting and assessment, periodic safety update reports, exclusions</td>
<td>13.202</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Data recording, reporting and assessment, suspected adverse reactions</td>
<td>13.199</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Data recording, Urgent Union procedure</td>
<td>13.203–205</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EMA and Member States duties</td>
<td>13.187–192</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EudraVigilance web-platform</td>
<td>13.192</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MAH obligations</td>
<td>13.193–207</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Post-authorisation safety studies</td>
<td>13.206–207</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Publicly available information</td>
<td>13.189</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Qualified person responsibility</td>
<td>13.195–196</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Risk management system</td>
<td>13.197</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Risks and adverse reactions, monitoring</td>
<td>13.185, 13.188</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sanctions and penalties</td>
<td>13.190</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Medicinal products for human use, pricing and reimbursement</td>
<td>13.168–183</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dossier requirements</td>
<td>13.171</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Health insurance system</td>
<td>13.176–177, 13.181–183</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pricing provisions</td>
<td>13.171–174</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Profitability issues</td>
<td>13.174</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Reimbursement scheme provisions</td>
<td>13.175–183</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Reimbursement scheme provisions, negative list</td>
<td>13.181–183</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Reimbursement scheme provisions, positive list</td>
<td>13.176–180</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Medicines Distribution study, UK</td>
<td>15.144–151</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mei, P.</td>
<td>11.49</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mena-Labarthe, C.</td>
<td>8.14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Merger control</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>China see China, competition law, merger control</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Marketing data</td>
<td>20.43–49</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Spain see Spain, competition law, merger control</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mergers</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BRICS and developing economies</td>
<td>18.16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Inversion mergers, US</td>
<td>14.57–58</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mergers in medical devices sector</td>
<td>7.1–115</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Conglomerate merger</td>
<td>7.113, 7.115</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Demand-side and supply-side</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Substitutability</td>
<td>7.8–11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dental equipment</td>
<td>7.57</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Diabetes-related equipment</td>
<td>7.54</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dialysis equipment</td>
<td>7.55</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
INDEX

drug eluting stents (DES) 7.100
e-cigarettes and antiviral patches 7.60
geographic market definition 7.78–82
light boxes 7.59
market definition practice 7.6–81
non-horizontal concerns 7.106–115
ophthalmic devices 7.58
patient monitors 7.52–53, 7.101–102, 7.112–113
speciality hospital beds 7.51
syringe pumps 7.56
vertical mergers 7.108–114
mergers in medical devices sector,
cardiovascular devices 7.43–49
cardiac rhythm management 7.47
cardiac surgery devices 7.48
electrosurgical devices (EDs) 7.49
interventional cardiology devices 7.44, 7.45
peripheral vascular (PV) devices 7.44, 7.46
mergers in medical devices sector,
competitive assessment 7.83–115
horizontal concerns 7.89–105
innovation protection 7.85, 7.93–94, 7.100
market classification approach 7.86, 7.93, 7.98
market shares analysis 7.91
mergers in medical devices sector,
consumable medical devices 7.61–77
antimicrobial scrubs 7.70
biopsy needles 7.66
compression therapy products 7.75
continuous temperature monitoring probes 7.68
drug-transfer devices 7.65
ear, nose and throat 7.62
intravenous sets 7.64
orthopaedic consumables 7.74
ostomy products 7.67
sterile single use 7.61
surgical textile products 7.69, 7.103
syringes 7.63
tissue matrices 7.71
wound care products 7.72, 7.73, 7.79
mergers in medical devices sector, diagnostic imaging devices 7.25–32
computed tomography (CT) 7.27
diagnostic pharmaceuticals 7.31
magnetic resonance imaging (MRI) 7.28
nuclear imaging (NI) 7.30
Picture Archiving and Communication Systems (PACS) 7.32
ultrasound (U/S) 7.29
X-ray 7.26
mergers in medical devices sector, in-vitro diagnostics (IVD) devices 7.13–24, 7.98, 7.105
Clinical Chemistry classification 7.18
Critical Blood Analyte tests for critical care 7.18
Genetic Testing classification 7.23
Global IVD Classification 7.16–24
Haematology/Haemostasis/
Immunohaematology/Histology/
Cytology classification 7.20
Imunochemistry classification 7.19
Infectious Immunology classification 7.22
Microbiology Culture classification 7.21
mergers in medical devices sector,
orthopaedic devices 7.33–42
cranio-maxillofacial devices 7.41
elbow implants 7.36
hip implants 7.37, 7.104
knee implants 7.35, 7.104
Pulsed Lavage system 7.42
shoulder implants 7.38
spinal devices 7.39
trauma devices 7.40, 7.96
mergers in pharmaceutical sector 6.1–67
Active Pharmaceutical Ingredients (API)
markets and other raw materials 6.32–33, 6.38, 6.59
and advertising 6.52, 6.56, 6.58
Anatomic Therapeutic Classification (ATC) 6.5–12, 6.30
Anatomic Therapeutic Classification (ATC), generics and classification by module 6.11–12
Anatomic Therapeutic Classification (ATC), originator companies 6.9
Anatomic Therapeutic Classification (ATC), originator products 6.10
bio-similar products 6.20–22
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Topic</th>
<th>Page(s)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>bio-similar products and small molecule traditional generics</td>
<td>6.23–24</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>contract manufacturing of finished dose pharmaceuticals</td>
<td>6.34</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>dosage delivery mechanisms</td>
<td>6.38</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>dual-status medicines</td>
<td>6.14–15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>galenic formulation and generics</td>
<td>6.25</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>geographic market definition</td>
<td>6.40–44</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>geographic market definition, finished pharmaceuticals</td>
<td>6.40–41</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>market definition</td>
<td>6.2–39</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>markets downstream of finished pharmaceuticals</td>
<td>6.39, 6.43–44</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>markets upstream and downstream from finished pharmaceuticals</td>
<td>6.31–39</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>markets upstream of finished pharmaceuticals</td>
<td>6.42</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>medicine characteristics and segmentation of product markets</td>
<td>6.30</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>national registration and reimbursement rules</td>
<td>6.29</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>originators and generics</td>
<td>6.16–19</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>out-licensing</td>
<td>6.35–37, 6.51, 6.59</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>over-the-counter (OTC) medicines</td>
<td>6.14–15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>pharmaceutical form and New Form Code</td>
<td>6.13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>prescription medicines</td>
<td>6.14–15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>product life cycle</td>
<td>6.28</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>product market definition for finished dose pharmaceuticals</td>
<td>6.4–30</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>product “pipelines”, innovation and R&amp;D</td>
<td>6.26–27</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>remedies and commitments in merger control</td>
<td>6.61–66</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>remedies and commitments in merger control, divestiture of product lines or businesses</td>
<td>6.62–65</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>synthetic small-molecule generics</td>
<td>6.17–19</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>mergers in pharmaceutical sector</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>competitive analysis</td>
<td>6.45–66</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Commission’s approach to affected markets</td>
<td>6.47</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>competition from generics and bio-similars</td>
<td>6.56–57</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>competitive drivers</td>
<td>6.48–60</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>competitive dynamics for OTC products</td>
<td>6.58</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>innovation and product differentiation</td>
<td>6.49–52</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>intellectual property rights</td>
<td>6.51</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>non-horizontal effects</td>
<td>6.59–60</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>prescription medicines, authorisation, price and reimbursement conditions</td>
<td>6.53–55</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mexico, <em>Drugs tendered by the Healthcare sector</em></td>
<td>8.73</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mey, B. 9.10, 9.35, 9.36</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>minimum bound effect, reverse payments, anticompetitiveness determination</td>
<td>2.54–55</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>minimum purchase obligation, Spain 17.33, 17.90</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Miño López, A. 8.1–220</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>minors and clinical trials</td>
<td>13.127</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>see also medicinal products for human use, clinical trials</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>monitoring</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>annual monitoring reports, reverse payments, EU approach 2.87–93</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Article 101 TFEU and horizontal cooperation agreements, sector inquiries 3.57–59</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>medicinal products for human use, market access 13.90</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>medicinal products for human use, pharmacovigilance 13.185, 13.188</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>mono-criteria tests, public procurement and dominant position abuse 8.131</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>monopolies</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>administrative monopoly, China</td>
<td>16.102–108</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

787
INDEX

blockbuster medicines and monopoly profits 3.77
competition enforcement in innovative industries 4.8–9
Montañá, M. 12.17, 12.104
Moon, S. 9.44, 9.50
Morton, F. 19.20
Mossialos, E. 11.1, 11.5
most favoured nation (MFN) principle marketing data, market dominance 20.42
Spain 17.79
trade law, TRIPS and access to essential medicines 9.35
Motta, M. 11.15
Moulet, P. 4.1–117
Müller-Langer, F. 10.84
Nagy, C. 18.72, 18.73
Navarro Varona, E. 10.1–109
Netherlands
AstraZeneca 1.98, 1.99, 1.100
in-hospital and out-of-hospital pricing 1.98, 1.99, 1.100
national sector inquiries 3.65
new molecular entities (NME) and patent exclusivity, reverse payments 2.38
new pharmaceuticals competition, Article 101 TFEU and horizontal cooperation agreements 3.262–267
competition, free movement and competition 11.8–10
drug development times, patents and supplementary protection certificates 12.2
increased costs, reverse payments 2.26–29
see also bio-similar products
Nihoul, P. 5.57
no-challenge clauses
Article 101 TFEU and horizontal cooperation agreements 3.139, 3.249
IP licensing agreements 4.100–102, 4.109,
4.116
Nolte, E. 1.86
non bis in idem principle, public procurement and bid rigging 8.22–26
non-compete clauses

Article 101 TFEU and horizontal cooperation agreements 3.226, 3.250
IP licensing agreements 4.85–86
non-entry mechanism, Fentanyl 3.197–198
non-fulfilment of patentability requirements, patents and supplementary protection certificates 12.60–63
not-for-the-market, public procurement and antitrust liability of contracting authorities 8.184–191, 8.204,
8.206–208
novelty requisite, patents and supplementary protection certificates 12.25–34
Nowag, J. 18.72, 18.73, 18.74
Oates, E. 12.97
O'Donoghue, R. 5.19, 5.26, 5.78, 8.147
Odudu, O. 8.115
OECD
common forms of bid rigging 8.36–38
pharmaceuticals consumption rise 1.3
Olson, L. 2.37, 2.54
O'Neill, J. 18.7
‘only one will survive’ principle, public procurement and dominant position abuse 8.164–172
Ooms, G. 9.44
orphan drugs
medicinal products for human use 13.60–63, 13.71, 13.98
UK Competition Act 15.47–48
orthopaedic devices, and mergers see mergers in medical devices sector, orthopaedic devices
out-licensing, mergers in pharmaceutical sector 6.35–37, 6.51, 6.59
Padilla, J. 5.19, 5.26, 5.78, 8.147
paediatrics, medicinal products for human use 13.56–59
parallel behaviour
public procurement and bid rigging 8.27–31
public procurement and cartels 8.45, 8.46, 8.47–48
parallel trade 10.1–109
competition issues 10.43
concept 10.37–46

Pablo Figueroa and Alejandro Guerrero - 9781785362613
Downloaded from Elgar Online at 12/06/2021 04:07:36AM
via free access
and counterfeit drugs, UK 10.91–93
and free movement see free movement and
competition, intra-brand competition
and parallel imports and exhaustion
of IP rights
and free movement of goods 10.5–6
import of patent protected medicines, US
1.55
intellectual property rights 10.40–43
price setting issues, and parallel imports
1.13–14
Product Licence for Parallel Import
(PLPI), UK 15.23
trading increase 10.44–46
parallel trade, competition law 10.47–75
Article 101 TFEU 10.48–62
dominant position abuse 10.63–75
dual-pricing policy 10.55–60
national competition authorities
10.61–62
parallel trade, conflicting interests of
stakeholders 10.7–18
consumers 10.15, 10.107–108
distributors 10.12–14, 10.87
health insurance companies 10.10, 10.87
pharmaceutical companies 10.16
pharmacists 10.11, 10.87
parallel trade, disparate prices and access to
pharmaceutical products 10.19–36
common market consideration 10.28–29
High Level Group on Innovation and
Provision of Medicines 10.27
Pharmaceutical Forum 10.27
price regulation 10.23–24
quantitative restrictions against imported
products 10.31–36
parallel trade, economics of 10.76–103
innovation issues 10.96–103
monetary benefits and shortages
10.87–90
prices and competition 10.82–86
quality of medicines imported and
counterfeit concerns 10.91–95
see also economic perspective, generics,
delivering entry, parallel trade
effects
Park, C. 18.39
Paskalia, V. 11.49
patent clusters
Article 102 TFEU, patent filings as
dominant position abuse 5.4, 5.31
generics, delaying entry of 1.42
reverse payments 2.20
patent expiry
medicinal products for human use 13.24
reverse payments 2.23–45, 14.8–9
patent extension request, BRICS and
developing economies 18.22
patent filings as dominant position abuse see
Article 102 TFEU, patent filings as
dominant position abuse
patent invalidity
and early generic entry, reverse payments,
EU approach 2.80, 2.82
patents and supplementary protection
certificates 12.60–63, 12.122
patent pools consideration, trade law
9.55–56
patent settlement agreements
BRICS and developing economies 18.44,
18.56–61
horizontal agreements see Article 101
TFEU and horizontal cooperation
agreements, horizontal agreement
issues, patent settlement agreements
reverse payments 2.60–63, 2.64–76
US 3.100–101
patent system 1.10, 1.18, 1.28–34, 1.41–47
patents
competition and patent clash, BRICS and
developing economies 18.6–18
divisional patents see divisional patents
equivalence doctrine, UK 12.67–71
exclusivity see exclusivity
IP licensing agreements, competition
enforcement in innovative industries
4.12–15
new patent–antitrust interface, Article 102
TFEU, patent filings as dominant
position abuse 5.54–75, 5.92–102
reverse payments 2.81, 14.7–9, 14.14
'scope of the patent' test, rejection of,
Article 101 TFEU and horizontal
cooperation agreements 3.177–179
validity uncertainty, Article 101 TFEU and horizontal cooperation agreements 3.122

see also licensing

patents and supplementary protection certificates 12.1–127

Article 101 TFEU and horizontal cooperation agreements 3.82

compulsory licensing 12.89–91
developing countries 12.11
equivalence doctrine 12.67–71

European Patent Office (EPO) 12.14

European patent with unitary effect (EPUE) and Unified Patent Court 12.15–19

exemptions to patentee's ius prohibendi 12.79–88

exemptions to patentee's ius probibendi, Bolar clause exemption 12.82–88

industrial property rights 12.3–4

international application and Patent Cooperation Treaty (PCT) 12.20–22

inventive step requisite 12.35–42

inventive step requisite, person skilled in the art identification 12.36–39, 12.42

inventive step requisite, problem-solution approach 12.41–42

national application 12.13, 12.14

new drug development times 12.2

non-fulfilment of patentability requirements and invalidity 12.60–63

novelty requisite 12.25–34

novelty requisite, person skilled in the art identification 12.32–33

novelty requisite, priority date 12.30–32, 12.33

novelty requisite, state of the art concept 12.26–34, 12.38

patent application routes 12.12–22

patent infringement 12.64–78

patentability requisites 12.23–63

sufficiency of disclosure requisite 12.56–59

TRIPS Agreement and 20-year protection period 12.4, 12.7

TRIPS Agreement effect 12.10–11

patents and supplementary protection certificates, industrial application requisite 12.43–55

second medical uses for a known chemical substance 12.45–55

second medical uses for a known chemical substance, dosage regime claims 12.51

second medical uses for a known chemical substance, judicial protection 12.52–54

second medical uses for a known chemical substance, purpose-limited product claims 12.46, 12.50

patents and supplementary protection certificates, supplementary protection certificates 12.92–122

Active Pharmaceutical Ingredients (API) 12.105–106

conditions to be met 12.100–114

duration 12.115–121

emergency epidemic situations or compassionate use 12.110

infringement test 12.103–104, 12.106

invalidity grounds 12.122

liter test 12.103–104

market authorisation as medicinal product 12.108–110

Markush formula 12.104

'old' products and new use authorisation 12.96–97

protection by basic patent consideration 12.101–107

scope 12.95–97

several certificates granted for same patent/product 12.111–114

subject-matter of protection 12.98–99

Paul, C. 12.78

pay-for-delay agreements

Article 101 TFEU and horizontal cooperation agreements 3.207

BRICS and developing economies 18.4–5, 18.24, 18.36, 18.46, 18.56–58, 18.65–70

China 18.36

Fentanyl 3.188

UK Competition Act 15.76–103

790
see also reverse payments
Paz-Ares, T. 10.78
Pecorino, P. 1.74
Peepenkorn, L. 4.99

penalties
medicinal products for human use, pharmacovigilance 13.190
Spain 17.6

UK Competition Act 15.35, 15.55, 15.58, 15.71–72, 15.78, 15.94, 15.113–114, 15.120, 15.125
per-product-supply markets, public procurement and bid rigging 8.14
Pharmaceutical Price Regulation Scheme (PPRS), UK 15.9, 15.13–15, 15.106, 15.136–143, 15.149

Pharmaceutical Sector Inquiry
Article 102 TFEU, patent filings as dominant position abuse 5.6, 5.28–35, 5.41, 5.76, 5.92, 5.98
reverse payments, EU approach 2.84–86
trade law 19.25–27
pharmacovigilance see medicinal products for human use, pharmacovigilance
pharmacy margins, free movement and competition 11.24, 11.44
piercing the corporate veil doctrine, public procurement and bid rigging 8.26
Piilola, A. 4.37, 4.52, 4.54
Pil Choi, J. 4.94, 4.98
Plahte, J. 9.44

Poland
national sector inquiries 3.66
Polpharma S.A. Pharmaceutical Works v. Astellas Pharma 12.58
Portugal, Abbott Laboratories 8.134
potential competition test
Article 101 TFEU and horizontal cooperation agreements 3.109–113, 3.120

Technology Transfer Block Exemption Regulations (TTBER) 4.29–31
predatory practices, public procurement and dominant position abuse 8.156–175
prescription and non-prescription drugs distinction, and free movement 11.21

price fixing
China 16.25, 16.27–29, 16.94–96
economic perspective 1.11–13, 1.11–14
restrictions, IP licensing agreements 4.59–60, 4.65
Spain 17.11, 17.30–32, 17.39–40
price intervention regulation, Spain 10.23

pricing behaviour, China see China, competition law, pricing behaviour investigations below purchasing prices in sale of medicines to hospitals, Spain 17.77
discrimination 1.12–13, 1.66–68
disparate prices and parallel trade see parallel trade, disparate prices and access to pharmaceutical products and Drug Tariff, UK 15.11–12
dual see dual pricing
economic perspective see economic perspective, demand and pricing of pharmaceutical products
excessive see excessive pricing
in-hospital and out-of-hospital pricing 1.96, 1.98
and R&D investment 1.27
selective price cutting, marketing data 20.42
tiered-pricing mechanism 9.44–50
unfair pricing, China 16.58, 16.61

see also profits
pricing and reimbursement
and free movement see free movement and competition, pricing and reimbursement
medicinal products for human use see medicinal products for human use, pricing and reimbursement
prescription medicines, mergers in pharmaceutical sector 6.29, 6.53–55
Priddis, S. 4.12, 4.48
primary market research (PMR), marketing data 20.16
private sector distortions, BRICS and developing economies 18.3
product hopping
economic perspective 1.48–51
reverse payments 2.5
UK Competition Act 15.63
US see US, product hopping
product life cycle, mergers in pharmaceutical sector 6.28
product market definition
mergers in pharmaceutical sector 6.4–30
Spain 17.91
product “pipelines”, mergers in pharmaceutical sector 6.26–27
production restrictions and exclusive licensing, IP licensing agreements 4.72–76
profits
blockbuster medicines and monopoly profits 3.77
controls, UK 15.9
medicinal products for human use 13.174
parallel trade effects 1.68–69
and reverse payments 2.23–45, 2.54, 2.56–57, 2.173–182
see also pricing
protectionist measures, free movement and competition 11.43
public health protection, free movement and competition 11.25, 11.40
public procurement and antitrust practices 8.1–220
statement of exemption, Spain 8.199–200
UK 8.205–212
public procurement and antitrust practices, antitrust liability of contracting authorities 8.184–212
consultant firms’ accountability 8.201
exemption statement 8.194–201
facilitation statement 8.203–204
FENIN/Selex doctrine and ‘not-for-the-market’ use of purchased products 8.184–191, 8.204, 8.206–208
liability statement (Slovakia) 8.193
national solutions 8.192–204
statement of infringement without sanctioning contracting body 8.202
UK singularity 8.205–212
UK singularity, justified anticompetitive behaviours in UK National Health Service 8.209–212
public procurement and antitrust practices, bid rigging avoidance 8.213–217
Certificate of Independent Bid Determination or equivalent attestation 8.217
competition authorities’ reactive nature 8.214
electronic bidding systems 8.216
preventive role of contracting bodies 8.215
regulatory nature of public procurement 8.214
selection criteria improvements 8.216
tender process design suggestions 8.216
public procurement and antitrust practices, bid rigging and collusion 8.6–31
cartel secrecy 8.15
cartels paradigm 8.6–9
collective recommendations 8.24–25
cost-effectiveness approach and price-quality ratio 8.27–28
horizontal temporary business associations (TBAs) 8.15
innovative-product requirements, lack of 8.14
market definition for bid rigging 8.16
massive harmful potential 8.20–21
non bis in idem principle 8.22–26
parallel behaviour inducement 8.27–31
per-product-supply markets 8.14
piercing of the corporate veil doctrine 8.26
public policies cutting public expenditure in health and social services 8.29
purpose and stability unification 8.17–19
restriction by object 8.10–16
subcontracting 8.15
tariff regulation changes 8.31
tendering procedures 8.9
public procurement and antitrust practices, cartels and collusive practice types in drugs and related markets 8.32–123
bid rotation scheme 8.41
boycotting of contractual procedure 8.33
cartel’s organisational and operational rules 8.35
confidence and trust factors 8.40
information exchange 8.39–41
market-sharing agreements 8.33
OECD “common forms of bid rigging” 8.36–38
recruitment process and the intra-group relationships 8.33
public procurement and antitrust practices, cartels and collusive practice types in drugs and related markets, price fixing 8.42–123
bid rotation 8.60, 8.70–73
bid suppression 8.62–69
bids identical or similar to reserve prices 8.52–54
close prices 8.50–51
co-participation 8.91–111
coordination and cooperation among the bidders and triple evidence test 8.45
cover bidding 8.55–61
cover bidding, and compensation schemes 8.60
equal bids 8.47
hub and spoke agreements 8.115–123, 8.202
identical or similar prices 8.44–49
imposition of prices by supplier 8.48
market sharing 8.74–90
market sharing, client sharing 8.78–85
market sharing, geographical 8.86–90
market sharing, squeezing rope effect 8.83
parallelism of behaviours 8.45, 8.46, 8.47–48
secrecy of bids 8.46–47
temporary business associations (TBAs) 8.93–108
temporary business associations (TBAs), groups of bidders and antitrust 8.94–97
temporary business associations (TBAs), procompetitive and anticompetitive joint ventures 8.98–108
temporary business associations (TBAs), subcontracting 8.109–111
vertical agreements 8.112–114
public procurement and antitrust practices, dominant position abuse 8.124–183
abusive practices 8.153–183
demand substitution analysis 8.129
dominant position 8.144–152
dominant position, contracting authority’s share on the demand market 8.150–151
excessive prices 8.176–178
exclusive agreements 8.179–183
generic drugs and predatory practices 8.156–172
generic drugs and predatory practices, pharmaceutical preparations 8.161–163
generic drugs and predatory practices, price/cost formula 8.169–171
geographic market limited to the tender 8.137–143
geographic market limited to the tender, differentiated products 8.142–143
generic drugs and predatory practices, geographic market limited to the tender, relevant turnover test 8.138
market definition 8.127–143, 8.168
market power in the field of supply 8.149
mono-criteria tests 8.131
‘only one will survive’ principle 8.164–172
predatory innovation 8.173–175
relevant product market 8.129–136
and supply substitutability 8.132–136, 8.143

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INDEX

Pugliese, P. 18.19
Pumfrey, N. 12.67
quality requirements
free movement and competition 11.35
   IP licensing agreements 4.91–92
quantitative restrictions against imported
   products, parallel trade 10.31–36
‘quick look’ approach, reverse payments, US 2.136

R&D
   Article 101 TFEU and horizontal
   cooperation agreements 3.35–40,
   3.246–252
economic perspective see economic
   perspective, R&D investment
   incentives, IP licensing agreements 4.3
   medicinal products for human use 13.93
   mergers in pharmaceutical sector 6.26–27
   reverse payments 2.23, 2.27
   see also innovation
   radiopharmaceuticals 13.43–45, 13.93
   see also medicinal products for human use
Rammer, C. 1.85
Ramondino, M. 5.34
‘reasonable choice’ criterion, UK 15.132–135
   reciprocal and non-reciprocal agreements, IP
   licensing agreements 4.51–52
   reference price system, Spain 17.12, 17.19
   reformulation types, US, product hopping 19.6–8
   refusal to supply
   BRICS and developing economies 18.29
   China 16.68–71
   marketing data, market dominance 20.42
   Spain 17.55–63, 17.76, 17.78
   Régibeau, P. 4.52, 4.62, 4.93
   regulator’s bargaining power, economic
   perspective 1.86–89
   regulatory process abuse, Article 102 TFEU,
   patent filings as dominant position
   abuse 5.41–43, 5.49, 5.80–82
   Reichman, J. 9.11
   Reiffen, D. 2.37
   reimbursement see pricing and
   reimbursement
   relevant market, establishing
   China 16.52–56
   public procurement and dominant
   position abuse 8.129–136
   see also market share
   Religiioni, U. 10.28
   repackaging and labelling, free movement
   and competition 11.36–39
   resale price maintenance
   China 16.31–32, 16.40–43
   UK, market studies and investigations
   15.128, 15.130
   research and development see R&D
   restriction by effect
   Article 101 TFEU and horizontal
   cooperation agreements 3.17–21
   Paroxetine 3.152–162
   UK Competition Act 15.101
   restriction by object
   Article 101 TFEU and horizontal
   cooperation agreements 3.16, 3.103,
   3.104–151
   BRICS and developing economies 18.44,
   18.56–61
   Fentanyl 3.203–204
   Lundbeck 3.105–122
   Paroxetine 3.146–154
   Perindopril (Servier) 3.16, 3.59, 3.103,
   UK Competition Act 15.87–91, 15.98
   restrictive clauses, IP licensing agreements
   4.2, 4.50
   restrictive distribution programs
   US 14.53
   see also distribution contracts
   restrictive settlements, reverse payments
   2.82, 2.85–86, 2.138
   reverse payments 2.1–182
   Article 101 TFEU and horizontal
   cooperation agreements 3.108,
   3.116–117, 3.121, 3.122
   beneficial settlements 2.10–13, 2.67
   blockbusters 2.5, 2.73
   BRICS and developing economies 18.34,
   18.47, 18.48, 18.51, 18.53, 18.67–70,
   18.71–75
   economic perspective 1.43

794
Pablo Figueroa and Alejandro Guerrero - 9781785362613
Downloaded from Elgar Online at 12/06/2021 04:07:36AM
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effects-based analysis of restrictions 2.12–14
generic companies and Active Pharmaceutical Ingredients (API) 2.20
generic companies’ terms of entry 2.22
IP and competition law conflict 2.6
legality issues 2.6–9
patent clusters 2.20
patent exclusivity and possibilities for generic entry 2.20–21
product hopping 2.5
settlement forms and characteristics 2.19–22
settlement as outcome of imperfect patent information 2.15–18
US see US antitrust laws, reverse payments
see also pay-for-delay agreements
reverse payments, anticompetitiveness determination 2.51–76, 2.137
beneficial reverse payment settlement for patients and healthcare providers 2.67–68, 2.71–73
and expected date of generic entry 2.51–53, 2.61
generic exclusivity role 2.58–59
minimum bound effect 2.54–55
patent settlements with value transfers 2.64–76
patent settlements without value transfers 2.60–63
profits comparison 2.54, 2.56–57
risk-averse preferences applied to theoretical model of settlement 2.72–75
reverse payments, EU approach 2.77–131
annual monitoring reports 2.87–93
annual monitoring reports, settlement categories 2.89–93
Fentanyl case see under EU cases, Fentanyl generic entry process 2.158–161
investigations 2.94–128
Lundbeck case see under EU cases, Lundbeck patent invalidity and early generic entry 2.80, 2.82
patent strength assessment issues 2.81
Pharmaceutical Sector Inquiry 2.84–86
regulatory assessment 2.77–82
restrictive settlements 2.82, 2.85–86, 2.138
Servier case see under EU cases,
Perindopril (Servier)
Supplementary Protection Certificate 2.159
US Actavis case comparison 2.137–139
value transfer cases 2.78–79, 2.89–94, 2.139
reverse payments, incentives to settle 2.23–50
blockbusters, loss of exclusivity and effect on originator’s profits 2.30–32, 2.41
erosion of originator’s profit from early generic entry 2.33–39
generic companies’ options 2.46–50
generic entry delays and effects on price and revenues 2.36
increased costs of bringing new pharmaceuticals to market 2.26–29
incremental innovation 2.44
information asymmetries 2.46–47
new molecular entities (NME) and patent exclusivity 2.38
originator companies and patent exclusivity 2.27–29
patent exclusivity and market exclusivity comparison 2.40–45, 2.49–50
R&D 2.23, 2.27
R&D and New Chemical Entity (NCE) 2.27
threats to profits prior to patent expiration 2.23–45
reverse payments, US approach 2.132–152
Abbreviated New Drug Application (ANDA) 2.165–166
Actavis case 2.132–138, 2.143–152, 2.167
Actavis case, scope of patent argument 2.134–136, 2.138
anticompetitive effects assessment 2.134, 2.136
EU approach comparison 2.137–139
FTC monitoring of settlements 2.140–142
INDEX

generic entry process 2.162–182
profits maximisation decision considerations 2.173–182
‘quick look’ approach 2.136
rule of reason 2.133
value transfers 2.135, 2.136, 2.138–139, 2.144–145
Rey, P. 10.95
Riedel, P. 15.1–151
Rijsdijk, M. 12.78
Rinnert, S. 9.30
risk evaluation
medicinal products for human use, clinical trials 13.124
medicinal products for human use, pharmacovigilance 13.185, 13.188, 13.197
risk-averse preferences and reverse payments 2.72–75
Robinson, T. 2.31
Rochert, J.-C. 20.13
Rockett, K. 4.52, 4.62, 4.93
Romania
Eli Lilly 8.113–114, 8.120–123, 8.202
national sector inquiries 3.67
parallel trade 10.89
Rosch, J. 4.3, 4.12
Rovira, J. 11.15, 11.53
royalties
IP licensing agreements 4.61–67, 4.115
Technology Transfer Block Exemption Regulations (TTBER) 4.37
Ruggeri, K. 1.86
rule of reason
reverse payments 2.133, 14.17, 14.19, 14.20
US, product hopping 19.33–34
Russia
antimonopoly violations 18.11
cartel activity 18.31
competition law 18.11
competition problems 18.26–31
distribution contracts 18.30
generic pharmaceutical companies 18.27
refusal to supply 18.29

see also BRICS and developing economies, competition law application challenges

safe harbours
Article 101 TFEU and horizontal cooperation agreements 3.28, 3.31–43
Technology Transfer Block Exemption Regulations (TTBER) 4.26, 4.37, 4.85, 4.88
sales restrictions and territorial protection, IP licensing agreements 4.77–84
sales tracking data, marketing data 20.16, 20.17, 20.21–22
Sampat, B. 1.42
Sanchez-Graells, A. 8.212
sanctions see penalties
Sauter, W. 3.98, 11.5, 11.10, 11.16
Scherer, F. 10.84, 10.97
Scheuermann, A. 10.96
Schmidt, H. 4.28, 4.46, 4.93
Scholz, F. 1.63
Schulz, A. 10.77
Schwarz, M. 1.68, 10.84
Schweitzer, H. 18.55
Schweitzer, S. 19.17
second generation products, Article 102 TFEU, patent filings as dominant position abuse 5.31
secrecy of bids, public procurement and cartels 8.46–47
self-assessment, Article 101 TFEU and horizontal cooperation agreements 3.8–9, 3.26–27
sell-out and sell-in data, marketing data 20.21–22
Serfes, K. 3.169
settlement agreement licensing restrictions, IP licensing agreements 4.106–110
Shadowen, S. 19.6, 19.7, 19.17, 19.23
Shaffer, G. 1.85
Shapiro, C. 1.41, 1.42, 1.43, 2.51, 2.65, 2.72, 2.135
Shorthose, S. 13.6

796

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INDEX

Competition Act, unfair competition acts distorting market competition as separate infringement 17.5
compulsory patent licensing 12.90
dominant position issues 17.21
dual pricing and Article 101(3) TFEU 17.43–45, 17.48–49
every delays to generic medicines 17.41
homogeneous group system 17.12
horizontal agreements 17.29–41
market sharing schemes 17.37, 17.40
Medicines Act 17.10–11, 17.13–14, 17.17, 17.43, 17.47, 17.62
minimum purchase obligation 17.33
penalties and fines 17.6
price intervention regulation 10.23
price-fixing 17.11, 17.30–32, 17.39–40
public procurement and antitrust practices, statement of exemption 8.199–200
reference price system 17.12, 17.19
undertakings and competition rules applicability 17.21–27
vertical agreements and illegal market foreclosure 20.30–34
vertical agreements, parallel trade restrictions and Article 101 TFEU 17.42–53
wholesale distribution issues 17.13, 17.33, 17.35, 17.38
Spain, competition law, dominant position abuse and Article 102 TFEU 17.54–79
collective dominant position abuse 17.58
competitor foreclosure and most favoured nation clause 17.79
divisional patents 17.67, 17.68
doctors’ management contracts 17.75
entry of generics, limitations on 17.64–71
excessive prices 17.78
loyalty rebate system 17.73–74
prices below purchasing prices in sale of medicines to hospitals 17.77
refusals to supply 17.55–63, 17.76, 17.78
supplementary protection certificate (SPC) 17.67–70
Spain, competition law, merger control 17.80–94
Anatomical Therapeutic Classification (ATC) 17.91
community dimension 17.87
centration project or agreement 17.81–85
centration project or agreement, time restrictions 17.83–85
countervailing buyer power 17.86
international (i.e. foreign-to-foreign) merger 17.89
market shares 17.92–93
minimum purchase obligations and entry barriers 17.90
product and geographic markets definitions 17.91
thresholds 17.80–82
specialisation agreements, Article 101 TFEU and horizontal cooperation agreements 3.41–43
Spies, D. 12.104
squeezing rope effect, public procurement and cartels 8.83
State-Owned Entities (SOEs), China 16.64–65
Steiner, R. 19.17
Stothers, C. 5.34
Stuyck, J. 5.58
Subbot, A. 18.11
subcontracting public procurement and bid rigging 8.15
public procurement and cartels 8.109–111
subject-matter of protection, patents and supplementary protection certificates 12.98–99
substitution and substitutability
China 16.53
mergers in medical devices sector 7.8–11
public procurement and dominant position abuse 8.129, 8.132–136, 8.143
UK Competition Act 15.21–22
UK, market studies and investigations 15.143

798
Suciou, M. 8.140
sufficiency of disclosure requisite, patents and supplementary protection certificates 12.56–59
Sufrin, B. 5.69, 5.86
Supplementary Protection Certificate (SPC)
Article 101 TFEU and horizontal cooperation agreements 3.82
Article 102 TFEU, patent filings as dominant position abuse 5.37, 5.50
BRICS and developing economies 18.64 economic perspective, R&D investment 1.34
medicinal products for human use 13.59
and patents see patents and supplementary protection certificates reverse payments 2.159
Spain 17.67–70
Surblyté, G. 3.64
Svetlicinii, A. 8.194, 8.201
Szymanski, S. 1.71, 10.79
Takahashi, I. 5.57
tariff regulation changes, public procurement and bid rigging 8.31
Taubman, A. 9.12
Tavares de Araujo, M. 18.19
technology
electronic bidding systems, public procurement and bid rigging 8.216
IP licensing agreements 4.4, 4.19–117
pools restrictions 4.111–117
Technology Transfer Block Exemption Regulations (TTBER) see IP licensing agreements, Technology Transfer Block Exemption Regulations (TTBER)
Teece, D. 4.3, 4.7, 6.51
temporary business associations (TBAs), public procurement and cartels 8.93–108
tendering procedures, public procurement and bid rigging 8.9
termination clauses restrictions, IP licensing agreements 4.103–105
territorial/customer restrictions, IP licensing agreements 4.71–84
third parties
access restriction, marketing data 20.25–27
information exchange, Article 101 TFEU and horizontal cooperation agreements 3.260–261
thresholds
established revenue thresholds, China, merger control 16.112–114
market share, Technology Transfer Block Exemption Regulations (TTBER)
4.26, 4.35–39, 4.85, 4.88
Spain, merger control 17.80–82
Tirlo, J. 1.67, 20.13
Tisdall, S. 18.7
Toutoungi, A. 12.110
trade law 9.1–56
affordable drugs 9.8, 9.42
EU Role in Global Health 9.4
intellectual property protection 9.7–8
patent pools consideration 9.55–56
Pharmaceutical Sector Inquiry 19.25–27
Regulation 816/2006 on compulsory license of generic medicines 9.51–53
Regulation 953/2003 setting up a tiered-pricing mechanism 9.44–50
Regulation 953/2003 setting up a tiered-pricing mechanism, restrictions 9.47–48
UK see UK competition and trade
UN Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) and access to essential medicines 9.1–3
trade law, essential medicines access over IP protection, favouring 9.20–53
bilateral trade agreements as harmful to access to essential medicine 9.33–36
customs enforcement of IP rights 9.21–31
EU-India free trade agreement 9.37–42
harm assessment 9.25–31
Regulation 608/2013 9.30, 9.41
INDEX

| Seizures of generic medicines transiting through the EU 9.23–24, 9.25–31 |
| Trade law, TRIPS and access to essential medicines 9.9–19 |
| Developing countries and harmful consequences 9.10–13, 9.23–24 |
| Flexibility clauses and compulsory licensing 9.12–13 |
| Most Favoured Nation (MFN) principle 9.35 |
| Willingness to impose TRIPS-plus obligations on developing countries 9.19, 9.33–36, 9.40–41 |
| Trademarks, intra-brand competition and parallel imports 11.29, 11.37–39 |
| See also intellectual property |
| Transparency |
| Free movement and competition, pricing and reimbursement 11.23, 11.43–47 |
| Marketing data 20.24 |
| Medicinal products for human use, abridged procedures 13.166 |
| Triple evidence test, public procurement and cartels 8.45 |
| TRIPS Agreement and essential medicines see trade law, TRIPS and access to essential medicines |
| Patents and supplementary protection certificates 12.4, 12.7, 12.10–11 |
| See also intellectual property |
| Tritton, G. 4.54, 4.60 |
| Tuominen, N. 5.1, 5.94, 5.98 |
| Tying restrictions |
| IP licensing agreements 4.93 |
| UK Competition Act 15.54, 15.57 |

| UK, cases |
| AAH Pharmaceuticals Ltd & Ors v. Pfizer 15.146 |

| Actavis v. Eli Lilly 12.71 |
| Apex Alphalt and Paving Co Limited v. OFT 8.7 |
| Argos, Littlewoods and JJB v. OFT 8.6 |
| BetterCare 8.205–208 |
| Bid rigging in the construction industry in England 8.56 |
| Epanutin 3.244–245 |
| Genzyme 8.151, 15.44–59, 15.68 |
| Improver Corporation v. Remington Consumer Product Limited 12.69–71 |
| Kier Group, Kier Regional Limited, Ballast Nedam N.V. v. OFT 8.9 |
| Kirin-Angen 12.71 |
| Lloyds 8.80 |
| Makers UK Limited v. OFT 8.6 |
| Market sharing agreement to supply of prescription medicines to care homes in England 8.138 |
| Napp 1.98, 15.16–43, 15.53, 15.63, 15.68, 15.137 |
| Paroxetine 2.9, 15.76–103, 15.125, 15.126, 18.56 |
| Phenylvoin Sodium 15.104–126 |
| Prescription medicines 8.6, 8.11 |
| Reckitt Benckiser Healthcare 15.50, 15.60–75 |
| Teva UK Limited, Norton Healthcare Limited v. Reckitt Benckiser 15.72 |
| Warner-Lambert Company v. Actavis Group 12.78 |
| Wheatly v. Drillsafe 12.71 |

UK competition and trade 15.1–151 |
Competition and Markets Authority (CMA) 15.4 |
Direct to pharmacy (DTP) model 15.10, 15.11, 15.144–145, 15.147–150 |
Enterprise Act 15.3, 15.136 |
Enterprise and Regulatory Reform Act 15.4 |
First-mover advantage 15.25 |
Generic products 15.13 |
Health Service Medical Supplies (Costs) Act 15.14 |
in-hospital and out-of-hospital pricing 1.98 |
Parallel trade and counterfeit drugs 10.91–93 |
patents and equivalence doctrine 12.69–71
Pharmaceutical Price Regulation Scheme (PPRS) 15.9, 15.13–15, 15.106
pharmacy regulation 15.11
prices and Drug Tariff 15.11–12
profit controls 15.9
public procurement practices 8.205–212
regulatory backdrop 15.8–15
statutory non-voluntary regulation scheme for branded products 15.13–14
wholesalers as logistics services providers (LSPs) 15.10
UK competition and trade, Competition Act 15.2, 15.5, 15.16–126
Anatomical Therapeutic Classification (ATC) system 15.20, 15.51, 15.67
appeals 15.36–41, 15.56–59, 15.95–103, 15.115–121
continuity of supply issues 15.106–107, 15.111
discriminatory and excessive pricing 15.16–43
dominant position abuse 15.17, 15.24–25, 15.28, 15.37, 15.44, 15.54, 15.56, 15.68, 15.86, 15.92–93, 15.102, 15.104–126
entry barriers 15.26–34, 15.40, 15.54, 15.56, 15.60–75
excessive pricing 15.109–114, 15.117–119
Genzyme 8.151, 15.44–59, 15.68
infringements by object 15.87–91, 15.98
market definition 15.20–23, 15.50–52, 15.56, 15.67, 15.84–85, 15.102, 15.107, 15.116
Napp 1.98, 15.16–43, 15.53, 15.63, 15.68, 15.137
OFT evaluations 15.42–43
orphan drugs 15.47–48
Paroxetine 2.9, 15.76–103, 15.125, 15.126, 18.56
‘pay for delay’ decisions 15.76–103
penalties 15.35, 15.55, 15.58, 15.71–72, 15.78, 15.94, 15.113–114, 15.120, 15.125
Phenytoin Sodium 15.104–126
product hopping 15.63
Product Licence for Parallel Import (PLPI) 15.23
Reckitt Benckiser Healthcare 1.50, 15.60–75
restriction by effect 15.101
substitutability consideration 15.21–22
tying issues 15.54, 15.57
WHO Anatomical Therapeutic Classification (ATC) system 15.20
UK competition and trade, market studies and investigations 15.127–151
control of entry regulations 15.128–135
generic substitution introduction 15.143
market structural changes 15.129
Medicines Distribution study 15.144–151
P-medicines 15.130
Pharmaceutical Price Regulation Scheme (PPRS) study 15.136–143, 15.149
‘reasonable choice’ criterion 15.132–135
resale price maintenance 15.128, 15.130
UN Millennium Development Goals (MDGs), and access to essential medicines 9.1–3
unfair pricing, China 16.58, 16.61
see also pricing
uniform marketing authorisation (MA) procedure, free movement, intra-brand competition and parallel imports 11.17–19, 11.31–33
Unnikrishnan, C. 18.35
US cases
In re Actos 14.21
In re Aggrenox 14.22
Bobbs Merrill v. Straus 11.13
In re Cardizem CD Antitrust Litigation 14.15
In re Cipro 2.146
In re Ciprofloxacin Hydrochloride Antitrust Litigation 14.15
In re Effexor XR Antitrust Litigation 2.142
FTC v. AbbVie 2.145

801

Pablo Figueroa and Alejandro Guerrero - 9781785362613
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INDEX

FTC v. Actavis 2.6, 2.10, 2.58, 2.132–139, 2.143–152, 2.167, 3.101, 14.6, 14.9, 14.15, 14.16–19, 14.21, 14.23, 18.47, 18.51, 18.65–70, 18.75
FTC v. Cephalon 2.146
FTC v. Watson Pharm. 14.15, 18.70
In re K-Dur Antitrust Litigation 2.135, 14.15, 18.67
In re Lamictal 2.22, 2.144, 14.20
In re Lidoderm Antitrust Litigation 2.146
In re Lipitor Antitrust Litigation 2.145, 14.22
In re Loestrin 14.20
Meijer v. Barr Pharmaceuticals 19.24
Mylan Pharmaceuticals v. Celgene Corporation 14.53, 19.31
New York v. Actavis (Actavis II) 2.5, 2.8, 14.42–48
In re Nexium (Esomeprazole) Antitrust Litigation 2.139, 2.147–148, 14.20
Professional Drug Co. Inc. v. Wyeth 14.22
Roche Products Inc. v. Bolar Pharmaceutical 12.82
Schering-Plough Corp. v. FTC 14.15
In re Solodyn (Minocycline Hydrochloride) Antitrust Litigation 2.147
Symphony Health Solutions corp. v. IMS Health 20.20, 20.24, 20.42
In re Tamoxifen Citrate Antitrust Litigation 14.15, 18.69
US v. Addyston Pipe & Steel Co 16.58
Valley Drug Co. v. Geneva Pharm. 2.11, 2.136
Verizon Communications Inc. v. Trinko 14.51, 14.55
Walker process equipment Inc v. Food Mach and Chem Corp 5.20
Warner Chilcott 8.175, 14.23
In re Wellbutrin XL Antitrust Litigation 2.144, 14.23
US, antitrust laws 14.1–64
Affordable Care Act 14.58
Biologics Price Competition and Innovation (BCPI) Act 2.162, 2.168, 2.170–172
Clayton Act 14.1
consumer welfare and excessive pricing 14.55
excessive pricing 14.49–56
excessive pricing, Turing Pharmaceuticals and Daraprim 14.49–50, 14.55
Food and Drug Administration (FDA) 14.3, 14.7–8
generics, delaying entry of 1.44
in-hospital and out-of-hospital pricing 1.96
inversion mergers 14.57–58
inversion mergers, Pfizer-Allergan merger 14.57
marketing data 20.20
parallel imports of patent protected medicines 1.55
patent exclusivity 2.3
patent exclusivity and possibilities for generic entry 2.20–21, 2.163–164
patent settlement agreements 3.100–101
pharmacy-benefit-manager (PBM) mergers 14.59–63
restrictive distribution programs 14.53
US antitrust laws, reverse payments 14.6–23
Abbreviated New Drug Application (ANDA) 14.9–13, 14.20
amicus brief 14.23
drug patents 14.7–9, 14.14
ey early cases 14.14–23

802

Pablo Figueroa and Alejandro Guerrero - 9781785362613
Downloaded from Elgar Online at 12/06/2021 04:07:36AM
via free access
generic products and patent expiry 14.8–9
illegality claims 14.15
non-monetary value calculation 14.22
and patent validity 14.16–19
and rule of reason 14.17, 14.19, 14.20
Abbreviated New Drug Application (ANDA) 14.28–31, 19.14
and advertising 14.40, 14.46
definition 19.4–5
drug experiments during the patent term 19.12
exclusionary conduct effects 19.35, 19.42–44
false representation consideration 14.32
and generic competition promotion 19.10–11
generic entry timing effects 19.20–28
hard switch 19.32–36
hard/soft switches 19.41–44
ignored regulatory regime 19.45–48
inconsequential changes claim 14.33–35
innovation concerns 14.41
judicial analysis 19.29–53
marketing exclusivity to first generic to challenge brand’s patent 19.13
price disconnect issues 19.17, 19.38–39, 19.48
reformulation types 19.6–8
robust regulatory analysis, improper coercion focus 19.49–53
Sherman Act and rule of reason 19.33–34
soft switch 19.37–40
soft-switch strategy 14.42–48
validity term and renewal, medicinal products for human use 13.89–90
Valletti, T. 1.71, 1.76, 10.79
value transfer
Article 101 TFEU and horizontal cooperation agreements 3.89–94, 3.115–117
reverse payments 2.60–63, 2.64–76, 2.78–79, 2.89–94, 2.135, 2.136, 2.138–139, 2.139, 2.144–145
Van den Horst, M. 12.78
Van Eecke, P. 12.80
Varian, H. 1.67
Vashisth, S. 18.16
Verma, S. 9.35
Vernimme, I. 12.88
Vernon, J. 1.26, 1.27, 10.99
vertical agreements
China see China, competition law, anticompetitive agreements between trading partners (vertical agreements) and illegal market foreclosure, Spain 20.30–34
mergers in medical devices sector 7.108–114
parallel trade restrictions, Spain 17.42–53
public procurement and cartels 8.112–114
see also horizontal agreements
Vertical Block Exemption Regulation (VBER) 4.28
see also IP licensing agreements, Technology Transfer Block Exemption Regulations (TTBER)
vertical restraints, and marketing data 20.26, 20.27, 20.30–34
Vitale, C. 10.13
Vogler, S. 1.12
voiding of decisions, Article 101 TFEU and horizontal cooperation agreements 3.23
Von der Schulenburg, F. 2.34, 2.63
Wadhwa, V. 18.16, 18.36
Wakely, J. 9.11, 9.17
Wang, Y. 2.26, 2.27
Ward, M. 2.37
Watal, J. 10.84
Weck, T. 3.1–267
Weiser, P. 8.174
Weiswasser, E. 19.14
welfare implications, see under consumers

803
INDEX

Wendling, B. 2.37, 2.54
Wertheimer, A. 2.44
Wey, C. 1.85
Whish, R. 8.160
WHO Anatomical Therapeutic Classification (ATC) system 15.20
wholesale distribution issues, Spain 17.13, 17.33, 17.35, 17.38

Wholesalers as logistics services providers (LSPs), UK 15.10
Wiggins, S. 2.57
Williams, O. 9.44
Wish, R. 5.18
Wright, J. 14.55
Wu, T. 5.54, 5.69
Zafar, O. 18.19