1. Development and social change: a genealogy for an era of complexity

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INTRODUCTION

Theories of development and social change most often seek to trace a continuity to the era of Antiquity, presumably to show its centrality to the ‘human condition’ and its universal relevance. It is often submerged within an overarching teleological concept of ‘progress’ that colours all aspects of the theory and its application. For us, following Foucault, the pursuit of origins is necessarily essentialist ‘because it is an attempt to capture the exact, and pure [trans-historical, immanent] essence of things’ (Foucault, 1984, p. 78). But, as for Foucault, ‘what is found at the historical beginning of things is not the inviolable identity of their origin, it is the dissension of other things. It is disparity’ (ibid., p. 80). For a genealogy which rejects the pursuit of origins, this means a refusal of faith in metaphysics, a careful listening to history and a search for the details and accidents that accompany every beginning. As Foucault argues for ‘liberty’ so we might argue for ‘development’: ‘genealogical analysis shows that the concept of liberty is an “invention of the ruling classes” and not fundamental to man’s nature or at the root of his attachment to being and truth’ (ibid., p. 81).

The critical discourse, or genealogical, approach we adopt needs to be set in the context of complexity, too often elided in both mainstream and oppositional development theory. With the social world becoming more complex and elusive, our research approach has to itself become more nuanced and not be reduced to the study of discrete hierarchical entities. Our approach to development needs to be adequate for ‘a world that enacts itself to produce unpredictable and non-linear flows and more mobile subjectivities’ (Law and Urry, 2004, p. 399). Development cannot be understood in a mechanical way through a linear analysis of structure and agency. Pre-complexity disciplines and models of research are ill-equipped to engage with the far-from-equilibrium structures and practices of actually existing development. We thus follow Law and Urry in moving beyond development theories which ‘deal poorly with the non-causal, the chaotic, the complex’ (ibid., p. 403). Our approach needs to be fit for
purpose in an era of global complexity and open to ruptures and a move beyond the status quo.

CAPITALIST DEVELOPMENT

Development theory and practice has been marked by the power-knowledge relations within which it emerged and which set its various phases. ‘Development’ tends to stand in for the Western development model, a vague Enlightenment notion of progress and even, for some, civilization itself. As to ‘social change’, it is more or less impossible to define and it sometimes becomes ‘development’ through a naturalist operation in which history becomes organic and naturalized. This form of Western universalism – based on the notions of Enlightenment and a one-way rationalization process – can also be seen as a form of secular utopianism. Robert Nisbet, in his classic Social Change and History (Nisbet, 1969), saw developmentalism through Christian redemptorist eyes ‘throughout its history the idea [of progress] has been closely linked with, has depended upon, religion or upon intellectual constructs derived from religion’ (ibid., p. 352). This convergence of discourses gave developmentalism a resistance to change but also inserted a basic contradiction at its very core.

The origins of development theory are usually traced in the dominant discourse back to Antiquity, but these links are quite tenuous. Even the supposed lineage through to the Scottish Enlightenment and the work of Adam Smith is not quite convincing. These eighteenth-century thinkers did indeed postulate a series of stages of human activity which led to the early liberal doctrine of progress ‘to resolve the Hobbesian problem of how social and thus political order might be attained’ (Cowen and Shenton, 1996, p. 11). However, it was the Saint Simonians who, much later in the 1820s, broke with the early liberal doctrine of progress as national progress, to advance a theory of development characterized by purposive design. It was then Auguste Comte, in breaking with the Saint Simonians, who proposed a ‘science of society’ with the objective of discovering the ‘law of human social evolution’ (Comte, 2009). Comte’s positivism was driven to control the effects of industrialism and secularism and impose order on social transformation. Knowledge would, henceforth, guide action rather than accept ‘laissez-faire’ as the source of disorder.

Development, as we understand it, is inseparable from the British Industrial Revolution and the French democratic Revolution, which ushered in a great transformation of society. The upheavals caused by these twin earthquakes created the need to deal with the social, economic and cultural problems emerging with the new capitalist order. Development, in
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...can be seen as the new philosophy and practice, seeking to impose a moral order on the chaos of progress. This was not only a discourse, but was grounded in the state practices of the mid-nineteenth century. It emerged in Europe to deal with the European transition to capitalism so it is hardly relevant to categorize these ideas and practices as Eurocentric. In the work of John Stuart Mill who developed the ideas of the Saint Simonians and Comte it also had an impact in India where Mill was an employee of the East India Company. As to Comte himself, he inspired a whole phase of development policy in nineteenth-century Latin America, and Brazil’s flag still carries his logo Ordem e Progresso (Order and Progress). Development is an empty signifier we would argue, and to have any critical purchase we need to articulate a more specific theory of capitalist development. That way we can ground the concept in the mode of production and reproduction which is coterminous with modernity as we know it. For Marx and Engels, development and capitalism were almost synonymous as the vision presented in The Communist Manifesto made clear: ‘The bourgeoisie cannot exist without constantly revolutionizing the instruments of production, and thereby the relations of production and with them the whole relations of society’ (Marx and Engels, 1973, p. 71). This exhilarating roller-coaster of modernization is the essence of Marx’s conception of development. Nature is subjected to humankind, chemistry is applied to industry and agriculture, the railway and the telegraph revolutionize communications. The insatiable drive of capitalist development tears up all obstacles in its way. Crisis and chaos are but springboards for further development. This system will inevitably take to the world stage; sweep away all the old social orders and revolutionize the modes of production.

Where there is considerable debate around the emergence of this new mode of production as development model is whether its inevitable corollary was ‘underdevelopment’ at the periphery. For one school of thought (Frank, Wallerstein), the capitalist ‘development of underdevelopment’ in the colonized world was a result of incorporation into the world market. Producing for this market for profit was what determined capitalist economic development beyond the European origins. However, this approach has been roundly criticized as ‘neo-Smithian’, insofar as the rise of the market is seen as sufficient to explain capitalist development. Instead Robert Brenner, along with other theorists of the transition to capitalism, argues that the rise of trade cannot determine the transformation of class relations of production. Thus, for Brenner, ‘the historical problem of the origins of capitalist economic development in Europe comes down to that of the process of “self-transformation” of class relations from serfdom to free wage labour – that is, of course, the class struggle by which this
transformation takes place’ (Brenner, 1977, p. 81). This perspective has great relevance for the contemporary study of development and underdevelopment as it stresses ‘internal’ social change.

The vital conundrum about capitalist development, we would argue, is whether it tends towards global development or whether development has, as its necessary counterpart, underdevelopment. This question can be framed by two ultimately contradictory statements made by Karl Marx in the mid-nineteenth century. In the 1867 preface to the first edition of *Capital*, Marx argued that ‘The country that is more developed industrially only shows, to the less developed, the image of its own future’ (Marx, 1976, p. 91). This mechanical view was and is shared by all stageist, unilineal and teleological views of development. Yet Marx himself, in engaging with the emerging Russian revolutionary forces late in life, began to argue a less necessitarian case which underpins future theories of uneven development. Thus in 1881, in a letter to a Russian follower, Marx was saying that ‘to metamorphose my historical sketch of the genesis of capitalism into Western Europe into a historico-philosophic theory of the general path every people is fated to tread, whatever the historical circumstances it finds itself . . . is honouring and shaming me too much’ (cited in Shanin, 1983, p. 59).

**COLONIAL DEVELOPMENT**

To answer the question posed above we need to introduce the category of colonial development, insofar as colonialism and imperialism were integral elements in the making of development. First, however, we need to qualify the concept of capitalist development by explaining how it has always been uneven development in practice (see Smith, 1984; Van der Linden, 2007). Uneven development is characterized by differential growth rates by economic sector, and unequal socio-spatial processes and class formations at local, sub-national, national, regional and global levels. Development patterns are not only quantitatively unequal (for example different GDP per capita rates) but qualitatively different, due to different histories of class formation. Yet this basic characteristic of uneven development is always ‘combined’ since the rise of the global economy. As Rudolf Hilferding (early theorist of finance capital) put it in 1910, ‘Capitalist development did not take place independently in each individual country, but instead capitalist relations of production and exploitation were imported along with capital from abroad’ (Hilferding, 1981, p. 322).

We have already mentioned one approach to development which sees ‘underdevelopment’ as its necessary counterpart. From that vantage point there has been much emphasis on the role of colonial pillage and
the practice of slavery in the early development of capitalism. In reality, though, the profits from slavery were quite low and its casual influence on the Industrial Revolution was quite tenuous. As to the trade with the New World, O’Brien concludes that commerce between core and periphery in the three centuries after 1450 ‘proceeded on a small scale, was not a uniquely profitable field of enterprise, and while it generated some externalities, they could in no way be classified as decisive to the economic growth of Britain’ (O’Brien, 1982, p. 3). It was not until the mid-nineteenth century that this early mercantile imperialism was to give way to the ‘free trade imperialism’ of the liberal era. This was also the period in which liberal ideologies constructed the case for empire in terms of a civilizing mission with regard to the ‘backward’ peoples of the world.

The era of ‘free trade imperialism’ (Gallagher and Robinson, 1953) is particularly interesting, given its parallels with contemporary globalization theory if not practice. The basic idea is that mid-nineteenth-century British imperialism (for example in relation to India) was not consciously planned but resulted simply from the strength and exuberance of British industrial capitalism which needed ever-expanding markets. International trade was driven by British (and European) technology, capital and shipping. In the inevitable clash with the moral economy of the rest of the world, European military superiority inevitably prevailed. But what is particularly relevant today about this phase of colonial development is that it shows how economic relations can be grossly exploitative and that the market and empire are complementary. In Latin America during this period we saw the consolidation of a British ‘informal empire’ in the newly independent republics which, interestingly, Lenin classified as suffering from ‘dependence’ in his treatise on imperialism.

Classical imperialism (1880–1945) was dubbed by Lenin the ‘highest stage’ of capitalism, insofar as its contradictions now came to the fore. In fact colonial capitalism proved remarkably sturdy and its impacts are still felt today through neo-colonialism and dependency. The late nineteenth-century ‘scramble for Africa’ is emblematic of this formal colonial phase of imperialism. A conscious ideology of Empire was developed, the effects of which are still felt today. The economic drive to seek new markets, new opportunities for profits and cheap natural, and labour, resources seemed insatiable. This period (up until 1914 anyway) has been deemed the first phase of globalization. The impact on the non-European world was, however, almost uniformly negative and there was a conscious policy to prevent industrialization and thus modern development in the colonial world. When the collapse of formal empire eventually came after the Second World War it was remarkably rapid, with the independence of India and Pakistan in 1947 being the watershed event.
The age of imperialism led to some important theorizing which is still relevant to a contemporary understanding of capitalist development on a global scale. Perhaps the most interesting, and of contemporary relevance, is the approach by Rosa Luxemburg, first articulated in 1913 (Luxemburg, 1951). Against the then prevalent focus on the nature of advanced capitalism and the inter-imperialist rivalries it was generating, Luxemburg focused on the broader expanded reproduction of capitalism across the globe. Capital needs to ‘realize’ surplus value, that is to say, the goods produced need to be bought. Capitalist expansion into non-capitalist societies necessarily transforms them into petty commodity producers which paves the way for capitalist industrialization. This focus on the social relations of the non-European world was novel at the time and opens up a decisively non-Eurocentric perspective. Her emphasis on the continued need of capitalism to engage in ‘primitive accumulation’ in the South prefigures David Harvey’s influential contemporary theory of ‘accumulation by dispossession’ (Harvey, 2003). For Rosa Luxemburg, ‘Capitalism must . . . always and everywhere fight a battle of annihilation against every historical form of natural economy that it encounters . . . The principal methods in this struggle are political force (revolution, war), oppressive taxation by the state, and cheap goods’ (Luxemburg, 1951, pp. 368–9).

Finally, we note that the colonial experience qualified the concept of capitalist development by introducing the phenomenon of the development ‘latecomer’, which lies behind the contemporary development project. It would seem that the more industrially developed countries did not show the less developed what their future held as Marx opined. Building on the notion of uneven but also combined development, Alexander Gerschenkron (in the 1950s) analysed the comparative advantages of late industrialization where backwardness could allow leaping over the ‘stages’ of development (1962). In relation to Russian industrialization in the 1890s, he saw the role of the state as an essential element for development, as was the emancipation of the serfs. This strand of analysis leads us from the colonial to the postcolonial period of capitalist development. It argues against all linear theories of the essential role of the state in the development process, outside original industrializing countries like England. Whether the state could, in fact, subordinate the capitalist market to human needs was, of course, another question.

THE DEVELOPMENT PROJECT

Following the decline of British imperialism and the rise of decolonization in the 1950s, a new development project emerged in a US-driven discourse.
In the post-war decolonization era we saw the emergence of the ‘Third World’ between the capitalist and communist antagonists of the Cold War. The low level of economic development in decolonizing Africa in particular was contrasted to the booming economy of the United States, rapidly becoming the hegemonic global power. Decolonization would lead to development in the American vision of the brave new world which was emerging after the retreat of the old colonial powers. In 1949, US President Truman declared that ‘We must embark on a bold new programme for making the benefits of our scientific advances and industrial progress available for the improvement and growth of the underdeveloped areas’ (cited in Esteva, 1992, p. 6). For post-development theorists like Gustavo Esteva: ‘Under-development began, then, on January 20, 1949 on that day, two billion people became underdeveloped’ (ibid., p. 7). There is no doubt that uneven development – or development/underdevelopment – did not begin in 1949, but there was a new discourse and political project then emerging.

To credit US President Truman with the ‘invention of development’ (Sachs, 1992) as the discourse-focused, post-development writers (see next section) do, is clearly an invention itself, but there is a sense in which development theory and practice took a new turn in the 1950s. Development and social change was no longer something that just happened but a process that could be actively promoted. Development became something that one party could do to another. The divide between the colonizer and the colonized of the imperial period now became the development-underdevelopment divide which characterized the postcolonial period. This paradigm suited the economic and political interests of the now rising hegemonic power, the US. Taking credit for decolonization and promoting the equality between nations, the United States moved seamlessly into constructing a neo-colonial order where formal political independence was matched by strong, economic dependence for the ‘developing’ nations.

Walt Rostow’s The Stages of Economic Growth (1960) with its subtitle ‘A Non-Communist Manifesto’ was emblematic of this new development paradigm, with its optimistic and teleological vision of the inexorable advance of modernization under US tutelage. The 1950s were also, however, a period of import substitution industrialization in many parts of the Third World, with inward-looking development, guided by the state, being a dominant feature. The developmental state promoted industrialization but also, and crucially, accelerated the social division of labour. The economic structures and social relations of production were transformed utterly by this strategy, which took on the previously dominant oligarchy and landed interests. Of course this process was more advanced in Latin America and later in East Asia than it was in sub-Saharan Africa. The
point of signalling diverse national development strategies is that Walt Rostow’s vision of development following some preordained path was not the only option, and that the countries of the South had agency and an ‘internal’ development process determined by social and political forces and struggles.

The ‘development project’ began to run out of steam in the 1970s and 1980s across some regions while, paradoxically, the period also saw the rise of the Newly Industrializing Countries (NICs) in East Asia. In Latin America we saw the exhaustion of the ‘easy’ phase of import substitution industrialization and the growing contradictions between a state-led development process and the needs of the transnational corporations. During the ‘easy’ phase of industrialization, there was a developmentalist alliance forged between the state, private and foreign sectors. International capital was seeking new investment possibilities and the consolidation of the internal market was in everybody’s interest. Protectionist barriers provided benefits for all, including the foreign investors. When the process slowed down, the contradictions between the various partners came to the fore and foreign capital began to pressurize for a more clearly leading role. The consumers, who were also workers, were now beginning to demand a share of the gains made by the developmentalist alliance which the capitalist sectors were not prepared to divide.

Latin America was also the paradigmatic case in terms of the emergence of an ‘internal’ critique of the development project from the so-called dependency school. Reflecting the contradictions in the developmental model, these theorists began to articulate an alternative model, based on a clear reflection of foreign ‘dependency’. In some way it was the binary opposite of Rostow’s modernization theory: where one saw the diffusion of capital into underdeveloped areas as the key to development, the other saw it as simply developing underdevelopment. Furthermore, dependency theory, as much as the dominant modernization theory, took for granted, and saw as natural, the nation-state as the self-sufficient framework for development. The two perspectives also shared a strong economic bias that led them to downplay the political process and basically ignore the cultural dimension. They were also equally teleological, insofar as modernization had an end point at US-style ‘modernity’, and dependency had its as Cuban-style ‘socialism’.

The dominant development project represented a global discourse, but also a coherent strategy, for the pursuit of nationally managed economic growth. The United States – with its perceived anticolonial heritage, commitment to liberalism and rapidly rising standards of living – was the undisputed role model and discourse leader. Third Worldism – of which Latin American dependency theory was a variant– came to mean
as McMichael puts it, ‘correcting the distortions, or imbalances of the colonial division of labour’ (McMichael, 1996, p. 74). Operating within the same logic of economic growth and industrialization, development became a singular enterprise even from a critical development perspective. The international aid framework consolidated this new regime. For the critics, such as dependency theorists, the emphasis on integration into the global economy as a source of underdevelopment meant that their only plausible alternative was some form of delinking, or withdrawal, from the emerging global system which was hardly a viable or progressive option.

POST-DEVELOPMENT

In terms of critical development discourses, the overarching concept now is that of ‘post-development’, which began to emerge in the 1980s. Whereas the dependency paradigm was still set firmly in a modernist frame, post-development springs from the postmodernist world view. Undermining the universalist pretensions of the Enlightenment is a key element in the postmodern critique of modernist social theory. The notion that the whole world could be analysed according to universal criteria of justice, truth and reason looks particularly hollow from a Third World perspective. A key theme is Lyotard’s call for ‘an incredibility towards metanarrative’ (1984, p. xxiv), and there is no clearer metanarrative than the discourse of development. Notions of truth and objectivity are seen to mask underlying power relations or, put simply, a claim to truth is also a claim to power. Searching for the master key to development and the expertise of the development expert to solve development problems must be viewed with considerable scepticism from this perspective.

The critical discourse of post-development takes many different forms as might be expected from such a radical perspective (see Crush, 1995; Ferguson, 2006). One of the most significant theoretical influences was the work of Michel Foucault and, in particular, his analysis of power, knowledge and discourse. Development discourse from a Foucaultian perspective is about disciplining difference, that is establishing what the norm is and what deviation from it is. Clearly the development-underdevelopment couplet can be analysed in such terms; with the latter being portrayed as the other of the West’s development. Western forms of rationality and the imbrication of power and knowledge in the development discourse/industry/practices have thus sought to normalize the Third World and its peoples. The focus on language, knowledge and power has also helped understand local knowledge as sites of power and also resistance. We now accept much more readily that there are multiple, unstable and
permanently reconstructing identities involved in the development and social change processes.

Since its emergence the post-development perspective has been criticized, largely for homogenizing development discourse and for not articulating an alternative development perspective. One of its original proponents, Arturo Escobar, does accept some of this counter-critique but still holds to ‘the need to decenter development as a social descriptor, the questioning of development’s knowledge practices, and post-development’s embedded critique of the ideas of growth, progress and modernity’ (Escobar, 1995, p. xviii). This vision does not entail the anti-politics of some post-development theorists and its propositions are now quite widely accepted. We are also much more prone, in general, to accepting that social change is not a linear, cumulative process (if it ever was) and that it is characterized by discontinuity and fragmentation. Social movements in the Third World or developing world have clearly laid to rest the myth of totality, and reinforce the notion that society has no centre. The very meaning of development, democracy and community is being reconstructed before our eyes in the old and new movements of contestation.

Post-development has clear links to the ‘new’ social movements of the 1960s which broke with the class focus of the modernist paradigm. The shift from the modernist national and labour movements to the more ‘postmodern’ women’s, environmental and indigenous movements was both a paradigm and political shift. As McEwan writes, the latter ‘although they are often characterized as a form of resistance to development, they are effective in using identity-based forms of participatory politics to extend the boundaries of citizenship to marginal groups’ (McEwan, 2009, p. 235). Progressive social movements can perhaps be seen as realizing the values of post-development. Subaltern social movements articulate subaltern forms of knowledge and a political practice that goes beyond economic growth. They are often place-based strategies where issues of environmental degradation, gender oppression and the marginalization of indigenous peoples come together around struggles over the privatization of water, destructive open-cast mining, big dams and the destruction of traditional livelihoods.

It is not easy to offer a simple conclusion on the success or otherwise of post-development in terms of development theory and practice. The anti-development approach that simply rejects all development modalities has limited appeal and, at best, has led to localized development efforts. The fate of the Zapatistas in Mexico – although not really anti-development in an explicit way – is perhaps indicative of how a critical perspective can end up being inward-looking and unable to expand to provide a rounded political alternative. From a more pragmatic perspective, we
might consider the verdict of Knippenberg and Schuurman for whom ‘models of alternative or “another” development, which do not include solving the problem of material scarcity, are theoretical exercises with no practical value’ (Knippenberg and Schuurman, 1994, p. 105). Be that as it may, there are oppositional and liberatory strands of post-development – especially when expressed within a broader postcolonial frame – which articulate a healthy scepticism toward metanarratives which is where postmodernism began (see Kapoor, 2008; Wainwright, 2008).

In terms of impact on the mainstream development perspective it is perhaps the less radical ‘alternative development’ school which has had the most significant role. From the 1970s onwards, there was an increasing shift in mainstream discourse, away from the simplistic ethnocentric modernization perspective of the 1950s. A vast literature emerged around ‘gender and development’ and ‘sustainable development’ was widely accepted as a desirable. We had ‘bottom-up’ development, participatory development and popular development (see Brohman, 1996). Indicative of the new mood, was the 1975 report of the Dag Hammarskjöld Foundation, which argued that development should be geared towards the satisfaction of human needs and that it should be in harmony with the environment. Continuously promoted by critical thinking, the ‘alternative development’ model gradually became mainstreamed. Jan Nederveen Pieterse can thus argue persuasively that the main divide in development theory ‘now runs between human and alternative development on the one hand, and . . . the positivism of growth on the other’ (2010, p. 96). Expressed institutionally, it is the UN agencies versus the IMF with the World Bank somewhere in the middle.

THE GLOBALIZATION PROJECT

What the development project was for the 1950s, so the globalization project became for the 1990s, an uncontested new development paradigm. Since the mid-1970s, the internationalization of production, finance and trade had been accelerating and a new regime of capital accumulation emerged by the late 1980s. As Philip McMichael notes ‘although the globalization project replaces the development project, “development” has not lost its currency. Its frame of reference has simply shifted’ (McMichael, 1996, p. 150). The new frame of reference was set by the emergent dominant paradigm of economic liberalization, somewhat abusively dubbed ‘neoliberalism’ when, in fact, what we witnessed from the 1980s onwards was a process of neoliberalization (Venugopal, 2015). Neoliberalism was never a static and unified theoretical or policy statement
and its application in different parts of the world took different forms. Neoliberal globalization did, however, mark a new phase of capitalist development, insofar as it was truly global and marked a decisive break with the paradigm of national development led by the state.

For the liberal globalizers, the essence of the new regime was the freeing of market forces to allow the ‘magic of the market’ to ensure the rational distribution of resources. The liberal globalizer world view goes beyond economics, to offer an alternative to all collective, or social, views of the world. The free, or unregulated, market is not only seen as the source of material wealth, but also of freedom and democracy. Globalization would, according to this view, lead to a decline of poverty and inequality worldwide. Globalization follows the earlier 1950s modernization theory in positing development as an inevitable process leading teleologically towards a predefined end. While globalization led to the increasing elimination of spatial barriers and the compression of time, it did not spell a homogeneous spatial development which continues to be uneven. If anything, the changing spatiality of global capitalism was more heterogeneous, differential and fragmented than in the past. Above all, globalization has led to an increased interconnectedness of the social fates of households, communities and peoples across the world.

The impact of the new neoliberal economic model was uneven across countries, economic sectors and social classes. While it did not restrict absolutely the choices open to developing countries, it did set clear parameters on what was possible and what was not. Fernando Henrique Cardoso, one-time dependency theorist, more recently President of Brazil, argued that globalization was ‘more like a fragmenting force than a levelling force which would make the world more homogeneous. It disconnects and reconnects segments of countries locally and internationally as economic growth produces more inequality’ (2009, p. 302). Just as with the earlier moves towards industrialization in the postcolonial era, the adaptation to the new era of globalization in the 1990s depended on the prior level of economic diversification. The larger, more diversified, developing countries (Brazil, Russia, India and China (BRIC)) were able to achieve integration – albeit subordinate – into the new world order, while smaller, less diversified countries were more likely to continue within a more traditional agro-export development model.

From a critical development perspective, a key issue in terms of assessing the globalization project has been its impact on inequality within and between nations. The promise of the globalization project was that income inequality and poverty would steadily reduce under the new free market global order. For optimists like Stuart Corbridge, we need ‘to acknowledge that the Age of Development (1950–2000) saw improvements in
global life expectancy the likes of which had never been seen before . . . The average person in China and India living more than twenty years longer in 2000 than in 1950’ (2007, p. 190). But then, of course, China and India had embarked on an endogenous modernization and development programme, driven by the state in a national development mode. The East Asian ‘tigers’ (Korea, Taiwan, Japan), used to ‘disprove’ dependency theory in the 1980s, were also state-driven protectionist models, which hardly go to show the merits of an unregulated global market.

The debate around global poverty and inequality is both highly technical in terms of measurement, and highly political in terms of the conditions to be drawn from results. The global ‘catch-up’ story is simply not borne out by the facts. If we compare regions, measuring income in terms of Purchasing Power Parity (PPP) between 1950 and 2000, ‘the broad trend towards divergence [between North and South] is clear’ according to Robert Wade (2010, p. 149) with Asia being the exception. If China is excluded there is no evidence for catch-up whatsoever. When we examine global incomes in terms of Market Exchange Rates (MERS) between 1960 and 2007 ‘we see no catch-up growth after the onset of trade and financial liberalization in the 1980s’ (ibid., p. 56), whether China is included or not. The simple fact is that between country income distribution has become more unequal since 1980, with a small reversal in the 2000s, due to the global commodity boom and not liberalization. The much-vaunted fall of ‘extreme poverty’ (less than US$1 per day) in terms of PPP is also a mirage, if we take China’s rather questionable statistics out of the equation.

The Millennium Development Goals (MDGs), which dominated the official development industry and the radical discourse of civil society since 2000, need to be understood in terms of the underlying dynamics of the globalization project. Despite their discursive dominance across the ‘development industry’ and NGO practice, they were never actually a development strategy. The blatant, though not often remarked on, absence of an industrial strategy in the MDGs, goes to show that. As Samir Amin puts it ‘the MDGs are part of a series of discourses that are intended to legitimize the policies and practices implemented by dominant capital and those who support it’ (Amin, 2006, p. 35). Effectively the MDGs (now known as the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs)) are the ‘human face’ of neoliberal globalization, and represent a way of co-opting the UN family which, as we saw above, has had some ideal of the need to maintain a degree of social cohesion in a development model that prioritizes financialization, privatization and an export-oriented model. This, however, is an unstable marriage and the post-Washington Consensus has not achieved the coherence and stability of its predecessor.
POST-GLOBALIZATION

Post-globalization, like post-development before it, marks the rupture of a dominant paradigm, although not necessarily the emergence of a new one. Many of the early proponents of globalization thought that the 2008–9 crisis showed that globalization ‘had gone too far’ (Rodrik, 1997). The consensus on what was seen as a virtuous circle of economic integration, political demoralization and social inclusion seemed shattered. Even Martin Wolf, author of a glowing globalization manifesto in 2004 which argued that ‘The failure of our world is not that there is too much globalization, but that there is too little’ (Wolf, 2004, p. 4) was, after 2009, taking a much more critical stance (see Wolf, 2010). Global Keynesianism was back on the agenda and the role of the state (so central in attenuating the effects of the financial crisis of 2008–9) was clear to all. However, globalization – in the sense of increasingly transnationalized social, economic and cultural relations – continues to be a dominant feature of our era, so it is hard to sustain a strong post-globalization thesis.

For many analysts, the effects of the 2008–9 global crisis were also to mark the start of a post-neoliberal era. Keynesian reflation policies, bank nationalizations and strong industrial policies seemed to mark the end of neoliberalism. However, we can only refer to post-neoliberalism if we take the latter to be a unified, static and totalizing strategy. Conversely, if we accept like Peck et al. that neoliberalization was defined by ‘a prevailing pattern of regulatory restructuring, driven by a family of open-ended social processes and associated with polymorphic forms and outcomes’ (2010, p. 101), then our verdict would be far less simplistic. Certainly, in terms of a development theory, neoliberalism has suffered a severe blow. But no paradigmatic shift has occurred, insofar as a new dominant alternative paradigm has not emerged beyond the somewhat nebulous conceptions of ‘sustainable development’. In keeping with the uneven development of capitalism that we have highlighted above, we can expect to see an uneven development of neoliberalism, partly reinventing itself and partly deepening some tendencies as it is implemented differentially across the globe.

The post-globalization and post-neoliberalism paradigms tend to miss the element of continuity with the previous era. As has always been the case with capitalist development, a crisis is an opportunity for recomposition at a higher level. The immediate post-crisis calls for re-regulation of the financial sector to prevent a recurrence soon gave way to ‘business as usual’ with the bankers bonuses reinstated and so on. However, if we take a more long-term Polanyian view of the 2008–9 crisis we might conclude that society began to create a social counter-movement to protect itself from
further commodification and the disembedding of the economy from social relations (see Fraser, 2014). No model of development and social change based on assumptions of stability and equilibrium will be adequate to the task of understanding the crisis or creating alternative development strategies. Arguably, we need to foreground instability and complexity more, and understand that the Polanyian ‘double movement’ (market deregulation and social protectionist counter-movements) is always with us.

If we are to take a broad view of capitalist worldwide development today, unconstrained by premature labels, one of the first tendencies to come to mind would be the rise of the BRICs. Whatever the limitations of the ‘emerging’ economies, they have clearly helped supersede the traditional paternalist development discourse that portrays the North as ‘developing’ the South. In Brazil, Russia, India and China (and to some extent South Africa) we have seen the return of the developmental state, a strong public sector and a refusal to go along with all of the North’s anti-developmental state proposals (see Kalinowski, 2015). In the aftermath of the 2008–9 crisis there was, certainly, an undue optimism placed in this group of countries’ ability to buck the trend of the global downturn. Nevertheless, growth rates in the global South are much higher than those in the global North, which has still not emerged fully from the 2008–9 crisis. Whether this will lead to a new Bandung Consensus – referring to the rise of the non-aligned or ‘Third’ World in the 1950s – remains to be seen but we can be sure that the old development models – radical as well as conservative – need to be revisited.

The other major distinguishing mark of development in the twenty-first century would be the return of the state to a central role. The dominant neo-developmentalism in Latin America is a good example of a contemporary strategy which returns to 1950s-style state-led development, but is now tempered by the pro-market and anti-protectionism of 1990s-style neoliberalism. Overall, the pendulum has swung from the market to the state, with few illusions left in the self-regulating capacity of the former. That does not mean that the state holds the answers to development. State capacity has been severely weakened by several decades of pro-market development policies, and through its capture by power elites, of course. Uneven development has led, in turn, to uneven state capabilities to engage proactively with development. Stateness itself is also unevenly developed and the capacity of the BRICs is not matched across the broader developing world. All we can say is that there is no development without the state, a statement that takes us back to Gerschenkron and the debates around the late industrializers.

Taking a broad retrospective view of capitalist development, we might posit complexity as the third analytical priority. Complexity, as John Urry
outlines, ‘repudiates the dichotomies of determinism and chance, as well as nature and society being and becoming, stasis and change’ (2003, p. 22). What this means, in terms of development and social change, is that we must be wary of binary oppositions between, say, modernization and post-dependency theory. We have seen already how there is no clear dividing line between neoliberalism and post-neoliberalism. Complexity points us towards the end of certainty and, of course, the inherent teleology in many development theories. There is always order and disorder in all development and social change processes. What the crisis in the dominant global development model since 2008 allows us to do is reimagine post-globalization (as we knew it) by developing future scenarios for change which will, of course, be multiple.

FURTHER READING


The ‘classic’ statement of the post-development school, quite influenced by Michel Foucault and, in its turn, influential in social movement analysis.


An accessible overview of classical theories of imperialism through to the contemporary issues around Americanization and Empire.


An interesting and accessible text bridging the gap between postcolonial and development theories thus pointing towards a postcolonial development agenda.


A broad overview of the ‘development project’ (1950s–1970s), its crisis and its succession by the ‘globalization project’ (1980s onwards), now itself in crisis.


A theoretically-oriented overview of development theory dealing critically with issues such as Eurocentrism, critical globalism and delinking/alternative development approaches.

REFERENCES


