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# Introduction

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## THE LOCI OF “CULTURE” TODAY

Recent years have witnessed the increased likelihood of encountering culturally sensitive news that is spread around the world and poses acute questions concerning our identities on individual, social and national levels. Each time this happens, our own discernment and judgment are called upon and put into question.

The *Charlie Hebdo* attack in January 2015 is a good example. Seventeen people were killed in successive attacks on the satirical magazine *Charlie Hebdo* and a kosher supermarket in Paris. It was France’s worst terrorist attack in a generation and was reported worldwide. The three suspects, shot dead by the heavily armed French elite forces, were second-generation Muslim immigrants from Algeria and Mali who were influenced by radical Islamist views.

A rally for unity in Paris was headed by more than 40 world leaders, including Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu and Palestinian President Mahmoud Abbas, and Ukrainian President Petro Poroshenko and Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov. According to the French Interior Ministry, 3.7 million marched throughout France, including roughly between 1.2 and 1.6 million in Paris, setting a record as the largest demonstration in French history. The “Je suis Charlie” (I am Charlie) slogan became synonymous with “anti-terrorism” and “freedom of expression” and echoed around the world. The front cover of *Charlie Hebdo* right after the attack depicted the Muslim prophet Muhammad wearing a white robe and turban and shedding a tear while holding a “Je Suis Charlie” sign, under the headline “Tout Est Pardonné” (All is Forgiven).

It goes without saying the suppression of free speech by violence is inexcusable. It would have been possible instead to file a case against the magazine (*Charlie Hebdo* had lost most cases when sued for defamation of character). Resorting to terrorism served only to increase prejudice and discrimination against Islam rather than to ameliorate it. It is quite ironic that a policeman killed by the terrorist attack in front of the publisher’s building was Muslim.

However, there arose a worldwide controversy over the editorial policy of *Charlie Hebdo*, and many voiced “Je ne suis pas Charlie” (I am not

Charlie). Where is the boundary between satire and hate speech? Satire is a citizenship's cultural responses to a history of oppression. However, for the Islamic tradition, despite some differences between sects and regions, isn't satirizing its founder essentially an act of blasphemy?

Where is the boundary between freedom of speech and violence of speech? Freedom of speech is regarded as a universal value in France, inheriting the spirit of the Enlightenment and the French Revolution and epitomizing the liberation from religion's heavy yoke. It is the Republic's laws, not Islamic laws (*sharia*), that govern the state of France, founded upon the principle of laicism. However, should this universal value in France be allowed to offend Muslims around the world? Should the same attention be paid to anti-Muslim discourses as is paid to anti-Jewish ones?

The predecessor of *Charlie Hebdo* was banned when it ran a satirical cartoon of the death of President Charles de Gaulle in 1970. Public reaction to a satirical cartoon was very different this time. It could be taken as Islamophobic or anti-Muslim in the guise of the universal value of freedom of speech. Or, is it fair to juxtapose France (or European, Western, modern, and so on) with Islam? It might be true that one can be free by staying away from God in France, whereas one can be free by embracing God in Islam. Yet, if we place absolute trust in our own principles while demonizing those of others, they will remain incompatible forever. Of course, we have to remember that the majority of Muslims in France (and Europe generally) were, in reality, born in France.

Many people around the world, whether "Je suis Charlie" or "Je ne suis pas Charlie," tried to make sense of the *Charlie Hebdo* attack by drawing upon convenient cultural narratives to defend their identities and legitimize their theories of justice. With the increasing global mobility of people, goods, capital and information, this is not solely a French problem. Sociocultural categories and boundaries are becoming more sensitized and negotiated.

This *Handbook* is a collection of chapters exploring this politics of culture in the age of globalization through case studies from various parts of the world. "Culture" is a broad concept, often synonymous with education, knowledge, belief, ideology, consciousness, discourse, art, values, morality, customs, tradition, and so on. In this volume, we approach culture in its relation to "non-traditional" security, especially "human security" and "soft power." When the risks and costs incurred by the dearth of cultural sensitivity and literacy are becoming higher and more global, the relationship between culture and security deserves re-examination.

## SUPER-MODERN AND POST-MODERN

Our time is often referred to as the Age of Globalization. Historical and geographical demarcation is, in essence, highly arbitrary, and it ultimately depends on how a boundary is drawn by whom, to whom, where, when and for what. Therefore, it is even possible to regard the entire human history as that of globalization. One can go back to the East–West interactions in ancient times, to the Age of Discovery (or Exploration) from the mid-fifteenth century in Europe, the establishment of the international monetary and trade system in the post-World War II era by the United States, and so on. Thus, it is not a strict term with a clear demarcation. In this volume, we tentatively refer to the historical period since the 1990s, when the term “internationalization” became obsolete, which is characterized by worldwide spread of the market economy after the end of the Cold War, as well as by the ubiquitous expansion of information and communication technology, or the “Third Industrial Revolution” (Rifkin 2011).

On the one hand, the development of the market economy and information technology are characteristics of modernization, and our time can be regarded merely as an intensification and expansion of the “modern.” That is to say, “globalization” here means “super-modern.” As time and space become compressed, for example, our times witness the proliferation of “non-places” (Auge 1995) such as airports, highways, hotels, convenience stores, fast food restaurant chains, ATMs, and online shopping malls. Most everyday chores may take place in such non-places, which lack distinctive local identities. Globalization in this context is an extension of modern logic of “the faster, the farther,” and the competition for super-modernity is becoming fiercer in many aspects of our lives.

On the other hand, however, it would be wrong to equate globalization solely with being super-modern. Globalization in our times has another characteristic: as being “post-modern.” After the Peace of Westphalia in 1648 ushered in the age of modern sovereign states in Europe, there began the political integration of local populations as nations in the West and in Japan in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries. Especially after World War II, the nation-state became the basic unit of international relations, and nation-building accelerated in other regions as well. It was considered to be more efficient and stable to have a culturally homogeneous population in advancing the modern state faster and farther. Therefore, the education of the national language and history, the erection of national monuments, the publication of national newspapers, the broadcasting of national radio and television, were strenuously pursued to create an “imaged community” (Anderson 1983). Through that process, certain

traits of culture were “invented” as “tradition” (Hobsbawm and Ranger 1983) or “forgotten” (Renan 1882).

However, the development of the market economy and information technology has shaken the foundations of the nation-state. It was in 1987 that Daniel Bell wrote, “the nation-state is becoming too small for the big problems of life, and too big for the small problems of life . . . In short, there is a mismatch of scale” (Bell 1987). With the progress of globalization, we have become more aware of the limits of functions and authorities of the nation-state and the power of multinational corporations (MNCs) and civil society organizations (CSOs). There arose a view of this post-modern development as an arrival of “new medievalism” (Bull 1977).

Thus, globalization has two facets: as “super-modern” and “post-modern.” On the one hand, the logic and efficacy of modernity is more emphasized and vigorously pursued; but on the other hand, the very process penetrates and undermines the sociocultural and institutional foundations. The nation-state, while facing up to global competition, is confronted by its limits of function and authority.

## THE QUESTION OF CULTURAL SECURITY

These two dimensions of globalization pose different questions to the loci of culture today. On the one hand, as globalization as “super-modern” proceeds, culture is increasingly considered to be a resource of competition in the market and by the nation-state. Including “non-places” such as airports and hotels, as mentioned above, urban planning, transportation, landscape, architecture, arts, sports, entertainment, education, medicine, health and cultural diversity have all come to assume economic values. Also, not only corporations but also the nation-state (and its capital and big cities) are now involved in global competition for “soft power” (Nye 2004); namely attractiveness, credibility and legitimacy. Therefore, we need to debate tax codes, intellectual property, tourism, land development and population not merely from economic viewpoints, but also from cultural ones; that is, as resources of soft power.

On the other hand, as globalization as “post-modern” proceeds, cultural properties often associated with the nation-state are challenged, made irrelevant, undermined or endangered. The nationalist or populist backlash is common. So is the politics of fear and division. At the same time, when the economic and welfare protection afforded by the nation-state becomes enfeebled, neoliberal ideology exerts a more dominant power in society, often trivializing minority cultures and local traditions. The widening gap in income between rich and poor has become

conspicuous in many parts of the world, often causing social unrest and cultural discontinuity. Under such circumstances, there is an urgent necessity to look at culture as a “safety net” of one’s identity, that is, as an integral element of “human security” (Commission on Human Security 2003).

In the field of international relations, both soft power and human security are usually regarded as constituting the realms of “non-traditional security,” whereas the military and the economy (“hard power” in Nye’s terminology) are the main preoccupations of “traditional security.” Our *Handbook* deals with culture in its relation to non-traditional security, and it is in this sense that we use the term “cultural security” here.

We aim at heightening our awareness of the unique and delicate interplay between culture and security in the age of globalization. The dearth of such awareness is risky and costly, when we imagine how our world should and can be. This volume is the first to directly address and explore this emerging concept, despite the publication of several books with the same title but much narrower focus (such as the protection of indigenous traditions and cultural heritage).

## CULTURE AND HUMAN SECURITY

Part I of the volume, consisting of 12 chapters, focuses on the state and role of culture as a “safety net,” that is, its relationship to human security. How are cultural identities, values and traditions challenged, appropriated and negotiated? What does “being secured” mean? How are we to deal with the questions of cultural relativism and incommensurability in framing issues? What are the paradoxes of our “goodwill” in engaging with those at risk? What are the limits of our empathy and humanity? What actions are needed to ameliorate the status quo? Each of these chapters, drawn from diverse cases in different countries, provides a window onto these questions.

Chapter 1 provides an overview of how the notion of cultural security has come to the fore within the humanities and social sciences. The question of “security” was once just political and social, but today is becoming more cultural, and the author argues that “[f]or some, ‘cultural security’ refers to the possibility of reproducing their culture; for others, to the possibility of producing new cultural forms.” As a case study, the problems posed for France by present-day terrorism – that is, radical Islamism and the related issues of immigration and Islam – are discussed in depth. The author then expands the scope of analysis to the question of how we can resist tendencies to the closure of countries and to violence in our

troublesome times, and achieve a higher degree of acceptance of the values of peace, discussion and negotiation.

Chapter 2 addresses the question of radical Islamism through a case study of Indonesia, the country with the single largest population of Muslims in the world, allegedly hosting 13 percent of the world's Muslims. Refuting the view of Islam or Muslims as a monolithic entity, the author traces how many newly independent Muslim countries adopted the Western model of the nation-state after World War II, together with secular ideologies that were often rejected by some Muslims as being incompatible with and even hostile to Islam. As such, the author maintains that "[t]he failure of these secular states in their modernization programs has only provided another impetus for the 'Islamists' to consolidate their efforts to replace their respective regimes."

Chapter 3 problematizes our enduring preoccupation with "racial" thinking. While it has been a while since biological bases of race have been scientifically denied, the concept of biological race is still appropriated in society. The author revisits "historical accounts of the horrific tragedies that were driven and justified by racist ideology" in the United States and demystifies persistent folk theories of the genetic inferiority of African Americans. Of particular importance to the discussion is the author's critique of the relationship between new developments in genomic technology and neo-racism. The use of new genomic technologies predicated on wrong racial assumptions serve only to exacerbate public mythology. The author argues that "[n]eo-racism is an ideology that threatens the security of all cultures."

Chapter 4 deals with indigenous peoples and traditional communities. The author points out why "intellectual property is not a good fit for TK [traditional knowledge] and TCEs [traditional cultural expressions]." Many examples elaborated here include the concept of "public domain" and "author-centric approach of copyright." Underlying in this assertion is that intellectual property is socially constructed, basically reflecting Western ideology about culture. However, as such, it has been constantly changing, adapting to new sociocultural milieus. For example, as the author argues, "the Australian and New Zealand experiences show that it is possible to take indigenous concerns and interests into account without having to significantly modify the core of intellectual property."

Chapter 5 continues the discussion on indigenous peoples with a focus on strategies for their language revitalization and maintenance in Canada, the United States and around the world. According to the authors, "newer research suggests" that in addition to continuing knowledge transmission, "maintaining heritage languages and cultures is correlated with the welfare of the speaker community." Reviewing the work of leading scholars

in the field as well as new data, the authors report on the current state of documentation materials, curriculum development, post-secondary programs and partnerships with universities and researchers. At a time when indigenous nations are growing at unprecedented rates, more proactive initiatives, not only at school but also at home and in the community, are needed than ever before.

Chapter 6 questions another Western notion: sexuality and its education program. Drawing data from the Southern African region, the authors illuminate how its overarching socio-religious worldview is distinct from the Western perspective, making “international standards” of sexuality education program less relevant to the “epicenter of the HIV/AIDS pandemic” in the world. For example, “it is considered a taboo to discuss sexuality matters with or in the presence of children, until they are ready for their rite of passage into adulthood,” according to the authors. Remaining silent about sexuality is a virtue, not a shame, in their ontology. The authors introduce a positive initiative in Zambia which is not fixated in Western-hegemonic approaches, but integrates Western-centered perspectives with indigenous forms of knowledge.

Chapter 7 turns to the spread of Western cosmology to the rest of the world through the prism of religion. At least three-quarters of Pentecostals and Charismatics are found in sub-Saharan Africa, the Asian Pacific rim and in most of Latin America, and this is the fastest-growing sector of Christianity and considered to be the fastest-growing religious movement in the contemporary world. Scrutinizing how Pentecostal and Charismatic forms of Christianity have gained popular support in the Global South, with in-depth case studies of South Africa and Honduras, the authors submit that Pentecostalism “provides cultural security for people who have profound and almost constant instability in their life experiences.”

Chapter 8 examines international adoption as another window onto the relationship between identity and security. Offering a comprehensive analysis of its historical trajectories and controversial debates, the author pays special attention to the role of artistic work (for example, film, visual art, songwriting, graphic narratives, poetry and memoir) to “express, document, and share their personal stories as well as collective histories of international adoptees.” The powerful experience of three artists, all adopted in the United States from Vietnam, Guatemala, and Korea, are detailed in order to illuminate its potency for the cultural security of international adoptees as well as for updating “our definitions of family, identity, and home” in the age of globalization.

Chapter 9 continues the discussion on identity and home through the question of statelessness, that is, people who are not considered nationals by any state. More than 10 million people in the world are estimated to fall

into this category today. However, the linkages between nationality status and cultural security have not been made explicit in academic discourses and policy debates. Building on historical analysis and literature review, the author proposes to overcome a disjuncture between legal provisions (including the United Nations statelessness conventions) and human security: “nationality should be understood not simply as a legal concept or the exclusive matter of human rights, but also as a category substantively related to the personal freedoms.”

Chapter 10 shifts the focus to community life, namely the issues of gated communities. As a means to seek a refuge from fear of crime and insecure outside world, such privately governed, wealthy communities have proliferated not only in the United States but also in Africa, Southeast Asia and Latin America. China is no exception. Utilizing rare empirical data from the typical Chinese city of Nanchang, the authors investigate perceived and actual security, and expose a persistent sense of anxiety among the residents, while social costs of spatial partitioning remain high. The loss of shared memory and community bonds, according to the authors, “places considerable stresses on cultural security in this age of rapid upward mobility, rural–urban mobility, urban–urban mobility and globalization.”

Chapter 11 explores the prevalence of distributed sensor networks, video surveillance, and predictive analytics under the banner of “smart cities.” Drawing upon a handful of case studies from US cities participating in IBM’s Smarter Cities Challenges initiative, the author reveals that it does in effect “mobilize a neoliberal orientation to governance that positions the public sector as in the service of private companies.” While surveillance is officially intended to enhance security, seek efficiency, and revitalize the local economy, “hidden technological protocols threaten to further normalize neoliberal arrangements and exacerbate social inequalities.” This is a classic example of a supposedly autonomous self whose identity is actually defined externally. “Surveillance becomes the logic of the smart city,” the author observes.

Chapter 12 provides a much-needed analysis of arts-related programs as a means to promote community empowerment and cultural security. “The arts have been heralded as a panacea for all kinds of problems,” as the author claims. However, their impacts have been little substantiated or overtly subjective, which has either undermined or overestimated the role of culture in society. Through a critical review of literature on arts impact studies, the author exposes conceptual and methodological traps that arts advocates and researchers tend to fall into. Evaluation is always vexing when it involves anything cultural, but public demand for accountability is on the increase. “[S]mall investments in research yield strong results that

can be leveraged to advance public policy and private philanthropy,” as the author maintains.

These topics are obviously the tip of the iceberg confronting culture as a safety net or part of human security in our times. Other topics that should receive our special attention include (but are by no means limited to): international human trafficking and modern-day slavery; conflict minerals; risk society and social responsibility; pharmaceutical companies and global health insecurities; food industry and cultural risks. We need more concerted efforts beyond disciplinary boundaries to explore this aspect of cultural security.

## CULTURE AND SOFT POWER

Part II of the volume, consisting of another 12 chapters, focuses on the state and role of culture as a resource of global competition, that is, its relationship to soft power. Geopolitical realism regarding territory, energy, and natural resources is gaining ground, and so is national competition in terms of “soft power”: the state’s ability to define the status quo, set agendas, and make rules, or in political scientist Joseph Nye’s well-known phrase, to “get others to want the outcomes that you want” (Nye 2004, p. 5). Does soft power really matter before geopolitics? Is soft power just a new version of cultural imperialism? What are the paradoxes of soft power and its conceptual oversights? How far can non-state actors exercise and wield soft power? How can soft power serve to benefit global common goods beyond national interests? Are soft power and “human security” compatible? These questions are examined through such cases as the state’s external policy advocacy, international broadcasting, exchange diplomacy, cultural diplomacy and developmental and disaster relief aid.

Chapter 13 revisits the concept of soft power as proposed by Nye (and promulgated by many) and problematizes two missing points. First, the whole discussion tends to be made at the country (unit) level, not at the international systemic (order) level. The author argues that we are prone to overlook “ideational sharing of the same norms, principles, rules, and procedures with regard to economic transactions, defense policies, and other diplomatic protocols” by the member countries of an international order. Second, soft power can be successfully imported by other countries. As such, the author submits that “China, which is not a democratic country, can still lead the order if it firmly sticks to the principles and norms of openness (the free market) and multilateralism.”

Chapter 14 takes another critical look at the concept of soft power, from an Iranian perspective. The authors, referring to such thinkers as

Antonio Gramsci and Edward Said, extract United States exceptionalism and Orientalism as the two constitutive ideologies behind soft power discourses for the promotion of a liberal international order. “Modernization theory” during the Cold War and human rights discourse today are closely linked to that America-centric world order. Situating the rise of political Islam as a “counter-hegemonic” current to “open the space for de-Americanizing soft power discourses,” the authors advocate that “the most forceful soft power blow to a Western-centered world came from the movement of Imam Khomeini.”

Chapter 15 questions the conceptual foundation of “cultural diplomacy” as a means of wielding soft power. Historically it has been a toolkit of the nation-state and predicated on the existence of a “national culture.” Appraising the historical trajectory of cultural diplomacy in the United States and Europe from the late nineteenth century, the authors shed light on the roles of non-state actors in this essentially state-orchestrated exercise over culture to pursue national interest. “It could be argued that the very notion of a soft power ‘strategy’ indicates state efforts to corral these multifarious actors into a common agenda centred upon state competitiveness or security.” As national security has become an acute concern in our times, the whole discourse on cultural security could easily be appropriated in this scheme.

Chapter 16 looks into diaspora community as one of the non-state actors for soft power today. As the global mobility of people, goods, capital, and information intensifies, the roles of a community of people who live outside their shared country of origin (or ancestry) have magnified. Focusing on the migrant community from India, which has the largest diaspora population in the world, the authors scrutinize the soft power role of this hugely heterogeneous group with equally heterogeneous categories of people within Indian diaspora, and India’s response towards them. With its greater impacts on India’s economy and national security, the authors maintain that diaspora as an instrument of state power can be used as hard power, soft power or agents of soft power to pursue hard power.

Chapter 17 begins by depicting how the Ottoman Empire attempted to reconstruct its international image to meet European standards and thus fortify its security in the nineteenth century. Then, the authors discuss the concept of “nation branding” (and global indices and soft power) as congruous with a corporate branding approach; as such, they suspect that “image-conscious policy choices are likely to create more opportunities for low politics to occupy a larger place in international relations, while encouraging countries to communicate with foreign target audiences to establish stronger reputations.” If that is the case, the way in which

international relations is understood and conducted could be significantly altered in due course.

Chapter 18 takes up the case of higher education as a source soft power in international relations. Global competition is fierce, and global indices are abundant in this field. Specifically, the author examines soft power effects of international education, focusing on international branch campuses. The chapter reveals that there is no guarantee that more exchange will produce more understanding and cordial relations, or positive soft power results for the hosting countries. Those effects are more context-dependent. The author reports that “at least in some cases, the implantation of offshore campuses of Western institutions is being perceived as a normative threat, and while for sure being attractive for many students, it also produces resistance.”

Chapter 19 focuses on one of the most conspicuous soft power initiatives in international education today: China’s Confucius Institutes. First set up in Seoul in 2004, and currently with 511 Confucius Institutes and 1073 smaller Confucius Classrooms in 140 countries around the world, they aim to “promote Chinese language and culture in foreign countries.” They are often criticized for being “a propaganda tool of the Communist Party or as undermining academic freedom at host universities.” The authors, comparing Confucius Institutes in Kenya and South Africa, explore the potentials and practical constraints of the state-run initiatives as a first contact point for people interested in Chinese language and culture.

Chapter 20 turns to the soft power competition in pop culture in East Asia. There is optimism that pop culture connects youth above and beyond their differences and thus serves as a common, collaborative platform for a better future. As Nye argues, soft power can be a win–win game, rather than a zero-sum game. However, the author, comparing the unique historical and political circumstances of China, South Korea and Japan, elucidates three identifiable factors that render such proposition moot. “[I]t is best to view the regional pop and media cultural competition as essentially industrial market competition for visual and audio attention, for commercial profit, and that the respective governments will take whatever ideological payoffs there are, if any, as serendipitous returns.”

Chapter 21 takes a unique look at the biotope in which creative professions – that is, producers of soft power resources – are nurtured. Based on in-depth interviews, panel discussions, and surveys of various disciplines (architecture, visual art, dance, theater, film) in Europe, the author reveals how a balance between four domains within the biotope (the domestic domain, that of one’s peers, the market, and the civil domain) that has sustained a long-term artistic career is made insecure under the influence of artistic, economic, and political globalization,

especially by a European Union policy that takes the global free market logic as its primary base to construct a unified “monotopic” identity. The prospect of the “creative commons” or the institutions of the commons is also examined as an alternative.

Chapter 22 delves into the roles of heritage or “heritage diplomacy” in international relations. Heritage is “a type of governance that informs our engagements with and perceptions of space, time, people and cultures.” Revisiting the history and methods of heritage diplomacy, the author demonstrates that heritage has great potential to serve as a means of exchanges, collaborations, and mutual understanding. However, just because it is so closely associated with a “sense of ownership and presence,” heritage diplomacy tends to be laden with risks and limitations, whether historical, territorial, or religious. The author illustrates these points with ample examples from all over the world, and offers the future directions of governance in the age of globalization and digital connectivity.

Chapter 23 introduces a unique experiment in the European Union to evaluate the risks for media pluralism and media freedom as the foundation of democratic society and soft power. The results of the 2016 implementation of the Media Pluralism Monitor in the 28 EU member states and two candidate countries (Turkey and Montenegro) are analyzed in full detail. Enabling a holistic and comparative assessment of different national media contexts, the Monitor has good potential to be applied to non-European countries as well. The authors argue that “[t]he need for new instruments to measure the state of health of our media systems, in a world of ‘fake news’ and ‘post-truth’, where the Internet increasingly conditions and disrupts traditional media, appears to have a global dimension.”

Chapter 24 explores the question of cultural security in Ukraine, a “battlefield where ‘Russian World’ principles and pan-European values have clashed.” Postulating that “cultural security in Ukraine is within the realm of informational security,” the author delineates the legal efforts of the Ukrainian government to “control the dissemination and use of Russian cultural artefacts in the media” in order to protect “(Western) European values of freedom and democracy.” Legal accounts are also provided to illustrate a potential risk that the governmental language media restrictions paradoxically undermine the principle of media pluralism and media freedom, and thus Ukraine’s new identity as part of Europe. Winning soft power (for example, attractiveness, legitimacy and credibility) requires walking a fine line with losing it.

No one knows how long the term “globalization” itself will remain in use in the near future. However, the expansion of the market economy and the innovations in information technology and life sciences seem

irreversible, shaking up the boundaries of cultural identities, values, and traditions as we know them. Furthermore, population aging, the social advancement of women, population concentration in urban areas, the creolization of identity, the rise of middle-class populations in emerging countries, conflict between secularism and fundamentalism, the rise of Africa, the opening of Arctic frontiers, global warming, the management of natural resources, development of new energy, the spread of English as lingua franca, negotiations over intellectual property rights, heightened awareness of animal rights – all these matters are intertwined with the process of globalization and thus sensitize the boundaries of culture.

How are we to make sense of culture, as a safety net (human security) and as a resource of global competition (soft power)? We need to critically keep alert to how culture is used and misused. At the same time, we need to creatively seek for ways to make the best of culture. Such critical and creative minds are more in need than ever before, on community, local, national, regional, and global levels. The contributors to this *Handbook* believe that “cultural security” should be one of the guiding concepts in this endeavor in both academic and policy circles.

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