
Index

- accumulative best choice (ABC) 23, 24
- activation map 208–10
- adaptive learning 269, 278
- Afriat, Sydney N. 41
- agent-based models 281
- Allais paradox 182
- Allport, Gordon W. 216–17
- altruism 131, 322
- Amazon Mechanical Turk (MTurk) 109–10, 314, 321, 352, 387
 - disadvantages of using 327
 - function of 327–8
- ambiguity aversion 181, 226
- anchoring-and-adjustment heuristic 279
- anonymity 113, 332, 353, 389, 395, 402
- ANOVA 197, 200, 361, 362
- antisocial punishment 360
- Approach–Avoidance measure 223, 224
- Asian disease
 - experiment 393
 - problem 50, 51
- asset matrix information 409, 411
- attrition, phenomenon of 138
- auction 12–13, 19–21, 80, 104–6, 227, 275, 300–301, 342
 - sealed-bid 19, 104, 189
- axioms 18, 21–4, 39, 241, 250, 258

- “backsliding” effect 298
- Balloon Analog Risk Task (BART) 164
- Bayesian equilibrium 253
- Bayesian information criterion 202
- Bayes’ rule 80
- beauty-contest game, experiments on 287, 289, 407, 409
- Becker-DeGroot-Marschak (BDM) incentive
 - mechanism 19, 58, 73, 201, 227
- behavior, *see* human behavior
 - individual, *see* individual behavior
 - intertemporal, *see* intertemporal behavior
- Behavioral Activation System (BAS) 223
 - questionnaire 224
- behavioral economics 85, 142, 145, 155, 196, 226, 295
 - applications relevant for 156–7, 160, 163, 164–5
 - and psychology 305
- Behavioral Inhibition System (BIS) 223
 - questionnaire 224
- behavioral prioritization 173
- belief
 - concept of 225
 - elicitation 271, 350, 386
 - formation, model of 279
 - normative, notion of 48–50, 52
 - over actions, notion of 47–8
 - and social norms, measurements of 40
- Belmont Report* (1979) 314
- Big Five Personality Inventory 223
- binary data models 64–7
 - marginal effects 66–7
 - predicted probabilities 66, 67
 - probit model 66
- binary lottery payoffs 17–18
- biobehavioral approach/avoidance system 5, 214
- blood oxygenation level–dependent (BOLD)
 - signals 147, 196, 198, 200
 - functional MRI and 150
 - recording and interpretation of 150–61
- Bonferroni correction 200
- “bootstrap” technique 60–61
- boundedly rational expected utility theory (BREUT) 243–5
- bounded rationality 215, 278, 280, 286, 358
- brain activation 207, 209
- brain activity 163, 165, 195, 197, 201, 206
- brain–behavior relationships 165
- brain imaging
 - cortical brain regions 162
 - electroencephalography (EEG) 158–9
 - functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI) 147–50
 - magnetic field for 149
 - magnetoencephalography (MEG) 160–61
 - positron emission tomography (PET) 157–8
 - positron-emitting radioactive isotopes 157
 - preprocessing imaging data 197–8
 - radiofrequency pulse for 149
 - recording of brain volume 153
 - results of experiments 208
 - reward-related neural circuitry 156
 - three-dimensional 149
 - transcranial electric stimulation (tES) 163–4
 - valuation system of 154

- brain mapping 206
 “brain/mind-reading” techniques 206
 brain stimulation techniques 161–5
 budget constraints 40–41
- Cardenas, Juan Camilo 317
 Chamberlin, Edward 104
 Charness, Gary 105, 107
 chat communication 339, 402, 405, 412
 cheap talk 50, 288, 405
 children, recruitment and managing of 329–30
 choice
 accumulative best, *see* accumulative best
 choice (ABC)
 hypothetical 386
 individual 3, 19, 194
 probabilistic nature of 236–9
 risky, *see* risky choice
- Choi, Syngjoo 41–2
 coding of free-form communication 406–10
 cognitive psychology 89, 206
 competitive markets 215, 304, 359
 complete information 12–13
 conditional cooperation, rates of 299, 360, 393
 constant relative risk aversion (CRRA) 42, 70, 75, 227
 consumer behavior 283–4
 consumption smoothing 6, 274, 282, 283–5
 content analysis of communication 405–7
 convex time budget 44–5
 cooperation and punishment 359–60
 corporate governance 272
 cortisol (C) 179
 critical cost efficiency index (CCEI) 41–3, 46
 cross-cultural differences
 in behavior 113
 benchmark for 352
 indicators for 361
 in personality profiles 223
 systematic 355
 in trust 355
 cross-cultural experiments 6, 349, 351, 353, 356–7
 cross-task contamination 22–3
 crowdsourcing 327, 352
- data analysis
 “bootstrap” technique for 60–61
 censored data 57, 64, 73–4
 multiple observations per subject 74–80
 tests comparing entire distributions 61–3
 treatment testing 57–60
 within-subject tests 63–4
 data mining 337, 407
- data, types of
 binary 64–7
 censored 73–4
 continuous (exact) 72–3
 interval 70–72
 ordinal 67–70
 panel 74, 272
 deception 28–36
 decision field theory (DFT) 244–5
 decision-making 6, 22, 104–5, 121, 130, 145, 152, 157, 250
 consumption decisions 283
 economic 165, 225, 235
 individual 180–85
 inter-individual variance in 229
 intertemporal consumption decisions 283
 peer effects in financial decisions 129
 processes in the brain 196
 under risk and uncertainty 234
 social 185–9
 value-based 164
 decision times, measurement of 342
 De Grauwe, Paul 280
 degrees of freedom 58, 84, 96
 development economics 3, 96, 105, 139
 dishonesty 228, 360
 dominant-strategy 254, 263
 double-blind payoff protocol 15–16
 dynamic stochastic general equilibrium (DSGE) model 5–6, 269, 274–83
- earnings 16, 413
 econometric analysis 3, 23, 57
 Economic Science Association (ESA) 1, 34–6, 92, 317, 371
 electroencephalography (EEG) 5, 142, 147, 158–9, 194, 198
 endocrine signals 174, 190
 endowment effect 21, 358
 energy consumption 128, 297–8, 306
 energy efficiency programs 139
 engineering of markets and institutions 305
 environmental protection, policy for 296–301
 equilibrium
 Nash, *see* Nash equilibrium
 subgame perfect, *see* subgame perfect
 equilibrium
- ethics
 of medical research 314
 training 317, 331
 and treatment of experimental subjects 32
 see also human-subjects research ethics
 expected utility (EU) 65, 241
 maximization of 17, 75
 theory 18, 22, 43, 202, 241–4, 283

- experienced subjects 321–2
 experimental design 1, 12, 22, 24, 39, 116, 136,
 151–5, 179–80, 194, 198, 203, 246, 306,
 319, 356–7, 379, 385, 391, 393, 398
 Experimental Economics Replication Project
 (EERP) 85, 87, 90–91
 experimental game 86, 252, 255, 299, 323, 328,
 350–51, 353
 experimental hypothesis 386, 390, 393
 experimental methods 3, 9, 11, 18, 22, 39, 269,
 290, 296, 306–8, 338
 experimental psychology 214
 experimental tasks 9–10, 150, 152, 160, 163,
 165, 339, 342, 352–3, 397
 experimenter “audience” effect 15
 experimenter–subject communication 353–4
 experimenter–participant interaction 395
 experiments 7, 196, 327–8, 349, 351, 354–7,
 355
 bargaining and competition 359
 on bounded rationality 358
 categories of 107
 cheating 215
 chosen-effort 368, 370, 377–9
 concept of 356
 on cooperation and punishment 359–60
 Cournot oligopoly 392
 course-credit 321
 cross-cultural 357–60, 363
 double auction 12, 20, 275
 dictator game 84, 313, 388–9
 on DSGE models 275
 versus economic decision problems 273
 extra-laboratory 107, 113
 versus field experiments 118
 gift exchange 343, 368, 377
 on intrinsic honesty 360
 paper-and-pencil 404
 principal agent, *see* principal-agent
 risk aversion and mental accounting in 282
 risk and time preferences 358
 social preferences 358
 on trust 359
 water memory 83
 exploratory or data-driven approaches (EDAs)
 203
 exponential discounting rates 227
 externalities 128–9, 299
 external validity 2, 7, 105, 108–10, 180, 271,
 282, 290, 313, 353, 369, 384, 385, 415
 eye tracking 196, 198, 250, 344

 Facebook 328
 collection of the data by 32
 data use policy 33

 fairness, notion of 46, 116, 269, 282, 289, 296,
 303, 410
 Falk, Armin 105
 false feedback 29, 36
 Fechner model 57, 75–6, 79, 80
 field experiments
 artefactual 107, 109–10
 collaboration with external partners 114–17
 constraints on control in 112
 deception in 32–3
 in development economics 105
 drawback compared to laboratory
 experiments 118
 within firms 134
 framed field 107, 110
 generalizability of 108–11
 natural field 107, 110–11
 school-level randomized 126
 types of 106–8
 financial crises, models of 287–8
 financial incentives 321, 368
 advertised financial earnings 321
 credibility of 356
 Five-Factor Personality Inventory (FFPI) 220
 fixed point theorem 259, 375
 focal points 16–17, 49, 285
 framing 15, 50–52, 73, 106, 249, 304, 350, 358,
 374, 385, 387, 392
 functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI)
 4, 142, 145, 147–50, 194, 197
 activation maps of 208–9
 blocked and hybrid designs 153–4
 and blood oxygenation level–dependent
 (BOLD) signal 150
 costs involved in using 155
 detection power of 154
 event-related experimental designs 154
 mixed block/event-related designs 155
 parametric modulator in 157
 typical experimental set-up for 155–6
 fundraising experiments 111, 131

 gain–loss framing 50–51
 Galton, Francis 216, 223
 game
 asymmetric matching-pennies 266–7
 beauty-contest 287
 centipede 13–14
 centralized market 394
 common-interest 17
 community 51, 387
 corruption 359
 decentralization 413
 dictator 14–16, 45–6, 48–52, 73–4, 85–6, 220,
 228–9, 313, 319, 322, 350, 360, 388

- duopoly 12–13
- global 287–8
- “joy of destruction” 393
- Lieberman 255–7
- minimum-effort coordination 264–6
- normal-form 257–8, 260, 267
- principal agent, *see* principal-agent
- prisoner’s dilemma 51–2, 254, 262–4, 322, 327, 387
- public goods 50, 73–4, 327, 355, 359, 360–61, 403–4
- sequential prisoner’s dilemma 51
- social dilemma 51, 218, 350, 358, 359
- stock market 51, 388
- tripoly 12
- trust 359, 414
- ultimatum 14, 47, 113, 152, 185–8, 322, 357, 359
- Wall Street 51, 388
- game theory
 - behavioral 351, 358
 - concept of 252, 269, 287
 - dominance solvable 255
 - relevance for social sciences 253
- game tree representation 15
- gender discrimination 33
- generalized axiom of revealed preferences (GARP) 16, 39, 41
 - violations of 46, 48, 52
- general linear models (GLMs) 151, 196
- genetic heritage 215
- Gravert, Christina 371
- gray matter 145, 147, 149, 150
- habit formation
 - behavioral impacts through 298
 - elements of 284
- Halton sequence 79
- Hausman specification test 69–70
- Heckman, James 105, 377
 - Heckman’s two-step correction 324
- hemodynamic response function (HRF) 150, 152–3, 198, 203
- heterogeneous expectations, modeling of 278, 280–81
- heuristic switching model 5, 279–81, 285–6, 290
- Holt-Laury procedure 70, 181–2
- honesty
 - honesty-humility dimension 218
 - intrinsic 360
- hormones 174–9
 - anorexigenic 176
 - categories of 174
 - cholecystokinin (CCK) 176
 - cortisol (C) 179
 - estradiol 178
 - experimental design 179–80
 - follicle-stimulating hormone (FSH) 175
 - function of 174
 - ghrelin 177
 - leptin 177
 - measurement of 175–6
 - metabolic 176–7
 - oxytocin (O) 178
 - peptide YY (PYY) 177
 - physiology 173
 - progesterone (P) 178
 - reproductive 177–9
 - stress 179
 - testosterone (T) 177
 - vasopressin 179
- house money effect 64–6
- human behavior 398
 - in competitive environments 188–9
 - Lewin’s conception of 216, 225
 - neural foundations of 142
 - personality determinants of 216
- Human Intelligence Tasks (HITs) 327
- human-subjects research ethics 313–24
 - best practices 331–2
 - blanket protocols for 317–18
 - fair subject selection 315
 - institutional regulations of 314
 - in recruitment and selection 320–24
 - regulations with respect to 314
- hyperbolic discounting 43, 45, 283
- incentives 225
 - age-appropriate economic incentives 330
 - binary lottery payoffs 17–18
 - complications associated with 9
 - cumulative prospect theory 22
 - “endowment” effect 21
 - experimenter demand effects 386–7
 - focal points of 16–17
 - how not to misuse induced valuation 21–3
 - incentive-compatible payoff protocols 22
 - incentive-incompatible payoff protocols 11, 23
 - monetary incentives 9, 316, 321, 356
 - payoff protocols in experiments 9–10, 16–17
 - tax incentives 304
- income, self-reported 302
- incomplete information 9, 13, 297
- independent component analysis (ICA) 152, 159, 204–5
- individual behavior 39, 364
- individual differences 98, 150, 180, 188, 215, 218, 222, 225, 344

- induced values 12, 106
 information acquisition 250
 information processing 281, 286, 270
 informed consent, of human subjects
 implied consent 316
 principles of obtaining 32
 written consent 316
 Institutional Review Boards (IRBs) 28, 30, 33, 35, 314, 389
 intention-to-treat (ITT) analysis 138
 inter-individual differences, theory of 214, 225
 internal motives 229
 internal validity 370, 384–5
 intertemporal behavior 45
 interval data 64, 70–72
 intrinsic motivation 301–2, 370–71, 374–6

 label framing 51
 “lab-in-the-field” experiments 298–9, 308, 353, 388
 laboratory experiments 105–6, 107, 109, 269, 323, 406
 versus economic decision problems 273
 versus field experiments 118
 laboratory interactions 270, 273–4
 labor economics 4, 105, 290
 labor markets 126–7, 215, 275, 282, 327
 crowdsourcing 327
 labor supply 304, 368
 Laffer curve conjecture 368
 leader–follower relationships 125
 learning
 “learning-to-forecast” experiment (LtFE) 272, 276, 279–81
 “learning-to-optimize” experiment (LtOE) 275
 Lewin, Kurt 216
 liability side equivalence (LSE) 304
 List, John 104, 114
 logbook 6, 335–7
 log-likelihood function 73–4
 loss aversion 283
 lottery 9, 15, 17–18, 21–2, 24, 63, 65, 72–8, 111, 127–8, 135, 181, 226–7, 229, 235, 237, 393
 certainty equivalent (CE) 72, 182, 235–6, 243
 Lucking-Reiley, David 104

 machine-learning techniques 409
 macroeconomics, experiments
 categories of 270
 dynamic stochastic general equilibrium (DSGE) model, *see* dynamic stochastic general equilibrium (DSGE) model
 general equilibrium (DSGE) model
 game theory and 269
 methodological problems in 280
 microfoundation of 270–71, 274
 Shannon model of 286
 sunspots 288
 magnetic resonance imaging (MRI) 147
 costs involved in using 155
 structural and functional 148
 magnetoencephalography (MEG) 4, 142, 147, 160–61, 194
 Markets
 design of 215
 institutions, efficiency properties of 11, 295, 299, 301, 305
 price, prediction of 93
 mental accounting 282
 microeconomics 3, 269
 micro-institution 350–51
 Milgram experiment 34
 Mischel, Walter 216
 mixed-strategy 255, 258, 262, 264, 266–7
 monetary incentives, *see* financial incentives
 multiple price list (MPL) 70
 mundane realism, notion of 369, 378

 Nash equilibrium 13–14, 252, 254, 258, 260, 267, 286, 287, 411
 natural language 409
 coding scheme 407
 importance of 355
 messages 407
 natural resources, exploitation of 297, 299
 neuroeconomics 1, 4, 142, 151, 155, 165
 “as if” models 194
 behavioral hypotheses 196
 and decision-making 194
 experimental designs in 198–201
 exploratory data analysis 203–8
 hypothesis-driven data analysis 196–203
 maximizing data quality in 195–6
 multivariate analysis of brain signals 208–10
 preprocessing imaging data 197–8
 statistical designs in 199
 statistical inferences 200
 neuroimaging techniques 147, 156, 205
 neuronal communication 4, 145–50
 neuroscience 84, 142, 145, 155, 162, 165, 194, 239, 250, 415
 neuroscientific knowledge 166, 173
 neuroscientific techniques 142–4
 neuroticism 217, 218, 220, 225, 321
 neurotransmitters 145–7, 157, 225
 neutral instructions 387–8
 null hypothesis testing 6, 318–19

 Odbert, Henry S. 216–17
 oligopoly 271, 392

- order effects, issue of 23, 63, 320, 391–2
- overpayment 107–8
- oxytocin (O) 178, 179, 186–7
- payoff protocols in experiments 9–11, 15–16, 21–4
- p-curve analysis, of economics experiments 93–4
- personality
 - big five 217–22
 - economic preferences as personality traits 225–6
 - psychology 5, 214, 215–16, 225, 226, 229
 - traits 215, 225–9
 - types 215
- personnel economics 368
- p-hacking, process of 84, 93–4, 96, 99
- Phillips curve 275–6
- physiological measurements 173, 194, 344
- pooled degrees of freedom 58
- positron emission tomography (PET) 142, 157–8
- power analysis, in hypothesis testing 318–20
- precise measurements 39, 45, 342, 349
- prediction markets 3, 85, 91–3, 95, 99
- preference elicitation 44, 226, 322
- preference manipulation 50–52
- preference measurement 3, 39–40, 226, 228
 - of risk preferences 40–43
 - of social preferences 45–50
 - of time preferences 43–5
- preference reversals 10, 18–22, 350
- preferences
 - Epstein-Zin 284
 - other-regarding 296, 353, 410
 - present-biased 43–4, 52
 - reciprocal 47–8
 - revealed 228
 - risk, *see* risk preferences
 - strength of, *see* strength of preference (SoP)
 - time, *see* time preferences
- pre-registration repository 99
- principal–agent
 - experiments 368, 377
 - game 410
 - problem 370
 - relationships 7
- privacy and data protection 316–17
- property rights dilemma 360
- prosociality, in trust and ultimatum games 185–8
- prospect theory 22, 50, 183, 283
- public information 12, 270, 285, 290
 - multiplier effects of 289–90
- pure strategy 258, 264, 411
- puzzles 373
- quantal response equilibrium (QRE) 5, 252–4, 259, 261–2, 267
 - heterogeneous (HQRE) 262
- quasi-hyperbolic
 - discounting models 43, 45
 - utility models 44
- randomization, in field experiments 121
 - attrition, phenomenon of 138
 - identification of treatment effects 122–4
 - intention-to-treat (ITT) analysis 138
 - power considerations 131–3
 - matched-pair randomization procedure 135
 - method to optimally use covariates 133–6
 - potential outcome framework 122
 - selection bias in 124
- randomized controlled trial (RCT) 108
- random lottery incentive mechanism (RLIM) 22–3
- random preference (RP) model 75, 76–7
- rank-dependent choice equilibrium (RDCE) 5, 252–62, 267
 - applications to 2x2 games, 262–7
 - and Nash equilibrium 254–5
 - and quantal response equilibrium (QRE) 254, 258–9
 - rank-dependent response set 260
- rational expectations equilibrium (REE) 269, 275, 276, 278–9, 287
- rational inattention 270, 285–6
- rationality, traits of 226
- real-effort 368–79
 - chosen-effort experiment 368, 369, 378
 - cost-of-effort function 369–70, 377, 379
 - and monetary incentives 368
 - taxonomy of 371–4
 - typography of 372
- realism, notion of 369–70, 374–5, 377–8
- real-time interaction 342–3, 354
- reciprocity, notion of 47–8, 282, 296
- recruitment and selection, of human subjects
 - financial incentives 321
 - selection bias in 323
 - self-selection, evidence for 320–21
 - subject pool effects 321–2
 - software 325
- regression
 - mass univariate 203
 - partial least squares (PLS) 204

- regret theory 247–9
- replicability 91, 97, 313
- replications, in scientific process
 - Bayes factors 90
 - confidence interval (CI) of 87
 - Experimental Economics Replication Project (EERP) 85, 87, 90–91
 - “file drawer” effects 84
 - Many Labs replication project 86, 98
 - p-curve method 93–4
 - pre-registration of analyses 96
 - small effect sizes 90
 - Transparency and Openness Promotion (TOP) guidelines 99
- reputation 31, 36, 220, 316, 326, 328
- research ethics, *see* human-subjects research ethics
- revenue 104, 368
- reward, biology of 156
- risk attitude
 - posterior estimates of 80
 - threshold 71, 76–7
- risk aversion 226, 227
 - and mental accounting 282
- risk dominance, notion of 265–6
- risk-elicitation list, of Holt and Laury 44
- risk preferences 40, 226, 358
 - elicitation of 43–4
 - measurement of 40–43
 - and sex hormones 180–82
 - and stress hormones 183–4
- risky choice 234–49
 - accumulator model 240
 - boundedly rational expected utility theory (BREUT) 243
 - decision field theory (DFT) 244
 - decision-triggering threshold for 241
 - process models 243
 - transfer of attention exchange (TAX) model 248
- rule-of-thumb consumers 284
- “rules of the game” constant 273, 349, 350, 356
- saliency, notion of 9, 303–4
- sample size planning 6
- scoring rules 92
- Second Life (SL) 329
- selection bias, in recruitment 6, 121, 124, 313, 321, 323, 324, 328, 330–32
- selfishness, traits of 226, 389, 415
- self-selection 320–21, 323
- signal-to-noise ratio (SNR) 152, 195
- Slider Measure 228
- Smith, Vernon 104
- social appropriateness 49–50
- social capital 359
- social decision-making 185–9
 - competitive behavior 188–9
 - prosociality in trust and ultimatum games 185–8
- social exchange study 51
- social interaction 121, 185, 282, 315
- social learning 129
- social media 313, 328–9
- social networks 32, 328
- social norms, Krupka and Weber’s methodology of 49
- social preferences, measurement of 45–50, 226, 358
 - beliefs over actions 47–8
 - normative beliefs 48–50
 - trust games and dictator games for 228
- social psychology 3, 28, 89, 216, 228
- social utility 130
- software tools 6, 335, 340
 - comparison of 345–6
 - criteria for choosing 341–4
 - switching 347
- Spearman correlation 91
- Standardized Effect Size (SES) 87, 132
- Stapel, Diederik 83
- statistical power 40, 63, 83, 96, 98, 131, 153, 195, 198, 320, 391
- statistical test, *see* test
- stimulus onset synchronies (SOAs) 161, 243
- strategic uncertainty 5, 269, 285, 286–8, 290, 360
- strength of preference (SoP) 67–8, 240–41
- subgame perfect equilibrium 14–15, 411
- subject pools
 - best practices 331–2
 - contamination of 28, 30
 - experimental economist and 313
 - human-subjects research ethics 314–18
 - management of 6
 - power analysis 318–20
 - recruitment and managing of
 - adults via online and offline channels 327–9
 - children 329–30
 - elderly 330–31
 - non-WEIRD subjects 331
 - students 324–6
 - recruitment and selection 320–24
- subjects
 - experienced 321–2
 - inexperienced 321
- sunspots 270, 285, 288

- tax evasion 214, 216, 301–2
- tax incentives 303–5
- tax liability 302
- test
 - cognitive reflection (CRT) 185
 - Epps-Singleton 63
 - Hausman specification 69–70
 - Kolmogorov-Smirnov (KS) 62, 63
 - Mann-Whitney 60
 - one-tailed 58, 64
 - parametric 60–61, 63–4
 - t-test 58–61, 63, 197, 200–201, 207
 - two-tailed 58
 - Wilcoxon signed-rank 64
 - within-subject 63–4
- test-retest reliabilities 219, 222, 226–9
- test statistic 58, 61–2, 70
- time preferences 43–5, 358
 - and sex hormones 184
 - and stress hormones 184–5
- Tobit model 74
- traits, *see* personality traits
- treatment testing 57–60
 - non-parametric (between-subject) 60
 - parametric (between-subject) 58–60
- tremble parameter, concept of 77–8
- trigger strategy 9, 16, 30, 32, 146, 152, 179, 239, 240, 287, 307
- trust, *see* game, trust
- uncertainty, theory of 287
- unemployment 135, 283
- utility
 - interpersonal 12–16
 - maximization 39, 42, 44, 46, 52
 - violations of 44
 - von Neumann-Morgenstern (N-M) 17, 245
 - rank-dependent 22
- validity trade-off, perception of 370
- value, economic concept of 156
- ventromedial prefrontal cortex (vmPFC) 153, 156–7, 163, 201, 210
- verbal protocol analysis 250
- virtual worlds, development of 329
- voluntary contribution 111, 403, 412
- Wealth of Nations 349, 364
- willingness to accept (WTA)/willingness to pay (WTP) 20, 57–9, 61–4, 73
- World Values Survey 352, 355, 361