1. Introduction: setting the scene

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GOVERNING THROUGH COLLABORATION OR RIVALRY: THE NATION STATE AND INTRA-STATE GOVERNMENTS

In most countries, there are political institutions that complement and interact with the nation state, and that are critical partners in the governance of any country. Those politicians elected to such local and regional authorities, which are integral parts of the nation state, and those elected to leadership positions locally or regionally are critical contributors to the democratic and governing arrangements of any nation.

Internationally there are various forms of governance and different formal structures of institutional responsibility for the provision of public services, their regulation and the resourcing of them and for the provision of varying degrees of local and regional self-government. There are, however, few nation states where the central government alone assumes responsibility for all such service provision and all the governance decisions made country wide. So the roles of councils and councillors, of sub-national assemblies and legislatures, of governors, police commissioners and those who lead provincial or regional authorities are all important in understanding the network of institutions and people that comprise a modern state. In a number of nation states (the German Bundesrat and in France the Senate) some elements of the national decision-making legislature are also closely linked to local and regional entities and derive their legitimacy from this local government.

As Hesse and Sharpe (1990/91: 608) described 30 years ago: ‘local governments ... play a major role in the delivery of fundamental collective public and quasi-public goods.’

They limited this observation to *local* government and specified ‘in the Western industrialised world’, but this observation now covers a much wider range of countries than at the time it was first published. It also covers a wider range of institutions that share relations and functions with nation state govern-

ments, not just local government. Changing forms of governance architecture and international patterns of advice from various development agencies both led to and accompanied the further emergence globally of various forms of institution that comprise intermediate governments, and the services and functions they provide.

Even in those nation states where the power of central government is dominant (e.g. the People's Republic of China and North Korea) there are forms of local and sub-national political and administrative institutions that enable some degree of localised discretionary choice over a range of decisions and actions. In other nation states there are either long-standing traditions of decentralised localised discretionary decisions, or there have been more recent governance reforms that have created a greater range of localised democratic institutions. This has often been at an intermediate level of governance: in France, regional councils were introduced and have been recently changed; in Spain, various forms of autonomous communities were created that have also changed over time; in the United Kingdom, devolved legislatures in Wales and Scotland were brought into being that have also changed since their initial creation. Whatever the form and antecedents of this historical legacy, in many nation states there are a rich variety of sub-national bodies that exist, and within them decisions and actions are directed by a varied array of local or regional representatives.

Some representatives are appointed, as not all bodies are 'democratic' in the manner that many readers of this book will understand – that is, directly *elected* through broadly universal suffrage. In many instances direct election is usual, but in some instances *indirect* election of, say, mayors can be seen (Copus, 2019). In some instances intra-state governments are *appointed* by central government, and this is not a phenomenon confined to authoritarian regimes; so, for example, provincial governors¹ and mayors in the Netherlands are appointed by the government from those recommended by the relevant local bodies, and this is an arrangement that might seem unusual in many other jurisdictions where direct election to public office is the norm but is merely mentioned here (Denters and Klok, 2005), rather than discussed by the authors, who are themselves Dutch.

Such variation in practice takes many forms across different nation states and illustrates the complex diversity that can be seen in forms of what we have called intra-state government. The collection of studies of such governments across a range of different nations provides a fuller examination of the role such spheres of government play in each nation state discussed.

INTRA-STATE GOVERNMENTS OR SUB-NATIONAL ENTITIES?

In this book we use the collective term ‘intra-state governments’ in preference to the more often used term ‘sub-national governments’ to refer to local and regional governing institutions and those who serve in them. We consider the term sub-national governments does not capture the vitality, dynamics and importance of the individuals and institutions that operate within the overall governing structures of nation states. Neither does the usual term capture the vast array of different offices, powers, functions, tasks, institutional structures, arrangements and relationships that form a complex set of governing processes of closer proximity to the public than national governments.

Moreover, the use of the prefix ‘sub’ implies an institution and elected offices of subordinate importance within a governmental hierarchy. Although the powers and roles of some local and regional institutions are limited by central authorities, others have wider and constitutionally protected offices and roles that enable a high degree of localised discretion. Such distinct policies and choices can impact on the actions of national governments, and in some countries in some instances, intra-state governments have a direct formalised impact on the policies and choices available to nation state governments.

The field of related study is growing; so *Regional and Federal Studies*, the leading academic journal published by Taylor & Francis, describes its aims as follows: ‘... dealing with various aspects of comparative territorial politics, regionalism, federalism, sub-national research, and multi-level governance.’

So the term ‘intra-state’ also helps in moving our focus beyond conventional models of local and regional government to indicate that we are exploring all levels of government other than national parliaments and executives. Thus throughout the book we will employ the term ‘intra-state’ as the context within which politicians and governing institutions operate and are explored.

THE INTERNATIONAL CONTEXT OF INTRA-STATE GOVERNMENTS: CULTURE OR CONSTITUTION?

The term ‘intra-state’ to denote governing institutions and elected officials within the nation state is one that gives greater recognition to the totality of institutions and politicians in any country, whether that is the smallest French commune or the largest American state. So although Castelmoron-d’Albret near Bordeaux only has 55 inhabitants and covers a little over 0.7 of a square kilometre, it has distinct powers and competences; so too does California, with 39.5 million people living within 424,000 square kilometres.

The range of governmental institutions our contributors discuss in subsequent chapters is therefore very extensive and they vary dramatically in size, geography form, function and significance. They also vary in terms of their discretionary authority and their constitutionally protected and embedded competences. So, at a critical point, the regional parliament of Wallonia in Belgium initially blocked the entire EU–Canada Trade Agreement (CETA) as the federal Belgium government required agreement from all regional parliaments on such matters before it in turn was empowered to give nation state agreement (Beesley, 2016).

In the United Kingdom, with varying levels of asymmetric devolution to the three countries of Wales, Northern Ireland and Scotland, devolved authority varies very widely; England was deliberately excluded from the devolution to the constituent nations and today has no similar form of government to those operating in the other three nations.

Abdel Baset al-Megrahi was imprisoned in Scotland for the Lockerbie bombing and released on compassionate grounds despite opposition to this from the British and American governments: ‘... the White House on Thursday said Scotland should not have released him President Barack Obama called the release a mistake’ (NBC News, 2009).

Contemporary press reports suggested that at least some sections of the US government tried to persuade UK government officials to intervene in the parole decision; however, an intervention power into Scottish law was simply not available to any UK government minister as Scotland has always had a separate legal system to the United Kingdom and this was a legal issue rather than an issue covered by the devolved powers granted to the Scottish Parliament. Recent experience of the Covid-19 pandemic in the United Kingdom has shown that distinct executive and legislative powers can be exercised in the four constituent nations.

In many nation states local councils have ultimate discretion² on the location and provision of various facilities, such as early age education establishments, sports centres, libraries and parks; the central government may only be able to intervene in rare instances of complete failure to provide such facilities or various forms of maladministration.

Variations of size, competences and capabilities can be found both between entities within a nation state and between entities in different nation states.

The smallest council in Scotland (indeed in the United Kingdom) is Orkney Islands Council with a population of a little over 20,000; the largest is Glasgow with almost 650,000 inhabitants. Both councils have a broad range of similar powers and competences although naturally on a completely different budgetary scale. However, as an island archipelago with populations distributed across a number of islands, Orkney has additional powers to own and operate harbours, airports and ferries, as do the two other similar Scottish councils,

Shetland and the Western Isles. Indeed, recently the Shetland Islands Council voted by a majority to explore independence from Scotland and reunification with Norway in a protest against the policies of a remote and distant government in Edinburgh, an interesting example of how in any sized nation internal tensions and local differences exist.

Other spheres of intra-state government also have wide variation in size of population. Bremen, with a population of 660,000, is the smallest German state, compared with North Rhine Westphalia, the most populous state (though not the largest by area) with almost 18 million people, a 30-fold difference in population. Those two states are also represented in the Bundesrat, the higher chamber of the German Parliament: Bremen has three members, North Rhine Westphalia six. In the United States, California (the most populous state) has almost 80 times the population of Wyoming (the least populous).

In terms of geographic scale and density of population there is also wide variation amongst the countries that are discussed in this book.

In Scotland an often-repeated observation on the land area of Highland Council (in excess of 30,000 square kilometres) is that it is only a few square kilometres smaller than Belgium. The latter has a population density of 370 people per square kilometre, Highland 20 per square kilometre. In Spain the largest autonomous community, Castile and Leon, has the lowest national population density in Spain at 26 people per square kilometre; Madrid, a tenth the size, has a population density in excess of 600 per square kilometre. The Yukon Territory, with the smallest population in Canada, has a population density of 0.08 per square kilometre, and the smallest province, Prince Edward Island, has the highest population density in the country at just over 25 people per square kilometre. In England the largest council is Birmingham with just over a million people, while the smallest is Rutland, with just over 37,000 people.³

Such variations of geographic form, of geographic size, of population and of population density have, in many nation states, produced wide variation of intra-state government forms and structures. In some countries, different entities of first-tier local government and consolidating provincial, regional or state government have developed historically in forms that are linked to political and philosophical ideals current at the time of their development.

Both Canada and Australia have fully established intra-state governments and additionally 'Territories'. In both cases there are distinct, though complex, differences of constitutional status, competence and authority between the fully formed jurisdictions of States and Provinces and the less formed Territories. In various South American countries the shape and form of local government owes much to the legacy of Portuguese and Spanish imperial rule (Nickson, 2019). In contemporary Spain, for example, while municipalities have a broadly similar form and set of functions to many other countries, the

Autonomous Communities have considerable variation in their competences, their financial resourcing and their relationship with their nation state government. These differences reflected the debates that led to and surrounded the emergence of a democratic form of governance out of the post-Franco era. In the case of Catalonia, such discussions continue at an intense level that is highly contested.

In England, particularly in the past decade, considerable variations have been introduced in the form of local government, particularly for cities and combined authorities that link together a number of previously established independent local government jurisdictions. Sometimes this has also seen the creation of the office of ‘elected mayor’, a far more powerful position – even though the powers vary from area to area – than the more traditional ceremonial role of the mayor elected annually from amongst the ranks of councillors for a one-year term. England’s directly elected mayors have broadly similar powers to its indirectly elected council leaders, who are chosen not by voters but by the majority party group (see Copus, 2006 and 2019).

There is also wide variation in intra-state entities that can be found in different countries, both in terms of the range of different intra-state entities and in terms of the number of such entities in each sphere. So France has regions, departments, subdivisions of departments, and approximately 35,000 communes or municipalities, many of which are now co-operating in the provision of facilities and services through a range of collaborative entities.

At the most immediate and local level, many countries have a very large number of councils, many of which are often small; others have far fewer and larger councils. In some cases this is unrelated to either the geographical size or population of the country. The Czech Republic, for example, with a population of approximately 10 million, has different variations of regional government and some 6,000+ municipalities. More than half of those entities have a population of fewer than 500 people and more than 90 per cent of them have a population of fewer than 5,000. In Spain there are approximately 8,000 municipalities and more than 80 per cent have a population of fewer than 5,000. However, even in these and similar countries with a very large number of small first-tier councils, the majority of citizens actually live in the much more populous council jurisdictions.

In the four countries of the United Kingdom the average population size of a council is large and the number of councils consequently small compared with countries with a similar size of population. The average size of councils in Britain is approximately 140,000 people with a range from 20,000 in Orkney to almost 1 million in Birmingham. In England there are 343 principal councils; in Wales 22, in Northern Ireland 11, and in Scotland 32. For a UK population of approximately 60 million that figure of just over 400 is far fewer councils than is found in many other countries.

In all four jurisdictions of the United Kingdom the reduction in the number of councils has continued relentlessly and periodically since the mid-1970s, most recently in Northern Ireland where the former councils were amalgamated to fewer than half the number of a few years ago (25 down to 11), and there has been discussion about plans to reduce the number of councils in Wales from 22 to 6.

Reducing the number of councils is not a phenomenon confined to the United Kingdom. Between 1950 and 2017 the number of councils in France was reduced from some 38,000 to the current 35,000; in Spain, over the same period, more than 1,100 councils were removed to reduce the number to a little over 8,100. In both cases this obviously still leaves large numbers of councils, many of which are small in population, but council reduction is part of a widespread global trend. In some other countries the culling of councils has been more severe, on par with the changes throughout the United Kingdom. In Sweden in the period since the 1950s, the number of councils has reduced from more than 2,000 to fewer than 300. The reduction in councils in Denmark has been even more dramatic – from some 1,000 municipalities in 1970 to fewer than 100 in 2017, a more than 90 per cent reduction in number. Where such mergers and reduction in the number of councils has taken place, the resultant councils still have average populations far smaller than councils in England, Scotland, Wales and Northern Ireland, which taken together as the United Kingdom forms an outlier in terms of the size of its local government units compared with other European countries.

These contrasting countries are referred to here because they show wide variations of council size and that even where some form of ‘constitutional’ protection for local government exists, the centre is still able to find some way of convincing, bullying or bribing councils into merging.

A report by the Commission on Local Democracy (2014) sponsored by CoSLA (the Convention of Scottish Local Authorities) has argued:

Local democracy in Scotland today is almost unique amongst western democracies because it has no status or protection in law and its institutions are wholly subject to the will of Parliament ... major changes to local democratic institutions can, and have, proceeded without the kinds of checks and balances legally required to secure the assent of local communities in most other countries. (31)

We would argue that this reflects a confusion between reference in a written constitution to the existence and continuation of some form of local government – which some written constitutions have as a common feature – and any substantial constitutional embedding of a set of particular local governments; some particular form of local government can be and is of course embedded in some constitutional settlements. Put simply, there is no bar, though there may

be quite complex procedures, to the government in some countries changing the array of local governments, combining some and abolishing others.

So in respect of Sweden, for example, the country often argued to have one of the most constitutionally embedded local government system, Erlingsson and Ödalen (2013) have disputed the real extent of constitutional protection:

In a comparative perspective Swedish local government is often taken to enjoy a strong constitutional status, a rather high degree of policy-making autonomy and financial independence ... (29)

There is a consensus among scholars who have scrutinised the legislation, that local self-government actually does not enjoy protection in the constitution ...

The mentioning of 'local government' in the constitution's first paragraph is not judicially binding. (ibid.)

In France, the continuing existence of such a large number of local municipalities is often casually assumed to reflect protected constitutional status. One report (Hughes et al., 1998) examined the constitutional status of various local government forms in different nation states. The authors observed, in relation to France, that the retention of so many small councils was less a matter of a constitutional barrier and more a matter that while 'in theory the French Parliament does have the power to regulate local government at will', 'in practice the French communes and departmental councils have a popular "legitimacy" that few British local authorities would claim' (6).

We would suggest it is highly likely that another reason French governments have not made major changes to first-tier local government is the complex relationship between intra-state governments and nation state governments. The French Senate, which can block legislation initiated in the lower house by the French government, is indirectly elected in a way that means an overwhelming majority of members are chosen from and by councillors through indirect democracy. So changing local government in any substantial way is perhaps just too difficult an issue for any French government to address while facing a very significant set of interested parties in a parliamentary chamber with an effective veto. There is another even more simple reason the French centre – as powerful as it is – has not been able to reduce local government and that is the French like it small – attempting to merge or destroy local government is something the French centre does at its peril. Even so, the larger regions formally created in France in 1982 were still merged and reduced in number from 22 to 13 in 2018.

In Italy there have been continuing political debates, government proposals and referendums about the form, status and continuation of regions, macro-regions and departments; all remains unresolved. Yet in a 2016 referendum, Italians voted against a constitutional amendment that would have abolished the provinces. In India, despite a proclaimed federal constitution with

state legislatures, there have been instances where the union government has created new states out of longer-established states. India has also, for a considerable period of time, maintained distinct 'Union Territories' that are, in effect, run by the central government, sometimes very controversially as in the case of what are now the most recent Union Territories of Jammu and Kashmir. What we often see when the centre wishes to reformulate the geographical structure of its intra-state arrangements is the rejection of those proposals by the public. In England there are no formal, binding referenda on council mergers, but where they have been held as a tactic by councils threatened with abolition, voters have rejected mergers – although they went ahead anyway, as in the English county of Dorset in 2019.

In many countries, councils seem to be the consistent survivors, while other intra-state institutions change in status and in form quite frequently (De Ceunink et al., 2019; Swianiewicz, 2018).

Boston, a city in the United States, has a population of 0.67 million; the council is governed by 13 councillors and an executive mayor. Boston, England, is home to some 39,000 people and Boston Borough Council has 30 councillors and a mayor with a ceremonial role. In addition to this, the residents elect five county councillors on Lincolnshire County Council.

The city of Montreal, Canada, has a population of approximately 1.7 million and 65 councillors; the commune of Montreal, France, has a population of a little over 2,000 and 19 councillors along with a mayor. The variation of scale between other intra-state governments, whether called states, regions or provinces, is substantial. An 80–100-fold population difference can be seen in some, and wide variation is also observable in land area; Alaska, the largest US state, is 400 times larger in area than Rhode Island. The United States also demonstrates wide variations in the numbers of elected representatives in state government: Alaska has 40 representatives in the lower house of the legislature, New Hampshire 400. The largest Indian state is Uttar Pradesh with almost 200 million people; Sikkim has a population a little over 600,000. There is very limited research available on whether differences in the number of elected representatives in elected institutions lead to different protocols of elected governance (Purdam et al., 2008). Rewards also vary widely: the 205 members of the Bavarian State Parliament are paid approximately €100,000 per annum, the 400 legislators in the New Hampshire lower house are paid \$200.00 per annum. It appears there has for a long time been variations in the monthly hours committed by councillors both between different councils and within the same council (McGarvey and Stewart, 2019). In other countries, for example Germany and Belgium, far smaller council populations and therefore fewer constituents per councillor appear to be correlated with less time devoted to council duties (Wilson and Game, 2011: 275). What is not known is whether such variation of numbers and reward leads to better government, or just dif-

ferent approaches to supporting representatives and different expectations of how they fulfil their roles.

In some sub-national entities, whether described as states or regions, active committed membership demands full-time engagement; elsewhere it is part-time alongside other commitments. The legislature in Texas meets biennially for five-month sessions; leading German state ministers are also required to serve as members of the Bundesrat; in France members of the National Assembly may also simultaneously serve in regional office and as mayors. The most recent Prime Ministers in France have been required to step down from local and regional office; previously, the system of ‘dual mandates’ allowed for politicians such as Chaban-Delmas to serve almost 50 years as Mayor of Bordeaux while simultaneously holding various offices including that of Prime Minister.

GOVERNING OR ADMINISTERING?

Across a wide range of nation states, the functions and roles of intra-state governing bodies include a blend of administrative functions carried out on behalf of the national (or in federations often state) government and other roles when the intra-state body has greater discretion over what services and facilities are provided. So in the former category might fall electoral organisation, registration of births, marriage/civil partnership ceremonies and the registration of deaths. The latter set of activities might include the provision of museums, sports facilities, social housing and parks. Education across the full age range is often a shared function between very local municipalities, regional spheres of government (often to a national mandate of more or less strict form), and – at higher education level – semi-autonomous institutions.

Intra-state bodies can use the powerful moral force of their elected status to support policies and actions not directly related to their jurisdictional functions. Cities, assemblies and similar bodies in the United States, the United Kingdom, France and other countries have expressed views on matters as diverse as the environment, refugee emergencies and immigrant flows, sometimes more ambitious than their national state governments, sometimes in direct contradiction to the expressed views of their national government (e.g. US ‘Sanctuary’ Cities).

Another factor in governing is the extent to which such intra-state governments can be ordered to take certain actions, or have their actions countermanded by a superordinate entity or official.

So for example, during the Syrian refugees crisis, French prefectorial authority was used to relocate refugees in France regardless of the wishes of local councils and mayors (Chrisafis, 2016). A similar centrally controlled process occurred throughout Germany. As the Brookings Institute (Katz et al., 2016)

reported: ‘The federal quota system for allocating refugees to states within Germany strives to be fair, equitable, and efficient, as it distributes refugees in accordance with a long-standing formula for distributing federal resources based on tax revenues and total population.’

That comment was really code for: ‘the centre controls and has the money to do so’.

In the United States, state governments appear to intervene most often in local affairs by suspending school boards because of poor educational achievement. In Italy some 200 or more councils have been suspended in recent years by state decree because of criminal activity (Aviso Pubblico, 2018).

The distinction between the powers, responsibilities and functions of different tiers and spheres in government is recorded in documents such as the *European Charter of Local Self-Government* (Council of Europe, 1985):

It is not possible to define precisely what affairs local authorities should be entitled to regulate and manage. Expressions such as ‘local affairs’ and ‘own affairs’ were rejected as too vague and difficult to interpret. The traditions of member states as to the affairs which are regarded as belonging to the preserve of local authorities differ greatly. (Article 3)

In jurisdictions with a tradition of high electoral turnout, and where elections to the national parliament and intra-state governments are coterminous (Sweden for example), votes for intra-state office will typically lag several points behind the national office vote. But local turnout for the 2018 Swedish local elections topped 84 per cent. In France, where electoral registration is very comprehensive and there is a cultural tradition of high-turnout voting, turnout for large city mayoral elections in 2017 varied from the mid 40 per cent to the mid 50 per cent. In the 2017 French regional elections, turnout was below 50 per cent (www.interieur.gouv.fr/Elections/Les-resultats, accessed 5 October 2019).

Despite this differential level of voter turnout in elections to intra-state governments, such votes often have major significance for governments at national level. In Britain, one signalling trigger for the Labour government defeat in 1979 was the protracted industrial dispute over refuse collection by local councils. A change in local government taxation to introduce the very unpopular ‘Poll Tax’ (legally titled the Community Charge) contributed to the end of the premiership of Margaret Thatcher. In Italy, poor performance by relatively naive and inexperienced 5 Star politicians swept into local office – as Mayor of Rome for example – clearly damaged the image of that insurgent party and impacted upon subsequent party results in other elections (Willan, 2019). In Germany shifts in the control of the federal state have an impact on

the upper chamber of the German Federal Parliament as political delegations to the Bundesrat change.

The brief examples used in this introduction provide a flavour of the differences and similarities found in intra-state institutional and political arrangements in unitary and federal states. Those differences and similarities, explored in the book, combine in various ways to contribute to the overall governance of the nation states involved – and sometimes beyond. We have asked our contributors to explore the most important aspects of these in relation to the country they are examining and seek to find connections and similarities elsewhere.

THE STRUCTURE OF THIS BOOK

Our contributors review intra-state governance in a number of countries of various political configurations: federal states, quasi-federal states, some that are parliamentary in governance, others with executive presidents, yet others that are more authoritarian in their form of political control. Various of those discussed have forms of multi-sphere governance that continue to change from time to time.

We have asked our contributors to focus on three key aspects of intra-state governance, and each of those aspects has numerous strands and elements that are interrelated.

The structure of intra-state governments

The form and architecture intra-state governance take in the country studied. Are there standardised and hierarchical tiers or governments with their own spheres of influence and policy domains? Do different entities necessarily work together to a purposeful outcome or debate and dispute issues of public policy whether or not there is a subordinate/superordinate relationship between different entities of intra-state government through either legislative means or executive and financial control?

Relationships and development

The extent to which persons involved in intra-state governments see career development and movement between institutions, by both elected and appointed officials, as a common pattern of events. Whether this is fluid or based on an assumed hierarchy of interest, expertise and status.

Role and control

How elected representatives to intra-state governments ensure control or oversight of public services, local spending and local regulation; promote community action and cohesion; enact local policy; or hold to account other

power holders. The implications of this for time commitment and whether the role is seen as voluntary or a full salaried appointment.

A NOTE ON COVID-19 AS A TEST OF INTRA-STATE GOVERNANCE

The editors and the contributors of each chapter started this work before the global spread of Covid-19 had such a devastating effect. In each of the countries discussed here, the impact of the pandemic has been seen in various ways. The common global feature of that impact has been a severe test of governments of all forms and character. Responding to Covid has challenged the relationships between nation state governments and all other spheres of government, almost regardless of the forms of intra-state governments.

In the United States, Canada, Germany and India there have been overt disagreements between the national governments and states, provinces and regions. In some cases – for example Germany – this has tested long-standing federal separation of powers. In Italy, Spain and France, nation state executives have imposed decisions on regional and local governments despite varying degrees of formal discretion for those spheres of government. In other countries, local governments have lobbied and protested at the actions of central government, as the Mayor of Manchester has done.

It has not been conclusively demonstrated whether purposefully decentralised forms of government have functioned more effectively in the face of the challenges of the pandemic than have centralised governments.

NOTES

1. In this introductory chapter we have generally used English-language terms to describe governing entities at all levels. The country/language-specific term is used where appropriate.
2. In most nation states described in contributions to this book, such decisions are challengeable in law if considered unreasonable or beyond the competence of the decision makers.
3. We omit from this the highly unusual arrangements of the County of the Isles of Scilly (population approx. 2,000) and the City of London (nighttime population approx. 5,000).

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