1. The British reference model

Vincent Rious and Nicolò Rossetto

In the field of regulatory practice, the British regulation of the energy sector, and in particular of the electricity network, represents a crucial reference. There are five reasons for this. First, Britain was a pioneer in the concrete application of the RPI–X incentive regulation to the energy sector. Second, and because of this, it is an instructive illustration of the application of the theoretical principle of incentive regulation, and an interesting case study for the assessment of the efficiency-improving prediction of incentive regulation. From this point of view, and third, since the very beginning of its application and the liberalization process, incentive regulation has achieved great success in the electricity network sector, in terms of cost and tariff reduction, increase in quality of service for network users and investment by network companies. Fourth, this application has also shown that the very theoretical principles must be adapted in practice because theory is based on a simplified and stylized view of reality. These adaptations were designed in a pragmatic way as difficulties emerged, not necessarily through investigating the overall architecture of regulation. However, and fifth, after 20 years of application of the RPI–X regulatory principles, the British regulator, the Office of Gas and Electricity Markets (Ofgem), felt it necessary to reconsider the overall picture of its regulatory practice in order to reset the regulatory principles. Some practitioners may have interpreted this as the dawn of a real revolution in the industry, even if many of the components of the historical application of the RPI–X regulation remain.

After a short presentation of the industry landscape in Britain (Section 1.1), the chapter describes the overall evolution of the British application of incentive regulation, from the beginning of the RPI–X regulation (Section 1.2) to the renewal brought by the new RIIO (Revenue = Incentives + Innovation + Outputs) regulation (Section 1.3). It shows the difficulties in applying concretely the theoretical principle of incentive regulation, the need to complement it with safeguards and even incentives to provide specified outputs and innovation, and the interaction and inefficient interferences that can emerge as regulation results from a set
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of regulatory schemes. Interesting, too, the need felt by Ofgem to reset its overall regulatory practice questions against the theory on the goal of incentive regulation. Cost-killing is not a regulatory holy grail if the network value for network users is missed. It shows, too, that theoretical work is still needed to define a cost function of electricity network activities as it could help go beyond the seminal theoretical design of incentive regulation in the power sector.

1.1 THE TSO AND DSO LANDSCAPE IN BRITAIN

Until 1989, the Central Electricity Generating Board (CEGB) had a monopoly over the generation and transmission of electricity in England and Wales. Moreover, 12 Area Boards were acting as regional electricity distribution and supply monopolies. In Scotland, two companies integrated over the whole supply chain (generation, transmission, distribution and supply) had a monopoly on their supply areas. In practice, their price was set on a cost-of-service basis.

During the late 1970s and the 1980s these companies were said to be inefficient for four main reasons. First, they had a bad record of controlling capital investment costs. Second, they built uneconomic nuclear power stations. Third, they paid excessive prices for British coal under a nationalistic decision to support the domestic mining sector. Finally, in the absence of competitive information sources, the CEGB appeared to greatly underestimate the future costs of decommissioning nuclear power stations at the end of their useful life. Nevertheless, in terms of short-run operating efficiency, the CEGB’s performance appears to have been reasonably good, except (as is now more apparent) for over-staffing.

Considering these inefficiencies, the British government, after several years of discussions, decided to restructure the power sector and to privatize it (Electricity Act, 1989). After numerous subsequent reforms and divestments, the industry is now organized with:

- several firms freely competing for the generation and supply of electricity to consumers
- a transmission system operator, National Grid, which operates the whole British system and owns the transmission network in England and Wales
The British reference model

- two transmission and distribution network owners in Scotland (ScottishPower Energy Networks in the south and Scottish Hydro in the north)
- 12 other electric distribution companies in England and Wales, several of which are under common ownership
- an independent regulatory authority, Ofgem, in charge of regulating the newly privatized industry.

In order to improve efficiency, electricity generators and suppliers are obliged to compete in the market, whereas network companies are subject to monopoly regulation. The goal of regulation, then, is to supervise competition on the open markets of generation and supply, considering these markets are frequently oligopolistic or prone to market failures. Moreover, for network monopoly companies, the role of regulation is to mimic competition so that companies are more cost-efficient and provide better services to customers (so-called value for money). Ofgem also has the mandate to promote security of supply and sustainability for present and future generations of consumers.


Figure 1.1 Major milestones in the regulation of electricity transmission and distribution grids

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Focusing on the regulation of network monopoly companies, Ofgem has gradually scrutinized and extended its regulatory tools. Hence, a learning process took place as follows (see Figure 1.1). First, Ofgem wanted to control only some inputs and types of costs of the monopolies while ignoring the others. Network companies soon learned how to play with these partial controls, moving expenditures from one type of input to another, neglecting the increase of some inputs or even decreasing some of the outputs, such as the level of service quality provided to network users. Ofgem noticed these secondary effects and progressively improved its regulatory control to avoid this undesirable edge effect. As implied by the chronology above, over time Ofgem has expanded its regulatory control from maintenance and energy losses (as soon as transmission was privatized) to quality of service (for the transmission sector with an interruption incentive scheme in 2003 following a blackout in London, and for the distribution sector with standards of service in 1997 and an interruption incentive scheme in 2005), congestion costs (from 1993 in the transmission sector), investment (with specifically dedicated regulatory schemes for transmission in 2001 and 2007 and for distribution in 2005) and innovation (during the late 2000s). This whole movement of regulation in Britain between 1990 and 2010 was encapsulated under the term of RPI–X regulation. Even if the RPI–X regulation was at the centre of Ofgem control of the network companies during this period, in reality more and more subtle regulatory tools have been implemented in order to overcome the difficulties encountered by the sole use of RPI–X regulation.

1.2 THE RISE OF RPI–X

At the centre of the regulatory framework established for the British electricity industry in the 1990s there was an ex ante definition, provided by the regulator, of the price dynamics that network firms must respect when charging their customers. The underlying idea was to exert pressure on network firms to reduce costs and progressively share any achieved cost reduction with network users. The framework apparently worked: network firms were usually able to significantly outperform their baseline and record increased profits, especially during the first regulatory periods; meanwhile, network users benefited from an important price reduction between the subsequent regulatory periods. However, some critical positions clearly emerged over the 20 years of RPI–X regulation and some problems required pragmatic intervention by the regulator.
In this section, we start by presenting the overall principle of RPI–X regulation and the way it was pragmatically implemented by Ofgem. Then, we narrow the focus to two critical aspects of this form of incentive regulation: service quality and innovation. Finally, we provide a brief assessment of the RPI–X regulatory experience and a list of drawbacks that justified the move to a new regulatory framework around 2010.

1.2.1 RPI–X Principle

The overall principle of RPI–X regulation is that the allowed revenue of a (network) monopoly company or the price it is allowed to charge its customers are subject to a cap linked to the Retail Price Index (RPI), a common measure for price inflation, and to an efficiency factor called the $X$ factor, representing the expected efficiency gains of the industry compared with those of the rest of the economy. With revenue or price dynamics set in advance, the monopoly firm is incentivized to reduce its costs below the expected efficient cost level, because it will retain as a profit any difference between the cap and its actual costs. Figure 1.2 explains this mechanism. The dark grey sloping line represents the price cap over time, as defined by the initial price level $P_0$, the productivity objective $X$ set by the regulator at the beginning of the regulatory period, and price inflation as measured by the RPI. The regulated firm can charge a price up to the level defined by this line. The light grey sloping line represents the real unit costs borne by

![Figure 1.2 How RPI–X regulation works](image_url)
Electricity network regulation in the EU

the firm. The difference between the two lines, i.e. the shaded areas, is the profit the firm can earn (if the light grey line lies above, and not below, the dark grey one, then the firm records a loss and not a profit).

Ideally, the firm is incentivized to be most efficient if the price dynamics are set for a long period of time. However, in practice regulators fix the cap only for a limited number of years, usually from three to five, because the uncertainties surrounding the activity of the monopoly company grow quickly over time and unforeseen implementation issues can emerge. In the early 1990s the British regulator adopted a regulatory period of four years for transmission (Transmission Price Control Review, TPCR) and of five years for distribution (Distribution Price Control Review, DPCR). Based on the experience gained in the first rounds of price controls, and as a consequence of the integration of the electricity and gas transmission grids into one single company, in the mid-2000s Ofgem decided to implement a single regulatory period for electricity and gas transmission. The length of this period was extended to five years, as in the case of distribution (see Tables 1.1 and 1.2).

Electricity distribution and transmission tariffs are determined at the beginning of each regulatory period by using a building block approach, where operating expenditure (OPEX), depreciation and the return on regulatory asset base (RAB) are estimated separately and then added together in order to define the maximal allowed revenue for the firm and the efficient and fair value for the various network tariffs. Originally, the RPI–X approach was applied only to a part of operating expenditure; its extension to capital expenditure (CAPEX) occurred later.

Table 1.1 Chronology of the regulatory periods for electricity distribution in Great Britain

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>England &amp; Wales</th>
<th>Scotland</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>April 1990–March 1995</td>
<td>Post-privatization price control</td>
<td>Post-privatization price control</td>
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<tr>
<td>April 1995–March 1996</td>
<td>DPCR1</td>
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<tr>
<td>April 1996–March 2000</td>
<td>DPCR2 after Offer reopened the price review in 1995</td>
<td>DPCR1</td>
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<tr>
<td>April 2000–March 2005</td>
<td>DPCR3 after merger of the regulatory process for all British distribution companies</td>
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<tr>
<td>April 2005–March 2010</td>
<td>DPCR4</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>April 2010–March 2015</td>
<td>DPCR5</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>April 2015–March 2023</td>
<td>RIIO-ED1</td>
<td></td>
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Source: Based on Simmonds (2002), Ofgem (2009) and Ofgem website.
Table 1.2 Chronology of the regulatory periods for electricity transmission in Great Britain

<table>
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<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>England &amp; Wales</th>
<th>Scotland</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>April 1990–March 1993</td>
<td>Post-privatization price control</td>
<td>Post-privatization price control</td>
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<tr>
<td>April 1993–March 1994</td>
<td>TPCR1</td>
<td>Post-privatization price control</td>
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<td>April 1994–March 1997</td>
<td></td>
<td>SCOTCO1</td>
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<tr>
<td>April 1997–March 1999</td>
<td>TPCR2</td>
<td>SCOTCO1 one-year roll-over</td>
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<tr>
<td>April 1999–March 2000</td>
<td></td>
<td>SCOTCO2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>April 2000–March 2001</td>
<td></td>
<td>SCOTCO2 two-year roll-over</td>
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<tr>
<td>April 2001–March 2005</td>
<td>TPCR3</td>
<td>SCOTCO2 two-year roll-over</td>
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<tr>
<td>April 2005–March 2006</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>April 2006–March 2007</td>
<td>TPCR3 one-year extension</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>April 2007–March 2012</td>
<td>TPCR4 after merger of the regulatory</td>
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<td></td>
<td>process for gas and electricity</td>
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<td>transmission companies over the whole</td>
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<td>of Great Britain</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>April 2012–March 2013</td>
<td>TPCR4 one-year roll-over</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>April 2013–March 2021</td>
<td>RIIO-T1</td>
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Source: Based on Simmonds (2002), Ofgem (2009) and Ofgem website.

Ofgem experienced six kinds of difficulties in setting the parameters of the RPI–X regulation. First of all, Ofgem had difficulties in setting the perimeter of RPI–X. Initially, the cap was not applied to the overall operating expenditure because part of it was wrongly or rightly supposed to be uncontrollable by the regulated firm. Congestion costs, for instance, were not subject to an incentive scheme but were simply passed through to the network users, since they were supposed to depend not only on network constraints but also on the costs of the generators activated to relieve congestion, a variable over which the network operator did not have any control. However, during the first regulatory period, congestion costs multiplied by five in just four years (from £50 million to £250 million) because generators exerted their local market power and the transmission and system operator, National Grid, was not made financially responsible for congestions and the associated costs resulting from its maintenance activity. Indeed, as soon as a cap was applied to congestion costs, those costs began to decrease and returned to their 1990 level within four years. They further shrank by a factor of five in the following four years, reaching an overall level of £10 million. This drastic cost decrease resulted from two changes in the behaviour of
National Grid. First, the regulated scheme incentivized it to enter into a long-term contract under the scrutiny of the regulator with generators located in load pockets that were essential for network reliability and able to exert significant market power. Moreover, the regulated scheme incentivized National Grid to plan its maintenance programme in a way that would minimize network constraints and costs.

A second difficulty for Ofgem was the interference between the various incentive schemes. In the case of electricity distribution, for instance, Ofgem first set the efficiency target on OPEX. In a later distribution regulatory review, it introduced a target on CAPEX too. The problem recognized at the fifth distribution regulatory review in 2010 was that having different levels of reward to go beyond the respective OPEX and CAPEX targets prompted the network companies to choose CAPEX over OPEX. Besides, a return on investment adds up to CAPEX once integrated into the RAB, while OPEX is, at best, merely recovered without any additional revenue. These two effects taken together incentivized companies to choose CAPEX over OPEX, which is likely to be inefficient since both are needed to provide least-cost network services.

Third, Ofgem had difficulties in setting the $X$ efficiency factor. This problem was particularly visible in the distribution sector. In the run-up to the 1990 privatization and before the regulator held the first distribution price control review in 1994, bundled distribution and supply tariffs were increased significantly. During the post-privatization regulatory period between April 1990 and March 1995, distribution companies were allowed to increase network charges by RPI + 1 per cent on average. At that time there was limited knowledge of distribution costs and how to assess the efficiency factor. Significant capital expenditure programmes and a limited growth in the amount of distributed electricity were also expected. In the end, actual costs were lower and excessive rent was left to the distribution companies. As a consequence, distribution firms earned remarkable profits, as confirmed by their high stock value. The British regulator then decided to revise down tariffs in 1995, between 11 per cent and 17 per cent, with further cuts in 1996 between 10 per cent and 13 per cent. An RPI – 3 per cent formula was imposed upon the companies over the following three years.

Fourth, Ofgem had difficulties in displaying transparently the methods used to set the $X$ efficiency factor for regulated companies, in particular through benchmarking. The benchmarking model of distribution companies, for instance, was disclosed only from the second regulatory review onwards, despite the fact that such a model had already been used in the
first regulatory review. Statistical benchmarking methods have been applied by the regulator, especially in the distribution sector, to determine the relative efficiency of the individual firms’ operating costs and service quality compared with those of their peers. The information obtained from these methods can be used as an input for setting the values of $P_0$ and $X$, in a way to incentivize the firms far from the efficiency frontier to move closer to it and to reward the most efficient firms so that they are induced to stay on the efficiency frontier (see Chapter 2, Section 2.3.1 for more information on benchmarking and yardstick competition). A range of empirical methods has been applied to identify the operating cost-efficiency frontier and to measure how far from it an individual company is positioned. Their results are obviously not identical and this has created a problem of transparency for Ofgem. Indeed, depending on the benchmarking technique chosen and the associated results, a distribution company will score closer to or further away from the efficiency frontier and hence will receive a tougher or less tough cost target for the next regulatory period. Understanding the impact of the benchmarking technique on their cost target, then, is of great importance for network companies. Although the inclusion of quality-of-service considerations has further complicated the issue, transparency has increased through the subsequent regulatory reviews, with Ofgem progressively publishing benchmarking methods, data and variables used.

However, transparency revealed a fifth difficulty for the British energy regulator: a lack of consistency and justification for changes in the benchmarking methods adopted over time. For instance, the weight applied to the different variables in the benchmarking during the second and third distribution regulatory reviews in 1999 and 2004 was different, without Ofgem giving any explanation for such change.

A last problem recognized only at the third distribution regulatory review was data gathering for benchmarking. Ofgem noticed that costs were accounted for in quite different ways across the industry. Several problems were identified. The main one was the so-called capitalization of OPEX: some distribution companies accounted part of OPEX as CAPEX; they then benefited from the return on this fictitious ‘investment’ and reached more easily the efficiency target on OPEX. Other problems of data collection also concerned the accounting treatment of exceptional costs, intra-company margins or expenditure required to repair the grid after major faults. Data gathering and a uniform accounting system are essential for developing sound efficiency analysis through benchmarking on an equal footing.
1.2.2 Output Regulation as a Safeguard for Services to Network Users

A major drawback of RPI–X regulation is that, on a stand-alone basis, it incentivizes companies to decrease the quality of the provided service. Indeed, it is far easier to cut costs by disregarding quality of service. Mechanisms providing output-related incentives hence have been developed by the energy regulator on a case-by-case basis to compensate for the failure of RPI–X regulation to ensure an adequate level of service quality for network users (see Box 1.1 and also Section 2.3.1).

**BOX 1.1 FROM RPI–X REGULATION TO OUTPUT REGULATION**

Output regulation generalizes the principle of RPI–X regulation to outputs instead of inputs. A target is set and the regulated company is assumed to at least reach it. Then, if it outperforms the target, it will receive a reward. Otherwise, a financial penalty will be inflicted. A deadband, where the company is neither penalized nor rewarded, can also be introduced around the target. Deadbands, rewards and penalties may be defined in a symmetrical manner or not. Rewards and penalties may be respectively subject to a cap or a floor to avoid excessive windfall profits or losses for the regulated company.

The relationship between the company’s performance and the remuneration ensured by this regulation scheme balances the company’s risk and its reward or penalty (see Figure 1.3). In this way, it modifies the share of profits and losses accruing to the network company and the network users.

**Figure 1.3  Relationship between the measure of a network output and the financial outcome for the network company under output regulation**

Source: Ofgem.
Output regulation can apply to a variety of specific activities. Basically, any output can be defined, monitored, subjected to targets and rewarded or penalized. For instance, outputs can encompass environmental policy goals (e.g. minimizing power losses from transits through modification of the network topology and of voltage control) or social policy objectives (e.g. the customer service reward scheme for rewarding actions by distribution licensees to help vulnerable customers on affordability; or, in the gas sector, gas safety and awareness of the dangers of carbon monoxide). However, the main reason output regulation has been introduced is that cost reduction prompted by RPI–X regulation could jeopardize quality of service in the longer term, with more frequent and deeper disconnections and poorer voltage quality (harmonics, voltage drops, voltage overload, etc.).

1.2.3 Three Mechanisms for One Goal: Innovation

Even with a quality safeguard, the RPI–X regulation still has a major drawback in the long run. Indeed, it incentivizes regulated companies to cut research, development and demonstration (RD&D) costs, mainly for two reasons. First, those costs can be easily cut overnight. Second, cutting those costs does not immediately endanger quality of service, thereby avoiding any immediate penalty for a network firm subject to output regulation as well. On the contrary, the firm can reach more easily its RPI–X target and earn an extra profit. However, although a cut in RD&D costs may be beneficial for the individual firm in the short run, in the long run it is detrimental from a social welfare point of view because of the public good aspect of RD&D. Thanks to spill-over effects, RD&D activities provide benefits not only to the investing company but also to other companies in the field and more generally to society as a whole. Without RD&D, little innovation can emerge, a development that is particularly negative in a period of deep technical, economic and organizational transformation for the entire energy industry.

Following the liberalization and privatization of the British electricity industry, a collapse in energy RD&D was noticed. By 2004, the amount of money British network companies were spending on RD&D was very small – less than £4 million per year, or less than 0.1 per cent of their total revenues. Thus, three regulatory schemes dedicated to innovation were designed towards the end of the RPI–X era: the Innovation Funding Incentive (IFI), the Registered Power Zones (RPZs) and the Low Carbon Network (LCN) Fund.
The IFI was the first scheme created in 2004 to allow distribution companies to invest in RD&D, even when project costs and benefits span beyond the price control’s five-year horizon. IFI, extended to transmission in 2007, allowed, up to its replacement in 2015, network companies to spend up to 0.5 per cent of their yearly distribution/transmission activity revenues on eligible IFI projects. The amount of money effectively spent under the mechanism was small, in total about £25 million per year for both transmission and distribution, but still much higher than the investments recorded before its establishment. Indeed, companies could recover 80 per cent of their eligible project expenditure under the licence condition, with a 25 per cent cap on their internal costs such as salaries. Eligible projects had to meet the criteria set out in an IFI Good Practice Guide and, as a minimum, align with at least one of Ofgem’s five sustainable development themes: i) managing the transition to a low-carbon economy; ii) eradicating fuel poverty and protecting vulnerable customers; iii) promoting energy saving; iv) ensuring a secure and reliable gas and electricity supply; and v) supporting improvement in all aspects of the environment.

Three RPZs were created in 2005 to encourage electricity distribution companies to develop new and more cost-effective technologies for connecting and operating renewable generation. The three zones were Skegness & Fens (Central Networks), the Orkney Isles (Scottish Hydro Electric Power Distribution) and Martham Primary (EDF Energy). Allowed revenues for the companies were then increased if renewable generation capacity connected to the respective network turned out to be higher than the baseline.8 The RPZ incentive scheme ceased to apply to any new generation connecting onto the zones in March 2012.

Lastly, the LCN Fund was part of the electricity distribution price control arrangements that ran from 1 April 2010 to 31 March 2015 (DPCR5). The Fund allocated up to £500 million for support to projects sponsored by distribution companies to try out new technologies, and operating and commercial arrangements that would be needed to deliver smart grids capable of supporting the growth of electric vehicles or locally based generation. There were two tiers of funding under the LCN Fund. A first tier was designed to enable distribution companies to recover a proportion of expenditures incurred on small-scale projects, whereas under the second tier Ofgem promoted an annual competition for the allocation of up to £64 million to help fund a small number of flagship projects.
The combination of these three innovation mechanisms may have been enough to appreciably improve the rate of technical progress in British networks at a time when capital expenditure was increasing significantly due to the necessity of replacing old assets and preparing the system for the challenges associated with the transition to a low-carbon economy. The benefits of some of these mechanisms in terms of social welfare were assessed to be more than six times higher than the associated expenses.\(^9\) However, one can conclude from the short overview provided above that the mechanisms were not harmonized. On the one hand, different mechanisms had the same target (electricity distribution network companies, for instance, were eligible for all the mechanisms). On the other hand, they were incomplete for two reasons. First, transmission was not fully able to participate in these mechanisms before 2007. Second, non-network players were not able to participate as well, hence preventing the (still monopolistic) network activities being opened to competition.

1.2.4 Benefits for Companies

A consumer association, Citizens Advice, blamed the RPI–X regulation and its application by Ofgem for providing excessive remuneration to the regulated companies, as proved by their ability to significantly outperform the baseline set by the regulator.\(^10\) During the last RPI–X regulatory periods, ending respectively in 2013 for transmission and 2015 for distribution, while the allowed return on equity was set close to 6 per cent, its effective value was generally closer to 9 per cent or 10 per cent, once the rewards and penalties stemming from the various incentive regulation schemes were considered. Only once did two distribution companies get an effective return on equity below the normal rate. Indeed, a network company, by cumulating the rewards or the penalties of the different incentive regulatory schemes, had the possibility to increase its remuneration or be penalized by 400 base points over or below the allowed rate of return on equity.

Nevertheless, it is undeniable that RPI–X regulation in the electricity sector was a great success. Prices decreased over the RPI–X regulation periods by 30–50 per cent (transmission to distribution). Quality of service improved significantly, with a reduction in power cuts by more than 10 per cent in number of events and 30 per cent in duration, a drastic increase in the level of investments (almost multiplied by two compared with the pre-privatization period) and transformed use of the power networks by combined-cycle gas turbines (CCGTs) first and then renewables.
These achievements were possible because a temporary rent was left to network companies. Despite the temptation to reduce allowed revenues and regulatory rewards to better-off consumers or return efficiency gains to consumers more quickly, the theory of incentive regulation shows that doing so would destroy any incentive for companies to improve their efficiency level over time. Meanwhile, an upgrade of regulation itself is always welfare improving because it may either lower costs or provide higher value and quality of service for the network users or both simultaneously. The continued improvement of regulation in the RPI–X era was in that vein and was the real purpose of refunding it with the RIIO regulation.

1.2.5 Success and Required Improvements

For 20 years RPI–X regulation in Britain was a great success, with major price decreases and an increase in quality of service while triggering a new investment cycle and accompanying the power sector in several transformations.

The RPI–X regulation applied in practice in Britain was built with pragmatism, correcting incentive mechanisms or developing new ones when it was considered necessary. However, the RPI–X regulation had four main drawbacks. First, it resulted in a patchwork of mechanisms whose interactions were neither fully identified nor understood. Second, it had also a short-run bias with a focus on cost saving through a sweating asset regulation. Third, correction patches on outputs and innovations were introduced but they incentivized the regulated companies to focus on the regulator’s expectations rather than on investigating those of the network users. In this regard, since networks are essential for the integration of renewable energy sources and the transition to a low-carbon energy sector, a realignment of regulation with climate policy objectives is needed. Lastly, regulation became a rather intrusive process, with detailed audit and benchmarking reviews, leading to regulatory costs, possibly unaligned with network users’ expectations.

1.3 THE EVOLUTION TOWARDS RIIO

In 2009, Ofgem decided to revise the overall principle of the RPI–X regulation in order to overcome the difficulties identified since its early implementation in the 1990s. The review resulted in the so-called RIIO
regulation where RIIO stands for ‘Revenue = Incentives + Innovation + Outputs’, meaning that the revenues of regulated companies shall be set to deliver strong incentives, innovation and outputs for network users. The RIIO regulation is built keeping in mind that the goal of regulation is to mimic competitive pressure on monopoly firms. The activity of the regulated company thus should be consumer-oriented. Namely, it should focus on i) outputs to improve services to network users, ii) incentives for cost reduction and iii) innovation in order to provide new services and cost reduction in the long run to the benefit of network users.

Meanwhile, what was announced as a revolution, in fact became an evolution. All the elements of the RPI–X regulation are still present (the RPI–X theoretical approach, output-based regulatory schemes and innovation-promoting mechanisms). The RIIO regulation nevertheless has the advantage of overhauling the entire regulatory process with the goal of overcoming the problems identified in the RPI–X regulation. Reorienting regulation towards outputs has then shifted the focus onto network users’ expectations. Besides, the objective of assessing total expenditure (TOTEX, i.e. the sum of OPEX and CAPEX) as well as OPEX and CAPEX individually was also to consider the overall service provided and not different types of costs that are of no immediate relevance for network users. The RIIO regulation also has the characteristics to allow companies to choose their incentive scheme on TOTEX from a so-called menu of contracts, with more or fewer incentives and subsequent potential risks and rewards. Lastly, innovation was fully integrated into the regulatory process and was no longer addressed through disparate mechanisms.

In this section, we start by showing how the RIIO framework is supposed to reflect better the expectations and needs of network users through the regulation of network outputs. Then, we move to consider how a menu of contracts for TOTEX can incentivize efficient behaviour by network companies. Finally, we illustrate how the promotion of innovation has been deeply embedded in the regulatory process.

1.3.1 Output Regulation Reflecting Network Users’ Expectations

RIIO is a performance-based model for setting the network companies’ price controls for a period of eight years. Contrary to RPI–X, the RIIO regulatory framework was built with outputs as the core element: while RPI–X regulation prescribed a set of inputs whose level had to be kept under control by the regulated company, RIIO regulation first defines a
set of outputs to be delivered to network users and only later seeks to deliver them at the cheapest cost.¹¹

Six key output categories have been identified to frame the activity of network regulated companies: customer satisfaction, reliability and availability, safety, conditions for connection, environmental impact, and social obligations. Consumers and stakeholders have participated in the definition of both specific outputs for each category and the expected targets to be achieved by companies. Beside the regulator, the network company may consult them too while realizing its business plan. The company may propose additional or alternative outputs and arrangements on incentives, able to address the specific needs of the stakeholders. Considered in the overall RIIO regulatory process, this opportunity provides powerful incentives for companies to innovate and seek least-cost ways to provide network services.

Outputs were defined to enable the regulator, network companies and stakeholders to have a clear understanding of what is delivered throughout the regulatory periods. Outputs were designed in such a way as to be material, controllable, measurable, comparable, applicable, compatible with the promotion of competition and compliant with legislation.

Output categories that differ from legal requirements or do not benefit from reputational incentives are subject to an adequate incentive scheme. Basically, incentives for safety and connections mainly rely on the general enforcement of legislation. Reputational incentives apply on availability, environmental impact of losses, business carbon footprint publication and visual amenity. In contrast, incentive mechanisms apply to the other categories, namely reliability, customer satisfaction and environmental impact of SF₆, a gas with a major greenhouse effect (several thousand times higher than CO₂) that is used in transformers for electrical insulation. Output regulation also partly applies on safety for network replacement and visual amenity.

The baseline revenue estimate, including investment requirements, will be based on the assessment of efficient costs for delivering the agreed outputs. Performance on outputs subject to regulatory incentive mechanisms then impacts the return on equity earned by the regulated company and can add up or down to the allowed rate of return until 100 base points, hence a remuneration at risk close to 15 per cent of its base level (in the first RIIO regulatory period for transmission (RIIO-T1) and distribution (RIIO-ED1), the return on regulated equity without reward and penalty from incentive schemes was set at 6.7 per cent for distribution companies and close to 7 per cent for transmission companies).
Even if the first regulatory period of RIIO is ongoing, its mid-term review and the letter by Ofgem beginning the discussion on the RIIO-2 framework have shown that some questions on the definition and proper delivery of outputs remain open. One of the main issues is that key performance indicators (KPIs) are sometimes closely related to the realization of one specific investment (examples are shunts or high-voltage direct current lines). Regulatory schemes associated with these KPIs and specific investments are then extremely similar to classic RPI–X regulation, simply capping the cost of these investments. But unexpected events have occurred. For instance, the regulated companies were able to provide some expected outputs with technical solutions that were different from those planned at the beginning of the regulatory period and at a far lower cost. The regulator is hence considering decreasing the cost cap initially designed for this output/investment. Another example also stems from unplanned external factors impacting the need for new investments in order to ensure the delivery of some outputs that have materialized, which then leads to questions about the definition of the associated outputs and their associated baseline level of costs. These questions are classical ones for regulatory-like concession contracts. Regular renegotiations are then needed because of the incompleteness faced with unexpected events. Let us see how Ofgem will cope with that at the end of RIIO-1 and in the design of RIIO-2.

1.3.2 A Menu of Contracts for TOTEX Efficiency Incentives

Besides being oriented towards output regulation, the current British regulatory design is based on a periodic revenue cap mechanism (with an eight-year period rather than the five-year period under the previous RPI–X regulation). The costs budgeted by the companies for regulated activities (operation and investments) in their business plans are taken into account to define the revenue allowances for the regulatory period. The revenue cap mechanism applies to budget costs following a TOTEX design. TOTEX is defined as the sum of CAPEX (i.e. only new investments that are considered completely controllable, but not the historical asset base) and controllable OPEX.12

A major change from the first RIIO regulatory period is the definition of the regulated asset value (RAV).13 In the RPI–X regulation, the RAV was classically defined as the non-depreciated network assets (namely power lines and substations). Other short-life assets such as IT facilities were included in the OPEX and so did not generate any return on
investment. Consequently, there was an incentive for the company to prefer CAPEX over OPEX since CAPEX was generating a return on investment, whereas OPEX was paid at cost only (except when specific incentive mechanisms applied). The network companies were also allowed to retain more efficiency gains on CAPEX than on OPEX, amplifying their interest in CAPEX.

To avoid this pitfall, Ofgem decided to change the way the RAV is defined (see Box 1.2). Now, the RAV is not only made up of CAPEX; a fixed part of total expenditures, whether CAPEX or OPEX, is included each year. The TOTEX capitalization rate, then, defines the part of TOTEX (so-called slow money) that is included in the RAV. A TOTEX capitalization rate of between 85 per cent and 90 per cent has been set for network companies (based on historical shares between OPEX and CAPEX). The non-capitalized part of TOTEX and non-controllable costs taken together form the so-called fast money and are funded in the year of expenditure. The RAV is then depreciated assuming that the new capitalized TOTEX is depreciated in a straight-line manner during 45 years on average.\textsuperscript{14,15}

The revenue cap is applied on network companies’ TOTEX with a menu of contracts mechanism (see Chapter 2, Section 2.3.1 for further information on the menu of contracts tool). This scheme is known as the Information Quality Incentive (IQI). The regulator targets two results with this menu of contracts. The first goal is to decrease information asymmetry as the network companies select the incentive scheme they think is more appropriate to their situation, hence revealing their target cost. Second, this incentive scheme defines the sharing factor applied to the gains or losses the network company may incur compared with the target cost. For instance, the contracts proposed by the regulator to the regulated company in the regulatory menu go from a 40 per cent to a 50 per cent sharing of efficiency gains above the target and a $\pm$2.5 per cent additional income reward/penalty.

The TOTEX allowances and efficiency targets are computed based on a combination of several methods (disaggregated analysis of CAPEX and OPEX, efficiency audits, consultation process, benchmarking). International benchmarking is used only to inform the overall Ofgem assessment of the companies’ forecasts. No mechanical application of benchmarking as incentive scheme is implemented. Rather, it is used in the stakeholder consultation process for the regulator to assess the cost of the network companies’ business plan and set the TOTEX allowances, but not to set the maximal allowed revenue itself.\textsuperscript{16}
Incentive on TOTEX may increase or decrease the return on regulated equity by 300 base points (compared with a base level fixed at 6.7 per cent for distribution companies and around 7 per cent for transmission companies). This means that the remuneration of a network company in Great Britain can be increased by more than 40 per cent if it reaches all the efficiency and output objectives set in the RIIO regulation. The TOTEX incentive accounts for more than 75 per cent of the whole level of incentives.

**BOX 1.2 ADJUSTMENT OF TOTEX, RAV AND REVENUE TO EXTERNAL FACTORS AND REVENUE FORMULA**

The TOTEX and, consequently, the RAV can be adjusted because of changes in drivers of expenditures (generation or demand connections, relieving internal network constraints, etc.). A baseline for a part of TOTEX (so-called load-related expenditures) thus is defined for the whole regulatory period based on some assumptions of drivers of the network companies’ activities. Changes in these drivers lead to additional TOTEX allowances. These drivers are the volume of new generation connections, new demand connections, additional transfer capability to relieve internal network constraints, integration of renewables, cost of mitigation measures to gain consent for reduction in visual amenity and funding for delivering outputs in RIIO-T2.

The RAV is also updated by inflation level. It is remunerated at the weighted average cost of capital (WACC) value. Besides, a two-year lag is introduced to make the tariff predictable enough. The authorized revenue $R_N$ for year $N$ is determined as follows:

$$ R_N = \text{FastMoney}_{N-2} + D_N + WACC \times RAV_N + A_{N-2} + I_{N-2} $$

with $D_N$ depreciation of the RAV for year $N$, $A_{N-2}$ adjustment from the year $N-2$, and $I_{N-2}$ financial incentive from the year $N-2$.

**1.3.3 Full Integration of Innovation in the Regulatory Process**

The RIIO regulation encourages technical and commercial innovation through the core incentives of price control, innovation stimulus package and competition, with the option of giving responsibility for delivery to third parties.

The core incentives of the RIIO regulation stimulate innovation with the price control framework. First, firms are incentivized to innovate and
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deliver the outputs asked by consumers and beyond through associated schemes of output regulation. Second, firms which innovate are rewarded through the normal mechanism of retaining part of the efficiency savings they achieve. Indeed, their incentive to innovate is higher in the RIIO regulation than in the RPI–X regulation because they retain efficiency gains over a longer regulatory period (eight versus five years). Lastly, companies can propose, in their business plans, the roll-out of innovative technologies, techniques or commercial strategies, which may impose higher costs in the price control period than the business-as-usual approach but that are justified by the longer-term delivery of outputs at lower cost to customers.

However, innovation also requires other mechanisms outside the price control framework. Indeed, where the commercial benefit of innovation is not clear, network companies may not have a strong motivation to pursue innovation in a timely way. It then requires the development of further specific schemes in order to encourage innovation (see Chapter 2, Section 2.3.3 for additional thoughts on the regulation of innovation).

An innovation stimulus package was then built as a starter to supplement incentives inherent to the RIIO price control framework. It provides partial financing for innovative projects intended to meet environmental objectives, not just those related to the low-carbon agenda. It relies on two processes: first, innovation allowance, and second, the network innovation competition.

Innovation allowances provide directly for small-scale innovation projects, with companies having the opportunity to self-certify against set criteria. The allowance is between 0.5 per cent and 1 per cent of total allowed revenues, depending on the quality of the supporting innovation strategy. In principle, it is similar to the previous IFI and to the First Tier funding available under the LCN Fund.

Besides, partial funding can be awarded through the Electricity Network Innovation Competition (NIC) scheme. An independent panel is appointed to evaluate the bids submitted. Ofgem then takes the final decisions on the awarding of funding based on the panel’s assessment. Contrary to all the other innovation mechanisms previously mentioned (under the umbrella of the RPI–X regulation or the RIIO regulation), network and non-network parties are eligible to apply for funding to help progress projects at any stage of innovation, from early research activities to trials and pilot schemes. The amount of funding available for electricity networks was initially £95 million per year, including £30 million per year for transmission. It is now closer to £45 million per year.
Funding can reach up to 90 per cent of the project costs, with the rest to be financed through network tariffs. Non-network parties are eligible to participate and compete in the innovation stimulus package if they satisfy a set of criteria. They must hold an ‘innovation licence’, demonstrate that they are well placed to undertake innovation related to network services, notably showing an ability to understand network operation, have qualified specialists, have experience on relevant projects and a fully worked-up proposal for an innovative project. They should also have facilitated access to the network. Indeed, if the innovation project proposed by a non-network company involves trialling on a network, the company should seek to arrange for this access in advance of making the bid for innovation stimulus funding. If it is unable to secure agreement from a network company, the governance panel of the innovation stimulus package will decide whether to recommend that Ofgem considers taking action to require a network company to facilitate access.

1.3.4 A Major Evolution, Not a Revolution

The RIIO regulation is a major evolution of the RPI–X regulation. It allows for a less intrusive regulatory process if companies’ proposed business plans are satisfactory for network users, stakeholders and the regulator. Hence, it is based on a consultation process and focuses on network users’ needs. Through the definition of appropriate outputs, RIIO regulation mimics competition pressure and fosters the emergence of services needed by network users and the proposal of innovative solutions to their benefit. Besides, under RIIO, the regulatory schemes are harmonized if not merged to avoid inefficient arbitrages by the companies. Nevertheless, the RIIO regulation remains grounded on the same theoretical principle that underpinned RPI–X regulation.

1.4 CONCLUSION

The application of the RPI–X regulation in Britain has been an example if not a source of inspiration for many regulators in Europe and worldwide, showing the possibility of applying concretely the RPI–X principle, its pitfalls, the improvements needed to adapt it to real situations or unexpected and unintended observed effects. The RIIO regulation is also viewed with much interest by regulators and network operators since it
Electricity network regulation in the EU shows, on the one hand, new regulatory forms and, on the other hand, new opportunities and risks for regulated companies.

From a theoretical and practical point of view, the change from the RPI–X regulation to the RIIO regulation shows that prior to cutting costs, it is necessary to identify what users expect from the network service and the possible alternatives. Otherwise, regulation incentivizes companies to decrease outputs in order to reduce costs, at the expense of network value for users. This concretely stems from a lack of a proper mathematical definition of the network cost function. If it had been available, more modelling of regulation would have been possible, and deeper economic understanding of wanted and unwanted consequences of the different regulatory schemes applied or proposed would also have been possible. It explains, too, why it is difficult to assess efficiency factors whatever the benchmarking methods applied, because it is difficult to compare the performance of a given company over time and circumstances and with peers. With such a mathematical definition of a network cost function, it would have been possible to have more parametric econometric analyses, better grounded on the physical and organizational principles of network activity. A network cost function could also be very valuable to enrich the seminal works on incentive regulation and to help it evolve.

Despite the undeniable great improvements in regulation, there have been, since the outset, persisting difficulties with assessing efficiency factors, defining network outputs and fostering innovation in a regulated environment. There is still work for practitioners and theoreticians in this regard. The recent and dense letter by Ofgem (2017) opening the consultation on the RIIO-2 framework shows that the British energy regulator wants to keep improving the current framework in all its dimensions: better definition of outputs and associated delivery; and improvements in the process of setting incentives for cost reduction and innovation. One can expect that Great Britain will remain at the forefront of this field for some time.

NOTES

1. In this chapter we focus on Great Britain. Other parts of the UK, such as Northern Ireland, are not considered here.
2. National Grid has changed its name several times since its unbundling and privatization in 1990. For the sake of simplicity and generality, we use its most common denomination.
3. National Grid also owns and operates the high-pressure gas pipelines in the whole of Great Britain. Additionally, the company has a minority stake in some British gas distribution networks and investments in electricity and gas grids in North America.

4. Ofgem was formed in 1999 by the merger of the Office of Electricity Regulation (Ofer) and the Office of Gas Supply (Ofgas). The two sector-specific regulators were initially created by the British government with the Gas Act of 1986 and the Electricity Act of 1989.

5. Under the incentive regulation framework established in the 1990s, the acronyms DPCR and TPCR denoted, respectively, a Distribution Price Control Review and a Transmission Price Control Review. For a chronology of the price control reviews see Tables 1.1 and 1.2.

6. One of the largest uncertainties concerns the level of electricity demand, which in turn affects the estimation of the efficient average cost for the network firm.

7. To be precise, the British regulator of the electricity sector was, until 2000, Ofer. However, for the sake of simplicity, we refer here generically to its heir, Ofgem.

8. Defined in this way, the RPZ incentive scheme can be considered as a form of innovation output regulation. Conversely, the IFI can be seen as a form of innovation input regulation.

9. In a report for Ofgem, the consultancies Mott MacDonald and BPI (2004) estimated a net benefit for customers of £92 million due to the RPZ mechanism and of £386 million due to IFI. Costs for customers were respectively estimated at about £29 million and £57 million.


11. As we have seen in Section 1.2, a focus on outputs was present also within the RPI–X regulation. Nevertheless, in that case the focus aimed merely to avoid cost reduction by network firms being realized at the expense of service quality.

12. Non-controllable OPEX is outside TOTEX and incentive regulation. It is directly passed through to the network users. It mainly includes the licence fees, the business rates (a tax on the occupation of non-domestic property in England and Wales), pensions and pensions schemes administration, and the costs related to the Inter-TSO compensation mechanism.
13. The definition of RAV is very close to that of RAB. They are sometimes used interchangeably.
14. The assets of the network companies that were already in place before the introduction of RIIO regulation will continue to depreciate over 20 years.
15. The work in progress is integrated in the TOTEX and so in the RAV, under the condition that the considered asset eventually provides the required output.
16. Ofgem’s view on international benchmarking in the RIIO regulation is as follows:

Under the RIIO regulatory framework, international benchmarking is a key element of the cost assessment toolkit, and we will continue developing our international dataset and TOTEX benchmarking methods during this price control. We will also ask the TOs to put forward more international benchmarking analysis themselves at both an aggregate and disaggregated level. However, having considered the emerging issues such as availability and maturity of the data for international comparators and stakeholders’ concern on the robustness of international benchmarking, we intend to rebalance the role of TOTEX benchmarking in RIIO-T1. Although we will take the results of TOTEX benchmarking into consideration when we assess cost efficiencies of network companies, we will focus more on disaggregated cost assessment approaches.

REFERENCES


