INTRODUCTION

Increasing global interconnectedness has generated new forms of human insecurity that demand the formulation of strategies that transcend national boundaries. This is one of the arguments contained in the influential United Nations Development Report of 1994 entitled *New Dimensions of Human Security* (see UNDP, 1994). In this report, the UN defined human security as ‘safety from the constant threats of hunger, disease, crime and repression’ and ‘protection from sudden and hurtful disruptions in the pattern of our daily lives – whether in our homes, in our jobs, in our communities or in our environment’ (ibid., p. 3). This definition of human security has become ‘central to several global initiatives, has been picked up by national governments and is reflected in the agendas and policy debates of regional intergovernmental organizations’ (UNDP, 2010, p. 17).

The link between globalization and human insecurity can be found in both rich and poor countries. The internationalization of production, for example, has reduced job security in many sectors of the national economies of the North. At the same time the globalization of Western values – perceived by many as a process of ‘Americanization’ – has increased ‘cultural insecurity’ in many societies of the South. The terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, added a new dimension to the relationship between globalization and human security. On that day, the distance between the quasi-medieval spaces within which Al Qaeda forces operated in Afghanistan and the post-modern spaces of New York disappeared amid the ghostly smoke of the destroyed Twin Towers of the World Trade Center. As Janice Gross Stein has pointed out, ‘the network of terror that perpetrated the attack is enabled by conditions unique to our times’ (Stein, 2001, p. 229).

More recently, the global financial crisis caused by the sub-prime housing problem and the collapse of several major financial institutions in the United States in September of 2008, revealed the interdependent nature of the global economy and its capacity to generate conditions of
human insecurity all over the world. By the end of 2008 the South Centre reported:

the credit freeze has severely hit developing countries through increasing risk premia and a severe cut in financing, even of short-term commercial lending; capital outflows from developing countries have generated a collapse of stock markets and exchange rates and a loss of reserves; and commodity prices have plunged and export orders are being cut worldwide. Even developing countries that were seen as relatively invulnerable to a recession in the industrial world are now feeling the strain. (South Centre, 29 October, 2008)

This chapter explores the phenomenon of globalization as a historical process that challenges the capacity of the state to generate conditions of human security. Moreover, it examines the theoretical rationale behind some of the most common global social policy strategies designed to contribute to the generation of human security in the world today. Finally, it advocates the need for academics and policy-makers interested in the promotion of global human security to avoid universal recommendations that do not take into consideration the historical specificity of the countries of the South.

The first section of this chapter reviews the formation of the democratic Western European state as an institutional arrangement designed to spatialize history and ‘to overcome contingency’ (see Luhmann, 1982, 1993; Taylor, 2003). The ‘universalization’ of this model will also be reviewed to provide a general characterization of the different levels of ‘stateness’ achieved by countries in the North and in the South. The second section analyses the differential impact of globalization on the states and societies of the North and the South. This analysis will be used in the third section to assess the framework of historical possibilities and limitations within which alternative global social policy strategies are being formulated and implemented to respond to the crisis of security affecting the world today.

PROCESSES OF STATE FORMATION AND SOCIAL POLICY: NORTH AND SOUTH

The North

The Great Crisis of the mid-1500s in Europe expanded the territorial scope of social life beyond the precarious boundaries of the ‘natural societies’ of the Middle Ages (Ortega y Gasset, 1946, p. 75). In these new circumstances, the construction of social order required the institutionalization of expectations (see Luhmann, 1990, pp. 21–79) in abstract space (rather
than in place), and the fostering of ‘relations between “absent” others, locationally distant from any given situation of face-to-face interaction’ (Giddens, 1990, pp.18–19). In turn, this required the centralization of power and the creation of a new foundation for authority. The historical answer to these requirements was the emergence and consolidation of monarchical absolutism (see Mann, 2003).

Monarchical absolutism recreated the territorial scope of social life by forming a centralized structure of political power that overran the political societies of the Middle Ages. The foundation of authority for this new structure of power was provided by the idea of sovereignty, which was best expressed by Hobbes in 1651 in *Leviathan*. The early modern idea of sovereignty involved a radical reconceptualization of medieval conceptions of territory, history and security, in that it created the foundation for the development of society’s capacity to generate ‘a strictly political history of chains of events’, with the capacity to replace ‘the archaic fusion of mythical and genealogical time’ that prevailed in the Middle Ages (Luhmann, 1982, p.333). In the creation of this new history, philosophy would gradually replace theology, and the ‘the omnipotent God’ would become ‘the omnipotent lawgiver’ (Schmitt, 1985, p.36). Moreover, with the emergence of the Great Leviathan, security would be not only politically created, but also planned and delivered by the state in a process guided by the doctrine of *raison d’état*, that is, by the subordination of public morality to state power (Koselleck, 1988, p.25).

The institutionalization of the modern state, then, was accompanied by the development of its capacity to regulate social relations within its territorial boundaries. In turn, this capacity made it possible for the state to regulate social relations across time. This is because continuous regulation of social relations across territorial space results over time in the institutionalization of ‘behavioural expectations’ (see Luhmann, 1990, pp.21–79). As such, the institutionalization of the modern state came to represent what Gross calls the ‘spatialization of time and experience’, which implies ‘the tendency to condense time relations – which are an essential ingredient for personal and social meaning– into space relations’ (Gross, 1981–82, p.59). Territoriality, from this perspective, should be seen as ‘a form of behaviour that uses a bounded space, a territory, as the instrument for securing a particular outcome’ (Taylor, 2003, p.101).

The role of the state as a synchronizer of social expectations and social experiences underwent significant change in the eighteenth century, when the Enlightenment introduced the idea of progress. An open future dissociated from the past represented a formidable challenge to society’s ability to achieve security and overcome contingency. This challenge was met by the ideas of popular sovereignty and representative democracy that
expressed a new faith in human beings’ ability to control their destiny. Democracy placed sovereignty not in the king or in the state, but in ‘the people’.

The democratic state responded to people’s needs and demands, not simply as the result of a passive reading of the people’s will, but as an active organizer of people’s aspirations and memories. Through its bureaucratic apparatus, the democratic state actively participated in the creation of ‘imagined communities’ (see Anderson, 1991) tied together by administrative and legal structures. These structures made the development of nationalistic values and identities possible.

The development of the administrative and regulatory capacity of the state required that the principle of sovereignty, as articulated by Hobbes in the seventeenth century, be redefined during the eighteenth century. These efforts were best illustrated by Jeremy Bentham’s concern for ‘the idea of rational rules as paramount standards of administrative behavior’ (Bahmueller, 1981, p. 186). The ultimate objective of these rules was to contribute to ‘the maximization of the Benthamite values of security, predictability, stability, and physical comfort’ (Long, 1977, p. 118).

The opportunities offered by the administrative and regulatory power of the sovereign state were fully realized with the emergence of civil society, that is, with the constitution of free associations that were not under the influence or control of the state. The emergence of these associations provided the state with an opportunity to use the organizational capacity achieved by society as an extension of its own regulatory power (see Rose, 1996; Holmer Nadesan, 2008). At the same time, the creation of ‘reproduction circuits’ that connected society with the state provided people with an institutional mechanism to ‘determine or inflect the course of state action’ (Taylor, 1990, p. 4; see also Giddens, 1984). This new relationship between the state and society created the conditions for the emergence and consolidation of citizenship rights.

Citizenship rights not only represented a challenge to the state, but also to national class structures. In this sense, the concept of class has a relative meaning vis-à-vis citizenship and, conversely, citizenship is a category that has an explanatory value that is intimately linked with that of class. Citizenship, T.H. Marshall points out, should be seen as ‘the architect of legitimate social inequality’ in class-divided societies (Marshall, 1983, pp. 48–9). From this perspective, both class and citizenship constitute evolving historical realities associated with the struggle over the distribution of power within sovereign political spaces. In England, according to Marshall’s gender-blind characterization of this struggle, citizenship rights evolved from civil rights in the eighteenth century, to political rights in the nineteenth century, to social rights in the twentieth century (see Marshall,
From this perspective, the welfare state can be seen as the product of the consolidation of social rights, and more generally, as the institutional consequence of roughly 250 years of evolution of citizenship rights. Further expansion of these rights, according to Marshall, would continue to challenge and reduce social inequality.

Marshall’s optimistic analysis has been shattered by the globalization of capital, the transnationalization of the power of the state and the difficulties that societies in the North confront today to condition public policy priorities. The conquest of risk and contingency, which constituted one of the central objectives of the struggle for social rights and the welfare state in the North, is being challenged by an attempt to legitimize the forms of insecurity created by the market, and by the presentation of ‘risk aversion’ as a dangerous ‘ideology’ (see Neal, 2000).

The South

In Europe, the modern democratic state represented an institutional product generated by history. This institutional product was transplanted as a normative model to the rest of the world through a combination of exporting and importing mechanisms that included imperialism, colonialism, the institutionalization of relations of political and economic dependency, and development strategies and programmes (see Badie, 2000). The imposition/adoption of the modern state as a normative model for the organization of the societies of the South facilitated the conformation of an international system of states. Through this system, states in the South became recipients of ‘a set of cognitive models defining the nature, purpose, resources, technologies, controls, and sovereignty of the proper nation state’ (Meyer, 1999, p. 123; see also Drori et al., 2006). These models include parliamentarism, bureaucracy, democracy, social policies and the welfare state. Many of the dysfunctional aspects of social life in Africa, Asia and Latin America are the result of the transfer of these models to societies that are the product of a historical dynamic that is fundamentally different from that of Europe. The legal principle of sovereignty that was formally attached to the states in the South by international law, for example, lacked the social and political significance it had for European societies.

Most states in the South never achieved the social regulatory capacity they required to spatialize history and to control social relations within their territorial boundaries. After almost two centuries of independent republican life in Latin America, the state power ‘fades off’ outside ‘the national urban centers’ (O’Donnell, 1993, p. 1358; see also Keck and Abers, 2006; Cárdenas, 2009). In countries like Colombia and Mexico, the
state is unable to displace drug cartels from the large swathes of territory that they control. In Africa, the regulatory weakness of the state is even more dramatic than in Latin America. The ‘juridical’ African state created by European colonial powers never developed the capacity to regulate social relations within its territorial boundaries. Most states categorized as ‘fragile’ by the international community are located in Sub-Saharan Africa (Cammack et al., 2006). In South Asia, the weakness of the state manifests itself more vividly in the persistence of ethnic and religious conflict. In India and Pakistan this situation exacerbates nationalistic feelings that can create conditions for the ultimate form of human insecurity: the nuclearization of conflict (Paul, 2010).

The low regulatory capacity of the state, the absence of effective state sovereignty, and the fragility – and in some cases virtual absence – of structures of citizenship rights with the capacity to domesticate the functions of the state, resulted in the restructuration and acculturation of the normative models of social policy and welfare institutions diffused by organizations like the International Labour Organization (ILO), the International Social Security Organization, and the Ibero-American Conference on Social Security (see Collier and Messick, 1975; Drori et al., 2006). This process of assimilation and reconstitution generated two main types of social policy and welfare systems: clientelistic and residual. Generally speaking, these two systems correspond to the levels of state regulatory capacity and societal organization achieved by the countries of the South. Clientelistic welfare systems in the South developed within corporatist structures of state–society relations. Social policies in corporatist regimes are mainly formulated and implemented in response to the power of elites and special interest groups rather than to broad social or class demands. Therefore, the coverage of social policies in these systems expresses the levels of power that different sectors of society have to ‘colonize’ the state apparatus. Malloy illustrates this situation when he explains the genesis of social policy coverage in the corporatist societies of Latin America:

The first and best coverage went to groups like civil servants and the military who controlled parts of the state apparatus itself; coverage of high quality next went to groups in strategic economic activities in export products such as railroads, docks, maritime, etc.; these were followed by groups in critical urban services such as banks, electricity, transport, etc; the last to receive coverage, and of a lower order, were manufacturing workers. . .the rural sector as well as the urban informal sector were excluded. (Malloy, 1993, p. 235)

Residual social policy and welfare systems emerged typically in the countries of the South where state power has been organized and exercised in a neo-patrimonial manner; that is, in the societies of the South that
never developed the legal, bureaucratic and political capacity required to institutionalize corporativist state–society relations (see Hartlyn, 1998; O’Neil, 2007). In neo-patrimonial countries, the power of the state is predominantly coercive and civil societies are rather weak or non-existent. Therefore, residual social policy and welfare systems are not generated by the constitutive force of citizenship rights. In fact, residual social policy and welfare systems can be seen as an alternative to citizenship. As in the case of the Elizabethan Poor Law in England, residual welfare and social policy systems are not designed to transform the structural conditions that generate poverty and insecurity; rather, they are designed ‘to preserve the existing one with the minimum of essential change’ (Marshall, 1965, p. 87). The Poor Law in England, Marshall points out, ‘treated the claims of the poor, not as an integral part of the rights of citizen, but as an alternative to them’ (ibid., p. 88).

In the neo-patrimonial regimes of Latin America – most Central American countries, for example – social policy functions as an alternative to citizenship. In these countries, social policies are designed to benefit segments of the population that suffer systematic forms of exclusion. The people in this category are citizens only in a formal manner. They are recognized as recipients of social policy by the same states that deny their rights and maintain their exclusion from effective political, economic and social participation. In Africa, the history of residual social policies goes back to colonial times. Akin Aina points out that social services were provided to African societies during the colonial period ‘to maintain law and order and a local low-level administrative cadre to exploit effectively the natural and other resources of the colonies and to create colonial markets for metropolitan export’ (Akin Aina, 1999, p. 76). For a short period of time after independence, African states expanded their capacity to provide social services in an effort to legitimize their power. However, by the end of the 1960s the African state was in crisis: ‘social services and social infrastructures either decayed from sheer neglect or, where they existed in rudimentary forms, were appropriated by local barons and misused for political patronage’ (ibid., p. 78). Social policy, in other words, became a component of the ‘politics of the belly’ whereby the state is used as a mechanism for the distribution of prebends and favours (Bayart, 2009).

Structural adjustment programmes, neo-liberal economic policies and targeted social spending severely reduced the regulatory capacity of the state. In Latin America, for example, all major international financial institutions worked to reduce the social functions of the state by promoting the privatization of health services and pensions. Privatization, as many studies point out, imposed a vision of social services ‘as commodities rather than fundamental human and social rights’ (Armada et al., 2001,
p. 753). In Africa, neo-liberal economic policies also reduced the social functions of the state. In South Africa, for example, these policies have limited the capacity of the national health system to respond to the AIDS epidemic that affects this country (Johnston, 2005). The weakening of the social role of the African state has also been linked to the brutal levels of ethnic violence and state coercion experienced by the populations of several Sub-Saharan African countries. As Adésina points out:

[I]n the absence of social policy-based engagement with the citizens, the coercive face of the state becomes the dominant (if not the only) area of interaction with citizens. . . From Sierra Leone to Rwanda, the fundamental questioning of the legitimacy of the state and the spilling over of difference into conflict, and conflict into genocide, occurred within this context of declining legitimacy of the state. (Adésina, 2007, p. 23)

Finally, in South and South-East Asia, neo-liberal economic policies frame and limit the social role of the state. The Asian regional associations, for example, ‘are economic in nature and there are major difficulties in extending their range to include a social agenda or dimension, except in terms of safety net provision in line with social liberalist orthodoxy’ (Yeates, 2003, p. 23).

GLOBALIZATION AND THE STATE: HUMAN INSECURITY NORTH AND SOUTH

Globalization constitutes a direct challenge to the preservation and expansion of human security in the North and in the South. In the North, the territorial and political spaces created by the modern state are undergoing radical transformations. Economic and political pressures against the welfare state, the increasing fluidity of labour markets, financial instability and the erosion of social rights, to name just a few of these pressures, have significantly reduced people’s capacity to control risk (see Mishra, 1999; Mittelman, 2010).

In the South, the pressures toward regional economic integration, the increasing power of transnational financial organizations and neo-liberal state reforms have reduced the chances for many developing countries to achieve the levels of state sovereignty and national identity that allowed societies in the North to shape their history. Furthermore, many of the fragile national territories of the South, especially in Africa, have been transformed in recent years into deinstitutionalized spaces in which life is ‘nasty, brutish and short’. The intensity and the nature of the challenge that globalization represents for human security at the national level vary
according to the different capacity that national states have to filter or adapt to external pressures without losing their domestic regulatory power and their capacity to respond to domestic needs and demands (see Yeates, 2001). In this sense, the notions of North and South are useful in that they represent categories for differentiating levels of institutional and regulatory capacity to create conditions of order and security at the national level.

Understanding the differential effect of globalization on the countries of the North and the South is essential to understand the different frameworks of historical limitations and possibilities within which social policy responses to the crisis of security created by globalization can be formulated. As Patricia Kennett points out:

Global processes are complex and contradictory. While opening up opportunities for some countries and people, others have been marginalized and excluded from the benefits of the information age. Each nation interacts in its own way with global, regional, national and local arenas. In the same way the nature of the welfare system and the form and content of social rights will vary. (Kennett, 2001, p. 145)

Unfortunately, the national differences that Kennett identifies in her analysis are not systematically considered by the bulk of the mounting literature dealing with globalization. Many academics in the North discuss global issues without taking into consideration the socio-political realities of the South. They show a propensity to assume the representation of ‘humanity’ without abandoning their own particular perspectives (see Bourdieu, 2000, pp.65–73). The perspective on globalization proposed herein emphasizes the differential effects of globalization as they are expressed in the diverse manifestations of the problem of security in different countries and regions around the world. In this sense, the crisis of security in the North appears as a consequence of the breakdown of the ‘symmetrical’ and ‘congruent’ relationship between state and society that resulted from the expansion of state power and the evolution of citizenship rights over the last 300 years (Held, 1991, p. 198; Aman, 2004).

The transnationalization of state power in advanced liberal democratic capitalist societies opened a gap between those who make policies and those who live with the effects of those policies (see Held, 1991). This gap has diminished the value of democracy in the North and its capacity to generate and reproduce security because people see themselves affected by decisions that they don’t make or control (see Luhmann, 1993; Sassen, 2007). The transnationalization of state power in the North creates tensions and contradictions between the liberal concept of the modern state – with its emphasis on domestic ‘responsiveness’ and
‘accountability’ – and the economic imperatives of the global market. The result is a crisis of authority arising from the state’s increasing inability to respond to society’s needs and demands (see Rosenau, 1992; Sassen, 2007). Therefore, the crisis of human security in the North is the result of a deficit of the democratic power of society to condition the functions and priorities of the state (see Kymlika, 1997). The solution to this crisis requires the democratization of the transnational power of the state. In other words, it requires the subordination of the functions and priorities of the transnational arms of the state to the needs and aspirations of ‘we the people’.

The crisis of human security created by globalization in the South, on the other hand, is the result of double bind: a deficit of state power, which manifests itself in the inability of the states in the South to influence the organization of the transnational space of power created by globalization; and a democratic deficit, which manifests itself in the inability of civil societies in the South to condition the power of the state and national policy-making processes. States in the South lack the capacity to influence the structures and processes that govern competition and cooperation within the transnational space of power created by global forces. As the United Nations Human Development Report *Globalization with a Human Face* points out, the structures and processes for global policy-making ‘are dominated by the large and rich countries, leaving poor countries and poor people with little influence and little voice, either for lack of membership or for lack of capacity for effective representation and participation’ (UNDP, 1999, p. 8; see also South Centre, 2008).

Furthermore, globalization encourages the isolation of important components of the policy-making process from the pressures of domestic politics, and frequently reduces the capacity of states to respond to society’s needs and demands, especially when they contradict the rationale of the global market. Therefore, it is ironic that the introduction of neo-liberal economic policies and state reform programmes coincided with the materialization of ‘transitions to democracy’ in the South. This double process of economic and political reform created profound tensions and contradictions between the principles of democracy and the principles that determine the formulation of neo-liberal policies.

Electoral democracy has survived and continues to dominate the political landscape of the South. Electoral democratic systems give people the capacity to choose the governments that administer states that are increasingly subordinated to the organizations that regulate the transnational space of power and conflict created by globalization. In these conditions, people can elect their governments but lack the capacity to effectively influence the policy-making process that affect their lives.
GLOBAL SOCIAL POLICY SOLUTIONS FOR THE RECONSTITUTION OF HUMAN SECURITY IN THE SOUTH

The deficit of state power and the democratic deficit confronted by the countries of the South need to be taken into consideration to assess the different global social policy strategies that have been formulated to confront the crisis of security faced by these countries. These strategies can be broadly classified as idealist and pragmatist. Idealist strategies typically propose the organization of a global governance system and a global civil society based on *common moral grounds* that can recreate, at the transnational level, the congruent relationship between state power and ‘we the people’ that generated democracy and security in the societies of the North. Pragmatist strategies, on the other hand, propose the formulation and implementation of transnational social policies to palliate some of the most urgent human needs experienced by the poor countries of the planet for the purpose of protecting the security of the North.

_Cosmopolitanism* and _liberal internationalism_ are the two main theoretical approaches used in the formulation of idealist global social policy strategies. Cosmopolitanism is ‘a moral frame of reference for specifying principles that can be universally shared; and, concomitantly, it rejects as unjust all those practices, rules and institutions anchored in principles not all could adopt’ (Held and McGrew, 2000, p. 401). Proponents of this position argue that the transnational space of power and conflict created by globalization offers opportunities for the realization of cosmopolitan ideals. This transnational space is perceived as a ‘new frontier’ that is virtually unconstrained by the historical structural conditions within which power has been unequally distributed among countries and regions of the world. ‘The challenge now’, Martin Albrow says, ‘is to escape the pessimism of the intellectual and to depict an age for all the people’ (1997, p. 105). ‘World society’, he adds, ‘the sum total of human interactions, is now of a shape where its history leaves it with uncertain and unclear organization and its theory has yet to escape the confines of the Modern Age’ (ibid., p. 113; see Unterhalter, 2008).

The idea of global citizenship and of a ‘world society’ that can function within the transnational space of power and conflict created by globalization tends to ignore the fact that the economic and political forces that control this transnational space are the same forces that reproduce the unequal power relations and the unequal distribution of ‘life chances’ that are responsible for the marginalization and the exclusion of the vast majority of the people from the South. The transnational space created by globalization has increased interaction and communication among transnational
actors and movements from the North and the South. However, these inter-
actions and exchanges of information, ‘do not promote the expansion of a
world that is intersubtively shared’ (Habermas, 1996, p. 292).

For a space to function as a political space, it has to be able to work
as a ‘reference framework’, that is, as an existential framework that is
created as a result of the collective experience of sharing a similar set of
life chances (Werlen, 1993, pp. 3–8). In the absence of this framework, the
intensification of ‘transnational politics’ does not necessarily translate
into the construction of a democratic transnational political space and a
‘global city’ (see Magnusson, 2000). The social actors from the North and
the South that participate in the transnational space of power and conflict
created by globalization, and the people that they represent, do not share
the same life chances. The statistical record could not be more revealing:

The richest 2 per cent of adult individuals own more than half of all global
wealth, with the richest 1 per cent alone accounting for 40 per cent of global
assets. The corresponding figures for the top 5 per cent and the top 10 per cent
are 71 per cent and 85 per cent, respectively. In contrast, the bottom half of
wealth holders together hold barely 1 per cent of global wealth. (Davies et al.,
2008, p. 402)

Moreover, the possibility for social actors from poor countries to exercise
power at the transnational level is limited by the gap that separates the
states from the South from the space of power and politics created by
globalization; and by the internal democratic gap that separates the state
and society in these countries. In these conditions, the cosmopolitan vision
of the world is beyond the reach of the weak and the poor. Proponents of
cosmopolitanism recognize many of these challenges. Nevertheless, they
continue to believe that globalization has created ‘cosmopolitan anchors
to the world’ (Held, 2006, p. 310). They argue that ‘the stakes are very
high, but so too are the potential gains for human security and develop-
ment if the aspirations for cosmopolitan governance and social justice can
be realised’ (ibid., p. 311).

The liberal internationalist position is a more instrumental version of
the idealist position. It advocates the ‘globalization of ethics’ through the
incremental democratization of the structures and processes that operate
within the transnational space of power and politics created by globaliza-
tion (see McGrew, 2000). The main UN global social policy response to the
crisis of security generated by globalization is rooted in this position. The
UN has identified key ‘global public goods’ as political and ethical imper-
avitives that can guide the formulation of economic and social policy (see
Artigas, 2001; UN, 2001). These public goods include equity and access to
key basic social services that should be adopted as ‘universal rights’ (UN,
The construction of a global consensus for the integration of social and economic policy, according to the United Nations, requires, ‘inclusive consultations that involve government ministries and other social and economic partners, such as trade unions, employers and other civil society organizations. . . Open, transparent consultations and dialogues are important for consensus building and bridging communications gaps’ (ibid., p. 13). The institutionalization of universal rights, including the right to key social services, is highly desirable from an ethical point of view. Unfortunately, this approach is based on a voluntaristic view of history and social change that obscures the structural conditions that reproduce social inequality across the world.

Voluntarism denotes any argument or explanation ‘that stresses the place of choice, decision, purpose, and norms in human action’ (Cashmore and Mullan, 1983, p. xii). Voluntaristic arguments for the formulation of global social policies ignore the fact that the democratization and moralization of state power and of public policy-making have always been the result of political struggle for power. Social policies and welfare state institutions in the North – as previously indicated – were the result of the struggle between the elites who determined the nature and organization of society and the groups excluded from the decision-making process that affected their lives. The struggle was about the definition of citizenship rights, the constitution of the ‘social contract’, and the political mechanisms to change it. As a result of this struggle, social policies and the welfare state emerged in the North as an institutionalized ‘trade-off’ between social equality and economic efficiency (see Esping Andersen, 1994). From this perspective, the integration of social and economic policy within a global ethical framework, as a strategy designed to reduce the levels of human insecurity created by globalization, can only be the result of political action against the national and the transnational power structures within which neo-liberal economic policies are designed and enforced at the national and global levels. This kind of political action must overcome the democratic deficit created by the gap that separates states and societies in the South; the tendency for globalization to intensify this gap; and the limited capacity that states in the South have to condition the transnational space of power and conflict created by globalization.

**Palliative Transnational Social Policy: The Pragmatic Argument**

Pragmatic transnational social policies are based on self-interest. They are predominantly designed to placate the needs of the people from the South in order to protect human security in the North. Expediency determines
the nature of pragmatic transnational social policies (see Rorty, 1995, p. 4). Therefore, they can only generate false forms of security in the South because they are dependent on the changing will, interest and convenience of the states and governments of the North. The report *A Human Security Doctrine for Europe* (The Study Group, 2004) is an example of the pragmatic approach to global social policy. This doctrine recognizes that ‘in the new global context, the European Union’s security policy should be built on human security and not only on state security’. Human security, ‘means individual freedom from basic insecurities’ (ibid., p.8). From this perspective, *A Human Security Doctrine for Europe* creates conditions for the formulation of global social policies designed to reduce human insecurity in the South.

The report identifies three reasons why the European Union should adopt a human security approach. The first reason, the report says, ‘is based on morality. It has to do with our common humanity. Human beings have a right to live with dignity and security, and a concomitant obligation to help each other when that security is threatened’ (ibid.). The second reason identified by the report is legal: ‘If human security is considered as a narrower category of protection of human rights, as proposed above, then it is now generally accepted that other states, and international institutions such as the EU, have not only a right, but also a legal obligation to concern themselves with human security worldwide’ (ibid., p.9). It is the third reason identified by the report that permeates the entire rationale, objectives and recommendations of *A Human Security Doctrine for Europe*. This third reason is conceptualized by the report as ‘enlightened self-interest’:

The whole point of a human security approach is that Europeans cannot be secure while others in the world live in severe insecurity. In failing states and conflict areas, the criminal economy expands and gets exported: the drug trade, human trafficking and the easy availability of small arms, and even the brutalisation of society are not contained within the conflict zone but felt beyond it, including in Europe. (Ibid.)

European self-interest is the principle within which moral and humanitarian considerations are framed. ‘European security policy’, the *Doctrine* states, ‘should be grounded in pragmatism’. This principle determines the factors identified by the report as operational guidelines to promote human security (ibid., pp. 11–12; see also Vankovska, 2007; Huish, 2008). In this sense, the idea of human security is used in *A Human Security Doctrine for Europe* to justify the creation of a ‘technology of government’ designed to protect the security of the North (see Duffield, 2005).
CONCLUSIONS AND A PROPOSAL FOR A NEW APPROACH TO HUMAN SECURITY

The task of making the reality of global human security explicit is incredibly challenging. It requires intellectuals to transcend the linear perspective – typically extrapolated from the North – within which the future of the planet is currently analysed. It forces us to embrace theoretically the disjointed, contradictory, and yet unified-in-destiny world that Picasso sensed before anyone else. Carl Einstein pointed out that the ‘wondrous harmonies’ in Picasso’s work were the result of ‘contrasting elements’ and that ‘truth’ in his paintings lay ‘in the identity which underlies the tension between opposites’ (Einstein, 1988, pp. 190–91). The ‘truth’ of globalization – its risks and opportunities – can only be established by creating a vision of humanity that is based on a theoretical recognition of the structural heterogeneity of the human condition, as well as of the tensions and contradictions generated by the increasing interpenetration between North and South in the times of global interpenetration that we live today.

From this perspective, the articulation of global strategies to confront the problems of human security in the South must be based on the recognition that there are no universal formulas to confront the ‘threats of hunger, disease, crime and repression’ that affect millions of people in the world today. Moreover, those strategies must recognize that no global initiative can substitute for the need for the countries of the South to develop their own domestic strategies and mechanisms to democratize relations between society and the state to promote real development, human dignity and security for their people. This means that global strategies to promote human security must recognize the right of every society to identify and implement the model of social organization that better responds to the fundamental needs and aspirations of their people. This is not a call for a relativistic approach to human security where every means to deal with hunger and poverty must be accepted as legitimate. It is a call to recognize the limits of pragmatism and global idealism and of the need to take into consideration the historical specificities and the social heterogeneity of the South.

NOTE

1. ‘Reproduction circuits’ are ‘cycles of routinized activities and consequences which are reproduced across time and space and between institutionalized locales’ (Cohen, 1989, p. 124).
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