

# 1. A new approach to an old conflict – identifying the problem and imagining a solution

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While at first sight the incipient Cyprus–Israel–Greece alliance, natural gas exploration and Turkey’s capricious internal–external deportment appeared to have eclipsed the long-standing efforts of Cyprus’s peace process to reconcile the divided island, upon closer inspection the peace process, as a matter of fact, revealed the paradoxical predicament that engulfs the Cyprus conflict. The quick collapse of financial certainty in 2013 exposed an ephemeral tempestuous prosperity that in effect concealed the contradictory combustions of a ‘frozen’/‘dormant’ conflict.<sup>1</sup> It came after four years of manoeuvring and tension over gas exploration in the Republic of Cyprus’s Exclusive Economic Zone, implicating Greek, Turkish, Russian, American and Israeli interest and involvement.<sup>2</sup> Cyprus has also, once again, reminded the United Nations (UN) – and the rest of the international community – of the nagging persistence and capacity of its conflict to reach beyond its narrow territorial confines.

The resolution of the Cyprus conflict has been a centrepiece of UN peacemaking for successive secretariats. Secretary-Generals Kurt Waldheim, Perez de Cuellar, Boutros Boutros-Ghali, Kofi Annan, Ban Ki-moon and António Guterres have all sought to resolve what remains a major source of instability in the region, yet a way forward has routinely proven elusive. The previous UN Secretary-General, Ban Ki-moon, in particular, in his early assessment of the Cyprus negotiations, reiterated the urgency for a resolution by insisting that ‘the time for an agreement is now’, warning that as the ‘domestic, regional and international context is constantly shifting[,] [t]he current window of opportunity is not limitless’.<sup>3</sup>

However, like those before him, progress has been negligible, begging the questions: Why? Can the UN, and other third parties, such as the European Union (EU) and the United States (US), realistically broker peace, reconciliation and reunification? And if not, what is the way forward? Is there a role for a dialogical approach under such polarised

circumstances? What are the means of creating such a dialogue? And, what of the future? How will Cyprus and its conflict unfold 10–20 years from now in a post-negotiated situation (whether a unitary, federated, two-state or status quo solution prevails)? These questions lie at the heart of this edited volume. The book aims to provide substantive answers to these questions in five distinct, yet complimentary parts that bring together theory, empirical analysis and dialogical interaction.

## NEW LEADERSHIP, SAME CONFLICT

As Turkish Cypriot leader Mustafa Akıncı assumed office in 2015, most commentators agreed that the strength and quality of the relationships between Turkey and Europe were under considerable strain.<sup>4</sup> Already his Greek Cypriot counterpart, Nicos Anastasiades, was frustrated in dealing with Akıncı's predecessor, Derviş Eroğlu, whose harder political disposition towards reunification saw him favour more autonomy for each community.<sup>5</sup> In forging a new Cyprus peace policy, both Anastasiades and Akıncı had to contend with the wide-ranging expectations of the Greek and Turkish Cypriots who were themselves riddled with their own divisions.

By all accounts Anastasiades constitutes a political paradox. He began his political foray as a law student in Athens during the 1960s with Georgios Papandreou's Centre Unity party, and later – paradoxically – found himself as a young defence attorney in Limassol for EOKA-B' (*Ethniki Organosis Kyprion Agoniston-B'* [National Organisation of Cypriot Fighters-B']), terrorists.<sup>6</sup> Subsequently mentored by Gláfkos Clerides, many were surprised that he openly campaigned for the 'YES' vote at the 2004 referendum – at a time of AKEL's (*Anorthotiko Komma Ergazomenou Laou* [Progressive Party of Working People]) ambivalence, split and eventual opposition. In a way, Anastasiades's fluctuation between aspirational centralist politics and paternal attachment to Greek Cypriot nationalism frames not only his own party DISY (*Dimokratikos Synagermos* [Democratic Rally]) but also the Greek Cypriots' broader political dilemma. The post-Annan Plan (Greek) Cypriot dilemma has reframed and (re)polarised Cypriot political discourse beset by the ephemeral challenges of regional reconfiguration, claims and counter-claims of legitimacy and the malaise stemming from economic uncertainty and insecurity, as well as political frustration.

Akıncı also inherited two unpopular and unresolved problems – economic and security dependence and access to the EU. Even more challenging was the need to review the relationship with two other key stakeholders, namely Turkey and the Greek Cypriot-controlled Republic of Cyprus.

In response to high expectations and profound anxieties, both Akıncı and Anastasiades set out in mid-2015 on a large-scale exercise in advocacy and public diplomacy. Central to this process were a number of joint statements and symbolic appearances by both leaders, most notably their walk down Ledra Street in May 2015, a joint 2015–16 New Year television appearance, an appearance at Davos in January 2016, and an address at the Cyprus Academic Dialogue ‘Life in a Federal Cyprus’ public event on 13 June 2016.<sup>7</sup> On 15 May 2015, after a long hiatus, the Greek and Turkish Cypriot community leaders, backed by the Turkish and Greek governments, in the presence of the UN Secretary-General’s Special Adviser, Espen Barth Eide, re-embarked upon ‘full-fledged negotiations’. The aim was to forge a new, ‘results-oriented’, momentum for the Cyprus peace talks to reach a ‘comprehensive and durable settlement’.<sup>8</sup>

But the momentum, when it came, was evanescent and unconvincing. ‘Leader led’ and far removed from Cypriot reality, the talks acquired a rather detached demur from the everyday. In terms of content, the talks had indeed ‘generated unprecedented substantive progress’, eventually tackling the rather thorny territorial chapter (Mont Pèlerin and Geneva, October–November 2016 and January 2017) before faulting on the insurmountable security and guarantee issues.<sup>9</sup> Their eventual collapse came in July 2017, under the heavy weight of historical impasses and insufficient understanding between Ankara and the Greek Cypriots on security. In keeping with the UN’s augmented rhetoric, incoming Secretary-General António Guterres observed ‘that a historic opportunity was missed in Crans-Montana’.<sup>10</sup> Eide’s complaint of ‘collective failure’ was not so much casting ‘blame’, as a rather stoic exhortation by failed mediators who were frustrated from the restiveness of their position.<sup>11</sup>

With the dramatic events in the Cyprus peace process, 2015–17 served as an opportune moment to revisit the vicissitudes of the peace process and the lessons to be learnt from the UN initiative, especially when viewed from a dialogical perspective.<sup>12</sup> However, such a third party attempt at mediation needs to be placed into a larger conceptual and practical framework that explores ways in which it might still be possible to advance the prospects for a negotiated settlement to the conflict.

## ARE GENUINE CYPRIOT NEGOTIATIONS POSSIBLE?

The preceding observations raise a pertinent question. If indeed, as mentioned earlier, the Cyprus talks are incapable of engendering a conducive dialogical quality, then could the problem lie with its methodological

approach? While both sides agree on the need for a ‘comprehensive’ settlement, persistent failures at negotiations invariably bring into question its methodological suitability. The need to review and revise the methodology of the Cyprus talks becomes more imperative as each failure further distances and polarises the two sides.

After the collapse of the Annan initiative, the Cyprus peace process adopted a ‘comprehensive’ approach to underpin its main methodological framework. Although notionally ‘comprehensiveness’ implies completeness and inclusiveness, the rather rigid adherence of the peace talks to this notion of ‘comprehensiveness’ has often stifled progress, decision making and effective leadership. Given the repeated failures of this tenet, it is not unreasonable to question its reflexive capacity to maximise the particular gains agreed during the negotiations while simultaneously advancing its prime directive/aspiration of achieving an overall consensus settlement. The danger of any methodology becoming bureaucratised is inherent in all institutionalised processes. However, it is equally understandable to expect that such methods need to prove their uniform benefit from the perspective of adaptability.

Furthermore, a culture of comprehensiveness, when incapable of meeting anticipated expectations, runs the risk of lapsing into a lethargic pace. Ever since the two sides’ agreement to establish a bi-zonal, bicomunal federation based on political equality and single external sovereignty, negotiations have been frustrated by the very same impediments that have beleaguered them from the very beginning. This is due to multiple difficulties, both conceptual as well as organisational, that are exacerbated by the insistence that ‘nothing is agreed until everything is agreed’. Part of the ‘Cypriot-led, Cypriot-owned’ mantra,<sup>13</sup> this methodology not only throttles creativity; its inertia also restricts the process to the official realm by denying the engagement of other sectors and agents.

An alternative approach, easier to articulate but more difficult to operationalise, involves the role of civil society in Cyprus. While its demeanour is subject to detailed analysis in Chapter 2, its potential to galvanise the intercommunal, as a shared space of mutuality, has yet to be realised. Cypriot civil society, itself a product of division, demonstrates the ability of the peace process to respond to the challenges of non-settlement in ways that maximise its long-term success beyond the status quo. Such adaptation can only be judged in the long term by civil society’s capacity to mobilise the two communities towards a solution. However, civil society is restricted by the power structures of the status quo which renders it politically dependent on external (third) parties and a benign leadership. Although both leaderships agree that the status quo is unacceptable, they are unable – or unwilling – to legitimise civil society

as a conduit for changing the status quo. To contextualise change and transform the conflict, practical steps are needed, orchestrated by the leaderships, which emboldens disenchantment with the status quo. To appreciate the impact of such measures we refer to the opening of the checkpoints in 2003. Regardless of the motives and expectations behind this decision, it contributed to the normalisation of intercommunal relations in two significant ways. First, it enabled visibility of each other in the everyday, allowing for commercial, social and political possibilities. Second, a bicomunal space was created with a degree of legitimacy. This transformed the demand for peace (and a solution) from a hypothetical to a tangible cause. However, the partial lifting of some physical barriers was not sufficient to normalise intercommunal relations.

Cyprus's peace process, and by implication civil society, is thwarted by the lack of legitimacy brought about by the existing arrangements described above. The legitimacy deficit of the peace process is pervasive on both sides but not necessarily uniform, varying according to economic, democratic and security circumstances. The gap – imagined or actual – between the political leadership and the citizenship stems from the incapacity of the state to actualise its promises in terms of material but also psychosocial security. The danger lurking in the dark confines of democratic discourse is that a cynical disposition towards the established mainstream political configurations will morph into support for populist zealotry. Implementation of measures – already agreed upon but restrained by the conditionality that ‘nothing is agreed until everything is agreed’ – that would benefit the everyday Cypriot can stimulate public debate and reconfigure Cyprus's political space by introducing a different discourse, different issues and different agents. This requires an adjustment in the methodology of the Cyprus peace process so as to incubate a zone of commonality shared by both two sides.

The intercommunal negotiations are largely constructed on a competitive basis, leaving little room for commonality to accommodate a forward-looking vision. The post-Annan methodology induces volatility and discontinuity in the parties' positions and commitments. With every collapse of the Cyprus talks, the two sides revised their respective positions and often recanted their previous proposals – though habitually this involved different leaders.<sup>14</sup> Such volatility benefits those with harder political dispositions, who prolong the stalemate ambience of the status quo and are protected from any radical reconfiguration of the political landscape. But its impediment on the socio-political fabric of both communities is not confined to the expectations of conformist groups. Volatility also has a detrimental effect on the psychology of change, transformation of the conflict and ultimately on the commitment to peacebuilding in Cyprus.

The 'comprehensive' methodology is problematic as it secretes the conditions and responsibilities involved in achieving a settlement. It also feeds into the false consciousness that the Cyprus problem can be resolved instantaneously. Reaction to the collapse of the Cyprus talks begets an almost fatalist premonition, which not only deters motivation and mobilisation but brings about a cynical dejection that overcasts any new initiative. Such a reductionist tendency also disregards the necessity to instil a transitional mind-set to a federal settlement. As implied throughout this book, a dialogical approach requires some revisions to the instituted methodology. Far from compensating for the weaknesses of the comprehensive methodology, a dialogical outlook perceives the Cyprus settlement as an evolutionary process.

Such a dialogical discourse aspires to analyse and evaluate the approach – both what was said and left unsaid, what was done and not done – of the various sides in the Cyprus conflict since 2009, with particular reference to the Greek and Turkish Cypriot communities, and keeping in mind, however, the broader Greek–Turkish context.

In examining the UN's role in the Cyprus conflict, we need to clarify several questions that are critical if we are to understand why these initiatives have thus far failed to bear fruit, and what a dialogical perspective might bring to the analysis of recent efforts and future prospects. The focus needs to centre on the difficulties that inevitably accompany any attempt by a third party to inject a meaningful and sustained dialogue in a situation marked by long-standing and profound mistrust, suspicion and hostility.

Compounding the difficulties involved is the fact that this conflict brings to the fore the antagonistic attitudes, perceptions and interests not of two monolithic parties, but two parties, each of which is itself the site of profound division not only about strategy and tactics, but also the objectives. Though not as dramatic as Turkish Cypriot interdependence on Turkey, which is further complicated by the struggle for Turkey and the rift that pits the *Islamists* against the *Kemalists*, the political differences within the Greek side about the central question of the nature and future of the Republic of Cyprus (and a federal solution) are no less troublesome or divisive.

In seeking to make sense of UN diplomacy we need to pose certain probing questions regarding its own understanding of the nature and dynamics of the conflict on the one hand and its conceptualisation and operationalisation of the 'dialogue' process on the other. Specifically, there is a need to clarify whether the UN (and by extension the Greek Cypriot and Turkish Cypriot communities, the Turkish Government, Greece, the EU, the US and other key actors) is psychologically, intellectually and organisationally equipped to bring fresh ideas to the peace process – and

more to the point what factors are assisting or impeding this possibility. To aid our objective, we first need to ground such questioning within the vicissitudes of the UN's role in the Cyprus conflict that invariably involves the historical evolution of the intercommunal talks as the template for its peacemaking approach.<sup>15</sup>

## SHADOWING THE NEGOTIATIONS – CHASING A SETTLEMENT

Joseph Camilleri always warned us that writing about an ongoing conflict resolution or peace process can be tricky – if not academically antiquated. This was the dilemma the editors, its contributors and publishers found themselves in at the inception of the book as it 'coincided' with the Cyprus peace talks of 2015–17.

While there is never a perfect time to publish a book about a conflict which is in the midst of ongoing negotiations, especially protracted ones such as that of Cyprus which has preoccupied the UN for over 40–50 years, the timing of the book was always going to be tricky and needed to be carefully considered if it was going to be relevant and have cachet. At each new round of the Cyprus talks, there was always the possibility (anticipation) of an agreement – for example in 2004 and prior to that in 1996 and 1985.

However, 'crystal-ball gazing' or second-guessing aside, the final outcome and consequences of the 2015–17 round of negotiations – which while promising, in terms of being led by two proven leaders who were equally committed to the principle of reunification, ran into the same set of obstacles that impeded their predecessors – could have gone either way: (1) there could have been a major breakthrough in terms of reaching a successful negotiated settlement that would have subsequently been approved by both communities in a separate but simultaneous referendum; or, (2) the talks could have succumbed to the very same underlying forces and subtleties that have plagued previous talks and been relegated to the inventory of failed attempts.

A book of this calibre needed to be aware of the risk of becoming obsolete should a settlement have been reached as well as the opportunity of making a policy and intellectual contribution to whatever the outcome of the talks ended up being. To be innovative and relevant the editors adopted the high-risk strategy of 'shadowing' the Cyprus peace talks.

They pursued a two-tier approach that was contingent on monitoring developments over the Cyprus talks while soliciting the writing of chapters that were relevant under both scenarios outlined above, soliciting authors

for the remaining chapters and preparing and planning for Parts IV and V (see below), including identifying and obtaining the commitment of participants and contributors.

As to whether the book adds anything new to the vast literature on Cyprus, the book sets out to substantively address the theory–empirical–normative dilemma that often besets conflict resolution scholars when they engage in particular case studies. The book aspired to be both a research project and a conflict resolution initiative characterised by its descriptive and proscriptive demeanour. This is indeed where its residual value lies; by bringing together its three distinct, yet complementary, components of theory, empirical analysis and dialogical interaction.

In terms of generating new knowledge, the book seeks to develop and test an approach (the dialogical) that supplements existing practices and processes in resolving deep-seated and protracted conflicts. Its ‘central question’ concerns itself with whether the predominant (adversarial-driven) ideological framework of peace negotiations can be altered to instil a culture of mutual understanding, empathetic engagement and beneficial problem solving – which becomes even more important if a settlement is reached reuniting the island on the premise of coexistence, concomitance and cooperation. Put another way, the book seeks to address the question of how to transform a protracted conflict and reconcile divided communities, such as is the case in Cyprus and its adjacent geopolitical parameter (aka Turkey and Greece), who radically disagree with each other.

These questions become more germane when set against the ongoing negotiations and the potential of a post-settlement. By testing the hypothesis that the intra-communal process is of equivalent significance to the intercommunal negotiations themselves, the anticipated outcome was to revamp the peace model so it entails a two-tier consensus-building paradigm geared towards common ownership of any negotiated outcome. The problem with the Cyprus peace process has been its very narrow terms of reference – largely anchored in the bicomunal mind-set of the 1960 model and the legalistic regulatory discourse of the UN – which sees the predicament that the negotiators find themselves in when positioned between constituency expectations and the progress of the negotiations.

In this context, the need to place as much emphasis on the ‘internal’ dialogues as a process and a culture of communication, engagement and cooperation becomes even more important in a pre-/post-settlement setting. Intra-communal dialogues would see both parties reassess their respective needs, fears and demands, articulate their situations, restate their positions, contemplate their preferred outcomes, and reflect on problem solving as a joint venture. As argued below, this constitutes the ‘missing link’ in the current peace model as applied to Cyprus and elsewhere.



## LOGIC, STRUCTURE AND INNOVATION OF THE BOOK

Building on Oliver Ramsbotham's notion of agonistic dialogue, the book adopts a dialogical approach that strategically links internal communal dialogues with the bilateral intercommunal dialogues. Such an approach brings into the dialogical framework those elements that often third parties and officialdom feel 'uncomfortable' engaging with.<sup>16</sup> In particular, in line with Ramsbotham's concept of 'agony', the book seeks to directly engage and link those groups that have been disenfranchised from, and ignored by, the peace process, such as the settlers, the refugees and the diasporas (see Chapter 7).

Premised on (1), the hypothesis that the relative serenity of the Cyprus problem is laden with potential 'explosions', and (2), the need to radically transform the ideological framework underpinning the Cyprus negotiations so they are geared towards reconciliation, the book's innovative approach aims to provide substantive answers to the questions raised above in five distinct, yet complementary, parts that bring together theory, empirical analysis and dialogical interaction.

The book seeks to make a small, but noteworthy, contribution towards the transformation of the adversarial nature of the Cyprus conflict by empowering the principal parties to value their relationship. To achieve this end requires altering the disputants' goals and perceptions so that, eventually, they are allowed to explore alternative visions for the future. In this context the book becomes an entry point to the conflicting parties' realisation of their potential by empathising with each other's needs, values and insecurities.

Apart from their EU imbroglio, nowhere is Greece and Turkey's historical relationship more accentuated than through their 'proxy' constituent brethren communities in Cyprus. Greeks and Turks occupy a large space in each other's psyche, and their encounters, often conflictual and violent, have defined their respective national identities. Locked in a common historical and geographical continuum, the destiny of both nations has involved the 'other' at key points in their historical trajectory. In their respective nationalist narratives, including their national liberation struggles of 1821 and 1922, the 'other' features prominently as the 'enemy' (as 'oppressor', 'occupier' and 'invader').<sup>17</sup> The book seeks to re-engage Turkey, and to a lesser extent Greece (largely due to the historically imbued asymmetrical level of involvement in the Cyprus conflict), by triangulating a more complicated binary conflictual interrelationship that is more attuned to the conflict's power dynamics than the diplomatic formulation of state sovereignty and recognition.

However, as mentioned above, the book embraces a wider framework, which, inspired by the dialogical approach, is often more easily captured by the conflict resolution and reconciliation rubrics. In short, *Cyprus and the Roadmap for Peace: A Critical Interrogation of the Conflict* seeks not only to address a problem with far-reaching local, national, regional and international ramifications, but inevitably to advocate for an approach (i.e. the dialogical intercourse) that brings together people with different interests, outlooks and objectives, with a view to enhancing mutual trust and more effective forms of communication, cooperation and interaction.

If we adhere to notions that view scholastic and epistemic endeavour as instrumental in the formation and transformation of public policy, especially on contentious issues such as the Cyprus problem, then we come to better appreciate and value their input and diversity. In this context *Cyprus and the Roadmap for Peace: A Critical Interrogation of the Conflict* forms part of the communication that disseminates ideas, perspectives and frames of analysis as positive contributions to the amelioration of prejudices, misconceptions and misapprehensions. The absence of such a sustained dialogue between Turks, Greeks and Cypriots has led to the perpetuating entrenchment and misconception of both 'Self' and the 'Other'.

However, underpinned by the theory of change, such an engagement – teleologically – demands reflecting on the probability of 'post-settlement' either as an alternative to the current division/status quo or as a prospective reality that invokes its own set of problems, challenges and political dynamics.

This volume consists of five parts. Part I, 'Conceptual Approaches to Dialogue', provides the discursive lens for the book. It aims to both contextualise the Cyprus conflict within the broader conflict resolution discourse and outline a framework for an innovative approach to radical disagreement, and 'adversarial monologue'.<sup>18</sup> It does so by addressing a set of questions that have plagued scholars and practitioners alike in their attempts to transform protracted conflicts and reconcile divided societies, parties, communities, nations, memories and narratives which radically disagree.<sup>19</sup> Specifically it sets out to provide answers to the following questions: how do you engage (and sustain) them in a 'dialogue' if they refuse to participate and truthfully converse with each other? What internal processes are at play during these reconciling attempts and how do you integrate into the dialogical process those elements who maintain a harder political disposition (hardliners, extremists, radicals and bloggers)? How does an imagined solution effect, and/or deter, the politics of change and continuity? And what processes are at play during these negotiating attempts?

In applying these questions to our case study – the Cyprus conflict – Michális S. Michael, and Maria Hadjipavlou (Chapter 2) advocate for ‘agonistic dialogue’ as the starting point for an evolving dialogue between and amongst the conflicting parties. ‘Agonistic dialogue’ rests on the fundamental premise of dealing effectively with boundary role conflict.<sup>20</sup> Often restrained by history and burdened by the weight of expectations, leaders quickly find themselves caught in the unenviable purgatory of the negotiators’ two-level quandary: that the intra-communal process in securing an outcome is of equivalent significance to the intercommunal negotiations themselves. By probing intra-group dynamics, in particular the leadership–constituency axis, Michael and Hadjipavlou argue for widening and deepening the dialogical process by venturing outside its accustomed ‘comfort zone’. The problem with previous Cyprus talks was the predicament that the Cypriot leaders found themselves in when confronted by the dilemma imposed by external realities. Essentially, this dilemma reflects the internal struggle between (and within) the Turkish and Greek constituencies and their leader-negotiators for control over both process and outcome.

As such, ‘internal’ communal dialogues become imperative if any intercommunal dialogue – at whatever level – is realistically going to be sustainable. This, it is argued, is the missing component in the current peace model in Cyprus. Adding depth to the theoretical outline are references to the scope and limitations of such internal dialogues and how they may feed into the broader peace process.

Part II, ‘Review of Greek, Turkish and Cypriot Policies and Politics’, and Part III, ‘New Roles and Engagements’, build on the central premise stipulated by Part I, in search of new nuances to the conflict. They do this by probing old and new agents and reassessing their effectiveness and relativity to the modern incarnation of the discourse. Drawing on the theoretical underpinning framed in Part I, this book purports to make a significant contribution towards an innovative approach that moves the dialogue process to the next phase.

In Chapters 3 and 4, Altuğ Günel and Nikos Moudouros, from two different perspectives, seek to decode Turkey’s geopolitical vision for Cyprus by asking the pertinent question ‘what does Turkey (really) want from Cyprus?’ A key challenge addressed by Günel and Moudouros is the conflicting and shifting meanings assigned to Cyprus in Turkey’s geopolitical discourse.

A key element missing in the rather prolific literature on the Cyprus conflict has been an analysis of the adversarial relationship between its two main protagonists – namely Turkey and the Greek Cypriots. Viewed through the Turkish Cypriot prism, Yücel Vural, Sertaç Sonan

and Michális S. Michael in Chapter 5 explore the historical incongruities of the Turkish Cypriot dilemma as it grapples with the juxtaposition between Turkey and the Greek Cypriots. Numerically, politically, economically and militarily weaker, and internationally isolated, the Turkish Cypriots always viewed Ankara as its protector against Greek Cypriot hegemony. Yet, growing dependence on Turkey, it turned out, has posed an equally severe existential threat to Turkish Cypriots' identity, making reaching an accommodation with the Greek Cypriots urgent. The discrepancy created by the conflicting and insurmountable demands by Turkey and the Greek Cypriots constitutes the very core of the Turkish Cypriot dilemma.

Finally, Alexis Heraclides offers us a critical assessment of Greece's historical role in the Cyprus peace process. Beginning with Greece's positivist role in the late 1950s until the 2004 Annan Plan, perceptions and misperceptions of Greece's role have complicated the peace process. A more constructive role, Heraclides argues, requires a paradigm shift of 'critical self-reflection' by Greece that would lend a more realistic assessment of the Cyprus problem.

In Part III, new roles and engagements are explored, starting with three otherwise disenfranchised communal groups that often are hidden from mainstream approaches to the Cyprus conflict. By bringing together the refugee, settler/immigrant and diaspora questions, Başak Ekenoğlu and Neophytos Loizides in Chapter 7 aspire to shift the debate onto those communal groups most effected by the conflict. By focusing on those forced to displacement (both Greek and Turkish Cypriots), the authors aim to address the variation in their post-conflict responses. While Greek Cypriots aim to maintain their right to return, Turkish Cypriots, officially, advocated preservation of the post-conflict realities – including those from Turkey who settled in northern Cyprus after 1974. Conjoined by a state of transiency, contested legitimacy and uncertainty over their residential predicament, they have become the 'interlopers' of the Cyprus conflict. By examining the perceptions, narratives and expectations of these groups, Ekenoğlu and Loizides argue for their greater political involvement in Cyprus's peace process.

In Chapters 8 and 9, Ahmet Sözen, and Constantinos Adamides and Michalis Kontos, separately, review the role of the preeminent third party in the Cyprus conflict, the United Nations. Its two distinct mandates in Cyprus, (first-generation) peacekeeping and peacemaking, are very much anchored in the typology of the Cold War.<sup>21</sup> Requiring consent from the parties, the UN's inability to 'facilitate' an agreement, while still visible in Cyprus for over half a century, has both exacerbated and aggravated expectations. From this mantra, Sözen concentrates on the

UN's capacity to build trust and confidence between the two Cypriot communities, a role he anticipates carrying into post-settlement. From the same analytical viewpoint, but in the rather realpolitik demeanour of high politics, Adamides and Kontos allude to the Greek Cypriot outlook that views the UN as the custodian – and therefore enforcer – of international law.

Similar expectations and limitations have befallen the other important third party in the Cyprus quagmire, the European Union. The EU's role in the Cyprus conflict has been subject to much debate. Fourteen years after Cyprus's accession, Erhan İçener and George Christou concur that any optimism that burgeoned, seeing the EU as potential catalyst to a solution, has almost dissipated. Although, as İçener maintains, Europeanisation was instrumental in probing the various boundaries in Cyprus, it has been hindered by the Greek Cypriot-led Republic of Cyprus's complacency and aggrandisement in its urgency to pursue a political solution to the conflict. Contrary to earlier expectations, İçener argues that Cyprus's accession to the EU without a solution has, paradoxically, opened the way for partition to be considered as a viable option going forward. Christou concurs that the Greek Cypriots' strategy switch has emboldened those who advocate for a unitary (as opposed to a federal) 'Cypriot state' solution to be achieved within the EU. But Cyprus's membership without a solution and Turkish Cypriot representation, has placed profound limits on the EU's ability to implement any regulations or intervene effectively to facilitate the movement to an agreeable solution on the island.

Bearing these complexities in mind, Parts IV and V bring the text full circle, back to its central theme – dialogical interaction. Specifically, Part IV, 'Constructing Two Binary Strategy Positions', constructs and synthesises two binary (strategy) position papers: one for the Greek Cypriot side and the other for the Turkish Cypriot side.

As the aim was to obtain a comprehensive and realistic depiction of the two sides' positions, the process did not rely exclusively on formal government policies but incorporated oppositional, minority and dissident views within the political sector. In order to provide an accurate depiction of the diversity of each community's position on a given dividing issue, in addition to the formal government position, the papers also provide (in a weighted capacity) the alternative and oppositional positions and options. Both position papers map out respective ways forward that encompass the difficult divisive core issues, including how to peacefully transform the current status quo, governance and power sharing, property, territory, security and guarantees, citizenship and human rights, settlers, and the right of return. The aim here was to

clarify ambiguities in the texts and obtain additional information either about the policy responses themselves or the context in which they were formulated and presented.

For Part V, 'Moving Forward Dialogically: Crossover Reflections and Debates', once each side's respective position papers had been produced, the editors solicited three prominent Greek Cypriot voices, George Vassiliou, Dimitris Christofias and Yiannakis Omerou, and three prominent Turkish Cypriot voices, Mehmet Ali Talat, Derviş Eroğlu and Aysu Basri Akter, to respond and reflect on each other side's positions within the context of the 2015–17 Cyprus peace process. The intention was for these 'reflections' to be succinct communicative pieces with the purpose not of negating, countering or debating but solving the predicament that the other side finds itself in. The ultimate purpose here was for each other's problems to become commonly owned and therefore require joint solutions, whereupon 'your problem' becomes 'my problem' – admittedly an overtly ambitious proposition. Obviously, to entice such a response, the strategy position documents needed to be genuine expressions of the parties' true interests and insecurities rather than constituting negotiating manoeuvres and ploys.

The aim was that these reflections would be measured and buttressed against the effectiveness of Cyprus's peace process. Here an attempt was made to connect these reflections with the two variables, previously referred to, of the modalities of intervention (including policy formulation, programme design and implementation, and resource allocation) and the trend-lines in the Cyprus conflict (in particular, changes pointing either to the accentuation or alleviation of tension).

In particular, Parts IV and V will ascertain which parties, under what conditions and with what requirements, are best suited/placed to formulate and implement dialogical interventions, either individually or in concert with others. Of particular interest here were the possible synergies that might obtain from more effective communication and collaboration between policy makers, experts and other relevant stakeholders in civil society, as well as between the conflict parties.

Finally, the book represents an exciting opportunity to explore radical disagreement and agonistic dialogue creatively, particularly in terms of encouraging a strategic engagement of discourses that link societal dialogue for mutual understanding to elite dialogue for political accommodation – thereby advancing genuine discursive engagement at all levels, and across the spectrum, in a sustainable way even during periods of intractability. By drawing on the theoretical underpinning, as framed at the beginning, the book purports to make a significant contribution towards an innovative approach that moves the dialogue process to the next phase. This shift from

appraisal to application is what distinguishes this book's novel approach on a conflict about which so much has been written.

## NOTES

1. The Cyprus conflict has been characterised as 'frozen' or 'dormant' due to the suspension of armed violence following 1974, interrupted by the occasional eruption of tension including violent exhortations. See Neophytos Loizides, *Designing Peace: Cyprus and Institutional Innovations in Divided Societies*, Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2016, pp. 151–2, 156.
2. On how gas exploration has affected the Cyprus conflict as an incentive for peace, see International Crisis Group, *Aphrodite's Gift: Can Cypriot Gas Power a New Dialogue?* Europe Report No. 216, 2 April 2012. For how it has impeded the conflict as an additional obstacle that complicates the peace process, see Ayla Gürel, Fiona Mullen and Harry Tzimitras, *The Cyprus Hydrocarbons Issue: Context, Positions and Future Scenarios*, Oslo: PRIO Cyprus Centre Report 1/2013.
3. United Nations, Security Council, *Assessment Report of the Secretary-General on the Status of the Negotiations in Cyprus*, S/2012/149, 12 March 2012, para. 23, p. 5, accessed 15 March 2018 at [www.securitycouncilreport.org/atf/cf/%7B65BFCF9B-6D27-4E9C-8CD3-CF6E4FF96FF9%7D/s\\_2012\\_149.pdf](http://www.securitycouncilreport.org/atf/cf/%7B65BFCF9B-6D27-4E9C-8CD3-CF6E4FF96FF9%7D/s_2012_149.pdf). The same sentiment was echoed in his final report on the Cyprus peace talks, reiterating that 'the momentum and overall circumstances surrounding the process are such that they present a real, yet fleeting and fragile, historic opportunity for the sides to bring the process to a successful outcome', United Nations, Security Council, *Report of the Secretary-General on his Mission of Good Offices in Cyprus*, S/2016/599, 8 July 2016, para. 45, p. 8, accessed 15 March 2018 at [www.securitycouncilreport.org/atf/cf/%7B65BFCF9B-6D27-4E9C-8CD3-CF6E4FF96FF9%7D/s\\_2016\\_599.pdf](http://www.securitycouncilreport.org/atf/cf/%7B65BFCF9B-6D27-4E9C-8CD3-CF6E4FF96FF9%7D/s_2016_599.pdf).
4. See 'Going Cold on Turkey', *The Economist*, 18 January 2014, accessed 26 January 2018 at [www.economist.com/news/europe/21594337-internal-power-struggle-further-dents-turkeys-hopes-joining-european-union-going-cold](http://www.economist.com/news/europe/21594337-internal-power-struggle-further-dents-turkeys-hopes-joining-european-union-going-cold); Dimitar Bechev, 'Turkey's Illiberal Turn', *Policy Brief*, European Council of Foreign Relations, 16 July 2014; Andrew Rettman, 'EU Says Turkish Media Crackdown Will Harm Relations', *Euobserver*, 15 December 2014, accessed 17 November 2017 at <https://euobserver.com/news/126912>; Meltem Müftüler-Baç, *Divergent Pathways: Turkey and the European Union: Re-thinking the Dynamics of Turkish-European Union Relations*, Opladen, Germany: Barbara Budrich, 2016; Beken Saatçioğlu, 'Turkey's EU Membership Process in the Aftermath of the Gezi Protests', in Isabel David and Kumru F. Toktamış, *'Everywhere Taksim': Sowing the Seeds for a New Turkey at Gezi*, Amsterdam: Amsterdam University Press, 2015, pp. 267–81. See also 'If EU Opposes Islamophobia, It Must Accept Turkey as Member: Erdoğan', *Hürriyet Daily News*, 24 January 2015, at [www.hurriyetaidailynews.com/if-eu-opposes-islamophobia-it-must-accept-turkey-as-member-erdogan-77379](http://www.hurriyetaidailynews.com/if-eu-opposes-islamophobia-it-must-accept-turkey-as-member-erdogan-77379); 'Turkey and EU Drifting Apart, Says Independent Turkish Commission', *Hürriyet Daily News*, 17 March 2015, at [www.hurriyetaidailynews.com/turkey-and-eu-drifting-apart-says-independent-turkish-commission-79809](http://www.hurriyetaidailynews.com/turkey-and-eu-drifting-apart-says-independent-turkish-commission-79809), both accessed 17 December 2017.
5. Vincent Morelli, *Cyprus: Reunification Proving Elusive*, Congressional Research Service, 5 January 2011, p. 6.
6. See Nikos Hasapopoulos, 'Nikos Anastasiadis, Enas Diaforetikos Proedros' [Nikos Anastasiades, a different (kind of) president], *To Vema*, 29 November 2014, accessed 15 October 2017 at [www.tovima.gr/politics/article/?aid=654894](http://www.tovima.gr/politics/article/?aid=654894). His later 'transgression' was an obvious result of paternal influence – so vivid in Cypriot masculine political culture. Specifically, his father, Chrysanthos Anastasiades, was appointed district police

- commander in Limassol during the putschist government of Nikos Sampson (15–22 July 1974). Tasos Tsapparellas, ‘Timithike os Praxikopimatias kai Ohi os Pateras’ [honoured as putschist and not as a father], *Cyprus News.Eu*, 14 October 2012, accessed 15 October 2017 at <http://cyprusnews.eu/tasos-tsaparellas/623091-2012-10-15-09-56-07.html>.
7. See Peter Spiegel, ‘Turkish Cypriot Leader Mustafa Akinci Sparks Hope of Cyprus Unity’, *Financial Times*, 4 June 2015, accessed 20 July 2016 at <http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/373eedf0-09d4-11e5-b6bd-00144feabdc0.html#axzz4EwXcZReB>; Tony Barber, ‘Cyprus: Crossing the Divide’, *Financial Times*, 26 January 2016, accessed 20 July 2016 at <https://next.ft.com/content/083fa076-bf91-11e5-846f-79b0e3d20eaf>; Evie Andreou, ‘Leaders Focus on Economic Benefits of a Solution’, *Cyprus Mail*, accessed 21 July 2016 at <http://cyprus-mail.com/2016/06/13/leaders-focus-economic-benefits-solution/>.
  8. United Nations, Security Council, *Report of the Secretary-General on his Mission of Good Offices in Cyprus*, S/2016/15, 7 January 2016, para. 2, p.1, accessed 29 March 2017 at [www.securitycouncilreport.org/atf/cf/%7B65BFCF9B-6D27-4E9C-8CD3-CF6E4FF96FF9%7D/s\\_2016\\_15.pdf](http://www.securitycouncilreport.org/atf/cf/%7B65BFCF9B-6D27-4E9C-8CD3-CF6E4FF96FF9%7D/s_2016_15.pdf).
  9. United Nations, Security Council, *Report of the Secretary-General on his Mission of Good Offices in Cyprus*, S/2017/814, 28 September 2017, para. 4, p.2, accessed 10 October 2017 at [www.securitycouncilreport.org/atf/cf/%7B65BFCF9B-6D27-4E9C-8CD3-CF6E4FF96FF9%7D/s\\_2017\\_814.pdf](http://www.securitycouncilreport.org/atf/cf/%7B65BFCF9B-6D27-4E9C-8CD3-CF6E4FF96FF9%7D/s_2017_814.pdf).
  10. UN S/2017/814, para. 45, p. 10.
  11. Evie Andreou, ‘Eide: A Collective Failure’, *Cyprus Mail Online*, 19 July 2017, accessed 16 January 2018 at <http://cyprus-mail.com/2017/07/19/eide-collective-failure/>.
  12. Writing in 2014–15, a notable example is Neophytos Loizides’s optimistic rendition *Designing Peace: Cyprus and Institutional Innovations in Divided Societies*, University of Pennsylvania Press, 2015. Loizides believed change could be brought about by good governance and institutional reform, pp. 212–13.
  13. See Michális S. Michael, ‘“Cypriot-led, Cypriot-owned” – Cyprus Talks Revisited’, *Australian Journal of International Affairs*, 67(4), 2013, pp. 526–39.
  14. For example, the post-2004 referendum period involved the following leadership pairings: Tassos Papadopoulos (elected 2003)–Rauf Denktaş (first elected 1983), Papadopoulos–Talat (elected 2005), Christofias (elected 2008)–Talat, Christofias–Eroğlu (elected 2010), Anastasiades (first elected 2013)–Eroğlu, and Anastasiades–Akinci (elected 2015).
  15. For a comprehensive survey of the UN’s involvement in the Cyprus conflict since 1964 see Security Council Reports at [www.securitycouncilreport.org/cyprus/](http://www.securitycouncilreport.org/cyprus/). For an analytical rendition of the talks see Michális S. Michael, *Resolving the Cyprus Conflict: Negotiating History*, Rev. and Updated ed., Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2011.
  16. See Oliver Ramsbotham, *Transforming Violent Conflict: Radical Disagreement, Dialogue and Survival*, Abingdon, UK: Routledge, 2010; and, ‘Radical Disagreement and Systemic Conflict Transformation’, in D. Körppen, N. Ropers and Hans J. Gießmann (eds), *The Non-Linearity of Peace Processes – Theory and Practice of Systemic Conflict Transformation*, Opladen/Farmington Hills: Barbara Budrich Verlag, 2011, pp. 57–76.
  17. Michális S. Michael, ‘Navigating through the Bosphorus: Relocating Turkey’s European/Western Fault-Line’, *Global Change, Peace and Security*, 20(1), 2008, p. 83.
  18. The term ‘adversarial monologue’ was borrowed and elaborated by Ramsbotham from Jay Rothman’s *From Confrontation to Cooperation: Resolving Ethnic and Regional Conflict*, Newbury Park, Calif.: Sage, 1992, in *Transforming Violent Conflict*, pp. 69–70.
  19. As Dominique Schnapper, ‘Memory and Identity in the Age of the European Construction’, in Collection Penser L’Europe, *Identity and Memory*, Paris: Centre d’Analyse de Prévision, 2007, p. 5, aptly reminds us, ‘memory should not be confused with history’. Memory, and its apposite ‘forgetfulness’, have a commanding presence in Cyprus. Used to affirm, but also to negate, group and national identity, ‘memory’ rapprochement – to the extent that it seeks to reconcile, if not a homogeneous, at least an identifiable space, in contrast to the two prevailing ethno-nationalists on the island – is a less tested and innocuous proposition.



20. 'Boundary role conflict' is a term in negotiation theory conceived by Daniel Druckman, 'Boundary Role Conflict: Negotiation as Dual Responsiveness', *Journal of Conflict Resolution*, **21**(4), 1977, pp.639–62, referring to the 'negotiator as [both] bargainer and [ . . . ] as representative' within the negotiating functional context of 'monitoring the other side for evidence of movement while monitoring one's own side for evidence of preferences' (pp. 639–40).
21. Joris Voorhoeve, *From War to the Rule of Law: Peacebuilding after Violent Conflicts*, Amsterdam: Amsterdam University Press, 2007, p. 56.