1. Introduction

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Many studies point to a democratic deficit not only of the European Union (EU) but of political systems in general (see for an overview Warren 2009) as well as to limitations in effective citizen participation (Dahl 1994) as the core element of democracy. In addition, the current constellation of political systems in the ‘Western World’ has been revealed as a ‘post-democracy’ emerging from the complexity of modern society (Zolo 1992) and has been depicted as a ‘crisis of egalitarian politics and the trivialization of democracy’ (Crouch 2004, p. 6). Usually, such diagnoses are related to the argument that governing modern societies inevitably implies governance beyond governmental structures of nation-states resting on representative democracy. But is the ‘golden age’ of democracy really over due to the pressures of globalization and the erosion of the nation-state and the ‘shift from government to governance’?

ASSESSING THE DEMOCRATIC QUALITY OF GOVERNANCE ARRANGEMENTS

This book concentrates on democracy beyond governmental structures in the sense of participatory governance (see Heinelt 2010, 2011; Fischer 2012) and argues that it is a political task to convert the inevitability of governance into participatory forms. As the reflections on participatory governance in this book aim at transforming governance arrangements by enhancing the realm of democracy, the democratic quality of participatory governance is crucial. (See for the following paragraph Heinelt 2010, pp. 9–10 and Heinelt 2011, pp. 463–4.)

The democratic quality of governance arrangements may be accessed – as suggested by Papadopoulos and Warin (2007) – by (a) their openness and accessibility, (b) the quality of deliberation taking place within them, (c) their effectiveness, and (d) their links to the public sphere. More specifically, the quality of deliberation should be related to ‘reasoning together among equals’ (Cohen 2007, p. 220), where ‘the reasoning must in some recognizable way be the reasoning of the equal persons who are subject to the decisions’ (Cohen 2007, p. 220) which can be related to the relevance of ‘arguing’ as a governance mode (see below). Effectiveness refers to the
ability to actually achieve the objectives determined by collective decisions (i.e., it means effective collective self-determination). Additionally (and beyond the reflections of Papadopoulos and Warin 2007), those who are potentially affected by policy outputs resulting from governance arrangements should directly or indirectly (through representative bodies) participate in the making and enforcement of rules for these governance arrangements. The last point emphasizes not only the links to and coupling with forms of direct and representative democracy based on voting, and in this respect with opportunities of citizens to influence forms of participatory governance. This point also highlights the view that especially the openness and accessibility of (participatory) governance arrangements, as well as their links to the public sphere, should be regulated in a binding form through forms of direct and representative democracy. This implies that such governance arrangements have to be established in a reliable form and for a certain period of time. In such arrangements calculable interactions can occur, which is especially important against the background of possible conflicts. Furthermore, both the reliability and a certain durability of governance arrangements are crucial insofar as it cannot always be expected that governance arrangements will develop in a reliable and durable form endogenously from societal interactions. This is even more important for the ‘political design’ of participatory governance arrangements including directly or indirectly all those who are potentially affected by policy outputs emerging from these arrangements. These criteria are broad enough to capture ‘a degree of participation so great and so fairly spread about that no one feels neglected and everyone feels, with justice, that his viewpoint has been pretty fairly attended to’ (Dahl 1971, p. 112).

RE-CONCEPTUALIZING THE NOTION OF DEMOCRACY: ‘THE THREE WORLDS OF DEMOCRATIC ACTION’

Against this background the notion of democracy has to be re-conceptualized. In the still on-going debate about a shift from government to governance this means first of all not focusing on government (or the state) and a ‘thin’ liberal democracy. Instead, the focus should be on a ‘strong democracy [as] a distinctively modern form of participatory democracy’ (Barber 1984, p. 117). ‘[L]iterally, it is self-government by citizens rather than representative government in the name of citizens. Active citizens govern themselves directly here, not necessarily at every level and in every instance, but frequently enough and in particular when basic policies are
being decided’ (Barber 1984, p. 151). And it has to be emphasized (again) that collective self-determination in this sense should be considered in relation to all kinds of (governance) arrangements where societally binding decisions are taken. In this respect, it is an aim of the book to make a contribution to what Dahl (1994) called a ‘third transformation of democracy’.

It is difficult to imagine what can be meant by a ‘third transformation of democracy’. As outlined by me elsewhere (Heinelt 2010, pp. 22–6, 2011, pp. 460–62), a distinction between various meanings of governing developed by Jan Kooiman (2000, pp. 143ff., 2002, pp. 86–7, 2003, pp. 133ff.) can help to identify perspectives on how to grasp this meaning and the way this transformation might evolve. However, this requires perceiving governing as democratic self-determination by different modes of governance – namely, by majoritarian decision (voting) as well as arguing in the sense of deliberation and bargaining. Jan Kooiman distinguishes different governing orders – namely, first order, second order and meta governing.

Meta governing can be linked to the formation of general or policy-specific images (or paradigms, Leitbilder; for similar concepts of meta-governance see Jessop 2002 or Sørensen and Torfing 2007). It is underpinned by communicative rationality based on deliberation. Meta governing and the development of images implies a linguistic coding of problem definitions and patterns of action which are binding through ‘ethical standards’ – as Kooiman (2002, p. 92) phrased it. But not just ethical standards in the sense of normative images or ideas of a ‘logic of appropriateness’ (March and Olsen 1989) are a matter of concern when it has to be considered how and why a certain linguistic coding of problem definitions and patterns of action becomes binding for interactions. Shared or commonly accepted and therefore dominant assumptions about causality (how the world works) are also crucial. In these kinds of interaction in which normative images of appropriateness and assumptions about causality (or a ‘knowledge order’; see Heinelt and Lamping 2015; Heinelt 2016, pp. 34–7, 65–70) are developed, participants can use their voice and influence the debate through ‘good reasons’. For the development and (actively spoken) creation of this kind of participation it is important to consider the distribution of ‘voice options’ and the conditions in which it is possible to be influential by (public) reasoning.

First order governing is oriented towards operational actions or the ‘world of action’ (Kiser and Ostrom 1982) with more or less narrow institutionally defined choice options. This is the world of implementation and concerns mainly administrative interest intermediation (see next section) where public administrations, their agents and supporters meet those who are affected by a specific policy or where policy addressees implement
a programme autonomously but not unrelated to the influences on and from other actors. Participation in this context means that those who could be affected by a policy have to be involved in its implementation. Voice again can be an important element of such engagement. But the importance of participation (by voice) in the context of first order governing is less related to ethics or images of appropriateness than to effectiveness. This means that through participation the implementation of a programme can be secured in line with policy objectives by taking the motives and concerns of the policy addressees into account. Furthermore, the willingness of policy addressees to comply can be secured by their participation. And finally, knowledge necessary for achieving a given policy objective in a particular context can be developed through participation. This underlines not only the importance of creating ‘voice’ options but also of reflecting on the circumstances and conditions under which specific actors can be influential. However, there is another kind of participation based on communication in the context of first order governing, namely, bargaining. Bargaining is rooted in a specific kind of power which derives from exit options, the option of non-compliance or holding back relevant knowledge. This has to be contrasted with arguing (see Elster 1991, p. 3), which can be of influence only if ‘good reasons’ referring to assumptions about causality can be put forward or if normatively binding images are employed, developed at the meta governing level. How do circumstances and conditions develop under which specific actors can be influential by voice – or, more precisely, by arguing and/or bargaining? Only at first sight does it seem plausible that they develop entirely endogenously in society or autonomously from politics. On the contrary, they develop or are established by political design (such as those outlined in Chapters 6 and 7 as well as Chapters 11 to 15). The political design of conditions under which specific actors can be influential by voice is a task of second order governing – as Kooiman called it.

Second order governing is geared towards institution building and the creation of policy instruments or programmes. Just as it is in first order governing, effectiveness can be seen as a standard of second order governing as well. By achieving effectiveness, second order governing can acquire a specific kind of legitimacy, that is, output legitimacy (Scharpf 1999). However, this kind of legitimacy is not only poor in a normative sense, it is also insufficient in relation to sustaining and changing institutions, or, to put it in general terms, in relation to the political order. This requires input legitimation by participation. Depending on the (perceived) extent to which citizens are affected, input legitimation by participation through voting can become indispensable, that is, a legitimation based on the equal right of all citizens to participate in systems of majoritarian decision-
making. To summarize, traditional forms of participation through the election of representative bodies or through directly expressed agreement or disagreement by referendums can be seen as crucial for second order governing. Furthermore, it must be emphasized that normative ideas or views on appropriateness and particular dominant understandings of causalities may have been developed through deliberation at the level of meta governing, but ultimately they become relevant only through decisions which are taken as binding on society. However, second order governing is embedded in the processes of meta governing and influenced by communicative rationality and by forms of participation based on (public) debate. Furthermore, at the level of second order governing itself, many opportunities for direct influence through communicative interactions exist – using either the mode of arguing or that of bargaining.

Against the background of the distinction between the three governing orders and the specific features of the political processes detected in each of them, it is possible to reflect on the interrelation between governance and democracy or, more precisely, between different forms (or common perceptions) of democracy, in other words, between the models of liberal and of deliberative democracy.2

- **Liberal democracy**, which stresses the individual’s right to participate in general elections and, through this process, the aggregation of individual preferences to form guidelines for those in representative bodies or in government and the option of making the latter accountable to the individual citizen, can be related to second order governing.

- **Deliberative democracy**, which emphasizes free, open and public reasoning, is important for meta governing as well as for first order governing. However, it has limited importance for second order governing.

These reflections can be transformed into a model of ‘the three worlds of democratic action’ (to modify the expression, ‘the three worlds of action’, from Kiser and Ostrom 1982): the world of meta-governance, the world of second order governing and the world of first order governing. In such a model the specific features of individual levels as well as the links between them can be addressed conceptually.

‘One person – one vote’ is applicable in only one of these worlds (the world of second order governing), and the same applies to arguing in another world (the world of meta-governance).

Because meta governing is about the clarification of what problems are about and how to solve them in a way perceived as appropriate, it is
related to cognitive and normative questions. Answers to cognitive questions (how the world functions, or from what assumptions of causality thinking starts), as well as answers to normative questions (how the world should function, or what it should look like), are based on communicative rationality, that is, on communication characterized by the exchange of reason, as well as on the necessity to justify the validity of claims resulting from an articulated reason (Habermas 1984). In other words: ‘ethical standards’ and images (enabling goal selection) can only be generated by arguing or ‘good reasons’. As shared norms or understandings they cannot be negotiated by bargaining over them, but rather their relevance in a certain situation can be agreed through this mode of communicative interaction. The same applies to majoritarian decisions, especially those made by representative bodies. What has been agreed upon as appropriate can be recognized through majoritarian decisions (by law) either in a particular situation or for a certain time.

Meta governing impacts on second as well as on first order governing through ‘framing’ (for ‘framing’ see, e.g., Campbell 1998; Hay 2002, pp. 194–215). At the same time, it should be emphasized that second order governing is crucial for creating conditions for being involved (and ways of being involved) in first order and in meta governing by setting up entitlements to participate. In this way, conditions for arguing and bargaining are established through majoritarian decisions.

DEMOCRATIC POLITICAL SYSTEMS ‘AS A COMPOSITE OF “PARTIAL REGIMES”’ (SCHMITTER) OF INTEREST INTERMEDIATION

Referring again to what Dahl called a ‘third transformation of democracy’, this transformation could lead to a model of a post-parliamentary democracy. However, we should not end up with a feeling of having lost something which we never really had – a vibrant democracy with citizens engaged not only in periodic elections but also in public reasoning about and having concern for the res publica, plus accountable political representatives and parties responsive to the demands and concerns of their members and supporters as well as to the citizenry in general. However, looking at democracy beyond the governmental structures in the sense of participatory governance requires reflection on particular forms of participation which can be related to certain models of democracy. From this perspective, democratic political systems have to be considered as a complex and broad web of varying forms of interest articulation and intermediation as well as decision-making. As a result, a democratic politi-
cal system is – as Schmitter (1993, p. 4) argued – not to be conceived of as one ‘regime’ ‘but as a composite of “partial regimes”’ because it consists of a complex web of various forms of participation. This also means that ‘citizenship, its most distinctive property [i.e., those of a democratic political system], is not confined to voting periodically in elections’ (Schmitter 1993, p. 4).

As outlined by me elsewhere (Heinelt 2002, 2010, pp. 51–6), these ‘partial regimes’ can be distinguished in different sectors of interest intermediation – namely, those of territorial, functional, administrative and civil society or civil interest intermediation. These sectors are, in aggregate, surrounded by the infrastructure or ‘core of civil society [comprising] a network of associations that institutionalizes problem-solving discourses on questions of general interest inside the framework of organized public spheres’ (Habermas 1996, p. 367). The sectors of interest intermediation function according to different governance modes (majority decisions, hierarchy, bargaining and arguing) and are differently aligned and can complement each other.

The sector of territorial interest intermediation covers representative democracy. Here, conflicts of interest between (voting) citizens can be addressed through parties and through the mode of majority decisions. For this sector to be effective, it is essential that the citizens living in a certain territory recognize one another as political subjects, and therefore to be seen as equals, that they take part in decision-making and accept majority decisions as legitimate and ultimately subject themselves to them. It is this submission to majority decisions – particularly with regard to re-distributive policies – which requires individual identification with the ‘political community’. Generating and stabilizing identity as a requirement for democratic decision-making does – in the last resort – depend on whether and to what extent a political community is developed through public discourse. It is a crucial function of the sector of civil society related interest intermediation to create and to foster this public discourse.

The sector of civil society related or civil interest intermediation relies on fora of political self-articulation and public deliberation (reasoning) offered by civil society and is composed of:

‘those nongovernmental and non-economic connections and voluntary associations that anchor in the communication structures of the public sphere in the society component of the lifeworld’ respectively ‘of those more or less spontaneously emergent associations, organizations, and movements that [. . .] distill and transmit such reactions in amplified form to the public sphere.’ (Habermas 1996, pp. 366–7)
Within this concept of civil society, this network of associations includes collective actors which try to influence societally binding decisions by public deliberation, that is, by arguing or using the 'power of “good reasons”’. In contrast to the other three sectors, the sector of civil society related or civil interest intermediation is directly linked to the infrastructure or core of civil society. This link is crucial for shaping a public sector characterized by processes of argumentative communication between participants who relate to each other in a reciprocal dialogue and with open opportunities for participation. ‘These “discursive designs” have an egalitarian, open form of organization that mirrors essential features of the kind of communication around which they crystallize and to which they lend continuity and performance’ (Habermas 1996, p. 367).

The sector of administrative interest intermediation covers the implementation of decisions based on the various sectors and related forms of interest intermediation but ultimately decisions taken in the ‘core’ of the political system. Here bargaining, and sometimes also arguing, take place between administrative bodies and private actors (particularly individual actors) involved in or affected by implementation. Key features of this are the well-known implementation problems (summarized, e.g., by Pressman and Wildawsky 1973). In order to achieve targeted compliance with and implementation of policies, it is necessary to address motives and to find ways to safeguard the willingness to comply of those involved or addressed as well as mobilizing the knowledge of those actors relevant for achieving the intended effects through communicative interactions. Within these interactions, private actors can exercise bargaining power by ensuring that the intended policy objectives are actually achievable. Furthermore, they can influence implementation by pointing out that particular arguments have to be taken into account to achieve the intended objectives effectively in a given context. Opportunities for private actors to influence implementation processes either by bargaining or by arguing depend not only on their resources (e.g., financial means as well as knowledge) or their ability to evade the binding interventions of administrative bodies. Their opportunities are also shaped by legally defined rights. First of all, there is the right to question decisions taken by the administration (e.g., through litigation). This applies also to rights to be involved in implementation or administrative decisions, that is, rights forcing the administration either to listen to articulated concerns and ‘good reasons’ or to take these into account. Finally, private actors involved in implementation have a number of options which enable them to influence decision-making on policy objectives in the ‘core’ of the political system either by providing relevant expertise or by lobbying. The latter option depends heavily on the importance of these actors in overcoming implementation problems.
The development in this sector shows that the state’s capacity to act vis-à-vis the social environment relies to a great extent on cooperation and bargaining relations with autonomous actors affected by the policy. What is essential to note is that cooperative, frequently informal, administrative action can be located in the self-perceptions of the administrative and private actors involved as well as in the perceptions of ‘external’ observers in the grey zone between cooperation and corruption. This problem can be addressed and (possibly) solved by political regulation stipulating and legitimizing certain interactions between administrative bodies and private actors. However, whether or not these kinds of administrative actions are legitimate or not is one question. Quite another one is whether or not these actions are broadly seen as appropriate or not. This depends on processes of norm formation, which are based on a public understanding generated by a crucial extent in the sphere of civil society.

In the sector of functional interest intermediation, conflicts of interests can be solved through negotiations between the associations in which interests of particular (functionally determined) parts of society are organized. Solving conflicts of interests or aims between actors such as trade unions and employer organizations depends on the bargaining results achieved through mutual agreement. This does not, however, exclude asymmetries between the interest groups involved. As a consequence of differences in the ability to articulate and to organize interests, asymmetries should be presupposed. However, the need to achieve consensual solutions in the bargaining process indicates that the actors involved are free to pursue their interests. This implies that they can question the binding nature of a decision by means of disagreement or non-compliance, or by ‘dropping out’ (‘exit’). This sector of interest intermediation is particularly relevant for the deliberate coordination of societal actions in a binding way in those (functional) spheres of society where majoritarian parliamentary decisions (or decisions taken by forms of direct democracy) are ineffectual or where decisions challenge the underlying structures (such as private ownership of production or contractual labour in the production process) of a functionally differentiated (capitalist) society. This applies particularly to wage policy as a typical issue of interest intermediation between trade unions and employer organizations. The Achilles heel of these arrangements (Teubner 1979, p.497) is, as has frequently been shown, submission to and compliance with the agents of the organizations on the part of the members. In addition, there are problems related to the ‘latent’ interest groups (such as consumers) forming an organization for the common articulation and the representation of their interests. Furthermore, ‘latent’ interest groups face problems in avoiding free-riding (Olson 1965). In order to overcome individualistic self-centred preferences which can lead
to free-riding, public discourses in the sphere of civil society could be important in terms of developing solidarity, ‘collective interests’ or even a widespread sense of what is appropriate (or not). Furthermore, the sector of functional interest intermediation is dependent on contributions from the sector of territorial interest intermediation, as has frequently been highlighted in the neo-corporatist debate. This applies particularly where agreements between autonomous associations which have to be reached by bargaining are blocked, so that binding solutions to conflicts of interest are instead reached through legitimized majority decisions. In this situation, it is frequently enough for bargaining parties to perceive the ‘shadow of hierarchy’ as a potential threat to independent agreement. In addition, binding decisions taken in the territorial interest intermediation sector provide a framework for interest intermediation between interest groups – from (statutory) licensing of them as agents of interest intermediation to procedural regulation of their interactions (see Schmitter 1979), for example in reaching wage agreements.

An approach such as this, which considers different sectors of interest intermediation as well as modes of decision-making while specifically looking at characteristics of functional interest intermediation, is in line with what Carole Pateman (1970, p. 37) called ‘functional representation’ through association (either with or without the involvement of government). Functional representation is first of all relevant because it cannot be assumed ‘that it is possible for an individual to be represented as a whole and for all purposes instead of his being represented in relation to some well-defined function’ (Pateman 1970, p. 37). Therefore, and referring to Cole (1920a, p. 114), Pateman (1970, p. 37) argued that a ‘system of functional representation [is essential which] implies “the constant participation of the ordinary man in the conduct of those parts of the structure of society with which he is directly concerned, and which he has therefore the best chance of understanding”’. Therefore, ‘a participatory society is necessary’ (p.37). Such a participatory society comes close to what is referred to in this Handbook as participatory governance, and it is possible to argue in the spirit of Pateman – again referring to Cole (1920b) – that the ‘democratic principle [. . .] must be applied “not only or mainly to some special sphere of social action known as ‘politics’, but to any and every form of social action”’ (Pateman 1970, p.37). And Pateman continued the quotation of Cole that the democratic principle has to be applied in particular ‘to industrial and economic fully as much as to political affairs’.3
OVERVIEW OF THE CONTRIBUTIONS TO THE HANDBOOK

The above discussion is the reason why in Chapter 10 Stephen J. Silvia and Wolfgang Schroeder address forms and the history of participatory governance in labour relations. Furthermore, the authors review the four most prominent intellectual conceptualizations of employee participation, namely, as a formative aspect of broader democratic theory, as a variant of socialist theory, as a means of advancing human growth and development, and as a way to increase productivity and efficiency in the workplace. Finally, they present thoughts regarding the future of participatory governance in employment relations.

Furthermore, ‘functional representation’ is essential for the coordination of interactions in the ‘scientific community’ as well as between this community and the public in general and the state in particular. This is reflected in more detail by Thomas Saretzki in Chapter 9. By quoting Polanyi (1962), he emphasized that the ‘scientific community’ should be politically organized as a ‘republic of science’. Instead of public guidance and control, Polanyi (1962, p. 60) argued that ‘the authority of scientific opinion remains essentially mutual; is established between scientists, not above them. Scientists exercise their authority over each other’ (emphasis in the original). In line with reflection about possible complementarities between different sectors of societies or their dependencies upon one another, Saretzki started from the following observation:

As studies on the history of modern science have shown, the boundary of science and its rules have been institutionally accepted and effectively guaranteed by the modern constitutional state. Without such recognition and guardianship from governments, boundaries between science and society could not have been established and sustained effectively over time. Nor could the bridges built to cross these boundaries at one point or another. (p. 158 in this book)

Against the background of the diagnosis of increasingly dynamic relationships between science and society which have led to a new mode of knowledge production (called ‘Mode 2’; see Nowotny et al. 2001), Saretzki summarized the debate by pointing out that:

established epistemological, social and institutional boundaries seem to be inappropriate both in terms of the expanding demands for specialized knowledge and with respect to the growing number of potential knowledge producers on the supply side. To overcome these boundaries, participation of ‘individuals and groups across the social spectrum’ (Gibbons et al. 1994, p. 14) on both the demand and the supply side appears as a solution, if not as a necessity. (p. 174 in this book)
Or in other words, and quoting Gibbons et al. (1994, pp.14–15): ‘In socially distributed knowledge production the organisation of that participation becomes the crucial factor.’

Reflections on the meaning of participation in the process of knowledge production are also at the heart of Chapter 8. Here, Frank Fischer considers not only the relevance of participation for bringing expertise ‘from below’ into policy-making processes but also takes concerns of policy addressees seriously as well as giving consideration to their knowledge in defining policy objectives and achieving them effectively (and perhaps also more efficiently). Based on brief case illustrations from Brazil, India and Nepal, he emphasizes that the relevance of the expertise of lay people evolves only in the context of citizen empowerment and political struggle against non-democratic governing bureaucracies. This draws attention to the issue of governance and power.

Michael Haus tackles this issue in Chapter 4. He starts from the observation that power is usually identified as the blind spot of the ‘governance perspective’. However, he argues that in the context of the debate on a shift from government to governance a new understanding of power has also developed. Instead of focusing on power in the sense of domination (in the tradition of Weber) or ‘power over’, emphasis is given to ‘power to’. This changed understanding of power becomes obvious in the debate about ‘urban regime’ as a form of governance arrangement where ‘power to’ was highlighted by Stone (1989) as a source of self-coordination of actors and enforcement of self-determined rules for their interactions.

Nevertheless, to democratize participatory governance in the sense that not only self-selected actors are incorporated in governance arrangements, ‘countervailing power’ is needed – as argued by Spencer McKay and Mark E. Warren (in Chapter 5). And they emphasize: ‘Participatory governance is developing today less because of normative commitments to the ideals of democracy (although such commitments often exist), but more often owing to concerns about governability in the presence of countervailing powers’ (p.90 of this book). Conditions for achieving and democratizing participatory governance are in their view deadlock or uncertainty, which require ‘compromises among actors [. . .] that cannot be determined through the usual political processes of bargaining or voting’ (p.90 of this book).

Before these chapters Rainer Schmalz-Bruns starts (in Chapter 2) with an overview of different concepts of participatory governance and the aspirations linked to them. However, his main ambition is to present three constitutive paradoxes of participatory governance and to outline how these paradoxes can be conceptually addressed or even solved.

Jürg Steiner reflects in Chapter 3 upon the meaning of deliberation and its relationship to participatory governance. This requires Steiner
providing an overview of contested meanings of deliberation. However, the main task of this chapter is to demonstrate how successful deliberation works in conflict resolution even in deeply divided societies. This is demonstrated on the basis of his own empirical research.

Nevertheless, for some readers of this book the question might remain: Can participatory governance really improve the quality of democracy? This question is tackled by Thamy Pogrebinschi in Chapter 6. She does so by referring to examples of democratic innovations in Latin America leading to participatory forms of governance. Furthermore, she gives a detailed presentation of criteria for characterizing these innovations as democratic which go beyond what has been outlined in the opening section of this introductory chapter.

Within a web of various forms of interest intermediation and interrelated governing orders the concept of citizenship needs to be re-conceptualized – or a new and specific kind of understanding has to be developed concerning who should be involved in what way. This is done in a conceptual way by Pieter-Jan Klok and Bas Denters in Chapter 7. They refer to the Institutional Analysis and Development (IAD) framework developed by Elinor Ostrom (1990) and reflect upon the basis of empirical examples about the role of rules in structuring governance arrangements and how they influence interactions and outcomes. This allows them to provide some guidance for designing governance arrangements in a participatory way.

Philipp Stolzenberg and Brian Wampler also used the IAD framework in Chapter 15 (and particularly what is called the ‘rules in use’ within this framework) to show how participatory budgeting really can fulfil its promise of involving citizens effectively in decisions on public financial resources. In addition, Stolzenberg and Wampler refer to Schmitter’s (2002) holder concept. This concept was developed because answers to the question ‘Who should participate?’ can no longer refer to citizenship when governing and the sphere of governance extend far beyond a state-centred vision of policy-making, as ‘citizenship is related to legal entitlement underpinned by the state’ (Heinelt 2010, p. 28).

Other chapters also consider how specific forms of participatory governance work – or do not function (well). These reflections start at the international level (Chapter 11 by Jens Steffek and Nele Kortendiek) and address the EU (Chapter 12 by Karl-Oskar Lindgren and Thomas Persson) and Local Agenda 21 projects (Chapter 13 by Brigitte Geißel and Pamela Heß) as well as neighbourhood initiatives (Chapter 14 by Rob Atkinson and Karsten Zimmermann). Empirical examples are included in particular to identify institutional design principles for effective and at the same time also legitimate forms of participatory governance. The forms of
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Participatory governance considered have mostly been developed during the last two or three decades without obvious linkages to the scholarly debate on the issue. Instead, they developed through the ‘intelligence of practice’ by trying to address challenges of governing public affairs or coordinating collective interactions effectively and in a way perceived as legitimate. And this is usually linked to what Charles Lindblom (1965) called the ‘intelligence of democracy’: those who are given the right to participate might be the very ones with the relevant knowledge necessary to produce better results or to achieve the politically defined objectives (see also Cohen and Sabel 1997, p. 320).

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NOTES

1. Papadopoulos and Warin (2007) include also efficiency. But as the focus here is on effective self-determination – and not on the necessary use of resources to achieve it – efficiency is not used as one of the criteria for defining the democratic quality of participatory governance.


3. More recent cases of social action which can be characterized as forms of participatory governance are mentioned in Pateman (2012). Such cases are addressed in details in Chapters 6 to 15 of this Handbook.

REFERENCES


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