Index

A-HAC 90–91, 92, 95–6, 98–110
Aadland, D. 126, 127
abatement
  allocation of subsidies to abatement projects by auctions 221, 223–4
decisions 197–8, 204–5
group and random fines 208–10
absolute cooperation 410, 416, 419
absolute effectiveness 226
abundance 409
acceptability of collective incentives 216–19
Adamowicz, W. 178
adverse selection 224
agent-based models 323–4
aggregate compliance effects 266–7, 271–2, 278–85
aggregate emissions 227, 266, 269–70, 270–71
actual and predicted 276–8
aggregate expected net profits 266–7, 271, 272, 273
compliance and allocation effects of deviation from predicted 272, 283–5
aggregate expected penalties 266–7, 270, 271, 272, 273
compliance and allocation effects of deviations from predicted 272, 281–3
aggregate extraction effort 295, 297, 298–9, 303–9
aggregate gross profit 266–7, 269, 271, 273
compliance and allocation effects of deviations from predicted 271–2, 278–81
aggregate violations 266–7, 268–9, 270–71, 276–8, 285–6
agricultural products, new 436
air quality 54–7
airport noise 57–61
Alatas, V. 411
allocation 233
allocation effects 266–7, 271–2, 278–85
Alpizar, F. 208, 209–10
Alwaysstakers 31–2
ambient flat tax 226–7, 368, 369, 374–5, 375–97
ambient pollution, monitoring xv–xvi, 193–232
ambient tax 194, 200, 201, 203–7, 226–7, 227–8, 373
robustness 211–21
ambient tax/subsidy 193–4, 199–200, 201, 203–7, 227–8
robustness 211–21
American Housing Survey (AHS) 42
Ames, R. 320
Amiran, E. 136, 138
Andrews, D.W.K. 94, 97
appropriation externalities 291
Arellano, M. 91
Arellano cluster-robust HAC covariance estimator (A-HAC) 90–91, 92, 95–6, 98–110
arms-length transactions 45
Arrow, K. 116
artefactual field experiments xii
water managers and cooperation xvii–xviii, 407–33
artisanal fishing communities xiii, 74–86
assessment data 40–41
asymptotic distributions 473–6
Attiyeh, G. 435, 455
attributes, bundle of 6, 14
auctions
double 237, 239, 276
using to allocate subsidies for abatement projects 221, 223–4
Vickrey 123, 142, 160, 180, 436
auditing, random 372–3, 397
availability of substitutes 136–8, 171–2, 178
average treatment effect (ATE) 17–20
FRD 31–3
interpretation of 35–7, 38, 49–50, 54, 56–7, 60–61
SRD 28–9
validity 38, 49–50, 54, 56–7, 60–61
Bahia Malaga 346
Baltagi, B.H. 109
bandwidth 91, 97, 109
equal to the time dimension 108
selection 94, 97
Banford, N.D. 177
banking of allowances xvi, 234–5, 236, 240–44, 244–6, 247–54
overbanking xvi, 235, 249, 250, 251, 254, 255
Bartlett kernel 95–6
Bayes Factors (BFs) 72, 78–9
Bayes’ Rule 70, 72
Bayesian estimation approach xiii, 67–88
Beck, N. 90
Becker–DeGroot–Marschak (BDM) mechanism 172, 179–81, 185
behavioral patterns 330–40
behavioral strategies
collective instruments for monitoring stock externalities 225–6, 227
fixed instruments to cope with stock externalities 368–9, 371–2, 377–86, 391–2, 400–403
comparison 384–6
behavioral types
multiple reward stages 294, 302–14, 315–16
water managers and cooperation 412, 413–14, 415, 416, 419–20, 421
typing methods 420–23
Ben-David, S. 235–6
Bertrand, M. 25, 92, 110
bias–variance tradeoff 39
bid deviations from induced values 442–7
bid functions 7–9, 11
Bishop, R. 120, 121–2, 177
bivariate panel data model 464, 469–73
Bjornstad, D. 447, 449

Blackburn, M. 130
Blinder, A.S. 460
Blue Ribbon Task Force 424
Blumenschein, K. 126–7, 129
Bohm, P. 120, 121, 234
Boun My, K. 211, 217–18, 219
boundary dummies 33
Bowker, J.M. 177
Bowles, S. 348, 358, 363
Box–Cox models 15, 45–6
Boyce, J. 177
Bromley, D. 166
Brookshire, D.S. 122
Brown, G.M. 132–3, 158, 166, 177
Brown, T.C. 123, 127
Brown-Kruse, J. 236
budget reminder 124–5
Buenaventura region, Colombia 347–64
Bulte, E. 127, 128
bundle of attributes 6, 14
Butler, J. 469, 470
buyers, in the housing market 6, 7–9
Cadsby, C.B. 410
calibration 124–30
Camacho, E. 204–5, 208–9, 210
cancer risk 51–4
cap-and-trade system xvi, 233–4
see also emissions trading
capacity, in terms of permits 238, 239
capital projects game 424
capitalization bias 35, 36
capitalization rate 35–7
Caplan, A.J. 126, 127
Cardenas, J.C. 320, 360, 411
Carpenter, J. 347, 350, 356
Carson, R.T. 121, 122, 127
census and survey data 41–2
certain decline 240, 241, 243–4, 244–6, 251, 252–4
certainty measures 128–9
Champ, P. 129
Chattopadhyay, S. 133
Chay, K.Y. 54–7, 61
cheap talk 125–7, 129, 219–21
cheating 391–2, 397
Chen, Y. 436
Cherry, T.L. 127

John A. List and Michael K. Price - 9781781009079
Downloaded from Elgar Online at 11/07/2021 11:23:34AM
via free access
Index 485

Chestnut, L. 116
Chib, S. 71, 72, 73
choice of measure xv, 157–70
Churchill County, Nevada 51–4
Clarke, E.H. 435, 437, 448
Clean Air Act Amendments 54–7
cluster-robust covariance estimator (A-HAC) 90–91, 92, 95–6, 98–110
coalition withdrawal 395–6
Cochard, F. 205–7, 210, 211, 212–13, 214, 216–17, 219, 221, 222
collective fines 200–201
see also group fines
collective incentives 198, 199–221, 227–9
monitoring stock externalities 224–7
performance of collective incentive instruments 202–11
testing for robustness of 211–21
collective penalty 373, 392–5, 397
see also mixed flat instrument
Colombia
fishing communities xiii, 74–86
government regulation and community efforts to support cooperation xvii, 346–66
new field experiments on irrigation, forestry and fisheries xvii, 325–42
common pool resource (CPR) games
effectiveness of multiple reward stages xvi, 291–318
field experiment on institutional heterogeneity 68, 69–86
fixed instruments to cope with stock externalities xvii, 367–403
government regulation and community enforcement efforts xvii, 346–66
new field experiments on irrigation, fisheries and forestry xvi–xvii, 319–45
communication 425
institutional heterogeneity in social dilemma games 75, 79–85, 86
community enforcement efforts xvii, 346–66
compensating variation xv, 163–7
complementarities between community enforcement efforts
and government regulation xvii, 346–66
complexity 323
compliance
behavior and fixed instruments to cope with stock externalities 391–6, 397
monitoring 372–3, 397
perfect 286
compliance effects 266–7, 271–2, 278–85
compliers 31–3
conditional heteroskedasticity 110
Condorcet Jury Theorem 458–9
confounding overlap 19
connections 311–14
consequentialism, and surveys 127–8
consistency experiments 145–8
consumers, in the housing market 6, 7–9
contingent valuation (CV) 171, 186
issues in using stated preferences xiv–xv, 115–56
contributions to a group good/account 434
community enforcement 349, 350–51, 353–6
government regulation and 347, 351–2, 356–63
water irrigation game 334–7
water managers 409–10, 412–13, 414–15
controlled data xi–xii
convolution 83–5
Cooper, D.J. 410–11
cooperation 321
absolute 410, 416, 419
government regulation and community efforts to support xvii, 346–66
prisoner’s dilemma as an inter-group game 461–3, 464–77
relative 416, 417–19
social dilemma games 291–3
measurement of social preferences 307–14
with multiple rewards 293, 298–302
water managers in public goods games xvii–xviii, 407–33
cooperators 414, 415, 419–20, 421, 422
cooperação games 409–10
cooperatives
efficiency of 408–9
MET xviii, 407–9, 423–5
corrective entreaties 124–7
Corrigan, J.R. 141
cost-shifting 424
counter-punishment (retaliation) 292
<see also> multiple reward stages
Coursey, D. 122, 141–2, 176
Court, A.T. 3
Cronshaw, M.B. 236
Cropper, Deck and McConnell (CDM) study 15, 45–6
Croson, R. 215
cross-section dimension 92, 98–108, 109–10
Cummings, R.G. 123–4, 125–6, 127, 128
damage-based (nonlinear) ambient tax 201, 211–13, 214, 217–18
damages, pollution 285–6
external 195, 202–3, 203–5, 207–10
internal 195–6, 202–3, 205–7, 210–11
mixed 196
data cleaning 38, 40–41, 44–5, 52–3, 55–6, 58–9
data collection 37, 38, 39–44, 52–3, 55–6, 58–9
data-dependent bandwidth selection 94, 97
data-generating processes (DGPs) 92, 97–110
Davis, D.D. 117
Davis, L.W. 51–4, 61
days-on-market information 41
Decennial Census Summary File 3 (SF3) 41–2, 44
decentralized markets 455
<see also> incentive compatible mechanisms
decentralized regulation mechanisms 315
Deck, L. 15
decline in permit allocations 239, 240, 241, 243–4, 244–6, 250–4, 255
certain 240, 241, 243–4, 244–6, 251, 252–4
uncertain 240, 241, 244, 244–6, 251–4
decomposed game technique 294, 302–3
degrees of freedom correction 108
demand for public goods 434–5
<see also> incentive compatible mechanisms
demographics
data collection for quasi-experiments 38, 39–40, 44, 53
WTP for open space 453–4
diabetes management program 129
dichotomous choice response format 122–3
Dickie, M. 122
differences in differences (DD) approach 21–6, 34, 37
differentiated product markets 6
Dillman, D.A. 127–8
direct democracy (DD) xviii, 460, 463, 464–77
directors 423–4
discontinuity effect 459, 460–61
discrete public goods 436–7, 437–47, 455
Dorada, La, (Magdalena) fishing community 74–86
double auctions 237, 239, 276
Driscoll, J.C. 92
duck hunter study 132–3, 158, 166–7
dynamic externalities see stock externalities
dynamic extraction game 370–75
fixed instruments to cope with stock externalities 375–97
dynamic policy instruments 368, 396
earnings, community sanctions and 353, 354, 355–6
with government regulation 356, 357, 358, 359–60, 360–61
ecosystems xvi–xvii, 321–2
dynamics, individuals and institutions 322–4
new field experiments on irrigation, forestry and fisheries 324–42
education, years of 75, 79, 80
effectiveness 226
absolute 226
fixed instruments for stock
externalities 227, 386–9, 397
relative 226, 388, 389, 397
efficiency 226
cooperatives 408–9
emissions trading markets 239–40
see also productive efficiency;
trading efficiency
fixed instruments for stock
externalities 227, 386–7, 389–91
gross and net 389–91
group 410
multiple reward stages in common
pool games 293, 296, 315, 316
consequences of allowing for
reciprocity 298–302
water managers and cooperation
414–15, 417–20
effort
aggregate extraction effort 295, 297,
298–9, 303–9
fishing game 329–30, 337–40, 342
Efron, B. 381
Eisenberg, R. 177, 178–9
Elbittar, A. 461
elicitation procedures 122–4
Ellickson, R. 166
emission decisions 197–8
emissions proxies 193
emissions trading
imperfect enforcement xvi, 265–88
lab experiment on banking,
investment and uncertainty xvi,
233–64
demand effects 143, 144, 157,
159–60, 161, 171–2, 178
see also reference states
enforcement
community enforcement efforts xvii,
346–66
imperfect xvi, 265–88
Ensenada de Tumaco (Pacific) fishing
community 74–86
environmental data 38, 39–40, 43
Environmental Protection Agency
(EPA) 158
equilibrium
analysis for lab game with banking,
investment and uncertainty
244–6, 259–60
ecosystems 323
hedonic 11–12
imperfectly enforced emission
trading 268–72
Nash equilibria see Nash equilibria
equivalent variation xv, 163–7
Erie, Lake 115
Erie, S.P. 408
ethical constraints 368
European carbon dioxide emission
reduction credit program 233
ex ante calibration 124–9
ex post calibration 124, 130
exclusion assumption 19
Executive Order 12866 xiv
existence value (non-use value) 116
exogeneity, determination of 38, 51,
54–5, 58
expected net profits see aggregate
expected net profits
expected penalties see aggregate
expected penalties
expected utility see aggregate
expected utility
loss aversion 173–5, 176, 183–4
rank-dependent 172, 175–6
experience see learning (experience)
external damage 196, 202–3
collective incentives 203–5, 207–10
external validity
public goods games 410–11
quasi-experimental hedonic property
models 38, 39, 50, 61, 63
externalities
static 367
stock see stock externalities
extraction effort, aggregate 295, 297,
298–9, 303–9
extraction of resources see resource
extraction/harvesting
Exxon Valdez oil spill 116, 119
feedback strategy 371
Feeny, D. 410
Fehr, E. 291–2, 347, 350, 354
field experiments xi–xii, 3–4, 67
WTP–WTA disparities 177, 178
see also artefactual field experiments;
framed field experiments
handbook on experimental economics and the environment 488

fines
collective 200–201
group 200, 201, 207–11, 213, 220–21, 228
random 194, 200–201, 207–11, 228
subsidy/fine instrument 200–1
firm behavior 268–72
first-order vector-autoregression [VAR(1)] filter 94, 108–9
Fischbacher, U. 294, 302, 303
Fischel, W. 166
fisheries
artisanal fishing communities and institutional heterogeneity xiii, 74–86
new field experiments 324–6, 329–30, 337–42
5–Percent Public Use Microdata Sample (PUMS) files 42
fixed effects 75–7, 79, 80
fixed instruments xvii, 367–403
flat tax 368, 369, 374–5, 375–97
forcing variable 26–7, 34
forest depletion 332–4
forestry 324–8, 330–4, 340–42
Fox, J.A. 436
framed field experiments xii

government regulation, community effort and cooperation xvii, 346–66
on irrigation, fisheries and forestry xvi-xvii, 319–45
free-riding 121, 321, 424, 434, 449
water managers as free-riders 414, 415, 419–20, 421, 422, 425
frequency distribution of outcomes 467–8
Frey, B. 358, 363
Friedman, J.W. 473
Friedman, L.S. 164, 165
full sample strategy 77, 78, 80, 81, 82–3
functional form 15–16
quasi-experimental hedonic pricing models 38, 45–6, 53–4, 56, 59–60
fuzzy regression discontinuity (FRD) 26, 29–33
Gächter, S. 291–2, 347, 350, 354
gains, values of losses and xv, 157–70
Gallagher, J. 34–5
Gallet, C. 120
Gangadharan, L. 236
gender 75, 79, 80
geo–coding 45
Geolytics Neighborhood Change Database 44
Gibbs sampler 71, 73
Gillet, J. 461
Gintis, H. 348, 363
Giordana, G.A. 225, 369
GIS data 43
Godby, R. 236
government agencies 43
government regulation and community enforcement efforts xvii, 346–66
institutional heterogeneity in social dilemma games 75, 79–85, 86
Greenstone, M. 34–5, 54–7, 61
Grether, D. 148
Griliches, Z. 3
gross efficiency 389–91
gross profit see aggregate gross profit

group fines 200, 201, 207–11, 213, 220–21, 228
groups
contributions to a group good/account see contributions to a group good/account
prisoner’s dilemma as inter-group game xviii, 458–81
Groves, T. 127, 435, 437
Groves–Clarke mechanism 435–6
Guzman, R. 141, 172
Haab, T.C. 124
Haan, M. 411
Haas, G.C. 3
Hagen, D. 136, 138
Hammack, J. 132–3, 158, 166, 177
Hanemann, W.M. 121–2, 136–7, 138, 178
Hansen, C.B. 26
Hansen, L.G. 194, 195, 199, 201
Harless, D. 177
harm vs benefit test for legal liability 166
Harrison, G.W. 119, 121, 122, 179
### Index

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Page</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>489</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

- **Hart, O.** 408–9
- **harvest-reducing strategies** 84–5
- **harvesting** *see resource extraction/harvesting*
- **Heberlein, T.A.** 120, 121–2, 177
- **hedonic equilibrium** 11–12
- **hedonic price functions** 6–11, 12
  - functional form issues 15–16
- **hedonic property value models** xiii, 3–66
  - examples of quasi-experimental approaches 50–61
  - quasi-experimental hedonic methods*in practice* 37–50
  - quasi-experimental techniques 16–37
  - traditional hedonic methods 5–16, 36–7
- **Henderson, A.M.** 158
- **Henrich, J.** 411
- **herding behavior** 459
- **Herr, A.** 369
- **Herrmann, B.** 411
- **heterogeneity** 6, 215, 238
  - institutional in social dilemma games xiii, 67–88
  - robustness of collective incentives 213–14
  - unobserved 20–21, 67–8, 92
- **heteroskedasticity-autocorrelation-consistent (HAC) covariance estimators** xiv, 90–110
  - A-HAC 90–91, 92, 95–6, 98–110
  - Monte Carlo experiment 97–108
  - NW-HAC 91, 92, 95–6, 97, 98–107
  - for panel data 91, 95–7
  - RE-HAC 90, 96–7, 98–110
  - for time series data 91, 93–4
- **heteroskedasticity-consistent estimator** 89–90, 110
- **hierarchical doubly-truncated Poisson (HDP) model** 68, 69–74
- **Hoehn, J.P.** 122
- **Hoff man, E.** 436
- **Holling, C.S.** 323
- **Holt, C.A.** 117
- **homo economicus** 311, 316
- homogeneity 215
- **Horan, R.** 194, 195
- **Horowitz, J.** 412, 414, 421, 422
- **housing data** 62
  - cleaning 38, 40–41, 44–5, 52–3, 55–6, 58–9
  - collecting 38, 39–43, 52–3, 55–6, 58–9
- **housing markets** xiii, 3–66
  - defining a housing market for a quasi-experiment 39
- **Hovis, J.L.** 141–2
- **hump-shaped behavioral type** 421, 422–3
- **Hundley Jr, N.** 424
- **hunting permit experiments** 121
- **hypothetical bias** xiv–xv, 116–17, 118, 119–30, 158–9, 435
  - calibration techniques 124–30
  - documenting the presence of 121–2
  - elicitation procedures 122–4
  - experimental approach 120–21
- **hypothetical pivot mechanism** 449–54
- **hypothetical voluntary contribution with provision point mechanism** 449–54
- **identification strategies** 27–8, 30
- **identity signaling** 303–14
- **Imbens, G.W.** 34
- **imperfect enforcement** xvi, 265–88
- **Imperial Irrigation District (IID)** 407, 408
- **incentive compatible mechanisms** xviii, 434–57
- **incentives** 319–20, 321
  - policies to cope with ambient pollution 198–202
  - *see also* collective incentives; individual incentives
  - valuation of gains and losses 161–3
- **income effect** 171–2
- **incumbents, replacement of** 472–3
- **individual allocation effects** 266–7, 271–2, 278–85
- **individual incentives** 198–9, 221–4, 229
- **individuals**
  - comparison of prisoner’s dilemma played in groups and by individuals xviii, 458–81
  - ecosystem dynamics, institutions and 322–4
- **incumbents, replacement of** 472–3
induced values 119
incentive compatible mechanisms 441–2
bid deviations from 442–7
industry welfare xvi, 265–88
informal associations 74
informal rules/regulation 74, 75, 79–85, 86
information 363
conditions 214–15, 217
effects and collective incentives 214–16
investment decision and emissions trading 255
information cascades 459
input-based tax/subsidy scheme 198–9
input tax 221, 222–3
Insko, C.A. 459
institutions 319–20
ecosystem dynamics, individuals and 322–4
institutional heterogeneity xiii, 67–88
market institutions 117
instrument calibration 124–9
instrumental variables (IV) methods xii, 34–5
inter-group game xviii, 458–81
inter-group reliability 206–7
internal damage 195–6, 202–3
collective incentives 205–7, 210–11
internal validity 38, 39, 49–50, 63
inter-period reliability 206–7
interpretation of treatment effect 35–7, 38, 49–50, 54, 56–7, 60–61
intra-group voting mechanisms 459–60, 462–3, 464–77
Inverse-Wishart (IW) density 71
optimal investment behavior 243, 245, 246, 259–60
irreversibility 176–7
irrigation 324–6, 328–9, 330–32, 334–7, 340–42
Irwin, J. 179, 180
Isaac, M. 320
Janssen, M.A. 322
Jegen, R. 358, 363
Jeliazkov, I. 72, 73
joint posterior density 70
joint profit maximization 368–9, 371–2
Kachelmeier, S.J. 159, 177
Kahneman, D. 146, 148, 160, 166, 173, 177, 319
Kao, C. 109
Karni, E. 148
Katz, J.N. 90
Kawagoe, T. 436
Kealy, M. 122
kernel 91, 94, 95–6
Kezdi, G. 92, 110
Kling, C. 140–41
Knetusch, J. 141–2, 145–6, 159, 162–3, 177
Kolstad, C. 141, 172
Köszegi, B. 145, 157, 162, 166
Kraay, A.C. 92
Kreps, D.M. 471
Krutila, J. 116
Kuminoff , N. 5, 15–16, 35–7, 46
Kurzban, R. 412, 414, 421, 422
Kusakawa, T. 235
laissez faire
emission and abatement decisions 197–8
fixed instruments to cope with stock externalities 371–2, 375–88
Landry, C.E. 126–7, 128
latent variables 17–18
learning (experience) 160–61
group and random fines 208–9
incentive compatible mechanisms 449, 453–4, 455
prisoner’s dilemma as inter-group game 464, 469–73
WTA–WTP disparity 141–3, 144
lab market 63
laboratory experiments xi–xii, 3
emissions trading
imperfect enforcement xvi, 265–88
interaction of banking, investment and uncertainty xvi, 233–64
explanations for WTA–WTP disparities 177, 178, 179–86
prisoner’s dilemma as inter-group game xviii, 458–81
imperfect enforcement xvi, 265–88
interaction of banking, investment and uncertainty xvi, 233–64
explanations for WTA–WTP disparities 177, 178, 179–86
prisoner’s dilemma as inter-group game xviii, 458–81
Index 491

Ledyard, J. 320, 434, 435, 437
Lee, M.-J. 20
legal entitlements 165–6
Lemieux, T. 34
Leontief utility function 136
Levitt, S. 3–4
Liebrand, W. 294, 302
limited access game 75, 79–85
limiting distributions 94
linear ambient tax schemes 211–13
List, J.A. 3–4, 120, 126–7, 128, 130,
140, 143, 147, 342
lives-saved vs. lives-lost experiment 148
location 464, 469–73
long cheap talk script 125–7
Loomis, J. 124–5
Lopez, M.C. 360
loss aversion 144, 160
losses, values of gains and xv, 157–70
lottery rule 326–30, 331–40
Lusk, J.L. 126
Lyon County, Nevada 51–4
MacDonald, H.F. 177
Magdalena fishing community 74–86
majority rule 458–9, 460
see also direct democracy
Malik, A.S. 266, 267, 269, 271–2, 280
marginal likelihood 70, 78–9
and model selection 71–3
marginal willingness to pay (MWTP) 12, 15–16, 45–6, 49–50
interpretation of the ATE 35–7
market efficiency 239–40
see also productive efficiency; trading efficiency
market equilibrium 268–72
market experiments 202
collective incentives in 219–21
hedonic property models see hedonic property models
market institutions 117
Markov chain model 464, 473–6
Marks, M. 215
Marwell, G. 320
Masclet, D. 347, 353, 356
Mason, C.F. 473
Maynes, E. 410
McCollom, D. 177
McConnell, K.E. 15, 133, 134, 138–9,
142–3, 172, 319
McKee, M. 179
mean squared deviation (MSD) 381, 382, 383, 384, 385
mean withdrawals 381–4, 385–6
member agency managers (MAMs) 409, 416, 417–19, 423–5
merchandise sales 159–60
Mestelman, S. 234, 410
Metropolitan Water District of Southern California (MET) xviii,
407–9, 423–5
Meyer, B.D. 61
Miller, D. 166
Milliman, J.W. 424
misreporting 391–5
Mitchell, R.C. 121, 122
mixed damage 196
mixed flat instrument 368, 369, 375, 375–97
mixed instruments 200, 201, 220–21, 373–4
Moeltner, K. 68, 69, 70, 71, 73, 77, 80–81
Moffit, R. 469, 470
Monahan, C. 94
monetary sanctions 349, 350–51, 352–63
monitoring technologies 367
monotonicity of treatment assumption 31
Monte Carlo experiments 91, 92, 94
assessing the accuracy of HAC covariance estimators 97–108
Moore, J. 408–9
Morgan, J. 460
Mori, T. 436
Morrison, G.C. 177
Muller, R.A. 234
multiple listing service (MLS) data 41
multiple Nash equilibria 207
multiple reward stages xvi, 291–318
municipal open space 437, 447–54, 455
Murphy, J.J. 120, 127, 278
myopic strategy
  collective instruments for monitoring stock externalities 225–6, 227
  fixed instruments to cope with stock externalities 368–9, 371–2, 377–86, 391–2, 402–3

Nalbantian, H. 202, 228
Nash equilibria
  multiple 207
  per-period Nash equilibrium 368–9, 371–2

natural experiments xii, 61, 159
natural field experiments xii–xiii
naturally-occurring data xi–xii
Neighborhood Change Database 44
Neill, H.R. 122–3
neoclassical model 132–41, 149
expanded models within the neoclassical framework 140–41
tests of based on WTA and WTP 134–40
net efficiency 389–91
net profits see aggregate expected net profits
Nevertakers 31–2
new agricultural products 436
Newey, W.K. 90, 92–3, 109
Newey-West HAC covariance estimator (NW-HAC) 91, 92, 95–6, 97, 98–107
Nikiforakis, N. 292
NOAA Blue Ribbon Panel 116, 124, 130, 144
noise, airport 57–61
non-arms-length sales 45
nonlinear ambient tax schemes 201, 211–13, 214, 217–18
non-linearities xvi–xvii, 321–42
non-market valuation xiv–xv
  issues in using stated preference approaches xiv–xv, 115–56
non-signalers 307–14
non-use values 116
number of permits 238, 239, 244, 245
NW-HAC 91, 92, 95–6, 97, 98–107
O’Connor, D.E. 424
offer functions 9–11
OLS 90
  Monte Carlo experiment with HAC covariance estimators 98–108
Olson, M. 408
omitted variables 14, 23–4
open-ended response formats 122–3
open-loop strategy 371
open space, WTP for 437, 447–54, 455
optimal investment behavior 243, 245, 246, 259–60
optimal tax scheme 372–3
optimum strategy 368–9, 371–2, 377–86, 403
ordering effects, on sanctions 361–3
organizational change 323
Ostrom, E. 291–2, 320, 322, 348, 363, 425
Ostrom, V. 363
outcome uncertainty xv, 171–89
over-abatement 201
overbanking of emissions permits xvi, 235, 249, 250, 251, 254, 255
overbidding 439, 443–4
overinvestment 250, 254–5
Oxoby, R.J. 214, 215–16
Ozone Transport Commission 254
Pacific fishing community 74–86
Palacios-Huerta, I. 411
Palmquist, R.B. 13
panel-corrected standard errors 90
panel data
  HAC covariance estimators for 91, 95–7
  hedonic property model 14, 25–6
  with serial correlation xiii–xiv, 89–112
parametric spectral density estimators 94
partner treatments 293
peer-to-peer rewards xvi, 291–318
peer-to-peer sanctions see sanctions penalties
aggregate expected see aggregate expected penalties
  collective 373, 392–5, 397
perfect compliance 286
permit prices
  imperfect enforcement 270–71, 276–8
lab experiment on banking, investment and uncertainty 246–54
permit use 247, 248
permit value 238, 239
per-period Nash equilibrium 368–9, 371–2
pesticides 158
Peters, H.E. 411
Phillips, O.R. 473
piangua mollusk 346, 347, 352
pigouvian taxes 198–9, 367
pivot mechanism 435–6
for a discrete public good 436–7, 437–47, 455
vs. provision point mechanism 437, 447–54, 455
Plott, C.R 143, 144, 148, 161–2, 178, 202, 219, 436
Poe, G. 127, 219, 220
point estimates 421
point source pollution 193
policy prescriptions 49–50
pollution damages see damages, pollution monitoring ambient pollution xv–xvi, 193–232
point source 193
pooled cross-sections 25–6
Pope, J.C. 5, 35–7, 57–61
positive changes 163–5
posterior predictive distributions (PPDs) 71, 73–4, 81–5
potential outcomes model 17
preference consistency 145–8
preference reversal 148
prewhitening filter 91, 94, 108–9, 110
prices see hedonic price functions; permit prices
prior predictive distribution see marginal likelihood
prisoner’s dilemma (PD) xviii, 458–81
private goods 118–19, 131–2
producers, in the housing market 6, 9–11
production capacity 238, 239
productive efficiency 240, 241–2, 243, 245, 246, 247–54
profit aggregate expected net profits see aggregate expected net profits
aggregate gross profit see aggregate gross profit
joint profit maximization 368–9, 371–2
propensity score estimation xii
property prices see hedonic property models
property rights 291
property rule 326–30, 334–40
pro-social individuals 311, 316, 321
provision point mechanism 437, 447–54, 455
proximity to school 26–34
public goods xvii–xviii, 116, 118–19, 131, 320
field experiments on irrigation, fisheries and forestry xvi–xvii, 319–45
incentive compatible mechanisms for providing xviii, 434–57
water managers and cooperation in public goods games xvii–xviii, 407–33
Public Use Microdata Areas (PUMAs) 42
Putler, D.S. 159
quadratic characterization 421, 422–3
quasi-experiments xiii, 3–66
examples 50–61
hedonic methods in practice 37–50
quasi-experimental techniques for the hedonic model 16–37
differences in differences 21–6, 34, 37
instrumental variables methods 34–5
regression discontinuity 26–34
and treatment effects 17–20
interpretation 35–7, 38, 49–50, 54, 56–7, 60–61
quotas institutional heterogeneity in social dilemma games 75, 79–85
quota rules 329–30, 334–40
Rabin, M. 144, 157, 162, 166  
Raleigh-Durham International Airport (RDU) 57–61  
Randall, A. 122, 135  
random auditing 372–3, 397  
random controls 373, 397  
random effect variances 79, 80, 81  
random effects  
  institutional heterogeneity and social dilemma experiments 75–7, 79, 80  
  model and repeated-game experiments 98–109  
random effects estimator assuming a common AR(1) error process (RE-AR1) 98–110  
random-effects HAC covariance estimator (RE-HAC) 90, 96–7, 98–110  
random lines 194, 200–201, 207–11, 228  
random shocks 213  
randomization xi, xii  
rank-dependent expected utility 172, 175–6  
rational strategy 225–6  
  fixed instruments to cope with stock externalities 368–9, 371–2, 377–86, 400–402  
RE-HAC 90, 96–7, 98–110  
real exchange experiments 158–9  
real pivot mechanism 449–52  
real valuation surveys, differences from hypothetical valuation surveys xiv–xx, 116–17, 118, 119–30, 158–9  
real voluntary contribution with provision point mechanism 449–54  
realtor associations 41  
reciprocity 321  
reciprocators and cooperation among water managers 414, 416, 419–20, 421, 422  
in rewarding xvi, 291–318  
efficiency consequences of allowing for reciprocity 298–302  
recommended play 215–16  
re-contracting cost 181, 182, 186  
reference dependence 139–40, 144, 162, 171–2  
reference states xv, 157–70  
referendum 123  
refined priors 77–8  
regression 24–5, 34  
regression discontinuity (RD) 26–34  
regulation  
  dynamic extraction game 372–4  
  fixed instruments see fixed instruments  
  government see government regulation  
  informal 74, 75, 79–85, 86  
  institutional heterogeneity in social dilemma games 74, 75, 79–85, 86  
  instruments for monitoring ambient pollution xv–xvi, 193–232  
  self-regulatory instruments see self-regulatory instruments  
  uncertainty regarding environmental regulations 235  
relative cooperation 416, 417–19  
relative effectiveness 226, 388, 389, 397  
reliability 206–7  
rent-seeking 407–8  
repeat sales data 14, 25–6, 42–3  
repeated-game experiments xiii–xiv, 89–112  
replacement of incumbents 472–3  
Requate, T. 204–5, 208–9, 210  
resource dynamics xvi–xvii, 321–42  
resource extraction/harvesting 291  
  collective instruments for monitoring stock externalities 225–7  
  dynamic extraction game see dynamic extraction game  
  institutional heterogeneity in social dilemma games 69–86  
  new field experiments on fisheries, forestry and irrigation 325–42  
retrospective-prospective voting rule 478  
retrospective voting rule 478  
revealed preferences 115–16, 409  
reward stages, multiple xvi, 291–318
Index 495

reward tokens 295–6
motivations for sending 305–7
number given 297, 299–301, 309, 310
sent by subjects in connections 312–13, 314
robustness checks
  collective incentives 211–21
  quasi-experimental hedonic methods 38, 46–9, 53–4, 56, 59–60
Rodriguez-Sickert, C.A. 320
Rosen, R. 5, 6–12
rotation rule 326–30, 331–40
Rowe, R. 116
rules 325–30, 331–40
Rutström, E.E. 122
Safra, Z. 148
Saijo, T. 235
Samuelson, W. 133
San Diego County Water Authority (SDCWA) 407–8
San Miguel, F. 148
sanctions 291–2, 301–2
  community enforcement efforts and government regulation 347, 349, 350–51, 352–63
Schlager, E. 322
school proximity 26–34
Schopler, J. 459
Schotter, A. 202, 228
Schulze, W.D. 141–2
second price Vickrey auctions 160
Sefton, M. 292–3
Segerson, K. 193–4, 195, 199–200, 202, 203, 373
selection problems
  instrumental variables method 34 on observables/unobservables 18
  self-regulatory instruments 291, 315
government regulation and community enforcement efforts xvii, 346–66
sellers, in the housing market 6, 9–11
serial correlation xiii–xiv, 89–112
sharp regression discontinuity (SRD) 26–9, 32, 34
Shehata, M. 159, 177
Shogren, J. 126, 130, 137, 138, 142, 177, 436
short cheap talk scripts 125, 127
Shortle, J. 195
signalers 303–14
Sinden, J.A. 122, 141–2, 159, 177
single market assumption 13
social dilemma experiments xiii, xvi, 117, 320–21
common pool resource games see common pool resource (CPR) games
institutional heterogeneity xiii, 67–88
self-regulatory instruments 291–3
social optimum 197, 199, 201–2, 212–13
high and low 213, 217–18
social orientation 294, 302–14, 315–16
social preferences 409
measuring 294, 302–14, 315–16
social sanctions 349, 350–1, 352–63
social welfare 203, 409–10
sophistication of subjects 214
Southern California see Metropolitan Water District of Southern California (MET)
space
  quasi-experiments determining spatial domain 38, 51–2, 54–5, 58
  robustness checks 38, 46–9, 53–4, 56, 59–60
spatial effects in new field experiments on irrigation, fisheries and forestry xvi–xvii, 321–42
split sample strategy 77, 78, 80, 81, 82–3
Spraggon, J. 203, 205, 206, 207, 208, 213–14, 215–16
stability
  over time 13–14
  states of in ecosystems 323
stakeholders 322
standard experiments 202, 203
stated preferences xiv–xx, 115–56, 409
hypothesical bias xiv–xx, 116–17, 118, 119–30
preference consistency 145–8
preference reversal 148
WTP–WTA disparity xiv–xx, 116–17, 131–44
static externalities 367
statistical calibration 124, 130
stock externalities
  collective instruments for monitoring 224–7, 228–9
  fixed instruments to cope with xvii, 367–403
Stoll, J. 135
Stranlund, J.K. 278, 286
strategic money maximizers 311, 316
strategy method 294, 302, 303
structural modeling xii
sub-game perfect equilibrium 368–9, 371
subsidies
  allocation by auction for abatement projects 221, 223–4
  subsidy/fine instrument 200–1
  tax/subsidy instruments see ambient tax/subsidy; tax/subsidy instruments
substitutability 136–8, 171–2, 178
sulfur dioxide allowance trading program 233, 254
Summary File 3 (SF3) Sample Data 41–2, 44
Superfund sites 34–5
surveys 434–5
  consequentialism 127–8
  hypothetical bias see hypothetical bias
  procedures 143–4
Suter, J.F. 211–12, 213
Tang, F.F. 436
taxes 372–3, 374
  ambient see ambient tax
  ambient flat tax 226–7, 368, 369, 374–5, 375–97
incentive compatible mechanisms 436, 438–9, 440, 441–2, 451–2
input 221, 222–3
pigouvian 198–9, 367
unit 367
tax/subsidy instruments
  ambient see ambient tax/subsidy input-based 198–9
Taylor, L.O. 126, 127, 128
Taylor series expansion 135–6
technical constraints on policy instruments 368
technology
  monitoring 367
Thailand xvii, 325–42
threshold/policy variable 34
time
  dimensions in the Monte Carlo experiment 98–108
quasi-experiments
  determining temporal domain 38, 51, 54–5, 58
  robustness checks 38, 46–9, 53–4, 56, 59–60
  time effects 23–4
  stability over 13–14
  time-series data 91, 93–4
  Tobit model 423, 452–4
  total suspended solids (TSPs) 54–7
toxic waste spills 166
trading efficiency 239–40, 241–2, 244–6, 247–54
traditional hedonic methods 5–16, 36–7
  empirical implementation 12–16
  theory 6–12
  transaction costs 140–41
  transaction data 40–41
  transition matrices 473–6
treatment effects
  institutional heterogeneity in social dilemma games xiii, 67–88
quasi-experiments and 17–20
  interpretation 35–7, 38, 49–50, 54, 56–7, 60–61
  see also average treatment effect (ATE)
treatment on the treated effect (TTE) 19–20
trust 425
  Trust Index 417, 419–20, 421, 425
  trustworthiness 301, 309–14
  truthful preference revelation 435–6, 451
  pivot mechanism 438–40, 446–7, 455
Tversky, A. 148, 319
two-level games 458, 459, 472, 477
typing, behavioral see behavioral types
unbounded utility 138
uncertainty
over future permit allocations in emissions trading markets xvi, 234, 235–6, 240, 241, 244, 244–6, 251–4, 255
value and outcome uncertainty as explanations for the WTA–WTP disparity xv, 171–89
uncertain decline 240, 241, 244, 244–6, 251–4
unit taxes 367
unitary rational actor (URA) assumption 458, 459–60
United States (US)
applications of the quasi-experimental hedonic method 50–61
Decennial Census Summary File 3 (SF3) Sample Data 41–2, 44
Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) 158
Executive Order 12866 xiv
Metropolitan Water District of Southern California (MET) xviii, 407–9, 423–5
sulfur dioxide allowance trading program 233, 254
Superfund sites 34–5
unobserved heterogeneity 20–21, 67–8, 92
utility functions 132, 136–7, 138
validity
external 38, 39, 50, 61, 63, 410–11
internal 38, 39, 49–50, 63
quasi-experimental hedonic methods 38, 49–50, 54, 56–7, 60–61
valuation 117, 319
issues in using stated preferences xiv–xx, 115–56
reference states and choice of measure xv, 157–70
valuation equivalence 158
value of permits 238, 239
value uncertainty xv, 171–89
variance–bias tradeoff 39
Velez, M.A. 74, 75, 320, 348, 360, 363–4
Vickrey, W. 435
Vickrey auctions 123, 142, 160, 180, 436
violations of emissions permits, aggregate 266–7, 268–9, 270–71, 276–8, 285–6
Viscusi, W. 158, 168
Volij, O. 411
voluntary contributions 320
Vossler, C.A. 219, 220–21
voting 117
prisoner’s dilemma as inter-group game xviii, 458–81
intra-group voting mechanisms 459–60, 462–3, 464–77
Walker, J. 320, 477
water managers xvii–xviii, 407–33
water storage projects 424
waterfowl hunter study 132–3, 158, 166–7
watershed
irrigation field experiment 324–6, 328–9, 330–32, 334–7, 340–42
management 321
Waugh, F.V. 3
Weber, M. 177, 178–9
West, K.D. 90, 92–3, 109
White, H. 89, 93, 110
Whitehead, J.C. 127
Wildschut, T. 461
Williams, K.C. 478
Willig, R. 134–5
willingness to accept (WTA) xv, 118, 131
consistency experiments and 145–8
reference state and choice of measure 163–7, 168
see also WTP–WTA disparity
willingness to pay (WTP) xv, 118, 131, 434–5
consistency experiments and 145–8
marginal (MWTP) 12, 15–16, 35–7, 45–6, 49–50
pivot mechanism vs provision point mechanism 437, 447–54, 455
reference state and choice of measure 163–7, 168
see also WTP–WTA disparity
withdrawals misreporting 391–5
Wong, W.-K. 162–3
Wooldridge, J.M. 109
WTP–WTA disparity evidence of 158–9
issues in using stated preferences xiv–xv, 116–17, 131–44
value and outcome uncertainty as explanations for xv, 171–89
Xepapadeas, A. 199, 200–1
Zeckhauser, R. 133
Zeiler, K. 143, 144, 161–2, 178
Zelmer, J. 411
Zerbe, R. 166
Zhao, J. 140–1