5. Lashkar-e-Taiba

Anthony Davis

INTRODUCTION

Much as al-Qaeda is instantly associated in the public mind with the falling towers of the World Trade Center and the 9/11 attacks on the United States (US), so Lashkar-e-Taiba (LeT) is all but synonymous with Mumbai and the three-day terrorist rampage by its gunmen through India's commercial capital. The global notoriety that Lashkar or LeT achieved in November 2008 with attacks that left 166 dead and nearly twice that number wounded made it arguably South Asia's best-known terrorist organisation. Among transnational jihadist groups Lashkar-e-Taiba or Army of the Pure¹ is a complex entity. Many of its operations, not least the Mumbai outrage, define it as a group in unambiguous pursuit of a terrorist agenda targeted against Hindus, Jews and Americans with an eye to a worldwide audience. Not for nothing do Indians refer to the Mumbai massacre as 26/11, their nation's equivalent of al-Qaeda's made-for-global-TV 9/11 attacks on the US.

At the same time, any dispassionate assessment of Lashkar needs to recognise that mass casualty terrorism is only one face of a Janus-like identity. Other equally important facets – military, political, social and ideological – coalesce to form a complex entity that defies the simple, if satisfying, categorisation of the group as a terrorist organisation. In addition to a proclivity for high-profile terrorism, Lashkar has from its earliest beginnings organised and trained as a military force. Its fighters have conducted operations mainly in Afghanistan and the state of Jammu and Kashmir disputed between India and Pakistan, but have also ranged as far as Bosnia, Kosovo and Chechnya. But while the battlefield reputation of its military wing has owed much to its own process of recruitment and training, Lashkar has also depended for much of its capability on its umbilical relationship with the Pakistan Army and more specifically the military's powerful Inter-Services Intelligence Directorate (ISI).²

In this context Lashkar has been willing to subordinate itself to the interests of the Pakistani state and to serve as a proxy force in the military's pursuit of the nation's perceived security objectives. For much of its existence Lashkar has fought as the tip of the Pakistani spear in the 30-year-long insurgency in

Kashmir, benefiting from equipment and training provided by the ISI and willing to adapt its operational tempo to ISI calibration. In return it has benefited in Pakistan from the diplomatic and political ‘top cover’ extended by the military. At the same time, Lashkar has come to serve as a military reserve force able to call on a cadre of trained combatants that can almost certainly be numbered in the thousands. In 1999, skilled Lashkar fighters played a major role in protracted conventional engagements between Pakistan and India in the mountainous Kargil sector of the Line of Control.

Given Lashkar’s salience as a military and terrorist force, it is easy to overlook the proselytising role of its politico-religious wing, the Markaz-e-Dawa w’al Irshad (MDI), later re-branded the Jamaat-ud-Dawa (JuD). An avowedly Salafist organisation that promotes the teachings of the Ahl-e-Hadith sect of Sunni Islam,³ MDI/JuD has developed an extensive national network of offices, mosques, madrassahs and schools that has actively prosecuted the group’s missionary and proselytising work. On a jihadist field dominated by groups of the revivalist Deobandi school,⁴ Lashkar, far more than any other Pakistani militant group, has focused significant resources on *dawa* or preaching through outreach activities inside Pakistan. The scope and impact of a social welfare network that embraces education, health and humanitarian assistance has made of MDI/JuD a virtual state within a state – albeit one that functions at the pleasure of the military. Finally, Lashkar – or more specifically MDI/JuD – has attempted to parlay social and religious influence into party politics with the establishment in 2017 of the Milli Muslim League (MML). The party has not fared well at the ballot box, but the foray into electoral politics has served to underscore an attempt to adapt to a shifting and clearly less favourable environment than that of the 1990s and 2000s.

More broadly, though, Lashkar’s history is best viewed as a careful balancing of two core missions. First has been a commitment to a concept of a globalised jihad aimed at least notionally at the reinstitution of the Islamic Caliphate. In practical terms, that objective is seen as best advanced from the sanctuary of Pakistan through the Indian Subcontinent. To this extent, Lashkar’s mission has overlapped comfortably with the strategic imperatives of the Pakistani military which demand the de-stabilisation of India and an overturning of the status quo in Kashmir. Lashkar’s second mission has been *dawa*, the reformist missionary drive to propagate Ahl-e-Hadith Salafism through proselytising and social welfare outreach within Pakistan and beyond. Lashkar’s foundational view of the symbiotic relationship between jihad and *dawa* was perhaps best articulated by its founder and ideological leader Hafiz Mohammad Sa’eed writing in one of the group’s publications, *Takbeer*, in 1999:

Islam propounds both ‘dawa’ and jihad. Both are equally important and inseparable. Since our life revolves around Islam therefore both ‘dawa’ and jihad are essential,

we cannot prefer one over the other ... the need is to fuse the two together. This is the only way to bring about change among individuals, society and the world. (Tankel, 2011, p. 38)

As a non-state actor with a multifaceted identity that has sought to blend social welfare and terrorism, missionary outreach and guerrilla warfare, religion and politics, Lashkar is unusual but not entirely unique. Notwithstanding the obvious sectarian difference across the Sunni–Shia divide, the Pakistani movement bears significant similarities with Lebanese Hezbollah. Both groups are typically categorised by many states as terrorist organisations, and both have a history replete with undeniably terrorist attacks on civilian targets across the regions in which they operate: Lashkar in Kashmir and India more widely, Hezbollah in Lebanon, Argentina, Bulgaria and well beyond. At the same time, both groups have grown to develop significant military forces deploying both guerrilla and unconventional capabilities.

Both groups have also acted as a proxy forces enjoying substantial state backing in wider regional conflicts and benefiting from access to funding, training and equipment that has been fundamental to their emergence and growth. And finally, both have sought to establish a parliamentary political role in their home countries, even if Lashkar's inglorious foray into Pakistan's electoral arena can hardly compare with Hezbollah's striking success as a representative of Lebanon's once downtrodden Shia community. For both organisations, however, balancing the aspirations of revolutionary jihadism and the constraints imposed by the role of both state proxy and domestic socio-political actor has been a perennial source of tension.

AFGHAN GENESIS

Like most jihadist groups in Pakistan and the Asian region more widely, Lashkar emerged from the conflict that overtook Afghanistan following the communist coup of 1978 and the Soviet invasion of 1979. The decade-long Afghan war and the jihadist fervour that it inspired exerted a profound influence on the handful of men who were to build Lashkar from a small group of Salafist fighters and ideologues into an organisation with global reach and notoriety. One of them was Zaki-ur-Rahman Lakhvi, who as a religiously committed 22-year-old student from Okara district in Punjab province travelled in 1982 to the southeastern Afghan border province of Pakhtia to join anti-communist Afghan resistance fighters or mujahideen. Despite his own affiliation with the Salafist Ahl-e-Hadith sect, Lakhvi joined and fought with a group from the far larger Deobandi school dominant along the Afghanistan–Pakistan border, until in 1984 he broke away to set up his own Ahl-e-Hadith faction.

Independently of Lakhvi's jihadist activities, in 1985 two teachers of Islamic Studies at the Lahore University of Engineering and Technology, Hafez Mohammad Sa'eed and Zafar Iqbal, founded their own Ahl-e-Hadith group, the Jama'at-ud-Dawa (Association for Preaching). Sa'eed was born in 1950 in the Sargodha district of Pakistani Punjab three years after his family had migrated from India in the partition of the Subcontinent. In the savage communal violence that accompanied the movement of millions across the new border, 36 of his relatives were killed, a trauma that undoubtedly influenced his childhood development (*Times of India*, 2012). As a young man, Sa'eed was first associated with the Pakistan's main Islamist party, the Jama'at-e-Islami, and joined its student wing. In the early 1980s he furthered his studies at the Islamic University of Medina in Saudi Arabia, where he was influenced by Salafist thought and forged links with Saudi clerics already involved in the Afghan jihad who inspired him to support the struggle (*Times of India*, 2012).

The following year the two groups – one focused primarily on the military jihad, the other on the need for preaching or *dawa* – joined forces to establish the Markaz ud Dawa w'al Irshad or Center for Preaching and Guidance (MDI). Leadership fell to Sa'eed, whose credentials as an Islamic scholar carried greater weight than those of either Lakhvi or Iqbal. The group's headquarters in the Pakistani border city of Peshawar, the organisational hub for the Afghan jihad, provided it with a wide range of contacts with Afghan, Pakistani and Arab Islamists also based there. Not least among them was Abdullah Azzam, the Saudi-trained Palestinian intellectual and writer who more than any other figure was to popularise the ideology of jihad across the Arab world and beyond. An associate of Osama bin Laden, Abdullah Azzam was one of 17 founding members of MDI (Tankel, 2011, p. 21).

In 1987, MDI shifted its focus of military operations and training from Paktia to the eastern Afghan province of Kunar where it set up bases and a training camp under the auspices of an Afghan Salafist commander, Jamil-ur-Rahman. Having earlier owed allegiance to one of the leading Afghan Islamist factions, the Hizb-e-Islami (Islamic Party) of Gulbuddin Hekmatyar, Jamil-ur-Rahman later broke away to establish his own Salafist group, the Jamiat al-Dawa al-Quran w'al Sunna, ruling an enclave in the mountains of Kunar. He was backed by Saudi Wahhabi clerics, private Saudi funding and, before long, an influx of Saudi fighters. Supported by Jamil-ur-Rahman, MDI fitted well into this milieu of doctrinaire, Arab-influenced Salafist purism from which bin Laden's al-Qaeda was to emerge in 1988.

Soviet forces finally withdrew from Afghanistan in 1989, but the jihad against the communist government of President Najibullah, still ensconced in Kabul, continued apace. In 1990, Lashkar-e-Taiba, the Army of the Pure, was formally founded as the military wing of MDI. The same year also saw

a rising wave of unrest in Kashmir, disputed since 1947 between India and Pakistan, spill over into full-scale insurgency. And it was in Kashmir rather than Afghanistan where Lashkar was soon to forge a reputation as a leading jihadist force.

IDEOLOGICAL COMPLEXION

From the time of its founding, both MDI's Ahl-e-Hadith beliefs and its chosen area of operations among the Salafis of the remote mountains of eastern Kunar set the organisation apart from the Sunni jihadist mainstream on both sides of the Afghan–Pakistan border. Meaning 'People of the Traditions of the Prophet', the Ahl-e-Hadith school originated as a distinct movement in 1870s in British-ruled India but traced its roots back to the revivalist teachings of the Delhi-based Islamic scholar Shah Waliullah (1703–1762). A South Asian variant of Salafi revivalism that upholds the Quran and Hadith as the only legitimate legal sources in Islam, the Ahl-e-Hadith sect rejects the four traditional schools of Islamic jurisprudence – Hanafi, Hanbali, Shafi'i and Maliki – as tantamount to a worship of their various founders and to be eschewed.

Within the context of 19th century India, the Ahl-e-Hadith existed as a small exclusivist sub-set of Sunni Islam, with its own distinctive prayer rituals and set apart from the far larger Deobandi school of Islamic reformism that emerged in 1867 from the madrassah in Deoband, north of Delhi. While the group developed links with the Wahhabi *ulama* in Arabia, they remained loyal to the British Raj and were viewed by the colonial authorities as essentially apolitical and quietist (Tankel, 2011, p. 27). In the context of the new state of Pakistan, the Ahl-e-Hadith remained a tiny minority. The overwhelming majority of Pakistani Sunnis – as many as 80 per cent – adhere to the Barelvi school of syncretic Islam that has blended the Muslim faith with various pre-Islamic traditions; and which in party political terms has mainly been represented by the Jamiat-e-Ulema Pakistan (JUP). Meanwhile a large minority of Sunnis are Deobandi, concentrated mainly in the North-West Frontier Province (since 2010, Khyber Pakhtunkhwa) and Baluchistan, and represented politically by the Jamiat-e-Ulema Islam (JUI) party.

Even within the small Ahl-e-Hadith minority, the Lashkar and MDI/JuD movement stands as a minority itself. Most followers of the Ahl-e-Hadith sect in Pakistan are members of the Markaz-e-Jamiat-e-Ahl-e-Hadith, which holds that jihad is collective responsibility. In significant contrast, MDI/JuD and its leaders have propagated the idea that the pursuit of jihad is an individual responsibility incumbent on every Muslim. Notionally at least, the obligation to jihad is viewed by the movement as a global mission on behalf of a united Muslim *ummah*, and to that extent Lashkar has been strongly influenced by the teachings of Abdullah Azzam and Osama bin Laden. As Sa'eed wrote in 2000,

‘The jihadist caravan that emerged from Afghanistan has spread throughout the globe. Mujahideen have no nationality: they are recognized and identified through Islam.’⁵

More immediately, however, Lashkar’s jihad has been founded on the notion of Pakistan as a sanctuary, a primary focus for *dawa* and a springboard for military jihad. In sharp distinction to Deobandi jihadist factions which in 2007 finally coalesced under the umbrella of the Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan (Pakistan Taliban Movement) and turned against the Pakistani state in a campaign of sweeping violence, Lashkar has remained throughout a loyal servant of the state and the military. From the group’s ideological perspective, the rulers of Pakistan at least professed belief in Islam, whatever their perceived religious shortcomings. Again, as Sa’eed himself put it: ‘We do not believe in revolutionary change in Pakistan; rather we want a gradual reform through “dawa”’ (Tankel, 2011, p. 43).

ORGANISATIONAL STRUCTURE

For most of its existence, Lashkar’s civilian wing, MDI/JuD has been headquartered at the village of Muridke some 20 kilometres outside Lahore.⁶ Seed money for the Muridke complex is generally understood to have come from its Saudi benefactors. One was Abdur Rahman Surayhi, an associate of Osama bin Laden, who became the father-in-law of Zaki-ur-Rahman Lakhvi, and assisted Lakhvi in setting up training camps in Afghanistan. Another important benefactor was Mahmoud Mohammad Ahmed Bahaziq (aka Sheikh Abu Abdul Aziz), who was to become a central figure in the financial affairs of the expanding MDI/JuD–Lashkar organisation. Muridke was designed and built to create a truly Islamic society in microcosm. It comprises offices, schools, shops, a madrassah, a hospital, residential quarters and farmland. The complex also hosts an annual convention or *ijtema* of Lashkar faithful and sympathisers from across Pakistan and indeed the world. By the turn of the century the *ijtema* at Muridke was drawing a congregation which over a week numbered several hundred thousand people.

By this period the movement had extended its reach and recruitment across Pakistan with a network of close to 2500 offices and recruitment points (John, 2011, p. 5). This organisational structure rests on a system of departments which answer to a central leadership council or *shura*, headed by emir Hafez Mohammad Sa’eed. These include importantly departments for political affairs, *dawa*, education, finance, and media and propagation. There is also a large social welfare department, the Idarah-e-Khidmat-e-Khalq (IKK); a publishing wing, the Dar al-Andalus; and an external affairs department which deals with the movement’s relations with jihadi groups and LeT assets beyond Pakistan. MDI/JuD also runs wings focusing on targeted outreach to

specific social groups. The most important of these are arguably the women's wing (Shoba-e-Khawateen), viewed by Sa'eed as crucial to instilling a culture of jihadist sacrifice in growing children, and the student wing (Tulaba Jama'at-ud-Dawa). But the movement also runs wings for teachers, doctors, farmers and workers.

At the centre of this far-reaching network, the core leadership of MDI/JuD remains a decidedly family affair. Sa'eed's deputy emir has long been his brother-in-law and cousin Abdur Rahman Makki, while his son Talha Sa'eed, son-in-law Hafiz Khalid Waleed and nephew Javaid Naved all occupy senior positions with direct access to the emir. This concentration of power around Sa'eed and his relatives has predictably caused dissension, and in particular tensions between Zaki-ur-Rahman Lakhvi and Sa'eed which at one point risked splitting the entire movement. Tellingly, however, they appear to have been papered over by the intervention of ISI officers (Tankel, 2011, p. 138).

OPERATIONS

Kashmir

As the Afghan war wound down after the Soviet withdrawal in 1989, Lashkar fighters scattered to various arenas of jihadist endeavour. These included notably Tajikistan, where a civil war raged from 1990 to 1992; and Bosnia, on the doorstep of Europe, where MDI luminary Bahaziq headed an ISI-backed jihadist following (Kiessling, 2016, pp. 125–126).⁷ However, it was the insurgency in Kashmir that attracted growing numbers of Lashkar fighters and came to both shape and define the movement as it expanded through the 1990s. While at one level Lashkar espoused a vision of jihad influenced by Abdullah Azzam and bin Laden that was global, more practically its instincts and horizons lay closer to home. A visceral anti-Hindu animus that had much to do with a recruitment base in Punjab and Azad (Free) Kashmir, the Pakistani-administered eastern third of the disputed state, drove a military agenda that was always centred on Kashmir. Rooted in widespread allegations of rigging in the state elections in 1987, unrest in Kashmir escalated in 1988 and 1989 with bombings, strikes and mass protests. By the spring of 1990, turmoil had morphed into fully fledged insurgency led by a local Kashmiri faction, the Jammu and Kashmir Liberation Front (JKLF).

A religiously moderate movement with deep roots in the Vale of Kashmir, the JKLF championed independence for the state rather than its accession to Pakistan. And given its popularity, the ISI was prepared to throw its initial support behind it. By 1991, however, the Pakistan military turned to a candidate better suited to Islamabad's own objectives: this was the Hizbul Mujahideen (HM), an overtly Islamist group linked to the Kashmiri branch

of Jama'at-i-Islami and committed to accession to Pakistan. With the benefit of ISI backing, HM expanded rapidly even as it shouldered the JKLF violently aside (Davis, 1991). Against this shifting backdrop, the first Lashkar volunteers joined the fight as early as 1990, two years before the fall of the Soviet-backed communist regime in Kabul. But it was not until 1993 that Lashkar publicly announced its first operation in Kashmir (Tankel, 2011, p. 58). By that stage in the conflict, local Kashmiri factions including HM were flagging in the face of massive deployments of Indian security forces and aggressive counter-insurgency operations. In order to maintain battlefield pressure ISI began to throw its weight behind tougher, more experienced Pakistan-based jihadist groups including Lashkar and the Deobandi Harkat ul Mujahideen (HuM) whose fighters became known in the Valley as 'guest mujahideen'.

An early assessment of Lashkar by a former Director-General of ISI (DGISI), General Javed Ashraf Qazi, was of a 'very motivated group' (Tankel, 2011, p. 40); and indeed, by 1995 Lashkar had asserted itself as the most effective of the Pakistan-based groups and benefited from a correspondingly high level of ISI support. The years of jihad in Kashmir that followed served to forge a relationship between the jihadis and the ISI in which Lashkar became the Pakistani military's favoured weapon in the covert war with India; or, in the words of one American commentator, 'Pakistan's premier proxy terrorist organization' (Roggio, 2019). It was not only LeT's military skills that recommended the group to ISI: its home base in Pakistan, coupled with its status as a small and politically weak religious entity, suggested that it would be easier to control and calibrate than either a Kashmir-based faction or a Deobandi faction with independent political influence in Pakistan. Courtesy of training and equipment provided by ISI, Lashkar fighters honed a range of military capabilities in Kashmir. Most obviously, small-unit guerrilla tactics against larger, less mobile Indian Army and paramilitary forces became an area in which its fighters excelled. Lashkar also developed a noted expertise in the manufacture and deployment of improvised explosive devices (IEDs). These skills were used not only in Kashmir but also in the Afghan theatre, to which Lashkar operatives filtered back in the mid-2000s as the tempo of hostilities in Kashmir declined even as the Taliban insurgency against North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) forces in Afghanistan escalated (John, 2011, p. xxix).

LeT units also proved their mettle in the Kargil hostilities of May–July 1999 (South Asia Terrorism Portal, 2018). This conflict unfolded as a largely conventional, if geographically limited, war in which Indian forces made extensive use of artillery and air power as they sought to re-take mountain heights overlooking the road between Kashmir and Ladakh which had been occupied in early spring by the Pakistanis. Lashkar fighters also gave some

cover to Islamabad's official narrative that the heights had been seized not by regular forces but by Kashmiri mujahideen. If there was one tactic that Lashkar can be said to have pioneered in Kashmir, however, it was the use of fedayeen or *fidayi* attacks. These operations involved small groups of trained and highly committed fighters mounting aggressive frontal assaults on Indian military compounds or barracks using automatic rifles and grenades. The assault team, typically consisting of only two or three combatants, would then seize control of all or part of a building and resist attempts to dislodge them for hours at a time.

These 'sacrificial' operations usually ended in the death of the attackers, but that outcome was not necessarily required, and there was no disgrace in escaping to fight another day. Importantly from a theological point of view, the fedayeen attack stood in sharp contrast to the tactic of suicide bombing transported from Iraq and adopted in the early 2000s by Deobandi groups such as Jaish-e-Mohammed (JeM) in Kashmir, and both the Afghan and the Pakistani wings of the Taliban movement. Fedayeen operations were suicidal but not suicide: the perpetrator was never the agent of his own death. The nature of the fedayeen attack was well articulated by deputy emir Abdul Rahman Makki, a leading MDI/JuD ideologue, who defined a *fidayi* attack as:

attacking the enemy risking one's life, without taking necessary precautions, pouncing upon the enemy in the face of sure death completing one's mission at every cost. If one embraces martyrdom in this course one feels it is a divine mission and if one returns alive successfully one is jubilant over Allah's bounty. (Tankel, 2011, p. 64)

As a military tactic in Kashmir, *fidayi* operations reached their zenith around the turn of the century even as the intensity of the conflict waned. Between 1999 and 2002 there were as many as 55 fedayeen assaults against Indian security force camps and government installations, most of them carried out by Lashkar (Tankel, 2011, p. 55). But, granted trained and motivated combatants and a willingness to die, it was a tactic that travelled all too easily from Kashmir to the streets of Mumbai. It was only a matter of time before the suicide bombers dispatched by Deobandi groups and Islamic State (IS) were trained to adopt fedayeen assault tactics and protracted resistance before detonating their suicide vests. The lethal fusion of the two tactics was to produce horrific results on the streets of Islamabad, Lahore, Kabul and Paris.

Operations Beyond Kashmir

Lashkar's operations beyond Kashmir in 'India proper' can be viewed as falling into two broad categories. The more visible manifestation involved attacks carried out directly by its own cadres on both civilian and military

targets. In this space it was joined by JeM, another terrorist organisation favoured by the ISI. Headed by the Deobandi cleric Massoud Azhar, JeM split from Harakat-ul-Mujahideen (HUM) in 2000 following Azhar's release from jail in India as the result of the successful hijacking of Indian Airlines flight IC 814. At the same time, Lashkar has also devoted considerable resources to assisting in recruiting, training and providing operational support to indigenous Indian terrorists grouped loosely in the Indian Mujahideen (IM) network. In the early 1990s the recruitment drive in India was led mainly by Mohamad Azam Cheema, a colleague of Hafez Sa'eed at the University of Engineering and Technology who arrived in the country shortly before the destruction of the Babri Mosque by Hindu fanatics in December 1992. The demolition of the mosque and widespread anti-Muslim pogroms that followed marked a crucial watershed in the emergence of home-grown terrorism, driving Indian Islamist activists to join LeT and later in 2008 to establish the IM network. Lashkar provided the ISI with an essential cut-out in efforts to support the wave of terrorist bombings that followed.

In terms of direct action, the confidence and capabilities honed by Lashkar in Kashmir were first demonstrated in 'India proper' in 2000. On 22 December that year, two LeT operatives launched a fedayeen-style assault on the Red Fort in Delhi. Before successfully escaping they killed two soldiers and one civilian guard, but the low casualty toll belied the political significance of the operation, an attack rich in symbolism which struck not only the Indian capital but also a fortress, built by the Moghul Emperor Shah Jahan and viewed as a locus of national power and pride. Lashkar's second major attack beyond Kashmir followed in 2002, after the December 2001 assault by JeM terrorists on the Indian Parliament, which pushed India and Pakistan to the brink of all-out war. Unfolding on 24 and 25 September 2002 and apparently in retaliation for the Gujarat riots earlier in the year in which large numbers of Muslims had been killed, the Lashkar operation struck an unambiguously civilian target, the Akshardham Temple in Gandhinagar, Gujarat. Two LeT operatives armed with assault rifles and grenades executed a massacre that took the lives of 30 worshippers and wounded at least 80 others. The gunmen who had travelled south from Kashmir were finally killed by National Security Guard commandos early on 25 September, 14 hours after the attack began.

In the years that followed, further operations unfolded. On 28 December 2005 an attack on a conference at the Indian Institute of Science in Bangalore killed one academic and wounded four others before the lone gunman, armed with an assault rifle and dressed in military-style fatigues, escaped with an accomplice. The targeting of a well-known institution in a southern city synonymous with India's prowess as a growing information technology (IT) power appeared aimed at economic de-stabilisation. An assault in the early hours of 1 January 2008 on a paramilitary Central Reserve Police Force (CRPF) recruit-

ment centre in Rampur, in the northern state of Uttar Pradesh, marked a return to fedayeen tactics against military targets. The attack involved four gunmen dressed in CRPF uniforms and armed with assault rifles and grenades storming the facility and killing seven CRPF personnel and one civilian and wounding five others, before escaping.

An unprecedented fusion of a complex special forces operation and a mass-casualty terrorist outrage, the notorious November 2008 assault on the commercial capital of Mumbai provoked a surge of global condemnation. Carried out by ten Lashkar gunmen who targeted five-star hotels, a restaurant, the main railway station and a Jewish centre, the operation spanned three days (26–28 November) ensuring maximum global news coverage. The slaughter left 166 people dead in addition to nine gunmen who were finally killed by security forces. Over 300 people were wounded. Given the capture and testimony of the tenth gunman, 21-year-old Ajmal Kasab from Faridkot, Pakistan, along with communications intercepts by US intelligence, the Mumbai attack also served to focus a penetrating spotlight on the close operational relationship between Lashkar and its ISI handlers. The following month the United Nations declared JuD a front for the already proscribed LeT and listed JuD emir Hafiz Sa'eed a terrorist under UN Security Council Resolution 1267. Interpol later issued arrest warrants for two serving senior Pakistan Army officers and one retired major.

Given the weight of international condemnation over Lashkar's Mumbai foray it was scarcely possibly for the Pakistani state not to react. On 11 December, Hafez Sa'eed was detained under the Maintenance of Public Order Act. In June 2009, however, the Lahore High Court ordered his release for lack of evidence of any participation in military activities. Zaki-ur-Rahman Lakhvi was one of 12 arrested in a police raid on a Lashkar training camp in Pakistani-administered Kashmir on 7 December, four days after being named by India as a leading suspect. In November 2009, almost exactly one year after the Mumbai attacks, he was one of seven formally charged by an anti-terrorism court for planning and facilitating the operation. However, he was finally released on bail in April 2015 after a detention in a Rawalpindi jail that provided access to several rooms, television, mobile phones, internet access and 'dozens of visitors a day' (BBC, 2015).

Predictably, the visibility of Lashkar in terror attacks beyond Kashmir declined sharply in the decade that followed. But operations were not terminated. The group's operatives were implicated in a fedayeen-style attack on Rajbagh police station in Kathua district of Jammu on 20 March 2015, and in a similar attack on the police station at Gurdaspur in the Indian state of Punjab on 27 July the same year. LeT was also very much involved in an attack on a CRPF convoy on the Srinagar–Jammu highway in Pampore which left eight CRPF dead and 20 injured along with two attackers killed. While Lashkar

has clearly retained a lethal presence in Kashmir, Jaish-e-Mohammed (JeM) has moved to the fore in high-profile fedayeen operations. Among the most notable was the 20 January 2016 assault on the Pathankot Airbase, close to the international border in Punjab, which was claimed by the umbrella jihadist group the United Jihad Council (UJC) but is understood to have involved JeM operatives. The assault left seven security personnel dead in addition to four attackers, in a battle that lasted some 17 hours. JeM was also undoubtedly responsible for the 18 September assault on the Indian Army brigade headquarters at Uri near the LoC which left 19 soldiers dead and over 20 wounded, and triggered surgical strikes by Indian forces across the Line of Control.

More recently, a 14 February 2019 suicide vehicle-borne IED (SVBIED) bombing of a paramilitary convoy at Pulwama in Kashmir left at least 40 CRPF personnel dead, and was claimed by JeM. On this occasion India's response, in the shape of air strikes against what were advertised as JeM training facilities, struck the Balakot region of Khyber-Pakhtunkhwa province in 'Pakistan proper' rather than Pakistani-administered Kashmir. As detailed below, the Pulwama attack was also to have major repercussions for Lashkar's front organisations.

MILITARY RECRUITMENT AND TRAINING

Lashkar's recruitment base has long tended to mirror that of the Pakistan Army, with a clear focus on Punjab – and even specific districts of the province – and North-West Frontier Province or Khyber-Pakhtunkhwa, as it has been known since 2010. And as with the army, recruitment has generally attracted youths from the lower-middle class more than other social strata (Fair, 2014, pp. 61–62). The Lashkar–Army symbiosis has even in some instances seen sons from the same family joining both streams of military service. At the other end of the age spectrum, there have been numerous cases of retired army personnel, including officers purged from the Inter-Service Intelligence Directorate, joining Lashkar; a striking reflection of the respect and prestige the jihadists have accumulated in the ranks of the regular service (Tankel, 2011, p. 61). Between the two poles of early and late recruitment into Lashkar direct, there have also been cases of army and ISI personnel, possibly including special forces operatives of the Special Services Group (SSG), taking 'unpaid leave' to join Lashkar units operating in Indian-held Kashmir (Tankel, 2011, p. 62).

The mainstream channel of induction into Lashkar, however, involves progression through a layered series of courses mostly conducted in camps in Azad Kashmir which traditionally has served as the hub of the group's military organisation. The most basic comprises the Daura-e-Aam or General Course required of all recruits. Gaining access to the course requires a letter

of authorisation from a local MDI/JuD branch office but, significantly, does not require the applicant to be a practicing member of the Ahl-e-Hadith sect: youths from any Sunni Muslim background may apply on the presumption that Lashkar training will soon convert them to the group's practices and beliefs. Essentially 'training-lite', the Daura-e-Aam typically lasts for three weeks with an emphasis on prayer, physical fitness and basic weapons instruction. However, not all those graduating from the course automatically move on to more focused military training.

Advanced military training is centred on the Daura-e-Khas or Special Course. Entry into this level of specialised instruction is selective and requires personal recommendations from senior Lashkar-MDI/JuD officials usually following a period of supervised *khidmat* or social service. *Khidmat* requires recruits to join a team engaged in active proselytising of Ahl-e-Hadith beliefs, and appeals to participate in jihad in markets, bus stations or other public venues. From 1998 onwards this form of socio-religious training in the organisation's missionary outreach was formalised in a 21-day Daura-e-Suffa or religious instruction course. Not all of those completing missionary training go on to advanced military training, however. Many inductees may move into other branches of the MDI/JuD's Pakistan-wide socio-religious network. But those joining the Daura-e-Khas embark on a taxing three-month course involving intense physical training; instruction in small-unit tactics and handling a range of small-arms including assault rifles, rocket-propelled grenades (RPGs), and mortars; and map-reading and radio communications. Instructors are drawn both from the ranks of seasoned Lashkar operatives as well as from the regular military.

Lashkar has also instituted a more narrowly specialised Daura-e-Ribat (literally, 'Watchman Course') which is reserved for operatives undertaking covert operations in enemy territory, that is, typically inside India. The course provides a more intelligence-based focus with instruction in surveillance and counter-surveillance, agent recruitment and covert communications skills. Significantly, military recruitment and training is set well apart from the civilian face of MDI/JuD and has been organised mainly from Muzaffarabad, capital of Azad Kashmir. At least until the fallout caused by the Mumbai operation of 2008, the Bait-ul-Mujahideen camp not far from Muzaffarabad has been the largest training facility.

PUBLIC OUTREACH

As evidenced by the Department of Media and Propagation and by the Dar al-Andalus publishing wing, Lashkar-MDI/JuD, more than any other jihadist group in the Subcontinent, has consistently stressed missionary outreach and humanitarian assistance both within Pakistan and beyond. Within Pakistan

these efforts have capitalised strongly on the manifest failings of the state while projecting an essentially non-sectarian message. As noted by one former Lashkar member, despite ‘belonging to the Salafi sect, Lashkar has [the] sympathies of people from all sects because of its social work and because it has focused on jihad against India and does not kill innocent people in Pakistan’ (Tankel, 2011, p. 132). Over the years the movement’s media output has been prolific and wide-ranging. It has involved a range of print publications and periodicals in Urdu, Sindhi and English, several of which have been financially profitable. By the late 1990s the group’s flagship monthly magazine *al-Dawa* was claiming a circulation of over 100 000 (Tankel, 2011, p. 80). Lashkar in its various incarnations has also maintained a robust online presence including a web-based radio station, Radio al Jihad, which has broadcast in Urdu, Sindhi, Arabic and English.

The annual *ijtema* or congregation held at Muridke over a week also attracts hundreds of thousands of MDI/JuD faithful from across Pakistan, as well as potential new members and military recruits. The huge gathering also provides an opportunity for networking with foreign Islamist and jihadist groups. This writer attended the *ijtema* in 1999 and was struck both by the level of organisation required to accommodate and feed the influx of attendees, and by the unrelenting ideological stress on jihad, most immediately against Hindu India but also including the United States and Zionist Israel. Projected onto one giant screen were maps and graphics detailing districts across Pakistan which had contributed *shaheed* or martyrs – each marked as a small light – in the conflict in Kashmir. The spread of lights was nationwide but revealed telling clusters in a relatively small number of districts in Punjab.⁸ On one evening a radio greeting from a Lashkar unit said to be operating in Indian Kashmir was broadcast over the public address system.

In addition to public outreach, MDI has also established its own educational network. This system is based both on Ahl-e-Hadith madrassahs, separate and distinct from those madrassahs run by the Jamiat-e-Ahl e-Hadith party, as well as al-Dawa schools which provide a heavily subsidised secondary education for both boys and girls. While the learning environment is predictably infused with the tenets and rituals of Ahl-e-Hadith Islam and the purported virtues of violent jihad, the curriculum is a modernist one that includes, mathematics, science, information technology and English. MDI/JuD’s modernism contrasts strikingly with the obscurantist, Quran-centric teachings in the madrassah of the main Deobandi parties, notably JUI. And in a country where the shortcomings of the state-education system are well-known, MDI/JuD’s al-Dawa schools have a clear appeal to lower-middle or working-class families keen to equip their children for the modern economy but unable to afford the private education sector.

Such has been the success of MDI/JuD's al-Dawa schools – which by 2001 numbered 127 nationwide – that the movement has also established its own teacher training college. Capitalising again on the manifest shortcomings of the Pakistani state, missionary-driven social outreach has also moved decisively into the field of health and disaster relief. MDI/JuD-run health facilities have expanded markedly from the hospital at Muridke which constituted their early beginnings. By 2010 the organisation was running six hospitals nationwide, along with 140 dispensaries, mobile clinics and the second-largest ambulance service in the country with a fleet of over 200 vehicles (John, 2011, p. 120). Higher-level training also includes a medical faculty attached to the hospital at Muridke that trains MDI/JuD's own doctors.

The capacity of MDI/JuD in the provision of humanitarian relief was notably underscored at the time of the Kashmir earthquake of October 2005, which in Pakistan-administered Azad Kashmir alone killed 73 000 people, while leaving 69 000 injured and a further 2.8 million homeless. It was perhaps unsurprising that given Lashkar's presence in the region, which served as a training base and launch pad for infiltration across the LoC, the response was immediate. But beyond the swiftness of the reaction, it was capability in terms of well-organised manpower, field hospitals and ambulances that drew national and international admiration. Teams from JuD's Idarah-e-Khidmat-e-Khalq (IKK) or Humanitarian Relief Department worked for weeks side by side with both Pakistan Army response units and United Nations agencies. The organisation's Falah-e-Insaniat Foundation (FIF) has also been active in humanitarian outreach both in Pakistan and well beyond. Following the massive displacement of civilians caused by the Pakistan Army's Zarb-e-Azb campaign into North Waziristan in June 2014, FIF was active in the distribution of relief goods, with as many as 500 volunteers (Inter Press Service, 2014). FIF was also involved in aid distribution to Rohingya refugees driven out of Myanmar by the Myanmar Army in late 2017.

FUNDING

Hardly surprisingly, given the sheer breadth of its operations – military, missionary, social and economic – Lashkar/MDI–JuD has relied on multiple streams of funding. The relative importance of these has shifted over the years, but by the late 1990s underpinned an annual budget that ran to millions of dollars. In its earliest incarnation during the period of the late 1980s, when Lashkar was establishing itself in eastern Afghanistan, the group appears to have owed its growth primarily to funds emanating from Wahhabi groups in Saudi Arabia, keen to carve out an ideologically sympathetic foothold in the Afghan jihad and more generally to extend Salafist influence in South Asia. The very fact that Arab luminaries such as Abdullah Azzam and Abdur

Rahman Surayhi were founding member of Lashkar is itself telling. From 1993 onwards, as Lashkar's military role in Kashmir grew, backing from Pakistan's ISI undoubtedly came to form a second and probably more important income stream. How far this state funding was dedicated solely to military pursuits targeted on Kashmir, and how far it contributed to MDI/JuD's ability to extend its other activities within Pakistan, is less clear.

As Lashkar's star rose above the Kashmiri battlefield it was also able to build up a network of fundraising operations focused on private donations. Inside Pakistan, contributions could be made either at boxes in MDI offices, mosques or even local shops; or alternatively paid into MDI bank accounts whose details were freely available on the group's website. The sale of animal hides donated by the pious after the cattle had been butchered for the Eidh-ul-Adha celebrations proved to be one early and successful money generator. MDI also collected the Islamic *ushr* tax in kind through its Farmer and Workers' Wing, a levy normally raised by an Islamic ruler but legitimised by MDI in the absence of a recognised caliph. Fundraising from a well-heeled Pakistani diaspora was equally important, particularly in the United Arab Emirates and the United Kingdom where the expatriate community from Mirpur district in Pakistani-administered Kashmir was known to be sympathetic to the Kashmiri cause as projected by Lashkar (John, 2011, p. 122).

Directed largely by Mahmoud Mohamad Ahmed Bahaziq and Haji Mohamad Ashraf, MDI's Department of Finance was also able to develop several activities into businesses, from which the profits could be ploughed back into wider portfolios in real estate and agriculture. Fees from the network of al-Dawa secondary schools was one such source of funding. Another was profits from the Dar al-Andalus publishing house. In short, despite the technical ban imposed on MDI in 2002, by the first decade of the century Lashkar-MDI/JuD had developed an impressive nationwide presence in the educational, medical and humanitarian spheres. The quality of service provided was typically well beyond anything that Pakistan's crumbling state agencies could offer.

ADAPTING TO PRESSURE

The end of 2001 presented Lashkar with a major dilemma, as it did the Pakistan Army under Musharraf. The 9/11 attacks and the invasion of Afghanistan that followed shattered the tacit alliance between the Pakistan Army and the jihadist movement. Musharraf was presented by Washington with a blunt choice of 'with us or against us' that in reality was no choice at all. As Musharraf argued, Pakistan had three overarching strategic priorities: opposing Indian hegemony and supporting the 'freedom struggle' in Kashmir; protecting and developing a nuclear programme that underpinned the nation's survival; and establishing a friendly regime in Kabul to ensure politico-military strategic depth on

Pakistan's western flank. Not without dissent among his corps commanders, he concluded that in order to advance the first two objectives he would need to sacrifice the third, and lend support to the US's impending war against the very regime that Pakistan had installed in 1996: Osama bin Laden's hosts, the Afghan Taliban.

The decision to make common cause with the Americans and betray the Taliban was anathema to many of the jihadist groups in Pakistan. Lashkar's own response to the 9/11 attacks was initially confused, eliciting different responses from different leaders. Before long, however, the movement fell behind Musharraf's position, and for two overlapping reasons. Firstly, Lashkar's primary military and ideological focus was Kashmir, not Afghanistan. Secondly, unlike Pakistan's Deobandi parties and jihadist factions such as JUI, JeM, Sipah-e-Sahaba Pakistan (SSP) and Lashkar-e-Jhangvi (LeJ), the Ahl-e-Hadith Lashkar shared little religious fellow-feeling with the Deobandi Afghan Taliban or for the war they had been waging against the Afghan Northern Alliance. Following the earthquake of 9/11 and the US invasion of Afghanistan, a second major crisis in the region was caused by the brazen terrorist attack mounted by JeM on the Indian Parliament building on 13 December. The incident, which left five dead including the Pakistan-based attackers, prompted a full-scale mobilisation of Indian forces along the border; angry demands from New Delhi for a crackdown on Pakistan-supported jihadist terrorism; and heavy diplomatic pressure from an administration in Washington alarmed by the prospect of war between the two nuclear-armed rivals.

Coming in the aftermath of the al-Qaeda attacks on the US, the assault on the Parliament building was – as it clearly intended to be – a huge embarrassment for Musharraf. On 20 December Washington announced a freeze of any assets held by Lashkar; a move that the government of Pakistan was then obliged to follow. And on 26 December, Washington formally listed both JeM and Lashkar as Foreign Terrorist Organizations (FTOs). On 12 January 2002, in a nationally televised address, Musharraf proscribed both Lashkar and JeM. The organisational sleight of hand that ensued was a foretaste of the response of the group and its ISI interlocutors to international condemnation and sanctions over the years to come. As the formal military wing of the organisation, Lashkar shifted its headquarters to Azad Kashmir, which technically has never been incorporated into Pakistan. MDI, the organisation's civilian wing, dissolved itself only to re-emerge under the name of the group founded by Hafez Sa'eed in 1985: Jamaa't ud Dawa (JuD). Bank accounts that were frozen had been emptied well in advance of the government move. Meanwhile along the Line of Control, infiltration into Indian-administered Kashmir by Pakistan-based groups including Lashkar slowed to accommodate US pressure on Islamabad; but never entirely stopped.

FOREIGN RECRUITMENT AND GLOBAL REACH

More than any other Pakistan-based jihadist organisation, Lashkar has established a significant international footprint and has recruited and trained jihadist volunteers from a wide range of countries. For would-be Western jihadists the attraction of LeT is not difficult to understand: at the ideological and military level, while its focus has been an India-centric one targeted primarily on Kashmir, its sectarian moorings and long-standing contacts with al-Qaeda underpin its sympathy and support for global jihadist activity on the global stage.

More practically, MDI/JuD's Pakistan-wide network of offices, madrassahs and mosques means that the group is uniquely easy to contact. And at the same time, its training camps offer a range of relatively sophisticated instruction in secure environments. There is no doubt that significant numbers of foreigners have passed through Lashkar training facilities. Countries whose citizens have benefited from military instruction include the United Kingdom, the USA, France, Australia, Russia, Uzbekistan, China, Bangladesh, Indonesia and, of course, India (John, 2011, p. xxvi). That said, it is easy to exaggerate the extent to which LeT has reached beyond its primary operational focus on India and the Subcontinent to establish the sort of global network associated with Lebanese Hezbollah. The number of foreigners known to have graduated from military training to become more or less integrated into Lashkar's operational network is actually quite small. It is also worth pointing out that the involvement of foreigners with Lashkar at any level is far less common today than during the first, pre-Islamic State, heyday of jihadist endeavour in the 1990s and 2000s.

Arguably, the best known of Lashkar's Western operatives is David Coleman Headley aka Da'ood Gilani. A US national born to a Pakistani diplomat father and an American mother, Coleman drifted into narcotics trafficking. Following a short spell in a US jail he returned to Pakistan and established a close association with Lashkar and Hafez Sa'eed himself, while at the same time working as an informant for the US Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA). In 2002 he underwent the LeT's Daura-e-Aam basic training course, followed later in the year by a more advanced course. By 2005 he had been taken under the wing of Sajid Mir, the Lashkar official in the External Affairs Department headed by Abdul Rehman Makki and responsible for handling foreign operatives. He had also changed his name from Gilani to Coleman, his mother's maiden name. Having been put in contact with a 'Major Iqbal' – assumed to be an ISI operative – Headley went on to conduct surveillance operations for the Mumbai attacks of 2008, a foray allegedly financed by 'Major Iqbal'. He also undertook target surveillance in Copenhagen for a pro-

jected attack on a Danish newspaper, *Jyllands-Posten*, which had published cartoons of the Prophet Muhammad. Headley was finally arrested at Chicago's O'Hare International Airport in October 2009, and in January 2013 was sentenced by a federal court to 35 years in jail for his part in the Mumbai attack.

Other foreigners who became notable Lashkar assets were the Australian Faheem Khalid Lodhi, and Willie Brigitte, a French convert to Islam born in the French West Indian territory of Guadeloupe. Like Headley, both men were run by LeT handler Sajid Mir. Brigitte underwent training in an LeT camp between late 2001 and early 2002 following the 9/11 attacks, where Sajid Mir marked him out as worthy of attention. Following Brigitte's return to France in 2002, Sajid Mir later financed his travel to Australia in May 2003 to assist Lodhi. An Australian of Pakistani descent who had migrated to Australia in 1998, Lodhi had also been through LeT military training. Under Sajid Mir's direction, he returned to Sydney in 2002 to plan terror attacks. Brigitte was deported from Australia in September 2003 and arrested by French authorities. He was finally sentenced in 2007 to nine years in jail. Lodhi and his associates were arrested by Australian police in October 2003 in raids which revealed the extent of the surveillance already undertaken on a range of targets in the Sydney area, including defence installations and the national power grid. He was sentenced to 20 years in prison on terrorism charges. In terms of a transnational cadre network, however, Lashkar appears to remain an organisation with a footprint centred essentially in the Subcontinent. Predictably, given the group's close and presumably ongoing cooperation with the ISI, that has resulted in a particular focus on countries offering easy access to India: Nepal, Sri Lanka, the Gulf States – offering recruitment prospects from a large pool of expatriate Indian Muslim workers – and, not least, Bangladesh.

POLITICS AND TIGHTENING SANCTIONS

As an organisation, Lashkar-JuD has undertaken a distinct shift in recent years towards expanding its footprint inside Pakistan through missionary, humanitarian and overtly political initiatives. The growth of the role of the Falah-e-Insaniyat Foundation (FIF) has been one important part of this process. More surprising was the foundation in August 2017 of the Milli Muslim League (MML) party, to contest the 2018 elections. Headed by Saifullah Khalid, a close aide of Hafez Sa'eed and a ranking leader of JuD, the MML was committed to turning Pakistan into a 'real Islamic and welfare state', and represented a striking retreat from Sa'eed's long-standing condemnation of electoral democracy as an un-Islamic Western implant.

In the context of a nation where religious parties have traditionally performed poorly in electoral politics, never winning more than 10–15 per cent of the total vote, the MML's prospects for success were always improbable.

Whether the launch of the party was driven by fundraising objectives, or by an-ISI backed ploy to weaken the Muslim League of Nawaz Sharif (ML-N) at a time when Sharif was under heavy pressure, is unclear. It is fair to assume, however, that Sa'eed could not have established the party without the explicit approval of the army and the ISI. Even so, the MML's initial showing in the 2018 elections was dismal: the party failed to secure a single seat in either national or provincial parliaments, dominated by mainstream parties such as the Pakistan People's Party (PPP) of the Bhutto clan, the ML-N of former prime minister Nawaz Sharif (now jailed on corruption charges), and the Pakistan Tehrik-e-Insaf (PTI) of current Prime Minister Imran Khan.

The foray into party politics did, though, reflect Lashkar's ongoing efforts to adapt to new conditions. Shaped partly by the storm of international opprobrium excited by the Mumbai attacks, and the salvo of sanctions that followed, the environment in which Lashkar and its army handlers operate has become far less accommodating than was the case in earlier decades. In late January 2017, Hafez Sa'eed had been placed under house arrest with other senior JuD leaders, but no specific charges were laid and by November he had been quietly released. Days after his arrest, however, he floated a new front, the Tehreek-e-Azaadi Jammu-Kashmir (TAKJ) to provide cover for fundraising and other activities by JuD and FIF. On 8 June, TAKJ was put on a list of proscribed organisations by Pakistan's National Counter Terrorism Authority.

Then on 3 April 2018 the US Department of State (DoS) added the MML to the list of Foreign Terrorist Organizations, with TAKJ thrown in for good measure. As the DoS's Counter-Terrorism Coordinator Nathan Sales noted: 'Today's amendments aim to take aim at Lashkar-e-Taiba's efforts to circumvent sanctions and deceive the public about its true character. Make no mistake: whatever LeT chooses to call itself, it remains a violent terrorist group.' The fallout from the JeM suicide bombing of the Indian paramilitary convoy on 14 February 2019, which killed at least 40 troops, was to further impact upon Lashkar. Amidst a surge of international alarm and condemnation, Islamabad was compelled to take further steps, and on 21 February Pakistan's Interior Ministry designated both JuD and FIF 'proscribed organisations'.

Additional measures followed. On 12 May, local media reports quoted Interior Ministry sources as noting that Hafez Sa'eed's brother-in-law Abdul Rahman Makki, the head of JuD's political wing, had been arrested by Punjab police under the maintenance of Public Order Act for 'hate speech'. Around the same time, the government banned 11 organisations for having links with the proscribed JuD, FIF and JeM. Given the history of 'smoke and mirrors' surrounding the relationship between Lashkar and its various front organisations on the one hand, and the Pakistani 'deep state' on the other, it would be premature to conclude that there has been any fundamental shift in army and ISI policy intended finally to close down the sprawling JuD-LeT complex. As

one perceptive Indian commentator has noted, the military has managed ‘to refine the role of a “minimal satisfier” to the level of art, making tiny and marginal concessions when the pressure is unbearable, but at no stage abandoning their basic purpose and strategy’ (Sahni, 2017).

Nevertheless, the stakes for both Pakistan and Lashkar are perhaps higher than they have ever been. There can be no doubt that the government of Imran Khan was severely discomfited by the February 2019 decision of the Financial Action Task Force (FATF), the Paris-based international terrorism financing watchdog, to maintain Pakistan’s ‘grey’ listing for its failure to crack down on funding for local groups proscribed both locally and internationally. As the FATF listing impacts directly on Pakistan’s prospects for raising desperately needed international bail-outs to sustain a crumbling economy, the possibility of a blacklisting has clearly concentrated minds in Islamabad as never before.

NOTES

1. The name also translates as the Army of Medina, the second-holiest city of Islam after Mecca. In this chapter the abbreviation LeT and the name Lashkar are used interchangeably.
2. The relationship with Pakistan’s military and the ISI is discussed below.
3. Salafism, from the Arabic *salaf* or ‘ancestors’, is a reformist movement dating from the late 19th century positing a purist return to the original and unadulterated sources of Islam: the Quran, the *sunnah* or ways of the Prophet Muhammad, and the traditions surrounding the companions of the Prophet. Salafist thinking rejects the later accretions of Islam’s four schools of jurisprudence: Hanafi, Hanbali, Shafi’i and Maliki. As detailed below, the Ahl-e-Hadith or People of the Traditions (of the Prophet) constitute one sect in the broader salafist movement.
4. A school of reformist teaching in the Hanafi tradition of Islamic jurisprudence which originated in the late 19th century in the Dar ul Uloom seminary in the north Indian town of Deoband.
5. *Taiba Bulletin* (‘official publication of Mujahideen Lashkar-E-Taiba’), 17 October 2000.
6. A second headquarters complex was later established at the Jamia al-Qadisia mosque in Lahore city.
7. Kiessling provides interesting detail on ISI support for Pakistani jihadist groups operating in Bosnia, Kosovo and Chechnya.
8. Over the years, Punjab has provided by far the largest proportion of the hundreds of Lashkar fighters killed in Kashmir, with the NWFP following in second place.

REFERENCES

- BBC (2015), ‘Mumbai Attack Suspect Released on Bail in Pakistan’, 10 April.
 Davis, Anthony (1991), ‘Pakistan’s Hidden Hand’, *Time Magazine*, 22 July.
 Fair, Christine (2014), *Fighting to the End: The Pakistan Army’s Way of War*, New York: Oxford University Press.

- Inter Press Service (2014), 'In Pakistan, Militants Wear Aid Workers' Clothing', 1 August.
- John, Wilson (2011), *The Caliphate's Soldiers: The Lashkar-e-Tayyeba's Long War*, Delhi: Amaryllis.
- Kiessling, Hein G. (2016), *Faith, Unity, Discipline: The Inter-Service Intelligence (ISI) of Pakistan*, London: Hurst & Company.
- Roggio, Bill (2019), 'Our Soil Is Not Used for Carrying out Terrorist Attacks, Pakistani PM Claims', *Long War Journal*, 19 February.
- Sahni, Ajai (2017), 'After Trump's U-Turn on Pak, India Should Trust Its Own Capacities', *Quint*, 18 October.
- South Asia Terrorism Portal (2018), 'Lashkar-e-Taiba terrorist "Army of the Pure"', accessed at https://www.satp.org/satporgtp/countries/india/states/jandk/terrorist_outfits/lashkar_e_toiba.htm.
- Tankel, Stephen (2011), *Storming the World Stage*, New York: Columbia University Press.
- Times of India* (2012), 'Who is Hafiz Saeed?', 4 April, accessed at <https://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/world/pakistan/Who-is-Hafiz-Saeed/articleshow/12529918.cms>.