1. The Social Legitimacy of Targeted Welfare and Welfare Deservingness

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1.1 INTRODUCTION

1.1.1 ‘Who Should Get What, and Why?’ Back on the Agenda

The issue of welfare targeting, regarding the allocation of resources between categories of needs and needy groups, has regained a central position in the social policy debate in many, if not all, European countries. It was central to the juvenile stage of the European welfare state in the first part of the twentieth century, and seemed to have been more or less definitely solved in its mature stage in the prosperous 1960s and 1970s. However, with the economic downturn following the 1979 oil crisis, a restructuring process of Western welfare states began, while in the East the political turmoil of the late 1980s and early 1990s was the starting point for welfare redesign. Since these years, welfare reform has been a constant factor in the ‘silver age’ of the European welfare state (Taylor-Gooby, 2002). Further, there is no foreseeable end to it, because the concept of the welfare state and its physical manifestations in specific social policies became substantially challenged again in the last two decades as a result of intensified international economic competition, a financial crisis, demographic ageing, migration and a ‘refugee crisis’, increasing inequality and the rise of new social risks. This combination of challenges has resulted in a precarious political context marked by intensified discussions about the scope and generosity of the welfare state, which in essence are debates about welfare targeting.

More concretely, what we witness in most European welfare states is an intensification of critical debates about the necessity and fairness of redistributive relationships that have been organized through existing welfare arrangements, or that, in view of social and economic challenges, should be organized anew. Debates vary across different social issues: the intensified pension debate concerns the redistribution of welfare between older and
younger generations, debates about work-care reconciliation have the redistribution of rights and obligations between the genders at their centre, an increasing reliance on means-tested benefits reflects a debate about redistribution from the richer to the poorer, discussions about activation concern obligations of the unemployed, the inclusion of immigrants in the welfare state has developed into an issue (welfare chauvinism) of itself, and debates about the solidarity and related redistribution between peoples of European countries are upcoming. The OECD, the European commission, the World Bank and the IMF have all contributed to these debates by advocating more-selective targeting of benefits at needy groups or those in ‘real need’. Clearly, the welfare state debate seems to have come full circle, in the sense that the basic welfare deservingness question of ‘Who should get what, and why?’, which dominated the debate in the early times of welfare state formation, is back to the forefront again, and will possibly stay there for some time to come. This longer-term perspective on the need for welfare reform and the related debates on (re-)targeting justify addressing the question of the social legitimacy of differently targeted welfare schemes.

The wider aim of this book is to contribute to the welfare reform debate by bringing together a collection of recent studies revolving around this question. Because in our view, as we will explain, the deservingness opinions of various social actors play a pivotal role in the social legitimacy of welfare schemes, the concrete aim of the book is to present a state of the art picture of the latest theoretical, conceptual and methodological developments in the field, as well as to offer new and more-detailed knowledge of popular deservingness opinions.

To put the book’s contributions into perspective, in this introduction we review what is known in academic literature on the social legitimacy of particular types of programmes and schemes that are targeted at specific needs and needy groups. The questions we address are:

- Which factors make some forms and aims of welfare targeting more, or less, supported by public actors than others?
- How can these factors be interpreted and related to each other in a more general framework of the social legitimacy of differently targeted benefits?

Before discussing the state of the art, we briefly elaborate on the two central concepts of social legitimacy and targeting. This helps the reader in understanding the conceptual perspectives from which we discuss the general issue, and sheds light on some of the practical choices we have made in order to delineate the possibly broad subject. We end with a brief introduction to the book’s chapters.
1.1.2 Social Legitimacy and Targeting

With the term ‘social legitimacy’, we refer to the degree to which the general public support specific benefits and services, which is commonly measured using public opinion data (Ringen, 1987). However, we recognize that it is not only members of the general public who have opinions about social benefits and services. Other relevant groups, such as politicians, policymakers, administrators, street-level bureaucrats, representatives of interest groups and experts, all have their own ideas on the issue. These ideas may directly influence actual policymaking and policy implementation, but also indirectly, for example through their influence on mass-media discussions and target group portrayals (Schneider and Jacoby, 2005). A literature review shows that there is very little empirical research on the opinions of representatives from the groups mentioned (De Swaan et al., 2000) (for exceptions, see Blomberg and Kroll, 1999; Forma, 1999; Kallio and Kouvo, 2015), but several chapters in this book report on such opinions, and in this way contribute importantly to the field (see Chapters 11, 12 and 13).

When addressing the targeting of social benefits, we realize that semantics may play a role and conceptual misunderstandings can easily arise. In the Scandinavian social policy debate, for instance, targeting tends to be equated with means testing as a way of distinguishing between people who are entitled to benefits and those who are not (Ferrarini, Nelson and Palme, 2016; Palme and Wennemo, 1998). A similar view underpins Andries’ account of Belgian social security developments (Andries, 1996). In the British debate, however, means testing is often seen as the opposite of universalism (Gugushvili and Hirsch, 2014) and is then mostly termed selectivity (Spicker, 1993). Selectivity, however, is a term used by other authors merely to indicate that benefits do not cover all – or very broad categories of – citizens (as universal benefits do), but only certain categories among them (Ferge, 1997).

To bring order to this conceptual mix-up of the related terms of targeting, universalism, selectivity and means testing, we start by viewing targeting in social policy most generally as a term denoting that social policies and resources are directed at a delineated group of citizens. In this sense, all social security benefits and social services are targeted (Miller and Tomaskovic-Devey, 1990; Saunders, 1991). We then follow the helpful idea of Van Lancker, Ghysels and Cantillon (2015) that a primary form of delineation is on the basis of ‘reference groups’: groups that are categorized according to broadly defined social needs or risks. Some examples of reference groups from social policy practice are ‘people aged 65 or above’, ‘workers with an impairment/disability’, ‘unemployed people’, ‘families with
dependent children’, ‘sick employees’, ‘households with a lack of means’ and ‘all adult citizens’. Any further targeting within such reference groups we consider to be a secondary form of targeting, the criteria for which can be plentiful (such as age, family size, household type, gender, type of work contract, work record, payment of contributions, job behaviour), whatever is seen as relevant by policymakers.

However, in relevant literature, the target criterion of financial neediness, operationalized through means testing, is seen as a criterion qualitatively different from others, because in practice means testing and making use of means-tested benefits often create specific problems for claimants, such as a poverty and unemployment trap, stigmatization, instability of entitlements and non-take-up (Garfinkel, 1982; van Oorschot, 2002), which are typically problems that run counter to full social inclusion as one of the central aims of social policy. Furthermore, in our perspective on targeting, universality or selectivity is a matter of degree, not of essence (see also Kangas, 1995). This issue only seems to be relevant at the level of secondary targeting, that is, within reference groups. At the level of primary targeting, it is difficult to say whether a benefit focusing on the elderly is more or less selective than one focusing on unemployed people. However, at the level of secondary targeting, within for example the reference group of the elderly or the unemployed, we can state that social benefits that exclude smaller segments of the primary targeted reference group are more universal, whereas benefits that exclude larger segments of it are more selective.

Lastly, it should be noted that in this book the contributions fit into what we would like to call a ‘target group’ perspective on targeting, as distinguished from a ‘social expenditure’ perspective. The first dominates literature on the social legitimacy of differently targeted benefits and views targeting in terms of social protection coverage, that is, as defining which categories of citizens within specific reference groups are considered eligible for social benefits, and which are not. This is different from seeing targeting from a ‘social expenditure’ perspective, which examines how financial resources are distributed differently across social risks categories. This perspective is applied in studies on the outputs and outcomes of welfare provision, but rarely in social legitimacy studies.

1.2 THE SOCIAL LEGITIMACY OF DIFFERENTLY TARGETED SOCIAL BENEFITS: A BRIEF REVIEW OF APPROACHES

Early European Poor Laws distinguished between those categories of poor people who were seen to be deserving of relief – the elderly, children and
sick and disabled people—and those who were regarded as undeserving—unemployed people, idle paupers and those capable of work (Geremek, 1997; Golding and Middleton, 1982; Katz, 1989; Waxman, 1983). However, present-day welfare states, with protection schemes and services going way beyond the early poor law systems in terms of coverage and generosity, still treat different groups of needy people differently. For some target groups, social protection is more accessible, more generous, longer lasting and/or less subject to reciprocal obligations than for other groups. Just a few examples make this clear: it is usually the case that elderly and disabled people can rely more strongly on less-stigmatizing benefits, than, for instance, unemployed people. In many countries widows are better protected by national benefit schemes than divorced women. Mostly, core workers can rely on more comprehensive social insurance schemes than peripheral workers, and job-seeking obligations attached to benefit receipt are usually less stringent for older people and single parents.

Such differential targeting of social rights and obligations may reflect various considerations of policymakers (van Oorschot, 2006), but what interests us here are questions about its social legitimacy. That is, to what extent does the general public agree with and support different social benefits and services and the divergent welfare provision they entail for different groups of citizens? Further, what factors cause some social benefits and services to be more supported than others?

A literature review shows that there are three research approaches to these questions, situated in two main groups. The first group of studies looks for the source of differential support in the institutional characteristics of social benefits (and of welfare systems). The second group focuses on differences in perceptions of characteristics of the target groups of benefits and services. Within this particular group, one stream of research focuses on general public images of target groups in terms of stereotyping and stigma, while another stream investigates differences in social support in relation to the popular deservingness of target groups, that is, to public perceptions of how different target groups score on a series of specific deservingness criteria. As we will explain later in more detail, there are links between these three approaches, but we will discuss them separately first.

1.2.1 Institutional Characteristics of Social Benefits

Studies examining the legitimacy of targeted benefits and taking an institutional approach to explaining why some welfare programmes generate more solidaristic attitudes than others, seek to understand this from differences in the design of benefits, in terms of how they are targeted and implemented. The underlying idea is that institutional design defines
opportunity structures, which has consequences for the interest individuals
and groups have in a scheme (as contributors and claimants), and the design
may affect the degree of trust people have in the fair operation of benefits.

**Opportunity structures**

The main premise in many studies about welfare support is that people give
more endorsement to the benefits they receive or are likely to receive. This
generally means that more-universally targeted benefits, which by our
definition excludes smaller segments of reference groups, tend to have
greater social legitimacy (Goodin and Le Grand, 1987; Skocpol, 1991). In
line with this argument, it is found that usually the middle and higher income
classes support universal programmes from which they benefit themselves –
such as old-age pensions and healthcare – more than they support selective
means-tested programmes – such as social assistance or housing allowances –
from which they do not directly benefit (Coughlin, 1980; De Donder and
Hindriks, 1998; Forma and Kangas, 1999; Moene and Wallerstein, 2003;
Rothstein, 2002). Further, that contributory social insurance schemes tend to
have higher social legitimacy than means-tested tax-financed assistance
programmes may also be understood from a difference in the number of
(potential) claimants, but it is suggested that this may also be because paying
contributions is associated more strongly with building up a personal
entitlement to benefits than paying general taxes (Coleman, 1982; Ullrich,
2002a).

We are careful to note that the commonly lower social legitimacy of
narrowly targeted benefits does not mean that means testing as an instrument
for targeting in itself is unpopular among the wider public. Perhaps the
opposite, as Kangas (1995) shows for the Finnish public: a majority were in
favour of ‘tougher means testing’ in various schemes generally, but typically,
higher and middle classes preferred increased means testing in more-selective
programmes, whereas lower classes preferred increased means testing in
more-universal schemes (Ervasti and Kangas, 1995; Kangas, 1995).

**Trust in government institutions and fellow citizens**

The social legitimacy of a benefit may not only lie in opportunity structures
and substantive (group) interests in certain social programmes, but it may
also be determined by trust in the government institutions that redistribute
benefits, and in fellow citizens who are part of this redistribution process.
This is important to recognize, as Rothstein (2001) points out, because a
benefit that is in the interests of people, but is mistrusted by them with regard
to the impartiality and fairness of its practical operation, may still not have
high support. Rothstein (1998) argues that support for redistribution depends
on perceiving a just distribution of burdens, meaning that support is
undermined if people do not think that everybody contributes a fair share. Further, it depends on believing that there is procedural justice, meaning that the benefit is implemented in a fair and effective manner (that is, cheaply, easily and without cheating). As Rothstein (1998) argues, in the case of more-selective – and especially means-tested – benefits, both aspects are more problematic. With regard to the first, more-selective benefits often place greater reliance on the contributions of middle and higher-income groups, while they distribute more to lower-income groups. This unequal division of burdens could be seen as unfair and might detract from the scheme’s support (Hills, 2002; Kuklinski and Quirk, 1997). This line of reasoning fits with findings from economic studies on co-operation, which show that people tend to be conditional co-operators: they will pay their fair share only if they believe others will also pay their share (Fehr and Fischbacher, 2005; Kahan, 2005). With regard to the second aspect, selective benefits do not excel in terms of procedural justice, because they are typically more complex. The increased monitoring and screening involved leads to higher administrative costs and more bureaucracy (Mkandawire, 2005; van Oorschot, 2002), which are important aspects of welfare state criticism (Ervasti, 2012; Roosma, Gelissen and van Oorschot, 2013). Screening also involves higher barriers, leading to the non-take-up of benefits (van Oorschot, 2001) and public disapproval of this underuse (Ervasti, 2012). Lastly, highly selective schemes tend to offer greater opportunity for (perceived) abuse, because such benefits entail more rules that can be broken (Alston and Dean, 1972; Overbye, 1999; Ullrich, 2002a). Rothstein (2001) suggests in addition that the mass media commonly pays more attention to potential fraud concerning highly selective benefits, which may give rise to general distrust in the fair operation of these schemes.

**Universal and selective welfare regimes**

Although we have explained that the focus of our chapter is on the social legitimacy of benefits, especially in the institutionalist approach to understanding differences in welfare legitimacy, attention is also paid to the social legitimacy of entire welfare systems, more precisely of ‘universal’ versus ‘selective’ welfare states. Although it is often not specified in relevant literature exactly what is meant by these terms, it is suggested that the more-universal states are considered to be the social-democratic, and to a lesser extent the corporatist, welfare states of respectively Nordic and Continental Europe, where social benefits are organized to a large degree by way of non-means-tested social provisions and contributory social insurances. Selective states are seen as the liberal welfare states of the Anglo-Saxon world, where means testing is a much more common part of social protection policies. It is generally argued in literature that more-universal welfare states – and
possibly also insurance system based welfare states (Coleman, 1982; Ullrich, 2002b) – can rely on broader and stronger social and political support compared with welfare states that are characterized by a selective (means tested) approach (Goodin and Le Grand, 1987; Korpi, 1980; Rothstein, 1998, 2001; Skocpol, 1991). Selective welfare states create a strong demarcation line between those who contribute (the rich and the middle class) and those who benefit (the poor), and are seen as socially divisive, rather than as integrative (Rothstein, 1998). This gap between contributors and recipients is believed to undermine support for the welfare state among the middle and higher classes (Kangas, 1995; Rothstein, 1998). Therefore, highly selective welfare systems overall (which rely to a large degree on means-tested benefits and services) seem to be subject to what could be called the ‘selectivity trap’. That is, once such a system is established, as in the US, it can prove to be very difficult to extend welfare coverage beyond the group of the poorest citizens. In other words, to the extent that the public at large sees welfare exclusively as something only for the poor, it will be problematic to achieve sufficient levels of social legitimacy and for welfare advocates to motivate the middle masses towards welfare extension (Hills, 2014; Korpi and Palme, 1998; van Oorschot, 2013). In the case of more-universal welfare states, social legitimacy is more easily achieved, because a greater number of people have a stake in the benefits provided, and in the case of contributory social insurance, it is easier to perceive social protection as earned because contributions have been paid. As a result, more-universal welfare systems are less divisive, because they are able to form class alliances between the poor and the middle class and generate the political support for a generous welfare state (Korpi and Palme, 1998). However, according to Rothstein, shared interests are not the whole story, because as we have seen, contributions and support also depend on whether people have trust in the just and fair operation of the welfare system (Rothstein, 2001). Together with others, Rothstein stresses that there is less opportunity for fraudulent benefit claims in more-universal systems.

1.2.2 Public Images of Target Groups

Stereotypical images of benefit target groups play an important role in studies about the legitimacy of social benefits. A general finding is that programmes targeted at groups with a (more) negative public image have less public support. These stereotypical images are of various forms, and socio-psychological research shows that they can be strong and hard to change (Allport, 1954; Fiske, Lin and Neuberg, 1999). In literature, traditionally most attention has been paid to the negative image the public has of the poor (and especially the black poor in the US) and the unemployed, but more
recently there has also been a growing focus on negative images of immigrants as benefit recipients.

The undeserving poor
In many industrialized societies, poverty is a discrediting attribute, and the poor are frequently stigmatized (Titmuss, 1970; Waxman, 1983), where the term stigma refers to ‘an attribute that is deeply discrediting’ (Goffman, 1963, p. 3). Stigmatization of individuals and groups is part of a sociocultural process of ‘othering’ (Lister, 2004), in which they are deprived of social respect and a negative social identity is attached to them. Selective benefits, and especially means-tested benefits, are highly intertwined with this process in various ways. Means testing itself often contains several discrediting elements, thereby adding to the stigma of poverty. Claiming a means-tested benefit makes it evident that a person is not able to provide sufficient economic welfare on his or her own, and is thus likely to be seen as deviating from prevailing norms of self-responsibility. Also, as suggested by Rothstein (2001), means-tested benefits are more easily associated with fraudulent behaviour because they offer more opportunities for rule breaking or evasion. In addition, the discretion exerted by administrators in assessing eligibility to means-tested benefits may reduce the extent to which they are perceived as being given ‘as a right’. Perceiving a benefit as being given not as a right, but as a form of charity, is believed to invoke feelings of shame and inferiority (Simmel, 1908).7 More broadly, in addition to their dealings with public agencies, people in poverty are repeatedly exposed to shaming by the attitudes and behaviour of the people they meet, and by the tenor of public debate that either dismisses them or labels them as lazy (Walker, 2014).

The ‘black welfare queen’
In the US, various empirical studies provide evidence that normative images of categories of poor people indeed play an important role in the support for welfare. Quadagno (1994) even argues that the American welfare state is designed to exclude racial minorities and that racism is embedded in the welfare programmes. Gilens (1999) shows that there is in fact a strong racial element in ‘why Americans hate welfare’: Americans tend to think that black people are more lazy and less responsible than white people, and that therefore welfare is taken up mostly by black people (see also Feagin, 1975; Nelson, 1999). Gender is an additional element in this discourse (Monnat, 2010b), because welfare is perceived as mainly used by teenage and single mothers (‘welfare queens’) who are morally looked down on (Gordon, 2001; Rein, 2001). It is argued that the 1996 welfare reform in the US legitimized large cuts by actually creating stereotypes of black single mothers in the social debates leading up to the reform (Schram et al., 2009). The reform
introduced strong sanctions to control the ‘alleged sexual immorality and supposed preference for welfare over work of one group: African-American females’ (Neubeck and Cazenave, 2001, p. 4). In practice, this racial stereotyping is reflected in sanction policies: black and Hispanic women are at greater risk of being sanctioned than white mothers on welfare (Monnat, 2010a). In stark contrast with this stands the common finding that in the US, programmes in which the targeted groups do not suffer from negative stereotyping – such as widows, elderly people and the physically disabled – are well supported by the American public (Applebaum, 2001; Katz, 1989; Williamson, 1974).

The lazy unemployed
Whereas racial stereotyping is a central element in American public images of social policy target groups (Alesina and Glaeser, 2004), European studies on the social legitimacy of benefits have traditionally concentrated on the public image of unemployed people instead. What is consistently found is that images tend to be negative. There is somewhat widespread doubt about unemployed people’s willingness to work and about the proper use of benefits (Larsen, 2002; Golding and Middleton, 1982), even in a universalistic welfare state such as Sweden (Furåker and Blomsterberg, 2003).

Further, when people are asked to compare unemployed people with disabled people (Maassen and De Goede, 1991) or with employed people (Ester and Dekker, 1986), the unemployed – especially the younger unemployed (Larsen, 2002) – are more often seen as having less character, less self-responsibility, less perseverance and as being less trustworthy. Among those who have more-negative images of unemployed people, support for unemployment benefits is usually lower (van Oorschot and Meuleman, 2014).

Immigrants
In recent years in Europe, the images that people have of immigrants in their society, and how these images affect support for benefits, have entered research agendas. In line with the American experience that it is difficult to build up an inclusive and comprehensive welfare system in a context of strong racial and ethnic diversity (Alesina and Glaeser, 2004), the suggestion is that in more-heterogeneous societies, support for redistribution is lower, and more specifically, that immigration undermines solidarity and the legitimacy of the welfare state (Alesina and Glaeser, 2004; Brady and Finnigan, 2014; Mau and Burkhardt, 2009). Although in the European case the negative effect of increasing diversity on (support for) welfare redistribution is contested (van Oorschot, 2008), in many European societies there is indeed a relatively high level of what is termed ‘welfare chauvinism’: 

In any case, there is reason to assume that in European societies, immigrants may be seen as ‘the new undeserving poor’ (Bommes and Geddes, 2003).

1.2.3 Deservingness Perceptions

An increasing stream of literature addresses differences in the perceived deservingness of target groups as a source of differences in the social legitimacy of benefits. The general claim is that people give greater support to benefit schemes aimed at groups seen as more deserving. Compared with ‘public image’ literature, which is concerned with the stigmatized and stereotyped social identities that overshadow the other characteristics of target groups, the deservingness approach is more detailed, in that it distinguishes a series of (perceived) characteristics of target groups (and not just ‘negative identity’) that influence the social legitimacy of a benefit. There are several relevant clues in the literature, suggesting that people deduce from the perceived characteristics of target groups how those groups score on a series of deservingness criteria. Van Oorschot (2000) developed a framework of five such criteria, which throughout this book we will refer to as the ‘CARIN’ criteria. The first of these criteria is control over neediness, that is, people who are seen as being personally responsible for their neediness are seen as less deserving (if at all). This criterion is argued to be especially important in determining deservingness and in relevant literature it is also termed ‘disability’ (De Swaan, 1988) or ‘locus of responsibility’ (Cook, 1979). In many deservingness studies the criterion is recognized as playing a role, for example when explaining why in times of high unemployment people support unemployment benefits more: in such a context people place less blame on the unemployed for their situation (Fridberg and Ploug, 2000; Jeene, van Oorschot and Uunk, 2014). A second criterion is attitude: needy people who are likeable, compliant and conforming to our standards are usually deemed more deserving. Cook (1979) refers to ‘gratefulness’ and ‘pleasantness’, whereas De Swaan (1988) refers to ‘docility’. A third criterion regards reciprocity: those who have contributed to ‘our’ group before (who have ‘earned’ our support), or who may be expected to be able to contribute in future, are seen as more deserving. Reciprocity is viewed as one of the essential features of the ‘moral
economy’ of welfare states (Mau, 2003) or even the foundations of cooperation in general (Fehr and Fischbacher, 2005). In the contemporary context, reciprocity can also be interpreted as the willingness to ‘do something in return’ for a benefit or to be actively looking for a job or participating in training programmes or job experience. Fourth, is identity: needy people who are closer to ‘us’ are seen as more deserving. This criterion can be applied to different scales and areas, by kinship relations, place of residence or to identity groups (De Swaan, 1988). As already mentioned, in more-recent studies this criterion is specifically recognized as an explanation for the lower legitimacy of social provisions for immigrants (Reeskens and van der Meer, 2014; van Oorschot, 2006). And finally, there is the fifth criterion of the level of need, that is, people with greater (perceived) need are seen as more deserving. This criterion can also be extended to dependent children in need (Jeene, 2015; Reeskens and van der Meer, 2014) who are seen as the ‘innocent third party’ involved (Houtman, 1994).

Assuming that people apply the five criteria to form deservingness opinions, the repeated finding of a ‘universal dimension of support’ can be understood. Coughlin (1980) coined the term after finding through a literature review that in industrialized Western countries, the general public was most in favour of social protection targeted at old people, closely followed by protection for the sick and disabled, whereas support for schemes aimed at needy families with children was lower, for schemes for unemployed people even less, and support was usually the lowest for social assistance schemes for the poor. Later studies corroborate Coughlin’s ‘universal dimension of support’, whether they concern cross-sectional data from different European countries (van Oorschot, 2000, 2006), or (time-series) data from single countries, for example the UK (Hills, 2002; Taylor-Gooby, 1985), Finland and Denmark (Larsen, 2002; Forma, 1997), the Netherlands (van Oorschot, 1998), Belgium (Debusscher and Elchardus, 2003) and the Czech Republic (Rabušic and Sirovátka, 1999). As mentioned before, support for the social protection of immigrants has also been analysed in recent studies and has been found to be at the bottom end of the support dimension (Reeskens and van der Meer, 2014; van Oorschot, 2006). The ‘universal dimension of support’ can be understood as an outcome of deservingness thinking. For example, immigrants can be expected to score particularly badly on the criteria of identity and reciprocity, while in the public eye most immigrants may also be accused of having put themselves in a situation of welfare dependency. Although the public usually has some doubts about whether unemployed people are themselves to blame for their situation, unemployed people as a group will score better on the criteria of identity and reciprocity (the latter especially in countries with contributory unemployment insurance schemes). Compared with unemployed people, sick
and disabled people will usually be seen as more deserving, because in their case there will be much less doubt about the involuntariness of their neediness. The most deserving group, however, will usually be the elderly. They cannot be blamed for their age, they are close to ‘us’ (they are our parents and grandparents, and we ourselves hope to live to an old age), they have extra age-related needs, they have earned their share in their productive life stage and they are not seen as an ungrateful and demanding group.

It should be stressed that deservingness is a relative concept, that is, the difference between deserving or undeserving is gradual, with most target groups falling somewhere between the two extremes. Kolemen (2010) emphasizes in this respect that if a group is regarded as ‘not clearly deserving’ this does not mean that it is ‘clearly undeserving’, and vice versa. Groups hold different positions on the dimension because perceptions of their deservingness may be formed on the basis of a different selection of criteria: not each criterion may be seen as equally important for each group. An example of this is when immigrant status strongly dominates a group’s popular deservingness, ruling out the possible influences of other characteristics, which was found in the vignette study by Reeskens and van der Meer (2014). By contrast, in the case of non-immigrant status, other characteristics – for instance control or reciprocity – may play a decisive role. A second reason for the gradualness of deservingness perceptions lies in the fact that target groups may combine different relevant group characteristics. For instance, as found in a Dutch study, whereas the elderly as a generic group have high deservingness generally, this may be less so for rich elderly (who score lower on the criterion of ‘need’), or whereas the unemployed tend to have lower deservingness, this may be higher for the disabled unemployed (who score higher on the criterion of ‘control’) (van Oorschot, 1998). Nevertheless, the literature, as discussed above, suggests that in present-day US and Europe, the generic groups of respectively black people and immigrants are close to the undeserving extreme, whereas elderly people are close to the deserving extreme.

Another issue addressed in literature is whether all deservingness criteria have the same weight, or whether some are usually more important than others in forming deservingness perceptions. Several scholars have made suggestions that point in different directions. For instance, De Swaan (1988) regards ‘disability’, or lack of control, as the most important, even acting as a necessary condition for deservingness. This would imply that once the public feels that a person can be fully blamed for his or her neediness, other criteria become irrelevant. It is a fact that in many empirical deservingness studies, perceived personal responsibility or control stands out as an important determinant of people’s perceptions of the deservingness of the poor (see for example Cook, 1979; van Oorschot, 2000). However, literature on the low
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deservingness of immigrants in European societies and the racial stereotype-based undeservingness of the US poor suggests that the identity of the targeted group is also reasonably relevant. Being seen as ‘one of them’ rather than ‘one of us’, seems to draw a strong demarcation line regarding the deservingness of benefits (De Swaan, 1988; Reeskens and van der Meer, 2014). Lastly, there are studies that argue reciprocity is at the heart of deservingness perceptions, because reciprocity forms the foundation for solidaristic co-operation (Mau, 2003). In our view, rather than declaring any one of the deservingness criteria as ‘the most important’, it is more likely that the weights of criteria differ between individuals and contexts.

The following model sketches our conception of how a target group’s overall deservingness is a joint result of the positive or negative scores of the group on the five deservingness criteria, and how the scores on and the effects of criteria can differ between individuals and contexts (see also Jeene, 2015).

![Diagram of deservingness model]

**Notes:**
- Ta = position Target group A on ‘negative – positive’ dimension of a deservingness criterion.
- Ec/Ea/Er/Ei/En = relative effect of a position on a criterion on the total deservingness of Target group A.

**Figure 1.1** A model of the deservingness of a target group

Figure 1.1 suggests that the relative deservingness of a specific target group is positioned on a dimension ranging from ‘very undeserving’ to ‘very deserving’, and results from a combination of the scores of the target group on the five separate criteria. These scores, Ta, may be more or less positive or
negative and can have a different weight (effect) in the overall deservingness outcome. It is important to realize that the Ta scores and weights, and therefore the overall outcome, can be different across individuals, and that the deservingness of Target group A in the general public’s eye is an aggregate of these individual perceptions. Further, it is also important that at the individual and aggregate level Ta scores, weights and overall outcomes can change over time, as a result of changes at the individual level (for example when a person gets older, his or her perception of the blame for unemployment may change), and at the context level (for example citizens may perceive unemployment as less blameful in times of high unemployment).

1.3 INTERRELATIONS, BUT A PIVOTAL ROLE FOR DESERVINGNESS OPINIONS

1.3.1 Interrelations

We have seen that there are three approaches in existing literature regarding the social legitimacy of differently targeted benefits. The ‘institutional’ approach seeks to understand these differences from differences in the institutional design of benefits (and by extension, of welfare systems). It is suggested that design characteristics create specific incentive structures and have consequences for the trust people (can) put in the just and fair operation of a benefit. Related to these factors, in the institutional approach, more-selective benefits are assumed to have lower legitimacy than more-universal benefits, whereas it is especially means-tested benefits that generally score the lowest. In the ‘public image’ approach, differences in legitimacy are seen as being related to the general image the public has about the target group for schemes. Typical of this approach is that it focuses on groups for which strongly negative images exist, and that are stigmatized and stereotyped, leading to (very) low legitimacy for benefits that address their needs. In the ‘deservingness’ approach, differences in legitimacy are related to people’s perceptions of the deservingness of target groups, which can take a position between positive (deserving) or negative (undeserving). As in the public image approach, in this approach, the social identity of target groups plays a role, but in addition, it recognizes a series of other criteria that people can apply when forming their deservingness opinions (control, attitude, reciprocity, need). The essence of this approach is the idea that people judge the deservingness of a target group against a number of criteria, and that a benefit that addresses this group is deemed more legitimate to the extent that the overall judgment is positive.
In many concrete cases of differences in the social legitimacy of benefits, it may be difficult (if at all possible) to assess which of the three approaches will be ‘best’ for understanding the differences. This is because there are frequently many more variables involved (such as aspects of coverage, generosity, claimant numbers, institutional character, image of the target group, perceptions of deservingness), than there are benefit cases to compare (Gilens, 1999). However, it is also important here that factors from the approaches may be interrelated.

Interrelations between public images and deservingness perceptions seem self-evident. A strongly negative image will almost by definition lead to a negative score on the criterion of identity, while the reasons for a negative image may be a negative score on an important deservingness criterion. For example, black Americans are a stigmatized group and are therefore seen as less deserving, but the stigma centres on the perception that they score particularly low on the criterion of ‘responsibility’ or ‘control’, that is, they are considered to be lazier than whites (Gilens, 1999) and can therefore be blamed for their neediness. Likewise, in Europe the relatively negative image of unemployed people is also connected to the criterion of ‘control’, that is, to doubts about whether they cannot be blamed for being unemployed (Larsen, 2002).

Interrelations may also exist between institutional factors and deservingness perceptions. The general finding that means-tested benefit schemes directed at the poor tend to have a low legitimacy can illustrate this. From the institutional dimension this is understandable, because in such schemes there is usually a strong demarcation between the group of contributors (the non-poor), who are less likely to ever benefit from the scheme, and the recipients (the poor), which may lead to perceptions of an unjust division of burdens (Larsen, 2006). The relatively costly administration of means-tested schemes may add to the perception of expensiveness among the non-poor. The complexity of means testing offers more opportunities for fraud and the perception of fraud (Rothstein, 1998), which from the deservingness perspective enforces negative perceptions of benefit claimants because fraud and misuse can be seen as an unwillingness to take responsibility for one’s own life (the criterion of ‘control’) and/or as a manifestation of despised morals (the criterion of ‘attitude’). As the American experience shows (Rein, 2001), the general undeservingness of the target group of a means-tested benefit may trigger policymakers to make the scheme even more selective and to implement stricter criteria to demarcate more ‘fairly’ the deserving from the undeserving poor. In turn, this institutional adaptation may generate more bureaucracy and higher perceived abuse, and decrease the perceived legitimacy of the benefit scheme even further. Thus, a stronger focus on discriminating deserving from undeserving...
target groups may lead to an institutional ‘selectivity’ reflex, which makes the scheme less legitimate instead of more legitimate. This is a paradox of means-tested benefits. In the case of universal benefits, which usually have high social legitimacy, there may also be an interplay between institutional and deservingness factors. Take the example of a most-universal benefit scheme: an unconditional basic income for all citizens. From the institutional perspective on legitimacy, such a scheme has many favourable characteristics: administrative costs are low, everyone is included so there is no demarcation between contributors and recipients, and fraud or abuse is impossible. Survey studies in the Netherlands (TNS-NIPO, 2014; van Oorschot, 1998), however, indicate that only a minority of about 20 to 30 per cent are in favour (mostly based on the argument that it would mean the end of benefit fraud), while the majority of about 50 per cent are against. The most important reasons given by the latter refer to deservingness criteria, that is, they feel that many people might not need the basic income (the criterion of ‘need’), that it is not fair that those who do not want to work would get an unconditional benefit (the criterion of ‘reciprocity’), and that the incentive to carry out paid work and to care for one’s own may be lost (the criterion of ‘control’) (van Oorschot, 1998).

![Diagram](image)

*Figure 1.2 A heuristic model for understanding the social legitimacy of differently targeted benefits*

In Figure 1.2 we summarize the main factors that may influence the social legitimacy of a benefit X that is targeted at a group A, as well as their
interrelationships. The model suggests that if the interest is in the relative social legitimacy of a specific benefit scheme, it is necessary to have information about the incentive structures and trust relationships created by its institutional design, about whether there is a relatively strong positive or negative public image of its target group, and about how the general public feels that the target group scores on a series of deservingness criteria.

1.3.2 A Pivotal Role for Deservingness Opinions

Notwithstanding the conclusion that there are three types of approaches to understanding differences in the social legitimacy of benefits, and that factors from each may be interrelated, there are arguments as to why deservingness perceptions can be seen as pivotal in producing differences in legitimacy.

First, the institutional characteristics (and the related legitimacy) of present-day schemes may be affected by deservingness opinions during the schemes’ formative years. When it is generally accepted that target group images and underlying deservingness opinions play a role in the formation of present-day policies (Burstein, 2003; Rein, 2001), it seems justified to assume that they have played a role in the past as well. There are no studies that have explicitly investigated this, but it is hinted at in literature in several ways. An interesting finding from the study by Kangas (2012) on the historical beginnings of various social security benefits in European and African countries, is the particular chronology of their introduction: first the schemes for the commonly most deserving categories of old, sick and disabled people were introduced, then family benefits and unemployment compensation, and lastly (if at all) social assistance for the least deserving category of poor people. Another hint comes from a study by Kahl (2005) into the religious roots of social assistance schemes in European countries, in which she suggests that social assistance arrangements in the Catholic European countries differ from those in Calvinistic countries, based on different perceptions of the poor: in the Catholic perspective the poor are seen more in a traditional Christian way as a pitiable and deserving group of ‘children of God’, whereas in the Calvinistic perspective, poverty is associated with the laziness and immorality of an irresponsible and therefore undeserving ‘underclass’. These arguments suggest that perceptions of the deservingness of target groups (and related stigmas) were underlying the choices in the previous institutional development of benefit schemes.

A second argument as to why deservingness perceptions may be pivotal relates to the ‘universal dimension of support’. That is, the empirical findings that in all European countries, and among all social categories, the rank order of the average deservingness of the groups of ‘the elderly’, ‘the sick and disabled’, ‘the unemployed’ and ‘immigrants’ tends to be the same (van
Oorschot, 2006). This suggests that deservingness opinions and attitudes are deeply rooted in popular welfare culture. van Oorschot (2006) speculates that this may be an example of a cultural pattern that finds its origins in its functionality for the survival of social groups. For instance, the deservingness criterion of identity may protect against burdensome support claims from outside the group, while the criterion of control may protect against such claims from inside the group. Bang Petersen (2012) takes this further, by arguing that determining the deservingness of individuals is a heuristic rooted in human psychology, as it evolved during evolution. The idea is that in pre-historical, small-scale societies, we developed the skills to detect reciprocators who contributed to reciprocal food sharing, and cheaters who violated the rules of co-operation by taking advantage of the collective gains. Dealing with these reciprocators and cheaters is assumed to have structured cognitive categories and created judgmental shortcuts, called ‘deservingness heuristics’, which operate independently of the ideological stances of people, of cultural differences and of institutional differences (Bang Petersen, 2012; Bang Petersen et al., 2012).

1.4 DEVELOPING THE FIELD OF DESERVINGNESS ATTITUDE RESEARCH

Research into the social legitimacy of differently targeted benefits was until recently mostly confined to analysis of public opinion surveys. There are, however, few of these – either on a national or cross-national level – and they frequently only address a small number of target groups or deservingness criteria. This is an obstacle in developing the field further, theoretically as well as empirically. As explained earlier, in this volume we try to extend the scope of the analysis of the social legitimacy of targeted benefits, and in particular of deservingness attitudes, by offering contributions addressing the latest theoretical, conceptual, methodological and empirical developments in the field, as well as contributions from various disciplines such as sociology, political science, social psychology and media studies. We invited a number of scholars who to our mind are involved in research that poses new research questions, applies new methods, and thus adds new knowledge to the field. As a result, this volume addresses a number of new topics, which we will briefly explain here.

1.4.1 Popular Ranking and Weighing of Deservingness

The first topic regards the question of actually how ‘universal’ the popular ‘universal dimension of support’ is. In Chapter 2, Laenen and Meuleman
analyse the geographical, temporal and social-structural variations in the popular ranking of specific groups of needy people, and come to the conclusion that in all the countries they studied there seems to be a considerable group of ‘welfare egalitarians’ who do not wish to differentiate between different target groups. In Chapter 3, Reeskens and van der Meer extend the topic of ranking by addressing the question of which of the various CARIN criteria people actually apply when they construct their rankings of perceived deservingness of unemployed people. Which of the criteria weigh more heavily than others in this construction? Using a novel vignette study approach, they find that Dutch public perceptions of the relative importance of the CARIN criteria largely reflect the control and reciprocity criteria embedded in the Dutch Unemployment Benefits Act. But in addition to that, the ethnic identity of the unemployed plays a significant role as well.

However, it should be noted that the topic of applying and weighing the CARIN criteria in assessing deservingness is also addressed in chapters that primarily address other types of new topics. As, for instance, in Chapter 12 by De Wilde, in Chapter 13 by van der Aa, Hiligsmann, Paulus and Evers, and in Chapter 14 by Kootstra.

1.4.2 The Cognitive Basis of Popular Deservingness Opinions

Because deservingness attitudes are partly based on people’s beliefs about the relevant characteristics of (potential) target groups, it is important to know more about the cognitive basis of these attitudes.

In Chapter 4, Baumberg Geiger looks empirically at the beliefs–deservingness perceptions relationship in the UK and a selection of other European countries, and finds that factually incorrect popular beliefs about the numbers and levels of unemployment benefits are associated with the perceived undeservingness of the unemployed. Data simulations show that perceived deservingness would often be considerably greater if people held correct beliefs about the benefit system.

Where false beliefs easily lead to unjustified, but explicit stereotypes and attitudes, in Chapter 5, de Vries studies the role of implicit attitudes, defined as the unconscious feelings and beliefs people hold about specific social groups. His empirical study in the UK finds evidence suggesting that many people do hold negative implicit attitudes towards unemployed people, and that these implicit attitudes may play a role in explaining their lower support for unemployed people deserving assistance through the welfare system.

Although it is apparent that deservingness attitudes can have a background in people’s implicit and explicit beliefs and feelings, an important question is, of course, which factors contribute to their (social) construction? In itself this
is a very broad question, but four contributions to this volume address specific aspects of it by studying factors operating in the contexts of people’s lives: media content and contextual factors at the country level, such as welfare design and the economic situation.

1.4.3 Media Frames of (Un)deservingness

In Chapter 6, van Doorn and Bos address the question of how visual portrayals of poor people in American news magazines affect public perceptions of who is poor and of who benefits from different public welfare programmes. Their results suggest that even though Latinos are now the largest minority population in the country, they do not feature heavily or even proportionally in coverage of poverty compared with the stereotype of the ‘black welfare queen’ in the mid-1990s. This may be at least partially explained by the fact that Latinos are not as strongly stereotyped as being lazy. In Chapter 7, Lepianka addresses the sociocultural construction of deservingness by investigating the ways in which Dutch print news media frames three sub-groups of the poor in the Netherlands: poor older citizens, poor immigrants and the (non-)working poor. She finds seven distinct frameworks applied by the Dutch daily media to account for the poverty of these groups.

1.4.4 The National Context of Deservingness Opinions

Although there is a small amount of literature dealing with differences in deservingness attitudes between welfare regime types, which is mostly based on cross-sectional opinion data, knowledge about the effects of country-level contextual factors on such attitudes would be increased by analyses of longitudinal data over a longer period of time, in which changes in context and attitudes can be studied in tandem. In Chapter 8, Uunk and van Oorschot analyse time-series data for the Netherlands from 1975 to 2006 regarding public opinions on the welfare deservingness of the benefit target groups of pensioners, unemployed workers, disabled workers and social assistance beneficiaries. They relate specific reforms of these benefits to developments in related deservingness opinions. Their findings seem to indicate that specific welfare reforms have only limited effects on deservingness opinions regarding target groups specifically subjected to them. In Chapter 9, in the context of a development towards an activating welfare state and of economic crisis, Buß, Ebbinghaus and Naumann investigate how the social legitimacy of job acceptance obligations for the unemployed has changed over two decades across 23 European countries. Their multilevel analysis
shows that support for obligations is at its lowest in times of economic decline.

1.4.5 Obligations of Claimants of Welfare Benefits

Similar to Buß and colleagues, in Chapter 10, Roosma and Jeene start off from the growing dominance of the activation perspective, in which citizens are no longer primarily considered as subjects with social rights, but as subjects with social rights and obligations regarding, for example, active job seeking and participating in training programmes, subsidized work and job experience. Although ‘activation’ is an attribute of many contemporary benefit schemes, the authors observe a substantial lack of knowledge concerning the social legitimacy of these policies. The limited available studies all focus on the target group of the unemployed. In their chapter, Roosma and Jeene also analyse public support for the activation of social assistance beneficiaries and people (partly) disabled for work. Their findings show that Dutch people generally support benefit obligations, but also see reason for leniency in certain cases.

1.4.6 Deservingness Opinions among Bureaucrats and Policymakers

Literature concerning the deservingness of groups of needy citizens has to date nearly exclusively focused on attitudes among the general public. However, there is reason to assume that more-formal actors in the welfare system, such as bureaucrats and policymakers, also have specific deservingness attitudes, which may guide them in their work and therefore have an influence on how bureaucracies treat claimants, and how benefit schemes are designed in the first place. As yet, we know very little about these attitudes, but three chapters in this volume offer interesting initial insights. In Chapter 11, Blomberg, Kallio, Kangas, Kroll and Niemelä compare deservingness attitudes towards Finnish social assistance clients among various professional groups involved in the administration of social assistance. One of their main findings is that municipal social workers and the heads of social welfare offices perceive social assistance recipients as deserving to a larger degree, whereas the social security officials of the nationwide Social Insurance Institution (Kela) do so to a lower degree. In Chapter 12, De Wilde focuses more directly on the application of the CARIN deservingness criteria by Belgian municipal boards that decide about claims for social assistance. Social assistance case managers responsible for preparing these decisions were asked whether a series of different clients, described by varying vignettes, would be granted assistance it they were to apply. It shows that vignette characteristics of hypothetical clients linked to
The attitude, control and reciprocity criteria are best able to predict eligibility. Chapter 13, by van der Aa and colleagues, makes new contributions to the field, not only by comparing deservingness attitudes of the wider Dutch public with those of policymakers, but also by extending the study of deservingness attitudes to the healthcare sector. A series of discrete choice experiments show that both policymakers and the general public assign the highest weight to the deservingness criterion of medical need. However, compared with policymakers, the general public gives greater importance to financial capacity or neediness as well as to lifestyle, based on personal responsibility and reciprocal co-operation.

Lastly, most deservingness debates and studies tend to focus on the traditional target groups in welfare states, with a preoccupation for the deservingness of poor people and the unemployed. However, increasingly the scope of the deservingness debate is also including two groups in particular: immigrants and the rich. The welfare deservingness of immigrants has become a contested issue in many European countries due to the large influx of economic migrants and political refugees in recent years, putting a strain on the sustainability of welfare provision types and levels. Further, because of growing inequality and the lagging of labour income behind capital income, the debate about the legitimacy of large income and wealth differences increasingly focuses on the question of why and to what extent the (very) rich actually deserve their wealth.

### 1.4.7 Deservingness of Immigrants

In Chapter 14, Kootstra reports on a vignette study that compares the perceived deservingness of two majority and four minority groups of welfare claimants in the UK. She finds that minority groups score more negatively on the CARIN criteria, and then shows that the links between scores on the criteria and deservingness are different for the various target groups. In Chapter 15, by Kumlin, Wollebæk, Fladmoe and Steen-Johnsen, the deservingness of immigrants is not the dependent variable, but plays an intermediate role in contrasting empirically two storylines about the relationship between trust and support for the welfare state. The more pessimistic story claims that immigration-driven diversity undermines support for the welfare state, because citizens have differentiated trust and deservingness views about natives (higher) and immigrants (lower). The second view suggests that in societies where a strong culture of generalized trust already exists, support for the welfare state will remain intact, even in the face of immigration-driven diversity. Kumlin and colleagues believe that their results are mostly consistent with the pessimistic deservingness-related view.
1.4.8 Deservingness of the Rich

The two contributions that are concerned with the deservingness of the rich are both American, which reflects that a strong debate about the issue has arisen in recent times in the US due to surging economic inequality and stagnating social mobility, as is explained in the two chapters. It is suggested that increasingly wealth, instead of poverty, is seen as a social problem. In Chapter 16, Sadin finds from opinion data that at present the American public perceive the rich as predominantly relying on structural advantage and having less actual control over their wealth than shown in previous research. It appears that the American people have begun to recognize the role that structural factors, instead of individual merit, play in the accumulation of wealth. In turn, this recognition influences people’s preferences regarding social welfare policy.

In a different sample of Americans, in Chapter 17, Ragusa finds that dispositional beliefs, such as that the rich are ‘hard working’, are the strongest predictors of Americans’ desire to lower taxes on the rich. By contrast, situational beliefs, such as that the rich acquired their wealth through ‘inheritance’ or ‘luck’, are the strongest predictors of Americans’ desire to increase taxes on the wealthy. Ragusa claims that his results confirm that the deservingness stereotypes of the rich have large effects on tax policy preferences, in the same way as stereotypes about the beneficiaries of social programmes have on preferences for social policies. One of the implications of these findings is that deservingness criteria may be generalizable to other policy domains.

NOTES

1. This chapter is based on a discussion paper written by the authors for the Improve Network (see van Oorschot and Roosma, 2015).
2. Because of this, some see an inherent contradiction in the social protection quality of means-tested schemes: people’s means are mostly used as a secondary targeting criterion to (best) help the ‘truly needy’, but whether means-tested benefits are truly helping the needy (best) is often questionable (Titmuss, 1970; Korpi and Palme, 1998; Gugushvili and Hirsch, 2014).
3. In practice it may even be difficult, however, to measure and compare the degrees of universalism or selectivity of schemes that focus on the same reference group, among other things because secondary target criteria applied in one scheme may be qualitatively different from criteria applied in another. For examples of such measuring see Saunders (1991) on selectivity and Goul Andersen (2012) on universalism.
4. Marx, Salanauskaite and Verbist (2013) argue that, for that reason, nowadays policymakers apply the instrument of means testing to a larger segment of the target population, including not only the poor and unemployed but also working families with low incomes. Two examples are the Revenue de Solidarité Active (RSA) in France, which makes work for people on social assistance more lucrative, and the Earned Income Tax Credit (EITC) in the US, a tax exemption for employees’ social security benefits for working households.
5. It is also noteworthy that although in opinion surveys it is consistently found that indicators of people’s interest in specific programmes (indirectly measured by, for example, their actual work status, income level, age and such like) do have an expected effect on their support for programmes, such effects are usually not very strong (Ploug, 1996; van Oorschot, 2000). This may be because the personal interest people perceive to have in a programme may extend beyond their present situation (they have benefited from it in the past, they may expect to need it in future), and beyond their own person as well (family members, or close friends using the programme) (van Oorschot, 2013).

6. This socially divisive character also explains why ‘programmes for the poor become poor programmes’ (Titmuss, 1970; Rainwater, 1982). That is, their lower societal legitimacy makes them more vulnerable to less benign and more reserved treatment by policymakers and administrators, leading in practice to lower quality of services and benefits, and of their delivery.

7. As Simmel noted in 1908, ‘die Gedrückheit, die Beschämung, die Deklassierung durch das Almosen hebt sich für ihn [der Arme] in dem Maße auf, in dem es ihm nicht aus Barmherzigkeit, Pflichtgefühl oder Zweckmäßigkeit gewährt wird, sondern er es fordern darf.’ (Simmel, 1908, p. 456), (‘the humiliation, shame and loss of status [“declassement”] brought about by the acceptance of charity are alleviated for him [the poor man] to the extent that it [the benefit] is not granted out of compassion or a sense of duty or even expediency, but rather because he has a valid claim to it’).

8. Which may reflect the different outcomes of the American versus the European social model: the first generates more poverty, the second more unemployment.

9. This paradox underlies the often recognized observation that ‘programmes for the poor tend to be poor programmes’, but it also underlies what is termed the ‘paradox of redistribution’, which points to the observation that the degree of poverty relief tends to be lower in welfare systems that are designed from a selective perspective, compared with those that are designed from a more-universal approach (Korpi and Palme, 1998). This paradox has been the subject of several empirical studies, with sometimes contradicting conclusions about its existence. However, the most recent study with better time series data corroborates it (McKnight, 2015); nevertheless, see Marx et al. (2013). This suggests that focusing welfare protection only on the poor is generally not in the best interests of the poor (van Oorschot, 2013).

10. See Fiske, Cuddy and Glick (2006) for an alternative evolutionary perspective on stereotypical images of welfare recipients and the poor, which suggests that people judge groups on universal, evolutionary generated perceptions of warmth (trustworthiness) and competence (respect). In social surveys on the attribution of warmth and competence, welfare recipients and the poor in particular score low on both dimensions, which explains their negative public image.

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