1. From colony to modern state: an overview of Taiwan’s path of development

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Taiwan has been in the global playing field since the Age of the Great Exploration in the 16th century, when it was named “Ilha Formosa,” meaning “beautiful island” in Portuguese. But its modernization arguably began with the enlightenment movement against Japan’s colonial rule in the 1920s.2 Most colonies became independent countries after the end of World War II, while few of them became modernized even after decades of their independence.3 Taiwan is one of the few, having become a modern state with remarkable achievements in its economic, socio-cultural, and political development. Hence the study of Taiwan’s path of development from colony to modernity is a significant subject in world development.

Taiwan became a Japanese colony after the first Sino-Japanese war in 1894–1895. Japan’s colonial occupation in Taiwan faced strong armed resistance and attempted uprising from the people of Taiwan in the first two decades or so. After the 1920s, the Japanese colonial government implemented a “policy of assimilation” under the homeland extension principle to homogenize the people of Taiwan with the Japanese (He and Tsai, 2019, pp. 71–73).4 Meanwhile, the anti-colonial movement shifted from overthrowing colonial governance by force to peaceful pursuit through a cultural enlightening movement (Chou, 2019, pp. 138–142). In 1921, Taiwanese intellectuals initiated a Petition Movement for the Establishment of a Taiwanese Parliament to set up a representative body for Taiwanese people under the colonial government.5 Leaders of the enlightenment also established the Taiwan Cultural Association (TCA) on October 17, 1921, which “set up small libraries around Taiwan, arranged film-screening tours, published newspapers, promoted formal education, and introduced Western scientific knowledge to the country.”6 Both the petition movement of establishing a Taiwan parliament and the initiation of the TCA were arguably inspired by Woodrow Wilson’s self-determination, the May Fourth movement in China and the abortive Taishō Democracy (1912–26) in Japan.
In spite of several setbacks and splits within as addressed in Chapter 15 by Shih, both enlightenments did lead to a series of socio-cultural and political movements in Taiwan. Since then, Taiwanese people were able to nurture their own indigenous cultural, ethnic identity, and to some extent Taiwanese nationalism within the colonial government, even though they were forced to be further Japanized under the Kōminka movement (皇民化運動) in 1937–45. Literally, the Kōminka movement was to make the people of Taiwan to become “real Japanese” and the loyal subjects of the Japanese Emperor who was being worshipped as a god by Japanese people. It was designated not only to promote the Japanese language as the “national language” for Taiwanese people, but also to change Taiwanese religious practice to Japanese Shinto and even their names to become Japanized. However, the Japanization movement was terminated after the end of World War II as Taiwan became a province of the Republic of China (ROC).

Due to the chaotic disruptions of post-war rehabilitation upon the arrival of the government of Republic of China (ROC) under Kuomintang (KMT), which led to the tragedy of the Incident of February 28th, 1947, Taiwan went through a short period of conflicting national identities in the immediate post-war period in 1945–50 (Wu, 2016). During the authoritarian period under the KMT in 1949–87, Taiwanese people continued to struggle for more socio-political participation and nurture their own ethnic and cultural identity to differentiate themselves from the Han Chinese in China.

After democratization gained its momentum in the 1990s under the leadership of President Lee Teng Hui (1923–2020), Taiwanese nationalism became more and more prevalent and became deeply rooted among a great majority of Taiwanese people. Politically, Taiwan transformed itself from a Japanese colony through a period of authoritarian regime under the KMT to a democratic country with regularized procedures of periodic elections for government turnover after the full-scale elections of the Legislative Yuan in 1992 and the direct popular election of the president in 1996. Economically, it transformed itself from an agrarian economy in the immediate post-WWII period to one of the high-tech hubs in the world by the end of the 20th century. Socio-culturally, the Taiwanese people have evolved from a repressed ethnic and national identity into a unique nationalism with a distinct multi-culture and Taiwan-centric civil society different from that of Communist China.

Taiwan’s unique development path provides a compelling model that contrasts starkly with those of many developing countries. This book offers a critical review of the evolution of socio-cultural, economic, and national identity in the past century in Taiwan since the enlightenment movement in the 1920s. It has four major sections. The first section is on identity and political developments as well as international relations; the second is on economic developments; the third is on social-cultural developments; and the fourth is on national identity and political developments.
development. The third section focuses on educational and societal development, and the last is on culture and literature development.

TAIWANESE IDENTITY, NATIONAL BUILDING, AND ITS EXTERNAL RELATIONS

Taiwan has fulfilled all of the four qualifications of a statehood as decreed in the Montevideo Convention of 1933. However, its unique international status is a puzzle for many who are not familiar with its national and ethnic identity. In Chapter 2, June Teufel Dreyer addresses Taiwan’s international relations, arguing that Taiwan’s place in the international system may be said to have been under threat since the day that Mao Zedong proclaimed the founding of the far larger and more populous People’s Republic of China (PRC) in 1949. When, after a number of disastrous policies, the PRC began to prosper and its rule became consolidated, ever-larger numbers of global actors began to acknowledge the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) as the sole legitimate government of China, breaking relations with the Republic of China (ROC) on Taiwan to establish diplomatic ties with Beijing. As the momentum of de-recognition of the ROC increased, so as well did Taiwanese concerns that they faced a choice between international isolation or unwanted absorption into the PRC.

Dreyer examines the strategies through which Taiwan has sought to establish itself as an independent actor in the international system and to resist a multi-dimensional assault by the Beijing government to reduce its freedom of action. These are inextricably intertwined with the democratization and emerging consciousness of an identity separate from that of either the Republic of China or China at large. China’s tactics against Taiwan have included shows of military might, cyber-attacks, disinformation campaigns, intimidation, united front activities designed to destabilize Taiwan from within, and use of its economic power to reward those countries and individuals that support China’s claims on Taiwan while punishing those that do not. The Taiwan government has devised a number of counterstrategies designed to resist Beijing’s pressure, playing a weak hand well.

In Chapter 3, Yi-Shen Chen focuses on three critical historical dates that shifted Taiwan from a province to a nation state. The San Francisco Peace Treaty with Japan, concluded in 1951, stated that Japan renounced its territories’ claims to Taiwan and the Pescadores (Penghu), but did not specify which governments of China in Beijing or Taipei would receive it. This is because the US was unwilling to see Taiwan become a province of Red China in the wake of the fall of the exiled KMT regime. In consequence, first General MacArthur and then President Truman consequently declared the “undetermined status of Taiwan.”
It was after the US sought rapprochement with China and Henry Kissinger made his secret visit there in 1971 that the representatives of the ROC (Chiang Kai-shek) were expelled from the United Nations on October 25 of the same year. Having lost its international recognition at the UN, the KMT realized its legitimacy to recover the mainland was gone and it had to win popular support through internal reforms. Apart from regular supplementary elections held for the central representatives, as Chiang Ching-kuo came to power as premier in 1972, young Taiwanese elites were recruited into his cabinet and the Ten Major Construction Projects were launched.

When President Chiang Ching-kuo passed away in 1988, he was succeeded by the Taiwan-born Vice President Lee Teng-hui, who later defeated his rivals within the KMT and was elected president in 1990 through the National Assembly. President Lee began a series of constitutional reforms, including abolishing the Temporary Provision of Mobilization to Eradicate the Communist Rebellion in 1991. This single action formally acknowledged the effective control of mainland China by the PRC, and ROC jurisdiction is limited to Taiwan, Penghu, and the two offshore islands of Kinmen and Matsu.

Subsequently, President Lee successfully completed a series of constitutional amendments to hold a full-scale election of all members of the National Assembly in 1991 and Legislative Yuan respectively in 1992 as well a direct presidential election in 1996. The 1996 presidential election made Lee to become the first popularly elected Taiwanese president and symbolized Taiwan’s de facto autonomy as a separate political entity from PRC. Lee expressed his view in an interview with German media that a ‘special state-to-state’ relationship existed between Taiwan and China,11 a doctrine to which recently re-elected President Tsai Ing-wen from the Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) continues to adhere.

In Chapter 4, Lung-chih Chang offers a synopsis of recent historical scholarship on the question of ethnicity in Taiwan. The formation of Taiwan’s multi-ethnic society can be traced from the interactions between states/empires, Han immigrants, and plains aborigines in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries; the territorial colonization and ethnic classification of upland indigenous peoples by Qing and Japanese regimes since late 19th century; and the ethno-genesis of Taiwanese consciousness in nation-building efforts of Japanese and Chinese regimes in the 20th century. Following the democratization process, Taiwan witnessed the ethnic movements of the indigenous Hakka peoples in the 1980s along with new initiatives for Southeast Asian immigrants since 1990s. He also introduces representative works on Taiwanese ethnicity from interdisciplinary approaches. The conclusion further reflects on the ongoing efforts and debates about transitional justice in contemporary Taiwan.

In Chapter 5, Shiuai-Chi Shen deals with the subject of which way to best characterize the dynamics of Taiwan’s national identity politics: the continu-
ing struggles of two antagonistic nationalisms, the conversion from orthodox Chinese identity to new Taiwanese identity, the triumph of pragmatism, or a chaotic society with confused national identity. Analyzing data from nine surveys conducted between 1991 and 2020, this chapter first depicts the trends in national identity of the general populace in Taiwan and identifies two distinct stages of identity change. The first stage is characterized by the rise and predominance of dual identities in the 1990s. The second is characterized by the waning of Chinese identity/nationalism since 2004. The phenomenon of dual identities raises a puzzling question for the study of nationalism: why the emerging Taiwanese national identity was compatible with orthodox Chinese nationalism. The decline of Chinese nationalism in Taiwan since 2004 poses another puzzle: why in the time of China’s rise and the increasing economic integration between the two sides of the Straits, Chinese national identity began to lose its appeal to the populace on the island. To answer these two puzzles, Shen examines the nature of both Taiwanese national identity and Chinese national identity and analyzes how they have negotiated with each other since Taiwan’s democratization.

FROM AGRARIAN ECONOMY TO INNOVATOR IN HIGH-TECH INDUSTRY

Section III covers three most important aspects of Taiwan’s economic development since the 1920s. Although there is no universally accepted paradigm that can be duplicated in other countries, Taiwan’s economic development is usually considered as a role model for developing countries. Until the mid-1930s, the main driver of Taiwan’s economic development had been agriculture, through its comparative advantage of resources among the regions that comprised the early Japanese Empire. However, as Frank Hsiao addresses in Chapter 6, when the Japanese Empire grew rapidly in the early 1930s, the pace of Taiwan’s industrialization accelerated before the second Sino-Japanese war in 1937. After 1939, for the first time in Taiwan’s history, the value of annual industrial production exceeded that of agricultural production (a turning point of economic development). With the increase in Japan’s military demand, the Taiwanese economy entered the war-stage after 1937, and industrialization progressed to heavy and chemical industries from the beginning of World War II until the end of the war in 1945.

Since Taiwan, like Japan, is a naturally resource-poor country, Taiwan had to rely on foreign resources in order to develop heavy and chemical industries. From mid-1937, the Japanese-appointed Governor General of Taiwan promoted three basic slogans with three “ka (to promote),” namely, “Industrialization (Kōgyōka),” “Japanization (Kōminka),” and “Becoming the Go South Base (Nanshin kichika).” The last of these reflected the adjustment

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of the Taiwanese economy and politics in response to Japan’s interests in, and later the military occupation of the Southeast Asia, i.e. “South China and the South Seas” (Nanshi Nanyō). Taiwan’s economic policy was therefore to search for, and to take advantage of, the resources available in Southeast Asia to promote Taiwan’s industrialization, especially heavy and chemical industries.

In Chapter 6, Frank Hsiao uses available literature and statistical data to trace the process of prewar Taiwan’s industrialization. He then shows that Taiwan’s industrialization followed the rapid rise of Japan’s militarism, and analyzes the resources of Southeast Asia available for Taiwan’s industrialization. Chapter 6 closes with a brief review of Taiwan’s postwar economic development and its New Southward Policy undertaken by the Tsai Administration.

Next, in Chapter 7, Peter Chow briefly highlights the colonial legacies that were relevant to Taiwan’s post-war development and then addresses the leader (Japan)—follower collaboration of industrial development in the “linked development” model in Asian countries (Gerald, 1998) since the 1960s. Taiwan evolved from a follower of Japan’s industrialization in the 1960s and 1970s, emerging as an innovator in some high-tech sectors after the 1980s and coming to play a significant role in the global supply chains. Chow argues that Taiwan’s industrialization was far beyond the “following the leader” collaboration between mother goose Japan and the small geese in Akamatsu’s (1962) “flying geese model.” After the 1980s, Taiwan developed its own indigenous manufactures by linking itself with global supply chains. To demonstrate the status of Taiwan as an innovator in the 21st century, Chow uses the database of four categories of high-tech industries by OECD and US Patent and Trademark Office data on the number of patents granted to foreign countries to show Taiwan’s role in high-tech industry, so as to provide Taiwan’s experience of industrialization for developing countries.

Capital formation and economic development are highly interdependent. In Chapter 8, Abraham Lin highlights the monetary and banking systems of Taiwan from 1661 to 2020. Lin briefly explores the history of different roles of banking and money and their role in capital formation for economic development. Taiwan has always had its own currency to represent its identity in different eras. Moreover, Taiwan has had certain degree of its monetary autonomy even under the Japanese colonial government. The banking system in Taiwan also has been developing in accordance with its overall economic developments. In pre-World War II periods when the Taiwan authorities wanted to emphasize the role of capital formation, they moved to adopt the gold standard system; when financial stability was emphasized after 1949, a gold standard-like (gold-dollar) system was considered. When the banking policies were prone to promoting international trades, Taiwan’s banking authority adopted the currency standard related to the major trade partners.
Section IV deals with societal and educational development in the past century. In Chapter 9, Michael Hsiao depicts and analyzes the significant cycles of the rise and fall of Taiwan’s civil society momentum and organized movements between 1920 and 2020. Between 1920 and 1937, the Taiwanese landlord–merchant–gentry class and intellectuals began to launch organized civil society movements to demand self-governance through the petition of establishment of Taiwan Parliament movement and various social and economic reforms in Taiwan. In the end, these were suppressed due to the breakout of the Pacific War and the ultimate termination of colonial governance. There was a similar suppression on civil society under the exiled Nationalist (KMT) regime after the war until the mid-1970s, though a few individual intellectuals spoke out for reforms within the KMT regime in the 1950s and 1960s. In the mid-1970s, a new wave of cultural enlightenment movements was led by literary luminaries, singers, and social scientists in the raging “nativist literature movement,” “sing our song movement,” and “indigenization of social science movement” respectively. The same time also witnessed the birth of many newly published critical social and political magazines by the new breed of social and political activists calling for political liberalization and democratization.

Beginning in 1980, large-scale civil society movements led to the first regime change from KMT to DPP rule in 2000. The primary goal of civil society movements was for democratization before 2000, and after 2000 it turned to democratic consolidation, democracy rescue, and national integrity from the external threat from Beijing.

Michael Hsiao points out that it was the Taiwanese landlord gentry and intellectuals who led the civil society protest under the colonialism; and then after the war, the leading force of civil society activism changed to liberal new middle-class professionals and intellectuals. He concludes that the civil society finally achieved its collective goals to realize social reforms, political democracy, and regime change in a true modern state.

Education is a particularly important infrastructure for crafting a nation state. In Chapter 10, Wan-yao Chou analyzes how a century of colonial education was carried out in Taiwan by Japan and the KMT/ROC party-state. In 1898, the Japanese Governor-General of Taiwan implemented a public elementary school system for Taiwanese children, teaching Japanese language and history; after the war, the KMT Government taught Chinese and Chinese history, but not until September 1997 was Taiwan’s history included in junior high school curricula. This chapter presents a basic understanding of the educational content offered to Taiwanese children during this period by two different ruling authorities. Comparisons are made between the two types
of education with focuses on national language (meaning Japanese and later Mandarin), history, and ethics.

In general, the Japanese colonial education was rich in *heimat* (here meaning Taiwan, 鄉土) materials, but the history of the island was almost completely absent from the readers, a vacuum that was filled by Japan’s history. In post-war Taiwan, there were very few homeland materials in the national language (now Mandarin). Taiwan, the homeland of the Taiwanese schoolchildren, was absent from their curricula, and what replaced it was an imagined “homeland in China.” History textbooks carried almost no history of Taiwan. Their main content was Chinese history, narrated from the perspective of Chinese nationalism.

Some peculiar aspects of ethics and geography textbooks are also discussed briefly in Chapter 10. The final part deals with the issue of how party-state education came to “an end without ending” in the period 1997–2016. The century of colonial education from 1898 to 1997 shaped today’s Taiwan to a great degree and induced the complicated national identity problems of both those who regard themselves as Taiwanese and those who regard themselves as Chinese who desire future unification with China. Crafting nation building through education under colonial regimes has been a long and hard struggle for Taiwanese nationalism.

In Chapter 11, Doris Chang addresses Taiwanese women’s status in historical perspective. The advancement of Taiwanese women’s status has been remarkable in the past century. In this chapter, Chang focuses on the discussion of women’s status in three key areas—the education of women and girls, the status and participation of women in the workforce, and women’s political participation and leadership. Among all the numerous incremental gains of the past century, the attainment of political leadership was perhaps the greatest achievement of Taiwanese women. During the Japanese colonial era, women in colonial Taiwan did not have the right to the franchise. In 2016, Taiwan became the first Chinese-speaking society to elect a female president via the popular vote. By 2020, the percentage of female lawmakers in Taiwan’s legislature had reached 42 percent—the highest in Asia and one of the highest in the world. The advancement of Taiwanese women’s political power in the 21st century must be situated within the larger context of the gender mainstreaming policies implemented by Taiwanese government and political parties since the late 1990s. Chang also examines women’s political leadership and participation within the larger context of Taiwan’s transformation from authoritarianism to democracy and its contested national identities from 1920 to 2020.

In the realm of educational attainment, most Taiwanese women and girls only received public education in the primary-school level during the Japanese colonial era. This phenomenon is fairly common in many other countries during the period before WWII. By the 2010s, more young women were
graduating with college degrees than their male counterparts. Yet horizontal segregation of college majors and professions along gender lines still persists in contemporary Taiwanese society. Most young men choose to major in fields such as science, technology, engineering, and mathematics (STEM), whereas most women choose to major in liberal arts, education, and bachelor’s degrees that would prepare them for vocations in social services and health professions. As shown in this chapter, one can see that the training of women and girls in the healthcare professions really had its genesis during the Japanese colonial era. Although there is a significant progress on women’s social status in Taiwan, more needs to be done to achieve gender equality in a modern or even post-modern society.

LITERATURE AND CULTURAL DEVELOPMENT

Section V focuses on literature and cultural development. In Chapter 12, Yin-Chen Kang addresses the development of new theatre in Taiwan. *Bun-hua-kiok* (cultural theatre) was the first modern theatre born in Taiwan and using Taiwanese language in the 1920s. The emergence of *bun-hua-kiok* resulted from the influence of Japanese modern theatre as well as the political and social movements of the Taiwan Cultural Association (TCA) during the 1920s. Since the beginning of colonization, Japanese modern theatre has spread to Taiwan. The modern forms were practiced by Japanese troupes in Taiwan for two decades. Then in the early 1920s, when TCA launched a series of movements, members considered modern theatre as an efficient instrument for cultural enlightenment. The theatre performed by these members was called *bun-hua-kiok*. From the late 1920s, some Taiwanese dramatists went to Japan to learn modern theatre theory and skills. They returned to Taiwan with the newest knowledge of modern theatre and helped to develop *bun-hua-kiok* into a more mature form. This new form was called *sin-kiok* (new theatre).

During the Second World War, the colonial government intended to take advantage of *sin-kiok* for propaganda. In the post-war period, *sin-kiok* eventually turned out to be a commercial product, although it was still often interfered with by the KMT government. When *Tai-gi* film (臺語片, Taiwanese movies) rose, some dramatists and players of *sin-kiok* participated in this industry with their experiences and training of the Japanese theatre. However, it declined and finally disappeared in the late 1960s due to policies of the KMT government that discriminated against the Taiwanese language, education, and media, thus effectively suppressing entirely indigenous Taiwanese culture and language. Nevertheless, this history was gradually rediscovered and valorized from the 1990s after indigenization was launched along with democratization. Its legacy has been continually expanded.
In Chapter 13, Michelle Yeh provides an overview of the development of Taiwan literature in the context of evolving linguistic, socio-political, and cultural conditions. Yeh divides this development into five chronological periods. During the Japanese colonial period (1895–1945), the continuity of classical poetry in Chinese existed alongside the burgeoning of modern literature—first in Chinese and later in Japanese.

In the transition from the colonial period to the post-war period, Japanese literature was banned and émigré writers from mainland China played a leading role on the literary scene. Much of the May Fourth legacy, categorically labeled “communist,” was banned, while the KMT promoted nationalism, traditionalism, and anti-communism. However, some writers found an affinity with Western modernism and engaged in bold and innovative experimentation.

In the 1970s, there was a reaction against modernism and the rise of nativism. The call for a return to Chinese culture and Taiwanese social reality was underscored by Taiwan’s setbacks in the international arena. The development culminated in the Indigenous Literature Movement of 1977.

The ascendancy of nativism on the one hand, and postmodern experiments on the other in the 1980s and 1990s was described in the fourth period. In the 21st century, literature has thrived on the Internet, but literary papers publishing shrank. As nativism became institutionalized, Taiwan literature was seen as independent of Chinese literature and part of world literature. Taiwanese literature is increasingly translated for international readers, with Taiwan writers winning awards in the West.

In Chapter 14, Jasmine Chen examines the origin and development of opeila (胡撇仔, the hybrid and creative performance) in Taiwanese opera (kua-a-hi 歌仔戲). Taiwanese opera, which shares similar performing conventions and repertoires with Chinese opera, is the traditional theatre initiated in colonial Taiwan. Taiwanese opera’s conventional performance encountered fundamental transformation when the Japanese government launched the Kōminka Movement (Japanization Movement) and banned Chinese-style theatres in the late 1930s. Due to this censorship, Taiwanese opera troupes adopted the Japanese “period drama” (jidai geiki, 時代劇) and modern “new drama” (shingeki, 新劇) to cope with Japanese police’s inspections. The hybrid form of performance gradually composed a unique subgenre in Taiwanese opera: opeila; the phrase was phonetically adapted from the Japanese pronunciation of “opera” (o-pe-ra, オペラ) in Taiwanese Holo (also known as Minnan or Hokkien) vernacular. Opeila did not disappear after the Japanese colonial period but continued to develop in post-war Taiwan. Throughout the era of indoor commercial theatre in 1950s and outdoor performances since early 1960s, most Taiwanese opera troupes follow the etiquette of performing classical repertoires for matinees and opeila for evening performances. While it has been an essential subgenre of Taiwanese opera, opeila has received little
attention from English scholarship regarding its historical background and hybrid transformation. This chapter articulates the significant context of *opeila* by discussing the hybrid theatre during and after the Japanese colonial period. Blending news archives with interviews of actors, this chapter shows how *opeila* not only mixed Japanese and Chinese culture but also integrated local creativity thereby transforming traditional Taiwanese opera.

The last century has witnessed Taiwan people’s struggles over their self-consciousness, autonomy, and self-determination. Chapter 15, by Fang-long Shih addresses a century of struggles over Taiwan’s cultural self-consciousness through focusing on the life and afterlife of Chiang Wei-shui (1891–1931) and the Taiwan Cultural Association that he founded in 1921. Shih investigates Chiang’s vision that the TCA’s promotion of a modernized culture would strengthen the social health of the Han population to become culturally fit for survival in the contemporary world. Shih argues that though Chiang intended to rally TCA members’ self-consciousness as a colonized people, he did not prioritize nationalist self-consciousness—whether Chinese or Taiwanese. For 40 years after his death, memory of Chiang’s cultural initiatives died with him, both during Japanese wartime mobilization 1931–45, and, counterintuitively, during the KMT martial law period 1949–87.

In the last 50 years 1969–2020, commemoration and memory of Chiang Wei-shui has been revived, with his initiatives in the 1920s being referred to as Taiwan’s “Self-conscious Age.” Shih criticizes the vehement arguments about his legacy, in which different sides sought to valorize him as an exemplar of their version of nationalist self-consciousness. Shih shows clearly the different forms in which contemporaries have made use of Chiang’s legacy and also the different convictions they read into Chiang to make their own points. Shih argues that ascribing nationalist motivations to Chiang is anachronistic, since he was an internationalist more than a nationalist, who saw modernizing culture as the way to cure Taiwan’s ill-health and who sought to generate *zijue* / self-consciousness as Taiwan’s colonized Han population on an equal footing with being Japanese or Chinese. If anything, nationalist sentiments were a by-product, an unintended consequence, of his primarily cultural motivation.

**CONCLUSION**

A critical review of a century of multi-dimensional developments in Taiwan reveals its unique path and trajectory of transforming from a Japanese colony to a modern state. According to *World Economic Outlook*, Taiwan was ranked as the top 15th country in GDP per capita by purchasing parity in 186 countries and areas (and independencies) in 2019 (International Monetary Fund 2020). Economic growth with equity is another miracle in Taiwan (Fei, Ranis, and Kuo, 1979). The Gini coefficient, an index of measuring income distribution
among households has never exceeded 0.3 prior to 1980s (Chow and Hsu, 2015). In spite of the inevitable deterioration of income equality after its drive for globalization in the past three decades, the Gini coefficient in Taiwan, according to Statista, was averaged at 0.3376 in 2015–19, compared with 0.4654 in China in the same period.

In the 2020 annual report of the Freedom House, which assesses the conditions of political rights, Taiwan has a total score of 96 and is ranked as a “free country” in 2020 (Freedom House). By the “democracy index,” Economist Intelligence Unit (EIU) ranked Taiwan as the top 11th globally and the top in Asia. In 2020 Taiwan, along with Japan (rank 21) and Korea (rank 23) was credited as “full democracy.” Other socio-cultural developments such as gender equality, multi-culture, and ethnicity in a civil society are also highly enviable.

Taiwan’s development provides a compelling case study for comparative development. Many of its contemporary achievements, such as provision of national health insurance, initiatives of developing the newly innovative industries, attaining a significant role in the global supply chains, development of cutting-edge technology in semi-conductor industry, and successful tactics to put the coronavirus pandemic under control with only single-digit deaths up to March 2021, even after the outbreak in mid-May, total cases numbered 16,759 with 849 deaths among a population of 23.8 million by December 15, 2021, are yet to be explored due to space limitations of the book. Nevertheless, subsequent chapters of this book, written by renowned scholars in each discipline, have offered a good beginning and stimulus for future Taiwan studies.

NOTES

1. I would like to express my sincere gratitude to Wan-yao Chou, June Teufel Dreyer, Frank S. T. Hsiao, Michael Hsiao, and Fu-Shan Huang for their suggestions and editorial assistances on this chapter. However, the usual caveat applies.

2. It is noted that, during the tenure of Governor Liu Ming-chuan in 1887–1891 under the Qing dynasty, Taiwan introduced a public school system, some light industries, and a built telegram and postal system, as well as a 28.6 km railway from Keelung (基隆) to Hsinchu (新竹). Chou (2019, p. 116) argued that what Governor Liu did in Taiwan was part of the “Self-Strengthening Movement” in the Qing dynasty.

3. Modernization has different meanings for different people. Chow (2002, pp.3–6) defined it as an increasing dominance of human beings over the natural environment on a scientific basis rather than superstition in the behavior norm in human society. Therefore, modernization is a set of socio-cultural, economic, and political transformations that are different from what were in the traditional society.

4. It was called the “Inland extension principle” (naichiENCHÔSHUGI, 内地延長主義), which literally means an “extension of Japanese proper” to the colony of Taiwan.

5. There was a consulting body under the Governor’s office. But, until 1921, there was no Taiwanese in that organization. Meanwhile, there was no regular session
for the Governor to consult with. See He and Tsai (2019, pp. 74–76). After several years of efforts, the petition failed. However, there was an election for municipal council in 1935, which was restricted to male voters and those who paid income tax. The second election for municipal councils was in 1939 and then was disrupted by the war.

6. In 2001, the Taiwan government designated October 17 as the Taiwan Cultural Day. The citation in the text was a remark by Minister of Culture from Central News Agency Focus Taiwan on October 17, 2017 at https://focustaiwan.tw/culture/201710170027, accessed on May 1, 2021.

7. In Article 2(b) of the San Francisco Treaty in 1951, “Japan renounces all right, title and claim to Formosa and the Pescadores.” However, it did not specify which country was the recipient despite the fact that Taiwan (Formosa) and Penghu (Pescadores) were occupied by the ROC government under the Allied Order then. Neither did it specify in the joint communique which established the diplomatic relations between Japan and China. It only stated that Japan fully understood and respected “the position of the PRC that Taiwan was an inalienable territory of the PRC.” In international law, there is no legal basis for China to claim its sovereignty on Taiwan. For legal reappraisal of the statehood of Taiwan, see Chiang and Hwang (2008).

8. Wu (2016) argued that there were three competitive national identities during 1945–50 with three different identities of Taiwanese motherlands. Wu argued the first shift of identity was caused by transfer of territory at the end of WWII. A second shift of identity was caused by the 228 massacre in 1947. The outbreak of the Korean war caused another identity shift.

9. According to the Election Study Center at National Chengchi University, 67 percent of the respondents identified themselves as “Taiwanese” whereas only 2.4 percent considered themselves as “Chinese” in July 2020. From Taipei Times at https://www.taipeitimes.com/News/front/archives/2020/07/05/2003739375, accessed on May 5, 2021.

10. Article 1 of the Montevideo Convention states, “the state as a person of international law should possess the following qualifications: (a) a permanent population; (b) a defined territory; (c) government; and (d) capacity to enter into relations with the other states. From Montevideo Convention on the Rights and Duties of States: The Faculty of Law at https://www.jus.uio.no/.../rights-duties-states.xml, downloaded on February 20, 2021.


12. In Section 6.11, Chapter 6 of this book, Frank Hsiao even showed that, according to the IMF data of October 2015, Taiwan’s GDP per capita in the purchasing power parity (PPP) already surpassed that of Japan (in 2007), United Kingdom (in 2009), France (in 2010), and Germany (in 2014) and was poised to catch up with the United States.

13. A Gini coefficient of “zero” means perfect equality, whereas “one” means perfect inequality. A Gini coefficient of 0.4 is a warning level of income inequality set by the United Nations.

REFERENCES


