1 Globalisation and migration: an introduction

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MIGRATION AND GLOBALISATION: DYNAMICS AND CONTRADICTIONS

Migration has been intensifying and diversifying in the last 25 years. According to the International Migration Report issued by the United Nations, in 2015 there were 244 million international migrants (here defined as people living in a given country who are either foreign-born or with foreign citizenship) – 10 per cent more than in 2010. More than two-thirds of these (71 per cent) lived in high-income countries, while developing regions hosted 29 per cent of the world’s total international migrant population.

While high-income countries are the top recipients, the main sources are middle-income countries, accounting for 65 per cent of all international migrants: a quarter (25 per cent) originate from high-income countries – 17 per cent from high-income OECD countries and 8 per cent from high-income non-OECD countries – while only 10 per cent come from low-income countries. Overall the total migrant stock worldwide has risen by 71 million people between 2000 and 2015 (Figure 1.1). Much of this growth was registered in the 2000s, and 81 per cent of this growth (approximately 57 million) was registered in high-income countries.

![Graph showing international migrants by income group of country or area of destination, 2000–2015](image)

Source: UN (2015: 5, Figure 1, Highlights).

Figure 1.1 Number of international migrants by income group of country or area of destination, 2000–2015
It is worth noting though that international migration often occurs within the same major area of the world (UN 2015: 14). Indeed, this is the case for the majority of migrants from Asia (60 per cent of the total, equivalent to 62 million persons), Europe (66 per cent or 40 million people), Oceania (59 per cent or 1 million people) and Africa (52 per cent or 18 million people) who live in another country of their major area of origin. It is only in Latin America and the Caribbean and North America where the majority of international migrants (84 per cent for the former and 73 per cent for the latter) live in a country outside their major area of birth. This clearly shows that there is a lot of intra-regional migration taking place between countries of different income levels, including within Asia and Africa. This attests to a complicated pattern of population flows that defies simplistic perceptions that all migration is directed towards Europe or North America.

Nonetheless the size of international migration remains rather small. In 2013, international migrants accounted for 3.2 per cent of the world’s population, compared to 2.9 per cent in 1990 and 2.2 per cent in 1980 (UN 2013). In the North, international migrants constituted 10.8 per cent of the total population compared to 1.6 per cent in developing regions. Between 1990 and 2013, international migrant stocks as a share of total population grew in developed countries but remained largely unchanged in developing regions, despite recent increases in migration between countries situated in the global South (Tables 1.1 and 1.2).

These general trends of international migration must be investigated within their socio-economic and political context. The integration of the world economy, the rapid growth of international trade and the progress of digitalised technology are all important levers of socio-economic globalisation. They intensify interconnectedness and facilitate the flow of information, goods, services, capital and raw materials. This has several consequences on economic and social life in different regions of the world.

As developing regions become integrated in international trade they experience both the advantages and disadvantages of the global economy. Production is becoming both de-

| Table 1.1  International migrant stock by developed/developing region and major area, 1990–2015 |
|------------------|------------------|------------------|------------------|------------------|
|                   | International migrant stock (millions) | Average annual change in migrant stock (millions) |
| World             | 152.6 | 172.7 | 221.7 | 243.7 | 2.0       | 4.9       | 4.4       |
| Developed regions | 82.4  | 103.4 | 132.6 | 140.5 | 2.1       | 2.9       | 1.6       |
| Developing regions| 70.2  | 69.3  | 89.2  | 103.2 | −0.1      | 2.0       | 2.8       |
| Africa            | 15.7  | 14.8  | 16.8  | 20.6  | −0.1      | 0.2       | 0.8       |
| Asia              | 48.1  | 49.3  | 65.9  | 75.1  | 0.1       | 1.7       | 1.8       |
| Europe            | 49.2  | 56.3  | 72.4  | 76.1  | 0.7       | 1.6       | 0.8       |
| Latin America/Caribbean | 7.2  | 6.6  | 8.2  | 9.2  | −0.1      | 0.2       | 0.2       |
| North America     | 27.6  | 40.4  | 51.2  | 54.5  | 1.3       | 1.1       | 0.7       |
| Oceania           | 4.7   | 5.4   | 7.1   | 8.1   | 0.1       | 0.2       | 0.2       |

Source: Adapted from UN (2015: Table 1.1).
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Table 1.2  International migrant stocks by destination and origin, 2015 (millions)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Destination/Origin</th>
<th>D/ed R</th>
<th>D/ing R</th>
<th>Africa</th>
<th>Asia</th>
<th>Europe</th>
<th>LAC</th>
<th>NA</th>
<th>Oc/a</th>
<th>Other</th>
<th>World</th>
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<tr>
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<td>12.0</td>
<td>40.3</td>
<td>50.4</td>
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<td>1.6</td>
<td>4.1</td>
<td>140.5</td>
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<tr>
<td>Developing regions</td>
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<td>90.2</td>
<td>20.6</td>
<td>59.5</td>
<td>9.2</td>
<td>6.1</td>
<td>1.9</td>
<td>0.2</td>
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<td>19.2</td>
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<td>0.0</td>
<td>0.1</td>
<td>0.0</td>
<td>1.9</td>
<td>20.6</td>
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<td>Asia</td>
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<td>9.2</td>
<td>20.2</td>
<td>39.9</td>
<td>4.6</td>
<td>1.0</td>
<td>0.4</td>
<td>0.8</td>
<td>76.1</td>
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<td>1.3</td>
<td>5.9</td>
<td>1.3</td>
<td>0.0</td>
<td>0.3</td>
<td>9.2</td>
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<tr>
<td>Caribbean</td>
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<tr>
<td>North America</td>
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<td>45.2</td>
<td>2.3</td>
<td>15.5</td>
<td>7.5</td>
<td>24.6</td>
<td>1.2</td>
<td>0.3</td>
<td>3.1</td>
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<tr>
<td>Oceania</td>
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<td>4.1</td>
<td>0.5</td>
<td>3.0</td>
<td>3.0</td>
<td>0.2</td>
<td>0.2</td>
<td>1.1</td>
<td>0.1</td>
<td>8.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>World</td>
<td>68.2</td>
<td>175.5</td>
<td>32.6</td>
<td>99.8</td>
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<td>35.8</td>
<td>4.3</td>
<td>1.8</td>
<td>9.8</td>
<td>243.7</td>
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</table>

Source: UN (2015: Table 1.2).

and re-localised through the emergence of global supply chains. This creates an increased and diversified supply of goods and services for both developing and developed regions; but it also leads to a global division of labour that is highly unequal. Local firms may thus become integrated into larger networks of production, but they may also be driven out of business because of the dominance of multinational conglomerates. Similarly, such socio-economic restructuring may create more jobs in factories and services in developing and less affluent regions but may also drive out of their properties and professions large segments of the population in these same regions.

The integration of the global economy also changes the nature and intensity of competition between and within sectors of production, thus undermining the capacity of States to regulate their labour markets and maintain welfare guarantees for their workers (particularly in the developed regions where labour rights protection is institutionalised). These phenomena are also feeding into one another, thus technological advances create a competitive edge for industry and drive further research with a view to developing new technologies and increasing productivity and growth.

These changes that take place largely in the economic field have important repercussions in society and politics. They may overall boost growth and drive economic development; but they also increase socio-economic inequalities – and often environmental hazards too. The social transformation spurred by the restructuring of the economy or of local or regional production systems changes social and economic hierarchies (as some people benefit more than others from these changes), influences values and shapes lifestyles. Such changes may also lead to political upheaval, instability or ethnic conflict when relations between ethnic or linguistic groups are destabilised.

Socio-economic transformations such as those induced and intensified by the globalisation processes described briefly above are usually drivers of increased international migration. They intensify grievances and opportunities that lead people to seek better living and working opportunities in distant lands, while also facilitating transport and communication.

This Handbook focuses on the dynamics that link migration and globalisation processes from economic, social, political and cultural perspectives, looking at the challenges that
emerge for labour markets, welfare systems, families and cultures, and institutions and governance arrangements as well as norms. In the following sections I discuss in more detail, and with reference to the relevant literature, the interconnection between migration and globalisation, while the final section presents the structure of the Handbook.

WHAT IS GLOBALISATION

Globalisation ‘refers to the widening, deepening and speeding up of global interconnectedness’, and can be described and understood in terms of four socio-spatial dimensions (Held et al. 2003: 67–8):

- extensity – referring to the stretching of social, political and economic activities across borders;
- intensity – the intensification of interconnectedness and of patterns of interaction and flows;
- velocity – the speeding up of global interactions and processes; and
- impact – closer intertwining of the local and global in ways that local events may affect distant lands.1

Interconnectedness is fuelled by the advances in information and communication technology (ICT) of the past couple of decades. Transnational flows (of capital, goods, services, people, media images, ideas or pollution) are key indicators of globalisation, while transnational networks (of corporations, markets, governments, non-governmental organisations (NGOs), crime syndicates, cultural communities) are its key organising structures, and ICT its key tool (Castles 2000: 271).

Globalisation has numerous political implications. It brings a series of challenges to the State (as a politico-territorial form of social organisation), which appears to surrender to supranational institutions or private actors, while its borders are transcended by multiple flows and networks. Sassen (1996) identified a partial de-nationalisation of national territories and a partial shift of some dimensions of sovereignty. Migration, however, remains largely anchored to the national State and to its control over its borders. While early accounts overemphasised the powerful tendency of globalisation to undermine State sovereignty and erode national borders, more recent approaches – and even recent events in Europe, North America or Asia such as the Mediterranean refugee emergency in 2015–2017, the Rohingya crisis in the same period, and overall the rise of populism and of ‘take back control’ conservative movements on both sides of the Atlantic – underline the (re-)bordering processes advancing hand in hand with globalisation forces (Andrijasevic and Walters 2010).

Turning to the economic implications of globalisation, it is worth noting that the de facto transfer of the control of national economic policy instruments (monetary policy, for instance, or interest rates) to supranational institutions and the domination of market forces over politics have important implications for democracy and the legitimacy of governments elected by citizens. At the same time, policies at the national level and beyond are being challenged by transnational social movements (Hardt and Negri 2000; Castells 2010b). Moreover, exposure to global forces at a time of generalised cuts in public...
spending deprives States of their earlier function of providing social protection for their citizens.

The cultural dimensions of globalisation are complex and multifaceted. Already in the 1960s, the Canadian scholar Marshall McLuhan coined the term ‘global village’ to describe the social implications of transformations in the media from an individualistic print culture to interactive electronic interdependence. The proliferation of electronic digital media and communication tools radically transforms the patterns of human interaction and experience of time, space and place (Appadurai 1996; Castells 2010a) while substantially altering our perception of our social and political context. The instant spread of media images and information across the globe does not simply shrink the distance between places or cultures, but irreversibly distorts distinct cultural forms and conduces to increasing homogenisation under the prevalence and worldwide diffusion of ‘western’ lifestyles and a global culture of consumerism. Yet, while globalisation accelerates cultural homogenisation, at the same time it also produces heterogeneity (Appadurai 1996), whether as a reaction to global forces or as a product of the global cultural flows. Cultural globalisation can exacerbate identity-related conflicts as local grievances, for instance of second-generation migrant youth, can be related to global hierarchies of power between Islam and the West, fuelling both religious fundamentalism and anti-immigrant sentiment (Triandafyllidou 2016).

Arguably, the changes that globalisation brings are felt most strongly in the domain of economic production. Indeed, globalisation entails multiple processes of economic restructuring, involving structural, technological, organisational and spatial rearrangements of production and exchange, and a reconfiguration of the relationship between capital and labour. Global restructuring is spearheaded by: the dominance of financial capital in productive and increasingly speculative investments; the rise of information as an important factor of productivity; the further growth and global character of multinational corporations; and the fragmentation and decentralisation of the production process through practices of subcontracting and outsourcing. Global restructuring has given way to a new international division of labour as post-Fordism in the global North went hand in hand with industrialisation in the global South. The combined effects of socio-economic change in developing and developed countries, briefly outlined in the next two paragraphs, set the background within which international migration accelerates and diversifies in the twenty-first century.

While the rise of India, China and Brazil as major economic players cannot be overestimated, the international economy and the global production system continue to be governed by mostly western institutions – notably governments in North America and Europe and international agencies such as the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the World Bank (Sassen 1998; Stiglitz 2006; Castles and Delgado Wise 2007). Despite promises of increased prosperity for all, the forces of globalisation and the politics shaping it appear to exacerbate inequalities both between and within countries. Capital investment to developing countries increased six-fold between 1990 and 1996 (Stiglitz 2006: 7), but the share of the world income they receive dropped from 32 to 19 per cent between 1970 and 2000 (Castles and Delgado Wise 2007: 5). While integration in the global economy and international trade networks offers important benefits to new industrial centres, the accelerated and segmented character of these processes unsettle local economies, replacing domestic production with export-oriented activity in specific sectors. Combined with
the effects of structural adjustment programmes and uniformly applied recipes of priva-
tisation and cuts in public investment, economic globalisation often leads to job losses
(Taran and Geronimi 2003: 3) or informal work as a means of survival (Portes et al. 1989).
The informal sector has grown in advanced economies as a necessary feature of late
capitalism associated with the demands for flexibility, adaptability and competitiveness
(Portes et al. 1989; Williams and Windebank 1998). While the increased digitalisation of
production and trade generates a demand for a highly skilled workforce, related socio-
economic and demographic change also stimulates a demand for low-skilled labour to
provide cheap goods and services, thus producing further labour market segmentation.
This type of socio-economic transformation is particularly pronounced among small
firms in labour-intensive sectors such as agriculture, food processing, construction or
manufacturing, as well as with the growth in demand for personal services such as domes-
tic and care work (Castells and Portes 1989; Williams and Windebank 1998; Taran and
Geronimi 2003).
Labor market segmentation does not entail, of course, clear-cut separating lines
between formal and informal sectors; rather, it involves a complex web of activities and
practices, some of which may be registered while others are not. Sassen’s (2001) analysis of
global cities explains how the formal and informal sectors are intrinsically connected, as
the expansion of the middle and upper-middle classes generates a demand for consumer
goods and services, coupled in turn by further demand for cheap goods and services by
the lower social strata. Precarious and informal work thus emerges as ‘a structural feature
of contemporary globalization’ (Peterson 2010: 244) and relates to the need for cheap and
flexible labour.

MIGRATION AND GLOBALISATION: DANGEROUS LIAISONS

Migration is part and parcel of the dynamics of globalisation – one of its most visible
faces, key dimensions and major driving forces, complementing and reflecting processes
of reorganisation of production in global supply chains and acceleration of international
trade. Processes of globalisation have significantly changed the patterns of international
migration, but they are also affected by multidimensional migration trends. As Castles
and Miller evocatively titled their often-quoted book, we live in ‘the age of migration’,
characterised by globalisation, acceleration, differentiation, feminisation, politicisation
and a proliferation of migration transition (2009: 11–12).
Yet, migration is ‘global’ par excellence: ever since early humans embarked from Africa
to colonise the world 50 000–60 000 years ago, the history of humanity has been a history
of migration. If the origins of globalisation are to be traced to the beginnings of capital-
ism and modernity, as we have seen, then the development of a world labour market since
the sixteenth century or so is a history of global migration, as Potts (1990) has shown,
explaining how European expansion, colonialism and industrialisation involved mass
population movements of colonisers and slaves, indentured labourers and convicts, new
world settlers and industrial workers.
The migratory movements of today are affecting virtually every part of the globe.
This is primarily what Castles and Miller called the ‘globalisation of migration’. The
geographical span of global migration trends is evolving into an ever-complex map where
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previous patterns described as ‘settler’, ‘colonial’ or ‘guest worker’ migrations give rise to new forms of legal and irregular migration – co-ethnic and diaspora movements as well as phenomena like the feminisation of migration (Triandafyllidou and Gropas 2014). There is today a differentiation of migration as there is multiplicity of types and forms of migration and a diversity of migratory channels and routes, partly resulting from evolving and fragmented migratory policies. In addition, the migration transition no longer follows explicit linear patterns as in the past, and several countries or entire regions emerge at the same time as sending, receiving and transit ones.

Even though the root causes of migration today remain essentially the same as ever – namely, economic need, security and better quality of life prospects (including a future for one’s offspring) – there has been diversification, blurring and overlap of the specific factors fuelling migration on a global scale. Migration theories of the past overstressed static push-pull factors, and neoclassical economics focused on wage differentials and other developmental disparities – both largely remaining the case. Nevertheless, rather than rationally acting individuals deciding on their own upon cost-benefit calculations, the new economics of labour migration has shifted the level of analysis towards the micro and meso levels, highlighting the importance of family networks in migration decisions as well as the migratory process at large (Stark 1991).

The rise of international migration in the last decades is linked not only to growing inequalities, but also to the growing interdependence and interconnectedness (economic or otherwise) that forces of globalisation propel (King 1995; Stalker 2000; Koser 2007; Castles and Miller 2009; Solimano 2010). These may be based upon the complex economic underpinnings of contemporary migration, as exemplified for instance in its relationship with accelerated and liberalised international trade (for example Solimano 2010, Ch. 3.2) or in the deeply intertwined mobility of labour and capital, usually moving in opposite directions (Sassen 1990). People, however, do not take emigration decisions in a vacuum, or respond mechanically to shifting conditions at home or changes in demand at destinations. The dramatic rise in global inequalities takes place at a time of deepening long-distance ties and of improved infrastructure for mobility and information.

Even if information may reach them in an often distorted way, people are increasingly aware of potentially better prospects elsewhere – not only through images transmitted by global media and the internet, but also via those already departed, their stories and visible benefits to relatives left behind, for example from remittances and western-style consumption. Homogenising lifestyles and consumer habits diffuse more than ever a sense of relative deprivation in comparison to ‘western’ living standards and the possibilities for personal development in the North (Koser 2007; Castles and Miller 2009), thus rendering spatial mobility a generalised means of social mobility (Bommers and Sciortino 2011: 214). Cheap payphone cards, Skype and other ICT tools help them keep in touch while abroad, essentially transforming the figure of the migrant from an uprooted person to a connected one (Diminescu 2008). Established transnational social networks and diaspora communities abroad not only affect migration decisions, but may also assist with movement itself and provide support or employment in destinations (Cohen 2008; Vertovec 2009).

In addition, advances in transportation have made travel more affordable, bringing distant lands within reach of more and more people. Additionally, accelerated global mobility has given rise to an entire ‘industry’ of migration involving individuals, institutions, humanitarian organisations, legitimate private companies and transnational
criminal networks. The wide range of intermediate actors includes ‘labour recruiters, immigration lawyers, travel agents, brokers, housing providers, remittances agencies, immigration and customs officials . . . institutions such as the International Organization for Migration (IOM) . . . and NGOs that provide assistance and shelter to migrants and refugees’ (Koser 2007: 38). The commercial side of the industry is ‘a system of institutionalised networks with complex profit and loss accounts’ (Salt and Stein 1997: 467), and smuggling and trafficking are the obvious illegitimate side of this business (Koser 2010: 189). Indeed, the growth of human smuggling is partly attributed to the restrictions on movement and partly fed by the technological and organisational infrastructure of globalisation.

Considering the factors triggering population movements, people’s ‘immobility’ appears to be more striking than global mobility patterns at present (Koser 2007; Bommes and Sciortino 2011: 215). This immobility is, of course, explainable in at least four ways. Firstly, it is now well established that the poor are the least mobile, often unable to afford the costs involved in the migratory process. Secondly, conventional migration theories assume a world of free movement, while mobility is constrained by border and immigration controls. Thirdly, rather than immobility per se, the vast majority of movement on a global scale takes place within, rather than between, countries – exemplified by the estimated 100–200 million people who in the past couple of decades have moved internally within China alone (Skeldon 2010: 147). Fourthly, global estimations may fail to capture unrecorded movements such as irregular migration or internally or internationally displaced populations.

Questions of migration policy, management and control are moving beyond national and local institutional frameworks and bilateral agreements towards regional and multilateral cooperation between receiving, transit and sending countries. ‘There is increasing realization that migration policy issues require enhanced global governance’ (Castles and Miller 2009: 12). One could talk of the globalisation of migration preoccupations, in the sense that migration is a central political issue for high-, middle- and low-income countries alike (Pécoud and Guchteneire 2005: 5).

The era of globalisation is marked by the contradiction between the increasingly unhindered mobility of capital and goods (and also information, ideas and resources, on the one hand) and the increasingly restricted mobility of people on the other. Migration may challenge borders, but it also remains regulated by them (Pécoud and Guchteneire 2005). In the words of Catherine Dauvergne (2004: 595), ‘As nations have seen their powers to control the flows of money or ideas . . . slip away, they seek to assert themselves as nations through migration controls and policies which . . . exemplify their sovereign control and capacity.’

International migration processes are embedded in an integrating though unequal world system whereby ‘development’ and ‘underdevelopment’ are intrinsically interconnected. The relationship between migration and development is indeed not a straightforward one (Raghuram 2009; Skeldon 2010; de Haas 2012). As Raghuram wondered, it is not clear whether migration is a cause or an effect of development, and vice versa. In contrast to earlier beliefs that migration is a failure of development (or a product of underdevelopment), there is lately growing consensus that migration arises as a product of development or as people’s response to changing developmental conditions, yet the situation is rather complex (Castles and Delgado Wise 2007; Solimano 2010; Skeldon 2010; de Haas 2012).
While in some countries ‘migration has set in motion a development dynamic’, in others it ‘has drained local economies of labour, talent and capital’ (Massey and Taylor 2004: 3).

De Haas offers a critique of what he calls ‘the migration–development pendulum’, referring to the historical shifts in views about the migration–development nexus, themselves reflecting shifts in dominant understandings of development or views about migration (Raghuram 2009). At the turn of the millennium, migration was discovered anew as a tool for development and the reduction of inequalities (Raghuram 2009; de Haas 2012). The recurring themes in this debate stress the developmental potential of remittances, the benefits of circularity and the circulation of the highly skilled, the mobilisation of migrant diasporas, and the skills, ideas and resources migrants transfer home (termed ‘social remittances’) as a kind of ‘development from below’ (Castles and Delgado Wise 2007; Raghuram 2009; Skeldon 2010; de Haas 2012). Much of this optimism is essentially centred on remittances, as these have grown spectacularly since the mid-1980s or so and their total volume has long surpassed that of development aid. Still, the assessment of their impact on development has not yet reached consensus as a positive one. Evidence shows that their positive effects mostly concern medium- rather than low-income countries (de Haas 2012), while their impact on local communities may stimulate socio-economic inequalities by fostering relative deprivation of non-migrant families compared to those having migrants abroad (Massey and Taylor 2004).

Raghuram (2009: 107) locates the origins of the debate in the developmentalist tradition, albeit refashioned by neoliberal ideologies not simply promoting the interests of developed countries (Castles and Delgado Wise 2007), but essentially shifting attention away from severe structural constraints and the intervening role of the State (de Haas 2012). Hegemonic views uncritically refer to certain forms of migration and development as ‘normatively privileged’ (Raghuram 2009: 108), as if there were a single linear ‘good’ vision of development (read: growth), or if migration could really be managed, or concern only the highly skilled. The renewed interest in the migration–development nexus thus also reflects concerns of the North over migration, for example in relation to security, immigration controls, questions of integration (Castles and Delgado Wise 2007) – hence the selectivity of ‘managed migration’ approaches (Raghuram 2009).

Yet, if we live in an age of migration, this is ‘because of rising, although unequal, levels of development around the world’; thus any ‘attempts to slow migration by promoting development are almost certain to fail’ (Skeldon 2010: 156, 157). Migration is neither a panacea for development, as the neoliberal mantra goes (Castles and Delgado Wise 2007: 7), nor to blame for structural constraints, as critical-structuralist perspectives used to argue (de Haas 2012) – for example in respect of developing countries’ loss of their youngest, fittest and most talented, in whose education they had invested. Rather, empirical evidence points to somewhat mixed and certainly strongly context-dependent development impacts of migration (de Haas 2012; Raghuram 2009; Skeldon 2010). In order for the developmental potential of migration to be unleashed, destination countries should create legal channels for both high- and low-skilled migration, combined with integration policies favouring social mobility (for example Skeldon 2010; de Haas 2012).

Beyond increasing numbers, diversifying composition, shifting geographical span, new forms and directions and changing global development patterns, migration in the age of globalisation is more than ever not just about people ‘on the move’; it is also crucially about the links people establish across borders, their inter-relationships with other types.
of flows and networks, and the multiple dynamics these generate. More recent studies have placed international migration in the context of globalisation, and emphasise institutional dimensions and the meso level of intermediate actors and social networks linking areas of origin and destination in evolving migratory systems and transnational spaces (Massey et al. 1993; Koser 2007; Castles and Miller 2009).

CONTENTS OF THIS HANDBOOK

The relationship between migration and globalisation is complex and multifaceted, but nevertheless particularly important either way. The economic and cultural forces of globalisation influence the intensity and direction of migration flows, while migration becomes per se an agent of globalisation not only through its contribution to the global division of labour, but also because migrants become agents of cultural globalisation by diffusing their culture in countries outside their own.

This Handbook is organised into five parts that deal with specific key dimensions of the relationship between migration and globalisation. The first part, entitled ‘Governing Migration in the Age of Globalisation’, looks at the regional and global governance of migration. This includes the universal legal frameworks for migrants’ human rights (Idil Atak in this volume) as well as a critical view of the role of international organisations and transnational civil-society actors (Fine and Pécoud; Korneev and Kluczewska) that may be working out of institutional interest in increasing their capacity and business – but not always with positive results for migrants and their families.

Contributions to this volume cover different regional realities such as Latin America (Acosta and Freier), Southeast Asia (Kaur) and Europe (Geddes). These three regions showcase different levels and types of regional migration governance. While Europe is institutionally the most advanced migration regime, Latin America exhibits important innovative elements – including a political will for free movement within the region, practised more or less openly by different countries. Amarjit Kaur in her chapter on Southeast Asia points out how population flows in the region still bear the brunt of the post-colonial legacy even if today they are influenced by important cultural and economic factors. This part of the book also covers the thorny, albeit highly topical, issues of migrant smuggling (van Liempt) and its character between organised crime, illegal business or simply a bunch of loosely connected social networks, and that of human trafficking with special concern on the ways in which international population flows may fuel forms of new slavery that are unfortunately becoming part and parcel of global economic integration (Mieres). On a more positive note, Marie McAuliffe and Alexandra Masako Goossens argue that while digital technologies have opened up new horizons for international migrants, they still do not seem to radically unsettle past network dynamics.

The second part of this Handbook focuses on the economic dimension. Hillel Rapoport explores the relationship between migration and trade. Indeed, why and how is it that goods travel easily in our interconnected world but people movement is considered a problem? And what is eventually the relationship between international trade and international migration? Following up on the economic impact of migration, Bilesha Weeraratne reviews the role of remittances for development, while Sarah Dickerson and Caglar Ozden consider the engagement of diasporas with countries of origin as well as different perspec-
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A dimension that has largely been overlooked in international migration studies has been the inter-relationship between internal, intra-regional and international migration flows. Indeed, migrations within a country, between neighbouring countries within the same world region and across different world regions/continents are inter-related. Insights from sub-Saharan Africa (Okyerefo and Setrana) and China (Zhang and Wang) are particularly interesting in this respect as they highlight the interplay of economic factors with migration management policies. Internal or intra-regional migration is often a stepping stone – to gather money and information – in order to move on to another continent. This is one of the dynamics illustrated by Michael Okyerefo and Mary Setrana in their chapter on Africa. However, this is not always the case: some countries of origin experience a spontaneous diversification of their emigration flows towards different destinations in line with prior cultural and historical relations, employment opportunities, visa regimes and migration networks. This is the case with Ukraine (Zhyznomirska and Odynets), a country typically at the crossroads between Russia and Europe.

On the other hand, migration within certain geographical regions functions as an independent system and does not necessarily lead to on-migration to a high-income country in Europe or North America. Visa policies and free movement regimes certainly play an important part here, as the case of the Eurasian migration system shows (Molodikova). At other times, though, regional migration flows consist mainly of people transiting to a final destination outside the region, as in the case of Central Americans crossing Mexico aiming to reach the USA or Canada (Casillas Ramírez).

The fourth part of this volume focuses on the role of climate change in stimulating population flows (Campbell) and on the thorny and still underdeveloped question of climate refugees (Thornton). While these concerns are mostly focused today on the Pacific region and Africa, their relevance is becoming increasingly felt throughout the world.

The fifth and final part of this Handbook turns to culture and the ways in which international migration at a time of intensified mobility and connectedness affects private life and identity issues. One important social institution that is fundamentally affected by international migration is the family. Brenda Yeoh and her co-authors focus on the impact of international migration on family dynamics in Asia, looking at the leading role of women in these migration processes and the ways in which notions of family and gender evolve through migration. Loretta Baldassar and colleagues highlight the general tensions that international migration poses to families – how it affects inter-generational relations and issues of care. Sabrina Marchetti’s chapter draws together the threads of the interaction between gender and international migration in the twenty-first century, explaining
what we mean by the term ‘feminisation of migration’ and highlighting gendered migration patterns in Europe in the area of domestic and care work. Last but not least, Ulrike Meinhof reviews how cultural and artistic practices travel together with migrants, giving rise to transnational cultural networks and transcultural capital. Focusing specifically on music, Meinhof shows how migration and cultural globalisation go hand in hand, mutually reinforcing one another.

NOTE


REFERENCES


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