Introduction to the *Research Handbook on Nationalism*

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The purpose of the present book is to give the reader an idea of what kinds of scholarship are undertaken today on the subject of nationalism around the world. It aims to bring to the reader's attention representative work, not necessarily the "best," recognizing that what is considered the best in various national traditions is likely to differ substantially. The time has passed when most participants in a scholarly discussion on a certain subject would share common agreed-upon standards, and when those who did not would not be included in the discussion at all. The world of scholarship as defined by the West has expanded dramatically, with a striking increase in the relevance for it of the post-Soviet and Chinese scholarly worlds in particular, which only a few decades earlier existed in their own closed spheres. And, in no area of study is the mutual relevance of these previously separate scholarly worlds more consequential than in that of nationalism – a subject of intense interest, transcending academia everywhere around the globe.

At the same time, significant changes, resulting in a widespread intellectual disarray, have occurred within Western social sciences and it is no longer clear what constitutes acceptable scholarship within the fields, apart from the fact that it is accepted (as a PhD dissertation, for publication in a journal, etc.) somewhere. This is exacerbated by the division of the Western social science into separate disciplines. Since their subject is singular, human society, and no aspect of it can be understood in isolation from others, these disciplines differ mostly in style, and what may be praiseworthy scholarship in history would not pass muster in political science, what would be perfectly acceptable in sociology would be decried in economics, and vice versa, even when all these sovereign "academic nations" address precisely the same intellectual question.

Added to this, what constitutes these disciplines is defined differently in various Western nations (UK and USA, not to speak of France, Germany, Italy and others in Europe) and completely differently within the independent scholarly traditions of the former Soviet and Sinic societies, and editors are left without standards, if the goal is to showcase representative work, or can select only from the limited and not at all representative work according to the standards of their national and disciplinary traditions and, ultimately, subjective judgment. As said, we have decided to present what there is and keep our judgment to ourselves.

This decision has several implications. The first of these is that the present book must be regarded as a primary source for research on nationalism – a source of data, not a summary or analysis of the accumulated knowledge (but a basis for such summary and analysis) and certainly not a reflection of a general understanding of the phenomenon. In fact, the work assembled here, which accurately represents what scholarly research on nationalism is undertaken today in various parts of the world, shows that no such general understanding exists – and it is evident that only a minority of scholars contributing to this collection even include understanding among their aims, considering a comprehensive

logical framework, within which the information they present can be interpreted and which makes sense of this information, important.

The aims of scholarship are obviously connected to the standards of a scholarly community. The information the book presents, as a whole and in specific chapters, first pertains to the different traditions and current approaches of the social sciences around the world – in a way, introducing these traditions and approaches to each other, nationalism being the field of study where the meeting occurs. In addition, of course, every chapter contains valuable information on the variety or aspect of nationalism on which it is focused. The representative nature of the Handbook explains the numerical bias in favor of cases (and scholarly traditions) generally underrepresented in Western scholarly discussions on nationalism, which include, above all, Chinese nationalism and Chinese/Sinic scholarly tradition, because of the enormous importance of the former for the future of the world and of the latter for the future of scholarship. On the other end of the size continuum, they include nationalisms of nations, by comparison tiny, such as Grenada and the post-Soviet Azerbaijan, Moldova and Georgia, interestingly, exemplifying the mentalist sociological approach with roots in the classical, by no means mainstream today, European historical sociology (Oliver Benoit, Chapter 12), mainstream Western political science (Maxim Tabachnik, Chapter 4), and the distinctive Russian style of rumination on national character, which the imperial nation bequeathed to all its former dominions (Nutsa Batiashvili, Chapter 25). Finally, there is much useful information on connections between nationalism and other phenomena (i.e., art-, religion-, terrorism-focused chapters by Athena Leoussi, Chapter 9, Nicolas Prevelakis, Chapter 28 and Nick Brooke, Chapter 3, respectively) and thematic topics, such as construction of national identity, institutionalization of nationalism, democracy and self-determination as aspects of nationalism, economic implications of and economic considerations within nationalism, and the roles of class, ethnicity, religion, and race in nationalism, and so on.

Virtually all 33 chapters in this volume contain data pertaining to a number of topics. Their authors were invited to discuss either specific cases of nationalism or connections between nationalism and other phenomena on which they were known to work. The editors then identified and grouped the chapters by certain thematic topics, but it is important to remember that the usefulness of any particular chapter may not be limited to the topic with which it is associated in the book and that the majority of the chapters could be classified differently.

PART I WHAT ON EARTH IS THIS ALL ABOUT?

The book opens with the focus on the inconsistencies in the expressions of nationalism today, bewildering Western social scientists, hot, but ill-understood topics of discussion in Western media and academia, concepts and categories that everybody uses but very few, if any, bother to define. Naming Part I of the book “What on Earth Is This All About?” we divided it into two sections: the first containing the chapter by American sociologists Francesco Duina and Dylan Carson (Chapter 1), “When right meets left: on the progressive rhetoric of far-right populist parties in Europe,” and of the Spanish social scientist Daniele Conversi (Chapter 2), “The Left and nationalism: from the French Revolution to the Anthropocene.” These chapters focus on the concepts that frame the

Western political discourse, the terms in which we evaluate political reality and which, for many of us, determine our personal attitudes to one or another political phenomenon: left and right. The public understanding of, among other things, nationalism – specifically, the understanding of the public that reads the leading newspapers and tunes into the shows of leading political commentators on major respected TV stations – depends directly on whether it is characterized as left or right. For the public in question, traditionally, left has connoted the positive, and right the negative meaning. Left has meant beneficial, progressive, enlightened, democratic, morally righteous, and true in the sense of being in line with the incontrovertible dictates of history and science; while right has been everything opposite to the left: detrimental, reactionary and retrograde, undemocratic, evil, dishonest, and dumb. After World War II, the overwhelming majority of Western academics, social scientists in particular, not unexpectedly have been on the left, while nationalism (incidentally, historically responsible for the creation of the left/right divide) seems to have after the turn of the millennium migrated very much to the right. This parting of ways throws a wrench into the scholarly interpretation of nationalism and politics in general today. On the one hand, as the meticulous research of Duina and Carson into the rhetoric of parties considered far right convincingly demonstrates, by definition right-wing and even far-right nationalists (called “populists”) turn out to be progressive, enlightened, democratic, and morally high-minded when it comes to their views on the rights of women and sexual minorities, as well as other individual freedoms. Their nationalism is none other than the defense of the liberal democratic Western traditions against the incursions of Islamic ideology that trample on these freedoms, rights, and traditions. What does being on the right (and far right) mean then? How does defending liberal traditions against religious fundamentalism brand one as an evil and dumb reactionary? And what is nationalism? Simply the opposite of seeing the West (for the discussion has relevance only to the West) as borderless?

These questions raised by the first chapter in the book are rendered more complicated by Conversi’s contribution in Chapter 2. This chapter argues that since the French Revolution, when the left/right divide first made its appearance, nationalism was predominantly associated with the left. Moreover, while the association with national socialism and fascism caused nationalism to sink deeply among the left’s characteristic sympathies, the association with anti-colonial, national liberation struggle after World War II, raised it in the esteem of the left again, and the reassertion of anti-imperial, anti-totalitarian nationalisms across the former Soviet and Eastern Bloc territory in the period of post-Soviet “transition to democracy” served to further re-establish it on the side of the general good. Thus, before 2000, nationalism’s place was not self-evidently on the right; at the very least it could be found on both sides of the political spectrum.

What these two chapters help us realize is the fundamental normative and intellectual disarray; the lack of the sense of ordered reality among the reading public in the West. It is this lack of the sense of order that explains the volatility of its attitudes, the ease with which the signs of approbation and opprobrium (left and right) move from one set of ideas and behaviors to its opposite. The confusion of the public is shared by the expert community that belongs to it and that directly influences its attitudes and ideas. The three additional chapters contained in the second section of Part I support this view. They all, though with different emphasis, discuss three issues at the center of nationalism studies in the West today: the connection between nationalism and violence; the connection between

national identity, ethnicity, and citizenship; and the inherent problems of multinational states. The analysis of these connections and problems depends on a clear understanding of what nationalism (including national community – nation, national identity, and national consciousness), ethnicity, citizenship, and state are, but, as the three chapters demonstrate, these are still open questions. The specific subject of Chapter 3 by Nick Brooke, a British international relations scholar, is the link between nationalism and terrorism. Noting that there are 250 definitions of terrorism and no consensus, Brooke adopts the following definition by Walker and Osbourne (2010, p. 13) of *nationalist* terrorism, which accepts at face value the terrorists' self-presentation: "Nationalist terrorism groups claim to be the authentic voice of a national culture. Through acts of violence they attempt to restore their lands back to one single larger country or seek complete independence from it by creating a new separate state." As nationalism and terrorism are here connected to each other by definition, the frequently observed link between nationalism and violence remains unexplained beyond the presupposition that it is somehow natural: "Nations inspire loyalty, camaraderie and love. When the nation is threatened, human beings have regularly turned to violence to protect their nation." It remains unclear what a nation is (as opposed to any other community), why nations inspire loyalty, what exactly in them is threatened, and why human beings turn to violence to protect them. Do they turn to violence to protect any community? Indeed, Brooke notes that in the last decades terrorism is as likely to be religiously as nationally inspired. Moreover, the targets of nationalist violence differ dramatically: some terrorists attack the military, paramilitary, and political representatives of the opposing state; others specifically target innocent and vulnerable civilians in schools, buses, and restaurants. Finally, *ethno*-nationalism is particularly predisposed to violence of the latter type, a predilection that it, incidentally, shares with religiously inspired terrorism.

But, as the two other chapters in the section make clearly evident, there is no shared understanding of ethnicity in Western scholarship. Wiping out the distinctions between citizenship-based national identity and ethnically based national identity creates hopeless conceptual confusion, as is demonstrated in Chapter 4 by a US-trained scholar of Eastern European origin, Maxim Tabachnik. The chapter argues that the relative strength of "historical ethnic identity" affects the nature of citizenship laws. The argument is based on the legislation in the post-Soviet states of Azerbaijan, Georgia, and Moldova in the recent decade, the "historically weak ethnic identity" of Azerbaijan and Moldova contributing to "their practice of unconditional *jus soli*," and "historically strong ethnic identity in Georgia" leading to an "ethnic bias in the country's identity politics." The habitual association of civic nationalism with liberal democracy (the voluntary nature of national identity obviously presupposes a greater degree of individual freedom than the idea that it is biologically determined) and the somewhat wavering commitment of Azerbaijan and Moldova to liberal values, however, prompt the author to oppose to ethnic nationalism not civic but "territorial" nationalism – "a broader concept based purely on in-group identification with the state territory." This substitution lumps all the related concepts into a semantically incoherent bundle. Not only is it not clear now what the distinction and relationship are between national and ethnic identity, but both ethnicity and nationhood are equated with territory (in their power to generate identity) and nations become indistinguishable from states. Nationalism is dissolved into nothing in a discussion of identity in general, which is a universal attribute of human mental process:

unlike non-human animals, whose social positions are genetically determined, we need a sense of personal identity to locate ourselves in our exceedingly complex indeterminate social world. We are no longer focused on the specific modern phenomenon – national identity. But nor do we understand that we have stepped far beyond the boundaries of the discussion of today's reality.

In Chapter 5, the US-trained nationalism specialist and political sociologist from Belgrade, Veljko Vujčić, asks the important question why the dissolution of the Soviet Union was (relatively) peaceful, while that of Yugoslavia led to several years of brutally violent ethnic conflict. His answer is that this was related to the attitude of the elites within the dominant nation (Russia in the Soviet Union and Serbia in Yugoslavia) to the state, in turn reflecting the centralized vs federal nature of the two multinational states and the history of the relations between these states and the respective cultural elites of the dominant nation. Language, both scholarly and political, used in discussions about and within the Soviet Union and Yugoslavia, interferes with this otherwise clear argument. The states were multinational, but the violence in Yugoslavia was ethnic. Does this mean that nations equal ethnicities? That national identity is the same as ethnic identity?

There is no word for “ethnicity” in Russian: the Soviet Union (as Russia today) comprised 153 “nationalities.” These *national* affiliations were inscribed in internal Soviet passports, which allowed their holders to move within the confines of the Soviet state. They were firmly believed to be determined by blood. People whose parents were of different nationalities could choose their passport nationality, their choice being limited to their two parents. Others had no choice at all. “Ethnicity” is a Western scholarly concept, used when the use of the related concept (also referring to biologically determined identity) “race” is inconvenient. With “race” reserved, very much as a result of the specific USA context, for the color of one's skin, the connection between “ethnicity” and biology has been seemingly loosened, and in scholarly discussions “ethnicity” would usually have a cultural dimension. But, since “culture” is also left undefined, and race is also associated with culture, in the end “ethnicity” is just another word for race.

The most common distinction made in the large Western scholarly literature on nationalism is between “civic” nationalism and “ethnic” nationalism. Insufficient as a characterization of any particular nationalism and unable to account fully for different propensities of various nationalisms, this is still a very important distinction, pointing to a fundamental difference between types of national identity. While in the Russian language “nationality” (membership in a nation, national identity) refers to genetic inheritance, in English “nationality” (membership in a nation, national identity) is the synonym of “citizenship.” One cannot lose one's genetic inheritance or acquire any but the one that one is born with, but one can both acquire and lose various citizenships; unlike genetic inheritance, citizenship is in principle voluntary. This makes nationalisms that define nationality as race “ethnic,” and those that equate nationality with citizenship “civic.” It is telling that in the Soviet Union, as in Russia today and as in numerous other countries – for instance, Germany – citizenship in the sense of right of residence, owning property, and political participation in the state is unconnected to national identity. The fact that it is such “ethno-nationalism,” conceptually unconnected to citizenship, that is most often associated with violence (and, in particular, violence against innocent civilians), is worth pondering on.

Each in their own way, the chapters in Part I deliver an extremely important lesson: nationalism manifestly plays an enormous role in our life today; it permeates our political

debates; it is connected to the most egregious cases of violence around us; somehow (we all know this) it is involved in the definition of our identities; and last but not the least, there must be some reason why we refer to our societies as “nations,” when they could be – and were for most of human history – called by many other names. Yet, Western scholarship has no handle on this; it cannot help us to understand the world in which we live. Clearly, no progress has been made in the study of nationalism in the four decades since the subject was brought into fashion again by Gellner (1983) and Anderson (1983). Insightful, empirically grounded, comprehensive works have been written but have not been built upon. And they have not been built upon because Western social science gave up on science; scholarship in it no longer abides by the method of conjectures and refutations – the logical formulation of hypotheses and their testing against systematically collected evidence. Both require coherent and empirically warranted conceptualization. In the absence of such conceptualization, all we have is the equivalent of “natural history” in biology before Darwin – descriptive studies of more or less fascinating data sets.

PART II THE SIGNIFICANCE OF RACE

The authors of the three chapters included in Part II of the book, “The Significance of Race,” Leone Campos de Sousa, a Brazilian sociologist, Oliver Benoit, also a sociologist, teaching in his native Grenada in the Caribbean, and Oyéshiku Carr, an historian/political scientist of Liberian descent, are US-trained scholars committed to the scientific method. Their work on nationalism is based on a clear, empirical, historically supported definition of nationalism as a form of consciousness centered on the idea of the nation – a sovereign community of fundamentally equal members and inclusive identity (fraternity) in principle, irrespective of status divisions connected to class and ethnicity/race. Nationalism, these authors are aware, is not a uniform phenomenon, but exists as several types, each encouraging different behavioral proclivities (e.g., ethnic – race-based – nationalism, defining the national community as a biological species and drastically separating between members of the nation and outsiders, encourages violence against outsiders). Their chapters analyze the development of nationalism in Brazil (Campos de Sousa, Chapter 6), Grenada (Oliver Benoit, Chapter 7), and Africa in general (Oyéshiku Carr, Chapter 8), focusing on the respective salient features, but bearing in mind the numerous possibilities of such development, the foremost being whether it is successful – actually resulting in nationalism of whatever type – or not. The role of race in this development is a central theme of all three chapters, which is the reason they are grouped together. (As noted, they could be grouped differently: for instance, Carr’s discussion of Franz Fanon’s theory of violence would make it natural to consider his chapter alongside those of Brooke and Vujačić in Part I.) Together, the chapters lead to the conclusion that the impact of race – itself a constructed, that is, cultural, rather than natural, phenomenon – on the development of nationalism depends on the specific cultural significance attached to it and the context within which its interpretation evolves. Because of this context, it contributes to the creation of civic nationalism and inclusive identity in Brazil, precluding any kind of racism, while blocking the way to civic nationalism altogether and impeding even the sense of ethnic nationhood in the small society of Grenada and most sovereign “nations” in Africa. The specifics of the three cases offer very interesting reading.

PART III CHANNELS OF INSTITUTIONALIZATION

The following five chapters in Part III of the book, “Channels of Institutionalization,” are united in that they treat channels in which nationalism may be institutionalized. Social institutions being established ways of thinking and acting (to use the classical definition by Durkheim, 1895 [2014]), the question of institutionalization is essentially the question of what encourages particular ideas and images. Institutionalization of nationalism is usually associated with the state (legislation, state-sponsored media and education) and the military, but, being the modern consciousness par excellence and the cultural framework of modernity, it is obviously simultaneously propagated through numerous channels, mostly in rather subtle and often unconscious ways. In retrospect, they can be detected in ostensibly completely independent from political considerations spheres of life: art, science, even bricks used in urban construction. It is such channels of institutionalization of nationalism that the five authors in this part of the book – the British sociologist Athena Leoussi (Chapter 9), the American social theorist Eric Malczewski (Chapter 10), the journalism professor Jennifer E. Moore (Chapter 11), also American, the Caribbean sociologist – in this instance writing as an artist – Oliver Benoit (Chapter 12), and the young American intellectual historian and aspiring policy-maker Richard Yarrow (Chapter 13) – write about. Institutionalization of nationalism through multiple channels is to be expected because the entrance to any channel of institutionalization is the individual mind and, in the case of nationalism, the minds of masses of people within a nationalizing population, if not all of them, are likely to be engaged. Individual minds carry and implement national consciousness into the social roles they hold within any of the specific social institutions, such as the role of a parent in the family, of a salesperson in a shop, or – as in the cases before us – of an artist and scientist. Some social roles have the power to project the ways of thinking that animate them very widely and therefore contribute to their further establishment both faster and to a greater extent than others. The roles of visual artists and scientists are among those – the former because they provide essentially abstract ideas with a visual form and an aesthetic dimension, thus making them at once more understandable and appealing (perhaps, it is this that Malczewski tries to conceptualize in the terms “symbolic depth,” “sensuous surface,” and “conductive surface”), and the latter (as Yarrow argues) because of the enormous authority science, and famous scientists, enjoy in modern society. The relationship between nationalism and the institutions of art and science is mutual: both art and science to a very significant extent owe their institutionalization to nationalism and repay it by contributing to its institutionalization. And, of course (as Leoussi and Yarrow take care to stress and others demonstrate), what is institutionalized in every case is not nationalism in general, but the specific type of nationalism and the characteristic features of particular nationalisms.

PART IV ECONOMIC NATIONALISM VS ECONOMIC DETERMINISM

Chapters 14–17 in Part IV, “Economic Nationalism vs Economic Determinism,” deal with the economic dimension of nationalism. Since Marx set the ball rolling, Western social scientists believe in the fundamental nature of the economic process, and because

Marx was a social evolutionist in the Lamarckian sense of the word “evolution,” regard this process as naturally progressive, necessarily leading to economic growth. As a result, they do not try to explain why economies grow, taking this for granted and confining themselves to descriptions, historical and formulaic, and tend to see in economic developments the surest explanation of every other social phenomenon. Most so-called “theories” of nationalism (i.e., speculative attempts to interpret nationalism as a uniform whole) represent varieties of such economic determinism and this inevitably influences empirical studies of nationalism. Sociologically (i.e., in terms of the inherent logic of social processes), this position makes no sense and historical evidence (i.e., evidence regarding sequences of events, essential for distinguishing between causes and effects) indeed proves it wrong. But scholarly traditions, like any other, often trump empirical evidence.

The evidence shows that the modern economy we call “capitalism,” in distinction to the traditional, subsistence-oriented economies, characterized by the orientation to growth, was a product of nationalism. The evidence and the dominant tradition in the field, in other words, directly contradict each other. Current scholarship on the economic dimensions of nationalism, as a result, depends on the relative weight a scholar ascribes to the facts vs inherited wisdom, the literature one is examined on in graduate school, or, to put this differently, on whether one is a social *scientist* or a social science *professional*. The latter position is, unquestionably, the prevalent one today, and our representative sample in Part IV reflects that.

In this context, economic nationalism – a central subject of public discussions – becomes especially problematic. The theory is that the current stage of economic progress (i.e., of natural evolution itself) requires globalization, in turn dependent on free trade and absence of protective tariffs, and that economic nationalism, connected as it is to protectionist policies, opposes globalization (i.e., nature) and is, therefore, a tool of sinister, retrograde, and benighted governments. In the last few years, alarmingly, it springs everywhere, finding favor with large sectors of the electorate, evidently mistrusting and lacking respect for expert opinions. Political platforms appealing to these sectors are called “populist.” In the media and in scholarly publications, economic nationalism, like nationalism in general, is broadly regarded as a tenet of populist ideology.

The subject of the first chapter in Part IV, Chapter 14, is the nature of and the relationship between economic globalization and nationalism. It is clear that its young and intrepid author, Zeying Wu, a Chinese national pursuing doctoral studies in political science in Boston, chooses empirical evidence over deference to recognized authorities. Comparing economic policies in Japan and China during respective periods of rapid economic growth (and using Britain and the United States as a background comparison for both), she notices that nationalism has been the motivating factor in all cases, but that at the moment the economy in question hit its stride, joining the frontrunners in the world competition, economic policies changed (again in all cases) from emphasis on protective measures to ones favoring liberalization and openness. Economic nationalism, therefore, has been behind both protectionist policies (which are never given up entirely, but are strongest when the economic competitiveness of the nation is threatened) and globalization – globalization being none other than the economic nationalism of the strong.

Other chapters in Part IV are more reflective of the traditional, professional thinking in political economy. The Polish political scientist Ireneusz Pawel Karolewski, in Chapter 15, ruminates on two contradictory trends within the European Union: the euro-nationalism

of the union and the illiberal nationalism of member states such as Hungary and Poland. Many authors, he writes, stress “the identity-making power of the common currency [of the EU],” the euro, yet no European identity has so far developed or is showing any promise of developing; all the EU has to show for decades of identity-creating policies is a “nationalism lite.” In these circumstances, ethno-nationalism of Central and Eastern European societies reasserts itself as populism and illiberalism with “a repressive potential that contradicts the liberal and pluralist understanding of democracy” by “a bulk of researchers,” and to their chagrin. (Karolewski’s consideration of the “voices defending illiberal nationalism” in the context of the previously colonized nations, among which both Poland and Hungary may be included, would make it possible to group his chapter with those of Benoit and Carr in Part II – representing the thematic topic of race in the volume – in a discussion of nationalism and anti-colonialism.) Metehan Tekinirk, a Turkish graduate student, pursuing a doctoral degree in political science in Boston, focuses in Chapter 16 on the same subject of the confrontation between the post-Cold War expectations of Western scholars that “the world’s political and economic order” would become ever more globalized (in the sense of cosmopolitan and liberal) and leave nationalism behind on the one hand, and the rising tide of populist nationalism on the other. Even though his specific cases remain European (Hungary and Turkey), the discussion is generalized to the entire world. Tekinirk’s conclusion is that, at least insofar as the economic order is concerned, the inconsistency is more apparent than real, because, while populist politicians reject liberal representative democracy, they still support global capitalism and unequal distribution of material resources. Chapter 17 by Emmanuel Dalle Mulle, a young scholar from the EU working in Switzerland, brings the adjustment between Western social scientists’ view of the world as globalizing and the reality of resurgent nationalisms one step farther. Basing his conclusions on the study of nationalism in the “rich” Catalonia, Flanders, Northern Italy, and Scotland, and comparing them with Germany, he argues that it is the economic globalization that encourages the rise of separatist nationalisms, because it reduces the powers of existing states, diminishing the risks of independence, while economic motives impel economically more prosperous communities to free themselves from the demands of outsiders who want to share in their wealth.

PART V ELITE AND GRASSROOTS CONCEPTIONS OF NATIONAL IDENTITY

Part V, “Elite and Grassroots Conceptions of National Identity,” allows us to consider national identity from the perspective of scholarly traditions independent of Western social science. It contains chapters by the Japanese scholar Chikako Takeishi (Chapter 18), Chinese scholars, Yanbin Chen (Chapter 19) and the co-authors Liming Chen and Guoxia Zu (Chapter 20), and the Russian archival historian Yuri Ivanovich Basilov (Chapter 21). For the Western reader they present, as stated at the outset, the compounded interest of unfamiliar data, and way of thinking, presentation style, and sense of the purpose of scholarship significantly at variance with what such readers are used to expect. First, there is very little posing in these chapters – the authors do not waste time on locating themselves within disciplinary debates, distinguishing their position from others,

or declaring their theoretical allegiances and desires to contribute to one or another literature. Their use of references reflects this: among the most important functions of references in Western social science is to define the author and often their relevance is limited to this function. Certain names must be named to demonstrate that the author is *au courant* with the field and they will be named, whether or not references to them support claims advanced, and – remarkably – whether or not the author has actually read the works cited (frequently the familiarity that a reference is there to demonstrate is only by hearsay). This is patently not the function of references in the chapters of this part of the book – all of them bear directly on the issues under discussion, and most of them are to primary sources and are part of the empirical apparatus rather than theoretical hedging. In general, unlike Western scholars, the authors in this part of the book do not attempt to fit their data into existing theories or to create general theories of their own: they distinctly consider their responsibility to lie in as accurate description of these cases as possible – the transmission of information about them. This differs from descriptive studies of Western social scientists in that Western scholars value description far below theoretical interpretation: they would like their studies to be of theoretical import and stop at description because of the failure to achieve their goal. This is not so insofar as scholars here are concerned.

Takeishi's chapter (Chapter 18) is a survey of accounts of current Japanese nationalism. She begins by carefully distinguishing nationalism as a research construct (i.e., a concept capturing and articulating the essence of the complex empirical phenomenon) from a specific expression of nationalism on the popular level – the grassroots *nashonarizumu* – then summarizes contingencies that shaped Japanese nationalism during the three phases of its historical development, points to the fact that the case of Japan displays the psychological dynamics (connected to identity construction) common to all modern societies, and, in the end, returns to her case, proposing research agenda with a special relevance to Japan. The subject of Chapter 19 by Yanbin Chen's is the formation of the Bai ethnic minority in China. It emerges on the basis of the economic profile of certain clans – traditional occupations of certain Yunnan Province extended families and their cohesion distinguish them from the surrounding population and eventually are interpreted in ethnic terms. This suggests that in China, ethnicity does not have the connotation of a racial, physical distinction, but is perceived strictly in cultural terms. This is also the suggestion of Liming Chen's and Guoxia Zu's in Chapter 20, which focuses on ethnic and national policies of the Chinese Communist Party. Perceiving ethnic differences in cultural rather than racial terms, the party and the state over which it presides, unlike its Soviet counterpart, do not assume that the interests of ethnic minorities and the Han majority that they represent are inherently in conflict and do not seek to suppress ethnic diversity, considering it a counterweight to the majority (or, as it is referred to in the chapter, state) nationalism, which, unchecked, could impose uncomfortably uniform institutions on all of China. At the same time, it promotes this nationalism to balance the divisive potential of ethnic diversity. This pragmatic attitude, in line with the traditional Chinese concepts of harmony and moderation, benefits everyone. Representing yet another independent scholarly approach, Basilov's chapter (Chapter 21) is a straightforward exposition of the little known in the West, but very interesting and important in its context, philosophical-sociological conception of Russian nationalism as Eurasian. The admission of the major Asian element within Russian identity was a response to the inferiority, the incomplete-

ness of Russia's Europeanness (perceived by the theorists themselves and reflected in European attitudes towards their country). At the same time, the conception of Russia as the Eurasian nation by definition incorporated numerous populations, both Asian and European, within the Russian state and justified the formation of the Soviet Union in the confines of the overturned Russian Empire. The psychological underpinnings and consequences, and the geo-political implications of Eurasionism's rhetorical artistry, make this an extremely useful theory to consider for anyone trying to understand nationalism, as well as many other subjects.

PART VI BY THE SIDE OF EMPIRES

In Part VI, "By the Side of Empires," the next four chapters offer a fascinating look at cases where national consciousness (earlier suppressed or non-existent) surged in the recent years from the perspective of those who are not only observers but also impassioned participants in the developments they analyze. The cases are Hong Kong (the subject of Chapter 22 by Tommy Yiu-man Leung, a young philosopher, social scientist, and activist, and Chapter 23 by Yuk-man Cheung, a sociologist and activist), Catalonia (written about in Chapter 24 by Agustí Colomines i Companys, a distinguished historian and public intellectual), and Georgia (the focus in Chapter 25 of Nutsa Batiashvili, an ethnographer, cultural anthropologist, and cognitive psychologist). Hong Kong and Catalonia were making headlines simultaneously in 2019–20, and all three have repeatedly attracted the attention of Western media as hotspots of conflict with much larger and more powerful adversaries. The great similarity between the three cases, if noticed at all, has been stressed neither by observers nor by the participants. Yet, it goes far beyond the intrepidity of the three small communities standing up to powers with all the means to crush them completely and expected to react with brutality, and left to their fate by the indifferent world. Several features unite Hong Kong, Catalonia, and Georgia. The objective achievements of all three communities – their historical record – allow them to see themselves as spiritually (i.e., morally and culturally) superior to the greater powers who lay claim to sovereignty over them.

Hong Kong, by right of its British upbringing, shares in Western civilization (considered *the* civilization by its members) and liberal democracy (considered in the West the most enlightened type of society). China, to which Hong Kong now belongs, in distinction, has a bad name in the West, as an authoritarian, even totalitarian, regime. Catalonia has a rich cultural tradition, a distinguished literature in its own language, older than that of Spain, and unique, world-famous architecture. More important, in the Civil War, it led the struggle against fascism, never reconciled to it, saw it as imposed from Madrid, and was the main victim of the regime, its language itself suppressed. Both Hong Kong and Catalan nationalists perceive their national struggle as the struggle for democracy, indeed *of* democracy, against the totalitarian state, and perceive themselves as the vanguard of the universal struggle. The dignity implied in the membership in culturally and morally superior communities in both Hong Kong and Catalonia is reinforced by this struggle and in turn reinforces their nationalism. The patent lack of acknowledgment of this dignity by China and Spain has the same effect, frustrating them and spurring them to continued and greater resistance. Until recently, Hong Kong was far more advanced economically,

far more prosperous and sophisticated than mainland China; it allowed Hongkongers to look down upon and be condescending to their less fortunate compatriots and the booming economy supported their sense of dignity. They can no longer rely on the economy for such support. Both Leung and Cheung in Chapters 22 and 23, respectively, stress that economic difficulties (for instance, inability to buy an apartment and start a family) affect the mood of the younger generations, disorient them, make them hopeless, even drive them to mental illness. Nationalism re-engages them and, reinforcing their sense of dignity, restores meaning to their lives. Agustí Colomines i Companys in Chapter 24 also emphasizes Catalonia's economic lead in Spain. However, in distinction to Dalle Mule (Chapter 17), who believes that Catalan nationalism and its independence movement are in the main motivated by economic interests, his account makes it clear that the conflict is essentially about dignity and recognition and that even economic matters are interpreted chiefly in these terms.

In the meantime, tiny Georgia, its population half the size of both Catalonia's and Hong Kong's, in its little corner of Europe entirely disregarded by Europeans, wages its own long war against the military colossus of Russia. In this case, brutal suppression is not a mere expectation; it is reality. Georgia belonged to Russia for two centuries until three decades ago; it no longer does. But Russia is not giving up on its erstwhile domains and in several military campaigns has already re-annexed a number of regions of the newly sovereign Georgian state. Economic considerations play no role in Georgia's resistance: with nothing but agriculture and tourism to support it, its insistence on its national sovereignty – which it tried to assert already a century ago – costs it dearly. It is dignity and only dignity that is at stake for Georgia.

Georgia is a proud ancient culture, one of the oldest cultural communities among those in existence today – suffice it to say that humanity owes it the invention of wine. The Georgian state is the successor of the Kingdom of Iberia, dating to the first millennium BCE. Georgia is the second oldest Christian society in the world, adopting Christianity as the state religion in the fourth century CE, a few years after the neighboring Armenia, but before Rome. At the time, Aramaic was used as the literary language, but already in the fifth century, Georgian (a variety of autochthonous Kartvelian) written language existed and a great literary and scholarly tradition began, which by the twelfth century – before Europe knew Dante – reached its Golden Age. Sophisticated but small and situated between the Caucasus and the Black Sea on the route of successive conquering armies, Georgia has only sporadically enjoyed sovereignty. Forced to exist within one (usually Muslim) empire after another, it held fast to its ancient faith and language, and upheld its distinguished traditions – these defined its identity and sustained the dignity of its nobility. When the Russian Empire took over the control of Georgia from Iran, Georgia was incorporated within a political framework that was far below its level in cultural development. Acquiring its very name only a century before it made Georgia its province, Russia developed through conquest out of what was a tiny principality founded only a few centuries ago. Until the eighteenth century it had no written language. Yet, Russians always looked down on Georgians, who experienced their subjugation as humiliating yet had no realistic possibility to resist it. When nationalism began to develop simultaneously in Russia and in Georgia, the population within the small province came to share both in the dignity their nobility derived from representing the ancient distinguished culture and in their experience of humiliation by Russia. After the 1917 Revolution, Georgia

attempted to separate but was forcibly incorporated in the Soviet Union. As a result, as Batiashvili engagingly describes in Chapter 25 (and as her double epigraph reflects), a dual national consciousness developed: the conscience of national pride that is at the same time the consciousness of national shame. Today, with its few bodies, the tiny nation by default serves as the vanguard troop in the fight for what the world in principle considers right – self-determination – against the naked cynical might (which the world in principle considers wrong but would not dare to oppose). And the only reason Georgia constantly risks the danger of losing its independence altogether in the valiant attempt to defend it, is that it is determined to be a proud nation, not ashamed of itself, that is, to decisively reassert its dignity.

Grouped together by the geopolitical circumstances that inspire their nationalism, the three cases in this part of the book represent a different aspect of the problematic of multinational states from the one stressed by Vujačić in Part I and a different perspective on anti-imperialist struggle from the one reflected in the chapters by Benoit and Carr in Part II. Juxtaposed with Dalle Mulle's discussion of "The nationalism of the rich," in Part IV, Part VI could be named "The nationalism of the better." The cases are valuable to discussions on a number of thematic topics. At the same time, the explicit emphasis on dignity in these chapters prompts a re-reading of all the chapters in this book in light of this issue. Once it is pointed out, one can easily see dignity considerations assumed in numerous otherwise focused discussions and suggesting themselves as relevant even in the discussions that make no mention of them at all.

PART VII COMPETING FOR SUPREMACY

In the short Part VII, "Competing for Supremacy," dignity is brought into the foreground as the explanation of confidence in and popularity of national leadership. The two chapters in it, in distinction to those in Part VI, are written by outside observers. In Chapter 26, the American international relations scholar and sociologist Chandler Rosenberger discusses Xi Jinping, and in Chapter 27, the Swedish political scientist Bo Petersson considers the appeal of Vladimir Putin in Russia. Careful analysis of the Chinese leader's recent official statements leads Rosenberger to conclude that most other observers' focus on Xi Jinping's new authoritarianism is misplaced and that they would do better paying attention to the bond he is creating between the Communist Party of China and the Chinese civilization. The glory of its 5000-year-long history adds mightily to the dignity of Chinese national identity, that is, to the personal identities of the 1.5 billion Chinese, uniting the people behind the party and further energizing the already colossal power of China's nationalism. Similarly, Petersson connects Putin's enduring popularity in Russia to his explicit commitment to safeguard the country's endangered status as a superpower – making Russia great again in the eyes of the world. As long as they have their dignity, apparently, Russians would put up with the lack of freedom and even be ready to live on an empty stomach.

PART VIII CIVILIZATIONAL SPECIFICITIES

The last part of the book, Part VIII, “Civilizational Specificities,” groups together six chapters that address traditions behind nationalism that nationalism finds in existence when it is created or imported from outside and within which it develops. The rise of Chinese nationalism not only makes it particularly clear that such pre-existing traditions may be extremely important, but also allows one to distinguish the traditions that are particularly important. Such traditions turn out to be civilizational, pertaining to the first principles that unite autonomous functional social systems into separate sets of more or less proximate kinship. While the societies within the sets are constantly observed by and relevant to each other, therefore exerting mutual influence and being interdependent, the coexisting sets (or families of societies) are irrelevant to and, for all intents and purposes independent from and exert virtually no influence on each other. Today there exist only three such families, or civilizations: the monotheistic civilization to which both majority Christian and majority Muslim societies belong, including all the societies called “Western”; the Sinic civilization with its center in China; and the Indic civilization centered on India. Civilizational traditions not only affect the ways the basic principles of nationalism are implemented, which all pre-existing traditions do, but have the power to transform these principles and change the essential nature of nationalism. Nationalism emerged within the monotheistic civilization in sixteenth-century England, where a new image of society emerged and was institutionalized – a sovereign community of fundamentally equal members and inclusive identity, called “nation.” The basic principles of fundamental equality of membership, popular sovereignty, and inclusive identity (fraternity) were logically related and retained wherever within the monotheistic civilization nationalism spread. However, after being imposed on Japan by the invading fleets of the USA, Britain, Russia, and other leading powers of the day in 1853, nationalism broke through the boundaries of the civilization within which it emerged and dramatically changed. This change was not evident at the outset, because few (if anyone) analyzed Japanese nationalism. The rise of nationalism in China in the recent decades made it clear. In the framework of the Sinic civilization, nationalism, while retaining the principle of inclusive identity, and the related emphasis on dignity that makes it insistently competitive, jettisons the principles of fundamental equality and popular sovereignty. The contrast with China brings into focus the features of the monotheistic civilization that escaped notice out of this comparison, including features that have systematically affected the development of nationalism in its original civilizational framework.

Part VIII is divided into two sections, with three chapters treating nationalism within the monotheistic civilization and three others discussing Chinese civilization. In Chapter 28, the Greek-French-American philosopher and political sociologist specializing in conceptions of self in early Christianity, Nicolas Prevelakis, focusing on “Nationalism and religion: Christianity,” provides a brief but comprehensive, lucid conceptual analysis of religion and the relations between religion and nationalism observed in the monotheistic civilization. The point most deserving of attention in this analysis is that in the age of nationalism, religion in general takes on a new meaning. Though this chapter would be very useful to anyone dealing with the topic, its aim is to characterize the interactions between specifically Christian consciousness and nationalism. Among other arguments, Prevelakis identifies four types of interplay between them: an alliance leading to an

established religion, as in the case of the Anglican Church in England; a clash between two powerful worldviews, leading to the formal separation between church and state, as in France; a redefinition of religion as ethnicity, a national characteristic (within ethnic nationalisms), which results in the confounding of the religious and political spheres, as in the Balkans and Russia – a very common outcome in the case of Islam as well; and the unidirectional sacralization of the political sphere, its installation as a quasi-religion, as in “civil religion” in the USA or leaders’ personality cults in various socialist regimes. All these types reflect the privileging of the logical thinking within monotheistic civilization, within which the simultaneous presence of two different truths represents a contradiction and cannot be tolerated (logic of no contradiction being inconceivable within the multi-world framework of polytheism in the conditions of which monotheism emerges, bringing with it the image of the consistent order, stark against the background of the earlier chaotic vision of reality, and elevating logic to the position of the only legitimate mode of thinking).

Chapters 29 and 30 in this section address another central characteristic of the monotheistic civilization, related both to the centrality of logic in it and to the history of monotheist religion, and indeed representing the central thread in the history of the monotheistic civilization as a whole, including the development of nationalism in it. This characteristic is the fixation on the Jews. Both Geneviève Zubrzycki and Joanna Beata Michlic (one an American sociologist of Polish origin, the other a British-educated social and cultural historian, also from Poland) analyze this fixation in the case of Polish nationalism today. (The focus on Poland juxtaposes these chapters with Chapters 15 and 16 by Karolewski and Tekinirk, respectively, in Part IV.)

Polish national identity is essentially defined in reference to the Jews. Zubrzycki, in Chapter 29, tries to make sense of the seemingly contradictory phenomena: right-wing populism, anti-semitism and denial of the Polish complicity in the Holocaust on the one hand, and Poland’s “Jewish revival” – that is, growing interest in all things Jewish – on the other. She argues that these are the two facets of the attempt to define what constitutes Polishness, the two facets of Polish nationalism, explained by the “magical” logic of Polish anti-semitism:

As Jewishness becomes a symbol standing for a liberal, plural, civic, and secular Poland, Poland is said by the conservative Catholic right to be ruled by “Jews” – by symbolic Jews – who must be neutralized. Poland is thus host to the apparently curious phenomenon of anti-semitism in a country with very few Jews. But the same logic is also at the source of *philosemitism*. For if ethno-religious nationalists contend that “Jews” are contaminating the nation with their civic ideals, building a pernicious post-national, cosmopolitan world, and must therefore be politically marginalized, “Jews” must for the same reason be resurrected and Jewishness promoted according to proponents of a civic and secular vision of the polity. Precisely because Jewishness carries specific significations and symbolic capital that other minorities in Poland (such as Ukrainians, Silesians, or the Vietnamese) do not possess, it is primarily through Jews and Jewishness that a modern multicultural Poland is articulated.

Michlic, in depressing detail in Chapter 30, depicts the resurgence of anti-semitic narratives and tropes in the three decades since the fall of communism and stresses that anti-semitism has always been at the core of Polish nationalism. The matrix of Polish nationalism of exclusivist ethnic type that crystallized in the first half of the nineteenth century and fully developed and sharpened in its second half, she writes, has not freed

itself from the anti-Jewish imagery at any juncture in the history of modern Polish nation-state, whether in periods of independence (pre-1918 and 1918–39), occupation by Nazi Germany and the Soviet Union during World War II, the 1945–89 communist era, or the post-communist present. Throughout all this time, the anti-semitic conviction that the “Jew is the anti-Pole,” and as such represents the ultimate Threatening Other for the nation, has been central in Polish national consciousness. At the same time, anti-Jewish tropes have shown a singular ability to adapt to and be repackaged for particular, changing, circumstances, indiscriminately assigning to Jews the blame for anything from the killing of Christ and “eating children” to occupying Palestine and building a Nazi colonial state there to promoting feminism and homosexuality to, perhaps most tellingly, “spoiling the good name of Poland and blackening the country’s international reputation,” “making the Poles insignificant.” These tropes become especially influential as they proliferate, mutating “without an end” everywhere on social media, feeding into and off, and whipping into a frenzy global anti-semitism.

As evidence presented by Michlic demonstrates, the Polish case is not at all unique. (Also see Yarrow in Chapter 13, completely unconcerned with the Jewish question, and yet unintentionally highlighting its importance in the context of German science: could Einstein and other Jewish Nobelists make their Aryan colleagues feel “insignificant”?) The “curious phenomenon of anti-semitism in a country with very few Jews,” to which, to quote Zabrzycycki from Chapter 29, Poland is host, is even more curious around the Muslim world of 1.8 billion: anti-semitism flourishes there in a total absence of Jews, its ancient Jewish populations being brutally expelled from their homelands in it between 1948 and 1960. The nations there also define themselves against the symbolic Jew, and also believe Jews to be the Threatening Other. Nor is anti-semitism peculiar to nationalism: it is rooted deeply in the monotheistic civilization and defines its characteristic psychological dynamics. The concept of one consistently ordered world (the universe) implied in the monotheistic belief encourages quantitative comparisons – of the same quality – in terms of more or less, better or worse. When it comes to definitions of identity, personal or collective, with regard to others, such comparisons become invidious. Because they borrowed their monotheism – their God – from the Jews, explicitly tracing their cardinal beliefs, constitutive of their perception of reality and their self-perception, to the stories of the Jewish people in the Hebrew Bible, both Christians and Muslims necessarily focused on Jews as the significant other; they had to define the Christian and the Muslim identities in comparison to the Jews. But this comparison at the basal, crucial, most vital point was mortifying: neither Christians nor Muslims were first, chosen, in the sight of God – Jews were. The very existence of Jews “spoiled the good name” of Christians and Muslims and “blackened their reputation” in their own eyes. At a very deep level, they had to contend with an essential sense of their inferiority. The existential envy of Jews, the profoundest *ressentiment*, and Jew-hatred was an inevitable result of this. Of course, this sense of inferiority personally bothered only the small upper stratum of theologians and religious leaders, but it was this stratum that articulated anti-semitic narratives and put in circulation anti-semitic tropes, and it is through these narratives and tropes that anti-semitism was institutionalized, permeating ways of thinking and acting throughout Christendom and the Muslim world. Nationalism carried the fixation on the Jews over into modernity. Anti-semitism was reinforced by the secular achievements of Jews, who everywhere rose to eminence in the spheres of culture, economy, and politics. Envy and

sense of inferiority in the secular domain pushed Germany to commit the Holocaust and the rest of the monotheistic civilization to acquiesce in it. The birth of Israel, in a war against the invading armies of five Arab states, an achievement made all the more striking by the magnitude of the disaster that preceded it, enflamed these sentiments, in the Muslim world immediately, and reactivated them first in Eastern Europe and then in the West after the shock of the Holocaust wore off. Today, as Michlic points out, even the Holocaust is envied. There is “competition over victimhood” around the world, with groups in Eastern Europe, Middle East, and even the US appropriating the term to argue that they have suffered at least as much as Jews. To create a level playing field in this status-aggrandizing game, the significance of the Holocaust is diminished, if not outright denied, and Jews are accused of “conducting the Holocaust of Palestinians,” thus proving that Jews are at least as bad as those who perpetrated the Holocaust on them and well deserving whatever happened to them in it. (As, on the one hand, Jews symbolize the civic values of advanced liberal democracy, and on the other, anti-semitic tropes and narratives inform the thought of the left as well as the right, these chapters can be usefully considered alongside those of Duina and Carson, Chapter 1, and Conversi, Chapter 2, in Part I of this book. Additionally, they can be juxtaposed with Chapter 6 by Campos de Sousa and Chapter 7 by Benoit, using *ressentiment* as an explanatory variable.)

The Sinic civilization, and China specifically, have no indigenous anti-semitic traditions and know of anti-semitism only by hearsay: indeed, the ubiquity of this attitude, which they find inexplicable, sometimes strikes Chinese as a distinguishing characteristic of what they regard as the “Western” civilization, alongside freedom and prosperity that Western societies themselves emphasize. This is related to the Chinese civilization’s cognitive openness, the acceptance of the essential heterogeneity of the world and lack of sensitivity to contradictions. Not assuming a consistent organization of reality, implicit in monotheism, Chinese civilization, unlike the monotheistic one, encourages qualitative comparisons and produces a very different psychological dynamic. For one, neither individuals nor communities in it *measure* themselves against each other. As a result, envy is not as common a sentiment as it is in (from the Chinese perspective) the West. Excellence of others does not make Chinese individuals and communities feel inferior to them; each has one’s own excellence. In China, status in society is traditionally, for millennia, distributed in accordance with educational achievement, which is believed to depend on inner talent – natural differentials in intellectual abilities are assumed and nobody sets great store by social equality; inequality, therefore, is not regarded as injustice, and freedom of choice is limited by one’s nature. Rarity and dispersion of envy greatly decrease group hostilities and divisions in society, contrasting with the ever-present conflict, whether open or temporarily concealed but assumed, within societies constituting the monotheistic civilization. In China, harmony is decidedly preferred to what in these societies is called justice.

For all these reasons, as demonstrated by the three remaining chapters in the book, Chinese observers find Western reality *un-understandable*. The authors of these chapters are two Chinese scholars, the Confucian philosopher Zhidong Cai (Chapter 31) and the professor of humanity and law, focusing on minority policies, Hongying Hu (Chapter 32), and the multidisciplinary scholar of modern China with a British PhD in anthropology and a Hong Kong PhD in cultural studies, coming from Singapore, Tung-Yi Kho (Chapter 33). All three acknowledge that Chinese nationalism is a Western importation

and yet argue that Western observers do not understand Chinese nationalism at all. They dutifully refer to Western scholarship on the subject, displaying impressive familiarity with it, which has no parallel, as regards familiarity with Chinese scholarship, among their counterparts among Western scholars of nationalism and is rare even among China experts. Cai's discussion focuses on the intellectual debate about Chinese nationalism in China between the group that can be characterized as "Westernizers," advocating "liberal nationalism," and those who stand for the so-called "neo-authoritarianism" – strong government supported by Confucian traditions. Chapter 31 is a discussion of other authors' views, between which Cai tries to find a middle ground, with something to praise and criticize in both positions:

Unquestionably, "civilizational-state", as somewhat a Chinese-characterized discourse, is a delightful creation. It is an endeavor to get rid of westernized discourses like "nation-state" in analyzing China. That is what should be prized . . . Nevertheless, from my perspective, it is implicitly anti-democratic on the other hand . . . there is hidden danger in this new type of nationalism. As mentioned above, modern nationalism takes modern political norms as its symbol of identity. But the proposition of "civilizational-state" is based on and gains identity through dissolving or denying part of modern political norms. In this sense, when we are busy getting proud of the rise of a "civilizational-state", our goal of a "political civilization" may come to nothing . . . [Still, a leading advocate of "civilizational-state"] is praiseworthy. He thinks, to improve people's livelihood, letting them have enough to eat is . . . the most basic requirement and manifestation of human rights. Even liberalists must admit that, for no matter how much importance you place on freedom, right to life is the most fundamental, and having enough to eat the basic activity to maintain life. Another example is . . . "good governance", emphasizing more the substance of democracy than its procedures. It is meaningful but exceeds the proper limits. He shows an attitude of looking down upon democratic procedures, which we cannot agree with.

We have here a style of argument completely unfamiliar to Western observers but crucial for them to understand.

Hu, in a detailed descriptive chapter focused on the research on Chinese nationalism in the past four decades (Chapter 32), argues that the recent emphasis of Xi Jinping on "human destiny" is beyond the existing theoretical framework of the study of nationalism because it no longer envisions only China's interest but the common good of humanity as a whole. She suggests that the source of this vision is to be found in Chinese civilization and that, for this reason, Chinese nationalism necessitates a new paradigm. Finally, according to Kho in Chapter 33, "the problem of Chinese nationalism is fundamentally a Western problem." It is a problem, he writes:

that stems from an epistemic and ontological Eurocentrism that, in taking for granted the supremacy of Western ways of knowing and being, finds it near intolerable that such an order can be challenged.

I aver that as a result of this gratuitous tendency to cast itself as "exceptional", the West has become bereft of the ability to be reflexive, to turn its analytical lens upon itself. Hence, as global political economic parameters have shifted in recent decades and the West finds itself in decline while China continues its ascent on the global stage, Western commentators in their Eurocentric blinkers have sought to cry foul over Chinese nationalism.

Food for thought. Perhaps, indeed, we need to re-examine our ways of knowing and being in comparison with China. This book, gathering together a great wealth of information

on nationalism, and on research on nationalism, around the world, offers us an opportunity to do just that.

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